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## Article – I

# Livelihood-related migratory practices of refugee families: A challenge to the integration of refugee children into Mozambique

Dério Chirindza<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

*Integration of refugees into host countries' National Education System (NES) is becoming increasingly popular. According to recent scholarly research, efforts to integrate refugees into the NES have proven tough. Existing research on refugee children from both the global south and rich nations has identified a variety of educational barriers for refugee children. Recurrent livelihood-related movement habits are one of these barriers. Urban refugee families migrate often within and outside of the city in quest of better living conditions, disrupting their children's integration into public schools. This study uses qualitative methods and a case study research design to focus on urban refugee children in Maputo and Nampula. Integration of refugee children into host countries' NES is crucial because it has the potential to improve their academic or school continuity, stability, access to high-quality education, local integration, and social development.*

**Keywords:** Children, education, livelihoods, migration, refugees.

## 1. Introduction

Mozambique is a refugee-hosting country and party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and it is committed to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and Global Compact on Refugees (UNHCR 2010, 1; General Assembly 2016; UNHCR 2019c, 2) and other instruments protecting the rights of refugees, including the education of refugee children. The country's commitment to these instruments and its national implementation has some shortfalls that can challenge the education of these children (UNHCR 2010; Antoniak 2012; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018).

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The comments of HE Dr Eduardo Bacião Koloma, Deputy Minister for MINEC (2006, 3) that Mozambique integrates refugees into national schools across the country indicated that there is an increasing interest in understanding and dealing with this issue in Mozambique. Also, the UNHCR Mozambique (2020) has recently expressed a strong interest in understanding and supporting the education of refugees.

UNHCR Mozambique (2020) is currently hiring an Education Consultant<sup>2</sup> to examine “the learning, cultural and structural barriers for the successful school retention and completion of [...] and quality learning in primary and secondary education as well as, particularly for refugee girls”. In line with this activity, UNHCR Mozambique (2020) has asserted that “Mozambique serves as a positive role model on the inclusion of refugees into national systems, including NES at all levels”.

However, this organisation (UNHCR Mozambique 2020) has also found that poverty and linguistic obstacles in the country are factors that prevent refugees, asylum seekers, and host communities from completing primary education. The disruption of refugee education can also arise from migratory practices of refugees as influenced by the pursuance of livelihood practices or the goal of resettlement (Kobia and Cranfield, 2009, 4; Dryden-Peterson 2015, 8; Mendenhall, Russell and Buckner 2017, 12; Erwin, Sewall, Tippens, Nyaoro and Miamidian 2019, 5).

This study looks at the influence of the livelihood-related migratory practices of refugee families on the integration of refugee children into the NES of host countries. The existing scholarly research (Kobia and Cranfield 2009, 4; Mendenhall et al. 2017, 12; Erwin et al., 2019, 5) has shown that, because of the high cost of living in urban settings, refugees constantly “move around to find more sustainable living arrangements” (Mendenhall et al. 2017, 12). However, very little research (Dryden-Peterson 2015, 8) has examined the context of these practices and their impact on the integration of urban refugee children into the NES.

This is critical given the possible good impact of refugee integration on urban refugee children. Efforts at integrating refugees into the NES lie on several rationales: pragmatism and access (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019); cost-efficiency and sustainability (Culbertson and Constant, 2015, 56; Muchabaiwa, Mutambirwa, Tsokalida, and Abuhai 2019, 5), quality, social cohesion and the future labour market, (Culbertson and

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<sup>2</sup> “This consultancy is expected strengthen the capacity of UNHCR's country team to engage with education and government partners both at national, provincial and district level to advocate for refugee enrolment in national schools and redefine its approach toward education activities, in line with the GCR [Global Compact on Refugees] commitment to strengthening national systems for the benefit of all learners” (UNHCR Mozambique 2020, emphasis added).

Constant 2015, 56; Muchabaiwa et al. 2019, 5), local integration (Cerna 2019, 8; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 15); Preparation for resettlement (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 18); return (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 27).

Integration into the NES appears to be the pragmatic option for refugees living in exile in the long term and inhabiting urban areas where there might not be separate schools or other affordable schools for them. In this case, integrating refugees into national schools helps improve the access of refugees to school and ensures their continuity with studies (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019).

Examples of refugees inhabiting countries without refugee camps include Congolese refugees living in South Africa and Sudanese refugees residing in Egypt (Schockaert 2020). These two countries lack refugee camps and these refugee populations have lived in these countries for longer periods (Lewis 2009). Thus, integration into school is the most feasible option for them to access schools.

Given the limited possibility refugees have to return to their homes or resettle elsewhere (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 15), integration into the NES is the most feasible option for them. Integration can enforce social cohesion (Cerna 2019, 8; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 15). Integration can help refugees develop a sense of impartiality, equality and ownership of the educational opportunities in the host country (Culbertson and Constant 2015, 56; Dyden-Peterson et al. 2018; Cerna 2019, 8). Learning together may support the development of positive contacts among refugees and national peers, and so counter acts of xenophobia, bullying and stigma or any type of tensions between nationals and refugees in neighbourhoods and schools (UNHCR 2011a, 4; Dyden-Peterson et al. 2018; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 15; Cerna 2019, 8).

The integration of refugees into the NES of the host country can pave the way for the economic integration of refugees more widely. The ability and skills refugees learn at school at a basic level may extend beyond the goals of learning to read, write and count, hence facilitating their successful participation in the labour market in the host country when they graduate (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 20). Sharing the same schools may improve the recognition of the academic levels of refugees in the host country. From this gain, refugees may pursue post-primary education and transit to work more easily (Culbertson and Constant 2015, 56-61; Cerna 2019, 8).

Moreover, integration efforts into the NES may help refugees benefit from existing national education structures and services (UNHCR 2012, 8; UNHCR 2015a, 3; Culbertson and Constant 2015, 56; Muchabaiwa et al. 2019, 5). Also, it has been agreed that - in theory - this policy may offer high-quality education to refugee children by helping these children learn in accountable schools properly monitored and supervised by the Ministries of Education of the host country; giving children instruction from

qualified or trained teachers in schools; and enabling access to curricular materials and recognised examinations and certifications (UNHCR 2012, 8; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 15). Access to these services, recognised examinations and certifications also enhances the sustainability of refugees' education since it allows them to pursue further studies in the receiving country (Nicolai et al. 2017, 8; UNHCR 2015a, 3).

In case refugees return to their countries of origin or resettle, the skills they acquired through integration into the NES of the host country may enable their political participation in their country of origin when they return or facilitate a smooth integration into the third country (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 27).

These rationales have been at the centre of UNHCR and other actors' efforts to integrate refugees into their host countries' economies. Through the UNHCR Education Strategy, the UNHCR has pledged to give technical assistance to host countries, involve all stakeholders, including the host government, in education provision, and promote the establishment of multi-year education initiatives. So, integrating refugees into host nations' NES has become a top priority in the international system. Therefore, it is critical to discuss this problem in light of the policy and academic setting. The findings of this study could help Mozambican policymakers better understand and approach refugee education. As a result, the fundamental purpose of this study is to fill the academic and policy deficit in this field, as well as to provide empirical and analytical expertise on the issue.

This study drew on qualitative research methodology and a case study design. The case under study consists of urban refugee children aged between 5 to 12 years old - with exception of one refugee child age 13, one refugee child aged 15, and one refugee child aged 17 years old - living in Maputo and Nampula. This study selected the refugee population from the Congo (DRC), Mozambique has hosted a significant refugee population from this country.

Data collection consisted of participant observation of schools attended by refugee children and neighbourhoods of refugee families. Data was also collected through open-ended and face-to-face interviews of 86 research participants. The study participants included: refugee children and their parents; urban refugee community leaders in Maputo and Nampula; individuals of Congolese-heritage; members of refugee-based organisations in Maputo and Nampula - the Refugee Student Association of Mozambique (AEREMO) and the Episcopal Commission for Migrants, Refugees and Displaced Persons (CEMIRDE); an officer of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Mozambique; the Head of Protection Officer/Coordinator of Social Protection Department. Apart from these participants, the study also engaged school teachers (n = 8) in Nampula through Focal Group

Discussion (FGD). To further enhance privacy, the enquirer used pseudonyms<sup>3</sup> and codes in the section of the analysis, among other strategies.

This data was analysed using multiple methods and tools, such as content analysis, thematic analysis, the Model of Inclusion in refugee education and critical review of the data. The model of inclusion and the findings from the field contributed to framing the themes representing refugee child experiences.

There are five sections to this study. The first section is the introduction, which establishes the setting as well as the study's main components: the objectives, research technique, and structure. This is followed by the Model of Inclusion in Refugee Education, an analytical framework for examining refugee educational experiences. The research findings come next. This section summarises the findings of the fieldwork done with refugee families (including refugee children) and other stakeholders in the provinces of Maputo and Nampula, as well as additional stakeholders listed in the introduction. The issue of migration and livelihoods is the focus of this section. Refugee child experiences in this part are shared, in part, in the form of personal case stories, as a key focus of the study is refugee child and parent perspectives, which are more effectively told in narrative form. All refugee names used in this part are pseudonyms. The fourth section discusses how the study's research findings support, limit, or provide new insights into the debate over refugee integration into the NES. The conclusion is the paper's fifth and final section. This section discusses the paper's main points and suggests areas for future investigation.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

The Model of Inclusion in refugee education was developed by Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Michelle J. Bellino and other scholars (Dryden-Peterson, et al. 2018, 1). This Model systematises the key areas relevant to understanding the process of integration of refugee children, including structural and relational integration (Dryden-Peterson et al., 2018).

Structural integration involves the ability of refugees to “access services and institutions”. Precisely, this involves mainstreaming refugees into the national schools, teaching them alongside national learners, and using the curriculum of the host country and the national language of instruction (Heart 2016, 41; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018, 10). Structural integration also carries other names, such as harmonisation, functional integration or mainstreaming of refugees into national schools (UNHCR 2015a, 2;

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<sup>3</sup>The Head of Protection Officer/Coordinator of Social Protection Department and the officer of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Mozambique opted to be identified by their proper names.

Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018,10). Chapter 3 (Analytical Framework) provides more details of structural integration as conceived by Dryden-Peterson et al. (2018, 10).

Relational integration is a socio-cultural process aimed at transforming and developing the identities of refugees necessary for their successful inclusion into the NES of the host country (Harrell-Bond 1999, 3; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018).

The term 'integration' in this study reflects the general outcome of both structural and relation integration. The terms 'structural' and relational integration' are important to use, as they may express the lived outcomes or the lived experiences of these policies, and the feelings and state of refugees as a result of the intervention under this policy. Thus, this study examines the extent to which the policy of Integration of refugees into the NES, fosters actual integration, with a lower case "i" (structural, plus relational), of refugees into the NES of Mozambique. Also, fundamental to understand in this study is that the term 'National Education System' (NES) comprises national schools, primarily, and all the related arrangements or actors, such as students, teachers, content and so on (Frick 2020). This study places much focus on schools, without ignoring education laws and other aspects that comprise the NES.

This paper looks at livelihood-related migratory practices of refugee families and how these practices influence the educational experiences of refugee children in Mozambican schools. This framework will help to define the research's argument and determine if these students are successfully integrating into the Mozambican educational system. Second, this approach will be beneficial in capturing essential components of stakeholders' opinions of effective integration.

### **3. Research Findings**

#### ***3.1 Migration and livelihoods***

The economic conditions of some families have meant that they are not able to stay stationary in one location inside and outside the country, and so their children are not able to have a consistent education. For instance, two refugee parents in Nampula commented that they are still based in the Maratane refugee camp, despite living in the city: "Until now I'm living in Maratane, [I] usually go there and stay" (RP15, Interview 23 April 2019). Another parent shared that, "Nowadays I have nothing. Totally nothing, I'm just as I am. I am living with the food I receive in the Maratane. If I did not receive it in the Maratane, I would not be able to handle the life of the city" (RP13, Interview 06 April 2019).

These two examples show that some refugees living in the city of Nampula are still based in the camp and, whenever necessary, they move with their families. Furthermore, these extracts highlight the difficulty refugees face to sustain their lives in the city, forcing

migration to improve the condition of their lives. “A refugee is that one who has no conditions; it is not the one who has money, it is the one who leaves the camp looking for better living conditions,” noted a member of AEREMO in Nampula (The Nampula AEREMO Member 02, Interview 23 April 2019).

These comments were echoed by the other three members of AEREMO in Nampula, a Congolese Heritage Secondary-School teacher (CHSST 02, Interview 03 April 2019); one refugee parent based in Nampula (RP13, Interview 06 April 2019); two refugee parents based in Maputo (RC01, Interview 01 October 2018 and RP06, Interview 30 January 2019) and the Head of Protection in the National Institute for Refugee Support (INAR), Mr Ivo Boaventura (Boaventura, Interview 16 January 2019). This suggests that refugees do not go to the city because they are already self-reliant, but because they want to pursue better living conditions there and become self-reliant.

One thing to note in these comments is that they relate livelihoods with refugee education and voluntary migration of refugees. They illustrate the impact livelihood concerns might have on the structural integration of refugee children into the NES of Mozambique by influencing their families to constantly move from one to another site. Indeed, one school teacher in Nampula reported that some of her refugee learners missed classes because their parents were constantly moving from Nampula city to Maratane refugee camp:

*“They just want to know about business and they move around a lot. Sometimes they are in a maratane, or Pemba; they are not concerned with the education of their children [...]. Sometimes refugee children say that their parents went to pick up tomatoes or buy bran for chicken. These parents do not show up at school when their teacher calls them” (ST13, Interview 20 May 2019).*

Similarly, another school teacher in Nampula also said:

*“Here in my class I have a [refugee student]. He doesn't show up, I asked the parents, the parents don't show up. Besides asking, I already sent those neighbour kids to inform the father to come, but they said that the father of my refugee student told them that he has no time because he went to Maratane to pick up tomatoes, because he is raising chicken. It is a confusion day by day” (ST12, Interview 20 May 2019).*

This comment suggests that the continuity of education is sometimes affected by internal movements from the city of Nampula to Maratane, but the reference to Pemba, another city of Mozambique, by the ST13 (Interview 20 May 2019) suggests that such internal movements of refugees are not limited to Maratane and Nampula, but also occur across other places or Mozambican cities. This is echoed in the comment below:

*“Then he [a refugee [parent]] goes to Nampula to do business or Maputo or even Inhambane, so that also makes it difficult for children to learn. If there is a good production of tomatoes in Chimoio, he goes to Chimoio, he does not think about the consequences of the child. He just thinks about his benefit. The child is dependent like any instrument (ST12, Interview 20 May 2019).*

So, internal movements of refugee parents occur in multiple places and disrupt the education of their children with the pursuit of livelihoods coming at the expense of their children’s education. Moreover, sometimes these parents do not take the documentation of their children when they travel, which causes additional difficulties:

*“When you call the refugee child's parents, they don't show up. Last year I had a boy [...] from Congo. He missed school a lot, he didn't show up [classes], he didn't write and I asked the guardian many times and he never showed up at school. [The refugee father] showed up at the end of the year when his son failed. At the end of the year, in grade 5, we asked for certification of attainment for grade 3 and grade 4. When I asked for these certifications, it was not possible for him to give me, because he studied grade 3 in Chimoio. The father left Chimoio, then went to live in Maputo, then he left Maputo and came to Nampula and when they leave there, sometimes they don't take that documentation” (ST12, Interview 20 May 2019).*

Concerning external movements, in Nampula, three school teachers also reported experiences of refugee families who were constantly moving from one place to another, inside and outside Mozambique. One school teacher said, “Refugee children do not stay permanently due to their parents' movements. They are in constant displacement within and outside Mozambique. But when they return, the school receives them as *assistantes* [a Portuguese term to express a non-certified student]<sup>4</sup>” (SP03, Interview 17 May 2019). This view suggests that these movements have hampered the access/continuity of learning of refugee children. Another school teacher in Nampula reported that she had to encourage a refugee family not to travel abroad and wait until their children could finish the year:

*“Four years ago, I witnessed a child's problem, which I taught in the 5th grade, the parents were about to tell her to stop studying until October because they had to travel, but because I knew that the girl was smart and couldn't take it [the certificate] without waiting for the end of the year, I [...] I went to her house, the girl cried, ‘teacher, I, I’, so I said ‘let's go home together’, with the girl, I asked and talked to the parents, I said we are in the month of October, next month, they have*

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<sup>4</sup> A student under this condition means that he/she attends classes but does not get a degree. Still, the student takes classes normally as others and gets access to the same teacher, textbooks and all the available learning material in school and in the classroom.

*exams, wait for the girl to finish, because the scores that the girl got hurt me a lot, the parents accepted, waited, before the exam they knew that she waived, we gave them and they traveled and ended up returning, soon she joined grade 6 because she already had documentation” (ST10, Interview 15 May 2019).*

This view mirrors the comment of another school teacher in Nampula:

*“They are children who study here today; it is normal to study in Nampula, tomorrow they will go to Maputo; the other day they go to America, or the other side, maybe, Tanzania. So, the student achievement is not favourable. But there are Congolese parents, who remain in Mozambique for a long time, but it is very rare” (ST13, Interview 20 May 2019).*

This comment indicates that not all refugees constantly move from one place to another and that such cases are rare. Indeed, almost all research participants reported that refugee children often complete their primary education cycle in Mozambique without interruption. Nonetheless, even a minority of cases is important as it highlights how parent actions shape child education and emphasises the unevenness of educational experiences of refugee children. It also underlines the fact that public schools and the NES are not equipped to deal with pupil mobility.

#### **4. Discussion**

A key overarching finding of this study is that refugee families engage in recurrent livelihood-related migration practices. The existing scholarly research (Kobia and Cranfield 2009, 4; Mendenhall et al. 2017, 12; Erwin et al. 2019, 5) has shown that, because of the high cost of living in urban settings, refugees constantly “move around to find more sustainable living arrangements” (Mendenhall et al. 2017, 12). This study explains the linkage between these constant movements and the integration of refugee children. Also, this study shows that constant livelihood-related migration threatens to disrupt access to refugee education.

These experiences shed light on the impact of the socio-economic challenges of refugee families vis-à-vis their migratory movements and the education of refugee children. The finding on the barriers to refugee education as related to the migration to the camp in pursuance of livelihoods explains the relationship between camp, city, the education of refugee children and livelihood. They emphasise that the refugee camp becomes a backup for refugee parents when the living conditions in the city are hard.

At the same time, while shielding refugee families economically and socially, this movement disrupts the education of refugee children. This study’s finding adds to the existing literature on refugee affairs (Feldman 2005, 7) that the city-camp movement is prejudicial to the integration of refugee children. These findings highlight the need to

look at urban refugees beyond the legal and bureaucratic understanding that emphasises self-reliance and their static presence in cities (UNHCR Mozambique 2014; Mendenhall, et al. 2017, 11; Brown, Mackie, Dickenson, and Gebre-Egziabher 2018, 10).

Moreover, in practice, the status of 'urban' and camp-based refugees is dynamic and moves forward and backwards between these two settings, thus challenging the education of refugee children. This article not only emphasises the changing character of refugee status, but it also backs up prior studies (Boze 2015; Dryden-Peterson 2015, 8) that have revealed the same.

That way, scholars, policy actors and readers need to capture these complex realities in order to better understand and ensure the effective integration of refugee children into schools. So, as Erwin et al. (2019, 2) argue, in addressing the integration of urban refugee children into schools, research and programing should not ignore family and household.

The findings of this study have also shown that, in some cases, these types of movements are adding an extra layer of disruption to education experiences (Dryden-Peterson 2015; Bengtsson and Dyer 2017, 35). This means that the findings presented in this section of this study support key debates within the wider current academic and policy literature on refugee education.

Relatedly, the findings of this study also correlate with other studies that show that structural integration can be limited by factors such as i) linguistic barriers (Horn et al. 2013, 9; Boze 2015, 18; Global Refugee Forum Education Co-Sponsorship Alliance 2019, 8; Pedró et al. 2019, 11); ii) limited school capacities (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018); iii) instruction from untrained teachers on the needs of refugee children (Bengtsson and Dyer 2017, 10; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018, 12) and iv) indirect costs of education (Grossman et al. 2013, 25; Horn et al. 2013, 9, Boze, 2015, 18; Mendenhall et al. 2015, 95).

The findings of this study give more insights (Meda 2013, 190; Muoka 2015, 13; Mendenhall et al. 2015, 121) into the factors that contribute and how they contribute to the adaption of refugees to the curriculum of the host country, or their relational integration. This study's findings also provide evidence to support the claim of Walton et al. (2020, 2) that "A refugee identity intersects with other identities, and some refugee children and young people experience multiple and intersecting axes of oppression as a result of structural inequalities." Therefore, policy initiates interventions to address their vulnerabilities and the need to be sensitive to these factors (Lee and Piper, 2013; Hashem 2017; Bešić et al. 2020).

Secondly, this study adds to the growing body of literature on urban refugee education in post-conflict and protracted contexts, therefore filling the existing gap in the extant literature that has focused on the education of refugee children in settlement structures

and camp-based settings in the context of emergencies (Lubbers 2001, iii; Dryden-Peterson 2003, 1; Omata 2004, 8; Wetimane 2012, 72; Consolo 2015; Deane 2016; Bailey 2016, 8; Richardson et al. 2018, 12; Erwin et al. 2019, 2).

Thirdly, this study adds further empirical and scientific data to the existing literature on the education of refugee children that were much descriptive and documented for policy or programme orientation of goals (Burde et al. 2015; Deane, 2016; Bengtsson and Dyer 2017, 42; Richardson et al. 2018, 12; Crul et al. 2017).

This finding advances the model of inclusion in refugee education (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018) that speaks of the barriers to refugee education, yet it is silent about this detail of livelihood-related migration practices. This framework mention two access barriers: physical and identity-based. “Physical barriers encompass resources and capacity, such as limitations in the number of school buildings or teachers and include the unequal distribution of these resources geographically”. Identity-based barriers encompass differential access to school and discrimination as a result of ethnicity, gender, language, religion, sexuality, or status as a non-citizen or refugee” (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018, 11).

This explanation reveals that physical barriers are based on school constraints. Similarly, the above description of refugee experiences shows that livelihood-related migration practices are also physical barriers, but they are home-based barriers. Thus, these kinds of migration are not mentioned both in physical and identity-based barriers. Therefore, they also challenge the ability of refugee children to access education.

Finally, the few existing studies on ‘low-income countries’ have been concentrated on large cities (UNHCR 2016a; Dryden-Peterson 2016b, 478; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2019, 7) or some of the world’s largest or protracted crises, or simply the most current (Onuoha 2006; Boze 2015, 18; Culbertson and Constant, 2015; Haybano 2016; UNHCR, 2016a; Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018). So, in focusing on urban areas of Mozambique, this study extends the debate on the integration of refugee children into the NES of host countries in non-Western case studies, and non-UNHCR “priority” case studies (like Uganda).

These findings extend beyond the literature on refugee education. By explaining the link between refugee education and the livelihood of refugees in urban areas, they add new information to the literature on urban refugees’ livelihoods (Jacobsen 2004; Jacobsen 2005; Jacobsen 2006).

As it relates to Mozambique, this study also complemented the existing (HE Dr Eduardo Bacião Koloma, Deputy Minister for MINEC 2006; Chongo 2017, 3) literature on refugee education that commented on the mainstreaming of urban refugee children in Mozambican schools, but did not explain the factors, processes and mechanisms

underpinning such integration. This study contributes to filling the gap in the understanding of “the ways in which the approach of inclusion of refugees in NES is enacted at national levels and experienced by teachers and students in schools” (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2018, 9).

In particular, it contributed to filling the gap in the literature on refugee education presented by UNHCR (2011b, 42) and SPII and OSISA (2012, 50). As stated in the introduction, the UNHCR (2011b, 42) argued that “Children from the urban areas are not assisted by UNHCR and thus are unable to attend school [...]” Similarly, SPII and OSISA (2012, 50) commented, “There is no mention of access to education for refugee children and students who are not living in camps, which is an area for further research.”

This study provides further details, or empirical evidence, to support the existing research (Dryden-Peterson 2015, 8; Bengtsson and Dyer 2017, 35) on how parents behave and refugee children themselves behave as influenced by these aspirations and opportunities. Besides, it emphasises that in the case of Mozambique where there are no separated schools and refugee children are mainstreamed in the Mozambican schools, refugee children fail to relationally integrate into the NES of Mozambique.

Another aspect that this study emphasises is that urban refugee children are not a homogeneous group. Not all refugee children experience the integration into the NES of Mozambique in the same way. Their experiences vary greatly according to their urban settings, place of birth, factors inside and outside of the home (e.g. parents and home life) as well as inside the classroom and so on. This study details the experiences specific to refugees in the context of Mozambique, i.e. the unevenness of refugee child integration experienced across urban settings.

## **Conclusion**

This study examined the impact of livelihood-related-migratory practices of refugee families, especially refugee parents, on the integration of their children into the NES. First, the study revealed that urban refugee families engage in these behaviours, migrating from Maratane camp to Nampula or elsewhere in and beyond Mozambique in quest of better economic opportunities. Second, the study discovered that these behaviours limit refugee children's educational continuity. As a result, these youngsters are unable to structurally integrate into Mozambique's public schools. Consequently, the likelihood of refugee children completing their degrees is limited.

This barrier has been observed in past studies looking at various African situations, and this empirical evidence backs up previous research. This study adds to our understanding of the relationship between refugee livelihoods, migratory behaviours, and refugee children's integration into the Mozambican national education system, and it calls for greater research into the interplay between the two.

In addition, whether evaluating or addressing refugee education, the approach to refugee education in Mozambique should take into consideration the changing status of urban and camp-based refugees.

Finally, further study across time, gender, refugee groups, and different urban contexts is needed to better understand the integration of urban refugee children into Mozambique's NES as it pertains to the livelihood-related migration practices of refugee families.

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## India's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia before Prime Minister Narendra Modi

Quach Thi Hue<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

*Historically, Southeast Asia has been the place to come for many countries around the world such as China, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, the UK, France, and the US... But unlike those countries, India has come to Southeast Asia by the way of peace, trade, and religion and it is the country with the oldest relationship with this region. India has had flourishing economic and cultural ties with Southeast Asian countries since pre-colonial times. Although interrupted during the colonial era, the struggles for freedom in India and many Southeast Asian countries led to a sharing of common problems. The spread of the two largest religions, Buddhism and Hinduism, from India through Asia and the adoption of these religions in Southeast Asia laid the groundwork for connections between India and the region. Throughout history, changes in the international and regional context as well as within Southeast Asia and India itself, India's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia before Prime Minister Narendra Modi (before 2014) has constantly been adjusted to suit the new situation. If New Delhi's policy towards Southeast Asia was not clearly defined at first, mainly as the reactions towards regional situations rather than towards the policy, then Indian policies have been adjusted with a focus on the Look East Policy.*

**Keywords:** Foreign policy, India, Southeast Asia, Enhanced Look East Policy

India's relationship with Southeast Asia is a long-standing one, possibly dating back to antiquity and more clearly from the colonial era. Throughout history, India's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia before 2014 had been continuously adjusted and could be divided into two phases: (i) Phase 1: Cold War period; (ii) Phase 2: Post-Cold War era.

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## **1. India's Foreign Policy towards Southeast Asia during the Cold War**

With the geographical proximity, as well as the cultural and religious connection, India's policy towards Southeast Asia existed before India officially gained national independence (August 1947). In the early modern period, although colonial rule in both India and Southeast Asia cut their ties, India's struggle for national liberation was a role model and a great encouragement for national liberation struggles of Southeast Asian countries<sup>2</sup>. India's first policy moves toward Southeast Asia existed before India's independence. From March 23rd to April 2nd, 1947, Indian leaders held a Conference on Asian Relations in New Delhi with the participation of 25 Asian countries, including Egypt. Countries like Burma and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) appreciated this move towards unity in the region by India. Although most leaders emphasised the integration of Asian nations among anti-colonial movements, there was very less coordination among Asian nations after World War II. However, almost all of India's efforts to promote solidarity among Asian nations were unsuccessful. The main reason is that some Asian and African countries were not "satisfied" with India's implementation of the Non-Aligned Policy. In addition, after the colonial period ended, the countries were mainly interested in political rather than economic issues. Countries in Asia and Africa mainly focused on security, neutrality and decolonisation. This prevented India from achieving its goal of ensuring regional solidarity in Asia, Africa and Southeast Asia in general and effectively implementing policies with Southeast Asian countries in particular.

### ***The policy of both cooperation and adaptation, protecting the cause of colonial peoples, aiming toward a unified Asia (1947-1955)***

The end of World War II had a direct impact on the world and regional power structures with the rise of major alliances and counter-alliances. In particular, India's Non-Aligned Movement was an attempt by the fledgling democratic nation to "stand neutral" and separate from the war between the two blocs of Capitalism (led by the US) and Socialism (led by the Soviet Union), which was taking place on a global level. In that international political context, India's policy towards each country in Southeast Asia was different because it was influenced by the internal political situation of countries, the relations between India and these countries and the relations of these nations with the superpowers/blocs. During this period, India's policy towards Southeast Asia mainly focused on building partnerships with Indochina countries, such as Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Although, there were ideological differences in the socio-economic structure, India and these countries had similarities because they have experienced the

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<sup>2</sup> Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (1998), 25 years of studying Southeast Asian countries, Publishing House. Social Sciences, p.289

same war against colonialism and great power and had close relations with the Soviet Union.

In the post-independence period, India wished to form and develop good relations with all countries in the region. During this period, the most important strategic objective of India's policy towards Asia in general and Southeast Asian countries, in particular, was the struggle for peace among the peoples<sup>3</sup>. India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru emphasised that "Asia is getting a second chance to reposition itself after the end of World War II"<sup>4</sup>. At this time, India was considered the natural leader in Asia as India was the first country to gain independence from colonisation in this region<sup>5</sup>. However, Prime Minister Nehru did not want to portray India as a power to replace British colonialism but as a power aiming to build a unified Asia. Following that approach, in March 1946, Nehru went to Malaya<sup>6</sup> and Burma and proposed the Asian Relations Conference hosted by India. Nehru strongly supported Indonesia's nationalist revolution. Nehru regarded Asia as an emerging region for world affairs in the future. Exactly one year later, the Asian Relations Conference was held in Delhi, during which Nehru declared that "This conference will stand out as a turning point separating Asia's past from its future"<sup>7</sup>. Representatives from more than 20 countries participated in the Asia Relations Conference, and even colonial Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaya and Burma also attended the conference. The conference condemned the invasion of the Dutch colonialists, demanding the immediate return of independence to Indonesia, and condemned the Western alliance that supported and aided the Dutch invasion of Indonesia<sup>8</sup>. Under Prime Minister Nehru, Southeast Asia has always been the focus of India's initiative on Pan-Asian solidarity and joint development in Asia. However, a bordering war with China in 1962 forced the South Asian nations to shift the focus from regional solidarity to strengthening the armed forces.

It can be said that the Asian Relations Conference and the Bandung Conference were India's initial efforts to establish relations with Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular. At this point, the interests of India and Southeast Asian nations were

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<sup>3</sup> Cao Xuan Pho, Tran Thi Ly (editor, 1997), *India: past and present*, Publishing House. Social Sciences, p. 294.

<sup>4</sup> Archana Pandya and David M. Malone, "India's Asia Policy: A Late Look East", ISAS (Institute of South Asian Studies) Special Report, No. 2, 25 August, 2010, p.18

<sup>5</sup> Sudhir Devare, *India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence*, Singapore: institute of Southeast Asean Studies, 2006, p.17.

<sup>6</sup> Malaya is the old name of Malaysia, which was restructured as Federation of Malaya in 1948 and gained independence in 1957. In 1963, Malaya changed its name to Malaysia.

<sup>7</sup> Archana Pandya and David M. Malone, "India's Asia Policy: A Late Look East", ISAS (Institute of South Asian Studies), Special Report, No.2, 25 August, 2021, p18.

<sup>8</sup> Cao Xuan Pho, Tran Thi Ly (editor, 1997), *India: past and present*, Publishing House. Social Sciences, p. 295.

converging toward a post-colonial developed Asia. In particular, the policy focus that India aimed at during this period was to gain independence from colonialism and to be Non-Aligned. Mr Nehru believed that Asia in general and Southeast Asia, in particular, should be separated from the confrontation between the two blocs of Capitalism and Socialism. This vision of Nehru was supported by Asian Nationalists such as Sukarno and Aung San<sup>9</sup>.

In the late 50s of the twentieth century, the United States began to strongly engage in Southeast Asia, causing the situation in Indochina to change drastically. In 1954, a conference was held in Geneva, forcing India to change its foreign policy towards Indochina. This marked a new phase in the relation between the two sides. India was appointed as the Chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC) and was tasked with maintaining a state of peace, neutrality and independence in these countries. By this time, India had succeeded in building close ties with both Laos and Vietnam. Although still pursuing the policy of non-alignment, the "neutral" nature of India was no longer "original" due to its closer relationship with the former Soviet Union, the war between India and China and the involvement of the US in Indochina, the increasingly close relationship between Cambodia and China, and the tensely strained relation between India and Cambodia. During this period, India played a pivotal role in establishing the "front of the Asian countries against colonial imperialism", forming a "new emerging force" at the United Nations forum. Particularly, the foreign policy emphasising on protecting the cause of colonial peoples had active results in protecting peace<sup>10</sup> in Southeast Asian countries. In order to contribute to ensuring the interests of the young countries that had just gained independence from the colonialists and to maintain solidarity among these countries, in April 1955, Indonesia, Burma, and India initiated the Bandung Conference, whose participants are Asian and African countries.

The Conference Bandung was organised with the aim of formulating policies and solutions to the problems of these countries, with a focus on world peace, security of Asia-Africa countries, peaceful coexistence, and the liberation of the Asian-African peoples from colonial rule and racial segregation. In particular, the "5 principles of peaceful coexistence" were developed into the "10 Bandung principles". The conference was an expression of the new balance of forces in the world and demonstrated India's

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<sup>9</sup> G.V.C. Naidu, "India and Southeast Asia: An Analysis of the Look East Policy, P.V. Rao (ed)", India and ASEAN: Partners at Summits, New Delhi: Promilla Publishers, 2008, p142

<sup>10</sup> Cao Xuan Pho, Tran Thi Ly (editor, 1997), India: past and present, Publishing House. Social Sciences, p. 296.

role<sup>11</sup> in ensuring a voice for the newly independent nations, including Southeast Asian nations.

### ***Non-Aligned Policy through Diplomatic Declarations (Diplomacy by Proclamation) from the 1960s to the 1990s***

Entering the 1960s of the twentieth century, India's policy towards Asia was affected by many factors, such as the disagreement between the Soviet Union and China took place sharply; China - India relations changed from friendship to confrontation and hostility; The Democratic Party came to power in the US and advocated strengthening relations with India; The US strongly countered the nationalist movements in Vietnam and Indochina; the birth of ASEAN, the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement.

During this period, India tried to build relations with Southeast Asia through many policies based on different ideals such as anti-racism, anti-colonialism, non-alignment, etc. A foreign policy of "Declaration Diplomacy" towards Southeast Asia was adopted by India<sup>12</sup>. Despite continuing to maintain the Non-Aligned policy, India "polarised" its policy and relations with Southeast Asian countries. Specifically, while India's cooperative relations with Vietnam and Laos continued to be maintained, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore – the pro-Western countries - were not "content" with India's increasingly closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Particularly, the birth of ASEAN (August 8, 1967)<sup>13</sup> made India have some important adjustments to its policy towards Southeast Asian countries.

During the 60s and 70s of the twentieth century, despite pursuing the Non-Aligned Movement, India always stood by the side of the national liberation struggle of colonised nations against colonialism and imperialism. Especially during this period, India actively condemned the war of aggression of the US imperialists in Vietnam, and resolutely supported the resistance war against the US of Vietnamese people and Indochina. In 1980, after the Congress Party came to power, India recognised and established diplomatic relations with the Government of the People's Republic of Cambodia<sup>14</sup>. India continues to maintain relations with other countries in Southeast Asia.

The changes at the regional and world level in the 1980s led to adjustments in India's foreign policy; of which, India's foreign policy priorities towards Southeast Asian

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<sup>11</sup> Cao Xuan Pho, Tran Thi Ly (editor, 1997), India: past and present, Publishing House. Social Sciences, p. 297.

<sup>12</sup> Sudhir Devare, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2006, p.71

<sup>13</sup> Consists of 5 member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand

<sup>14</sup> Cao Xuan Pho, Tran Thi Ly (editor, 1997), India: past and present, Publishing House. Social Sciences, p. 299.

countries focused on security and economic issues, so besides South Asia, Southeast Asia has become an important gateway in economic integration goals and political role in the Asia-Pacific region. This contributes to renewing and revitalising India's traditional combinations with Southeast Asian countries.<sup>15</sup>

The policy of increasing cooperation with ASEAN was also promoted by India during this period. Although India has made diplomatic and economic efforts to join ASEAN since 1987, these countries expressed their reservations due to India's support of the Heng Samrin regime<sup>16</sup>. Additionally, India also "maintained the distance" with ASEAN during this time. The reasons for this way of approaching ASEAN stem from: First, India regards ASEAN as a plan of America to serve Cold War strategic goals because the initial appearance of ASEAN in India's view is like a "new face" of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). The second is the opposition to India's non-alignment policy and the pro-American attitudes of the Philippines and Thailand. Third, Malaysia only maintained bilateral and political relations with India instead of maintaining multilateral relations with India through ASEAN. Fourth, the tense relationship between India and China negatively impacted the Chinese community living in Singapore. Fifth, Indonesia - the most influential country in ASEAN at the moment - had apprehension related to India. In addition, ASEAN countries were also indifferent to India due to differences in relations with the two poles. Specifically, India and ASEAN differed on the issue of marking the US presence in the region; India objected because of the suspicion that the US would eventually use Southeast Asia to serve its interests, on the other hand, ASEAN members wanted the US to intervene to "suppress" China<sup>17</sup>. ASEAN's close relations with the US and Japan made India worry. As a result, the differences in policies and strategies caused gaps in ASEAN and India's relations. Sixth, India did not consider ASEAN a top priority in terms of security at this period of time. However, the end of the Cold War marked the adjustment in India's foreign strategy toward Southeast Asia, opening a new period in India's relations with Southeast Asia, especially with regard to India-ASEAN ties.

## **2. India's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era**

The end of the Cold War led to new directions in the foreign policy of India and Southeast Asian countries; specifically the end of the Cold War, the trend of globalisation, India's economic liberalisation and reform policies, the rise of ASEAN,

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<sup>15</sup> Gordon, Sandy: *India's Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, St. Martin Press, New York, 1995, p.121

<sup>16</sup> Grare, Frederic, "India and the ASEAN Regional Forum", in Grare, Frederic and Matoo, Amitabh (eds.): *India and ASEAN: The Politics of India's Look East Policy*, op.cit., p. 125

<sup>17</sup> Guihong, Zhang, "Sino-Indian Security Relations: Bilateral Issues, External Factors, and Regional Implications", *South Asian Survey*, vol. 12, no. 1, Jan-Jun 2005, p. 71

India's maritime security issues, China, and strategic interests in Southeast Asia<sup>18</sup>. Especially, the internal political and economic context made India aim more toward its Southeast Asian neighbours. Politically, the constant change of the ruling party in the Indian government made India's foreign policy unmaintainable and lack a long-term strategic perspective<sup>19</sup>. Economically, the rising inflation, governmental subsidies, high-interest rates, and a simultaneous decline in remittances in the second half of the 1980s weakened India's economy. India's budget during this period also had a strong fluctuation in the spending structure. These forced India to open up to the world economy as well as adjust its foreign policy to focus on economic issues instead of political and ideological factors<sup>20</sup> as previously. In addition, the emergence of ASEAN as an influential regional institution made ASEAN an important part of India's foreign policy. Although there were still obstacles, many ASEAN countries have positively responded to India's actions, especially to the economic investment opportunities that India offered. The China factor also began to put a heavy weight on some ASEAN regions, especially after the closure of the US bases in the Philippines in 1992 and the emergence of the dispute on The East Sea.

### ***Southeast Asia – a pillar of India's Look East Policy***

The launch of the Look East policy in 1992 was India's response to new post-Cold War challenges. Despite its longstanding and historical ties, India's policy towards Southeast Asia is only truly apparent through its Look East Policy<sup>21</sup>. The Look East Policy aims to promote economic integration with East Asian countries and towards the formation of strategic partnerships in other fields such as security and military<sup>22</sup>. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated, "The security dialogue between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is extremely important.... Our area is

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<sup>18</sup> Nanada, Prakash, "Strategic Significance of the Andamans", *Indian Defense Review*, vol. 17, no. 3, July-September 2002, pp. 12-24

<sup>19</sup> The period 1967-1993 was called the "Congress system of opposition", when the dominance of the Congress Party in Indian politics came under strong attack/competition from political parties at the national level, levels of regions/states of India. The Congress Party worked hard to maintain a dominant position in Indian politics under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi but was still defeated by the Janata Party with a coalition of many other parties opposed to the Congress party. However, the coalition led by the Janata Party split and the Congress Party returned to power in 1980, then defeated again in the 1989 general election by the National Front, a coalition of opposition parties, in which the Janata Dal Party holds the leadership role. See Nguyen Thi Oanh. (2020). Basic features of the political party system of the Republic of India. *Journal of Indian and Asian Studies*, Issue 5/2020, P. 46-56, ISSN: 0866-7314.

<sup>20</sup> Economic Survey 1990-91, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi, 1991, p.3; Chanchreek, K. L: *The Gulf War: A Global Crisis*, H. K. Publishers and Distributors, Delhi, 1991, pp. 171-186

<sup>21</sup> Sudhir Devare, *India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p.1-10.

<sup>22</sup> Vo Xuan Vinh, "Some Basic Contents of India's Look East Policy", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, No. 10-2009, p. 56.

next to an important strategic sea route that needs to be protected”<sup>23</sup>. According to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the Look East Policy is not only a foreign economic policy but a change in India's strategic vision, in which India considers East Asia, especially the countries in Southeast Asia, a top concern in its foreign policy. India's Foreign Minister Gujral (1989-1990) affirmed, "We regard a full dialogue partnership with ASEAN as a testament to the destiny of our 'Look East' policy"<sup>24</sup>. During the first period (1991 - 2002), India concentrated on developing cooperative relations with Southeast Asian countries, considering these countries the focus of its policy. In the second phase (2002 - 2012), India expanded its Look East Policy to the whole of East Asia, in which it continued to focus on relations with countries in Southeast Asia, considering this a bridge to open up the policy across East Asia and even Asia – Pacific.

From the goal of economic interests, security and energy security, the Look East policy is a multi-faceted and multi-pronged approach aimed at establishing strategic combinations with separate countries, developing closer political links with ASEAN and strong economic ties with Southeast Asia, helping India to establish a foothold in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Within the framework of the Look East Policy, India's policy towards Southeast Asia is reflected in the following contents:

#### **(i) Regarding India's policy objectives toward Southeast Asia**

Overall, India's policy towards Southeast Asia is aimed at: first, institutionalising linkages with ASEAN and its member states (Dialogue Partners, ASEAN+ Summits and membership of the ARF); second, strengthening bilateral relations with ASEAN member states; third, creating a foothold and affirming the position so that Southeast Asia does not become the only "backyard" or "zone of influence" of a major country outside the region, especially China. And fourth, through the Look East Policy, Southeast Asia is an important gateway to help India become one of the great powers in the Asia-Pacific<sup>25</sup>.

To achieve this goal, India employs the following approaches: First, emphasise the role of ASEAN as a regional cooperation mechanism; that is, India chooses to focus on ASEAN when approaching Southeast Asia. Second, sub-regional cooperation is carried out through the promotion of multilateralism. Accordingly, in order to link the Northeast India sub-regions with mainland Southeast Asia, BIMSTEC (Bangladesh - India - Myanmar - Sri Lanka - Thailand Economic Cooperation) and the Mekong - Ganges Cooperation are two main mechanisms used by India. Third, economic

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<sup>23</sup> Address by former Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the Institute of Diplomatic and Foreign Relations, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, May 16, 2001.

<sup>24</sup> Nguyen Hoang Giap, Trinh Muu (2006), Vietnam's current international relations and foreign policy, Publishing House. Political theory.

<sup>25</sup> Ngo Xuan Binh (editor, 2019), Adjusting India's foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Publishing House. Social science.

diplomacy and defence diplomacy are used to promote the convergence of interests and strategies.

**(ii) Promote institutional connectivity through strengthening bilateral and multilateral political relations**

In terms of multilateralism, to implement this policy, India considers ASEAN the focal point to rebuild its relationship with Southeast Asia because India's main goal is to become a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. Through active diplomatic efforts, in 1992, India became a partial dialogue member of ASEAN and became a full dialogue member of this organisation in 1995. In 1996, India joined the ARF and attended the fourth senior officials meeting in 1997<sup>26</sup>. This reflects the maturing relationship between the two sides and the adjustment of India's policy and strategy with Southeast Asia<sup>27</sup>. By 2002, India became a party of the ASEAN + 1 cooperation mechanism; in 2003, India signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Thus, in terms of institutions, India is eligible to participate in the East Asia Summit. In December 2005, in Malaysia, India was one of the official members to attend the East Asia Summit - an important cooperation mechanism in Asia.<sup>28</sup>

In particular, India always upholds the role and centrality of ASEAN in the region. At the 5th ASEAN-India Summit (2007), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stressed that “the convening of the East Asia Summit is a historic development. We acknowledge that the contributions of ASIAN as well as inviting India to participate from the beginning valuable as the motivation of this positive development”<sup>29</sup>. At the 9th IISS Asian Security Summit (June 2010), India's National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon emphasised: “ASEAN must be the foundation of ADMM+8 in addressing the future security of the region”<sup>30</sup>. In the ASEAN-India Vision Statement on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of ASEAN-India dialogue relations (1992-2012), in addition to the two sides affirmed to elevate the ties to a strategic partnership, “India reaffirmed to continue supporting ASEAN's central role in the evolving regional architecture, including the EAS, ARF, ADMM+ and other regional processes”<sup>31</sup>.

On the bilateral side, since 1992 successive Prime Ministers of India have regularly visited Southeast Asian countries. Narasimha Rao visited Indonesia in 1992, and

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26 37 Võ Xuân Vinh (March 23, 2007), ASEAN in India's Look East Policy, Communist Journal, <https://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/web/guest/nghien-cu/-/2018/2189/asean-trong-chinh-sach-huong-dong-cua-an-do.aspx#>.

27 The communiqué was issued at the end of the Fifth ASEAN Summit, December 1995.

29 Indian Prime Minister's address at the 5th India-ASEAN Summit, January 14, 2007, Cebu, Philippines

30 Address by NSA (National Security Advisor of India) at the 9th IISS Asia Security Summit, Singapore, June 05, 2010.

31 Vision Statement ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit, New Delhi, December 20, 2012.

Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam in 1993. Prime Minister India also visited Singapore in 1994 and Malaysia in 1995. These visits created many opportunities to interact with policymakers from Southeast Asian countries. India participated for the first time at the ASEAN Logistics Ministers' Meeting (PMC) in Jakarta in July 1996 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) with a focus on discussing political and security concerns of the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>32</sup>

### **(iii) Economic integration through the institutionalisation of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment activities**

The announcement of the Look East Policy is a step toward India's geoeconomic integration into the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era through the gateway of Southeast Asia. According to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, "Look East Policy is a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and India's position in the developing global economy". Indian Foreign Minister J.N. Dixit also once said: "The engagement in the economies of important industrialised countries in the West, Japan and ASEAN countries gives India opportunities to access the investment and technology exchange"<sup>33</sup>. "We [India] believe that we will have great and growing economic interests in ASEAN".

To facilitate economic and trade activities, India and Southeast Asian countries have institutionalised several economic cooperation mechanisms. Several cooperation mechanisms have been put in place to promote bilateral and multilateral economic relations between the two sides. The Joint Trade Committees between India and ASEAN countries have been upgraded to the ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee. As a result of India's becoming a Dialogue Partner, the ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee and the ASEAN-India Working Group on Trade and Investment were established. The ASEAN-India Fund was established to promote trade, tourism, science and technology and other economic activities. In particular, the two sides held a High-Level Leadership Conference for the first time in 1998. In 2000, India, along with Thailand and Myanmar, established the Ganges and Mekong River Cooperation Organisation. In 2003, India, Thailand, and Myanmar held a "Conference to connect traffic between the three countries" and proposed to build a cross-border route between India-Thailand-Myanmar. Also in 2003, India and ASEAN held the Leaders' Summit and the India-ASEAN Trade Summit and established an annual cooperation mechanism. Together with China, India signed the "Framework Agreement on Comprehensive

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<sup>32</sup> Grare and Mattoo, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Ram, A. N, "India's Look East Policy: A Perspective", in, Kesavan, K.V (ed.): *Building A Gblal Partnership: Fifty Years of Indo-Japanese Relations*, Lancer Books, New Delhi, 2002, p.8.

<sup>33</sup> J.N. Dixit (2001), *Indian Foreign Policy and its Neighbours*, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, p. 340.

Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN"<sup>34</sup>. To institutionalise economic activities, during the first meeting among the economic ministers of India and ASEAN in Brunei in September 2002, the Indian Minister of Trade and Industry expressed his wish to conclude a formal agreement with ASEAN as a Regional Trade and Investment Agreement (RTIA) or a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the coming years<sup>35</sup>.

During the early years of the 21st century<sup>36</sup>, the total two-way turnover increased from 2.3 billion USD to 7 billion USD. From the countries with almost no or no investment from Southeast Asia in the 1990s, Malaysia and Singapore became the 10th and 11th largest countries in terms of FDI into India by 2002. Thailand was at 18th place and Indonesia and the Philippines at 33rd and 35th place respectively. In total, these five countries accounted for almost 5% of total investment in India<sup>37</sup>. India's trade growth with Southeast Asia was the fastest of any other region between 1991 and 1997. While ASEAN's exports-maintained momentum, imports declined significantly as a result of the financial crisis in 1997-98. Exports increased from about \$1.4 billion in 1993 to more than \$6.2 billion in 2000. On the other hand, ASEAN's imports increased from \$1.4 billion to \$4.4 billion in 1997 but fell sharply to 1. \$71 billion in 1998, and then grew to about \$3 billion in 2000<sup>38</sup>. Especially, by the end of 1996, 152 out of the total of 200 joint ventures of India abroad in ASEAN countries had an investment capital of over 88.5 million USD<sup>39</sup>. From 1993 to 2003, bilateral trade growth between India and ASEAN reached an average rate of 11.2% from 2.9 billion USD in 1993 to 12.1 billion USD in 2003<sup>40</sup>. At the 3rd India-ASEAN Summit in 2004, the two sides signed the "Partnership for Peace, Progress and Co-Prosperity". In the same year, India became a member of the East Asia Summit. In 2009, the two sides signed the Trade in Goods Agreement (AIFTA). In the first quarter of 2011, the two-way trade turnover between India and ASEAN reached 57 billion USD, increasing 8 times over the past 10 years. India's share of exports to ASEAN increased from 7.49% in 1996 to 10.86% in 2010. ASEAN accounted for 10% of India's total trade<sup>41</sup>. It can be said that ASEAN and India are important investment partners of each other. Between 2004 and 2010, India's investment in the ASEAN region

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34 Grare, Frederic, "India and the ASEAN Regional Forum", in Grare, Frederic and Matoo, Amitabh (eds.): *India and ASEAN: The Politics of India's Look East Policy*, op.cit., p.125

35 India's Interests in FTA with ASEAN. *Hindus*. September 16, 2002.

36 S.D. Muni, "India's look East' Policy: The strategic dimension", <http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg>

37 Based on data published by the Ministry of Industry of India SIA Bulletin. Out of the total foreign direct investment capital was Rs 2,805,372 million from 1991 to May 2002, of which the five ASEAN countries were Rs 1,41,703 million. <http://indmin.nic.in/vsindmin/publicat/default.htm>

38 Data taken from the website of the ASEAN Secretariat.

39 Dinh Van Ha: *India - ASEAN relations after the cold war (1991-2010)*, Master thesis 2012, Hanoi University of Social Sciences and Humanities.

40 <http://www.aseansec.org/5738.htm>

41 Bhawna Pokharna, *India - ASEAN Summit Partnership*, *International Research Journal*, August 2010, Vol. 1, Issue 2, p.36

reached \$21.8 billion, accounting for 25% of India's total overseas investment<sup>42</sup>. The two sides have signed a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), Free Trade Agreement (FTA)<sup>43</sup>, Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA).

#### **(iv) Promoting multilateralism**

Another important aspect of India's Look East policy towards Southeast Asian nations is the aim toward multilateralism through regional cooperation institutions. India also launched many new multilateral initiatives involving Southeast Asian countries. The most prominent and effective are the Mekong-Ganges Cooperation (MGC) in 2020; Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in 1997 and Ganga-Mekong Swarnabhumi (India, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) in 2000.

*Mekong - Ganges Cooperation – MGC* is a multilateral initiative including India and 5 ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) to cooperate in the fields of tourism, culture, education, transportation and communication, of which transport connection is one of the important pillars. This initiative was launched in 2000 in Vientiane, Laos. Within the framework of the MGC, six countries are also developing transport networks including the East-West Corridor project and the Trans-Asia Expressway. The four pillars of MGC are tourism, culture, education, transportation and communication. It is concretised through such activities as the cooperation with small and medium enterprises, the conservation of rice germplasm, the establishment of a Health Working Group, the establishment of a Joint Data Archive Center (CARC) at Nalanda University, and finally the India - Cambodia Laos Myanmar Vietnam Rapid Impact Projects<sup>44</sup>. One of the so-called Asia Expressway Projects under MGC is expected to connect Singapore with New Delhi via Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Bangkok (Thailand), Vientiane (Laos) Chiang Mai (Thailand), Yangon and Mandalay, Kalemmyo (Myanmar), Tamu, Dhaka and Calcutta (India). India has begun the construction of a road connecting Tamu (Manipur) to Kalemmyo, an important intersection in central Myanmar<sup>45</sup>. This will contribute to promoting border trade between India's northeastern region and neighbouring countries of Myanmar and the Mekong River region. The MGC is not only an expression of cultural and commercial links among member countries for centuries

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<sup>42</sup> Ranjit Gupta, India's Look East Policy, Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta, Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007, p.36

<sup>43</sup> ASEAN –india dialogue relation” <http://www.aseansec.org/5738.htm>, May 2010.

<sup>44</sup> Aseanindia (March 2017), About Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), <https://www.mea.gov.in/aseanindia/about-mgc.htm>

<sup>45</sup> Kuppuswamy, C. S, “India's Look-East Policy: More Aggressive, Better Dividends”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 1663, 3 January, 2006.

but also a cooperation mechanism that contributes to enabling people living in the two basins of the Mekong River and the Ganges River to connect more closely to develop, promote integration and prosperity together. Thus, the MGC became a mainstay of India's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia during this time.

*Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC):* BIMSTEC is also one of the important contents of India's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. Historically, the communities and countries around the Bay of Bengal have interacted and established diverse relations. Along with many other initiatives after the end of the Cold War, a new sub-regional grouping was established on June 6<sup>th</sup>, 1997 in Bangkok called the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Regional Technical and Economic Cooperation. (BIST-EC) including Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The main areas of cooperation identified include cooperation in trade, investment, industry, transportation, infrastructure, science and technology, human resource development, energy, fisheries, agriculture, natural resources and tourism. In 1997, Myanmar became a member of this institution.

In July 2004, at the first BIST-EC Summit, BIST-EC was officially renamed BIMSTEC<sup>46</sup>; in which the focus of BIMSTEC is: expanding BIMSTEC cooperation to the fields of culture, education, public health, biodiversity protection and traditional knowledge, rural development, medium and small enterprises, construction, environment, information and communication technology, biotechnology, climate change research and natural disasters. India and its member countries also established a BIMSTEC Free Trade Area, an Annual Action Plan on Tourism, and established the BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce.... This can be seen as another attempt by India to connect with the hub of ASEAN through Myanmar and Thailand.

#### **(v) Promoting strategic interactions through defence diplomacy**

Within the framework of the Look East Policy, military cooperation between India and ASEAN countries is also promoted. India has signed defence agreements with countries such as Singapore, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. India has initiated naval diplomacy with South and Southeast Asian states. The Indian Navy conducted the Milan naval exercise with the navies of Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Sri Lanka in 1995 in the Bay of Bengal. Since 1991, India has been conducting naval exercises with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia in the Indian Ocean and with Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines in the following years through the 'Milan'<sup>47</sup> naval exercise and “Joint Communiqué on

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<sup>46</sup> BIMST-EC Summit Declaration”, World Focus, vol. 25, no. 9, September 2004, p. 23; Bhasin, Avtar Singh (ed.): India's Foreign Relations–Documents 2004, Geetika Publishers, New Delhi, 2005, p. 916; Morris, Peter, “Grouping to Check China's Influence”, Asia Times Online, 11 February, 2004.

<sup>47</sup> Annual report 2006-07, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 2006, p. 32; Jayant, V, “Indian Navy Planning Strategic Command for Far East”, The Hindu, December 26, 2000.

Anti-Terrorism Cooperation with ASEAN” .... In 2000, India sent warships, tankers and submarines to Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Vietnam to jointly conduct bilateral exercises as a sign of India's goodwill to strengthen and increase its presence in this region<sup>48</sup>.

With these steps, India has built strategic trust based on similar interests with Southeast Asian countries. In addition, India also emphasised cooperation in maritime security, especially in the East Sea. At the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+), India affirmed: The security of sea lanes is important to the Asia Pacific region...we are cooperating with other countries in the region to enhance security for the maritime industry in the region. A collective approach to maritime security will benefit the entire region<sup>49</sup>. In addition, in the ASEAN-India Vision Statement on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of dialogue relations (1992-2012), the two sides agreed to promote cooperation at sea including through participation in the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) to address common challenges on maritime issues such as piracy, search and rescue, environment, maritime security, maritime connectivity, freedom of navigation, fisheries and other areas of cooperation<sup>50</sup>. Thus, from the expansion of its economic focus, India began to adjust its strategic policy to the areas of strategy and security.

In short, India had a great interest in Southeast Asia from a very early age. At different historical times, the international, Southeast Asia and India situations have different fluctuations, so India's policy towards Southeast Asia is always adjusted pertaining goals and content to suit the specific situation. This adjustment is primarily rooted in India's national interest, and then is the result of the combined effects of factors at the international and regional system levels. During the Cold War period, if New Delhi's policy towards Southeast Asia was not clearly defined, mainly as a response to regional situations rather than a policy response through following the policy of non-alignment, following the "middle way", by the post-Cold War period, India's policy towards the region had a clear adjustment with the focus on the Look East Policy. However, India's policy prior to 2014 was mainly "observation" rather than "action". This led to strategic adjustments from the Look East policy to the Act East policy in the later period of the Indian Government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi for the expanding Southeast Asian neighbourhood.

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48 Nguyen Tang Nghi, Huynh Ho Dai Nghia: India's Look East Policy in the Early Years of the 21st Century-Place and Role in the East Sea, *Journal of Indian and Asian Studies*, pp. 32-41.

49 Kar, Sitanshu (2010) "Towards an Inclusive Security Architecture: ASEAN+8 Defence Ministers", Meeting in Hanoi, India strategic.

50 Vision Statement ASEAN – India Commemorative Summit, New Delhi 20/12/2012.

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## Cultural Imperialism and the Global South

Vivek Mohan Dubey<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

This essay addresses the issue of Cultural Imperialism and the National Identities of the countries of the Global South. The binarism in which both of them are portrayed is the main focus of this essay. It tries to conclusively demonstrate the untenability of the same binarism by highlighting the various local worlds that empirically exist in the contemporary world. The overlap of many complex social processes and concepts have been unravelled to refute the popular and faulty understanding of the current human condition that cries out for better explication.

**Keywords:** *Cultural imperialism, liberal-rational dilemma, cultural universalism, cultural relativism.*

What the present world seems to be undergoing is nothing but the interplay of Seven Master Variables operating at the global level along with their respective paraphernalia with numerous permutation and combination. They are Agricultural Economy, Industrial Economy and Post-Industrial Economy and their commensurate cultural counterparts are Primordial Ties, National Identities and the Global Culture. With a few constantly decreasing exceptions, the Seventh Master Variable, Democratic State organizes the political life of humankind. The complexity and at times confusion also of the current human condition stems precisely from the interplay of these variables as they operate parallel and simultaneously in many parts of the world. Only in the developed world of the West the intersection of Post-Industrial Economy, Global Culture and Democracy is clearly and cohesively established although much variation and many problems exist even there. The rest of the world is doomed to face the consequences of the operational requirement of all seven variables put together. Due to

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precisely this ambiguity Global Culture and National Identities of the countries of the Global South have been and still are portrayed in antagonistic terms in which the loss of one is inevitably seen as the gain of the other. Their mutual incommensurability and contradictory operation in many parts of the world make the comprehension of the contemporary human condition exceedingly difficult as they function in a highly heterogeneous and diversified world with little willingness, as it is clear by the mid of 2022, to abandon its distinct cultures and traditions. Isolation, indifference, resistance and adaptation all register their political presence with the hope of its due recognition by the other side. No wonder many attempts to capture the present human condition either succeeded partially or failed completely. This short and narrowly focused essay tries to address the same issue in a thematic manner. What follows, therefore, is humbly and hopefully the most comprehensive account of the same reality weaving together existing insights available on the subject and avoiding their familiar shortcomings.

Nationalism, by definition, is a cultural phenomenon and like much of the contemporary human heritage, historically speaking, it emerged in West Europe first and spread over to other countries of the West itself. The spread of nationalism in other parts of the world like Asia and Africa was the subsequent historical development propelled by the forces of Modernity exploited by Western countries to their advantage. The basic error of the current scholarship begins here. Even in England and the first convert France, it was initially confined to Europe only. It emerged, there too, due to the combination of their domestic politics and the unprecedented forces unleashed by Modernity. It required some time to crystalize there. Once consolidated in the Parental Home it came in a position to be emulated by the others. That is why even the United States is a darling child of modernity, not its mother. Mercantilism, Colonialism, Race, and Imperialism all in one form of a combination or the other imposed modernity on the rest of the world and nationalism emerged as a reaction and unintended consequence of this imposition. Had there been no West-East encounter the trajectory of the East or Global South would be radically different from the one it turned out to be in the Modern World History. It was natural and emulation in the West and the outcome of blatant imposition on the Rest. This is precisely the reason why the same phenomenon has yielded strikingly different outcomes as the world later witnessed and the process is likely to persist in the long run as well.

In a not-so-familiar essay, John Plamentaz specifies conditions under which nationalism is likely to flourish. Nationalism, according to him, is the weapon of the culturally disadvantaged. It grows where the people somehow become convinced that their values and cultures are being threatened either by another superior culture or by some other political threat. Political sociology of international politics sufficiently provides the aforementioned background condition for nationalism to flourish. Since the family of nations is moving or aspires to move in the same worldly direction of material progress, some are inevitably in a more advantageous position than others. Huge disparity among

the nations of the world is the condition of primary importance for nationalism to emerge.

Plamenatz classifies nationalism into two types: Western and Eastern. In the case of the West, nationalism emerged from the feeling of some scarcity. Scarcity lies in the standards that were likely to and did prevail all over the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But West was culturally equipped to overcome those deficiencies. As pointed out by Plamenatz “the Germans and the Italians, when they first became strongly nationalist, were already, by reference to standards they shared with the nation with whom they compared themselves, well equipped culturally ... Their most urgent need, so it seemed to them, was to acquire national states of their own, rather than to acquire the ideas and skills needed to run such a state, for they possessed them already in large measure” (Plamenatz, 1989).

Eastern nationalism is fundamentally different in character. It is drawn through the process of diffusion into the civilization that is alien to it. Eastern nationalisms are to survive in a world, whose models and standards have already been shaped by the West Europeans. There is a growing awareness among the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America that their cultures are not well equipped to meet to standards of civilization they are drawn in. Therefore, they have to revitalize their cultures in order to survive, excel and flourish in that civilization. In his words “We have also the nationalism of peoples recently drawn into civilization hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards. This is the nationalism of people who feel the need to transform themselves, and in doing so to raise themselves; of people’s who come to be called backward and who would not be nationalist of this kind unless they both recognized this backwardness and wanted to overcome it.” (Plamenatz, 1989). Besides the desire to meet or surpass those standards there is a feeling that these standards have come from an alien culture. Whether it is diffusion or imposition or both it certainly leads to a baffling paradox.

This predicament unfolds itself firstly in the need to create new identities that are in consonance with cosmopolitan standards. Due to the awareness of the fact that their ancient cultural heritage obstructs their development, they have to either change it or transcend it. At the same time, the same cultural legacy is seen as necessary to retain their distinct national character. They are faced with two choices: imitation and hostility. Imitation is necessary to meet the standards of progress set by the alien culture. Hostility is required to prove their own equality or in some cases superiority over the dominant standards. “The attempt is deeply contradictory. It is both imitative and hostile to the models it imitates. It is imitative in that it accepts the value of the standards set by the alien culture. It has involved two rejections, both of them ambivalent: the rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is to be imitated and

surpassed by his own standards, and the rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity.” (Plamenatz, 1989). Dilemma particularly assumes a politically charged form in an increasingly democratic set-up where the choice becomes either the conventional identity or the modern progress. It is precisely this binarism that colors human thinking in many parts of the world including enlightened ones. We are now in a position to move to the next issue of Cultural Imperialism.

According to Iris Marion Young “cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant group's experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm, some groups have exclusive or primary access to ... the means of interpretation and communication in a society. As a consequence, the dominant cultural products of the society, that is, those most widely disseminated, express the experience, values, goals, and achievements of the groups. Often without noticing they do so, the dominant groups project their own experience as representative of humanity.” (Young, 1990).

Another useful definition of cultural imperialism has been provided by John Tomlinson. According to him, “the term cultural imperialism refers most broadly to the exercise of domination in cultural relationships in which the values, practices, and meanings of a powerful foreign culture are imposed upon one or more native cultures. In this broad sense, cultural imperialism could be used to describe examples of the enforced adoption of the cultural habits and customs of actual imperial occupying power from antiquity down to nineteenth and twentieth-century European colonialism” (Tomlinson, 1999).

Cultural domination is the sine-qua-non of cultural imperialism. It has been used (and sometimes misused) in a variety of ways with several serious stakes on each side. John Tomlinson, for instance, points out that “the issue of language dominance and the threat to linguistic diversity opens out to the broader issue of cultural imperialism, the idea that a global culture is in one way or another liable to be a hegemonic culture. This pessimistic construction of the idea of global culture has been the more prominent one in the late twentieth century.” (Tomlinson, 1999). There is another school of thought that associate it with the growing consumerism of Western and more particularly American products. Jonathan Friedman's writings are clearly on these lines. As noted by him cultural imperialism is “an aspect of the hierarchical nature of imperialism, that is the increasing hegemony of particular central cultures, the diffusion of American values, consumer goods and lifestyles.” (Friedman, 1994). Next on the list are those who openly praise cultural imperialism. David Rothkopf and M. Waters are the names, who are most associated with this school. In Rothkopf's words “American culture is an amalgam of influences and approaches from around the world ... The United States should not hesitate to promote its values. In an effort to be polite or political, Americans should not deny the fact that of all the nations in the history of the world, theirs is the most just, the most tolerant, the most willing to constantly reassess and improve itself,

and the best model for the future ... If Americans now live in a world in which ideas can be effectively exported and media delivery systems are powerful, they must recognize that the nature of those ideas and the control of those systems are matters with which they should be deeply concerned” (Rothkopf, 1997).

Despite being recognized under International Law, the state ceases to be the soul object of political reference in a densely connected world. As a natural corollary of this development National also ceases to be the opposite of the Global. Quick and intensive connectivity enabled by the revolution in transportation and communication highlighted the significance of the local. The porosity of state borders and omnipresent media made the production and presentation of locality at a global scale an unignorable development of the late twentieth and first quarter of the twenty-first century. As noted by James Rosenau “localisation involves processes wherein connections within countries are either reduced to, preserved by, or confined to existing or smaller jurisdictions, preferably within subnational or even sub-provincial spaces but not excluding national spaces.” (Rosenau, 2003). Local people are those whose existence primarily depends on or is tied to territory. Their politics, economics and most importantly their identity are heavily shaped by local territorial conditions. As Rosenau observes “for them place and rootedness are as important as ever. Their very identity is tied to place, and they cannot conceive of living anywhere else, for they are dependent on a piece of ground for their livelihood and on a particular culture and language for their sense of well-being.” (Rosenau, 2003). Caution, however, needs to be maintained while thinking about the local people. Local worlds are dynamic entities even if the pace of change is relatively slow there. They cannot be treated as constant. “They do undergo transformations. Variations occur in the way globalizing dynamics impinge upon their processes and structures.” (Rosenau, 2003). Despite all magnitude, intensity, velocity and penetration capacity of globalisation, a large part of humanity still resides in the local world although the shrinkage of this space is also beyond dispute. Not being a monolith, like culture and identity themselves, huge inner variation defies its coherent and consistent articulation. For the sake of convenience and at the risk of over-simplification, an attempt can be made to classify the local world under the following categories.

### **Insular Locals**

The world of Insular locals is largely unaffected by, if not completely isolated from, the dynamics of globalisation. They are found in rural and semi-urban areas where the impact of globalisation is yet to be felt. The world of Insular Locals in some ways highlights the limitations of globalisation. They are mired in the remotest areas of the world that are yet to be properly connected with the rest of the globalized world. It, however, needs to be mentioned that the space occupied by Insular Locals is substantially shrinking day by day and the day is not far when their space may evaporate completely. As pointed out by James Rosenau “with the possible exception of peasants

in remote rural areas of the developing world-and even these exceptions are increasingly rare-the ranks of the Insular Locals are diminishing ... Some people are still much less affected by global forces-still much more authentically local-than others and it is these less globally touched who are treated here as Insular Locals” (Rosenau, 2005).

Face-to-face community life with extremely limited geographical mobility characterizes the life of Insular Locals. The neighborhood is their society; family is their centre; nearby temple, mosque or church is their heaven; local schools are the place of their learning; job in a proximate area is their livelihood; the small market is the place of their shopping and socialization. They are easily located and often directly contacted. Their addresses are fixed and show little mobility. Life is simple. Culture is relatively “pure.” Social bonds are tight. Families and even joint families are intact. People usually recognize each other by face. Horizons are limited. Mobility is infrequent. Outside global influences are irrelevant. Eating, clothing and living patterns are old. They are perfect or near so an example of the old form of community life. Community means in most cases face-to-face small community occupying a relatively short piece of land.

Insular Locals are largely immune from the influences of global culture. The main attributes of global culture like pop music, the internet, McDonald’s, global standardization, global sports, consumerism and so forth are alien things for Insular Locals. The only thing that keeps them informed about the outside world is either radio or TV, a percentage of which is increasing even in the remotest areas of the world. Their lives are indeed a little more complicated than depicted here, but it is far simpler than that of those who either have become or are increasingly becoming globalized. As pointed out by Rosenau “for Insular Locals the immediate community traces the limits of their horizons. Beyond the horizons little is considered salient. Their lives are inextricably tied up with and fully sustained by events and trends in the community, and their orientations towards developments elsewhere in the world are minimal, if they exist at all” (Rosenau, 2003).

## **The world of Resistant Locals**

Globalisation has not remained unchallenged in contemporary world history. It causes a lot of discontent and faces a lot of resistance ranging from the nonviolent to violent. Resistant Locals are those who resist globalisation. Unlike Insular Locals, Resistant Locals are aware of the globalizing dynamics operating in the world. Nor are they isolated from the process of globalisation. Its influence is also familiar to them. But they are somehow dissatisfied with the consequences of globalisation and perceive that resistance is where their interests lie. Who are Resistant locals? According to James Rosenau “diverse types of people reside in this world. Workers are threatened by a loss of their jobs to foreign competitors; citizens are convinced that local cultures are being overwhelmed by westernisation and its corollary, Americanisation and thus fearful that

globalising dynamics are generating an undesirable degree of homogeneity, environmentalists worry that rapid industrialisation in the developing world will undermine the Eco balance of their small regiment of the developed world, arch-conservatives who decry the movement of immigrants into their community; intellectuals preoccupied with the negative effects of communication technologies for social and political life; social democrats concerned that neoclassical economic policies underlying globalisation are widening the gap between the rich and the poor-these are among the more conspicuous individuals who seek to preserve the meaning of local space by resisting the encroachment of global forces. Whatever their particular concerns, however, they tend to share a conviction that globalisation has led to a life in which the nearby is treated with contempt” (Rosenau, 2003).

Resistant Locals exhibit strong adherence to local values and affiliations. Though fully aware of the dynamics of globalisation (due to which they tend to resist it) they are not very keen to participate in it or to become a vehicle for it. On the contrary, they view globalisation in general and the consequent emergence of global culture in particular with suspicious eyes. Values and ideas, glamour and phantasmagoria associated with global culture are things to be disdained by the Resistant Locals. Their attachment to local traditions and distinct way of life does not permit them to get swayed by the enormous attraction of global culture. Their resistance to globalisation takes a variety of forms. Two are worth mentioning. Firstly, Resistant Locals particularly from modest economic backgrounds tend to organize their resistance to globalisation at the local level. They confine their activities and express their worries at the local level. Signing petitions, participating in protest marches, attending rallies and in some extreme cases damaging multinational-corporate-owned property are some of their favorite tricks. Secondly, there are those who oppose globalisation at the global level. Elites, activists and politically and socially aware people take a keen interest in organizing their resistance to the dynamics of globalisation at the global level. They tend to contact like-minded people all over the world and try to bear pressure on the dynamics of globalisation (or at least parts thereof) which they find unacceptable. Internet is the main tool of Resistant Locals. It is through internet dense networking is undertaken among like-minded people all over the world. Several nongovernmental organisations also play their role in resisting globalisation. Many NGOs, working in environmental, social and financial sectors, highlight the unevenness of globalizing dynamics. They actively keep their respective constituencies informed about the harms and other undesirable or unacceptable social effects of globalisation. “Thus, it is not far-fetched to describe the world of Resistant Locals as crisscrossed by a vast array of transnational networks that are functionally equivalent to the conferences and airport gatherings where those in the global world converge to frame their strategies, strike their bargains and implement their policies.” (Rosenau, 2003). Rosenau further comments “for some people the inclination to resist stems not so much from opposition to the consequences

of globalizing dynamics as from a valuing of the diversity embedded in cultural differences. Such persons are likely to favor localizing processes because they serve the goal of warding off uniformities fostered by the distant proximities and thereby sustain the aesthetic and intellectual pleasures to be derived from the preservation of differences among communities and cultures” (Rosenau, 2003).

## **Exclusionary Locals**

Exclusionary locals are more hostile to globalisation than their Resistant counterparts. Exclusionary Locals are different from Insular Locals in the sense that they are aware of the dynamics of globalisation and their world is penetrated by globalisation. Nor do they act like Resistant Locals who try to minimize the perceived bad consequences of globalisation. Exclusionary Locals prefer to take a firmer stand against globalisation. As observed by James Rosenau “the Exclusionary locals are characterized by an inclination to retreat from the globalizing tide as the latter becomes more encroaching and to do so by withdrawing to their intellectual haven or emotional (usually ethnic) heritage. Those who retreat ... tend to see themselves as members of a counterculture in which localism is viewed as a solution to multifaceted challenges, as a place where anti-globalisation, anti-development, ant-modernity, anti-science, only small-is-beautiful come together in an island politics-seeking liberated zones outside the system, enclaves that provide shelter from the storm, usually in the hope that the system will somehow atrophy or collapse.” (Rosenau,2003:). Huntington’s thesis of Clash of Civilizations eloquently captures this portion of the human condition which is large enough to make the world look like such; clashing on civilizational lines.

A large part of Exclusionary Locals oppose globalisation for emotional reasons. They are so touchy about their identity that they perceive globalisation and more particularly global culture as a threat to it. So only they tend to take asylum in ethnicity, nationality, language, religion or other heritage that can provide emotional and psychological security to them. It is not an exaggeration to comment that most of the ethnic revival witnessed during the Post-Cold War world is stemming from this psychic tendency/necessity of these people. There are others who are equally loyal to their traditional way of living. But they are not in favor of isolating themselves from the rest of the world. Exclusionary locals, however, take a different line of thinking and prefer to take a different course of action vis-à-vis globalizing dynamics of the world. They seem to believe that their traditional culture is not a counter-attack on globalisation. Their sheer attachment to their traditional way of living is enough to make them feel and feel with conviction that theirs is the only culture that can save them from ever intruding globalizing dynamics.

The traditional culture of Exclusionary Locals is much more than the way of living. It is a source of social and psychological comfort and perpetuates their identity that is being

increasingly perceived as threatened. It is not that Exclusionary Locals were always immune from external influences or they exemplified the notion of culture as a self-containing whole. Most, if not all of them, did display quite openness to the external world in earlier times. The present world as uncertain and unpredictable as it is (to which globalisation is no exception) causes much of their sudden closeness towards the outside world. It is worth mentioning that most Exclusionary Locals reside in post-colonial states that are struggling with all sorts of problems within their domestic jurisdiction. It is this already precarious situation that globalisation exacerbates that causes if not justifies their effort to immunize themselves from the cultural influences of the outside world.

Exclusionary Locals oppose globalisation on ethnic lines. Ethnicity is taken in the broadest possible sense of the term. It refers to the “deeply felt bonds of kinship with unknown others of the same background and history ... ethnic, linguistic, religious, national, cultural, tribal, and other historical bonds, some of which are occasionally posited as primordial but all of which are seen as linking people to an idea of who they are and with whom they share deep commonalities.” (Rosenau, 2003). This vast and sometimes contradictory notion of ethnicity is deployed just to make the point that nationalism can cause exclusionary localism as much as tribal orientations of people do. Ethnic ties of Exclusionary Locals serve as the safeguard through which perceived assault of cultural globalisation is sought to be countered, resisted, minimized and if possible, bypassed. The current takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban immediately comes to mind.

Nationalist resistance to globalisation traverses through several trajectories. For them, globalisation is so intruding phenomenon that is to be always contested. They arbitrarily draw ethnic and other social boundaries to generate we feeling so necessary for contesting globalisation. Religion is used for this purpose. Religious values and the threat stemming from the emergence of global culture to them are invoked. Muslim Jihadis and right-wing nationalists in different parts of the world are the most glaring illustrations. Primordial identities are invigorated to resist global culture. Networking with the like-minded people is undertaken. Cultural purity is evoked. History is glorified. The present is disdained. The future is depicted as bleak. Enormous effort is devoted to convince the masses that global culture is threatening their long-cherished traditions and values. Things are caricatured in binary terms. Nationalist sentiments are overemphasized. “Aliens” are demonized. Research is undertaken to demonstrate the adverse consequences of globalization. Despite being aware of the fact that costs of isolation are high in an interdependent world, connection with the rest of the world is discouraged. Even if the fellow citizens of Exclusionary Locals are tempted to exploit the fruits of globalisation they are constantly reminded of their traditional values. This is how gigantic resistance to globalisation is undertaken.

## **Affirmative Locals**

Affirmative Locals welcome globalisation. They substantially differ from their Insular, Resistant and Exclusionary counterparts. They neither resist nor retreat from the process of globalisation. They perceive globalisation as a welcome development in its own right. They tend to participate actively in the dynamics of globalisation. They want to exploit the benefits of globalisation. They tend to travel frequently. They are not opposed to consumption patterns brought to their home by globalisation. They are not hesitant to work in Multinational Corporation for their livelihood. They watch foreign T.V. programs, particularly American and European ones. They can be seen working on the internet. They are not opposed to speaking in English. Without questioning their fundamental values and orientation they buttress the dynamics of globalisation. As pointed out by James Rosenau “in other words, Affirmative Locals are not inclined to contest the consequences of globalisation. Other things being equal, they simply accept that the world has shrunk, and in so doing, they see this shrinkage as offering opportunities to enrich their own local ways without undue compromises.” (Rosenau, 2003). This vast section of humanity seeks ideational asylum in Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of the ‘End of History.’

Affirmative locals display openness to global culture. They are not opposed to what Benjamin Barber referred to as McWorld. They tend to spend their leisure time in McDonald's, Disney Parks, and watching global sports. Their lifestyle resembles that of the global elite. Most of them, particularly their children, aspire for global elite status. They tend to ape the lifestyle associated with the global elite. In fact, some parts of this lifestyle have already become the daily routine of Affirmative Locals. For example, visiting McDonald's is the status symbol for many Affirmative Locals. Another illustration of this will be the popularity of cricket in India or South Asia. Cricket means different things to different people. It came to India from England during colonial times. Since then, the game has become so popular in the country as to justify being labelled as the national game (although it has not been declared officially). Soccer, T-shirts, Tennis, Olympics, Jeans and so forth are some of the cultural attributes of the West that have been readily accepted by Affirmative Locals throughout the world. Elites of Affirmative Locals deliberately facilitate the percolation of global culture down to the masses in their constituencies. Elites of this section try to bring their insular counterparts into the mainstream of globalisation. They pay attention to the legitimate concerns of Insular Local and tend to undertake the politics of reform so that benefits of globalisation can reach these communities without undermining the fundamental texture of the traditional life they fondly cherish. They tend to “harness globalisation on behalf of local citizens movements and alternative institutions (that) are springing of all over the world to meet basic economic needs, to preserve local traditions, religious life,

cultural life, biological species and other treasures of the natural world, and to struggle for human dignity.” (Rosenau, 2003). Thus conceived the issue of national identity and global culture dissolves into the famous debate of universalism versus particularism, cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism and absolutism versus relativism. Detailed critical examination of this debate is unwarranted here. Relevant points of this debate will be discussed here that are pertinent to the issue of Global Culture and National Identity.

At the heart of universalism is the idea of some fundamental and unchangeable human nature that characterize humans as humans. “That human nature consists of stable and predictable passions and dispositions, instincts and emotions, all of which can be studied” is how it is being understood in the circle of philosophers and political theorists. (Benhabib, 2002). This view is emblematic of modernity and found its most systematic articulation in the works of none other than the father of modern philosophy Rene Descartes. He sought to establish philosophy on the firm foundation of reason and rationality. His task in his words was to seek an “Archimedes so that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place and transport it elsewhere; demanded only that one point should be fixed and immovable; in the same way, I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain and indubitable.” (Descartes quoted in Bernstein, 1983). His quest for some universally applicable reason and standards led to the principle “that we should not rely on unfounded opinions, prejudices, tradition, or external authority, but only authority of reason itself.” (Bernstein, 1983:). No doubt, many Cartesian philosophical assertions have been invalidated since the time they were postulated but Cartesian Anxiety for a firm and universal base of knowledge continues to haunt Western philosophical thinking till the present times.

Universalism serves as a justificatory strategy in contemporary philosophical debates. The normative content of rationality is often justified in the name of universalism. As noted by Seyla Benhabib “impartiality, objectivity, intersubjective verification of results, and data, consistency of belief, and self-reflexivity minimally define this normative content.” (Benhabib, 2002). Universalism in this scheme of things postulates that rationality is universally applicable. Social phenomena if approached rationally will yield similar conclusions. The entire social universe can be and should be explicated in terms of reason. Rational methods should be deployed to comprehend the social world. Humans are guided by a single universally applicable reason irrespective of their differences. Same rational principles provide guidelines for human action. All people behave in a similar manner under the same conditions. As pointed out by Ernest Gellner “the inherently idiosyncratic has no place in a corpus of knowledge. Unsymmetrical idiosyncratic explanations are worthless—they are not explanations ... Ungeneralisable explanations are useless for a practical and cumulative body of knowledge. If like conditions did not produce like effects, then the experimental accumulation of

knowledge would have no point and would not be feasible.” (Gellner, 1984). It is generally referred to as epistemological universalism.

Particularly important in this context is social and cultural universalism. As noted by Ernest Gellner “in our actual and shared world, diverse cultures, though not sharing their beliefs, nevertheless seem to have little trouble in communicating with each other. The world contains many communities, but they visibly inhabit the same world and compete within it. Some are cognitively stagnant, and a few are even regressive, some, on the other hand, possess enormous and indeed growing cognitive wealth ... its implementation leads to a very powerful technology. There is a near-universal consensus about this ... those who do not possess this knowledge and technology endeavour to emulate and acquire it.” (Gellner, 1984). It indicates at least two things that are relevant for the purposes of this essay. Firstly, it connotes certain norms and cultural standards are operating on the global plane. Though they might have originated in Western and developed countries of the world, they, by now, have become or becoming increasingly universal in the sense that adherence to them has become almost necessary. Any deviance from them leads either to isolation or premodern status. These so-called universal standards are seen as the models to be emulated. Secondly, many cultures find them increasingly difficult to emulate them. They either do not have the necessary technology (in the broader sense of the term) to emulate them or even if emulated they present a threat to a certain way of life in many communities. It is in this sense humanity is deeply divided among haves and have-nots. Ali Mazrui confirms this point that “there is the gap in ... power between North and South and the cultural foundations that underlie it.” (Mazrui, 1990). It is in this sense there is something that can be characterized as Southern culture distinguishable from Western culture. It is this cultural divide between North and South that causes most of the problems confronted by the contemporary world.

Relativist thinking operates in opposite direction. “In its strongest form, relativism is the basic conviction that when we turn to the examination of those concepts that philosophers have taken to be the most fundamental whether it is the concept of rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or norms we are forced to recognise that in the final analysis all such concepts must be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or culture.” (Bernstien, 1983). While relativism stems from a variety of sources like romantic, scientific and anti-epistemological, and takes a variety of forms such as moral, conceptual, perceptual, and relativism of truth and reason, here the focus will be on cultural relativism.

Cultural relativism rejects the idea that “all people at all times and in all cultures could be brought to agree on the assessment of meaningfulness, existence, goodness (moral worth) and beauty (aesthetic value) of relevant entities.” (Harre and Krausz, 1995).

Cultural relativists argue that “no such agreement is possible” and different cultures do not lend easy credence to some universal evaluative standards. They are to be judged on their terms. To put it more affirmatively cultural “relativism is often defined for a popular audience in the thesis that meaning, truth and value are relative to culture, that is each culture has its own unique system of meaning, repertoire of truth and criteria of value.” (Harre and Krausz, 1995). Cultural relativism relies on the assumption that various elements constitute the culture of a community. These elements differ significantly from one culture to another. They mean different things to different people. Spoken languages, sense of right and wrong, identities and affiliations, customs and rituals, aspiration and practices, values and morals, emotions and their expression, rationality and wisdom, behavioral norms and ideas: all these are culturally filtered. No two cultures overlap on these issues beyond the point. They are culture-specific. It is an error to apply elements of one culture to another. As pointed out by Harre and Krausz cultural “relativism depends heavily on the thesis of the radical diversity of cultures ... There are various elements that go to make up a culture. Each element, which might be alleged to vary from culture to culture, is tied in with certain aspects of everyday life ... there are diverse ways of experiencing the world, and many diverse symbolic systems ... on which so much emphasis has been placed.” (Harre and Krausz, 1995).

What implications does the issue of universalism and particularism have in the context of global culture and national identities of the global south? The nation-state is a local unit in the context of globalisation and globalisation is a master narrative operating on the global scale bringing with it attendant global ethics and morality. National cultures and global cultures stand or are perceived to stand in direct contradiction with each other. As pointed out by Mike Featherstone “one of the problems in attempting to formulate a theory of globalisation is of adopting a totalising logic and assuming some master process of global integration is underway which is making the world more unified and homogenous. From this perspective ... the power of the flows of information, finance and commodities, means that local cultures inevitably give way.” (Featherstone, 2003). That global culture is a threat to local national cultures of the world is what is at stake in the debate between universalism (represented by the global culture) and particularism (represented by national cultures). The very usage of the term culture in the singular in the context of globalisation and plural in reference to national indicates the direction of homogenization caused by the former leading to the evaporation of the latter. Of relevance for this article is the fact that the notion of locality inherently involves some kind of nostalgia and mythical security. It begins with some “good old days” one has left behind or in the sense of some integrated organic community of perfect coherence and order that provided some sort of mythical security in the early days. Past in this sense is inherently virtuous, more moral and emotionally fulfilling. Present, on the other hand, does not promise to deliver what the past provided in amplitude. Since homelessness has increased in modern times because more and more

people work and live far away from the place of their parentage, this feeling is more permanent in modernity. As pointed out by Featherstone “nostalgia, or the loss of a sense of home, is a potent sentiment in the modern world, particularly for those groups who are ambivalent about modernity and retain the strong image of the alleged greater integration and simplicity of a more integrated culture in the past.” (Featherstone, 2003). It is, therefore, necessary to maintain some caution while speaking or listening to some glorified version of the locality of a perfect social and moral order which is being threatened by the emergence of global culture. “There are problems with establishing the extent to which localities were integrated in the past. We have to be aware of ... those who make such pronouncements and that they might be painting a nostalgic and over-unified picture. It is also important that we do not operate with the view that localities can change only through the working out of a one-way modernisation process entailing the eclipse of community and the local culture.” (Featherstone, 2003). Implied in the notion of locality is the imagination of some sort of integrated moral community based on face-to-face interaction supposedly unpolluted by external influences. It is fondly believed that in such a small face-to-face social setting the social and emotional bonds between individuals will be more intense and daily interaction will generate some sort of common knowledge reducing the chance of misunderstanding. It is also believed that “the regularity and frequency of contacts with a group of significant others ... are held to sustain a common culture.” (Featherstone, 2003). These kinds of communities either never existed or even if they existed deep back in history, their decline cannot be attributed to globalisation. To defend globalisation more vociferously, globalisation, as it is understood today is far more recent vintage. It cannot be held responsible beyond the point of destroying which either existed a long time back in history or was empirically nonexistent. Even if fairy tales of pure moral and cultural communities hold some water, in recent times their decline is caused by modernisation, a process different from globalisation. The essential point to be made in this regard is that many complex social processes overlap with each other and consequently making the Global Culture and National Identity Binarism almost natural. Whereas the closer and more open enquiry of the cultural ontology of the contemporary world conclusively renders Binarism untenable.

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## South Korea's Approach to the Indo-Pacific

Yukti Panwar<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

*South Korea, along with Japan has been a traditional US ally in East Asia since 1945. The alliance grew even stronger with the Korean War. South Korea is still one of those nations where we can see a deep imprint and influence of the US mixed with their Japanese colonial past and their rich heritage. There are a few more important things to note about South Korea today. South Korea is highly dependent on the USA in terms of its security, even though its defence sector is highly developed and advanced. Its biggest security threat is the nuclear rogue state of North Korea. In recent decades, China and South Korea have been increasingly engaging in trade relations. China has always been the closest ally of North Korea, and with Seoul being disproportionately dependent on Beijing – has made it prudent for Seoul to have friendly ties with China, which can come in handy in the process of denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.*

**Keywords**-Missiles, Nuclear, South Korea, Sunshine policy

### Introduction

When it comes to South Korea's engagement and role in the Indo – Pacific, it has been much more passive than many, especially the US would want it to be. There are reasons for this. First is the evergreen security threat of North Korea. Second, which is interrelated, is the increasing US-China rivalry, and Seoul is being sandwiched between them, unable to choose one side. Third, is its historical discords with Japan. Until the ascend of Yoon Suk-yeol as the new South Korean President in May 2022, Japan – South Korea relations were at an all-time low. They were so bad that when Fumio Kishida became the Prime Minister of Japan, there was negligible communication between the leaders of South Korea and Japan until the coming of Yoon.

So first, we will discuss the role the US has expected South Korea to play in the Indo – Pacific, and then we will dive into these three reasons mentioned before. Then we will

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analyse the New Southern Policy, that came up in 2017. This is the policy South Korea has been following to increase its engagement with ASEAN nations and India on the political, economic, and socio-cultural front. In the end, we will look into the approach of the Moon Jae-in government and link it with the new government under Yoon Suk-yeol. We would probe into the possibility of whether Korea can now have a more tilt toward the US over China and embrace the idea of Indo-Pacific and participating more actively.

## **Expectant Role of South Korea in the Indo – Pacific and its Passive Approach**

In 2011, the Obama administration in the US introduced the policy of ‘Rebalance of Asia’. The focus was on the Asia – Pacific region and there was this projection of the US, who had neglected the region completely, as a key player in the region. This came in the wake of the alarming rise of China, at least economically, and its aggression in the South China Sea. As a result, in terms of geopolitics, China was the new threat to the US and it could not ignore the Asia – Pacific, which was later expanded to the Indo – Pacific anymore.

One major aspect of that policy and subsequent efforts of both the Obama and Trump administrations has been this – to encourage connectivity among its traditional allies and partners. It also focuses on modernising its traditional alliances and encouraging the regional partners to take greater responsibility for their security and defence policy. The main targets of this are Japan and South Korea which have been dependent on the US for their security since 1945. This is something we can currently see Joe Biden, trying to achieve as well. This is critical for the USA to be able to have an East Asian front against China.

In the East Asia region, what the USA has been envisioning and aiming to achieve, is that South Korea and Japan cooperate closely with one another. Also, they, along with the USA can engage actively as a trilateral front, to counter Chinese dominance in the region. To be able to achieve this, the US assumed and expected that both South Korea and Japan will step up and take a more pro-active anti-China stance and engage in a US-led institutional structure for the Indo – Pacific (earlier Asia – Pacific). While Japan was able to step up to USA’s expectations and is now one of the most active countries in terms of engagement with the Indo – Pacific, South Korea has taken a much more passive stance. The reasons for the same are as follows – the focus of Korean foreign policy on North Korea, to mitigate the seemingly permanent threat Seoul faces; Seoul’s attempts to balance the Chinese and USA influence to appease them both; and Seoul and Tokyo’s historical discords.

Before discussing these reasons, we have to keep some things in mind - most of South Korea's engagement with the region has been bilateral in nature - beyond the US's framework of multilateral institutionalisation. Which is something the USA does not like. But, with the coming of Yoon Suk-yeol, there is seemingly room for South Korea's engagement in multilateral forums of the Indo - Pacific. This became evident with Joe Biden's proactive communication with Yoon hours after he got elected and visited him, just days after he took the oath as the President.

### ***North Korea***

North Korea has always been a security and existential threat to South Korea. Since the 1990s and early 2000s, with the coming of the Sunshine Policy, South Korea has aimed to have active and consistent communication with North Korea. It is not an exaggeration to say ever since its existence, the foreign policy of South Korea is fixated on North Korea and the region of East Asia - China, Japan, and Russia. The US has been an all-season ally for South Korea.

Despite this, North Korea, especially after acquiring nuclear weapons, is the main threat to South Korea. And China is the only country in the world, which can reach out to the North Korean leader. Therefore, this is a major reason why Seoul does not want to have holistic ties with China. It needs amicable relations with China so that China can step up and help Seoul to stop Pyongyang from possibly attacking Seoul.

To not give North Korea any possible reasons to attack, South Korean governments, especially the Moon Jae-in government have walked on a tight rope when it comes to approaching their foreign policy. This is thus the primary reason for Seoul's passive approach towards the Indo - Pacific, not to irk North Korea and to avoid a very possible attack on Seoul. If Seoul goes completely against Beijing, as the US wants, China will not be up for the idea of mediating between the two Koreas. Not until they have taken their sweet revenge and "punish" Seoul for going against its interests. South Korea got a taste of this in 2016 and 2017 when China was aggressively opposing the deployment of THAAD in South Korea by the USA. As a reaction, China did not release an official statement of condemnation, but it was successful in rallying the public in such a way that the people in China were boycotting Korean brands and products. This led to a major economic loss for South Korea.

However, in recent years, from 2017 and especially this year, North Korea has increased its ballistic missile tests at an alarming rate. This puts the security of both South Korea and Japan at a major risk. Therefore, the new government under Yoon Suk-yeol is getting more and more confrontational over passive towards North Korea and aligning more with US's viewpoints about North Korea and East Asia in general.

## **US-China Rivalry and South Korea's Dependence**

South Korea is dependent on both the US and China. It is dependent on the USA mainly in the security sector and China for its trade relations (China is South Korea's largest trading partner). Therefore, when Sino-American relations started turning sour during the Trump administration, South Korea increasingly found itself sandwiched between the two. It cannot take one's side completely, against the other. Therefore, a lot of its efforts were not only focused on deterring a nuclear attack from North Korea, but also on appeasing both the major powers.

This is also the reason behind South Korean reluctance for joining Quad Plus, for that would essentially place Seoul against Beijing. At least that is what Beijing would think. If it thinks that South Korea is a threat like it perceives India, then it would not hesitate to be aggressive towards South Korea directly or use the North Korea card. Or both. After its experience with the retaliation of deployment of THAAD and the Communist Party's campaign to ban BTS in China, South Korea is more conscious of this than ever. For China, US-South Korean relations are the weakest link in the US security front against China. Therefore, Seoul's strategic decisions are something that China has been particularly paying close attention to in recent years.

The US has also always enjoyed a significant sway in South Korean foreign policy. This significantly reduces the room for Korean policymakers to navigate their interests. The Moon Jae-in government, especially, was trying to make a more independent space for South Korea to pursue its foreign policy on its terms. The new government is likely going to pursue the same direction, but while engaging more actively in multilateral arrangements. It is likely to reduce its dependence on both China and the US while using one to balance the other. In this case, as of now, it seems that the Yoon government will tilt towards the US to balance China.

## **South Korean-Japanese Historical Discords and Tensed Relations**

South Korea and Japan have tense relations with one another. The reason is because of their colonial past. South Korea was a colony of Japan. Due to a lot of atrocities committed by Imperial Japan, South Korean people have been scarred for generations and due to a seeming lack of Japanese will of owning up to their mistakes and properly apologise, it is an evergreen issue in domestic politics of South Korea and Japan, which does impact their relations significantly.

If one did not know better, it would look like since South Korea and Japan are both key allies of the US, they must be sharing great relations. That is not the truth in the slightest. They clash on a lot of issues like the comfort women issue (Japan had forcibly deployed many Korean women as comfort women to serve the Japanese Army during World War 2); Yasukuni Shrine (this Shinto shrine honours the people who have been

convicted as war criminals); Japanese history textbooks, Dokdo/Takeshima islands (territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan); and naming of the Sea of Japan.

In 2015, the US tried to negotiate and solve the comfort women issue between South Korea and Japan, but the efforts were in vain. In 2020 and 2021, Seoul's relations with Tokyo reached an all-time low, due to South Korea's Supreme Court ruling in 2018, which ordered Japanese companies to compensate the forced labourers during the Japanese colonial period. This was followed by Japan removing South Korea from the list of its favoured trading partners in 2019. The situation kept deteriorating from there as South Korea threatened the resumption of the process of termination of the intelligence pact it has with Japan. This was followed by both governments revoking the visa-waiver programme for visitors from the other nation. This was projected as the response to COVID-19, but it looked more like a battle of tit-for-tat between the governments. When Fumio Kishida came to power, he did not engage in much communication with Seoul. It is only when Yoon Suk-yeol came to power, that there is a glimmer of hope for restoring relations. But that is going to be a difficult journey.

### **South Korea's New Southern Policy: Outreach to Indo-Pacific**

As we have noted before, South Korean foreign policy has traditionally been focused on the immediate neighbours of South Korea – North Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the US. However, due to the US-China rivalry, South Korea realised that if it wants to pursue a more independent foreign policy, it must lower its vulnerabilities, especially its economic dependence on China. The same can be done by diversifying South Korea's strategic and economic partnerships.

The New Southern Policy of South Korea, launched in 2017, talks about strengthening Seoul's ties with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India. The goal is to advance ties with these nations to the same level as with Japan, China, Russia, and the US. The policy has three main pillars: peace, prosperity, and people. Peace signifies strategic and political cooperation; prosperity signifies economic cooperation and people signifies socio-cultural cooperation. This is the first diplomatic framework Seoul has formulated for improving ties with Southeast Asia and India, although it has enjoyed strong relations in the region for many years. Some of the examples are defence deals with India in 2021 and the shifting of the Samsung factory from China to India.

This can be seen as Seoul's attempt to reach out to the Indo – Pacific region and navigate it on its terms, beyond the trade frameworks and regional organisations led by either the US or China. In the long run, it can provide substantial results and it converges with the American and Japanese ideas of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”.

## South Korea's Indo-Pacific Approach under Yoon Administration and Conclusion

South Korea under President Yoon brings forth hope for both the US and Japan. Yoon is ruling a South Korea which is increasingly becoming anti-China and wants to take a more assertive stance against North Korea. It also wants improved ties with the US and Japan and wants to proceed further with its New Southern Policy. Judging from his proactive approach towards his interactions with Joe Biden and Seoul's signing of the Indo – Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), it seems like South Korea will be edging closer to joining the Quad Plus framework, but it will be very tactful in dealing with China without compromising with Korean interests. If South Korea ramps up its engagement under the New Southern Policy, its outreach and engagement with the Indo – Pacific is going to become more active and significant.

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## The emergence of Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific

Dnyanashri Kulkarni<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

*From the League of Nations in the aftermath of World War I to the formation of the United Nations and several other multilateral frameworks in the post-World War II period, these forums introduced new dawn for global governance and ensuring cooperation among nations. International cooperation flourished as states employed multilateral architectures to meet the rising global problems. One of the key achievements of these multilateral forums has been the globalisation and development of international economic cooperation. However, more recently, the changing power dynamics at the regional and global levels have impacted the functioning of multilateral institutions.*

**Keywords**-League of Nations, scourge of war, UN system

### Introduction

Countries have started to look for alternatives as “the consensus seems impossible and reforms remain elusive” in multilateral institutions.<sup>2</sup> Recently, states have started to indulge in smaller, informal and more targeted interest-based groupings, dialogues and forums that are comparatively difficult to resolve at larger forums. One common argument for the shift toward small groupings is the failure and ineffectiveness of building traditional regional multilateral institutions.<sup>3</sup>

This growth of minilaterals is often considered an alternative due to the inefficiency of multilaterals in the region. Therefore, this paper ponders to understand and analyse the concept of minilateralism through existing minilateral groupings. The study seeks to

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<sup>2</sup> Aarshi Tirkey, 28 December 2020, Addressing the inefficacy of multilateralism — Are regional minilaterals the answer?, ORF <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/addressing-inefficacy-multilateralism/>

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focus on the rising minilateral arrangements since the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Firstly, this paper attempts to define minilateralism and draw its features. Secondly, it focuses on the emergence of minilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific region with the help of the Balance of Power Theory.

## Defining Minilateralism

One of the challenges that come with minilateralism is determining the magic number itself. Bhubhinder Singh and Sarah Teo argue, “*minilateral arrangements occupy the space between bilateralism (both the US- and China-led) and broader regional multilateralism (such as the ASEAN), involving three to nine countries and are rather “exclusive, flexible and functional in nature.”*<sup>4</sup>

In terms of trade, minilateralism is also known as plurilateralism. It refers to trade and investment negotiations between three or more countries but fewer than all World Trade Organisation (WTO) members.<sup>5</sup> They may occur both inside and outside WTO. The reason for plurilateral trade agreements to succeed lies in the failure to achieve consensus across all WTO members due to varied domestic policies. The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) is an example of a successful plurilateral mechanism.

Vannarith Chheang explains two dimensions of minilateralism such as economic and political-security minilateralism. He views economic minilateralism as cooperation between three or more countries on economic issues, aiming to promote trade, investment, infrastructure development, cross-border connectivity and tourism.<sup>6</sup>

He argues by referring to the minilaterals such as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle<sup>7</sup> and the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle (CLV-DT) that these minilateral groupings are relatively effective in cooperation among all the member countries as well as poverty alleviation and narrowing the development gap. It is pertinent to mention that Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle is the first among the many to consider geographical proximity for trade and investment cooperation.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN

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4 Bhubhinder Singh and Sarah Teo, *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2020), p. 2.

5 Naoise McDonagh, 17 February 2021, *Is plurilateralism making the WTO an institutional zombie?* East Asia Forum <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/02/17/is-plurilateralism-making-the-wto-an-institutional-zombie/>

6 Naim, M 2009, ‘Minilateralism: the magic number to get real international action’, *Foreign Policy*.

7 It was created in 1989 which later became the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle in 1994.

8 Ooi, GL 1995, ‘The Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle: sub-regional economic cooperation and integration’, *GeoJournal*, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 337–344.

Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) was formed in 1994 with the aim of promoting trade, investment and tourism, and free movement of people. Similarly, the CLV-DT grouping has been considered the most dynamic growth triangle in the region. For instance, in 2018, at the biannual summit, World Bank and ASEAN representatives were present, thus indicating that the grouping has drawn the attention of multilateral institutions.

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand is also a great example of economic minilateralism. It can be rightly said that these minilateral groupings aid in serving the larger aim of regional economic cooperation and integration as they complement multilateral institutions like ASEAN by narrowing the development gap within member countries of ASEAN, facilitating practical and sector-driven cooperation and embedding norms of regional economic integration in ASEAN.<sup>9</sup>

The security minilateralism intends to deal with non-traditional security threats and issues like terrorism, natural disasters, transnational crimes etc.<sup>10</sup> Since the security issues are not likely resolved in multilateral forums, the minilateral cooperation in the security and defence realm provides an opportunity for a more flexible and effective way to deal with them. For instance, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) of Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom formed in 1971 is considered the first 'minilateral defence coalition'. In the maritime domain, against the backdrop of the attacks by the militant Abu Sayyaf in 2016, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines discussed setting up trilateral patrols in the Sulu-Celebes Seas.

## **Rise of Minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific**

In the context of minilaterals a closer look at the Indo-Pacific which has emerged as one of the most important arenas for trade and security cooperation and well as the competition; becomes pertinent. The emergence of minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific region can be analysed by referring to the balance of power theory. The theory of Balance of Power, coined by Kenneth Waltz fundamentally states that nations will form an alliance against a dominant power posing a threat to the other nation's security.<sup>11</sup> In more recent times, against the backdrop of rising conventional and non-conventional

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<sup>9</sup> Vannarith Chheang *Minilateralism in Southeast Asia: Facts, opportunities and risks*, MINILATERALISM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN Edited by Bhuhindar Singh and Sarah Teo 60 pg. 104-119

<sup>10</sup> Vannarith Chheang *Minilateralism in Southeast Asia: Facts, opportunities and risks*, MINILATERALISM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN Edited by Bhuhindar Singh and Sarah Teo 60 pg. 104-119

<sup>11</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), 129.

security threats, countries in the Indo-Pacific region have started to adopt a more power-centric and pragmatic approach.<sup>12</sup>

The United States has always put the Indo-Pacific at the forefront of its foreign policy. Emphasising a free and open Indo-Pacific, Washington's aim has been freedom of navigation and building a strategic partnership to promote stability in South Asia.<sup>13</sup> In order to achieve these goals, the US has adopted an alliance mechanism such as the "QUAD" (America, Japan, Australia, and India), the AUKUS alliance (the U.S., the UK, and Australia), the U.S.-Japan-ROK (Republic of Korea) etc.

Similarly, in September 2021 the European Union also announced its Indo-Pacific strategy. For the EU, the region is of paramount importance as *more than one-third of all European exports go to the region, a majority of those transiting through the sea lanes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans*.<sup>14</sup> While the EU's participation in the region through minilateral groupings is not that evident, however, the Australia-UK-Netherlands trilateral dialogue on building Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) capacities in Indonesia is considered a success.<sup>15</sup>

China, on the other hand, views Indo-Pacific as a gateway to extend its influence in the region. Recently, China signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands that allows China to deploy security forces in the island nation. This security pact points out China's desire to deploy its forces abroad.<sup>16</sup> Over a span of the past few decades, Beijing with its "string of pearls" and the "maritime silk road", China has aimed at strategically cooperating with the countries in the region.

Furthermore, in 1995, the Mekong River Commission was signed between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam to address the water security issues. Recently, the focus has been on enhancing the communication and resources of the basin and developing institutional efficiency. China, for its part, in 2015, initiated the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) with Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Similarly, China conducts joint patrols with lower Mekong countries like Laos, Myanmar and Thailand for ensuring the safety of navigation. On contrary, as a direct

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<sup>12</sup> Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, "India's Vision of the East Asian Order," *Asia Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 2018), p. 39.

<sup>13</sup> The White House, February 2022, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States  
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Garima Mohan, December 2019, A European Approach to the Indo-Pacific? Global Public Policy Institute

[https://www.gppi.net/media/Mohan\\_2019\\_A\\_European\\_Approach\\_To\\_The\\_Indo\\_Pacific\\_final.pdf](https://www.gppi.net/media/Mohan_2019_A_European_Approach_To_The_Indo_Pacific_final.pdf)

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ananth Krishnan, 24 April 2022, Why has the China-Solomon Islands deal become the latest flashpoint between China and the U.S.? *The Hindu*

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challenge to the LMC, the Mekong-US partnership was established. Nonetheless, since China shows hesitance to formally abide by the UNCLOS, unilateralism in a way accommodates China's way to advance its approach in the region.

As for Japan, in April 2017, Tokyo announced the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. Japan, in fact, was the first country to emphasise the Indo-Pacific region. For instance, in 2007, at a joint Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha sitting, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his speech referred to Dara Shikoh, and, in particular, a Sufi text he authored in 1655, *Majma-ul-Bahrain* which translates as 'Mingling of the Two Oceans'.<sup>17</sup> While Dara Shikoh's purpose was to find common ground between the two universes of Islam and Hinduism, for Abe, it was the perfect metaphor for a "broader Asia", one in which the "Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of... prosperity"<sup>18</sup> Japan, along with QUAD, has engaged in the Indo-Pacific region through other unilateral groupings such as US-Japan-ROK, US-Japan-India etc.

## **Climate Change and QUAD formation**

On 26 December 2004, a Tsunami in the Indo-Pacific region became a catalyst for the formation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue wherein countries with naval capacities- India, US, Australia and Japan had set up a coalition to rescue and rehabilitate those trapped and affected. For instance, Indian naval helicopters were deployed within 24 hours with relief packages in Colombo. Out of these four countries, Japan was keen on establishing "value-based" connections in order to create an "arc of freedom and prosperity" throughout the region.<sup>19</sup> 3 years later, in 2007, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum summit in the Philippines, the four countries decided to meet and discuss the prospects for engagement. The same year marked their participation with Singapore in naval exercises. <sup>20</sup> More recently, in 2017, during the ASEAN Summit, the four countries re-joined to revive the QUAD forum. In 2021, the QUAD grouping met for its first in-person summit on 24<sup>th</sup> September in Washington. Concerning the formation of QUAD against the backdrop of the tsunami in the Indian ocean, the QUAD, consequently, proved to

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<sup>17</sup> Prof Rajaram Panda, 25 February 2021, The QUAD concept: What Promise does it hold for the Future? Vivekanand International Foundation <https://www.vifindia.org/article/2021/february/25/the-quad-concept-what-promise-does-it-hold-for-the-future>

<sup>18</sup> Shinzo Abe, 22 August 2007, "Confluence of the Two Seas" Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmvo7o8/speech-2.html>

<sup>19</sup> Taro Aso, "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons," speech on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar, November 30, 2006

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/>

be an instance of successful cooperation between the four Indo-Pacific states in comparison with ASEAN's response.

In recent years, the Indo-Pacific region has attracted states to forming minilateral groupings. As Alfred Mahan, the nineteenth-century American naval strategist, rightly stated, "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters", the maritime domain has become a crucial space in establishing new and emerging powers, shaping regional dynamics and the larger security architecture.<sup>21</sup>

Geographical asymmetry, differences in the political system and divergent threat perceptions in the Indo-Pacific region have resulted in an institutional deficiency where multilateral forums are unable to address these concerns. Consequently, states are moving towards informal, target-oriented and relatively smaller groupings for reaching consensus. Forums such as ASEAN in the region have been criticised for being "talk shops" where no notable results are reached.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the emergence of minilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific region has gained significant attention. Along with QUAD, several other minilateral groupings are formed in the region, for example, Japan-US-India, Japan- Australia-India (JAI), India-France-Australia etc.

### **China Challenge in the Indo-Pacific**

Be it economics, trade, military or technology, China is emerging and has resulted in a shift in the balance of power, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, the recent and ongoing Russia- Ukraine war too, has changed the dynamics in the region. European Commission's President, Ursula Von der Leyen, in her address at the Raisina Dialogue 2022 highlighted that "what happens in Ukraine will have an impact on the Indo-pacific". She further added that the impact can be seen through the price gain in grains and even energy and fertilisers for that matter.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, the bilateral trade surplus of China (US\$396.58 billion) makes the US the biggest trading partner of China. On the other hand, keeping Beijing and Moscow closer ties into consideration as well as balancing the trade surplus and its relations with Russia is likely challenging for China.

While the world hopes for China's peaceful rise, it has territorial disputes with many countries in the Indo-pacific region. For example, Japan over Senkaku island and its

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21 1 Brewster, D. (2010). An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean? *Security Challenges*, 6(3), 1-20. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26459796>

22 Cha, V. D. (2011). Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia's Regional Architecture. *Asia Policy*, 11, 27-50. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24905025>

23 Speech by President Von Der Leyen at the Raisina Dialogue. 25 April 2022. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech\\_22\\_2647](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_22_2647)

claims over the South China Sea include countries like the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. It is pertinent to mention that in 2021 China's President Xi mentioned that "reunification" with Taiwan "must be fulfilled"<sup>24</sup>. Therefore, Taiwan continues to be a priority for China which has led to heavy militarisation, raising concerns about security in the Indo-Pacific region. China has also been fully militarising the islands in the disputed South China Sea.

Further, the Belt and Road initiative of Xi Jinping intends to "develop better transport connectivity within Asia which includes the Association of South-East Asian Nation (ASEAN) Connectivity initiative, the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program, the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) Cooperation Program, the South Asia Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) Program, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).<sup>25</sup>" speaking of China's investment in the region, it has already taken over Sri Lanka's Hambantota port on lease for 99 years. Besides, since China is the manufacturing hub of oil and gas imports that comes from the Persian Gulf through the Malacca Strait, this region further strategically becomes important for China.

With respect to China's economic ties in the region, over the years, China has witnessed an increased high trade volume with Indo-Pacific countries, due to its key position in the regional value chains. China equally leads the Foreign Direct Investments with ASEAN and other Indo-pacific countries.

As per the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community report, China continues to expand its 'global intelligence' and 'convert influence posture' for advancing the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) political, economic and security goals that ultimately challenge U.S. influence.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, the United States' strategical goal over the past few years has been strengthening allies and partners to establish a web of security in the region. The following table indicates the U.S. presence in the region through minilateral groupings:<sup>27</sup>

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24 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58854081>

25 <https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/belt-and-road/>

26 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 2022 (with information as of January 2022), Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community

27 Joel Wuthnow (2019) U.S. 'Minilateralism' in Asia and China's Responses: A New Security Dilemma? *Journal of Contemporary China*, 28:115, 133-150, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1497916>

**Table 1.** Key U.S. Minilateral security activities in Asia

Dialogues	Non-U.S. participants	Dates	Focus
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group	Australia, India, Japan Japan, ROK	2007–8, 2017– 1999–2004	Regional security issues North Korea
U.S.–Japan–Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Ministerial	Australia, Japan	2005–	Maritime security, North Korea, Counter-terrorism
U.S.–Japan–India Trilateral Ministerial	India, Japan	2015–	Maritime security, regional development
U.S.–Japan–Mongolia Trilateral Dialogue	Mongolia, Japan	2015–	Regional security issues, regional development
U.S.–Japan–ROK Trilateral Ministerial	Japan, ROK	2010–	North Korea
<b>Intelligence-sharing agreements</b>			
Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement	Japan, ROK	2014–	North Korea
Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement	Japan, Australia	2016–	Maritime security
<b>Multinational exercises</b>			
Cope North	Australia, Japan, ROK (prev. US- Japan only)	2012–	Maritime security, HA/DR, combat readiness
Malabar	India, Japan (prev. US-India only)	2007–	Maritime security, HA/DR, combat readiness
Pacific Dragon	Japan, ROK	2012–	North Korea
Proliferation Security Initiative Exercises	Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore	2014–	Non-proliferation
Talisman Sabre	Australia, Japan, New Zealand (previously US-Australia only)	2015–	Maritime security, combat readiness
<b>Regional initiatives</b>			
Lower Mekong Initiative	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam	2009–	Regional development, water security
Maritime Security Initiative	Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam	2015–	Maritime security

*Source: Joel Wuthnow (2019) U.S. ‘Minilateralism’ in Asia and China’s Responses: A New Security Dilemma? Journal of Contemporary China*

The US is not new to the minilateral mechanism, for instance, Australia, New Zealand, and the US treaty was signed in 1951. In addition to the above table, though officially defined as a multilateral mechanism<sup>28</sup>, Blue Dot Network is also an important minilateral initiative of Australia, Japan and the US for promoting infrastructure development, particularly, in the Indo-Pacific region. It has also been perceived by scholars as a counter to the Belt and Road initiative of China.

Though several other countries are dependent economically on China, they have now started to engage in groupings like the Quad-Plus, New Zealand and South Korea. While Quad-Plus is not a security grouping, it has emerged in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic to calibrate its policies to deal with post-pandemic economic recovery, vaccine diplomacy and other non-traditional security issues. Furthermore, an assertive China has also led the major powers in the region to come up with Australia-United Kingdom- United States (AUKUS) trilateral pact.

<sup>28</sup> <https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/>

Thus, it can be said that Lee Brown rightly argues, “the Asia Pacific to Indo-Pacific is an exemplar of an emerging minilateral security regionalism, rather than the predominant forms of bilateral and multilateral security and economic regionalism that have dominated Asia in recent decades”<sup>29</sup>

Apart from these minilateral groupings involving major powers and rivalry, several other regional minilateral security groupings have emerged in recent years. For instance:

1. The Mekong River Commission- Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam
2. The Malacca Strait Sea Patrols- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand
3. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation- Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.

## Conclusion

Based on the above discussion, it can be said that minilateral groupings provide a target and issue-based operational efficiency that involves a relatively small number of member states. While multilateral forums aim for “inclusivity” in the region, minilateral groupings, on the other hand, share common threat perceptions and envision adopting a more targeted approach to mitigate those challenges.

The summits of these groupings take place at different levels, for instance, the QUAD grouping takes place at the level of the head of states and foreign ministerial level. Similarly, Japan-US-India meetings also take place at the head of the state level. Depending upon this, the meetings may or may not occur on the sidelines of a multilateral summit. E.g., Japan-US-India meetings take place on the sidelines of G20 summits.<sup>30</sup>

By referring to the above discussion, certain features can be drawn of minilateral groupings- firstly, they are smaller in numbers, from 3 to 9 member countries. Secondly, they are informal with an absence of formal institutional structure and adopt more targeted initiatives with the intention to deal with a specific threat or issue, involving fewer states. These forums have also made room for indulging in novel discussions such as emerging technologies (5G, digital trade), supply chain and cybersecurity. They are often viewed as ad-hoc and a place that bridges bilateralism and multilateralism. Today, minilateral groupings are being formed to discuss vital areas of concern such as security,

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<sup>29</sup> Lee-Brown, J 2018, ‘Asia’s security triangles: maritime minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific’, East Asia, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 163–179

<sup>30</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, [https://www.mofa.go.jp/s\\_sa/sw/in/page3e\\_000969.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000969.html) ; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, [https://www.mofa.go.jp/s\\_sa/sw/page3e\\_001038.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/page3e_001038.html)

climate change, trade, cross-border connectivity and people-to-people exchange. In fact, these groupings have now become even more important because they aim to achieve a specific goal. The formation of minilateral groupings in fact suggests that there is a pragmatic shift from emphasising overall global cooperation to forming strategic alliances with like-minded nations, for instance, the India-Japan-US, the India-France-Australia etc.

Nonetheless, the Indo-Pacific region has remarkably emerged as a pivot for minilaterals. Be it the US-China rivalry in the region or rising challenges such as climate change, cybersecurity, infrastructure development etc, states have now started to resort to minilateralism for advancing their interests in the region. Evidently, these groupings provide a pathway for political dialogue and “confidence-building” between key partners in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>31</sup>

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## Iranian nuclear energy: history and advancements

Bhanavi Bahl<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

*As Iran rapidly gains toward the establishment of its nuclear arsenal, discomfort and apprehension are escalating in the world. A proof of Iran's cutting-edge technology is its latest milestone on the nuclear front. Iran has begun testing its uranium-enriching centrifuges, which has allowed Iran to extract, separate and then enrich uranium at a faster pace. Despite renewed attempts to reinstate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, Iran continues to make headway in the field. This paper aims to objectively report and illustrate the recent advancements in Iran's nuclear energy. All the while, assessing the political and economic dimension of the nuclear dispute which has brought forth powers from around the world. On one end nations push for Iran's nuclearisation for their core economic interests, while others, in attempts to further ostracise the pariah, impose economic sanctions. This push and pull of power have materialised into a 'tug-of-war', making Iran's nuclearisation an issue that transcends not only its immediate region but also in the international arena as well. The paper begins by touching upon the historical background of Iran's nuclear programme that was first pursued in the 1950s, however, it was marked with negligible progress. It was only in the 70s that Iran made progress on this front, along with its ambitious efforts toward the revolution in 1979. This section concludes by discussing the advancements in the 90s and 2000s, with the aim of setting the pace as a prelude to the section that analyses Iran's nuclear programme today and its implications. The proceeding sections analyse the groundwork that set the pace for the Iran Nuclear Deal. Lastly, the paper discusses Iran's nuclear technological advancements and the political-economic factors that influence 'Iran's Nuclear Crisis.'*

**Keywords:** Iran, Nuclear Power, Iran Nuclear Crisis

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## Background

Iran's development of its nuclear programme dates back to the 1950s<sup>2</sup>. After an agreement between the Shah of Iran and the United States, the programme was established under the US Atoms for Peace programme<sup>3</sup>. While there weren't any major technological advancements under this programme, it led to the initial journey of Iran with respect to the nuclear sphere. In 1967, Iran was the recipient of America's 5 MW research reactor, which was powered by highly enriched uranium (HEU)<sup>4</sup>, this came to be known as the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). This served as a starting point for future projects and contracts with nations like South Africa, Germany, France etc. and other foreign companies<sup>5</sup>. While the Shah of Iran was a firm believer in home-grown technological advancements, this applied to its nuclear programme as well, as a result of which the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) was established in 1974. At the same time, he did not want to rule out receiving help from other countries. It was in the 1970s that Iran broadened the horizon of its nuclear arsenal by signing several agreements and contracts with foreign companies and suppliers. In 1974, the Shah of Iran announced the signings of preliminary agreements with Siemens KWU and Framatome for the establishment of four nuclear power plants<sup>6</sup>. The construction of two major nuclear plant projects, near Bushehr and Darkovin, began in 1975 and 1979 respectively. However, the projects failed as they were eventually dissolved or recalled<sup>7</sup>. This trend continued even in the 80s when despite Iran's agreement with Germany's Siemens KWU for the Biblis B reactor; the agreement stagnated quite early into 1979 after which it was damaged by Iraqi air strikes in 1984-88. It was in 1979 when the Islamic Revolution forever changed Iran, which temporarily halted the nuclear programme. This was set off after the Shah's regime was toppled, closely followed by the imprisonment of AEOI's head. Many of Iran's nuclear scientists also fled the nation in wake of the revolution<sup>9</sup>. This led to an inevitable vacuum in Iran, that left it without leadership in the quest for nuclearisation. The fallout of Iran's nuclear programme was further facilitated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who stood staunchly against

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2 "Iran Nuclear Overview" NTI. 25 June, 2020. <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/>

3 Ibid.

4 Katherine Malus "From "Atoms for Peace" to "JCPOA": History of Iranian Nuclear Development."

Columbia K=1 Project. Center for Nuclear Studies. 9 September, 2018

<https://k1project.columbia.edu/content/atoms-peace-jcpoa-history-iranian-nuclear-development>

5 Ibid. <https://k1project.columbia.edu/content/atoms-peace-jcpoa-history-iranian-nuclear-development>

6 "Nuclear Power in Iran" World Nuclear Association. January, 2021. <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/iran.aspx>

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 David N. Yaghoubian, *Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005. 773-79. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25597516>.

developing a nuclear arsenal<sup>10</sup>, as he considered it to be ‘un-Islamic’ and called for the programme’s termination<sup>11</sup>. Eventually, in 1984, the nuclear programme was revived with Khomeini seeking out international assistance to complete the construction of the unfinished Bushehr plant<sup>12</sup>.

Undoubtedly, ever since the revolution, US-Iran relations took a bitter turn. While the 50s-70s was a time of robust partnership between the two. 1979 was a marked detour in their long history of partnership. The Revolution was against the Shah who now exercised his dictatorial whip over Iran, coupled with an increasingly corrupt system and an overheated economy. Even in the face of ‘anti-Shah’ sentiments, the United States continued to back the Shah. This worsened, during the hostage crisis that began towards the end of 1979 when Americans were captured by radical Iranian students and were held hostage outside the US Embassy in Tehran<sup>13</sup>. They claimed that the Americans would be set free once the US repatriates the Shah, as Iran believed that Washington was granting refuge to the Shah. 1979 was by far one of the most dramatic years in US-Iran relations. In many ways, it has been a point of no return, as the two severed their relations the following year. Thus far, relations have always been clouded by a looming suspicion and oddity towards one another, which is also part and parcel of the failed JCPOA, that will be discussed in due course of the paper.

Following this, Iran no longer received any assistance from not only Washington but its allies as well. Iran then solidified its ties with China and Pakistan to develop its nuclear arsenal. After several tries, in 1987, Iran was reported to have acquired centrifuges, nuclear plans etc, from A.Q Khan a Pakistani nuclear scientist, who had earlier assisted Pakistan, Libya and North Korea with their nuclear programmes<sup>14</sup>. Iran’s renewed eagerness to develop its nuclear programme came with the hostilities it experienced with Iraq throughout the 80s which eventually escalated into the Iran-Iraq War which went on for eight years. Iraq was placed at a strategic advantage as it received aid from the United States in the form of training, military equipment, and economic aid. As per reports by the CIA, Iraq was also found to have used chemical weapons against the

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10 Mohammad Homayounvash, “History and Evolutionary Trajectory of the Iranian Nuclear Programme” Florida International University Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2012.

<https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1731&context=etd>

11 “Iran Nuclear Overview” NTI. 25 June, 2020. <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/>  
<https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/>

12 Ibid.

13 “US Relations With Iran” Council on Foreign Relations. 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-iran-1953-2021>

14 Katherine Malus “From “Atoms for Peace” to “JCPOA”: History of Iranian Nuclear Development.” Columbia K=1 Project. Center for Nuclear Studies. 9 September, 2018  
<https://k1project.columbia.edu/content/atoms-peace-jcpoa-history-iranian-nuclear-development>

Iranian army<sup>15</sup>. This could also be a contributing factor to the arms race<sup>16</sup> that began in West Asia, as this would stimulate a 'domino effect' in Turkey, Saudi Arabia<sup>17</sup> and other nations in the region, pronouncing the effects on Iraq's existing far-reaching abilities. The 'arms race' can be said to have manifested in the form of the Persian Gulf War, as Iraq was viewed to have annexed Kuwait with the prime objective of exercising its 'arms muscle' over issues of oil pricing and production.

A period of building and developing the foundations of their nuclear structure, slow economic recovery and a chaotic political system along with the costs of various military operations found Iran grappling with domestic and international isolation. Despite this, Iran made commendable progress in the 90s and early 2000s. The 80s concluded with Tehran signing deals with Pakistan and China to train the Iranian army. China also provided Iran with 27KW miniature neutron source reactors (MNSRs) and two 300MW Qinshan power reactors<sup>18</sup>. In 1995, as part of the Bushehr-I deal, Russia agreed to aid Iran in building the Bushehr power plant as well as three reactors<sup>19</sup>. Iran's efforts were continually blocked by America, as it tried to put a stop to its agreements with Argentina and China for nuclear development as well as trying to stall the Russian deal<sup>20</sup>.

In 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) investigated Iran's nuclear development programme, it discovered that the various technologies being developed were undeclared and unregulated. For example, the Natanz Enrichment Complex included the construction of a heavy-water production plant in Arak<sup>21</sup>. These findings were followed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carrying out investigations and inspections. After a few years of back and forth with the IAEA regarding Iran's suspension of the nuclear enrichment programme, in 2005, Iran announced that it would resume its enrichment programmes, rejecting a negotiatory proposal put forth by France, Germany and the United Kingdom. This then led to a diplomatic fallout, undoing all the progress made through negotiations. In tandem with

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<sup>15</sup> "Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War" Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. Central Intelligence Agency. 10 August, 2010

[https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0001030207.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001030207.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> Geoffrey Kemp. "The Middle East Arms Race: Can It Be Controlled?" *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 3. 1991: 441-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328315>.

<sup>17</sup> Mohammad Homayounvash, "History and Evolutionary Trajectory of the Iranian Nuclear Programme" Florida International University Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2012. p.91

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<sup>18</sup> Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in *Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats*. Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 303.

<sup>19</sup> Nathan E. Busch "No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation" Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004. p. 265.

<sup>20</sup> "Iran Nuclear Overview" NTI. 25 June, 2020. <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/>  
<https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/>

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

this, the traumas of the 9/11 attacks, shook people globally. The most apparent manifestation of this isolation by America was through its 'Bush Doctrine' which, along with the Middle East, pushed Iran's nuclear programme further into an impasse. It led the rest of the world to brand Iran as an 'axis of evil'<sup>22</sup>. It was in 2009 when relations with the international community were no longer at a stalemate and had escalated that Iranian President, Ahmadinejad announced the construction of uranium enrichment facilities. This was despite Iran having hit a wall with the IAEA and the UNSC over this issue in the past. The decade concluded with Washington imposing sanctions for the first time that would prevent foreign companies from supplying gasoline to Iran. An incident that doesn't seem too far from the current reality, as Iran was found in a similar situation, not many months ago, over the JCPOA.

## Analysis

The onset of the decade was not astray of issues that plagued the preceding years. In September 2009, Iran revealed to the IAEA that its nuclear enrichment facility project was almost complete. Analysts have said that this emerged due to Tehran's attempts to deter plausible attacks from Israel on its nuclear projects<sup>23</sup>. A plethora of difficult and cold diplomatic followed which was mostly expressed in the form of sanctions. At the same time, a newfound spirit of solidarity emerged between Iran, Brazil and Turkey, in the form of the Tehran Declaration- which emphasised Iran's right to uranium enrichment and other nuclear activity. Following a series of on and off impositions of sanctions, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the Iran Nuclear Agreement was eventually put into action in 2015, between the UK, US, Russia, France, China and additionally Germany. This deal was struck to prevent Iran's forward movement on its nuclear programme. Advocates of the deal argued that it would leash Iran and prevent it from expanding its nuclear programme<sup>24</sup>. Provided the other signatories fulfilled their end of the agreement, which was to lift sanctions and the weapons embargo that dealt with its transfer of weapons and ballistic missiles<sup>25</sup>. The deal, however, failed as a result of US withdrawal in 2018. The possible reasons and implications of the Iran nuclear crisis will be illustrated in the paragraphs that are to come.

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22 "Iran and the Axis of Evil" The New York Times, February 10, 2002.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/12/opinion/iran-and-the-axis-of-evil.html>

23 Mohammad Homayounvash, "History and Evolutionary Trajectory of the Iranian Nuclear Programme" Florida International University Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2012. p.91


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24 Kali Robinson. "What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal" Council on Foreign Relations. 18 August 2021

<https://www.cfr.org/background/what-iran-nuclear-deal>

25 Ibid.

## Economic growth in Iran



Source: Central Bank of Iran

BBC

It is interesting to note that Iran's economic distress set the stage for the signing of the deal. The crisis was further exacerbated due to years of sanctions that were imposed by the US and EU. Iran was, therefore, more than willing to sign the deal, to revive its economy even at the cost of its progressing nuclear prowess. As per an IMF report<sup>26</sup>, Iran's GDP grew by 12.5%<sup>27</sup> post the nuclear deal.

The impacts of the imposition of sanctions were felt on Iran's oil exports as well, which contributed to the economic miseries it faced. The lifting of sanctions and the signing of the deal did well to increase Iran's oil exports and production. Unfortunately, before Tehran could even reorient its policy measures that accommodate a revival of the economy post the sanctions, the United States withdrew, reinstating the sanctions. This set off pressure on the Iranian economy once again since the sanctions were primarily on oil exports, that account for 80% of its GDP. By 2020, oil exports dropped to an all-time low. This has caused damage to not only Iran's economy but also its relations with Washington and the revival of the deal. Despite on and off talks on the revival of the deal, it has failed to come through to this date. A large part of this stalemate can be attributed to the inability or rather, the unwillingness of Iran and the US to come to a mutual agreement. Primarily because this requires compromises on the unrealistic demands from both sides. Iran has demanded the US lift its sanctions and bring about a restoration of economic benefits. Second, it asked for compensation for all the

<sup>26</sup> "IMF Survey : Iran Faces Multiple Challenges as Growth Prospects Brighten" International Monetary Fund. 20 January, 2016 <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sonew012016a>

<sup>27</sup> Amir Paivar. "Nuclear deal: Is Iran's economy better off now?" BBC News. 4 May, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43975498>

financial damage incurred as a result of the sanctions especially in the face of the pandemic, when it faced difficulties in acquiring medical supplies<sup>28</sup>. Washington on the other hand, seeks more transparency on its nuclear programme's developments. A more ambitious demand than the preceding one is also more 'important' for the success of the agreement. It deals with Iran's support for the proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon<sup>29</sup>. A prolonged impasse can be expected as the two sides struggle to come to a consensus. Seemingly, Iran however has made full use of the years after 2018 by expanding its nuclear enrichment programmes ever since the dissolution of the deal. It has tested and deployed over a thousand advanced centrifuges that make the uranium enrichment process easier<sup>30</sup>. This has been very convenient for Iran so to develop its latest addition of the Arak water reactors, missiles and other advancements.

## **Iranian Advancements in Nuclear Technology**

As per reports released by the IAEA, in the early months of 2019- Iran was transparent and cooperative with the IAEA over verification and monitoring of its nuclear developments, specifically its enrichment activities, heavy water processing, development and research for fuel centrifuges<sup>31</sup>. Iran's new developments in this field work in tandem with its noncompliance with the JCPOA- and have led to Iran being more uncooperative than before. After the US imposed its sanctions again, Iran exceeded the 300 kilograms limit imposed on it regarding uranium hexafluoride<sup>32</sup>. Its uranium enrichment process has increased to 4.5%, later announcing that its commitment to follow the directives and regulations set by the JCPOA, would be disbanded. After the first report published by the IAEA, Iran has gone ahead and defied the restrictions that have been set. It then informed the IAEA that the stock of heavy water reactor material has exceeded 130 metric tons, beyond the permitted limit<sup>33</sup>. However, it has not gone beyond the 5% U-235 limit set by the IAEA for uranium enrichment and it continues to cooperate with it over monitoring and verification of its activities<sup>34</sup>.

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28 John Krzyzaniak. "Iran and US still far apart on reviving the JCPOA" International Institute for Strategic Studies. 23 August 2021. <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/08/iran-us-jcpoa>

29 "New US Secretary of State stands by demand Iran return to nuclear deal before US does." Reuters. 28 January, 2021 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-blinken-idUSKBN29W2XF>

30 Robert Einhorn "Averting a new Iranian nuclear crisis" Brookings. 17 January, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/bigideas/averting-a-new-iranian-nuclear-crisis/>

31, "IAEA Director General's Report on Verification and Monitoring of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency. updated 31 May 2019, [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org).

32 "Iran Nuclear Overview" NTI. 25 June, 2020. <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/>

33 "IAEA Director General's Report on Verification and Monitoring of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency. updated 18 November 2019, [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org).

34 "Iran Nuclear Overview" NTI. 25 June, 2020. <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/>

Iran's development of its nuclear programme has undoubtedly stirred suspicion and fear amongst its neighbours and in the world. Israel for instance is fearful of this and is reported to have carried out attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities, like the explosion at Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment plant<sup>35</sup>. Israel has always vehemently protested the JCPOA, primarily because it believes that it will be unable to contain Iran's development of its nuclear weapons and bombs. President Hassan Rouhani, under whom Iran's nuclear capabilities have progressed most, announced that Iran is inaugurating 30 IR-5, and 30 IR-6 devices at Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment plant and three cascading centrifuges<sup>36</sup>. This quickly caught the world's attention because the heavy water used can produce plutonium, a fuel used in nuclear warheads<sup>37</sup>. What concerns the world and the IAEA, even more, is China coming to the aid of Iran in developing its nuclear arsenal, since it is already equipped with developing heavy water reactors. The Arak reactor had earlier been shut down in 2015 after the signing of the JCPOA, however, the Chinese are said to have continued their work on the reactor<sup>38</sup>. Other than this, as per the IAEA, Iran's nuclear development projects and materials are present in locations that are undisclosed to the organisation.

Recently, Iran has accumulated more than 120 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium<sup>39</sup>. As per the JCPOA agreement, Iran was forbidden from going above the 3.67% threshold of uranium enrichment<sup>40</sup>. In addition to this, Iran has also been engaging in the production of uranium- this is again, prohibited under the JCPOA<sup>41</sup>. Iran informed the IAEA about its production of uranium in 2019 and the process has been underway ever since. This worked in tandem with a nuclear law that was enacted in December 2020. This law was a game-changer for Iran, as it was after this that its projects gained momentum and force. It was passed in order to increase its leverage over Washington and to restart talks for the JCPOA, with the intention that all parties that had imposed

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35 Kunal Singh "The Limits of Military Coercion in Halting Iran's Nuclear Weapons Programme" Observer Research Foundation. 6 August, 2021. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-limits-of-military-coercion-in-halting-irans-nuclear-weapons-programme/>

36 "Iran Unveils Advanced Nuclear Centrifuges" The Hindu. 10 April, 2021. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/iran-unveils-advanced-nuclear-centrifuges/article34291761.ece>

37 "Iran intends to restart activities at Arak heavy water nuclear reactor: ISNA news agency". Reuters. 28 July, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-nuclear-idUSKCN1UNo6P>

38 Maryam Sinaiee "Iran Prepares to Revive Arak Nuclear Reactor, With Chinese Help Or Alone". Iran International. 19 March, 2021 <https://old.iranintl.com/en/world/iran-prepares-revive-arak-nuclear-reactor-chinese-help-or-alone>

39 "Iran says more than 120kg of uranium enriched to 20%" The Guardian. 10 October, 2021 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/10/iran-says-more-than-120kg-of-uranium-enriched-to-20>

40 Ibid.

41 Julia Masterson. "Iran Ratchets Up Nuclear Programme" Arms Control Association. March 2021 <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/news/iran-ratchets-up-nuclear-program>

sanctions on Iran, would be lifted<sup>42</sup>. As per this law, Iran is expected to begin operating its centrifuges and resume the uranium enrichment process. It was under this law that Iran produced 120 kilograms of enriched uranium and restarted its Arak heavy water reactor project.

According to the Arms Control Association, if it weren't for the Arak water reactors being redesigned, then Iran would have been able to produce plutonium that could fuel up to two nuclear weapons per year. Though the newly designed reactors and the construction of the heavy water reactors pose a higher risk of proliferation. Since the 20% uranium enrichment process began, Iran has been able to gather 17.6 kilograms of it at the Fordow enrichment facility. Its enriched uranium stocks are now a total of 2,968 kilograms at 2% enrichment. 1890 kilograms have been enriched between 2-5% and 17.6 kilograms have been enriched to 20%. Iran has also produced 13.3 kilograms of uranium in the form of uranium oxides, 10.5 kilograms of uranium in fuel assemblies and rods, and 10.9 kilograms of uranium in liquid and solid scrap. Under the JCPOA, Iran's stockpile is supposed to be limited to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched to 3.67 per cent U-235, or about 202 kilograms of uranium by weight.<sup>43</sup>

## **Political Economic Factors of the Iran Nuclear Crisis**

Analysts that take into consideration the political-economic factors have long argued that what we know of Iran's nuclear crisis exists as a consequence of the economic order<sup>44</sup>. This claim is supported and further argued for, through the World-Systems Theory. Proponents of this theory argue that the world is arranged in a hierarchal order that is based on the economic division of labour<sup>45</sup>. Since the very beginning, Iran's revolution was seen as a threat to the west, this resonates even today as Iran is miles apart from the capitalist system, while the US attempts to integrate it through the JCPOA.

According to the theory, nations are divided into core countries and peripheral countries. The former refers to wealthy countries, while the latter refers to poorer countries. The peripheral countries are also responsible for the production and exporting of goods. Very often, the core countries rely on the peripheral countries for natural resources. In that regard, the Middle East has always been relied upon by the West (core countries) for its oil and natural gas resources. Consequently, Iran's role has thus always been considered an important one in shaping the world economy's

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Halit Tagma. "The Political Economy of the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis' World-Systems Theory" Northern Arizona University. October 2020. p.105. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344385369>

<sup>45</sup> Ibid p.106

trajectory<sup>46</sup>. Proponents of this theory give an example of the level at which the US exercised its monopoly over influencing decisions. That was especially evident in the coup of 1953, as a post-revolution Iran seemed to support the goal of setting up an export-oriented economy. However, to Washington's dismay, the revolution failed to bear the fruit that it was so eagerly expecting to reap the benefits of. It was in this political and economic climate that Iran was pushed away even further from the US and viewed from a lens of suspicion due to its non-dependence on the global capitalist system.

The core supporters of the JCPOA primarily wanted it enforced for three main reasons. One is to reduce their dependence on Russia's natural gas. Two, to ensure that other European companies are able to extract oil and natural gas from Iran and lastly, to capitalise on Iran's petrodollars through the sale of goods to it<sup>47</sup>. This is supplemented by those who oppose the JCPOA essentially because the revenue generated by the core countries would reduce due to the development of Iran's nuclear programmes. Secondly, the increase in oil supply would mean a decrease in its prices and finally, counter Russia's monopoly over the region and the pipeline it backs in Iran<sup>48</sup>. Simply put, Iran's nuclear 'crisis' is being made into a crisis in the first place because it fails to align with the interests of the core countries. The implications of this have manifested in the form of these countries punishing Iran and isolating it even further as world powers struggle to gain economic control over it.

## **Conclusion**

Today, as Iran's nuclear crisis worsens, it stands this way as a result of the ups and downs in its nuclear development programmes. A programme that had initially gained momentum in the 50s after an agreement was signed between the Shah of Iran and the United States; was lost under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini following the Iranian Revolution. This also opened a new set of implications like complicated US-Iranian relations and economic sanctions. It was amid this bitterness with Washington that Iran turned to solidify its relations with China and Pakistan; thereby worsening its ties with the US. After a series of sanctions, the JCPOA had just been put to the works when Iran and Washington experienced a falling out. While the deal was considered to be a success on the front of restricting Iran's nuclear activities; this only lasted for a while, up until Iran recently developed its ARAK heavy water reactors and its centrifuges that focus on uranium enrichment. The allies it has created over the years with nations other than the US and the JCPOA signatories have also aided Iran in attaining the high position that it has on the nuclear front. Another reason why Iran agreed to sign the nuclear deal was

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid p.124

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p.140

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p.141

to smoothen out its diplomatic ties with the West and its allies. The deal has however failed terribly on that front due to disagreements on other fronts like regional power play. The increasing need to exercise a ‘whip’ over Iran and its nuclear advancements, has not only isolated Iran further into the abyss, but it has also widened the diplomatic gulf between the West and Iran, creating an environment for a seemingly bleak future for Washington’s ambitions for the Nuclear Deal.

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## Book Review – I

### **Allison, Graham T. (2017). *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap?* London, United Kingdom: Scribe Publications**

*Rayan V Bhagwagar<sup>1</sup>*

The geopolitical landscape of the world has seen rapid deterioration, in terms of the stability of the existing international system. But even before this deterioration, the international has been termed as being anarchic in nature. The current ‘global disorder’ – as I prefer to refer to it – is witnessing a whirlwind in declining Western power. One can say that we – as an international political community – are at a Y-Junction, where the world makes do with the global hegemony of the United States, where the choices are between another unilaterally-decided world system or a reformed and inclusive multi-lateral one.

Graham Allison’s book is a fabulous work that discusses Thucydides’ trap and its relevance in history from both the far past as well as the present. Having assessed the historically crucial Peloponnesian war, Thucydides in his volumes delves into the heart of the matter, identifying root factors that led to war. He suggests that when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, there comes around a structural crack in the existing power structure which inevitably leads to war as “the rule, not the exception” (Allison, 2017). However, the book does not discuss only the Peloponnesian war. It discusses some of the most puzzling wars in human history (as shown in Annexure I). An interesting way that the author explains this concept is through the example of successful start-ups such as Google, Apple and Uber, who enter the market with great success and challenged existing champions of the industry such as IBM and Taxi operators.

This book intends to focus on the previously gradual and now rapid ascension of Chinese power in the international system. A revisionist state, the People’s Republic of China has worked on building its economic might to match with, and even exceed, that of the United States. It challenges Washington not only in the economic domain but also in the politico-military domain, wishing to expel the American presence in the Asia-Pacific wholly and completely. History, as portrayed in this excellent work, has revealed

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that Thucydides' trap of power struggle among competing states has resulted in war twelve times, of the sixteen discussed in this book.

The author suggested in 2017 – when this work was first published – that “on the current trajectory, a war between the US and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than currently recognised” (Allison, 2017). As per the US Department of Defense in November 2021, the People's Liberation Army Navy moved up to become the largest naval force in the world, in terms of the number of vessels operated. This in itself gives the proper credit that the factual information, that Graham Allison discusses in such plain language, deserves (Shelbourne, 2021).

The author very appropriately draws China as being the single greatest threat to the existing international structure, and the way the world conducts itself. Through numerous instances and arguments, the reader cannot help but feel that China will not be the responsible stakeholder it shows itself as being. This does not and should not, in my opinion, take away from the attention of the world that the United States – the current, dominant authority in the international order – has also acted irresponsibly in several instances. While one may find the extensive research tilt the way of Washington, it would be unwise to suggest that Beijing is not the greater threat to a potential multilateral, rules-based world order.

The vast array of examples discussed in this book makes it absolutely compulsory reading for every single observer, commentator, researcher, analyst and student of the expansive field of international relations, security & strategic studies and foreign policy; for this book does not discuss only the arguments against China but also explores solutions to dealing with and managing its rapid rise. Taking from the leadership portrayed by President John F Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis, Graham Allison lists out critical values that the American leadership must keep in mind while handling China. It must clarify vital interests, prioritising elaborating in great detail the interests that define American values and policy-making. It must also parallelly understand the motive behind Chinese actions, understanding and appreciating appropriately Beijing's core interests which define its policies. The book also discusses the lack of initiative among America's political elite to engage in strategic thinking and planning, writing that “though deliberate crafting of strategy does not guarantee success, the absence of a coherent, sustainable strategy is a reliable route to failure” (Allison, 2017). Having authored a publication on Lee Kuan Yew – Singapore's ‘founding father’ and one of the finest statesmen in modern history – Allison discusses the need for thinking along the lines of Lee's school of thought: the answers to the problems beyond borders lie within. America's degrading democracy is one of the central factors impacting its declining stand in the international arena. In my opinion, sitting President Joe Biden has already lost this battle and has failed to solve America's domestic problems; it lies upon the

shoulders of his successor to ensure that unity in American politics makes a return, for America to truly be back.

To conclude this review, this book very comfortably articulates both the American and Chinese perceptions of the threats germinating from one another. It is of vital importance that the leadership of these countries understand their interests, like the Americans did the Soviets, and vice-versa, which ensured that the cold war never turned hot. One of the interesting parts of this book is 'Appendix I: Thucydides' Trap Case File' which discusses the sixteen examples very well for the common man or beginner student to comprehend. Overall, the author deserves a thundering round of applause for the research invested in this book, which quite certainly will make its way to the Politburo in Beijing and the Oval Office in Washington.

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## Book Review – II

### **Gokhale, Vijay. (2021). Tiananmen Square: The Making of a Protest. New Delhi, India: HarperCollins India**

Yukti Panwar<sup>1</sup>

*“It has been called many names, but is best known as the Tiananmen Square incident because Tiananmen Square was the stage on which the drama that held the world spellbound for fifty days was performed. The happenings in the square led to the sort of chaos and uncertainty that usually presages a regime change. That did not happen.”* (Gokhale, 2021)

In this book, former Foreign Secretary of India, Ambassador Vijay Gokhale goes down the memory lane to give his eye-witness account of one of the most prominent incidents of Chinese modern history – the Tiananmen Square incident. While giving his own account, he first dives into the background of prominent players of as he calls the players – Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Chen Yun and the other Elders in the leadership of China’s Communist Party (CCP). And then he traces all the political developments and undercurrents that happened and led to that final incident in 1989 – to do this, he goes back to the way Deng assumed power and supreme leadership in China. One major undercurrent throughout the book was the way he was juxtaposing the narratives brought out by the Western media and the Chinese media – and how both were different from the ground reality. The former was busy projecting the probable fall of Communism in China and the advent of democracy while the other was showing it as a form of discord propagated by very few in the minority. Student leaders’ accounts were not the most credible either, as the author highlights that they were also exaggerated in instances just to grab the media’s attention.

The author, while tracing the development of the stage for the Tiananmen Square incident also mentioned that the major countries dealing with China-Japan, the US, the UK, India, and Singapore, and their leadership had missed the possible eruption of chaos in the Chinese domestic political sphere, as China of the 1980s had offered all these countries a highly fertile ground to pursue their economic interests and further expand and develop their respective countries, facilitating its economic growth. According to the author, rather than the movement to bring about democracy in China,

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student protests, which were a major component of this incident, the idea of a little bit more transparency in the political discourse, and the demand for better economic conditions were major driving forces. The author very interestingly says that throughout Chinese history, the leadership has always feared the intellectuals more than those who bear weapons and the Tiananmen Square incident is a good example of that.

The whole book and its complex material are written in such a lucrative and easy-flowing language that it makes it easier to follow the complex and multi-dimensional trajectory of the making of this protest. At points, it felt like, that the reader herself is that young diplomat who witnessed and analysed this all and has written a book about it 30 years later. It is a good head start for an Indian especially, to gain a better understanding of China, its politics and its history, it can be read by anyone as long as they are interested to know about China. This account also seems much more unbiased and credible than both the projections made by the Chinese government and the western media.

This book is a definite read. It seamlessly manages to transport one to China of the 1980s and feel the scenario developed while feeding you with tides of knowledge – which never fail to leave us alone. Ultimately, the author has successfully tried to emphasise in his book, that the Tiananmen Square incident is an incident which is extremely crucial to understanding why Chinese state structures and the Communist Party function the way they do in our times. And why there are consistent efforts to make the common Chinese forget about this incident. Also, we should realise that this incident is still something that the Chinese leadership derives its lessons from. To evoke similar thoughts, I'll conclude this review by quoting Fang Lizhi, one of the three scholars targeted severely by the CCP at the dawn of the Tiananmen Square incident, and also the one who became the cause of a sour point in US-China relations at the time. The same quote by Lizhi has been used by the author before starting the book:

*“The leaders are aware that what happened is an extremely ugly mark on their historical record, and they have been eager to have the world forget it as soon as possible.”*

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## Research Centres of JSIA

### **CENTRE FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY (CGGP)**

Traditional notions of sovereignty and the nation-state in international relations and international law have, if not entirely eroded, been joined by the rise in importance of transnational actors. These bodies may be state driven international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the G-20, regional political organizations such as the Southern African Development Community, or private sector entities ranging from multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to activist networks. Cooperation and interdependence between this network of state and non-state actors with the intention of tackling problems that transcend traditional nation-state boundaries is the aim of the area of study known as global governance. The Centre for Global Governance and Policy (CGGP) is unique in its study of global governance issues. CGGP is held jointly by the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) and Jindal Global Law School (JGLS). As such, CGGP combines legal and International Relations perspectives. As disciplines, International Relations and Law often speak in separate tones. CGGP aims at intensive and multi-disciplinary research on the abovementioned cross-border problems, marrying the insights of Law and International Relations to address both the academe and a policymaking audience. CGGP emphasizes a Global South perspective and probes the possibility for more balanced and even-handed structure for global governance. Simultaneously, CGGP feels that academic focus on Indian foreign policy is fixated on strategic issues relating to immediate neighbours (i.e., Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka et al) or with Europe and the US, leaving the country's relations with Latin America, Africa, and the rest of Asia understudied. The CGGP seeks to break new ground in transcending this parochial mould and promoting cutting edge research on South-South relations with a special onus on India's role as a bridge-builder and consensus maker. In March 2011, CGGP released a report entitled *Rethinking International Institutions: A Global South Agenda*. The Report interrogates existing international institutions—both formal institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations Security Council, and informal institutions, including concepts like humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion. The Report builds on existing literature on institutions within International Relations and International Law parlance. It notes the declining prominence conferred by the Global South on traditional international institutions, and examines the implications for the rise of so-called post millennium international institutions. The Report highlights diverging aspirations between, roughly, advanced and less advanced emerging economies, creating marked differences in use of traditional international institutions, and access to post millennium international

institutions. The Report calls for the development of a Standing Committee in the G-77, chaired by India, to address these divergences.

### **CENTRE FOR STUDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (CSPV)**

The Centre aims to study political violence from two prisms—globalized violence and globalized ethics—and to explore alternative ways to understand it. The Centre takes an interdisciplinary approach, in particular combining international relations, political theory, sociology, ethics and philosophy in general. There is a particular focus on specific and urgent phenomena, such as mass killing, forced displacement, human security, and gender-based violence. Starting from Western ways of thinking, the Centre's focus has expanded to cover non-Western philosophy, thereby inserting inter-civilizational perspectives. The Centre also aims to provide an Indian hub for those interested in both globalized violence and ethics.

Tackling political violence is a daunting task. Part of its reason exists in its very paradoxical nature that all politics requires some kinds of violence in some stages in order to establish and secure authority. Poststructuralist understanding tells us about the inevitable linkage between politics and violence. Nevertheless, it is a hasty evaluation that we have lived in a world of harming and the harmed. Learning and analysing globalized violence is, therefore, a task to learn globalized ethics, and vice versa. CSPV organizes bi-weekly reading seminars with faculty and postgraduate students. It will host international seminars and lectures and provide the JGU community with opportunities to exchange views and enriching ideas. Research outcomes will be released through various media, including the University's in-house journals and working papers, so that the Centre will also offer a locus for global feedback. Finally, the Centre also aims to develop international linkages and joint activities with JSIA's other research centres. The overall goal of the Centre will be to provide firm knowledge and value basis for the future generations of scholars and practitioners, both domestic and global.

### **CENTRE FOR NEW ECONOMIC STUDIES (CNES)**

Espousing the philosophy of how contemporary economic theories look at socio-economic problems in a variety of ways, the Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES) through its research and activities aims to focus more on exploring the diversity of the scholarship on economics. At CNES, students and young researchers are not only exposed to the basic foundations of economic reasoning and thought but are exposed to the inter-disciplinary application of the discipline of economics in fields of political science (via political economy), psychology (via behavioural economics), history (via economic history), legal studies (via law and economics) etc.

In most universities and traditional learning centres for mainstream economics learning, there still remains a lacuna between the taught economic theory and the application of such theories in the real policy environment. CNES aims to fill this lacuna by linking economic theory with historical experience(s) and empirical observation under a robust, experimental environment of research. At CNES, teaching or understanding a given economic theory cannot be viewed merely as an exposition of received and established truths or as an intellectual exercise in the skills of logical deduction and inference.

### **CENTRE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES (CMES)**

The Centre for Middle East studies was launched with the objectives of fostering interdisciplinary research on Middle East Studies in collaboration with regional academics, experts and practitioners; conducting research and analysis on bilateral relations between India and the Middle East to explore synergies and address mutual long-standing economic, political and social challenges; supporting a balanced Middle Eastern research studies from various perspectives to widen access to first-hand knowledge of the Middle East; developing materials and resources for educators and the wider public readership; contributing to broad dissemination of research results and information regarding the Middle East; and expanding the network of institutional partnerships with universities in the Middle East, opening opportunities for student and faculty exchange.

### **CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES (CES)**

The field of European studies has over the decades engaged in extensive research of the plurality and diversity of Europe. Consequently, any focus on Europe has been of an elaborated yet contested one. Moving beyond the “tunnel history” which risks ignoring the relations of domination, exploitation and exclusion of non-Europe that has shaped Europe to the present day, CES aims to contextually study socio-political and legal transformations that continues to reinvent the region and engage in interdisciplinary diffusions - a shift from eternally studying Europe as the “inside” to Europe “inside-out”. The Centre for European Studies (CES) intends to build an unprecedented and discursive community of researchers who can engage and debate their approaches in open floors together with peers from other continents, academic traditions and cultures. Founded in 2011, CES at the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) aims to establish plural observers who will endeavour to study Europe, Europeanness and its myriad identities as a reflexive concern through three core research groups: Anthropology of Europe • European Politics, Culture and Society • New Democracies of Europe Centre for European Studies is now a part of Globus Research Cluster funded by EU commission’s Horizon 2020 project. The cluster is led by Prof. Helene Sjursen, ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway. Earlier, CES has

coordinated and published the European edition of the Jindal Journal of International Affairs (JJIA) Volume 2 Issue 1. It was released by Cord Meier-Klodt, Acting Ambassador, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, New Delhi. Through its research networking, CES has coordinated and concluded JSIA MoUs with Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland; Centre for European Studies, Katholieke Universiteit (KU), Leuven, Belgium, Institute for European Global Studies, Basel University, Switzerland and Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University, The Netherlands.

#### **CENTRE FOR A NEW SOUTH ASIA (CNSA)**

The Centre seeks to mitigate the security dilemma of the South Asia region of great potential and immense risk by reviving the liberal and free exchange which formerly existed and which is the foundation of peace and civilizational growth. The Centre utilizes interdisciplinary research, debate, dialogue, performances and ideas to advance this goal. Along with talks, seminars, conferences and exchanges with academics, students and practitioners from across the region as well as globally, the Centre focuses on the power of performances and consanguinity in culture to move the prevailing paradigm from a realist zero sum interaction towards the liberal order prevalent in other parts of the world.

#### **CENTRE FOR AFGHANISTAN STUDIES (CAS)**

Located at the crossroads of South Asia and Central Asia, facing southwards from the Hindukush into the Indian sub-continent and looks down northwards into India's extended neighbourhood. Afghanistan's political geography has left a deep imprint not only on the regional geopolitical calculus but is also mirrored in its diverse and complex sociocultural tapestry. Traditionally the India has had deep civilizational links with Afghanistan. The change in political geography of the region with the 1947 partition notwithstanding, India has maintained good political relations with the Afghan state. The only aberration thus far being the period of Taliban rule (1996-2001). India's engagement with the country was stepped up after 2001 with the aim of contributing to international efforts to bring peace, stability and eventually resuscitating the country as a bridge between South and Central Asia. However, intensified political and diplomatic engagement has not translated into a deeper socio-anthropological understanding of Afghan society, essential to evolving a sound policy prognosis.

The Centre for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) through its research intends to provide a window into complex yet fascinating dynamics shaping sociocultural, geo-political and economic landscape of Afghanistan. CAS would contribute to cutting edge, policy-oriented research on Afghanistan and its implications for the region at large. It would also provide a platform for collaborative exchange programs and transmission of knowledge to students and scholars.

### **CENTRE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES (CSEAS)**

Southeast Asia, a sub-region of Asia, consists of the countries that are geographically south of China, east of India, west of New Guinea and north of Australia, which includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. These countries share historical, political, economic, cultural and social ties, and all but East Timor are members of the regional bloc called Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In recent years, the regional bloc has taken several initiatives to integrate member countries, including developing a single market that will ensure the free flow of goods, services, investment and skilled labour, and the free flow of capital. Nonetheless, the region is far from being homogeneous and encompassing with different political institutions, diverse languages and cultures. Because of the geostrategic location and its emerging economy, the region has become greater interest to its neighbouring countries as well as the Western democracies.

### **JINDAL CENTRE FOR ISRAEL STUDIES (JCIS)**

The field of Israel Studies is an important area of geo-politics. It merges studies of race, peoplehood, culture, identity, history, regional conflict in the Middle-East and spatial coexistence. Since August 2012 Jindal Centre for Israel studies in JSIA through the initiatives of Dr. Rohee Dasgupta has been engaging MA students in the study of modern Israel and organizing academic conferences. It has fostered institutional networks and exchange on Israel Studies with the Schusterman Centre for Israel Studies, Brandeis University, USA and Tel Aviv University, Israel. JCIS aims to carry out research on race, ethnicity and conflict; Jewish Identity, bilateral relations between India and Israel, the American-Jewish Diaspora and Israel as well as on Europe and Israel. It intends to build a research colloquium of scholars pertaining to modern Israeli politics, culture, society, and economy and the betterment of Israeli-Arab relations (including Israeli-Palestinian relations). It welcomes students to write MA dissertations on Israel Studies. JCIS currently offers two elective courses in the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) and the Jindal Global Law School (JGLS).

### **CENTRE FOR AFRICAN, LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES (CALACS)**

JSIA's Centre for African, Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CALACS) mission is to enhance interregional understanding and cooperation through policy-oriented research, dialogue and training. To achieve this goal, CALACS serves as a hub at JGU for academics, policy-makers, diplomats and businessmen in India and abroad to connect, exchange, and develop initiatives related to: African, Latin American and Caribbean (ALAC) countries relations with India ALAC countries, India and the Global South:

interregional policy coalitions and institutions Sustainable development, trade, investment and other issues affecting ALAC countries

### **CENTRE FOR BORDER STUDIES (CBS)**

It is increasingly being recognized in the study of international relations that Borderlands represent a dynamic subsystem marked by complex and historical interlinkages between communities and local governance systems that transcend established inter-state boundaries. The concept of interstate borders (and the functional role of frontier regions) in international relations has undergone a fundamental shift. Borders are not only seen as barriers, but also as institutional mechanisms that create new opportunity structures for the communities residing adjacent to them. Despite the emergence of the interdisciplinary field of Borderland Studies (and the creation of academic associations both regionally and globally) there is still a marked disjuncture in terms of practical and academic training being provided to students of the social sciences (such as international relations, political science, history and sociology) in the Indian context for understanding developmental trajectories of Borderlands.

The Centre for Border Studies seeks to conduct research in border regions through collaborations and participation of institutions based in border districts and border communities. Some of the Key Research being undertaken include: BADP Case Studies, Rehabilitation Challenges in J&K (LoC) and confidence building measures, health inequality in Border Regions and Border Trade, markets and Infrastructure. The four pillars of the Centre are: Research Initiatives, Certificate Programme in Border Studies, Border Studies Immersion Programmes (Field Schools and Internships) and Advocacy.

### **JINDAL CENTRE FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH (JCGS)**

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly poverty eradication, requires national policies, an international and regional cooperation that supports development efforts. The research Centres that are focusing on the Global South studies are very few in the Southern globe in comparison to their number in the North countries. Jindal Centre for the Global South aims to fill this gap and conducts policy-oriented research, dialogue and training into the social, economic and political key issues across countries of the Global South with a special emphasis on South-South Cooperation and its underpinning development opportunities for the Global South countries. The Centre promotes the unity of the South in achieving the SDGs while recognizing the diversity of national interests and priorities. Jindal Centre for the Global South is affiliated to the School of International Affairs at Jindal Global University (JGU). It draws researchers from across the faculties of social sciences and humanities from inside and outside JGU.

## **CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (CSS)**

The role of security is paramount to all levels of the global environment, from international organisations and states to societies and individuals. In line with this, while the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) concentrates more specifically on topics of security, it situates itself in the larger domain of international relations studies. International security is in the end not merely defined by the concept of war or the effects to mitigate it, but rather goes far beyond it to encompass a plethora of issues. Every action of every actor in the international system defines the concept of security both for itself and for others in the system. In this, the concept of international security has been expanded to reflect, not merely the study of state security but also include topics like ethnic, sectarian and religious conflict; civil wars and state failure; cyber and space warfare; resource related security issues; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; defence economics and also the role of ethics or morality in security policies.

The evolution of the field of international security studies is an impressive topic in itself. It has changed and diversified from an initial concern with superpower rivalry and nuclear weapons to focus upon sectors of political, economic, military, environmental and social life. CSS believes that these sectors must be better understood in order to gauge and examine their influence on important current trends defining international politics and dynamics as well. In this regard, the Coronavirus pandemic, a surge of populism in Europe, the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia and increasing resource scarcity in many regions of the world must all be understood as key security issues in order to gain a deeper understanding of international security as a whole. The Centre for Security Studies thus, through in-depth analysis, reports and policy briefs, and projects explores both regional and thematic topics in the broader field of International Security Studies.

# Submission Guidelines for Jindal Journal of International Affairs (JJIA)

## MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION

Manuscripts and all editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Editor-in-Chief, Jindal Journal of International Affairs, at Jindal School of International Affairs O.P. Jindal Global University Sonipat-Narela Road, Sonipat, Haryana-131001, NCR of Delhi, India.

Manuscripts should be submitted via email to **editorjjia@gmail.com** or **submissionsjjia@gmail.com**. Contributors must provide their affiliation; complete postal and e-mail addresses and telephone numbers.

The onus lies on the author to divulge any potential conflict of interest regarding the manuscript.

The preferred length of an **article** submitted to JJIA is between 6000 and 7500 words including references. All articles must be accompanied by an abstract of 150–200 words together with eight important keywords.

**Book reviews** should be between 1500 -2500 words with full details of the reviewed book including the subtitle, the name of the author, place of publication, name of publisher, year of publication, number of pages and the price. Notes should be numbered serially and presented as footnotes. Notes, other than website sources (with access date), must contain more than a mere reference.

All figures, i.e., diagrams, images, photographs and tables should be placed at the end of the contribution and numbered in the order they appear in text. Table and figure locations should be indicated in text by callouts (e.g., “[See Table 1]”) inserted after the respective paragraphs.

Each table or figure should have a heading, an explanatory caption, if necessary, and a source or reference. Tables need to be submitted in MS Excel or MS Word.

All figures having an image resolution of minimum 300 dpi, 1500 pixels, min width 4 inches and their format should be TIFF or JPEG. It is requested that excessive formatting for tables and figures be avoided.

Limit the levels of heading within an article to two, or at most three. Avoid long headings and do not number them.

JJIA prefers British spellings throughout (‘labour’ not ‘labor’, ‘centre’ not ‘center’); universal ‘s’ in ‘-ise’ and ‘-isation’ words.

Single quotes throughout; double quotes used within single quotes. Spellings of words in quotations should not be changed.

Quotations of 45 words or more should be separated from the text and indented with one space with a line space above and below supported by specific page source.

Use 'eighteenth century', '1980s'. It is suggested to spell out numbers from one to nine (in words), 10 and above to remain in figures. However, for exact measurements use only figures (5 km, 7 per cent not %).

Use thousands, millions and billions. It is advised that the use of italics should be minimized unless necessary, but used consistently.

Permissions and Releases- Material taken directly from a copyrighted source should be clearly identified, and the copyright holder's written permission to reproduce it must be submitted in a separate file. It is the author's responsibility to seek permission for reproducing copyrighted material.

References and Citations for citing and referring to scholarly works the Journal follows Chicago Manual of Style. The Journal prefers footnotes instead of endnotes. We will consider manuscripts for publication only if they are written in accordance with this style.

**Sample of Chicago Manual of Style is given below.**

For further details, kindly see the website - [http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools\\_citationguide/citation-guide-2.html](http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-2.html)

### **Book**

#### ***Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)***

Grazer, Brian, and Charles Fishman. 2015. *A Curious Mind: The Secret to a Bigger Life*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Smith, Zadie. 2016. *Swing Time*. New York: Penguin Press.

#### ***In-text citations***

(Grazer and Fishman 2015, 12)

(Smith 2016, 315–160)

#### **Chapter or other part of an edited book**

In the reference list, include the page range for the chapter or part. In the text, cite specific pages.

#### ***Reference list entry***

Thoreau, Henry David. 2016. "Walking." In *The Making of the American Essay*, edited by John D'Agata, 167–95. Minneapolis: Graywolf Press.

### ***In-text citation***

(Thoreau 2016, 177–78)

In some cases, you may want to cite the collection as a whole instead.

### ***Reference list entry***

D’Agata, John, ed. 2016. *The Making of the American Essay*. Minneapolis: Graywolf Press.

### ***In-text citation***

(D’Agata 2016, 177–78)

### **Translated book**

### ***Reference list entry***

Lahiri, Jhumpa. 2016. *In Other Words*. Translated by Ann Goldstein. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

### ***In-text citation***

(Lahiri 2016, 146)

### **E-book**

For books consulted online, include a URL or the name of the database in the reference list entry. For other types of e-books, name the format. If no fixed page numbers are available, cite a section title or a chapter or other number in the text, if any (or simply omit).

### ***Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)***

Austen, Jane. 2007. *Pride and Prejudice*. New York: Penguin Classics. Kindle.

Borel, Brooke. 2016. *The Chicago Guide to Fact-Checking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ProQuest Ebrary.

Kurland, Philip B., and Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987. *The Founders’ Constitution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/>.

Melville, Herman. 1851. *Moby-Dick; or, The Whale*. New York: Harper & Brothers. <http://mel.hofstra.edu/moby-dick-the-whale-proofs.html>.

### ***In-text citations***

(Austen 2007, chap. 3)

(Borel 2016, 92)

(Kurland and Lerner 1987, chap. 10, doc. 19)

(Melville 1851, 627)

### **Journal article**

In the reference list, include the page range for the whole article. In the text, cite specific page numbers. For articles consulted online, include a URL or the name of the database in the reference list entry. Many journal articles list a DOI (Digital Object Identifier). A DOI forms a permanent URL that begins <https://doi.org/>. This URL is preferable to the URL that appears in your browser's address bar.

### ***Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)***

Keng, Shao-Hsun, Chun-Hung Lin, and Peter F. Orazem. 2017. "Expanding College Access in Taiwan, 1978–2014: Effects on Graduate Quality and Income Inequality." *Journal of Human Capital* 11, no. 1 (Spring): 1–34. <https://doi.org/10.1086/690235>.

LaSalle, Peter. 2017. "Conundrum: A Story about Reading." *New England Review* 38 (1): 95–109. Project MUSE.

Satterfield, Susan. 2016. "Livy and the *Pax Deum*." *Classical Philology* 111, no. 2 (April): 165–76.

### ***In-text citations***

(Keng, Lin, and Orazem 2017, 9–10)

(LaSalle 2017, 95)

(Satterfield 2016, 170)

Journal articles often list many authors, especially in the sciences. If there are four or more authors, list up to ten in the reference list; in the text, list only the first, followed by *et al.* ("and others"). For more than ten authors (not shown here), list the first seven in the reference list, followed by *et al.*

### ***Reference list entry***

Bay, Rachael A., Noah Rose, Rowan Barrett, Louis Bernatchez, Cameron K. Ghalambor, Jesse R. Lasky, Rachel B. Brem, Stephen R. Palumbi, and Peter Ralph. 2017. "Predicting Responses to Contemporary Environmental Change Using Evolutionary Response Architectures," *American Naturalist* 189, no. 5 (May): 463–73. <https://doi.org/10.1086/691233>.

### ***In-text citation***

(Bay et al. 2017, 465)

For more examples, see [15.46–49](#) in *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

### **News or magazine article**

Articles from newspapers or news sites, magazines, blogs, and the like are cited similarly. In the reference list, it can be helpful to repeat the year with sources that are cited also by month and day. Page numbers, if any, can be cited in the text but are omitted from a reference list entry. If you consulted the article online, include a URL or the name of the database.

#### ***Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)***

Manjoo, Farhad. 2017. “Snap Makes a Bet on the Cultural Supremacy of the Camera.” *New York Times*, March 8, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/technology/snap-makes-a-bet-on-the-cultural-supremacy-of-the-camera.html>.

Mead, Rebecca. 2017. “The Prophet of Dystopia.” *New Yorker*, April 17, 2017.

Pai, Tanya. 2017. “The Squishy, Sugary History of Peeps.” *Vox*, April 11, 2017. <http://www.vox.com/culture/2017/4/11/15209084/peeps-easter>.

Pegoraro, Rob. 2007. “Apple’s iPhone Is Sleek, Smart and Simple.” *Washington Post*, July 5, 2007. LexisNexis Academic.

#### ***In-text citation***

(Manjoo 2017)

(Mead 2017, 43)

(Pegoraro 2007)

Readers’ comments are cited in the text but omitted from a reference list.

#### ***In-text citation***

(Eduardo B [Los Angeles], March 9, 2017, comment on Manjoo 2017)

For more examples, see [15.49](#) (newspapers and magazines) and [15.51](#) (blogs) in *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

### **Book review**

#### ***Reference list entry***

Kakutani, Michiko. 2016. “Friendship Takes a Path That Diverges.” Review of *Swing Time*, by Zadie Smith. *New York Times*, November 7, 2016.

#### ***In-text citation***

(Kakutani 2016)

### **Interview**

#### ***Reference list entry***

Stamper, Kory. 2017. "From 'F-Bomb' to 'Photobomb,' How the Dictionary Keeps Up with English." Interview by Terry Gross. *Fresh Air*, NPR, April 19, 2017. Audio, 35:25. <http://www.npr.org/2017/04/19/524618639/from-f-bomb-to-photobomb-how-the-dictionary-keeps-up-with-english>.

#### ***In-text citation***

(Stamper 2017)

### **Thesis or dissertation**

#### ***Reference list entry***

Rutz, Cynthia Lillian. 2013. "King Lear and Its Folktale Analogues." PhD diss., University of Chicago.

#### ***In-text citation***

(Rutz 2013, 99–100)

### **Website content**

It is often sufficient simply to describe web pages and other website content in the text ("As of May 1, 2017, Yale's home page listed . . ."). If a more formal citation is needed, it may be styled like the examples below. For a source that does not list a date of publication or revision, use *n.d.* (for "no date") in place of the year and include an access date.

#### ***Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)***

Bouman, Katie. 2016. "How to Take a Picture of a Black Hole." Filmed November 2016 at TEDxBeaconStreet, Brookline, MA. Video, 12:51. [https://www.ted.com/talks/katie\\_bouman\\_what\\_does\\_a\\_black\\_hole\\_look\\_like](https://www.ted.com/talks/katie_bouman_what_does_a_black_hole_look_like).

Google. 2017. "Privacy Policy." Privacy & Terms. Last modified April 17, 2017. <https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/>.

Yale University. n.d. "About Yale: Yale Facts." Accessed May 1, 2017. <https://www.yale.edu/about-yale/yale-facts>.

#### ***In-text citations***

(Bouman 2016)

(Google 2017)

(Yale University n.d.)

For more examples, see [15.50–52](#) in *The Chicago Manual of Style*. For multimedia, including live performances, see [15.57](#).

### **Social media content**

Citations of content shared through social media can usually be limited to the text (as in the first example below). If a more formal citation is needed, a reference list entry may be appropriate. In place of a title, quote up to the first 160 characters of the post. Comments are cited in reference to the original post.

#### ***Text***

Conan O'Brien's tweet was characteristically deadpan: "In honor of Earth Day, I'm recycling my tweets" (@ConanOBrien, April 22, 2015).

#### ***Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)***

Chicago Manual of Style. "Is the world ready for singular they? We thought so back in 1993." Facebook, April 17, 2015. <https://www.facebook.com/ChicagoManual/posts/10152906193679151>.

Souza, Pete (@petesouza). 2016. "President Obama bids farewell to President Xi of China at the conclusion of the Nuclear Security Summit." Instagram photo, April 1, 2016. <https://www.instagram.com/p/BDrmfXTtNCt/>.

#### ***In-text citations***

(Chicago Manual of Style 2015)

(Souza 2016)

(Michele Truty, April 17, 2015, 1:09 p.m., comment on Chicago Manual of Style 2015)

### **Personal communication**

Personal communications, including email and text messages and direct messages sent through social media, are usually cited in the text only; they are rarely included in a reference list.

#### ***In-text citation***

(Sam Gomez, Facebook message to author, August 1, 2017)