819 Phil.

310

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 200026, October 04, 2017 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARMANDO DELECTOR, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case involves a brother fatally shooting his own brother. In his defense, the accused
pleaded accident as an exempting circumstance. The trial and intermediate appellate courts
rejected his plea and found him guilty of murder qualified by treachery. Hence, he has come to
us to air his final appeal for absolution.

The Case

Under review is the decision promulgated on September 22, 2006,[1] whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision rendered on March 17, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 41, in Gandara, Samar convicting the accused of murder for the killing of the late
Vicente Delector, and penalizing him with reclusion perpetua, with modification by increasing
moral damages to P50,000.00.[2]

Antecedents

At about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 8, 1997, the late Vicente Delector was talking
with his brother, Antolin, near his residence in Barangay Diaz in Gandara, Samar when the
accused, another brother, shot him twice. Vicente was rushed to the Gandara District Hospital
where he was attended to by Dr. Leonida Taningco, but he was later on transferred to the Samar
Provincial Hospital where he succumbed to his gunshot wounds at about 1:00 a.m. of the next
day.[3]

Vicente's son, Arnel, identified his uncle, the accused, as his father's assailant. Arnel attested
that the accused had fired his gun at his father from their mother's house, [4] and had hit his
father who was then talking with Antolin. Corroborating Arnel's identification was Raymond
Reyes, who had happened to be along after having come from his school. Raymond also said
that Vicente had been only conversing with Antolin when the accused shot him twice. [5]

On October 2, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar charged the accused with
murder in the RTC through the following information, viz.:

That on or about the 8th day of August, 1997, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay
Diaz, Municipality of Gandara, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot one VICENTE DELECTOR alias TINGTING with the use of a firearm (revolver), which
the accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused the untimely death of said
Vicente Delector.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

In his defense, the accused insisted during the trial that the shooting of Vicente had been by
accident. His own son corroborated his insistence. According to them, Vicente had gone to their
house looking for him, but he had earlier left to go to their mother's house nearby in order to
avoid a confrontation with Vicente; however, Vicente followed him to their mother's house and
dared him to come out, compelling Antolin to intervene and attempt to pacify Vicente. Instead,
Vicente attacked Antolin, which forced the accused to go out of their mother's house. Seeing
Vicente to be carrying his gun, he tried to wrest the gun from Vicente, and they then grappled
with each other for control of the gun. At that point, the gun accidentally fired, and Vicente was
hit.[7]

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its decision,[8] finding the accused guilty of murder, and disposing:

WHEREFORE, accused Armando Delector is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and is hereby meted a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Accused shall likewise indemnify the heirs of Vicente Delector the sum of Php50,000.00, actual
damages of Php12,000.00, moral damages of Php30,000.00 and costs.

In line with Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Warden of the Sub-
Provincial Jail, Calbayog City, is hereby directed to immediately transmit the living body of the
accused Armando Delector to the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila where he
may remain to be detained. The accused shall be credited for the period he was under
preventive detention provided he has previously expressed his written conformity to comply
with the discipline, rules and regulations by the detention center, otherwise he shall be entitled
to only 4/5 thereof pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Decision of the CA

Aggrieved, the accused appealed, contending that:

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED GIVING FULL FAITH AND CEREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; and

II

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the conviction for murder subject to an increase of the moral
damages to P50,000.00,[10] to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by

us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court in
Criminal Case No. 3403 with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is increased
to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

The CA opined that the exempting circumstance of accident was highly improbable, stating:

Indeed, given the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim, it is highly improbable
that the same was due to an accident. It is unlikely that the accused-appellant would purposely
set out and grapple with the victim who, if he is to be believed, was already armed with a gun
while he (accused-appellant) was totally unarmed. Such actuation is utterly inconsistent with
the ordinary and normal behavior of one who is facing imminent danger to one's life,
considering the primary instinct of self-preservation. But then, even granting that the accused-
appellant merely acted in defense of his other brother, Antolin, his failure to help or show
concern to the victim, who was also his brother, casts serious doubts to his defense of accident.
Furthermore, a revolver, the gun involved in this case, is not one that is prone to accidental
firing because of the nature of its mechanism. Considerable pressure on the trigger must have
been applied for it to have fired.[11]

Hence, this appeal, in which the accused insists that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.[12]

On its part, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its appellee's
brief maintaining that the evidence of guilt was sufficient, but recommending that the crime for
which the accused should be held guilty of was homicide, not murder, considering that the
records did not support the holding that he had deliberately and consciously adopted a method
of attack that would insure the death of the victim; and that evident premeditation was not also
shown to be attendant.[13]

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the decision of the CA that accident could not be appreciated in favor of the accused,
but we must find and declare that, indeed, the crime committed was homicide, not murder.

To start with, the lower courts did not err in giving more credence to the testimonies of the
Prosecution's witnesses instead of to the testimony of the accused and his son. Arnel and
Raymond positively identified the accused as the assailant. Their identification constituted
direct evidence of the commission of the crime, and was fully corroborated by the recollection
of a disinterested witness in the person of Dr. Taningco, the attending physician of the victim at
the Gandara District Hospital, to the effect that the victim had declared to the police
investigator interviewing him that it was the accused who had shot him.[14] The testimonies of
Raymond and Dr. Taningco are preferred to the self-serving and exculpatory declarations of the
accused and his son.
The factual findings of the RTC are accorded the highest degree of respect, especially if, as now,
the CA adopted and confirmed them. Unlike the appellate courts, including ours, the trial judge
had the unique firsthand opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses
when they testified at the trial, which were factors in the proper appreciation of evidence of
past events. Such factual findings should be final and conclusive on appeal unless there is a
demonstrable error in appreciation, or a misapprehension of the facts.[15]

Secondly, the RTC and the CA both observed that the exempting circumstance of accident was
highly improbable because the accused grappled with the victim for control of the gun. We see
no reason to overturn the observations of the lower courts.

Article 12, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability "(a)ny person
who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it." The elements of this exempting circumstance are, therefore,
that the accused: (1) is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) causes injury to another
by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it.

Accident could not be appreciated herein as an exempting circumstance simply because the
accused did not establish that he had acted with due care, and without fault or intention of
causing the injuries to the victim. The gun was a revolver that would not fire unless there was
considerable pressure applied on its trigger, or its hammer was pulled back and released. The
assertion of accident could have been accorded greater credence had there been only a single
shot fired, for such a happenstance could have been attributed to the unintentional pulling of
the hammer during the forceful grappling for control of the gun. Yet, the revolver fired twice,
which we think eliminated accident. Verily, the CA itself pointedly debunked the story of the
accused as to how the accident had occurred by characterizing such story not only
incomprehensible but also contrary to human experience and behavior.[16] We adopt and
reiterate the following observations by the CA:

... had the accused really been grappling and twisting the victim's right hand which was holding
a gun, the latter would not have sustained the wounds. It was improbable that the gun would
fire not only once but twice and both times hitting the victim, had its trigger not been pulled.
Further, the location of the gunshot wounds belies and negate(d) accused (appellant's) claim
of accident.

Also, the Court finds incredible [the] accused (appellant's) allegation that he did not know that
the victim was hit. He admitted there were two gun reports. The natural tendency of (a) man in
his situation would (be to) investigate what was hit. He surely must have known his brother was
hit as he even said he let go of the gun. Then he said his brother went home so he also went
home. It is odd that he did not attempt to help or show concern for the victim, his brother, had
his intention (been) really merely to pacify.[17]

We reiterate that issues concerning the credibility of the witnesses and their account of the
events are best resolved by the trial court whose calibration of testimonies, and assessment of
and conclusion about their testimonies are generally given conclusive effect. This settled rule
acknowledges that, indeed, the trial court had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor
and conduct of the witnesses, and is thus in the best position to discern whether they were
telling or distorting the truth.[18]

Nonetheless, the Court cannot uphold the judgments of the CA and the RTC and convict the
accused for murder. A reading of the information indicates that murder had not been charged
against him. The allegation of the information that:

xxx the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one VICENTE DELECTOR alias TINGTING with the use of a firearm (revolver), which the accused
had conveniently provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused the untimely death of said Vicente
Delector.

did not sufficiently aver acts constituting either or both treachery and evident premeditation.
The usage of the terms treachery and evident premeditation, without anything more, did not
suffice considering that such terms were in the nature of conclusions of law, not factual
averments.

The sufficiency of the information is to be judged by the rule under which the information
against the accused was filed. In this case, that rule was Section 9, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which provided thusly:

Section 9. Cause of accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in
the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (8)

Section 9 required that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be
stated "in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the
statute defining the offense." As such, the nature and character of the crime charged are
determined not by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been
violated but by the facts alleged in the indictment, that is, the actual recital of the facts as
alleged in the body of the information, and not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law.[19] The facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical
name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the character
of the crime.[20]

To enable "a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be

charged," as Section 9 further required, the courts should be mindful that the accused should
be presumed innocent of wrongdoing, and was thus completely unaware of having done
anything wrong in relation to the accusation. The information must then sufficiently give him or
her the knowledge of what he or she allegedly committed. To achieve this, the courts should
assiduously take note of what Justice Moreland appropriately suggested in United States v. Lim
San,[21] and enforce compliance therewith by the State, to wit:

xxxx Notwithstanding apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we
ought to say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the
information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the
pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he
must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the requirements of plain
justice.

xxxx

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on
the merits, xxx. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all
things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he
commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the
acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law
denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in
the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a
conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a
real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the
name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial
rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines
what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court
alone to say what the crime is or what it is named. xxx.

In People v. Dimaano,[22] the Court has reiterated the foregoing guideline thuswise:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by
the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does
not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

If the standards of sufficiency defined and set by the applicable rule of procedure were not
followed, the consequences would be dire for the State, for the accused could be found and
declared guilty only of the crime properly charged in the information. As declared in People v.
Manalili:[23]

xxx an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint
or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint
or information would be violative of this constitutional right. Indeed, the accused cannot be
convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him.

Article 14, paragraph 16, of the Revised Penal Code states that "[t]here is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which offended party might make." For treachery to be
appreciated, therefore, two elements must concur, namely: (1) that the means of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate;
and (2) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted,[24] that is, the
means, method or form of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon or consciously
adopted by the offender.[25]

Treachery, which the CA and the RTC ruled to be attendant, always included basic constitutive
elements whose existence could not be assumed. Yet, the information nowhere made any
factual averment about the accused having deliberately employed means, methods or forms in
the execution of the act - setting forth such means, methods or forms in a manner that would
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense was intended to be charged -
that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. To reiterate what was earlier indicated, it
was not enough for the information to merely state treachery as attendant because the term
was not a factual averment but a conclusion of law.

The submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that neither treachery nor evident
premeditation had been established against the accused is also notable. A review reveals that
the record did not include any showing of the presence of the elements of either circumstance.

As a consequence, the accused could not be properly convicted of murder, but only of
homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249, Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

The accused is entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus, the
minimum of his indeterminate sentence should come from prision mayor, and the maximum
from the medium period of reclusion temporal due to the absence of any modifying
circumstance. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence is nine years of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum.

Conformably with People v. Jugueta,[26] the Court grants to the heirs of the late Vicente Delector
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages (in lieu of actual damages for burial expenses), plus interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this decision until the full satisfaction.

The records show that the accused was first detained at the Sub-Provincial Jail in Calbayog City
on November 19, 1997,[27] and was transferred by the RTC on July 18, 2003 following his
conviction for murder to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, Metro
Manila.[28] Under the terms of this decision, the period of his actual imprisonment has exceeded
his maximum sentence, and now warrants his immediate release from his place of confinement.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 22, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals subject to the MODIFICATION that accused ARMANDO DELECTOR is found and
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and, ACCORDINGLY, sentences him
to suffer the indeterminate sentence of NINE YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM,
TO 14 YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, AS THE MAXIMUM;
and ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of the late Vicente Delector P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this decision until the full satisfaction, and the costs of suit.

Considering that accused ARMANDO DELECTOR appears to have been in continuous detention
since November 19, 1997, his immediate release from the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City,
Metro Manila is ordered unless there are other lawful causes warranting his continuing
detention.

The Court DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to immediately implement this
decision, and to render a report on his compliance within 10 days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Leonen, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

October 25, 2017

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on October 4, 2017 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by
the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office
on October 25, 2017 at 10:45 a.m.
 Very truly yours,

(SGD)

WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

ORDER OF RELEASE

TO: The Director

Bureau of Corrections
1770 Muntinlupa City

GREETINGS:

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court on October 4, 2017 promulgated a Decision in the above-entitled
case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 22, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals subject to the MODIFICATION that accused ARMANDO DELECTOR is found
and pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and, ACCORDINGLY, sentences
him to suffer the indeterminate sentence of NINE YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE
MINIMUM, TO 14 YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, AS THE
MAXIMUM; and ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of the late Vicente Delector P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality
of this decision until the full satisfaction, and the costs of suit.

Considering that accused ARMANDO DELECTOR appears to have been in continuous detention
since November 19, 1997, his immediate release from the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City,
Metro Manila is ordered unless there are other lawful causes warranting his continuing
detention.

The Court DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to immediately implement this
decision, and to render a report on his compliance within 10 days from notice.
SO ORDERED."

NOW, THEREFORE, You are hereby ordered to immediately release ARMANDO

DELECTOR unless there are other lawful causes for which he should be further detained, and to
return this Order with the certificate of your proceedings within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.

GIVEN by the Honorable PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Chairperson of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 4th day of October 2017.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)

WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-10; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate
Justice Romeo F. Barza and Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla.

[2]
CA rollo pp. 19-30; penned by Judge Rosario B. Bandal.

[3]
Rollo, pp. 3-4.

[4]
TSN, Arnel Delector, August 9, 1999, p. 19.

[5]
Id. at 14.

[6]
Rollo, p. 4.

[7]
TSN, July 11, 2000, pp. 6-10.

[8]
Supra note 2.

[9]
CA rollo, pp. 29-30.
[10]
Supra note 1.

[11]
Id. at 8-9.

[12]
Rollo, p. 50.

[13]
Id. at 88-99.

[14]
Id. at 7.

[15]
People v. Tuy, G.R. No. 179476, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 534, 537; Garong v. People, G.R.
No. 148971, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 446, 455; Lubos v. Galupo, G.R. No. 139136, January
16, 2002, 373 SCRA 618, 622.

[16]
Rollo, p. 7.

[17]
Rollo, pp. 7-8.

[18]
People v. Lagman, G.R. No. 197807, April 16, 2012, 669 SCRA 512, 525.

[19]
People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 130210, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 168, 175; People v. Juachon,
G.R. No. 111630, December 6, 1999, 319 SCRA 761, 770; People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 99355,
August 11, 1997, 277 SCRA 67, 88.

[20]
People v. Escosio, G.R. No. 101742, March 25, 1993, 220 SCRA 475, 488; People v. Mendoza,
G.R. No. 67610, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 743, 752; People v. Bali-Balita, G.R. No. 134266,
September 15, 2000, 340 SCRA 450, 469; Buhat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119601, December
17, 1996, 265 SCRA 701, 716-717.

[21]
17 Phil. 273 (1910).

[22]
G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 647, 666-667 (the crimes involved two
counts of rape and one count of attempted rape).

[23]
G.R. No. 121671, August 14, 1998, 294 SCRA 220, 252.

[24]
People v. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, September 10, 2003, 410 SCRA 463, 480; People v. Hugo,
G.R. No. 134604, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 62, 80-81.
[25]
People v. Pumalan, No. L-54562, August 6, 1987, 153 SCRA 1, 9.

[26]
G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.

[27]
CA rollo, p. 32.

[28]
Id. at 36.

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