3. Conjugal Partnership Property What must be established?

a. Presumption that property is conjugal  Possession of paraphernal funds under her administration
FC, Article 116 and available for investment
 Sufficiency of such funds for the price of the property
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the
 Investment of such funds in the property in question
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted, or registered in
 Following will be ENOUGH if taken TOGETHER
the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
o Title to the property is in name of wife alone
unless the contrary is proved.
o Husband gave his consent to its being mortgaged
by the wife
Presumption of Conjugality o Wife was financially able to buy the property
 Not necessary to prove that the property as acquired with
o Admission or acknowledge of one spouse that the
funds of the partnership, BUT must prove that property money used to purchase the property came from
was acquired DURING the marriage. the other spouse is evidence against the party
 Prevails even over the ordinary rules of accession
making the admission.
Rebutting Presumption
● There must be strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses. The proof must be clear, satisfactory, and convincing.
○ Why? Interest of third persons would be prejudiced by failure to
give the presumption its full force and effect.
● Burden of proof rests on the asserting party.

What is NOT ENOUGH?

● Simple manifestation in the deed of acquisition that property is
exclusive property
○ Would make spouses sole arbiter of the character of the property
acquired during the marriage
 Declaration in deed of sale, if the sale is made prior to the
marriage but executed during the marriage.
 Deed of sale or certificate of title of the registration or tax
declaration placed in the name of one of the spouses, if
there is no showing of date of acquisition.
Jocson v CA
● Proof that property was acquired during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non for the presumption of conjugal ownership
● The phrase “married to” indicates only the status of the person,
not enough to prove that is was acquired during the marriage since
it is a certificate of registration, not acquisition.

Recitation Summary:
1. In 1972, Emilio Jocson died intestate while his wife Alejandra
was long dead already by then.
2. His son Moises questions the sale of almost all his father’s
property to his sister Augustina.
3. Moises claims that the sold properties were unliquidated
conjugal properties as they were registered under the name of
“Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”, hence could not
be sold by Emilio.
4. The Court held that while there is a presumption of conjugal
property, the alleger must first prove that the property in
question was acquired during the marriage.
5. Since Moises was not able to prove that the property in
question was acquired during the marriage of his parents, the
Court has to base on the title per se and the formula of “A
married to B” means exclusive and not conjugal ownership.
6. The Court clarified that the properties could have been
acquired before the marriage but were just registered after the
marriage.
Facts: 2. W/N the complaint is already barred by prescription. NO.
1. The family members involved are: a. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, a contract tainted by vitiated
a. Alejandra Jocson – Wife, died first, intestate consent, as when consent was obtained through fraud, is voidable;
b. EmilioJocson – Husband, outlived the wife, sold properties to and the action for annulment must be brought within four years
daughter before dying from the time of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4,
c. Moises Jocson – Son, questions the sale of properties to sister Civil Code), otherwise the contract may no longer be contested.
d. AgustinaJocson-Vasquez – Daughter, buyer of father’s properties, For real estate transactions, discovery is deemed to have taken
married to Ernesto Vasquez. place at the time the convenant was registered with the Register of
2. Emilio Jocson executed 3 documents of sale to Agustina during his lifetime: Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman). Since Exhibits 3 and 4 were
a. 1968 Deed of Sale (in Filipino) for 6 parcels of land in Naic, Cavite – registered on July 29, 1968 but Moises Jocson filed his complaint
assessed to be Php 8,920, purchased at Php 10,000. only on June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as
b. 1968 Deed of Sale (in Filipino) for 2 rice mills and a camarin / camalig in these documents were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had
Naic, Cavite – assesssed to be Php 3,500, purchased at Php 5,000. prescribed.
c. 1969 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale which b. However, the other allegation has not yet prescribed. According to
whereby: Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without cause produce no
[Link] and Agustina, without the participation and intervention of Moises, effect whatsoever. A contract of sale with a simulated price is void
extrajudicially partitioned the unsettled estate of Alejandra into three parts (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3])), and an action for the
equally divided to Emilio, Agustina and Moises each receives 1/3. declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (Article 1410, Civil
[Link] sold his 1/3 share to Agustina – assessed to be Php 24,840, Code; Castillo v. Galvan).
purchased at Php 8,000.
3. Moises claims that the transactions are null and void since: 3. W/N the transactions were null and void. NO.
a. the sold properties were unliquidated conjugal properties as they Allegation of Invalidity due to Fraud / Simulated Sale
were registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to a. Moises claims that Agustina did not have the money to purchase
Alejandra Poblete”, hence could not be sold by Emilio, and the properties since she has no other income aside from helping in
b. the purchase prices were so low that the sale involved simulated the family business of rice fields and rice mills.
consideration / vitiated consent. b. Agustina claimed that she has her own business of buying sand
selling palay even before she was married. This was corroborated
1. W/N CA erred in considering only the allegation of fraud / vitiated by Moises’ own witness, Isaac Bagnas. Moises himself was not
consent and not considering the transactions null and void due to the sure whether Agustina had other businesses or not.
sales being simulated / fictitious. NO. c. The allegation of Moises was not proven.
a. The CA was actually able to make a judgment regarding the
allegation of simulation.
b. “That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, are decisively Invalidity due to Purchase Price Being Too Low
not simulated or fictitious contracts, since Emilio Jocson actually d. Only 1 transaction had a purchase price below assessed value.
and really intended them to be effective and binding against him, e. Moreover, any difference between the market value and the
as to divest him of the full dominion and ownership over the purchase price was only slight, may not be so shocking considering
properties subject of said assailed contracts, as in fact all his titles that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter in which
over the same were all cancelled and new ones issued to appellant case filial love must be taken into consideration (Alsua-Betts vs.
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez” CA.
 f. In the deeds of sale, Emilio admitted that he sold the properties properties. The properties are technically registered in his name
below market value due to Agustina being a good daughter. alone.
g. Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a contract
of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that Ruling:
the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
(Article 1470, Civil Code) and there is nothing in the records at all Appeals is AFFIRMED. The sales of property by Emilio Jocson to his
to indicate any defect in Emilio Jocson's consent. daughter Augustina Jocson-Valdez are valid.
Invalidity due to Improbability of a Sale between a Father and his Daughter
h. This kind of sale is not inherently improbable.
i. In this case, its improbability is purely speculative and has no
relevance to a contract where all the essential requisites of consent,
object and cause are clearly present.
Invalidity due to Properties being Conjugal
j. This involves only the first 2 transactions since the 3 rd transaction
validly involved the share of Emilio in the estate of his wife.
k. The properties are exclusively owned by Emilio and could thus be
sold.
l. Article 60 of the CC provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
m. However, in Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, the Court held
that: The party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage.
n. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of “Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is no proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses’ coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It
is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It
may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio
Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after
his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was
described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
o. Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on
their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the
registered owner. This is so because the words “married to’
preceding “Alejandra Poblete’ are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the
Francisco v CA to show that the property was acquired during the marriage
● Absent proof of acquisition at marriage, property cannot be is on the party invoking such presumption
presumed to conjugal. Such proof must be strong, clear, and 10. Teresita failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the
convincing. properties were acquired DURING her marriage with
● Phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of civil status. Eusebio
● For presumption to kick in, must be shown that property was
acquired DURING marriage.

RECIT SUMMARY
1. Petitioner Teresita is the legal wife of private respondent
Eusebio Francisco by his 2nd marriage
2. Private respondents Conchita, Araceli, and Antonio are
Eusebio’s children by his 1st marriage
3. Teresita alleges that since their marriage, she and Eusebio
have acquired properties in Brgy. Balite and Barrio San
Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, and that these were administered
by Eusebio until he became unfit to do so due to illness
4. Eusebio signed a general power of attorney authorizing
Conchita to administer the properties
5. Teresita thereafter filed for damages and annulment of the
general power of attorney
6. She also sought to be declared administratrix of the
disputed properties, claiming that these were conjugal
properties
7. After the RTC and CA ruled in favor of private
respondents, Teresita filed this petition with the Supreme
Court
8. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA,
holding that the disputed properties are the exclusive
property of Eusebio
9. Although there is a presumption that property of the
marriage is conjugal (Art. 160, NCC), the burden of proof
FACTS OF THE CASE b. Although there is a presumption that property of the marriage is conjugal
 Petitioner Teresita Francisco is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio (Art. 160, NCC), the burden of proof to show that the property was
Francisco by his 2nd marriage acquired during the marriage is on the party invoking such
 Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli Marilla, and Antonio presumption
Francisco are children of Eusebio by his 1st marriage c. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for
 Teresita alleges that since their marriage in 1962, she and Eusebio acquired the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership
the following properties: d. On the land in Brgy. Balite: Teresita failed to refute Eusebio’s testimony
o Sari-sari store, residential house and lot, apartment in Brgy. Balite, that these were inherited from his parents
Rodriguez, Rizal i. Pursuant to Art. 148, NCC, this is exclusive property
o House and lot in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal because it was acquired by Eusebio by lucrative title (i.e.
 These were administered by Eusebio until tuberculosis, heart disease, and inheritance)
cancer rendered him unfit to do so e. On the house, apartment, and sari-sari store in Brgy. Balite: the mere fact
 Private respondents convinced Eusebio to sign a general power of attorney that Teresita is the licensee of the sari-sari store or is the applicant for the
authorizing Conchita to administer the properties building permit for the house and apartment does not establish that these
 Aug. 31, 1988 – Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of the improvements were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio
general power of attorney f. On the property in Barrio San Isidro:certificate of title registered in the
o She also sought to be declared administratrix of the disputed name of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco” is no proof
properties that the property was acquired during their marriage
i. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are 2 different
 RTC DECISION: in favor of private respondents because of lack of proof
acts
that the properties were acquired during the 2 nd conjugal partnership or that
they pertained exclusively to Teresita ii. Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already existing
o Hence, the properties belong exclusively to Eusebio and he has the
iii. “Married to Teresita Francisco” is descriptive only of
capacity to administer them
Eusebio’s civil status
 CA DECISION: affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC
3. WON Eusebio shall retain control of the administration of the disputed
properties
ISSUES
a. YES. These properties are exclusively his capital
1. WON Arts. 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code apply in this case despite
b. Even if they were conjugal properties, Teresita cannot administer them
being repealed by Art. 254 of the Family Code
because Eusebio is not incapacitated to do so
a. YES. Teresita and Eusebio were married in 1962, before the effectivity of
c. Lower court found that, contrary to petitioner’s claim, Eusebio is not
the FC
suffering from serious illness so as to impair his fitness to administer his
b. Applying the new law would impair prior vested rights pursuant to Art.
properties
256 in relation to Art. 105, par. 2 of the FC
c. The repeal of Arts. 158 and 160, NCC does not operate to prejudice or
RULING: Petition is denied. CA decision is affirmed. The subject properties
affect rights which have become vested or accrued while these provisions
are exclusive property of EusebioFrancisco and he shall be the administrator
were in force
of the same.
2. Whether the disputed properties are conjugal properties or exclusive
property of Eusebio
a. EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY. Petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence
to show that the properties were acquired during her marriage with
Eusebio
 Dewara v Alvero  Lot was acquired by the petitioner through consolidation of the lot left by her
● Burden of proof falls on the person contesting the presumption in grandfather to her father and his 2 siblings
favor of conjugality  One sibling gave her share to the other 2 siblings, then those 2 sold their shares
to the petitioner for an amount which is claimed to be far below market value
● The presumption of conjugality is not affected by separation in and thus is claimed to be indicative of a donation and therefore gratuitous in
fact of the spouses character
 On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision
 Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara (Elenita) Issue and ratio:
were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of
governed their marital relations. Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo - It is CPG
 Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in  There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita
California while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City. and Eduardo during their marriage.
 January 20, 1985 - Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name  It is also undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal
of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case partnership of gains, since they were married before the enactment of the Family
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Eduardo before Code and they did not execute any prenuptial agreement as to their property
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch IV, Bacolod City. The relations.
MTCC found Eduardo guilty. o Thus, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the
o Ordered to pay a civil indemnity of Sixty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety- lot in question.
Eight Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P62,598.70) as actual damages and Ten  Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her father
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages. and her aunt was in the nature of a donation because of the alleged gross
 RTC affirmed decision disparity between the actual value of the property and the monetary
 The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince this
returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his name. Court of the paraphernal character of the property. Elenita proffered no
 Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent StenileAlvero, to levy on Lot No. evidence of the market value or assessed value of the subject property in 1975.
234-C, Psd. 26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of 1,440 square meters,  Thus, we agree with the CA that Elenita has not sufficiently proven that the
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-80054,in the name of ELENITA prices involved in the sales in question were so inadequate for the Court to
M. DEWARA, of legal age, Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara, and resident reach a conclusion that the transfers were in the nature of a donation rather
of Bacolod City, to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo. than a sale.
 The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo (seizure) on the title of the lot and o Furthermore, gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale,
subsequently sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no except as it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really
interested buyers other than Ronnie. intended a donation or some other act or contract.
 The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela  The records are bereft of proof that the consent of petitioner’s father and her
to satisfy the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo. aunt were vitiated or that, in reality, they intended the sale to be a donation or
 Ronnie then caused the consolidation of title in a Cadastral Proceeding before some other contract.
the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-80054 in the name of  Inadequacy of the price per se will not rule out the transaction as one of sale; the
Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of respondent price must be grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience, such that the
spouses. mind would revolt at it and such that a reasonable man would neither directly
 Petitioner contested the above, and RTC sided with petitioner and declared that nor indirectly consent to it
said property was paraphernal in nature.  However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal property
of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may
 automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations,  The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of
fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. both the husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the
 Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it spouses;
must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations  Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational
should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. or other course
 Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a  The enumeration above-listed should first be complied with before the
rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is conjugal partnership may be held to answer for the liability adjudged
bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be against Eduardo.
insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership  Finally, the indemnity imposed against Eduardo shall earn an interest
assets only after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code at the rate of twelve percent per annum, in accordance with our ruling
have been covered. in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
 The payment of indemnity adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in Criminal Ruling:
Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie may be enforced against the partnership assets CA Decision annulled and set aside. RTC decision is reinstated with
of spouses Elenita and Eduardo after the responsibilities enumerated under modification.
Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered. This remedy is provided for
under Article 163 of the Civil Code
o Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership.
o Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged
to the partnership.
o However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the
marriage, and that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; Article 161 of the Civil Code
enumerates the obligations which the conjugal partnership may be held
answerable, viz.:
 Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
 All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership
 Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which
constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the
partnership;
 Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon
the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs
shall not be charged to the partnership;
 Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
b. Properties that compose the CPG  ● Proceeds will belong to same patrimony as source of
FC, Article 117 funds for premium
 ● If premiums were paid partly from conjugal and partly
The following are conjugal partnership properties:
from separate, then proceeds will be partly conjugal and
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
partly separate
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
If beneficiary is the other spouse
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
● SEPARATE if one spouse gets insurance and assigns the other
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work, or profession
spouse as beneficiary. Beneficiary must
of either or both spouses;
reimburse the partnership with 1⁄2 of premiums paid with conjugal
3) The fruits, natural industrial, or civil, due or received during
funds SEPARATE if spouses are insured jointly, even if
the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits
premiums are paid from conjugal funds.
from exclusive property of each spouse;
○ No obligation to repay any part of premiums to conjugal funds.
4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law
SEPARATE if insurance is procured by a third person and spouse
awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is
is named as beneficiary.
found;
○ A gift to the spouse and is separate property
5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
CONJUGAL if the insurance is procured by spouse for the other
6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in
AND premiums are paid from conjugal funds
excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by
either spouse; and
Products of Industry
7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from
Income from work, labor, or industry of the spouses in the form of:
gambling or betting. Hoever, losses therefrom shall be borne
 Daily wages
exclusively by the loser-spouse.
 Periodic salaries
 Honorarium or fees
Acquisition by Onerous Title  Income from industrial, agricultural, or commercial
The origin or ownership of the money invested or property enterprise
exchanged is inquired into
● Will belong to the same patrimony What is conjugal
Life Insurance  Individual earnings from business purchased with
 ● An onerous contract
paraphernal funds
 ● If taken prior to the marriage to the
 Salaries earned during the marriage, whether received
marriage, then separate. Partnership is entitled to during marriage or after resolution
reimbursement for premiums paid during the marriage. o Salaries earned prior to the marriage are separate,
If beneficiary is the insured himself or his estate even if received during the marriage
  Physical or external manifestation or one’s intellect or
genius
Fruits of the Property  Cannot be conceived separately from its author since it is
Fruits -> all kinds of natural, industrial, or civil fruits coming from taken from his own personality
the capital and products or benefits which the property may
produce. Business Property -> ownership is dependent on the
 Natural and industrial fruits must be received during the ownership of establish or product it is attached to
marriage
 Civil fruits must be due during the marriage ● Follows the ownership of the principal since they are merely
 Fruits of separate property accrued after death of the accessories to some commercial establishment or product
owner are separate property
Earnings and benefits derived from these properties belong to the
Liability for Expenses conjugal partnership.
 Conjugal partnership does not have to reimburse the spouse
for expenses of cultivation; fruits themselves are liable for Registration of Separate Title
expenses of cultivation, especially for their production, IF clearly conjugal or no proof that it belongs exclusively, mere
administration, and preservation fact that registration was made in the name of one spouses only
 Fruits cannot be considered part of the conjugal partnership will NOT be sufficient to defeat the right of the conjugal
until after there is liquidation and payment of expenses, partnership
since only the net income passes to the partnership.
● EXCEPT that third persons rely upon the certificate of title in
Fruits vs Products the registry. Even if the land is purchased with conjugal funds, if
the certificate is exclusively in the name of one spouse, then a third
Fruits Products
person who purchased the property in GOOD FAITH from one
Produced periodically without Objects which are separated or spouse acquires a valid title.
diminution or alteration in the taken from the thing, and are not
substance of the thing produced again once separated Ownership of Hidden Treasure
Belong to the spouse who owns  If treasure is found by chance on a stranger on the land of
Belong to the conjugal
the thing from which they are spouse, share of spouse will be conjugal, and vice-versa.
partnership
taken  If treasure is found by one spouse in his own property, it is
conjugal
Intellectual Property -> considered as separate property of the  If treasure is found by the spouses on the property of either
spouse who produces or invents / discovers it of them, it is conjugal.
Ownership of Livestock
 EXCESS of the same kind at the time of dissolution over
the number at time of marriage constitutes conjugal
property
 The young of the livestock are considered as replacements
of those which die
 In reduction by sale, the number sold would mean a
reduction of capital and must be subtracted from the
capital at time of marriage.
o Proceeds of the sale is separate

Acquisition by Chance
 Acquisition by occupation is conjugal since considered as
products of industry or labor of a spouse
 Acquisitions by games of chance are conjugal, but losses
are borne by spouse alone.
 Capital must be deducted and returned to the gambler
spouse and only the “real winnings” are conjugal
Zulueta v Pan Am
 Damages arising from breach of contract, where payment is
by conjugal funds, form part of the conjugal property.
 No proof that the tickets were purchased with the separate
properties.

Recitation Summary:
 Pan Am was ordered to pay damages to Mr. Zulueta for
breach of contract of carriage.
 After Mr. Zulueta filed for an action for damages, Mrs.
Zulueta filed for dismissal of the case insofar as she is
concerned because she already entered into a compromise
agreement with Pan Am paying her P50,000. The court
denied Mrs. Zulueta’s motion.
 Issue is
o 1. W/N the compromise agreement between Pan
Am and Mrs. Zulueta is enforceable. NO.
o 2. W/N damages form part of the spouses’
conjugal properties. YES
 The payment of P50,000 is effective, insofar as it is
deductible from the award. What is ineffective is the
compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership
is concerned.
 What is acquired with money of the conjugal partnership
belongs thereto or forms part thereof which includes
damages. Since there is no proof that the tickets were
purchased with the separate properties, presumption is
always in favor of the ordinary course where they were
purchased using conjugal funds.
Facts of the Case:  What is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the
 Defendant, Pan Am was ordered to pay for actual and moral or conjugal partnership is concerned. Mrs. Zulueta's motion was for the
exemplary damages for breach of contract of carriage when its agent, dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned, and the defense
Capt. Zentner ordered that the petitioner Mr. Zulueta and his wife and cited in support thereof Article 113 of said Code, pursuant to which
daughter to be off-loaded from the Wake Island- Manila flight. "(t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except:
 Even before Mr. Zulueta had reached the ramp leading to the plane, … (2) If they have in fact been separated for at least one year."
Capt. Zentner was already remonstrating at him in an intemperate and o This provision, was held, however, refers to suits in which the
arrogant tone and attitude ("What do you think you are?), thereby wife is the principal or real party in interest, not to the case at
impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer back in the same vein. As a bar, "in which the husband is the main party in interest, both
consequence, there immediately ensued an altercation in the course of as the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the
which each apparently tried to show that he could not be cowed by the conjugal partnership . . . he having acted in this capacity in
other. Then came the order of Capt. Zentner to off-load all of the entering into the contract of carriage with PANAM and paid
Zuluetas, including Mrs. Zulueta and the minor Miss Zulueta, as well as the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of
their luggage, their overcoats and other effects hand-carried by them; the conjugal partnership," to which the amounts recoverable
but Mr. Zulueta requested that the ladies be allowed to continue the for breach of said contract, accordingly, belong.
trip.  The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an incident of the
 Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded to retaliate and punish him for the humiliation to which her husband had been subjected. The Court
embarrassment and loss of face suffered by defendant's agent. This ordered that said sum of P50,000 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be
vindictive motive is made more manifest by the note delivered to Mr. deducted from the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for
Zulueta by defendant's airport manager at Wake Island, Mr. Sitton, the simple reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, as
stating that the former's stay therein would be "for a minimum of one provided by law, said amount would have to be reckoned with, either as
week," during which he would be charged $13.30 per day. This part of her share in the partnership, or as part of the support which
reference to a "minimum of one week" revealed the intention to keep might have been or may be due to her as wife of Rafael Zulueta. It
him there stranded that long, for no other plane, headed for Manila, was would surely be inane to sentence the defendant to pay the P700,000
expected within said period of time, although Mr. Zulueta managed to due to the plaintiffs and to direct Mrs. Zulueta to return said P50,000 to
board, days later, through a plane that brought him to Hawaii, whence the defendant.
he flew back to the Philippines, via Japan.  What is acquired with money of the conjugal partnership belongs
 While Mr. Zulueta filed for an action for damages, Mrs. Zulueta thereto or forms part thereof which includes damages. Since there is no
subsequently filed for dismissal of the case insofar as she is concerned proof that the tickets were purchased with the separate properties,
after she entered into a compromise agreement with Pan Am paying her presumption is always in favor of the ordinary course where they were
P50,000. The court denied Mrs. Zulueta’s motion. purchased using conjugal funds.
Issues: Ruling: The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Pan Am is ordered to
 W/N the compromise agreement between Pan Am and Mrs. pay the P700,000 damages which is due to Mr. Zulueta
Zulueta is enforceable. NO.
 W/N damages form part of the spouses’ conjugal properties. YES
 The payment of P50,000 is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the
award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount due) from the
defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs.
Zulueta.
Mendoza v Reyes
● Property acquired by funds obtained from loans are part of
conjugal property if loans are for the benefit of the partnership.

Recit Summary:
1. Ponciano Reyes and Julia Reyes, married in 1915,
purchased two lots in 1948. They mortgaged the property
with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to pay for the
instalments on the property. They then leased the properties
to the Mendozas.
2. Without securing Ponciano’s consent, Julia sold the lots to
the Mendozas, asserting that the lots were her paraphernal
property.
3. The Court ruled that the lots were part of the conjugal
property of the spouses, since they were acquired during
the marriage, and the funds used were at the expense of the
common fund.
4. Even if the property was registered in Julia’s name, the law
provides that properties acquired during marriage are
conjugal, and registration in the name of one spouse does
not destroy its conjugal nature.
5. The Court also ruled that Ponciano is not barred by
estoppel. Even if he has claimed in a previous case that the
couple has no conjugal partnership funds, such claim was
not made to mislead the Mendozas or with the intention
that they act upon it.
6. Finally, the Court held that there is no unjust enrichment of
Ponciano if the deed of sale is annulled, since it was to the
wife that the benefit accrued.
7. The Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which
voided the sale of one half of the properties (the share of
Ponciano)
FACTS b. The presumption in Art 160 of the Civil Code (now Art 116, FC)
 Ponciano Reyes and Julia Reyes, married in 1915, purchased two lots also has to be overcome:
in 1947, Lots 5 and 6, Block No. 132, Retiro Street, Quezon City, from "ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
J.M. Tuason& Co. (represented by Gregorio Araneta). In order to pay the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
for the instalments on this purchase, they jointly borrowed money from exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. The lots were used as security,
and thus the spouses executed mortgage contracts in favour of RFC. For this presumption to be operative, all that needs to be proven is
 In the deeds of sale executed by Araneta for the lots, the vendee named that the property was acquired during the marriage.
is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption 'vendee' and
those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent.' c. Evidence shows that the property was acquired during thme
Corresponding TCTs were issued for these lots, which were annotated marriage (married in 1915, purchased in 1948).
with the mortgage contracts. Was the acquisition at the expense of the common fund?
 The spouses built a house and a camarin on the lot. These were leased Under Art 161 of the Civil Code (now Art. 121, FC), debts and
to the spouses Mendoza for ten [Link] contract of lease was signed obligations incurred for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are
by Julia as lessor, with the marital consent of Ponciano. However, the liabilities of the partnership.
spouses were unable to pay the obligations to RFC. The loan becomes obligation of the partnership, and the money
 On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in becomes conjugal property [Castillo, Jr. vs. Pasco (11 SCRA 102,
Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold the lots in question, together with their 107)]
improvements to the Mendozas for P80,000.00 without the knowledge
and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the spouses were living d. The testimony of Julia that the purchase price and the construction
separately and were not in speaking terms. By virtue of such sale, of improvements were from her personal funds is belied by the
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 56110 and 56111 were subsequently mortgage contracts, which show that the properties were paid out
issued in the name of the Mendozas. of the loan from RFC.
 Ponciano now comes to court seeking the annulment of the deed of sale Her ability to raise her own funds is belied by the fact that these
of the two parcels of land, asserting that the lots were conjugal sums were used by the couple to establish businesses and buy
properties. In their testimony, the Mondozas allege that the properties property during happier times.
were the paraphernal property of Julia.
 The trial court ruled in favour of the Mendozas, declaring the lots e. Her claim of exclusive ownership is also belied by ITRs which she
paraphernal property of Julia, and thus she may dispose of them prepared, and which state that the rentals paid by the Mendoza’s
without marital consent. The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling, were part of the conjugal partnership. Other ITRs she prepared also
voiding the sale of one-half of the properties which was Ponciano’s state that the properties are capital assets of the partnership.
share.
Issues: 2. W/NPonciano is estopped from claiming that the lots are conjugal
1. W/N the lots are conjugal property - YES property – NO, estoppel is not present in this case.
a. The applicable law is Art 153 of the Civil Code (now Art 117, FC) a. In 1948, Ponciano was sued by the Gocheco brothers in the
"ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property: Municipal Court of Manila for ejectment from a leased hotel he
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at was operating. Judgement was rendered in favour of the brothers.
the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be In order to garnish the rentals in the disputed building, the brothers
for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;" filed a civil suit against Ponciano.
 b. In the latter case, Ponciano tried to defend by saying that he and
his wife had no conjugal property, and that they acted
independently from one another whenever one engaged in any
business.
c. Article 1437 of the Civil Code provides that when one leads others
to believe in a particular thing and to act in accordance with this
thing, he is prevented in litigation from denying the thing.
d. In estoppel it is essential that the latter shall have relied upon the
misrepresentation and had been influenced and misled thereby.
e. Since the Mendozas were not party to the cases, and there is no
showing that they knew about it or the defence of Ponciano before
they purchased the property, it cannot be said that they were led to
believe in the defence or made to act upon it.
3. W/N the Mendozas could be considered buyers in good faith – No
a. Mrs. Medoza testified that she was assured by Julia that the
properties were paraphernal, and that she never dealt with
Ponciano when the Mendozas were renting the properties they later
purchased.
b. However, the mortgage contracts with RFC, which were issued in
the name of Julia Reyes, married to Ponciano Reyes, have been
annotated in the TCT of the lots purchased.
c. Thus, the Mendozas had notice of the existence and contents of
said mortgages, their joint execution by the spouses Ponciano
Reyes and Julia Reyes and the application of the loans to the
payment to Araneta of the purchase price of the lots in question.
d. Furthermore, property acquired during a marriage is presumed to
be conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the name
of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature.
(Bucoy v. Paulino, 23 SCRA 249).
e. The Mendozas also demanded the consent of Ponciano in the mere
lease of the properties, yet in the deed of sale such was not
required.
4. W/n there would be unjust enrichment by Ponciano if the deed of
sale was annulled – No.
a. The Mendozas admitted that the benefit of one-half of the purchase
price accrued to the wife Julia.
b. Since Poncianodidi not receive any part of the proceeds from Julia,
who has been aligning herself with the couple, there could be no
unjust enrichment.
Ruling: Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Villanueva v IAC property and was owned by Modesto Aranas solely.
● When there is no proof as to when the improvements were made Because Modesto had no legitimate children and survived
on exclusive property and the source of funds used for such his wife, only Modesto’s illegitimate children had the right
improvements, the presumption is that the improvements on the to Lot 13-C.
separate properties are from the separate property of a spouse

RECITATION SUMMARY
1. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay for their loan, so
Bernas acquired the land and was issued TCT No. 15121.
2. A month later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo
Aranas, describing themselves as instrumental witness in
the deed of mortgage, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Roxas City against Jesus Bernas and Remedios Bernas.
3. Consolacion Villanueva and RaymunodAranas, the
plaintiffs, prayed that Jesus and Remedios Bernas’ title
over Lot 13-C be cancelled and they be declared as co-
owners of the land. They grounded their cause of action
upon their alleged discovery of the two wills of Modesto
and Victoria Comorro.
4. RTC ruled on favor of the Bernas spouses. Plaintiffs
appealed to the IAC, but the judgement of the RTC was
only affirmed in toto. Consolacion Villanueva then
appealed to the SC.
5. The SC ruled that Consolacion Villanueva, who was
standing by virtue of Victoria Comorro’s will, had no right
over Lot 13-C or the improvements on the said lot because
Lot 13-C was not conjugal property. Moreover, Victoria
Comorro died before her husand; therefore, she never
inherited anything from Modesto Aranas, and had nothing
to bequeath to Consolacion Villanueva or to anyone else.
6. The SC ruled that the judgement of the IAC is affirmed.
Bernas is deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear
title to Lot 13-C. The property in question was not conjugal
FACTS  That Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas are not
1. Modesto Aranas, married to Victoria Comorro, inherited land, children of either Modesto Aranas or Victoria Comorro
described as Lot 13-C from his deceased parents.  That the lot in question is not expressly mentioned in the will
2. Modesto and Victoria had no children, but Modesto was survived by  That TCT No. 15121 exists, and was issued in favor of
two illegitimate children, Dorothea Ado and Teodoro Aranas. defendant spouses Jesus Bernas and Remedios Bernas
3. Dorothea and Teodoro mortgaged Lot 13-C to Jesus Bernas for P18, 8. Plaintiffs appealed to the IAC, but the judgement of the RTC was
000, with Raymundo Aranas, a relative, as witness to the agreement. only affirmed in toto.
4. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay for their loan, so Bernas 9. Consolacion Villanueva, on her own, then appealed to the SC.
acquired the land and was issued TCT No. 15121.
5. A month later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas,
describing themselves as instrumental witness in the deed of ISSUE
mortgage, filed a complaint with the RTC of Roxas City against
Jesus Bernas and Remedios Bernas. 1. WON Consolacion Villanueva had a right over Lot 13-C and the
6. Consolacion Villanueva and RaymunodAranas, the plaintiffs, prayed improvements thereon standing by virtue of Victoria Comorro’s last
that Jesus and Remedios Bernas’ title over Lot 13-C be cancelled and will and testament
they be declared as co-owners of the land. They grounded their cause  No.
of action upon their alleged discovery of the two wills of Modesto  Lot 13-C was not conjugal partnership property property of
and Victoria Comorro. Victoria Comorro and her husband. It was Modesto Aranas
 Victoria Comorro’s will bequeathed to Consolacion and exclusive property as he inherited it from his parents
Raymundo, and to Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas, in equal  Victoria Comorro died before her husand; therefore, she
shares pro indiviso, all of said Victoria Comorro's "interests, never inherited anything from Modesto Aranas, and had
rights and properties, real and personal . . . as her net share nothing to bequeath to Consolacion Villanueva or to anyone
from (the) conjugal partnership property with her husband, else.
Modesto Aranas . . ." 2. WON the improvements to Lot 13-C are conjugal property, so that
 Modesto Aranas' will, on the other hand, bequeathed to Consolacion Villanueva may be said to have acquired a right over
Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas (his illegitimate children) all them by succession, as voluntary heir of VoctoriaComorro
his interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria "as  No.
well as his own capital property brought by him to (his)  Proof is needed in order to determine the character of the
marriage with his said wife." improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to
7. RTC ruled on favor of the Bernas spouses because: one spouse separately, but no proof was presented by
 The property in question was registered before the mortgage Consolacion Villanueva or by anyone else.
in the name of the late Modesto Aranas, married to Victoria
Comorro SC RULING
Judgement of the IAC is affirmed. Bernas is deemed to have
 The wills above described were probated only after the filing
acquired indefeasible and clear title to Lot 13-C. The property in
of the case (No. V-4188)
question was not conjugal property and was owned by Modesto
Aranas solely. Because Modesto had no legitimate children and
survived his wife, only Modesto’s illegitimate children had the right o Refers to fully paid properties, does not apply to
to Lot 13-C. partially paid properties
o Tolentino: compromise is that the spouse should be
reimbursed for what or she has paid if ownership is
c. Property purchased by installment conjugal
FC, Article 118
Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds d. Rules on Improvement
of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to FC, Article 120
the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or
marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the
vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or
by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the
reimbursed by original owner- spouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of improvements made by the conjugal partnership
6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the
excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of
either spouse; and one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from subject to the reimbursement of the value of the property of the
gambling or betting. Hoever, losses therefrom shall be borne owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said
exclusively by the loser-spouse. the owner or owners upon property shall be retained in ownership by the owner- spouse,
liquidation of the partnership. likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
Basis of ownership is the date of vesting or transferring of In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested
ownership. The source of the money paid is NOT taken into upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the
account. liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
 Prior = separate Applicable when improvements on the separate property are paid
 During = conjugal by the conjugal partnership.
 What is the basis of full ownership?
o Separate title with the name of the person, with no Rules
“mortgaged” or any other annotation. ● Cost of improvement + increase in value > value of property,
o Full ownership will be when you can sell it CONJUGAL
Under CC, basis was “who paid more” ○ CPG reimburses the spouse
FC 109 (4) -> property purchased with the
exclusive money of the spouse is exclusive property
● Value of property > value of improvement, SEPARATE minor repairs, upon the conjugal partnership property;
○ Spouse reimburses the CPG 5. All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
CC, Art. 158. Buildings constructed, at the expense of the 6. Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or
partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the complete a professional or vocational course, or other
spouses also pertain pertain to the partnership, but the value of the activity for self-improvement;
land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. 7. Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family;
Separate and becomes conjugal if anything is building on it that is 8. The value of what is donated or promised
paid for by conjugal funds. by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or
Under CC 158, there is a difference between ordinary completing a professional or vocational course or other
improvements on separate property and improvement by activity for self- improvement;
construction of building on land that is separate property 9. Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit
is found to be groundless.
● Only latter involves transforming of separate into conjugal. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient
Former only states that the improvements are conjugal, not the to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
entire property itself. liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.

FC, Article 121

The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: Differences between ACP and CPG
1. The support of the spouses, their CPG (FC 121) ACP (FC 94)
common children, and legitimate children of either spouse;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be (5) All taxes and expenses
preservation of separate property used
governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; for mere preservation of
by the family
2. All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage separate property
by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of
the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with (9) Antenuptial debts that do not benefit
No such provision
the consent of the other; family, support of illegitimate, crime or
3. Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without quasi-delict, subject to reimbursement
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited;
4. All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or
Why (5)? CPG has interest in preservation of separate properties ● If expenses are incurred and fruits are destroyed or not sufficient
since its fruits belong to conjugal funds, no need for express to cover expenses, then the loss shall be borne by partnership since
stipulation that it is used for the family. a reverse logic that it enjoys the net profits of the fruits.

Family -> include only the spouses and their legitimate children Minor repairs -> required by the deterioration caused by the natural use
of the thing and are indispensable for its preservation; CPG liable
● Partnership is not relieved of obligation even when spouses are
separated in fact. Major repairs -> occasioned by extraordinary events affecting the
substance of the thing and not merely its enjoyment; CPG not liable
Debts
Debts contracted by one spouse are chargeable to the partnership if FC, Article 122
the family has benefitted [FC 121 (3)] Debts by administrator- The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
spouse binds the family, even if he does not explicitly state that he before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
is acting for the partnership partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them
EXCEPTIONS: admin-spouse manifests he is clearly acting for be charged to the partnership.
private and exclusive interest; nature of obligation is for the However, the payment of the personal debts contracted by either spouse
private interest of admin- spouse (e.g. gambling money, political before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as
expenses, donation to strangers); conjugal property is mortgaged to well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
secure indebtedness of a third person or act as guarantor / surety enforced against the partnership assets, after the responsibilities
for a stranger enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered if the spouse
○ If benefit is for a third party, then the CPG is NOT liable who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such
Litis Expensas spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-
 Unjust demands of the wife cannot obligate the conjugal mentioned.
partnership to the payment of litis expensas. DIFFERENCE:
 ACP, automatically liable
 Expenses incurred in litigations concerning one spouse
 CPG, must fulfill first the liabilities and responsibilities
alone are chargeable to separate property, but she may
 CPG becomes liable only for personal obligations of the spouses
demand litis expensas by Art 122. after liabilities and responsibilities are covered, and only
when the debtor spouse has no property or such is
Losses in Production of Fruits insufficient.
 IF ACP -> automatically liable for personal obligations in case
of insufficiency, NO NEED TO FULFILL LIABILITIES /
RESPONSIBILITIES

Liabilities for Damages

1. Pecuniary damages are imposed against the separate property of
the wrongdoer.
2. Tolentino: CPG must be liable also if it benefitted from the
crime because there would be unjust enrichment at the expense
of the wrongdoer spouse.
3. CPG liable for indemnities to be paid incident to a spouse’s
business since the profit of such business inure to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership
4. Mere fact that guilty spouse, in case of legal separation, forfeits
his or her share in the net assets does not extinguish the
obligation to pay. Such payment must actually refund in money
or property the amount of such advances, not just deduct the
share forfeited.

FC, Article 123

Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in
betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling whether permitted
or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged
to the conjugal partnership, but any winnings therefrom shall form part
of the conjugal partnership property.
-same with art 95
DBP v Adil  1970 – Spouses failed to pay the obligation so the DBP filed a
● Respondent spouses Confesor and Villafuerte obtained a loan from complaint against the spouses for the payment of the loan in City
DBP and executed a promissory note for its payment. Upon lapse of the Court of Iloilo City
period in the first promissory note, Confesor executed a second  The Court ordered the spouses to pay the outstanding obligation
promissory note stating they will pay and in default thereof, they agree to amounting to P5,760.96 with interest
foreclosure of their mortgage. As the spouses were unable to pay, DBP  Spouses appealed to the CFI of Iloilo and it reversed the decision of
filed a complaint, but such was denied by the CFI. Petitioner argues that the lower court
the court erred in holding that Confesor’s second promissory note cannot o DBP filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
bind the conjugal partnership, only him in his personal capacity. court
● Court held that the signing of the husband the note can make the CPG WON the conjugal partnership of the spouses can be held liable for
liable since the husband is theadministrator pursuant to CC 165. As the outstanding obligation- Yes
administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for  Court a quo: the husband signed the promissory note alone so
the benefit of the CPG are chargeable to the CPG. In here, the Confesor cannot bind his wife or their conjugal partnership for the
promissory note was for the benefit of the CPG, and is thus chargeable. liability of the outstanding obligation from the loan
Petition is granted. - Legal basis: Art. 166, NCC which states that “…the husband
Ma’am: Wife said they didn’t have to pay anymore, but court held they cannot alienated or encumber any real property of the conjugal
had to because of the new contract. The new contract is presumed to be partnership without the wife’s consent.”
in CPG. Prescription only extinguishes right to demand but not  SC: we disagree because under Art. 165 of the Civil Code, the
obligation to pay. husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.
 Feb. 10, 1940 – Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte  As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the
obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to
Bank (now called the Development Bank of the Philippines/DBP) in the conjugal partnership.
the sum of P2,000.  In the case at bar, Confesor signed the secondary promissory note for
o This is evidenced by a promissory note binding the spouses the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Therefore, the conjugal
jointly and severally to pay the account in 10 equal yearly partnership is liable for this obligation.
amortizations
 The obligation remained unpaid even after the lapse of the ten-year SC Ruling: the decision of the CFI is reversed and set aside and the
prescription period decision of the City Court of Iloilo is reinstated, which orders the spouses
o April 11, 1961 – Confesor, who was then a member of the to pay the outstanding obligation.
Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note
acknowledging said loan and promising to pay it on or before
Ayala Investment v CA
June 15, 1961
 Petitioner filed a case for money againstPhilippine Blooming Mills
o Confesor wrote in the promissory that he agrees to the foreclosure
for a loan, with respondent Ching as surety thereof. After the court
of the mortgage if he fails to pay for the outstanding account
found PBM and Ching liable, the Sheriff levied some of the
properties of the respondent. Respondents filed a case against
petitioner alleging that the property levied was property of the
 conjugal partnership and thus cannot be levied and auctioned.  The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for
Petitioners argue that the contract itself can be seen as an obligation the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-
 Court held that benefits must directly result from the loan in appellees
order for said loan to be chargeable to the CPG. Indirect benefits
are not considered since these are merely incidental or speculative  No. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and respondent-
 Signing as surety is not an exercise of a industry or profession nor an appellants right of recourse against appellee-husband as surety
act of administration for the benefit of the family since this is clearly is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
for the benefit of the debtor. There must be proof presented to  Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
establish the benefit redounded to the family. Petition denied.
profession
 If loan is given to the husband himself, it is enough that the benefit
to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract.  No. Here, the property in dispute also involves the family
NO NEED FOR BUSINESS TO SUCCEED. home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one.
 If loan is given to another person, it cannot alone be presumed to be  The petition for review should be, as it is hereby, DENIED for
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented lack of merit.
to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership

Recit Summary
 PBM obtained a loan from AIDC
 Executive VP of PBM, executed security agreements on
making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs
indebtedness to AIDC.
 PBM failed to pay the loan.
 AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
respondent-husband
 CFI ordered PBM and respondent-husband to jointly and
severally pay AIDC.
 Sr. Deputy Sheriff of Rizal issued upon respondents-spouses
the notice of sheriff sale dated May 20, 1982 on three (3) of
their conjugal properties and scheduled the auction sale of the
properties levied.
 Private respondents filed a case of injunction
 Auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder
 The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of the  Lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent
respondent Court of Appeals in Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ
Ching vs. Ayala Investment and Development Corporation, et. al. of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction
upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch  AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
168, which ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of questioning the order of the lower court enjoining the sale.
respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for  June 25, 1982 - Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining
the payment of the debts secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Order enjoining the lower court from enforcing its Order
Ching.  June 25, 1982 - auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder
 Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan  September 3, 1983 - AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation injunction filed before Branch XIII of the CFI of Rizal (for being
(AIDC) moot and academic - sale already took place) - motion dismissed
 December 10, 1980 and March 20, 1981 - As added security for the  September 18, 1991 - trial court declared the sale null and void.
credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive  AIDC appealed to CA - affirmed CFI decision; motion for
Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements on making reconsideration deniedHence, this petition for review.
himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to 1. The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for
[Link] failed to pay loan the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills
 July 30, 1981 - AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First petitioners-appellees
Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 42228) a. No. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and respondent-
 CFI Rizal: ordered PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to appellants right of recourse against appellee-husband as
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. It
P50,300,000.00 with interests
does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the
 Pending appeal, upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ
of execution pending appeal. - GRANTED family of petitioners-appellees.
 Abelardo Magsajo (Sr. Deputy Sheriff of Rizal) issued upon b. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the
respondents-spouses the notice of sheriff sale dated May 20, 1982 on benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the
three (3) of their conjugal properties and scheduled the auction sale creditor-party litigant claiming as such.
of the properties levied. 2. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry
 June 9, 1982 - private respondents filed a case of injunction (Civil or profession. Signing as a surety is not embarking in a
Case No. 46309) against petitioners with the then Court of First business.
Instance of Rizal (Pasig) to enjoin the auction sale a. No. Here, the property in dispute also involves the family
 Petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one.
partnership because the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry
the said conjugal partnership
or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of
the family.
SC RULING:The petition for review should be, as it is hereby, DENIED No,defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the
for lack of merit. payment of the loan.
Carlos v Abelardo 1. Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by
 Respondent Abelardo obtained a loan from petitioner Carlos to buy a house the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged
and lot that subsequently became their conjugal dwelling. Upon failing to to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit
pay the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of money. Abelardo of the family.
argues that the loan was actually his share of contracts from his work in the 2. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121
construction company of Carlos. of the Family Code:
 Court held that the amount was in the nature of a loan since checks were The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
drawn from the personal bank of the petitioner. It also held that the loan is a a. (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
liability of the CPG under FC 121. CPG shall be liable for debts designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
contracted by either spouse even without the consent of the other if partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
such debt redounded to the benefit of the family. The loan was used to consent of the other;
build the conjugal home, thus the partnership is liable. Petitioned granted. b. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
1. Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo benefited;
approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 3. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities,
for the purchase of a house. the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
2. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of separate properties.
the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but
pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of W/N Honorio has civil liabilities towards Manuel for causing the alienation
the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners of his wife’s love. No, there is no proof that Honorio caused their separation.
inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against
petitioner. W/N Manuel has civil liabilities towards Honorio for making death
3. On October 13, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of [Link], two witnesses gave testimonies that prove that death threats were
money and damages and each of the respondents filed separate answers made.
since by then they have already been separated. a. Randy Rosal, Honorio’s driver was given a written letter of threat and this
a. Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together was already presented as evidence.
with her husband, from petitioner. b. He told IrineoPajarin, also a driver, “Sabihinmosabiyenan ko babarilin ko
b. Manuel Abelardo denied that the $25,000 was a loan. He claims siyapagnakita ko siya.”
that this was his share from the profits of the construction company Ruling:
of Honorio which he managed. The petition is granted. Honorio should be paid $25,000 or its equivalent in
W/N the $25,000 used to buy the Abelardo conjugal house was a loan. PH currency plus damages.
Yes. Manuel has received checks from the construction firm in the account of Carandang v Heirs of Guzman
H.L. Carlos Construction, while the $25,000 check came from the personal  Petitioner spouses Carandang subscribed to newly issued
account of Honorio Carlos. Also, Theresa herself admitted that the amount was a capital stock of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS), a
loan. company where they and De Guzman are shareholders of.
W/N Manuel was solely liable to pay for the loan. De Guzman claims that part of the stock was paid by him
and filed a complaint to recover such amount from the
 spouses. Spouses assail the failure of Milagros de Guzman, their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which is
wife of de Guzman, to be impleaded as a party in interest primarily bound for its repayment.
since the checks respondent used to pay them were issued  When the spouses are sued for the enforcement if the
in her name. obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded
 Re: procedural, Court held that the checks are presumed to in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal
be conjugal property because no evidence to the contrary partnership and not as independent debtors, such that the
exists. Quirino de Guzman is the co-owner of such, and is a concept of joint and solidary liability, as between them,
real party in interest. does not apply.
 Court also held that when the spouses are sued for  Either of them may be sued for the whole amount, similar
enforcement of obligation entered into by them, they are to that of a solidary liability, although the amount is
impleaded as representatives of the conjugal chargeable against their conjugal partnership property
partnership and not as independent debtors. Thus, the
CPG is liable. Petition denied.

 Quirino de Guzman and Arcadio and Luisa Carandangare

corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System(MBS)
 MBS increased its capital stock and was subscribed
byArcadio and Luisa Carandang
 Quirino de Guzman claims that these subscriptions
werepaid by him, so he sent a demand letter to Arcadio
andLuisa
 Arcadio and Luisa refused to pay claiming that they hada
pre-incorporation agreement where Quirino promised to
pay for stock subscriptions by Arcadio and Luisa without
costs in exchange for Arcadio’s technical expertise, etc.
 RTC and CA ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered Arcadio
and Luisa Carandang to pay Quirino

W/N the purported liability of Arcadio and Luisa

Carandang were joint and solidary

 YES, for marriages governed by CPG, an obligation

entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against
Ros v PNB  Aguete claims that she has no knowledge of the loan
● Spouses Ros obtained a loan from PNB and executed a mortgage obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage
to secure such loan. Ros was unable to pay, thus PNB foreclosed instituted on the conjugal property. She interposed the
the property and executed the land. The wife of Ros claims she has defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were
no knowledge of the loan and she did not consent to the mortgage. forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of
Thus, the spouses filed for annulment of the proceedings on the
the family.
ground that the loan did not redounded to the benefit of the family
and the signatures were forged.  SC affirmed the ruling of the CA that the debt contracted
● Court held that while CC 173 allows the wife to file for by Jose Ros is chargeable to the CPG.
annulment of a contract encumbering conjugal property if she did
not give here consent to the contract, the evidence shows that
Aguete gave her consent to the mortgage. The document has
been ratified before a notary, and no evidence has been presented
that the signatures were forged. The loan was used for working
capital of the husband, and where husband contracts obligations
on behalf of the family business and in the exercise of his
industry, the law presumes that such obligation will redound to
benefit of the family. Thus, CPG is liable. Petition denied.

RECIT SUMMARY:
 Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for
the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against PNB.
 Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB and as security,
executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. A Certificate of Sale was then issued in
favor of PNB as the highest bidder. After the lapse of 1 year
without the property being redeemed, the property was
consolidated and registered in the name of PNB.
FACTS:  The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage.
 Jose Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB Laoag Branch and The property, acquired during Ros and Aguete’s marriage, is thus
as security, executed a real estate mortgage involving a land with all considered part of the CPG.
its improvements.  The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
 The loan remained outstanding upon maturity. Thus, PNB instituted without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. A Certificate of Sale was husband do so, then the contract is voidable under Art. 173, CC. Art.
issued in favor of PNB as the highest bidder. After the lapse of 1 173 allow allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the
year without the property being redeemed, the property was subject property. However, Art. 173 does not guarantee that the
consolidated and registered in the name of PNB. courts will declare the annulment of contract. Annulment will be
 Claiming that Estrella Aguete (the wife) has no knowledge of the declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her
loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage consent.
instituted on the conjugal property – a complaint was filed by her and o In this case, the documents disavowed by Aguete was
her husband to annul the mortgage interposing the defense that her acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public
signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan documents. A certificate of acknowledgment serves as prima facie
did not redound to the benefit of the family. evidence of the execution of the instrument/document involved.
 PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint and insists that it was o The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary
the spouses own acts of omission/connivance that bar them from public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer.
recovering the land on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment o The spouses did not present other positive evidence (i.e.
and prescription. handwriting expert) to substantiate their claim of forgery, which
 RTC: In favor of Spouses. Under the Civil Code, the effective law at became fatal to their cause.
the time of the transaction, Ros could not encumber any real property  Moreover, the application for loan shows that it would be used
of the conjugal partnership without Aguete’s consent. Aguete may, exclusively “for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic
during their marriage and within 10 years from the transaction &virginia tobacco.” Even in her testimony, Aguete confirmed that
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it
husband entered into without her consent. prospered. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the
 CA: Reversed. Assuming that Aguete did not give her consent to exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to
Ros’ loan, the conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive
proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the and private debts.
case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the family’s
SC RULING: Petition is denied. The decision of the CA is affirmed.
business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership.
ISSUE: W/N the debt contracted by Jose is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership of gains. – YES
f. Administration and Disposition of the CPG - Both spouses jointly, husband’s decision will prevail, BUT wife
FC, Article 124 can contest within 5 years of the decision
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal property shall
Acts of Ownership / Acts of Strict Dominion - UNABLE TO
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
PARTICIPATE =/=
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within
INCAPACITATED
five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
 Unable to participate = not necessarily incapacitated. Just
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
can’t get in touch with that spouse
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
 Incapacitated = incapacity to act
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
 Disposition or encumbrance = acts of ownership.
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
 Mortgage is an act of ownership also.
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
 Because of the loan and possible foreclosure of property
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
 Lease for 1 year
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
Owners will not be able to exercise their rights of
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
ownership
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
In case of disagreement, no decision will
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
 not prevail since both spouses must agree.
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
W/o consent of other spouse, void. Authorization is ONLY
or both offerors.
applicable if the other spouse is incapacitated. If other
spouse is NOT, no court authorization can overrule the
decision of the spouse.
 Ma’am: article is confusing.
Same with ACP (FC 96).
That the sale of conjugal property will be void if without consent
of other spouse and that spouse is not incapacitated. FC, Article 125
Neither spouse may donate any conjugal property without the
● Being aware of transaction =/= consent to the transaction consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the
consent of the other, make moderate donations from the
Same rule as FC 97 applies, i.e. that either spouse may dispose by community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing
will of his interest in the CPG. or family distress.

Acts of Administration
Moderate -> depends upon the financial and social circumstances
of the couple

SAME WITH ACP (FC 98)

 ● Donations must be made jointly, a donation without

consent of one spouse can be the subject to attack of a
fraudulent alienation
 ● Donation made by the husband after the death of the
wife is null and void as to the half that pertains to her.
Felipe v Heirs of Maximo Aldon  The land is awarded to the children, but not the widow
 Gimena, Maximo Aldon’s wife, sold pieces of land to the o During the marriage, only the husband can file annulment
spouses Felipe without the consent of her husband. The heirs of of the contract since he is the victim w/ interest.
Aldon filed a complaint alleging that they are the owners of the o Wife cannot since she caused the defect.
land and seek to recover it since the petitioners refused their o Children can, but only upon death of father.
offer to redeem the mortgage. The CA nullified the sale and  Also, Extraordinary prescription cannot apply in favor of the
ordered the spouses to surrender the land, holding that the petitioners. It states that ownership over immovable property
contract was invalid since it was executed without the acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
husband’s consent and the lands were conjugal. 30 years without need of title or of good faith. Complaint
 Court held that under CC 172, the wife cannot bind the was filed 25 yrs after “sale”. Therefore, w/in the period.
conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, thus the
sale made by Guimena is voidable under CC 1390, since
Gimena had no capacity to give consent. Only the husband,
however, can file the annulment since he was the victim who
had an interest in the contract. However, the children have the
right to question the contract following the death of the
father since it deprived them of their heredity rights in their
father’s share in the lands. Petition granted. Under FC,
contract will be void.

RECIT SUMMARY:
 Wife GimenaAlmosa sold lands belonging to CP w/o consent
of her husband to petitioners (sps Felipe) in 1951
 In 1976, Heirs of Maximo (now widow Gimena and children
Aldon) filed complaint vs petitioners to recover the property.
RTC dismissed, CA granted and called the transaction
“invalid”
 SC ruled that the contract = defective
o 4 kinds of defective contract: Voidable, rescissible,
unenforceable, and void.
o The contract in this case is VOIDABLE since Art. 173
CC states:Contracts w/o consent of husband =
annullable w/in 10 years from transaction
FACTS:  (4) VOID/ INEXISTENT (ART. 1409), Must fall under a
 Wife GimenaAlmosa sold lands belonging to CP w/o consent of her category in Art. 1409 CC
husband Maximo Aldon (married 1936) Transaction ^is only voidable DURING the MARRIAGE by the
o Lands were bought 1948-1950, later divided into 3 in 1960-1962. HUSBAND
o 1951, Wife Gimena sold ^ to petitioners (sps Eduardo Felipe Because husband = victim w/ interest
&Hermogena Felipe) w/o husband Maximo’s consent Why wife Gimena cannot file
 1976 - Heirs of Maximo (widow Gimena, children Sofia and Salvador  She was responsible for the defect
Aldon) filed complaint vs petitioners  DEATH of husband terminates the marriage and dissolves the
o Heirs wanted to recover the land, claimed that they were the owners CP BUT does NOT suddenly give Gimena the right to file
and orally mortgaged the land to petitioners, who refused to redeem when she couldn’t during marriage
o RTC dismissed. BUT the children Aldon can file
 CA granted Heirs of Maximo appeal to reverse RTC decision to  They could not while the marriage subsists since they merely had
dismiss. an inchoate (undeveloped) right to the lands sold
o CA: Deed of sale is real but since it concerns CP and the wife Gimena BUT upon Maximo’s death, the children acquired the right to question the
executed it w/o husband’s consent, it is INVALID. The lots are defective contract
presumed CP since they were purchased during marriage  As it deprived them of hereditary rights in father’s share in the
lands.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:  Father’s share = ½, children’s = ⅔ of father’s (the other ⅓ to the
 W/N the sale of lands belonging to CP by the wife w/o consent of the widow)
husband is VALID Prescription & Effect of petitioner’s bad faith
o NO. It is VOIDABLE (note NOT “invalid”) Their bad faith is revealed by testimony
o A contract entered into by wife w/o consent of the husband = Son of petitioners Vicente Felipe attempted to have wife Gimena sign a ready-
VOIDABLE “except in cases provided by law” made doc professing the sale of the lots to the petitioners in Dec. 1970
 ART. 166 CC: Husband cannot alienate/ encumber real property of This actuation indicated that they knew the lots did NOT belong to them.
CP w/o wife’s consent Otherwise, why were they so interested in a document of sale in their favor?
 ART. 172 CC Wife cannot bind CP w/o husband’s consent Petitioners cannot acquire ownership of the lots by prescription
 ART. 165 CC: Husband is the administrator of conjugal partnership  Even if the possession can be considered as “possession in the
Sale = defective contract. Which kind? VOIDABLE concept of owners” (Other people believe through my actions,
4 kinds of defective contract: that I am the owner of the property) , this only started (at earliest)
 (1) VOIDABLE (ART. 1390), in 1951.
 ART. 1390 (1): 1 party = incapable of giving consent to  Extraordinary prescription (ownership over immovable
the contract property acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession
 Gimena had no capacity (essential element) thereof for 30 years without need of title or of good faith) .
 ART. 173 CC: Contracts w/o consent of husband = Petition was instituted in 1976. (25 yrs)
annullable w/in 10 years from transaction  Children Aldon have right to file action to recover
 (2) RESCISSIBLE(ART. 1380 CC), All essential elements are
untainted, but it must be Gimena’s consent that is tainted. SC RULING:
 (3) UNENFORCEABLE (ART. 1403), Must fall under a CA decision awarding lands to both wife and children MODIFIED. Land shares
category in Art. 1403 CC are awarded to children Aldon whilepetitioners, as possessors in bad faith, must
solidarily pay value of the fruits corresponding to the shares to said children.
SEPARATE OPINION:
 AQUINO, J. , concurring
o ART. 166 CC = Husband cannot dispose of CP w/o wife’s
consent. Sale by husband w/o wife’s consent = void.
o Since husband = admin of the conjugal assets, wife cannot
make dispositions w/o his consent
o Actions declaring sales contrary to law as void/ inexistent do
not prescribe
Tinitigan v Tinitigan Sr.
● Petitioner Payuran leased to Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc. a property in
Pasay. She also leased a factory building to United Electronics Co. Both
transactions were done without consent of her husband, respondent Tinitigan Sr.
He subsequently filed a case to annul the lease to United and prohibit Payuran
from disposing conjugal properties. He then filed a subsequent motion seeking
judicial approval for sale of the Pasay property, which the court granted.
Petitioner argues this sale would result in losses to the property and was
subsequently appointed as administratrix by another Court, with the condition
that the disposition Pasay property will be subject to the decision of the prior
court. Petitioner assails the validity of the order authorizing the sale of the Pasay
property since she was named administratrix of such.
● Court held that the husband is the administrator under CC 165. The
appointment of Payuran as administratrix was upon the condition that the
disposition of the Pasay property would be subject to the decision of the court.
The Court also found that her designation as administratrix was done only after
judicial approval of the sale, thus, Tinitigan was still the administrator at that
time. The judicial approval was also pursuant to CC 166 which states the court
can give judicial approval for a sale if the wife does not give her consent.
● Court also held that while the husband cannot alienate or encumber property
without the wife’s consent, he may dispose of the conjugal property for the
purpose of fulfilling obligations or debts contracted for the benefit of the
partnership pursuant to CC 171 in relation to CC 161 (1). Petition denied.
Facts: compel her if she unreasonably refuses to give consent, hence the husband’s
 Payuran entered into a contract to lease a residential house in Pasay to seeking of judicial approval in the sale.
Pentel. Payuran and her children also entered into a contract with United  Art 171 states that husband may dispose conjugal properties without
Electronics to lease a land in Paranaque, Rizal. In both these transactions, consent and judicial intervention in order to pay debts and obligations
the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr. (husband of Payuran) was not secured. contracted by the husband for the benefit of conjugal partnership.
 Tinitigan Sr. then filed a case to annul the contract with United Electronics
and also to restrain his defendant relatives from disposing properties in the WON the judge has jurisdiction
name of Tinitigan Sr. and Payuran  Yes. The amended petition intended to not only annul the contract with
 Tinitigan Sr. filed a motion to approve the sale of a residential house, which United Electronics, but also to restrain the defendant-relatives of the
is a conjugal property, to Quintin Lim Eng Seng (President and General plaintiff from encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the
Manager of Pentel). This is to pay the outstanding conjugal obligations Molave Development Corporation or those in the name of Severino
amounting P256,137.79. The sale is for P300,000 and this was the same lot Tinitigan Sr, and TeofistaPayuran.
leased by Payuran to Pentel with the option to buy at P350,000. This sale
was allowed but Payuran and her children filed a motion for reconsideration WON the sale is valid even if it was authorized for Quintin and not Chiu.
since they said they would suffer losses because it could be more profitable.  Yes. The approval is not to vest Quintin with exclusive rights to purchase
 Payuran filed for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership. but to secure judicial approval in lieu of marital consent.
The parties then agreed to continue the partnership and Payuran was
appointed as the administratrix of the conjugal properties but sale is still Ruling:
subject to the CFI. Petitions are denied and the sale of the conjugal property in Pasay is
 The sale of land in Pasay was sold to Chiu at P315,000 and this is approved valid.
since it is “justifiable to relieve the rest of the conjugal properties from
mortgage obligations which are in danger of foreclosure"
 Pentel filed a case against Chiu and Tinitigam Sr. on the ground that the
decision and order to sell are void.

Whether the sale of the Loring property is void because Tinitigan had no
authority to sell it since it is under the administration of Payuran

 No. Art 165 of NCC states that the husband is the administrator of conjugal
partnership although Art 168 states that wife may be administrator with the
express authority of husband through a public instrument.
 The decree appointing Payuran as administratrix is not applicable since it
was issued after the CFI had granted Tinitigan Sr. the authority to sell the
Loring property.
 Husband is still required to get the implied or express consent of the wife
for this transaction that’s why Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval for the
Loring property.
 Art. 166 NCC states that while the husband as administrator cannot alienate
or encumber property without wife’s consent (unless she is declared non
compos mentis, a spendthrift, or under civil interdiction), the court may
Guiang v CA  This ended in an amicable settlement mandating Gilda to vacate their house.
● Respondent Corpuz seeks to annul a sale of conjugal property by her husband However, her signature in the settlement was vitiated through intimidation
to the petitioner spouses. This property consists of their residence and the lot on by the officials and the spouses.
which it stood. While they initially sold one half of it to the spouses, her  Despite the amicable settlement, Gilda remained in their house. Hence,
husband sold the remaining half even over her objections to the sale. The parties spouses filed a motion for execution of the amicable settlement. Gilda then
eventually signed an amicable settlement which the respondent eventually filed a petition assailing the sale of the conjugal property without her
questioned. Petitioners argue that the contract of sale was initially voidable but consent.
subsequently ratified by the signing of the amicable settlement.  The RTC ruled in favor of Gilda, citing Article 124 of the Family Code
● Court held that contracts signed without the consent of the wife are void which renders sale of conjugal property without both spouses' consent as
pursuant to FC 124 and cannot be ratified. However, this shall be construed void. This was affirmed by CA.
as a continuing offer that may be perfected as a binding contract upon
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court. However in this W/N the deed of transfer of rights to spouses Guiang was void
case, the amicable settlement does not mention a continuing offer to sell the YES. Since Gilda has proven she had no knowledge of the sale of their conjugal
property since it was only to the effect that the private respondent would vacate property, and she never consented to it, by virtue of art 124, the sale was void.
the property. Petition denied.
W/N the amicable settlement and the agreement with Callejo cured the
Facts: defect in consent/ ratified the agreement
 Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz were married and had 3 children (Junie, NO, SC held that since the agreement on the sale was void, the amicable
Harriet, Jodie). The spouses bought a land from Manuel Callejo which settlement which was produced based on the previous agreement is likewise
became a part of their conjugal property. void. The agreement with Callejo and the amicable settlement cannot ratify a
 The couple built a house in one half of the lot then sold the other half of the void contract. The contract does not have a defect in consent that can be cured
lot to spouses Antonio and LuzvimindaGuiang. through ratification because the consent was absent.
 Gilda went to Manila to find a job in the Middle East but was victimized by
an illegal recruiter. While she was in Manila, she was informed by her child Ruling: Decision of RTC and CA are affirmed and the sale of the conjugal
that her husband intended to sell the remaining portion of their land to property without Gilda’s consent was void.
spouses Guiang.
 She sent a letter back home expressing her objection to the sale and it was Relucio v Lopez
given by her daughter to Luzviminda. Despite knowing about Gilda's  Respondent Lopez allege that her husband abandoned themand is
objection to the sale, Luzviminda still bought the land from Judie. solely administering properties for the benefit of him and his
 During the sale, a Deed of Transfer of Rights was executed without Gilda's concubine, petitioner Relucio. Respondent argues that the property
knowledge and consent. have been acquired by the husband but was put in the name of
 In an attempt to cure the defect in Gilda's consent, spouses Guiang paid Relucio in order to exclude the respondent from benefitting from
Manuela Callejo P9,000 and executed an agreement a sale of the land
these properties and their fruits.
bought by spouses Corpuz.
 It was only when Gilda went home that she found out about the sale of their
 She also alleges that he mismanaged and alienated conjugal property
land. She continued to stay with her children in their house but Spouses solely for his benefit and for support of his illegitimate children.
Guiang filed a complaint against Gilda in the Barangay Hall. The spouses Petitioner argues that there was no cause of action against her despite
wanted to eject Gilda and her kids from the house. respondent’s allegation that she must impleaded since properties are
registered in her name.
 Court held that the respondent’s causes of action were all against the
husband. The judicial appointment as administratrix of conjugal
partnership is entirely between the spouses to the exclusion of all
other persons.
 The accounting by the husband of the conjugal partnership arises
from marriage, to which the petitioner has nothing to do with. The
forfeiture of husband’s share in the property co- owned with the
petitioner is solely on the issue of whether there is legal basis to
forfeit, a right that extends to the husband’s share alone.
 Lastly, the petition for support concerns only the husband and not
the petitioner as a stranger. Petition dismissed.
DOCTRINE: 3rd Parties or Strangers to the marriage do not have b. An obligation on the part of the defendant
cause of action when one spouse petitions for appointment as the c. An act/omission on the part of defendant that violated
sole administrator of the properties. the rights of the plaintiff / breach of obligation that
FACTS: gives rise to an action for recovery of damages
1. In 1968, Husband left Wife and 4 legitimate children 2. The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against the husband
2. He arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and a. Cause of action arises only between the husband and
administration of the conjugal properties the wife who have rights and obligations to each other.
3. Spent and used for sole gain and benefit and excluded the wife 3. Petitioner is a complete stranger to the marriage and to the
and children cause of action
4. VALID during that time, as husband was sole admin a. Administration is between the married couple only
5. In 1976, Husband got into an illicit relationship and cohabited 4. Wife’s petition for forfeiture is on the share of the husband’s
with the Petitioner/Paramour share of the properties co-owned by him and petitioner
6. Started to build up a fortune consisting of stockholdings in a. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-
Lopez- owned or controlled corporations, and other properties ownership
(buildings, vehicles, lots, jewelry, etc.) 5. Seeking of support by wife is from the husband, also not from
a. Came from actual contribution of properties and money the stranger
(which were conjugal) of Husband
b. Concealed these from the original family, entered into using WON petitioner’s inclusion as party is essential to the
his name or his paramour’s name or both proceedings.
c. In 1993, Petition of Wife to be sole administratix of  NO, an indispensable party is one without whom there can be
properties, forfeiture, etc. against husband and petitioner no final determination of an action
d. A motion to dismiss the petition filed by Petitioner on the  A real party in interest is an indispensable party, who stands to
ground that wife has no action against her be benefited/injured by the judgement of the suit.
1. DENIED: as she was impleaded as a necessary or
 Since petitioner would not be affected in any way, she is not a
indispensable party because some of the properties were
real party in interest, and is not an indispensable party to the
registered in her name.
suit.
W/N wife’s petition for appointment as sole administratix
establish a cause of action against petitioner.
NO. a cause of action is an act or omission of one party
(defendant) in violation of the legal right of the other (plaintiff).
1. Elements:
a. A right in favour of the plaintiff
Jader-Manalo v Camaisa - During their meeting for the formal affixing of Norma’s
● Petitioner Jader-Manalo offered to buy properties consisting of a signature to the Contracts to Sell, petitioner was surprised
ten-door apartment in Makati and one in Tagaytay from the that the parties have decided to back out of the agreement
respondent spouses Camaisa. She and the husband Camaisa wrote because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the
an agreement and signed it, with the husband assuring her that the consideration
wife, Norma, knew and consented to the sale. Subsequently, the 5. Norma refused to sign the contract, prompting petitioner to
respondent spouses backed out because they needed spot cash. file a complaint for specific performance and damages
Norma’s refusal to sign the contracts made petitioner file a 6. RTC rendered a summary judgment dismissing the
complaint to compel Norma to sign and pay for damages. Norma complaint. CA affirmed RTC decision.
argues the checks forwarded by petitioner were returned to the 7. SC denied petition. Pursuant to Art. 124 of the FC,
latter and that she never gave her consent to such transaction. disposition of a conjugal property by the husband requires
● Court held that the law, under FC 124, requires the written written consent of the wife unless the latter is shown to be
consent of the wife. Even if wife is aware of the transaction, the incapacitated, which is not the case here.
sale will be void if she did not give her written consent to it. It
also held that court authorization under FC 124 can only be
resorted to if there is proof that the wife is incapacitated or unable
to give consent. Absent the proof of such, the court cannot
intervene. Petition denied.

Recit Summary:
1. In response to an ad on Bulletin Today regarding the sale of
a ten-door apartment in Makati as well as that in Taytay
Rizal, petitioner made an offer to buy said properties to
respondent spouses
2. After some bargaining, petitioner and EdilbertoCamaisa
reached an agreement for the purchase. Petitioner will pay
through monthly installments.
3. When asked about the conjugal nature of the properties,
Edilberto assured her that his wife has given conformity
and consent to the sale.
4. Edilberto signed the Contracts to Sell and thereafter,
petitioner delivered two checks as initial payment for the
properties
Facts of the Case: sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for
 Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an specific performance and damages against respondent spouses
advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
Fernandez C. Camaisa and EdilbertoCamaisa, in the Classified  RTC rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint
Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its  CA affirmed RTC decision citing that because the wife did not
April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door apartment in sign the contract, the sale was never perfected. In fact, the
Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal. downpayment was returned by respondent spouses and was
 Thereafter, petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to accepted by petitioner.
be respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the
properties Issues/Ratio:
 After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon 1. WON the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property
the purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for the Taytay property without the wife's written consent.
and P2,100,000.00 for the Makati propertyto be paid on a. No. A summary judgment is one granted by the
installment basis with downpayments of P100,000.00 and court upon motion by a party for an expeditious
P200,000.00, respectively, on April 15, 1992 settlement of a case, there appearing from the
 Petitioner, the real estate broker and Edilberto met in the pleadings, depositions, admissions and a davits that
latter's office for the formal signing of the typewritten there are no important questions or issues of fact
Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed the contracts, involved, and that therefore the moving party is
petitioner delivered to him two checks entitled to judgment as a matter of law
 When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the b. Pursuant to Art 124 of the FC, the disposition of a
properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's conformity conjugal property by the husband as administrator
and consent to the sale. in appropriate cases requires the written consent
 Wife called the petitioner to meet to clarify certain provisions of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.
in the agreement and made handwritten notations on the c. The court also cannot intervene to authorize the
contracts to sell. transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife
 When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the since said wife who refused to give consent had not
real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of been shown to be incapacitated
Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses d. The properties subject of the contracts in this case
informed her that they were backing out of the agreement was conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the effective, the consent of both husband and wife
consideration must concur.
 Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to
sell had already been duly perfected. Still, Norma refused to Held: Petitioned DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
Villanueva v Chiong  Petitioners contend that the lot is part of the exclusive property
 Respondents are married couple separated in fact. Florentino, of the husband due to his separation in fact with his wife
the husband, sold half a portion of the contested land to the  The court did not find merit in the contention since the defacto
petitioners and allowed them to occupy the land and build separation did not dissolve the property relation of the
improvements thereon. However, the wife refused to sign the respondent spouses. It was also established through evidence
deed of sale and filed an action to annul the sale, which was that the said lot was co-owned by the spouses
granted by the RTC. Petitioners argue that the land is exclusive  On the issue of the validity of the sale without the wife’s
property of Florentino and can thus be sold by him without consent, it was held that such alienation is not void but merely
wife’s consent since the respondents were already separated in voidable at the instance of the wife.
fact.  Since the wife was able to file the annulment of the sale within
 Court held that the separation in fact does not affect the the prescriptive period, the Court granted such annulment of
conjugal partnership pursuant to CC 178. Thus, the lot the entire alienation and not just the amount of her share.
retains it conjugal nature and enjoys the presumption of  Petition dismissed.
conjugality under CC 160. Husband cannot encumber the
conjugal property without the wife’s consent even if the
spouses are separated in fact. The wife may annul the contract
since this is voidable pursuant to CC 173.
 The court also held that the alienation must be annulled in
its entirety, not only insofar as the share of the wife since
the law did not specifically limit this in the statute. Petition
denied.

Recit Summary:
 Respondent husband sold his share (half) on the property
acquired during his marriage to petitioners, which the wife did
not give consent to.
Facts of the Case: spouses shall not be affected by their separation in fact without
 Florentino and EliseraChiong were married in 1960 but were judicial approval.
separated in fact in 1975. During their marriage, they acquired  Article 160 of the Civil Code also states the presumption of
the lot in question. conjugal partnership for properties acquired during the
 In 1985, Florentino sold the western half of the lot to marriage.
petitioners, Vilanueva, for P8,000 payable in installments, after  Although the certificate of title of the lot is registered in the
which the former allowed the petitioners to occupy the lot, and name of Florentino, the tax declaration presented by Elisera
build a store, a shop and a house thereon. acknowledged both spouses as owners. Additionally,
 After the last installment, in December 1986, petitioners Florentino categorically admitted in the Deed of Sale that he is
demanded the execution of a Deed of Sale in their favor to a co-owner of the lot.
which the wife, Elisera, refused to sign. 2. Was the sale by the Florentino without his wife’s
 In 1991, Elisera filed a complaint for Quieting of the Title with consent valid?
Damages and a subsequent Complaint for Specific  The Court held that without the wife’s consent, the husband’s
Performance with Damages, which were consolidated by the alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the
RTC. A year after, Florentino executed the Deed of Absolute Family Code, is not void, but merely voidable (art. 166 & 173,
Sale to the petitioners. CC).
 The RTC, in its 2000 decision, annulled the deed and ordered  Article 166 of the Civil Code requires for the consent of both
the petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements spouses for the sale of the conjugal property to be valid.
situated therein. The complaint for Specific Performance with  Accordingly, in Article 173, the contract is annullable at the
Damages was then dismissed by the RTC but ordered instance of Elisera which she was able to do within the
Florentino to return to the petitioners the amount of the sale prescribed period of 10 years from the date of transaction.
with interest.  The alienation should also be annulled in its entirety and not
 Petitioners’ MR was not given merit; hence the case at bar. only to the extent of the share of the wife to the conjugal
1. W/N the subject lot form part of the exclusive property property, thereby restoring to the parties their original situation
of Florentino or the conjugal property with his spouse? before the execution of the contract.
 Petitioners contend that the lot in question belongs exclusively  Applying Article 1398, petitioners should return to respondents
to Florentino since his de facto separation from his wife the land with its fruits and respondent Florentino should return
dissolved their property relations. The Court found no merit in to petitioners the sum ofP8,000, which he received as the price
this contention. of the land, together with interest thereon. The award for the
 Respondent’s de facto separation does not affect the conjugal payment of interest is deleted as such has been offsetted by the
nature of the property and prejudice Elisera’s interest over it. parties.
Art 178 of the Civil Code states that the conjugal partnership of
Ruling:WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. offer as a binding- contract. Thus, the deed is valid contract.
The order for the payment of interest is DELETED. Petition granted.

Recit Summary:
1. Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores
2. Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks
were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file
a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against
respondents.
3. RTC Branch 33 ruled that:
a. Petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure because the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed without the
husband’s consent.
b. Petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from
Edna as he could file a personal action against her but it had
no jurisdiction over the personal action
4. Petitioner led a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against
respondents raffled to RTC Branch 42
5. Edna filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93
Flores v Lindo which ruled that the liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of
 Petitioner Flores loaned Edna Lindo money that she secured the loan however subsists despite the illegality of the mortgage.
with a mortgage covering property under her name and her 6. The CA set aside the Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion stating that it acted with grave
husband’s name. She signed the agreement for herself and for
abuse of discretion in denying respondents' motion to dismiss.
her husband as attorney-in-fact. Petitioner subsequently filed  SC ruled that according to Article 124 of the FC , the transaction shall
for foreclosure of property after the checks Edna issued were be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
dishonored for insufficiency. RTC however, ruled that the and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
petitioner was not entitled since the deed was executed without the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
the consent of the husband since the SPA executed by the
7. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that
husband came only after the deed was executed. perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
 The Court held that under FC 124, any disposition without making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
written consent of wife is void, but may be perfect as a 8. But since the Petitioner did not ask for relief, the petitioner's avenue for
binding contract upon acceptance of the other spouse. The recovery of the loan is closed.
9. However, considering the circumstances of this case, the principle
execution of husband of a special power of attorney and the
against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over
subsequent signing of the wife as attorney-in-fact constitutes the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits
the acceptance of the husband of that perfects a continuing 10. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the
erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the
validity of the Deed.
FACTS 1. The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their
 Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) conjugal property must be consented to by her husband to be effective.
amounting to P400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with 3% compounded In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or
monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. consent of the husband, is necessarily void.
 Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (the Deed) covering a 2. The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan
property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. however subsists despite the illegality of the mortgage.
(collectively, respondents). 3. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a
 Edna also signed a Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the creditor
as his attorney-in-fact. may be enforced in an ordinary action.
 Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were  Court of Appeals:
dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a 1. Set aside the Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for having been issued with
Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents. grave abuse of discretion stating that it acted with grave abuse of
 RTC Branch 33 ruled that: discretion in denying respondents' motion to dismiss.
1. Petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage 2. Ruled that on a nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the
2. The Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority of creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor, that is recovery
Enrico since the Deed was executed on 31 October 1995 while the of the credit with execution of the suit. Thus, the creditor may institute
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was only dated 4 two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the collection of
November 1995 debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both.
3. Petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he 3. Ruled that petitioner had already waived his personal action to recover
could file a personal action against her but it had no jurisdiction over the amount covered by the promissory note because he had availed of
the personal action which should be led in the place where the plaintiff the other option.
or the defendant resides in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the ISSUE & RATIO:
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. W/N the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the
4. Petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure because the Deed of complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of
Real Estate Mortgage was executed without Enrico's consent. suits.
 RTC Branch 42:  It is true that the rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action
Petitioner led a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt.
respondents raffled to RTC Branch 42  The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for
1. Issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the
2. Ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands mortgage security and one can only choose one or the other otherwise there
which, although growing out of the same subject matter, constitute would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one
separate or distinct causes of action and were not put in issue in the venue to another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and
former action the residence of the parties.
3. Ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its decision did not  Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the rules.
mean that petitioner could no longer recover the loan petitioner  The important Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
extended to Edna.  However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
RTC Branch 93: the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93 which perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
ruled: spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
 The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
 However, petitioner allowed the decisions of the RTC (33 & 93) to become
final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief thus
closing petitioner's avenue for recovery of the loan.
 But the petitioner still has a remedy under the law respondents could still be
held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person
may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
 Unjust enrichment is "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience." (Art. 22
CC)
 Requires two conditions:
(1) That a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification
(2) That such benefit is derived at the expense of another.
 This is done to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of
another without just cause or consideration.
 Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been
fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the
instance of Edna.
 Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust
enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule
on multiplicity of suits
 Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the
erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity
of the Deed.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (removing the right of creditor to claim debt) are SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is directed to proceed
with the trial (on how much Edna really owes).
 g. Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership Regime  Fruits of the former conjugal property will be divided according to
FC, Article 126 the rules of co-ownership
 Fruits of the separate property no longer go to the common fund
The conjugal partnership terminates:
but become separate property
1) Upon the death of either spouse
2) When there is a decree of legal separation
3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void FC, Article 127
4) In case of judicial separation of property during the The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the
marriage under Articles 134 to 138. regime of conjugal partnership except that:
SAME WITH ACP (FC 99)  ● The spouse who leaves the conjugal
home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the
Effects right to be supported;
 Provisions of FC 116 to FC 125 shall cease to apply.  ● When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is
 Property acquired after the dissolution of the partnership shall be required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
separate summary proceeding;
o Other spouse and his heirs cannot claim any share nor inherit  ● In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate
o Fruits accruing to such will not be considered as conjugal and property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of
shall not be liable for debts of the partnership EXCEPT when the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
the conjugal property has been exhausted proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber
 Debts and obligations incurred cannot be charged against the any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits of
conjugal property proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.
 Disposition of property by a surviving spouse must be considered
limited only to the share of the vendor in the property SAME WITH ACP (FC 100)
involved, not to the corpus of the property
o Applies also to mortgages Abandonment of conjugal home without justification causes
 Dissolution must be recorded in the registry of property in order to spouse to lose right to be supported
affect third persons. ● His or her obligation to support the other is not
o Purchaser in good faith must be held to take a good vand valid extinguished. Amount shall be taken from conjugal
title. property and if not sufficient, separate properties of spouses
shall be solidarily liable.
Co-ownership
 If properties are not liquidated, parties impliedly establish a co- Solidary liability -> if one spouse has no separate, spouse who has
ownership among themselves property shall be liable. One of the debtors may be made to bear
the entire obligation.
Judicial authorization will not take place of consent if the spouse is  Justifiable separation obligates the husband to pay
willing to give such consent separate maintenance to the wife and can be a ground for
separation of property
FC, Article 128 FC, Article 129
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse following procedure shall apply:
may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation 1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties
conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary of each spouse.
conditions as the court may impose. 2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of
The obligations to the family in the preceding paragraph refer to personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to
marital, parental, or property relations. the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she 3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his
The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested
three months or has failed within the same period to give any by law in the conjugal partnership.
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie 4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said
dwelling. assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
SAME AS ACP. (FC 101) with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (2) of Article 121.
Abandonment -> departure with intent never to return. Not just 5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
physical separation, but absolute cessation or marital relations with shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
the intention of perpetual separation. 6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source,
Spouse can seek the remedies in the first paragraph (petition for the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the
receivership, judicial separation of property, or sole administration family, belonging to either spouses, even due to fortuitous event,
of community) after three months of absence. shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
Justifiable Separation shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
 Maltreatment of spouse husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
 Bringing a concubine into the house agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a
 Forcing spouse to live with persons whose habits, voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this
character, and language are offensive to her dignity Code.
8) The presumptive legitimesof the common children shall be STEPS IN LIQUIDATION
delivered upon partition in accordance with Article 51. 1) Inventory -> list separately the exclusive and conjugal property
9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the  Include only actual property possessed at time of
lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by dissolution of the partnership
the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority  When not necessary?
of the common children choose to remain. Children the age of o One of the spouses or his heirs
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the renounce benefits of the partnership; may still be
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the required if prejudicial to creditors
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of o Separation of property preceded the dissolution of
said children. the marriage
o Partnership dissolved by death of one spouse and
Methods of Liquidation the only heir is the surviving spouse
● Extrajudicial partition between the husband and wife or their o Dissolution cause by legal separation and share of
heirs guilty spouse is forfeited to the innocent spouse
 If there are no debts; heirs and legatees are all legal age
 Done through a public instrument filed in the office or the 2) Mutual Restitutions
register of deeds ● Benefit received from CPG shall be returned, advancements
 Disagreement settled by an ordinary action of partition made to CPG shall be charged.
o Partition is illegal and void if made pending an ● Does NOT involve actual transfer of properties, but only the
action for the acknowledge of a natural child crediting or inclusion of the value to be restored as assets
brought against the predecessor during his lifetime ● Restored -> advances for payment of personal debts and
 Such action implies a claim for inheritance obligations; Charged -> acquisition of conjugal properties,
 Ordinary action for partition indemnification for loss or deterioration of movables used for
o Liquidation and partition of a partnership already benefit of family [129 (6)]
dissolved
o Done if parties cannot agree on an extrajudicial 3) Payment of Debts
partition and there are no debts to be paid ● If CPG not enough, spouses shall be solidarily liable through
 Testate and intestate proceedings their separate properties
○ Applicable only when dissolution is by death
○ If there are debts and parties cannot agree on the settlement of 4) Net Remainder
debts ● Will be the net profits and divided equally between spouses
○ Settlement of the two estates of the deceased spouse and their ● Share of net remainder will be used to pay balance of his or her
liquidation of the partnership can be made in a single proceeding debts not covered by respect separate properties
 FC, Article 130
5) Presumptive Legitimes
Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
● Taken from total properties of each spouse (i.e. net remainder +
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding
balance of separate)
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceedings is instituted, the surviving
6) Total Remainder
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
● Whatever remains after all payments and deductions shall be
judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of
delivered to the spouses
the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the one year period, no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving
Differences between ACP and CPG
the community property of the terminated marriage shall be
CPG (FC 129) ACP (FC 102) void.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
No stipulation
payment of
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall
be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset
mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
thereof. govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of SAME AS ACP. FC 103.
his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of
property or for the value of his or her exclusive No stipulation No disposition or encumbrance = you keep it
property, the ownership of which has been vested
forever, you can’t sell it
by law in the conjugal partnership.
Validity of any disposition or encumbrance can be challenged by
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from
whatever source, the loss or deterioration of heirs of deceased. However, these will be valid to the extent of
movables used for the benefit of the family, what is allotted in the property involved to the vendor or
No stipulation
belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous mortgagor in the final partition.
event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal
funds, if any ● Shall also be valid if the surviving spouse is the only heir of the
(4) The net remainder of deceased spouse.
(7) The net remainder of the properties of the the properties of the
conjugal partnership shall constitute its profits absolute community
shall constitute its net Article imposes a mandatory regime of complete separation for
assets. subsequent marriages if requirements are not complied with.
In ACP -> net remainder is divided
In CPG -> entire mass is divided ● Tolentino: no logical reason since why should the regime
continue if the heirs succeed to get a partition of the properties
after the celebration of the second marriage?
Mortgage can still be valid even if the entire conjugal partnership ● COMPARE TO ACP: ACP not need to have both be done?
property is under administration since heirs are co-owners and (confirm);
have the full ownership of his part. ACP = capital, CPG = separate property;
ACP = capital first before duration, CPG = duration first before
FC, Article 131 capital
Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of
two or more marriages contracted by the same person before FC, Article 132
the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the The Rules of Court on the administration of estate of deceased
respective capital, fruits, and income of each partnership shall be persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of property of
determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not
rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the expressly determined in this Chapter.
existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the
different communities in proportion to the capital and duration FC, Article 133
of each
From the common mass of property, support shall be given to the
ACP (FC 104) -> no double proportion
surviving spouse and to the children during liquidation of the
CPG -> with double proportion?
inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered;
but from this shall be deducted that amount received for
Liquidation of the Partnerships
support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
 BOTH marriages have to be before FC
 If proof is known, liquidate the conjugal properties of the
first marriage first, then the conjugal properties of the
second marriage shall be liquidated.
 COMPARE TO ACP: no necessary relation between the
two, share of spouse in first marriage does not necessarily Allowance to Family
 Under Rules of Court -> widow and minor or incapacitated
become capitalfor the second marriage
children
 Under FC -> surviving spouse and children
o No qualification, thus can include widower,
When no Proof
 Divide on the basis of a double proportion
children of age, illegitimate children
o FC prevails under Art 132
o Basis of the duration of each partnership
 Grandchildren NOT entitled, but parents may be given
o Basis of the separate property brought to the
marriage by the respective spouses support during the liquidation.
Advance on Share
● If allowance given exceeds what pertains to them from their
shares in liquidation, the excess is considered an advance upon the
shares of CPG and inheritance.
Go v Go
 Protacio Jr bought a land from Gaviola and subsequently
affirmed under oath that it was his father who purchased the
property. After the death of his mother, Protacio Sr. and
Protacio Jr. sold the land to Servacio, one of the respondents.
Petitioner subsequently demanded the return of the property,
arguing that it was conjugal property and was sold without
prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio
Sr. and his wife. RTC, despite holding that the land was
conjugal property, affirmed the validity of the sale as long as
said portion will not encroach upon the legitime of other heirs.
Petitioners argue that the sale is void for being made prior
liquidation
 Court held that the property in question is governed by the
Family Code pursuant to FC 130, however, the conjugal
partnership was dissolved after the death of the wife and thus
an implied co-ownership ensued among Protacio Sr. and the
heirs of his wife.
 The court held that Protacio Sr. had the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest in the property since this
involved transferring the rights of the selling co-owners to the
buyer, making the latter a co-owner of Marta’s share.
FACTS OF THE CASE - Petitioners appeal, claiming that Art. 130, FC is applicable and that the sale
- Feb. 22, 1976:Protacio, Jr. bought 2 parcels of land (17,140 sq. m.) in by Protacio, Sr., et al. was void for being made without prior liquidation.
Southern Leyte from Gaviola. o Respondents argue that is not so, since the sale was valid to the
- Nov. 25, 1987: Marta Barola (Protacio Sr.’s wife and mother of petitioners) extent of the portion that was allotted to the vendors as his share;
died. that the sale did not prejudice the rights of the petitioners.
- March 29, 1999:Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and
Waiver saying it was his father Protacio, Sr. and not him who had W/N Art. 130 is applicable
No. Under Art. 130, FC (in relation to Art. 105), disposition of conjugal
purchased the property.
property after its dissolution must be made after liquidation; otherwise, the
- Dec. 28, 1999: Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito Go, sold a portion of the
selling is void. Art. 105 of the FC provides that the applicability of the rules on
property (5,560 sq. m). to respondent Servacio for P5,686,768. dissolution is “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance
- March 2, 2001: Petitioners demanded the return of the property, but with the Civil Code or other laws.”
Servacio refused. They sued Servacio and Rito in the RTC for the
annulment of the sale of the property. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the
o Petitioners averred: (1) Following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their conjugal partnership
property became conjugal property; (2) The sale of the property to governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death, the conjugal partnership was
Servacio was null and void because there was no liquidation of the dissolved (Art. 175(1), Civil Code). An implied co-ownership of the assets
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta Barola. ensued among Protacio, Sr. and Marta’s heirs. This is governed by Art. 493,
o Respondents said Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property, Civil Code.
since he purchased it with his own money.
- RTC Ruling A co-owner has the right to sell his share. Protacio, Sr., then, may sell his
o The property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. The sale without
(not exclusively Protacio, Sr.’s.). consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, because the rights of
 There were 3 vendors in the sale to Servacio: Protacio, Sr., Rito, the selling co-owners were effectively transferred, making Servacio a co-owner
and Dina. The participation of Rito and Dina was due to their of Marta’s share. Declaring the sale as void will prejudice the rights of Servacio
being heirs of Marta. and Rito who had already acquired the shares (Art. 105).
 Art. 160 of the Civil Code (law in effect when the property was
RULING: The petition is denied. The RTC’s decision is affirmed.
acquired): Property acquired by either spouse during the marriage
was conjugal unless there is proof that the property acquired Domingo v. Sps. Molina
pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife.  June 15, 1951: Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property
o However, the sale of the property was valid. consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18,164 sqm.
 Protacio, Jr.'s renunciation was insufficient to rebut the legal parcel of land
presumption.  September 10, 1978: 10 years after Flora died, Anastacio sold
 The alienation of the surviving spouse of a portion of the
his interest over the land to Genaro and Elena Molina to answer
community property shall be valid to the extent of what will be
allotted in the final partition to the vendor. for his debts to them
 Simply: Why invalidate the sale of a portion of  1986: Anastacio dies
community property that will eventually be the
vendor’s share in the final partition?
 May 19, 1995: the sale of Anastacio’s interest is registered, and  CA Ruling: affirmed the RTC Ruling
transferred the entire one-half undivided portion of the land to o Melecio failed to prove (by preponderant evidence) that
the spouses Molina there was fraud in the conveyance
 May 17, 1999: Melecio (one of the children of Anastacio and o Flora’s death is immaterial because Anastacio only sold
Domingo) learned of the transfer; he files a Complaint for his rights (excluding Flora’s interest) to the lot to
Annulment of Title and Recovery and Ownership; claims that: spouses Molina
o Anastacio gave the property as collateral for the money o Melecio’s action has prescribed (failed to file action w/in
he borrowed 1 year of decree of registration)
o Anastacio couldn’t have sold the property without  Melecio files this petition for certiorari
Flora’s consent
o Document transferring the interest was falsified MAIN ISSUE: W/N the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses
o He (Melecio) lived on the property from his dad’s death Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal. HELD: YES
until his filing of the complaint o The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was
o Presented testimonies that Molina’s brother was the dissolved upon Flora’s death (FC, Art. 126)
register of deeds at the time, and that there were 5 other  FC, Art. 130 does not apply (provisions of the
occupants of the land since 1986 FC shall be w/o prejudice to vested rights
 Spouses Molina asserted that: already acquired in accordance with the Civil
o Anastacio surrendered the title to the property as Code or other laws)
payment to his debts, and he told them that they already o An implied co-ownership among Flora’s heirs (including
own half the land Anastacio) with respect to her share of the conjugal
o Melecio went with his dad many times to borrow money partnership; but in addition to this, Anastacio also owns
-> he know of the sale one half of the original conjugal partnership as his share
o Melecio built his hut on the property only in 1999, w/o (as undivided interest) (Art. 493, NCC)
their consent  Anastacio, as a co-owner, is free to sell and
o Presented testimony from occupant that Melecio never dispose his undivided interest in the property
lived on the property o The spouses Molina became co-owners of the property
 Spouses Molina died during pendency; represented by their to the extent of Anastacio’s undivided interest
adopted son Cornelio Molina o Melecio should have filed an action for partition
 RTC Ruling: case dismissed
o Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio ISSUE #2: W/N there was fraud in the transfer of the subject
didn’t sell the property property to the spouses Molina. HELD: NO.
o Anastacio could dispose of conjugal properties w/o o Factual questions cannot be questioned in a Rule 45
Flora’s consent because it was necessary to answer for petition
conjugal liabilities
 o the facts of the trial court (especially when affirmed by
the CA) are binding upon this Court
o there was a notarized deed of conveyance executed
o Melecio failed to prove (by preponderant evidence) that
there was fraud in the conveyance

RULING
 Petition DENIED. CA affirmed.