Rule 110 Cases: Prosecution of Offenses

1. People v. Bautista (GR 168641)

Facts:
- On June 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida Bautista,
on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, on the other.
- Goyena filed a complaint w/ Office of Brgy of Malate but no settlement was reached. Thus,
the Chairman issued a certificate to file action.
- Hence, Goyena filed a complaint for slight physical injuries against Bautista.
- After prelim investigation, Prosecutor Junsay-Ong recommended the filing of an
information against Bautista. This was approved by City Prosecutor but no date of such
approval cant be found.
- The information was filed with MTC Manila on June 20, 2000.
- Bautista sought dismissal on the ground that by the time information was filed, the 60-day
period of prescription had already elapsed. MTC denied this petition.
- Bautista appealed to the RTC which affirmed the MTC.
- Bautista appealed to the CA which ruled in favor of him declaring that the offense had
prescribed by the time the information was filed: The information was filed after nearly 6
months. Art 91 of the RPC states that ‘proceedings at the CPO was unjustifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to him fr a time very much more than the prescriptive period
of only 2 months”.
- Goyena appeals to the SC seeking reversal of the CA’s decision.

Issue: WON the prescriptive period for filing began to run anew after the investigating prosec’s
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor.

Held: NO

-The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosec’s approval
of the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation. The prescriptive period remains from the time
the complaint was filed w/ the OCP until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted.
- The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial does not apply sine the delay
occurred not in the conduct of preliminary investigation but in the filing of the information.
-Petition Granted. CA decision set aside.
 2. Francisco v. CA, 122 SCRA 538

Facts:

Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave
oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his employees, each
Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12
April 1980.

On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61,
found petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5) cases
filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each
case, as alleged in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties,
Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was
acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.

Issue:

(a) Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to
the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.

Held:

Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based
on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not
just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity
and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit.

The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave
felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily
those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to
be less perverse.

Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the gravity of the offense
committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term
not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus
may avail of probation.
The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in
each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which
is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each
case to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed
by law; and to pay the costs.

The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily
must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation
with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow
probation after an appeal has been perfected.

Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the
imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence
and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he
filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was
otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED

3. Reodica v. CA, GR 125066

On the evening of October 17, 1987, while Isabelita Reodica was driving her van in
Paranaque, Metro Manila, her van hit the car of Norberto Bonsol. As a result, Bonsol sustained
physical injuries and the damage to his car amounted to P8,542. On Oct. 20, 1987, Bonsol filed
an Affidavit of Complaint against Reodica with the Fiscal's Office. Later, on January 13, 1988, an
information was filed before the RTC of Makati charging Reodica with "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. Reodica pleaded not guilty to the
charge against her, so, trial ensued.
On January 31, 1991, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Reodica of the "quasi
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries" and
sentencing her to suffer imprisonment for 6 months and pay Bonsol P13,542. Reodica contends
that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light offenses which cannot be complexed.
Further, since the two are light offenses, the RTC do not have jurisdiction over such offenses, and
even if does, the penalty imposed on her is excessive. Being light offenses, adding up the
imposable penalties of the mentioned light offenses only sum up to 60 days of imprisonment and
not 6 months as imposed on her by the lower court. Moreover, she also argues that "the offense
of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor,
is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months". The information was only filed on January
13, 1988 or almost 3 months from the date of the vehicular collision, thus, the offense had already
prescribed.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with the petitioner that the penalty should
have been arresto menor in its maximum period, pursuant to Art.365 of the RPC. But, it contends
that it was proper to "complex" reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to
property "because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not
the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations". Further, the OSG
argues that although it is the MTC which has jurisdiction over cases of slight physical injuries, the
RTC "properly took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher
penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542".

Issue: 1. Whether or not the two light offenses - damage to property and slight physical injuries
can be complexed, and even if it can be complexed, was the 6 months imprisonment sentenced
to Reodica proper?
2. Whether or not the crime has already prescribed.

Held: 1. The two offenses cannot be complexed, they should have been filed separately.
2. No. The Supreme Court used Art. 91 of the RPC for resolving the issue on prescription of the
offense.
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence
to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him.

Thus, the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap
interrupted the run of the offense's prescription.

4. Crespo v Mogul
Crespo v. Presiding Judge Mogul

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

Gancayco, J:

FACTS:

 On April 18, 1997, Assistant Fiscal Gala filed an information for estafa against Mario
Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena but while the case was pending, accused
Crespo filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition
for review of the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal to file such information with the
Secretary of Justice.

 Respondent Hon. Leodegario Mogul denied accused motion to defer arraignment and
denied a motion for reconsideration of the same. However, the arraignment was deferred
to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

 Accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
to the CA and the CA, in an order, restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment and such order was made final.
  The Undersecretary of Justice then resolved accused Crespo’s petition for review and
reversed the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal, directing the fiscal to dismiss the
information against accused Crespo for insufficiency of evidence and a motion to dismiss
was filed by the Provincial Fiscal.

 Despite the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice, Judge Mogul denied the motion
to dismiss and set the arraignment reasoning that due process and the independence and
integrity of the court dictate that the case against Crespo be resolved by evidence before
it and not by the determination of the Undersecretary of Justice.

 Hence, accused Crespo filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with the
prayer for issuance of a preliminary writ of prohibition or TRO with the CA.

 CA issued a TRO against the threatened act of arraignment but it eventually lifted the
restraining order and denied accused Crespo’s motion for reconsideration, hence, this
petition for review.

 Second Division of SC transferred the case to the SC En Banc.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a trial court may be prevented from hearing a case upon the instructions
of the Secretary of Justice to the Provincial Fiscal to file a motion to dismiss?

HELD

1. NO. The filing of a complaint or information in court initiates criminal action and vests
jurisdiction to the court. After the filing of the case, a warrant for the arrest of the accused
or upon voluntary submission of the accused, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person.

2. Preliminary investigation conducted by fiscal to determine whether a prima facie case

exists warranting prosecution of the accused is terminated upon filing of the information in
the proper court. While it is true that the fiscal has quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once case has been brought to
court, the disposition of the case is under the court’s sound discretion.

3. That the Secretary of Justice who thinks that the case should be dismiss controls the fiscal
or prosecutor who will be assigned to the case is of no moment as despite of his opinion,
it is their duty to see that justice is served.

4. Although the fiscal or public prosecutor controls the prosecution, he cannot impose his
opinion on the court.

5. Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with the prayer for issuance of a
preliminary writ of prohibition is DISMISSED.
5. SEC v. Export Resource Corporation

Facts:
• The Board of Directors of IRC executed a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings
Berhad (GHB). The memorandum paved way for IRC to acquire 100% of the entire capital
stock of GEHI (Ganda Energy Holdings) which would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas
turbine power generating barge. The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-
year power purchase contract with National Power Corporation.
• In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to
40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488 million. IRC would also acquire 67%
of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing Club(PRCI). Under such agreement, GHB shall
extend a loan required to pay the proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI
• IRC alleged that a press release amounting the approval of the agreement was sent through
fax to Philippine Stock Exchange. However, SEC received reports that IRC failed to make a
timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors heavily
traded IRC shares utlizing this material insider information.
• Hence, SEC required the directors to explain why they failed to disclose material information
as required by law. Unsatisfied with the answer, SEC rendered a decision finding that IRC
violated the Rules in connection with the Old Securities Act.
• This led the respondents to file an answer which questioned the authority of SEC to investigate
with such matters.
• CA ruled in favor of the respondents and enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or
administrative cases against respondents since there was no law requiring the disclosure,
insider trading or any of the provisions of the revised securities act. CA then barred SEC from
making any action against respondents for said violations.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the SEC retained jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Revised Securities
Act.

Held:

1. Yes, SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Revised Securities Act. Sec
53 of the SRC provides that criminal complaints for violations of rules and regulations enforced
or administered by SEC shall be referred to the DOJ. However, SEC retains limited
investigatory power. Hence, SEC may still impose appropriate sanctions.

6. Panlilio v. RTC Br. 51 Manila, 641 SCRA 438

Facts:

Petitioners were corporate officers of Silahis International Hotel Inc. (SIHI) who were charged with
violation of the SSS law in relation to the Revised Penal Code. The criminal case was raffled in
RTC Br 51.

Meanwhile, a petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation was pending in RTC Br 24.
SIHI's petition was granted and a suspension order was issued by RTC Br 24, staying all claims
against SIHI.

On the basis of RTC 24's order, petitioners now claim that the proceeding before RTC Br 51
should be suspended.

RTC Br 51 denied the petitioners' motion and ruled that the stay order does not include the
suspension of criminal proceedings. This decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the stay order stays criminal cases

Held:

No. Section 18 of FRIA explicitly provides that criminal actions against the individual officer of a
corporation are not subject to the Stay or Suspension Order in rehabilitation proceedings.

The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of
the corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual capacities. Such being the
case, the purpose of the law for the issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since the
appointed rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as mandated by law. It bears
to stress that the rehabilitation receiver is not charged to defend the officers of the corporation. If
there is anything that the rehabilitation receiver might be remotely interested in is whether the
court also rules that petitioners are civilly liable.

Such a scenario, however, is not a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings, because as aptly
discussed in Rosario, should the court prosecuting the officers of the corporation find that an
award or indemnification is warranted, such award would fall under the category of claims, the
execution of which would be subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court. The penal
sanctions as a consequence of violation of the SSS law, in relation to the revised penal code can
therefore be implemented if petitioners are found guilty after trial. However, any civil indemnity
awarded as a result of their conviction would be subject to the stay order issued by the
rehabilitation court. Only to this extent can the order of suspension be considered obligatory upon
any court, tribunal, branch or body where there are pending actions for claims against the
distressed corporation.

7. Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Chan, 644 SCRA 13

FACTS:

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP
22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the
MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled
with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was
implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
plaintiffs attachment bond for damages,

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages. The MTC cites the grounds of litis
pendentia and that the case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required

Chans motion for reconsideration was denied as well as his appeal with the RTC. On the CA,
Chan's appeal was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil
Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.

RULING:

NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of
an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly provides: "The criminal action
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed."
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.”

8. Chua v. Padilla, GR 162797

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are:

Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of Padillo Lending Investor
engaged in the money lending business in Lucena City. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua, served
as the firm’s manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua, brother of Renita Chua, herein
petitioners.

One of Marissa’s functions was to evaluate and recommend loan applications for approval by
respondents. Once a loan application had been approved, respondents would authorize the
release of a check signed by them or their authorized signatory, a certain Mila Manalo.

Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was found that Marissa was
engaged in illegal activities. Some of the borrowers whose loan applications she recommended
for approval were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were spurious. Marissa’s modus
operandi was to alter the name of the payee appearing on the check by adding another name as
an alternative payee. This alternative payee would then personally encash the check with the
drawee bank. The cash amounts received were turned over to Marissa or her husband Wilson for
deposit in their personal accounts. To facilitate encashment, Marissa would sign the check to
signify to the bank that she personally knew the alternative payee. The alternative payees
included employees of Wilson or his friends. The total amount embezzled reached ₱7 million.

Respondents filed complaints against petitioners and several others with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Lucena City. In turn, the NBI forwarded their complaints to the Office of the
City Prosecutor, same city, for preliminary investigation, docketed as I.S. Nos. 98-1487, 98-1621,
98-1629, and 98-1605.

In a Resolution dated March 18, 1999, Lucena City Prosecutor Romeo A. Datu (now retired),
disposed of the complaints as follows:

WHEREFORE, after preliminary investigation, finding sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of

a prima facie case of Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, let an Information be
filed against Marissa Padillo-Chua, Wilson Chua, Renita Chua, and several John Does, the same
to be filed with the Regional Trial Court.
The case against the other respondents, namely, Perla Correa, Giovani Guia, Emmanuel Garcia,
Zenaida Nantes, Cherrylyn Mendoza, Rosalie Mazo, Fernando Loreto, Cesar Salamat, Antonio
Bana, Isidro Manalo, Jr., Ramon Villanueva, Alexander Asiado, Peter Tan, Jun Tan, Flaviano
Evaso, Edgar Sebastian, Crisencio Asi, Roberto Ong and Gregorio Flancia is provisionally
dismissed.

Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and Renita
with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, docketed therein as Criminal Cse No. 99-182. It was
raffled of to Branch 59.

Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged against petitioners, respondents
interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice who issued a Resolution dated January 3, 2000,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution is modified. The City Prosecution Office of Lucena City
is hereby directed to file the Information of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents defined and penalized under Article 315 par. 1(b) in relation to Articles
171 and 172 (58 counts) against respondent Marissa Padillo-Chua and to cause the withdrawal
of the Information of estafa through falsification of commercial documents against respondents
Wilson Chua and Renita Chua. Report to us the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.

The Secretary of Justice found that the participation of Wilson Chua in the commission of the
crime was not clearly established by the evidence. There was no showing that he abused the trust
and confidence of respondents when two (2) of the questioned checks were deposited in his bank
account. As to Renita Chua, the Secretary of Justice found no proof of conspiracy between her
and Marissa.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied with finality by the Secretary of
Justice on November 6, 2000.

Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 62401. They alleged that in issuing the Resolution dated January 3, 2000 directing the
Prosecutor’s Office of Lucena City to file the corresponding Information only against Marissa, the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. They prayed that the Court of Appeals
order the Lucena City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-182 and
instead, file several Informations against petitioners.

On January 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding
that there was no conspiracy among the petitioners.
Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. Revisiting its Decision, the Court of
Appeals, on May 15, 2003, promulgated its Amended Decision granting respondents’ motion,
thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the Court
orders the DOJ, City Prosecutor, Lucena City to include Wilson Chua and Renita Chua as
accused in the said case.

SO ORDERED.

In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances
which, if considered, would establish probable cause against Wilson and Renita. The Court of
Appeals identified these facts to be: (1) Marissa’s consistent practice of depositing checks with
altered names of payees to the respective accounts of Wilson Chua and Renita Chua; (2)
considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife, it can be inferred that one knows the
transactions of the other; and (3) Wilson had full knowledge of the unlawful activities of Marissa.
This is supported by the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998.

Wilson Chua and Renita Chua filed their motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but
the Court of Appeals denied the same on May 28, 2004.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in compelling the
Secretary of Justice to include in the Information Wilson and Renita.

Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, partly provides that "All
criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of a public prosecutor." The rationale for this rule is that since a criminal
offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows that a representative
of the State shall direct and control the prosecution thereof.3 In Suarez v. Platon,4 this Court
described the prosecuting officer as:

[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose

obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.

Having been vested by law with the control of the prosecution of criminal cases, the public
prosecutor, in the exercise of his functions, has the power and discretion to: (a) determine whether
a prima facie case exists;5 (b) decide which of the conflicting testimonies should be believed free
from the interference or control of the offended party;6 and (c) subject only to the right against
self-incrimination, determine which witnesses to present in court.7Given his discretionary powers,
a public prosecutor cannot be compelled to file an Information where he is not convinced that the
evidence before him would warrant the filing of an action in court. For while he is bound by his
oath of office to prosecute persons who, according to complainant’s evidence, are shown to be
guilty of a crime, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or
malicious prosecution.8

We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor’s exercise of his discretionary powers is not
absolute.

First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice
who, under the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control and supervision over
the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify
the ruling of said prosecutor." In special cases, the public prosecutor’s decision may even be
reversed or modified by the Office of the President.9

Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the ground that
he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.10

Here, we note that the Court of Appeals, on motion for reconsideration by respondents, ruled that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that only Marissa should
be charged.

We agree.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.11 We have carefully examined the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice dated January 3, 2000 wherein he ruled that there was no probable cause to hold Wilson
Chua and Renita Chua for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. As found by the
Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either overlooked or patently ignored the following
circumstances: (1) Marissa’s practice of depositing checks, with altered names of payees, in the
respective accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband
and wife makes it difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions entered into by the
other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998 confirming that Wilson
had knowledge of Marissa’s illegal activities.

Indeed, as we ruled in Sanchez v. Demetriou,12 not even the Supreme Court can order the
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support
at least a prima facie case. The only possible exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, as in this case.

Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in directing the City Prosecutor of Lucena City to include
Wilson and Renita Chua in the Information for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

9. People v. Dumlao, GR 168918

Facts:

Before the Sandiganbayan, an information was filed charging Dumlao, La’o and others with
violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA No. 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

It was alleged in the said information that the respondents, who were members of the GSIS Board
of Trustees, entered into a contract of lease-purchase with respondent La’o, a private person.
The said contract provided the concurrence of GSIS to sell La’o a property it had acquired,
consisting of land and building known as the Government Counsel Center for P2 million on an
installment with annual interest and amortization. La’o was also authorized to sub-lease the
ground floor of the said building during the lease period, from which he collected yearly rentals in
excess of the yearly amortization, causing huge disadvantage to the government.

Considering the foregoing, Dumlao filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts alleged
did not constitute an offense. He averred that the prosecution’s main thrust against him was the
alleged approval by the GSIS Board of the said contract. He contended that it was never approved
as the signatures of his fellow respondents did not appear in the minutes of meeting therefor,
proving their non-participation therein. Additionally, there was no board quorum during that time
to push through with the approval thereof. Hence, since the evidence of the prosecution was
insufficient, he should be deemed innocent.

The Sandiganbayan ruled in Dumlao’s favor, based on the said insufficiency of evidence.

Issue:

Whether the insufficiency of evidence is a ground for motion to quash.

Held:

No.
Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. The grounds, as
enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as follows:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its
case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court.

In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for
insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its
evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the prosecution
of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accused’s culpability.
It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not
only did it not consider the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on
a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without basis
and untimely.

10. Pinato v. Ayco,

The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of public
prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear transgression of the
Rules.

Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in
a criminal case to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the
absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor
Pinote was at that time undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon
City.

On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused to cross-examine the
two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that prior proceedings
conducted in his absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to have waived its
right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.

Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for
“Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for allowing the defense to
present evidence in the absence of a prosecutor

HELD:

As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the
public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case
there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of
the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to
the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute
the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless
the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely
to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account
that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital
state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace
of the people.

Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no
matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due
process, so is the State.

Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the hearings
or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of
his Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It
does not absolve Judge Ayco of his utter disregard of the Rules

11. Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS

Sandiganbayan tried and affirmed graft charges against Felicimo Lazarte Jr., an engineer and
chair of the National Housing Authority(NHA). He allegedly used public funds amounting to
P230,000 to pay a Makati-based construction company for a ghost project(financing a project that
is not part of a plan) in Bacolod City.
Further, he was accused of conspiring with fellow officers;namely, Josephine Angsico, Virgilio
Dacalos, Robert Balao, and Josephine Espinosa. They filed a motion to quash the allegation, and
after a thorough investigation, the court dismissed the charges of the alleged conspirants for
failure to prove participation, but it retained Lazarte’s charge.
Issue: As department manager of the NHA (Salary Grade 26), does the Sandiganbayan have
jurisdiction over petitioner Lazarte?

RULING
The Court sustains the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed out by
the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary
Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled
corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls within the scope of
its jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by
law. NHA being part of that.
Further, the position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case
of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds,
not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan---- that which includes
the position held by Lazarte.

12. Gueg v. People

13. Malto v. People

Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a minor,
to indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA
had a “mutual understanding” and became sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioner’s
threat to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.

Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAA’s mother lodged a complaint in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Assistant City Prosecutor charged the petitioner in an Information
a violation of Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610. During the month of November 1997 up to 1998,
in Pasay City, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce
and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to
indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said
accused has carnal knowledge.

The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction
and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article
III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as amended and sentenced him to reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not
covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and thereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction on the grounds that there was
no rape committed since their sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of their “sweetheart”
relationship

HELD

NeGATIVE. Petitioner is wrong.

Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended. The first element of Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused. The second
element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third element corresponds to
the minority or age of the offended party. Since all three elements of the crime were present, the
conviction of petitioner was proper.

Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of RA
7610. Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have sexual
intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection. The sweetheart
theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or without the
consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires
proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual
relations.30

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610,
the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can
easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
Those of tender years deserve its protection.

The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more
damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be
deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of
ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of
giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

To provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in
situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. [A]s well as to intervene on behalf of
the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails
or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts
against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and
custody of the same.

The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call for Children as
enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be
exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy
life.

14. People v. Ubina

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

The series of events that led to the charge of rape started in the morning of October 9, 2000 when
the appellant went to the Tabang Elementary School in Tabang, Sto. Niño, Cagayan (where AAA
was a student) to inform her that her grandfather ("lolo") was in a hospital and needed her there.
AAA went with the appellant but was told while at Tuguegarao that her lolo was in a different
hospital. The appellant then brought her to Allacapan, Cagayan "in a house where the accused
stayed when they were still young."

In a room at that house, the appellant removed AAA’s pants and thereafter inserted his penis into
her vagina while AAA was lying down. AAA resisted when she was made to lie down and cried
as the appellant removed her pants. The appellant sexually abused [her] five (5) times in the
seven (7) days they stayed in Allacapan.

From Allacapan, the appellant brought AAA in the afternoon of October 16, 2000 to her
grandfather’s house located in a rice field in Campo, Sto. Niño, Cagayan. He molested [her] twice
at that location that same afternoon. Again, AAA cried as the appellant removed her shorts and
panty.

After three (3) days, AAA’s grandfather brought her home to San Manuel. With the appellant’s
warning not to tell anyone what transpired between them, AAA did not mention a word regarding
the incident to either her grandfather at Sto. Niño, or to [her] father upon her arrival at home at
San Manuel. It was only on the following day that she told her father about her ordeal. AAA’s
father reported the matter to the police the next day.

After initial police investigation, AAA was brought to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center where
Dr. Jeliza Alcantara medically examined her. The examination disclosed several hymenal
lacerations in her genitalia, indicating that she was no longer a virgin. The Medical Findings state:

"Abdomen – flat, soft, normo active bowel sounds, non-tender

GUT – Normal External Genitalia, admits 2 fingers with ease (+) multiple complete and incomplete
old healed hymenal lacerations

xxx

The appellant denied that he raped AAA but admitted that his father-in-law instructed him on
October 9, 2000 to bring AAA home from school because he (the father-in-law who is also AAA’s
grandfather) was sick. [She] was summoned because no one else was available to look after him.
After bringing [her] home, he went to his farm to pick up his wife. The appellant denied that he
brought AAA to Allacapan, Cagayan; he had no reason to go there since he didn’t know anybody
from that place. He further claimed that on October 16, 2000, he was at Maguiling, Piat, Cagayan
to have his buffalo carabao vaccinated; he went home by 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that
same day.

The appellant claimed that he could not think of any reason why AAA would accuse him of rape,
and surmised that [her] father could be angry at, or at the very least envious of, him. He narrated
that AAA’s father did not receive any dowry from his father-in-law while he and his wife were given
a carabao.6

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds that the guilt of the accused Orlando
A. Ubiña for the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code has been established beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences the said accused
Orlando A. Ubiña to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) years of Reclusion Perpetua. He is further
sentenced to indemnify the private complainant AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.7

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11, in Criminal
Case No. 895-T, finding the appellant guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION with respect to penalty and the awarded damages. The appellant is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the complainant ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and, as awarded by the trial court, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.8

The appellate court disregarded the aggravating circumstance of craft and the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship of the parties in the imposition of penalty because it
noted that they were not alleged in the information. It however modified the penalty of 30 years’
imprisonment imposed by the trial court and instead imposed the single and indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua. It also awarded the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

Appellant denies raping AAA. He alleges that after he fetched AAA from school on October 9,
2000, he went to the farm to fetch his wife; that on October 16, 2000, he had his carabao
vaccinated at Maguiling, Piat, Cagayan; that AAA’s father fabricated the accusation against him
out of jealousy because their father-in-law gave him and his wife a carabao as dowry, while the
former and his wife were not given any; that the testimony of AAA was inconsistent and incredible
– AAA cannot recall the place where the alleged first sexual abuse happened; and AAA’s father,
unlike other parents of rape victims, did not immediately report the alleged rape incidents to the
police, nor did he confront him about what he allegedly did to his daughter. Finally, appellant
invokes his right to be presumed innocent considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal is bereft of merit.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the
person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime,
only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized
with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.9

When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges
of truth and sincerity. Also, in a long line of cases, we have held that if the testimony of the rape
victim is accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim's
testimony because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus
run the risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.10

In the instant case, both the trial and appellate courts found AAA’s testimony to be clear,
convincing, and credible. In fact, records show that AAA properly identified her rapist and
realistically depicted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant:

Q Do you know the accused in this case?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you know him?

A My mother and his wife are sisters.

xxxx

Q Do you recall where were you at around 10:00 O’clock in the morning of October 9, 2000?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A At Tabang Elementary School, sir.

Q At that particular date and time, do you still recall if somebody came to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was that person?

A Lando Ubiña, sir.

Q Who is this Lando Ubiña, is he the same accused Lando Ubiña in this case?

A Yes, the same person sir.

Q If he will be shown to you, will you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is now in the court room, will you please point at him?

A There, sir (Witness pointed to a person who was asked his name and he answer [sic] that he is
Lando Ubiña).11

xxxx

FISCAL:

Q Did you reach the hospital?

A No, sir.

Q Where did you go then?

A In Allacapan.

xxxx

Q While in Allacapan, do you recall if something happened to you?

xxxx

A He removed my short pants.

xxxx

COURT:

Q What did you do when Orlando Ubiña removed your pants?

A None, sir.

Q You did not object or refuse?

A I cried, sir.

FISCAL:

Q After the accused removed your shortpants, what happened next or what did he do next?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina.

xxxx

Q Did you resist when he made you lie down?

A Yes, sir.12

xxxx

Q On October 16, 2000, do you remember if there was anything unusual that happened to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you tell what happened to you on October 16, 2000 at barrio Campo, Sto. Niño, Cagayan?

A He again removed my shorts and panty and sexually abused me again.

Q What did you do when the accused removed your shorts and panty?

A I cried again.

Q How many times on October 16, 2000 did the accused sexually abuse you?

ATTY. LIGAS:

Objection, the information allege [sic] only one sexual intercourse.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

A Two times, sir.

Q How do you know that the penis of the accused entered into your vagina at barrio Campo, Sto.
Niño, Cagayan?

A I felt the entering of his penis into my vagina.

Q How long did he sexually abuse you at Campo?

A For a long period, sir.13

It is well-settled that the evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility is a matter best left to the trial
court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude. Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and
conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.14 No such facts or circumstances exist
in the case at bar.

We find that the prosecution satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had
carnal knowledge of AAA through force, threats and intimidation. The force, violence, or
intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the
parties but also on their relationship with each other.15 Appellant is the husband of the victim’s
aunt; as such, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.16 It
is a settled rule that in rape committed by a close kin, moral ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.17

The alleged inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, i.e., her inability to remember the house where
she was raped and her father’s alleged unnatural reaction upon knowing that his daughter was
raped, are inconsequential matters that do not bear upon the elements of the crime. What is
decisive in a prosecution for rape is whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently
proven. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness, to serve as basis for
acquittal, must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused for the
crime charged. As the inconsistencies alleged by appellant had nothing to do with the elements
of the crime of rape, they cannot be used as grounds for his acquittal.18

We have said before that the workings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently
and there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.19 AAA
could not be expected to remember all the details surrounding her harrowing experience with
appellant. The emotional trauma she suffered may tend to make her forget a circumstantial matter
such as the house where she was raped. On the same note, AAA’s father cannot be expected to
immediately demand justice for his daughter. His initial shock could have prevented him from
doing anything at all. Be that as it may, the inaction of AAA’s father on the day he knew his
daughter was raped does not negate the crime of appellant.1awphil

The proposition of appellant that the father of AAA instigated the filing of the criminal charges
against him is a feeble attempt to exonerate himself. Besides, no mother or father would stoop so
low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing
that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter’s psyche and mar her life if the
charge is not true.20 Moreover, we held in People v. Viajedor,21 that family resentment, revenge
or feud have never swayed the Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a complainant
for rape, especially a minor who remained steadfast in her testimony, throughout the direct and
cross-examinations, that she was sexually abused.

Compared with the factual backdrop painted by prosecution witnesses, appellant’s version of what
transpired only generates disbelief. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute
self-serving negative evidence which can not be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
positive declaration of credible witnesses.22 To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability;23 whereas for alibi to prosper, it must be proven that during the
commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis.24 In the instant case, it was not shown that it was physically
impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Moreover, nobody
corroborated his alibi.

In People v. Esperanza,25 we explained that:

The twin circumstances of minority and relationship under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances because they alter
the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty. As special qualifying circumstances they
must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information; xxx If the offender is
merely a relation - not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or common law spouse of the
mother of the victim – the specific relationship must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is
"a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree." 26

The information in the instant case only mentioned appellant as AAA’s uncle, without specifically
stating that he is a relative within the third civil degree, either by affinity or consanguinity. Even
granting that during trial it was proved that the relationship was within the third civil degree either
of consanguinity or affinity, still such proof cannot be appreciated because appellant would
thereby be denied of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Appellant cannot be charged with committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then
be tried and convicted of rape in its qualified form.27 Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
disregarded the qualifying circumstance of relationship.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the minority of AAA because such was
properly alleged in the Information and was proven during trial by the presentation of a certification
of AAA’s record of birth duly issued by the office of the municipal civil registrar of Sto. Niño,
Cagayan.28 Conformably with the Esperanza case,29 when either one of the twin special qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the
information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. As
such, complainant’s minority may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. However, it
may not serve to raise the penalty in the instant case because in simple rape, the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua which is single and indivisible.

Anent the award of damages, the appellate court correctly awarded ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages in addition to civil indemnity because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.30 Moral damages are separate and distinct
from civil indemnity;31 however both are automatically granted once the fact of rape has been
established.32 In People v. Catubig,33 we held that the presence of an aggravating circumstance,
such as complainant’s minority in the instant case, entitles her to an award of exemplary damages.
The amount of ₱25,000.00 is deemed appropriate under the circumstances.34

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Orlando A. Ubiña guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the victim AAA, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity ex delicto, and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay the victim Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

15. People v Tampus

FACTS:
At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the
national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water.
The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, followed
Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died
upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered
to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po
kami."

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report submitted on the
same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his on-the-spot
investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his
back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck

Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila
and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado.

The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus
and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado.

In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the following issues

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain silent after the
fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus
to testify
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the arraignment and
hearing were held at the state penitentiary

HELD:
1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and Avila had already
admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they surrendered to the first guard
whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge.
That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at
the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment
without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to
counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and
testimony in court.
Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings in
Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted
by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation.

It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt,
confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution.

2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession.
The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain
silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the
accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right

3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the
trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national
penitentiary.

Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in
Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the
judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).

The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may
motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive
to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the
trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and
defense.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The extra-judicial confession of the accused is manifestly barred from admission under the Bill of
Rights.

I have grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the accused of his constitutional right to counsel
and to remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary" extrajudicial confession during his
custodial interrogation by the prison investigator, who at such late stage (in propounding question
No. 6, not at the beginning of the interrogation) purportedly took time out to admonish and inform
the accused of his rights to counsel and to silence. The fundamental rights of such unfortunate
disadvantaged persons as the accused should all the more be clearly protected and observed. At
the very least, such alleged waiver must be witnessed by a responsible official of the penitentiary,
if not by the municipal judge of the locality.
Counsel for the accused's second assigned error is also well taken. After the prosecutor had
presented the State's evidence at the hearing for the purpose, and when counsel de oficio then
called upon the accused to testify, it became the trial court's duty (contrary to the majority's ruling)
to apprise and admonish him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and against self-
incrimination, i.e. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Under the above-cited section 20 of the Bill of Rights, any confession or incriminatory statement
obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared "inadmissible in evidence."

Rule 112, Case Number 11

11. Delos Santos-DA v. CA, GR 178947

Facts:

Del Rosario filed a complaint for replevin and damages against Delos Santos with the RTC of
Legazpi City. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Del Rosario.

On April 2, 1998, the postman attempted to deliver a copy of an adverse decision to the office of
Atty. Olaybal, counsel for petitioner Del Rosario. At that time, the office of Atty. Olaybal was closed
since he was then suffering from influenza. The postman instead delivered the copy of the
decision to Bernadeth Faye Alamares, who was a clerk in an office adjacent to Atty. Olaybal.
Alamares received the Decision and signed the corresponding registry return card.

On 17 April 1998, a Friday, Atty. Olaybal reported for work. Alamares subsequently turned over
the mails she received, including the decision, to Atty. Olaybal. Atty. Olaybal asked from Alamares
the exact date when she received the Decision. Alamares replied that to her recollection it was
before the holidays, referring to 9 April 1998 (Bataan Day). Atty. Olaybal concluded from
Alamares' recollection that she received the decision on 8 April 1998 and mistakenly thought that
the end of the reglementary period to perfect an appeal fell on 23 April 1998.

On 20 April 1998, the next business day, Atty. Olaybal filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal
of the decision.

The trial court, however, dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time.

Atty. Olaybal filed a Petition for Relief pleading mistake and excusable negligence for failure to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary period and praying that the appeal be given due course.

The trial court dismissed the Petition for Relief and issued a writ of execution. The CA affirmed
the Orders of the RTC.
Issue:

Was the service of the trial court's decision valid and binding on petitioners?

Held:

No. Section 2 of Rule 13 provides:

SEC. 2. Filing and service, defined. xxx Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the
pleading or paper concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be
made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. xxx

Section 7 of Rule 13 provides:

SEC. 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in
the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if
known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to
the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry
service is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by
ordinary mail.

Section 9 of Rule 13 provides:

SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions. Judgments, final orders or resolutions
shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication
has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be
served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
Therefore, service of decisions must be made to the counsel on record if a party appears by
counsel. Service of decisions by registered mail should be made by depositing the copy of the
decision in the office, in a sealed envelope, addressed to the party's counsel at his office.

In this case, the postman served a copy of the trial court’s decision on Alamares who was neither
an associate nor employee of Atty. Olaybal. The records show that Alamares was then an
employee of Asaphil Corporation whose office is adjacent to Atty. Olaybal. There is nothing in the
records showing Atty. Olaybal authorized either Alamares or Ashapil Corporation to receive mails
addressed to him or his law office.

Since there was no valid service of the trial court's decision on Alamares on 2 April 1998, we shall
reckon the fifteen-day period within which to perfect the appeal from 17 April 1998, when Atty.
Olaybal actually received a copy of the trial court's decision. Consequently, Atty. Olaybal filed
the notice of appeal within the reglementary period when he filed it on 20 April 1998.

Order of the RTC was annuled and Notice of Appeal was reinstated