The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy

Also by Christopher Hill

NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICIES AND. EUROPEA:'\ POLITICAL COOPERATION
(edited)
The Changing Politics of
TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER (with Lawrence fl-eedman. Adam Roberts,
R. J. Vincent, Paul Wilkinson and Philip Windsor)
Foreign Policy
CABINET DECISIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY: The British Experience October
1938~June 194 l

TWO WORLDS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Academics, Practitioners and the

Trade in ideas (edited, with Pamela Beshojf)

THE ACTORS !N EUROPE'S FOREIGN POLICY (edited) Christopher Hill

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY: West European Reactions to the Falklands
Conflict (edited, with Ste!fos Stavridis)
MARCHING TO CAPTIVITY: the War Diaries of a French Peasant 1939-1945- Gustave
Folcher (translated and edited English 1•ersion; first published in Frr>nch, edited hy
Rimy Cazals)
DOCUMENTS ON EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY (edited, wirh Karen Smirh)

BIBLIOT~CA.
Libera Universita lnternazlonale
degli Studi Soc1al1
Viale Pola, 12
f1A1~P: RmT!C!

Lur~·- ·

3f MAR Z010

pal grave
macmillan
 Christopher Hil\2003
For

*
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hill, Christopher 1948-
The changing politics of foreign policy I Christopher Hill.
[Link].
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-333-75421-2 (doth)- ISBN 0-333-75423-9 (paper)
1. International relations- Political aspects. 2.1nternational relations-
Psychological aspects. I. Title.
jZ1253 .HSS 2002
327.1- dc21 2002075289
10 9
10 09 08
Printed and bound in China
'Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion
and perspective.' Contents
-Max Weber

List of Tables X

List of Figures Xt

List of Abbreviations XII

Acknowledgements xiv
Preface xvii

1 Foreign Policy in International Relations 1

An initial definition 3
Competing approaches s
The changing international context 11
The challenge to foreign policy analysis 15
Argument and structure 19
2 The Politics of Foreign Policy 25
Agency and structure 25
The state, sovereignty and foreign policy 30
Between home and abroad 37
Foreign policy for whom? 40
Expectations of foreign policy 43
The diversity of states 46

PART I AGENCY
3 Actors: the Responsible Decision-makers 51
Who governs, in foreign policy? 53
The foreign policy executive 56
Cabinets, Security Councils and Politburos 63
Intelligence: a special case? 66
Leading responsibly 69
4 Agents: Bureaucracy and the Proliferation of
External Relations 72
Agents not agency 73

VII
Vlll Contents
Contents IX

Bureaucracy and foreign policy 75 Linkage politics 208

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 76 Confusing responsibilities 214
Proliferating rivals 82
The theory of bureaucratic politics 85
The heart of the matter- organizational process 92 PART III RESPONSIBILITY
Politicians and officials; can the dog be 9 The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 219
separated from his tail? 95 Sources, constraints and actors 220
5 Rationality in Foreign Policy 97 Complications from domestic events 224
Rationality in policy-making 98 Constitutional structures 230
Bounded rationality 102 Autres rCgimes, autres nueurs? 235
Non-decisions in foreign policy 107 Class, development and foreign policy 240
The psychological factor 108 Foreign policy as output- and choice 248
The power of historical thinking 116
Own goals 118 10 The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 250
Avoiding the worst 123 Accountability versus the security state 251
Public opinion 262
6 Implementation: Translating Decisions and Interest groups and the mobilization of civil society 268
Capabilities into Actions 127 The media as gatekeepers 273
More than a technicality 127 The rise of public diplomacy 279
Power and foreign policy 129 In conclusion 281
The spectrum of means 134
Diplomacy 138 11 On Purpose in Foreign Policy: Action,
The military arm 143 Choice and Responsibility 283
Economic statecraft 148 Action 286
Culture !52 Choice 292
Seeking balance !54 Responsibility 297
Hopes and prospects 304
PART II THE INTERNATIONAL
7 Living in the Anarchical Society 159 Notes and References 308
The outside world !59 Index
362
Material conditions 166
Semi-material conditions- or the politics of
human geography 171
Political interdependence 174
Opting out and other forms of resistance 183
System change !86
8 Transnational Reformulations 187
A transnational environment 189
A taxonomy of actors 194
Foreign policy and transnational actors: a model 203
List of Tables List of Figures

3.1 Head of government-foreign minister 6.1 The continuum of power in foreign policy 135
relations: three models 61 6.2 Resources, capabilities and instruments 137
6.1 The range of economic sanctions (actions and threats) 150 8.1 Governments, peoples and international relations 187
8.1 TN A-state relationships in international politics 205 8.2 lntersocietal connections: three models 212
 List of Abbreviations xiii

KGB Komitet Gosudarstennoi Bezopasnosti

List of Abbreviations (Soviet Security Service)
LDC Less Developed Country
LOP Liberal Democratic Party (of Japan)
MERCOSUR Mercado Commun del Sur
(Common Market of the Southern Core)
MIT! Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
AIDS Auto Immune Deficiency Syndrome NCG Non Central Government
AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee NIC Newly Industrializing Country
ANC African National Congress NPC National People's Congress (China)
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States NSC National Security Council
pact on security (1951) OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations Development
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party OPEC Organization of Petrol Exporting Countries
CFC Chlorofluorocarbons OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CDU Christian Democratic Union PF Patriotic Front (of Zimbabwe African
CIA Central Intelligence Agency National Union)
CHOG Commonwealth Heads of Government PKK Workers Party of Kurdistan
csu Christian Social Union PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
DGSE Direction generale de Ia securit€ ext6rieure SEA Single European Act
EC European Community SOP Standard Operating Procedure
ECOFIN (Council of) Economic and Finance Ministers TNA Transnational Actor
EMU Economic and Monetary Union TNE Transnational Enterprise
ENA Ecole nationale d' administration UEFA Union of European Football Associations
END European Nuclear Disarmament UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and
EU European Union Development
FAC Foreign Affairs Committee USAF United States Air Force
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office WEU Western European Union
FOP Free Democrat Party WTO World Trade Organization
FPA Foreign Policy Analysis ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GAIT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
!GO Intergovernmental Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International Non-governmental Organization
IPE International Political Economy
IR International Relations
IRA Irish Republican Army
 Acknowledgements xv

argument. Jennifer Chapa, my administrative assistant at LSE, has gone

Acknowledgements well beyond her formal duties m helpmg out. and her work ha,
been immaculate. Alison Carter has always been wrllmg to lend a hand.
Keith Povey has been a most efficient and friendly editorial consultant,
while my sister, Jane Hill, has willingly given her time and ~nvaluablc
expertise to help me get the book to press. I very much apprecrate every-
thing they have all done. . ,
[ have also benetited greatly from bemg able to test the book s argu-
There are a number of people and institutions I wish to thank for their ment in the constructively critical atmosphere provided by university
help over the four years this book has been in the making, There are seminars. Michael Mastanduno at the John Sloan Dickey Center for
many more whose assistance I have drawn on over the much longer International Understanding of Dartmouth College, Hans Maull and
period in which my ideas about foreign policy have been gestating. colleagues at the University of Trier, James Mayall at Cambridge.
Throughout my time in the Department of International Relations at Martin Smith and Tony Payne at Sheffield, Alfred Tovras at the Hebrew
the London School of Economics and Political Science I have benetited University in Jerusalem, and Donatella Viola at the University of
from the intellectual stimulus and friendly support of gifted colleagues. Plymouth, together with seminars at LSE and the EUl, have all provrded
It has been a tremendous environment in which to work, at once eclec- hospitality and given me pause for thought. . . .
tic and rigorous. This is partly because we are kept up to the mark by an The following individuals have generously provrded the mformatron,
extremely able student body. Every week over twenty-five years I have comments and criticisms, despite being pressed for time themselves,
learned something or been sharpened in my thinking in a seminar or without which a wide-ranging comparative book of this kind could not
tutorial, not least in the fortnightly 'foreign policy issues workshop' have been completed. It is a pleasure to acknowledge their help: Chris
which I have run for interested research students, many of whom now Alden David Allen, Filippo Andreatta, Philip Bell, Geoff Berridge,
are well-known scholars. The individuals whose theses I have had the Pamel; Beshoff, Christopher Brewin, Chris Brown, Elisabetta Brighi,
privilege of supervising have been particularly helpful. It is well-known Fraser Cameron, Nicola Catellani, Raymond Cohen, Christopher Coker,
that the PhD student-supervisor relationship is a close and important Michael Cox, Patricia Daehnhardt, Michael Donelan, Spyros
one. What is less often acknowledged is that the benefits are two-way. Economides, Michel Girard, Ayla Giil, Gregor Hackmack, Mutsumi
All of my research students are in this book in one way or another. Hirano, Heidi Hobbs, Brian Hocking, Albert Jonsson, Daphne Josselin,
I am most grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council Miles Kahler, Vinzenz Kastner, Patrick Keatley, David Keen, John Kent,
of the United Kingdom. Their award (number R000222572) made it Alan Knight, Henrik Larsen, Michael Lee, Michael Leifer, Roger
possible for me to take the leave during which this project got going Leverrnore. Richard Little, Andrew Linklater, Chris Lord, Peter Lyon,
during 1998. Professor Yves Meny and the Robert Schuman Centre at Roger Morgan, MacGregor Knox, Inderjeet Parrnar, Chad Peterson,
the European University Institute in Fiesole kindly provided me with Leticia Pinheiro, Frank Rusciano, Helene Sjursen, Karen Sm1th,
research facilities at that time, and for shorter periods since. Professor Michael Smith, Stelios Stavridis, James Tang, Paul Taylor, Kevin
Jan Zielonka, also at the EUI, has been a constant source of encourage- Theakston, Jose Valdes-Ugalde, Jana Valencic, Brunella Vigezzi,
ment and ideas. The help of the library staff of the LSE, the EUI and Andrew Walter and Stephen Wright. I also gratefully acknowledge the
the Royal Institute of International Affairs has been indispensable. permission granted to me by the University of Birmingham Library to
My publisher at Palgrave Macmillan, Steven Kennedy, has displayed quote from the Chamberlain papers, and that of Davrd Baldwm and
both fhe professional qualities of his trade and a committed interest in the Princeton University Press to use the table adapted on page 150.
the content of this book. The Department of International Relations Finally, the advice of Palgrave's anonymous readers helped me to
Staft· Research Fund enabled me to employ two research assistants, at improve the shape and scope of the book at a critical point.. . .
different points: Maria Ekenbratt did sterling work in checking foot- Four colleagues have been particularly valuable rn the wntrng of thrs
notes, while Alan Chong both dug out sources and helped me clarify fhe book. It is a fortunate institution indeed which disposes of the wrsdom
xv1 Acknowledgements

on foreign policy of Fred Halliday, Margot Light, William Wallace and

Michael Yahuda, and I have been privileged to be able to draw on their Preface
knowledge and advice. Margot and I have shared the pleasures and
travails of teaching Foreign Policy Analysis at LSE, and I could have
had no better comrade in anms.
Personal circumstances affect the writing of any book, for good and
ill. I have been fortunate in being able to write much of this one in the
pleasant rural environment of San Donato in Collina, ten miles beyond
Florence towards Arezzo. This would not have proved possible without In the mind of the reading public, foreign policy is a subject written
the generous hospitality and encouragement of friends in the locality. about by journalists, retired diplomats, and ministers looking for a place
I am deeply grateful to the following, and to all their families: Cristina in history. There is certainly a lot to learn from the accounts of these
and Ugo Andreotti Lorenzetti, Rita and Lorenzo Butini, Jean and Luca experienced riders on the carousel of international meetings, conflicts
Fanelli, Colette Kleemann, Sergio Lavacchini, Grazia Nocentini and and conspiracies. There is, however, another literature altogether deal-
Stefano Papola, Anneliese and Mario Poli, Floriano and Elisabetta Poli, ing with foreign policy, in the academic world. This has grown up over
and Giovanni Tinti. the last fifty years under the name of 'foreign policy analysis' (FPA),
My family and friends have been the foundation on which everything and is nested in the general subject area of International Relations, itself
has been built. In particular I wish to pay tribute to the woman whom a close relative of political science. Some of the concepts of foreign
I always knew as Carole Knight, whose friendship and sensibility policy analysis have leaked into our general political vocabulary, such
so many people have missed since her tragic death in 1998. As ever, as 'crisis-management', 'misperception' and even 'groupthink', but for
I have relied most on the keen judgements and tender feelings of my the most part it has remained an in-house activity. Ironically, in the last
wife Maria McKay, while our children, Alice and Dominic, are the two decade or so FPA has paid the price for its introspection as many in the
people who make everything worth while. new generation of scholars have come to see foreign policy as integral
to the played-out Westphalia states-system, and of only residual intel-
lectualinterest.
CHRISTOPHER HILL This book argues that such neglect is understandable but miscon-
ceived, as foreign policy is now of even greater importance to our polit-
icallives than ever before. This is because it is a key site for responsible
action, and for democratic accountability in a world where the facts and
myths of globalization have obscured the locations of decision-making
and confused the debate over democratic participation. The aim is therec ·
fore twofold: first to persuade any practitioners and general readers who
might pass this way that there already exists a useful frame of analysis
which can help them to make sense of particular cases, and problems
.j arising from them, such as the role of the media, or the impact of
domestic politics: and second, to make the case to those in the academic
world that foreign policy is an area of the greatest political and intel-
lectual importance, requiring a new phase of study.
Broadly interpreted, foreign policy is about the fundamental issue of
how -Organized groups, at least in part strangers to each other, inter-
~elate. The nature of these groups and their inteJTelations is naturally
m evolution, and this book attempts to trace the impact of recent
xviii Preface Preface xtx

upheavals, but there is great continuity over recorded history around since Joseph Frankel's The Making ol Foreign Policy launched Foreign
the central question of how societies co-exist, at once separately and Policy Analysis in 1963. 1 There have been some excellent texts
together, at times in conditions of great antagonism but also managing produced, notably by Jensen in the United States and Clarke and White
to cooperate on a regular basis. There is every reason to suppose that in Britain, but those who have wanted to reflect at length on foreign
this problem - which is also the defining issue of International policy have tended to rely on the platform of either a country study or a
Relations more generally - will be at the heart of many of the great dra- particular 'middle-range' theory2 Many perceptive and detailed works
mas, tragedies and achievements of the future, just as it has been, posi- have been produced in each category over the last thirty years or so, and
tively, in the peaceful transition from the Warsaw Pact, and negatively, the current book draws heavily on them, while not pretending to an
in the Balkans. Until 'global governance' crystallizes into something exhaustive coverage. Apart from those already mentioned, a long list of
solid and coherent, with international institutions taking genuine scholars has made major contributions to our understanding of foreign
responsibility for the welfare of a real world society, citizens and politi- policy both in particular contexts and more generally3 They in turn have
cians alike will continue to wrestle with the dilemmas arising from the drawn on great social scientists in other disciplines, such as Kenneth
existence of foreignness, in varying ways and to varying degrees. Boulding or Herbert Simon.
Indeed, to the extent that international affairs now impinges more on There are two figures in particular, however, who with Joseph
people's everyday lives than it used to, the continuum between the Frankel, represent key reference points for the present work. The writ-
domestic and the foreign is likely to generate more issues than it did in ings of Stanley Hoffmann and Arnold Wolfers combine the capacity for
the past, not less. penetrating analysis with a humane concern for the often tragic conse-
The task is a daunting one since it involves great breadth at the risk quences of foreign policy. 4 They naturally see the discussions of power,
of sacrificing depth. The scope is comparative and world-wide. Yet the process and value as inherently linked, and do not allow themselves to
same is true of any attempt to write about other major social phenom- be side-tracked by excessive concerns about the separation of facts and
ena, such as war or poverty. The first priority must be to work with a values - while at the same time being scrupulously dispassionate in
frame of reference which may be applied to all instances of the phe- tone. For them, empirical work and political theory are both indispen-
nomenon under the microscope, and thereby to analyse the concepts sable to writing intelligently about politics, and accordingly their work
and processes which it necessarily entails - even if that leads us to resists pigeon-holing. It continues to inspire.
note more differences than similarities in the way foreign policy is Analysis is the main skill of Hoffmann and Wolfers and it is the key
conducted. Indeed, the argument must not escape into too much abstrac- word in 'foreign policy analysis'. By analysis is meant not just the
tion; empirical examples are employed throughout, from a wide range necessary breaking down of foreign policy into its constituent parts,
of countries and time periods. An historical perspective is indispensa- concepts and processes, and the examination of the impact of its vari-
ble, but the theme of the book is the changing nature of contemporary ous environments. It is also understood in a sense akin to psychoanaly-
foreign policy. Thus, while reference is made to events throughout the sis, whereby an attempt is made to draw out deeper meanings than
twentieth century, the main focus is on the period since the end of appear on the surface, and to understand action in terms of the way
the Second World War, in which new states have multiplied through actors constantly redefine themselves through interaction with others.
decolonization and old states have found new ways of coordinating their The interplay, indeed overlap, between the domestic and the external
foreign policies. The author's area of special knowledge, as well as the sources of behaviour is central to any modem understanding of what
nature of the literature, means that examples are often drawn from west- foreign policy does, just as the interplay between the interior and exte-
em Europe and north America, but a conscious effort has been made to rior worlds is the way in to understanding an individual's behaviour.
do justice to diversity. The relationships at stake in the world of foreign policy are those
Given the breadth of the subject and the gradual drift in International between states but also between states and transnational actors of many
Relations writing away from statist subjects, it is not as surprising as it different kinds, and across a range of issue-areas in what is a multi-level
first seems that few general books on foreign policy have been written international system with a hugely varied cast. Understanding how
xx Preface

foreign policy decisions are arrived at, implemented and eventually

changed is not a matter of a single theory, even less of generalizing on 1
the basis of an individual case. It involves doing justice to the richness
and complexity of the foreign policy universe, without forgetting the
basic premise of social science- that there is order in the world, and it Foreign Policy in
can be systematically observed. This means accepting that there are two
sides to the politics of foreign policy - the slow-moving international International Relations
system, and the darting, sometimes unpredictable movements of the
individual players the system contains. It is the interplay between the
two which constitutes our large, elusive but fascinating subject.

To the non-academic citizen 'foreign policy' is an uncontentious aspect

of the world of politics, albeit one that is generally remote and inacces-
sible. Most people in most states would have little difficulty in accept-
ing that foreign policy exists and that it consists in what one state does
to, or with, other states. To many specialists, however, this conventional
wisdom is deeply suspect. As the concepts of state sovereignty and
independence have come under attack in recent decades, so the idea that
a government might have a discrete set of actions (let alone strategies)
for dealing with the outside world has come to seem anachronistic, even
na"ive. The very division between home and abroad, domestic and for-
eign, inside and outside has been brought into question from a number
of different viewpoints, conceptual and political. In consequence, a seri-
ous division has opened up, not for the first time, between the normal
discourse of democratic mass politics and the professional discourse of
academic commentators. Some attempts have been made at bridging
this gap through popularizing such terms as 'interdependence' and
'globalization', but since no scientific consensus attaches to them, the
only result has been to obscure matters further. On the other side of
the coin various forms of nationalist reaction have taken place against
the idea that a given society might have to accept limits on its freedom
of action by virtue of inhabiting a common international system, and
there are too many examples of groups, even whole nations, believing
that survival requires a foreign policy geared to a degree of brutal self-
interest barely imaginable even by Thomas Hobbes. 1
The gap between popular and professional understandings of foreign
po1icy is beginning, therefore, to have some serious consequences.
These are compounded by the fact that intellectuals are themselves
2 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy in International Relations 3

divided three ways, between the specialists in a given country or area, An Initial Definition
who still tend to talk the language of normal diplomacy, the academic
subject of International Relations, which has become introverted in The increased internationalization of much of daily life, especially in
musings about its own philosophical evolution, and 'public intellectu- developed, commercially active countries, causes problems when it
als' from other disciplines who sometimes feel a responsibility to inter- comes to defining foreign policy and what should be studied under that
vene in the key ethical issues of foreign policy, such as Bosnia, but are heading. Is the focus to be reduced to the rump of what diplomats say
all too often innocent of the history and theory of international politics. to each other, which would leave out many of the most interesting
These various divisions mean at best that debates are conducted at aspects of international politics, or should it be widened to include
cross-purposes and at worst that in the area of external policy the dem- almost everything that emanates from every actor on the world scene?
ocratic process is severely compromised. This genuine dilemma over what foreign policy includes has led some
It is my hope in this book to go some way towards redressing the to assume that its content is now minimal, and that agency lies else-
imbalance caused by people talking past each other. I aim to provide a where, with transnational enterprises of various kinds. It has led others
conceptualization of foreign policy that might stand some chance both to ignore the question of agency altogether, as if in embarrassment, con-
of bringing its usefulness back into focus for an academic subject which centrating their attention on structures- power balances for neo-realists.
seems to have lost interest in actions and decisions, and of helping pub- international regimes for liberals, and markets for the gurus of global~
lic debate about international affairs to evolve in the direction of under- ization. Both of these reactions represent a trahison des c/ercs, as they
standing the interplay between the state and its external context For lead to the neglect of a wide range of activities with the potential for
both audiences the aim is basically the same: to break the association of influencing the lives of millions, Foreign policy consists in varied activ-
foreign policy with the cruder versions of realism- that is, the assump- ities, whether Richard Holbrooke 's mediation over Kosovo, the contlict
tion that behaviour can only be understood and/or guided by reference with Russia over NATO enlargement, debates over China's entry into
to self-evident national interests- and to show that both democracy and the World Trade Organization or Nelson Mandel a's intercession for Ken
efficiency, the twin totems of modem society, require a workable notion Sara Wiwa in Nigeria. It is not a residual category to be associated with
of foreign policy if they are not to be lost in a miasma of generalization a dwindling number of 'diplomatic' issues.
about 'global governance' and the like. A brief definition of foreign policy can be given as follows: the sum
Foreign policy needs liberating from the narrow and over-simplified of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually
views that are often held of it, and International Relations as a sub- a state) in international relations. The phrase 'an independent acto;'
ject needs to move forward in reconstituting its notions of agency after enables the inclusion of phenomena such as the European Union; exter-
the waves of attacks on realism in recent decades, which have estab- nal relations are 'official' to allow the inclusion of outputs from all parts
lished the weakness of state-centric accounts without putting much in of the governing mechanisms of the state or enterprise while also main-
their place. taining parsimony with respect to the vast number of international trans-
The approach taken here is to rework the idea of foreign policy, not actions now being conducted; policy is the 'sum' of these official
to defend a particular school of thought or appeal to a mythological past relations because otherwise every particular action could be seen as
of paradigmatic unity and shared discourse, Too many people have a separate foreign policy - whereas actors usually seek some degree of
doubts about the contemporary function of foreign policy for the issue coherence towards the outside world. Lastly, the policy is 'foreign'
to be brushed aside. Equally, there is widespread bewilderment as to because the world is still more separated into distinctive communities
where we can realistically expect meaningful actions to be taken in than it is a single, homogenizing entity. These communities therefore
international relations, and over the appropriate contemporary roles of need strategies for coping with foreigners (or strangers) in their various
states, international organizations, pressure groups, businesses and pri- aspects (it should be noted that the word 'foreign' derives from the latin
vate individuals. The very definition of international politics is at stake 'foris' meaning 'outside'). 2
in the questions a reconsideration of foreign policy naturally throws up, Definitions of political activities are notoriously difficult and foreign
that is, 'who acts, for whom and with what effect?' policy is no exception. 3 To some extent decision-makers themselves
4 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy in international Relations 5

decide what foreign policy is by what they choose to do, but now that routinized outputs of an actor's behaviour. That very often the system of
foreign offices do not monopolize external relations this only pushes the policy-making fails to live up to these aspirations is beside the point; the
problem onto another level, to the point of deciding which personnel are pursuit of a foreign (or health, or education) policy is about the effort to
to be counted as 'foreign policy-makers'. In a world where important carry through some generally conceived strategy, usually on the basis
international disputes occur over the price of bananas or illegal immi- of a degree of rationality, in the sense that objectives, time-frames and
gration it would be absurd to concentrate foreign policy analysis on instruments are at least brought into focus. Thus foreign policy must
relations between national diplomatic services. Although the latter try to always be seen as a way of trying to hold together or make sense or
achieve the status of gatekeeper and clearing-house, in practice they the various activities which the state or even the wider community is
have to accept a great deal of parallel diplomacy on the part of col- engaged in internationally. In that sense it is one way in which a society
leagues in 'domestic' ministries. It is for the same reason that the once defines itself, against the backcloth of the outside world. ·
popular distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics is no longer of Foreign policy is therefore both more and less than the 'external rela-
much help. 4 High politics- in the sense of serious conflict touching on tions' which states generate continually on all fronts 5 It attempts to
the state's most basic concerns- can be as much about monetary inte- coordinate, and it is the way in which- at least in principle- priorities
gration as about territory and the threat of arrned attack. Conversely low are established between competing externally-projected interests. It
politics - in the sense of routine exchanges contained within knowable should also project the values which the society in question thinks are
limits and rarely reaching the public realm - can be observed in NATO universal, whether through Robin Cook's ethically-motivated foreign
or OSCE multilateralism as much as (perhaps more than) in discussions policy or less directly as with the Canadian or Swedish commitment to
over fish or airport landing rights. Thus the intrinsic content of an issue UN peace-keeping operations. It is, in short, the focal political point of
is not a guide to its level of political salience or to the way it will be an actor's external relations.
handled, except in the tautological sense that any issue which blows up
into a high-level international conflict (and almost anything has the
potential so to do) will lead to decision-makers at the highest level Competing Approaches
suddenly taking over responsibility - their relations with the experts
who had been managing the matter on a daily basis tlien become a Foreign policy may be approached in many different ways within
matter of some moment, which can be studied as a typical problem of International Relations. The subject has also, however, been extensively
foreign policy analysis. studied by historians, at first via the detailed accounts of diplomatic his-
The idea of foreign policy also implies both politics and coherence. torians and then through the lens of' international history', which strove
Everything that a given actor generates officially at the international to relate diplomacy6 to its domestic roots, whether political, social.. eco-
. .
level is grist to the mill of foreign policy, but when we are asked to say nom1c or cultural. Indeed, m recent years there has been something
what foreign policy consists of we usually refer to the more centrally of an equal and opposite move towards foreign policy analysis on the
political aspects of the activity, that is, actions, statements and values part of historians, as IR has moved away from it. The tools of decision-
relating to how the actor wishes to advance its main objectives and to making analysis are readily adaptable to detailed cases, and the opening
shape the external world - a version of 'the authoritative allocation of up of many state archives has made it impossible to avoid evidence of
values', except that what connotes 'authority' is precisely what is at such pathologies as bureaucratic politics or small group dynamics. In
issue in international relations. It is natural that foreign policy should be the United States in particular, there has been a deliberate encourage-
seen as a political activity, given the at best informally structured nature ment of links between historians and political scientists, with much
of the international system, but as we have already seen, it is difficult to useful cross-fertilization 7
predict in advance what is likely to rise up the political ·agenda. At a half-way house between history and political science lie countrv-
There is a similar issue with coherence. The very notion of a 'policy' studies. There remain many scholars immune to the pull of intellectu-al
in any field implies conscious intentions and coordination. It is the fashion who continue to develop their expertise on the foreign policy
umbrella terrn under which huddle the myriad particular 'decisions' and of an individual state, almost always with the will and capacity to
6 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy in lnrernarional Relarions 7

demonstrate the intimate links with domestic society. Area-studies are to study all types of actor in international relations, and indeed this book
strong in both the United Kingdom and, particularly so, in France, as focuses? on actors and agency rather than limiting itself in principle to
any reading of Le Monde will demonstrate. United States foreign policy states.'- The only way that the label of realism can be justitied is if all
naturally generates most analysis, although from regrettably few non- those who believe that states are of continued significance in interna~
Americans8 The other permanent members of the UN Security Council tiona! relations are deemed eo ipso realists. 13 This is an indefensible
also continue to be studied in some depth, while there has been a proposition, as the large body of liberal thought about states and inter-
notable upsurge of interest in Italian and, particularly, German foreign national society indicates.
policy. Japan, Australia, Canada, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Spain and Life was breathed back into realism, despite the attacks from foreign
Brazil ligure quite prominently in the literature, while other states are pohcy analysts, students of transnational relations and others, by
usually dealt with in groups, as with 'African foreign policies' or Kenneth Waltz's formulation of neo-rea/ism in the late l970s. 14 Whereas
'European foreign pohcy'. 9 There is a need to break down some of the realism was not clear about where the drive for power originated _ in
larger categories used, such as 'the foreign policies of new states' and human passions, in the state itself, or in a world which lacked rules -
in particular to provide more detailed work on important cases such Waltz was clear and systematic. His view was that the international sys~
as Iran, South Africa, Syria, Turkey or Pakistan. 10 It will be a pity, tern was dominant in certain key respects. It represented a balance of
however, if those who remain convinced of the importance of states in power with its own logic, so that if one wished to explain war or other
international relations are confined to studying single cases. Unless major features of the international system as a whole the only resort was
welcomed by IR in general they will inevitably be forced into the camps to a parsimonious theory such as his which stressed 'the logic of anar-
15
of either history or comparative politics, which will be to the gain of the chy' . Neo-realism captured the heights of IR in the United States both
latter but much to the detriment of International Relations. because of its scientific set of propositions and the appeal of balance of
Realism is the best known approach in IR, and the most criticized. It power theory to the system's hegemon. By the same token it has had
is the traditional way in which practitioners have thought about interna- less appeal elsewhere.
tional relations, emphasizing the importance of power in a dangerous, In neo-realist theory, foreign policy, with its associated interest in
unpredictable world. Realism became the orthodoxy in academic writ- domestic politics and in decision-making, was simply not relevant, and
ing after the discrediting of the 'legalistic-moralistic' approach of the indeed barely discussed. Waltz can be accused of inconsistency, since
inter-war period, and in the Cold War it seemed self-evident that states, his previous book had been about the differences between US and UK
and military force, were the main features of the international system. ways. of making foreign policy, concluding that the more open
Much realist thought was more subtle than this summary allows, as any Arnencan system was also the more efticient. 16 Yet he has a broadly
encounter with the work of E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Integrated vrew whrch allows for a discussion of agency through foreign
Niebuhr, Martin Wight and Arnold Wolfers soon reveals." What real- policy, so long as 1l does not pretend to explain what inherently it
ism did not do, however, was probe into decision-making or other cannot explain- for example, by taking a 'reductionist' approach to the
domestic sources of international behaviour. study of war in general, as opposed to the origins of a particular war
In recent years foreign policy analysis has often been seen as realist where it may have a great deal to contribute.
on the grounds that it is 'state-centric'. This is ironical given that FPA Neo-realisrn therefore deals in levels of analysis, with foreign policy
grew up in reaction to the assumption of classical realism that the state analysis operating at the level of the explanation of particular units. This
was a single, coherent actor pursuing clear national interests in a is not the place to debate the overall value of neo-realism in IR. It is
rational manner, with varying degrees of success according to the tal- important, however, to show that it is unsatisfactory - because highly
ents of particular leaders and the constraints of circumstance. The work hmrtmg - as an approach to foreign policy. In Chapter 2 I shall discuss
done in FPA invariably challenged the ideas of rationality, coherence, the underlying issues of structure and agency. For the moment, it is
national interest and external orientation - possibly, indeed, to excess. worth stressing how few interesting political and intellectual problems
As will be shown below, it is fundamentally pluralist in orientation. It is are left for an actor in a system which operates in the top-down manner
true that states remain important to FPA, but its methods may be used envisaged by Waltz and his colleagues. Given the historical debates
8 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy in International Relations 9

which have taken place on the role of German foreign policy in the ori- environment, and to alliance politics, where pay-offs, free-riding and
gins of two world wars (with special reference to Prussian culture and the like. may be more evident. Even here, however, the nece~sary
Nazi leaders respectively), on the international impact of the differences assumpttan that states are unified actors is difficult to sustain empiri-
between Soviet and Chinese communism, or on the domestic politics of cally, More generally, the economic formalism of the public choice
US policy in Vietnam, to take only the most dramatic examples, it see,ms approach and the contortions it must perform to cope with such matters
self-defeating to assume the predominance of the 'pattern of power m as competing values, geopolitics and conceptions of international soci-
determining great events in international relations. For neo-realism has ety limit its ability to generate understanding, Like game theory, public
a deterministic quality which is at odds with the tendency of FPA to choice can be of considerable heuristic use, but to start from an assump-
stress the open interplay of multiple factors, domestic and interna- tion of unitary decision-making optimizing given preferences, with the
tionaL 17 It also assumes that states are primarily driven by the need to influences which shape preferences bracketed out, limits the applicability
maximize their security, largely through the exercise of power and inde- to actual cases. 19 Moreover, contrary to some globalization theory, as
pendence. Most students of foreign policy would see this as excessive well as to public choice, international politics is about much more than
generalization, doing less than justice to the variety of states' actual adapting to the market
In recent years the wave of post-positivism has brought a new per-
positions and goals,
An approach which has so far had little particular impact on the study spective to bear on foreign policy, Post-positivists are another broad
of foreign policy, although it is widely disseminated elsewhere in polit- church, but in general they reject the fact-value distinction most promi-
ical science, is that of rational choice, or public choice in some recent nent among realists and behaviouralists, and consider that there is little
incarnations, This is partly because FPA grew up attacking the assump- point in attempting to work scientifically towards a 'truthful' picture of
tion of rational action on the part of a unitary actor with given goals human behaviour. This is because politics is constituted by language,
(usually power maximization) which was associated with realism: It tdeas and values. We cannot stand outside ourselves and make neutral
continues to be the case because few IR scholars of any persuasiOn judgements. That this view has incited considerable controversy is not
believe that the explanation of international relations can be reduced to the issue here. More relevant is the extra dimension it has given to for-
the individual preferences of decision-makers seeking votes, political eign policy studies - another competing approach, but one which con-
support, personal advantage or some other kind of measurable currency. fmns the importance of the state, Writers like David Campbell, Roxanne
Rational choice has grown out of the individualist assumptions of eco- Doty and Henrik Larsen have examined the lanouage " ~
of foreion
0
policy
nomics, and in its stress on power as currency and on the drive towards and what they see as its dominant, usually disciplinary, discourses 20
equilibrium it is closely related to neo-rea\ism, Yet the collective action These are, however, still national. 21 Language is seen as crucial to
problems are particularly acute in international relations, As David national identity, on which the representation of outsiders ('the Other')
Lake has pointed out, 'there is no necessary reason why the interests of will be a significant influence. Indeed, foreign policy is important pre"
18
self-seeking politicians should coincide with the national interest' cisely because it reinforces (undesirably, in the views of Campbell)
This is hardly news to any foreign policy analyst, but there is a real issue national and statist culture, If this approach can be linked more effec-
in relating the motives and behaviour of individual decision-makers to tively to the analysis of choice, and can confront the problem of evi-
the collective ends of foreign policy, particularly when mistakes are dence, then it may yet reach out from beyond the circle of the converted
only likely to be punished occasionally, and in extremis, unlike much of to contribute more to our understanding of foreign policy, Language,
domestic politics where politicians are afraid to raise taxes by one per whether official or private, rhetorical or observational, has a lot to tell us
cent for fear of defeat at the next election. about both mind-sets and actions, and it is a relatively untapped resource.
Public choice theory addresses this very problem of collective action, All the approaches listed above have something to offer the student of
and the converse, that policies agreed jointly (often bipartisanly) may foreign policy - and they need not be seen as 'competing' in every
be remote from the actual preferences of individual politicians - let respect History and country-studies are an indispensable part of any ana-
alone those of the voters, It therefore offers some possibilities for for- lyst's armoury, while it would be pig-headed to ignore the ideas generated
eign policy, particularly in relation to foreign economic policy, to the from realism, public choice and post-positivism. Nonetheless, there are
10 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy in International Relations 11

limits to eclecticism, and the present book is rooted in the particular What is more, it should always attempt to connect its analysis to the
tradition of writing known as foreign policy analysis (FPA), albeit with underlymg questions of all political life, such as 'who benefits?' 'what is
a concern to extend the subject well beyond decision-making, and in the right course of action?' and 'which institutions best serve our desired
particular to ensure that foreign policy is seen not as a technical exercise ends?' Like much American International Relations, FPA strove at first to
but as an important form of political argument. Since the chapters which earn the status of science, only to suffer in range and reputation as a result.
follow apply FPA in some detail, there is no need to describe its approach It is time to move on.
here in more than summary form.
FPA enquires into the motives and other sources of the behaviour of
international .actors, particularly states. It does this by giving a good The Changing International Context
deal of attention to decision-making, initially so as to probe behind the
formal self-descriptions (and fictions) of the processes of government The politics of foreign policy are perpetually changing, depending on
and public administration. In so doing it tests the plausible hypothesis the country or the region, and by no means always in the same direc-
that the outputs of foreign policy are to some degree determined by the tions. This is why case and country-studies are so important. There is no
nature of the decision-making process. As the language used here sug- point in lofty generalizations if they seem beside the point to experts on
gests, there was a strong behaviouralist impetus behind the rise of FPA, Guyana, or Germany, or Gabon. Yet as the result of imperial expansion,
but the subject has subsequently developed in a much more open-ended world war and economic integration we have had to get used to seeing
way, particularly in Britain. 22 The Comparative Foreign Policy school the world, and the international political system, as a whole. Changes
which was dominant in the United States for so long did not probe the m the whole are thus real and of great significance for the parts. Con-
politics of foreign policy, internal or external; it was interested in find- versely, changes in a particularly important part may lead to upheaval
ing correlations between the factors involved in foreign policy over as m the system as a whole. We have had a strong sense of this since
wt'de a range as posst'ble. 23 the implosions of communism, the Cold War and the Soviet Union in
This is a world away from the kind of FPA which has developed in the dramatic events of 1989-91. When the phenomenon- or perhaps the
alliance with the more theoretically-minded historians, and which is the Idea - of globalization is added to the equation it is natural to
basis of the present book. This approach employs 'middle-range theo- conclude that we are living in dramatic times which cannot but have a
ries' to examine particular areas of human activity such as perception or transforrnative effect on foreign policy as an activity, and on individual
geopolitics, and is sceptical that an overarching single theory of foreign states' foreign policy problems.
policy can ever be achieved without being bland and tautological. 24 The There are three elements of the contemporary international context
Scandinavian attempt to promulgate 'weak (general) theory' to cope which can be taken to represent major change: the end of the Cold
with the problem of integrating middle-range theories might succeed - War; the process of globalization; and the challenge to the Westphalia
but it is difficult to see what it would look like in practice 25 A great deal state system represented by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
of high-quality scholarship has already come out of FPA's middle-range (le droit d' ingerence). Each of these great issues will be examined in
theories and the challenge is to build on that rather than to start again. turn, but only in terms of the implications for foreign policy.
They are already integrated in the sense that foreign policy analysis is The end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989
underpinned by systems theory, even if there are still many creative is seen by some as a revolution in international affairs in itself.27
interconnections to be explored. 26 Alternatively, it can be viewed as involving 'only' the collapse of a
The approach taken in this book is based on the assumption that Foreign particular state/empire, with large consequences for the balance of
Policy Analysis can and should be open, comparative, conceptual, inter- power but no different in kind from the end of Napoleonic France or
disciplinary and range across the domestic-foreign frontiero It should be Wilhelmine Germany. This second position seems more convincing,
analytical in the sense of detachment, of not being parti pris, but it should but when one bears in mind the causal interconnections between the
not be positivist, in the sense of assuming that 'facts' are always external end of the Cold War and globalization (possibly accelerated) and
and disconnected from actors' perceptions and self-understandings. the extent of the current challenge to the principle of non-intervention
 12 The Chan[;illR Politics of Forci&n Policy Foreign Policy in International Relations 13

(not feasible in the era of the Brezhnev doctrine) then the contrast The end of the Cold War has thus introduced qualitative changes to
between the two becomes rather less sharp. international politics, which foreign policies have to take into account,
The end of an empire always alters the outlook and calculations of but which do not amount to a challenge to foreign policy as such.
the other members of the system, and not only at the end of major wars. Glohalization, by contrast, is seen by many as having rendered foreign
The dismantling of the French and British empires between 1945-64 policy redundant. At least, the large numbers who write about global-
created many new states and seemed to have weakened the two metro- ization give this impression by the simple fact of ignoring it 29 In part,
pole powers. Yet adjustment soon takes place. By 1973 it had become foreign policy is a sub-set of the problem of what is happening to the
difficult to remember the world as it was before decolonization, while state in an age of globalization, understood as the creation of an inte-
the position of France and Britain remained remarkably unchanged. grated world capitalist market, and the putting in place of some of the
Even to this day their permanent seats on the UN Security Council arc sinews of a global civil society, through developments in information
not in real danger. On the other hand, both decolonization and the end technology, travel and education. Globalization in its turn has been
of the Cold War signalled the death of a set of particular ideas, and the boosted by political change, notably the emergence of the confident
arrival of new possibilities. The nature of a new order may not be imme- states of east Asia in the wake of the Vietnam war, and the collapse of
diately apparent, but it can be immanent. In the case of 1991 and after, the communist bloc in Europe.
what happened was not only the humiliation of a superpower, and the At one level the problem of globalization is just the latest episode in
folding up of a set of international institutions, but also the destruction the long-running debate about the impact of economics on politics,
of a major transnational ideology. which began with Richard Cobden in the 1860s making a linkage
This ideology, coupled with the power of the Soviet Union, had acted between peace and free trade, and has had at least one other active phase,
as a straitjacket for the foreign policies of many different states, not just during the 1970s discussion of interdependence and detente. It is always
those in eastern Europe. Poor states needing Soviet aid, or looking for a bad mistake to assume that the present will resemble the past, but in the
reassurance against American power, all found themselves detined by it. case of foreign policy and globalization there seem to be good reasons
Opponents, likewise, either turned directly to the US and its allies for for supposing that the death of foreign policy has been forecast prema-
fear of international communism, or self-consciously adopted a strategy ture!y30 If foreign policy is essentially the political strategy conducted
of non-alignment in the hope of escaping the bipolar trap. Some states by independent units in relation to each other, indeed, then this could
found themselves the victims of various kinds of intervention in any case. only happen with the de facto disappearance of independent units.
Large resources were consumed by those who saw themselves (rightly or Discounting the possibility of world government, this could conceivably
wrongly) as threatened by Soviet communism. come about by stealth, through the emergence of global govemance in
All this has now disappeared. There is no communist aid or interven- the form of a net of issue-based regimes, in which units took up positions
tionism. There is no anti-communist excuse for western interventionism. on the merits of a problem, without concern for community-based link-
There is no need for neutralism or non-alignment, even if, like the ages. This seems improbable for three reasons: states would becorne
Cheshire eat's grin, something always remains in the ether. Resources unviable as devices for satisfying their citizens, who expect the use of
are (or should be) released for other purposes, domestic and international. linkage in order to achieve priority goals; there would be a significant
Internal politics have, in many cases, been reconfigured as the result of danger of partial interests capturing the policy of the state as a whole,
the ideological straitjacket being removed. Indeed, for some sta(es the and subordinating the notion of the 'common good'; 31 the overall rela-
very relationship between foreign and domestic politics has been cast into tionship between goals, resources and institutions could not be effec-
the melting pot. In some rather unpredictable states, politics has been tively managed- issues can never be kept in neat compartments.
shaken up by the removal of the old orthodoxy. France has found it eas- Much more significant in terms of the impact of globalization is
ier to move into a working relationship with NATO, and Italy has begun likely to be a reshuffled relationship between foreign policy and foreign
to develop a more confident national foreign policy. In both countries economic policy. The two things should be considered in tandem, but
the domestic environment has become more fluid as the result of the rarely are because of the intellectual difficulties of keeping such a wide
demoralization of what were previously strong communist parties. 28 range of activity in focus at the same time- and because of scholastic
 14 The Changing Polirics of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy in International Relations IS

habit. In times of stability, as the post-1991 period seemed at first likely Even if the trend continues, it is clear that any challenge to the
to be, it is natural to expect that economics will occupy a central place 'Westphalian system' of sovereign states possessing the ultimate tight to
in foreign policy. Modernity heightens this expectation. Although determine their own law and political system will be a long-drawn-out
Europe at least seems to have exchanged a period of grim stability in the and difficult business, The United Nations Charter flagged the tension
Cold War for one of mixed hope and turbulence, this trend need not be between human rights and sovereignty over 55 years ago, but left the
denied, Much of foreign policy for modern states is about promoting issue hanging in the aiL The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
prosperity as much as security, and indeed about blurring the two con- 1948 was little more than a hopeful signpost, with no capacity for
cepts together. In some areas of economic and social life governments' enforcement. The move towards greater consensus on the value of human
role may be extremely limited as they bend the knee before the effi- rights, and indeed liberal democracy, since 1991 means that if powe1ful
ciency of the market principle, but this does not mean that it is non- states are prepared to sponsor change, it might begin to have more prac-
33
existent; far from it, in fact. Governments simply become subtle and tical meaning- as arguably it has already begun to do, For the present,
I the most that can be said is that we have entered a long period of transi-
varied in their strategies for protecting the welfare of their citizens,
sometimes working together with other states, sometimes intervening tion with respect to the foundational principles of international order, and
indirectly (even illegally) to win contracts, and sometimes using tradi~ that this will have inevitable consequences for foreign policy,
tiona! means, such as defence expenditure, for reasons of economic These consequences will mean uncertainty about rules and norms,
policy, Of course handling instant financial transfers, multinationals' tax and particularly about their implementation: it is highly probable that
the 'double standards' problem will become ever more evident, with
I avoidance and the fast-changing nature of innovation means that the
decision-making system for external policy cannot remain unchanged, intervention - even for the best of reasons - occurring on a patchy and
Foreign ministries have no choice but to accept the direct involvement discriminatory basis, To some degree all states will have to take on
of many more ministries, while trying to reposition themselves as coor- board new considerations and obligations as they formulate foreign
dinators in some fom1, and experts on 'the international' as a whole. policy, but for many of them, having just become used to the notion of
This does not make any fundamental difference to the fact that states sovereignty, it will be disconcerting to see new pnnc1ples mtroduced m
need some form of external strategy, and machinery, for managing their paralleL This is particularly true of regimes in new states, which are often
external environment. That it now contains many more events of impor- the most passionate defenders of independence and non-mtervenlion,
tance, which press directly onto the domestic, makes the conduct of The new possibilities will be twofold: interference in one's own affairs
foreign policy more important, not less. if they draw the hostile attention of the 'international community', usu-
The third major contemporary development in international relations ally in the form of the more powerful democratic states; and being
could well in the long run turn out to be the most significant The emer- drawn into new international commitments, including what might be
gence of serious support for the idea that the right of a state to determine actions with both high risks and high costs, In either case, domestic
its own internal affairs should be qualified so as to prevent serious society would become more exposed to external developments, with
human rights abuses has the potential to precipitate moves towards a potentially significant consequences for the citizenry, As the external
different kind of system, in which superordinate law and institutions set environment becomes more complicated, with law, organizal!ons and
limits to both internal and external behaviour - in short, towards an transnational human rights groups all protruding more into states, or
embryonic international constitution, Foreign policy has always, of engaging their support, so foreign policy will be a more critical site
course, been constrained from the outside, but the inhibitions have come for political decision-making, not less,
from fear, or concerns about practicality, or from internal value-
systems, If a law of humanirarian intervention, or what Tony Blair has
called 'the doctrine of international community', becomes established, The Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis
the constraints will become more systematic, transparent and institu-
tionalized32 The trial of Slobodan Milosevic at The Hague is an attempt Change is a perpetual challenge to social science, and Foreign Policy
to begin this process, Analysis is no exception, It has faced, for example, the problem of how to
 ~-" ,_,

16 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy in International Relations l7

integrate transnational actors into its framework since the early 1970s. answer has been given earlier in this chapter. Yet, as with other large
The changes in the international context described above- themselves political concepts such as democracy, analysis. and definitions are. i~1 a
with longer roots than just the past ten years - represent the current constant dialectical relation with each other. This means that no positiOn
challenges. As I have argued. none of them poses the kind of threat to on the relationship of external relations to foreign policy will convince
the very purpose and existence of foreign policy which is often rather until the problem has been broken down into its component parts- as it
unthinkingly assumed. Each of them, however, is having a significant will be in subsequent chapters through the discussions of bureaucratic
impact on the nature of contemporary foreign policy, on its relationship politics, transnational relations and domestic society. . .
with domestic society and on the means by which it is conducted. The Finally, Foreign Policy Analysis must also face the nonnative Issues
details of these changes - and the elements of continuity -will become which its positivist roots have tended to obscure. If it is an area of seri-
clear in the chapters which follow. Beneath the detail, however, lie certain ous enquiry then it must confront- if not be dominated by- the possi-
key questions, theoretical and practical, which provide the rationale for bility that it might contain built-in nonnative biases. More prosaically.
the book as a whole. it just might not address certain important value-based questions. It is
In theoretical terms the main issue FPA faces is whether foreign certainly true that many of the interesting questions about foreign
policy remains a key site of agency in international relations, or whether policy are not technical but involve issues of value or principle. One
it is being steadily emptied of content. This in turn depends on views such is how far foreign policy may be effectively harnessed to an ethi-
about the nature of agency and its relationship to structures in world cal cause, without damaging other legitimate goals. Another is the long-
politics. Part of the answer may be given through theorizing the state, debated issue of how far foreign policy can or should be accountable to
evidently still a major source of political life, but not all of it. The state citizens who are probably ignorant of the issues but who may ultimately
is one of a variety of different international actors, whose positions be asked to die in its name. The tension between efficiency and democ-
relative to each other and to structures need to be traced. racy, and the need to trade them off, is particularly sharp here. The
Another dimension of the problem is the extent to which actors. and changing contemporary environment, however, has given extra force to
the communities they embody, can still be said to have distinct 'foreign' one particular nonnative issue which has always existed between the
and 'domestic' environments. If they do, then it follows that they will interstices of foreign policy, namely how much responsibility to take for
need some form of means of coping with the particularities of the shaping the lives of others outside one's own society, and for the inter-
foreign. But if the environments are blurring into each other so as to national milieu as a whole. Although states vary in what they can do,
become functionally indistinguishable, do they not need to integrate and view the matter through the lens of self-interest, this is a perpetual
policies and mechanisms accordingly? If one allows the more modest ethical challenge for every foreign policy. The broadening of horizons
proposition that any entity with the capacity to make decisions has an enabled by technology and the pace of economic growth since 1945
'inside' and an 'outside' (associated with the universal notion of 'mind- have brought the issue of wider responsibilities to the forefront of
ing our own business') does this mean in the international context that policy-makers' concerns. ~
I dealing with the outside is another way of describing foreign policy, This brings us to the practical questions facing Foreign Policy
or IS it rather an administrative boundary, with no qualitative shift? Analysis. The first links theory to practice by asking what expectations
The third aspect of the theoretical challenge facing the study of for- is it reasonable for citizens to have of policy-makers, and for policy-
eign policy concerns the category of 'external relations'. If we do'con- makers to have of themselves? How much of what may be deemed
clude that inside is not the same as outside, and in particular that desirable is also feasible? There are naturally limits to the extent to
p~licy-makers have to operate in differing kinds of environment, does which a general answer can be given, but it must surely be the task of
thts mean that everything which a system projects outwards is foreign any analyst to clarify the nature of action in [Link] to the outside world
policy" Conversely, how do those activities which are conventionally by relating the complexity of the environment to the needs and circum-
labelled 'foreign policy· relate to the multiple strands of a society's inter- stances of particular actors. On that basis realistic expectations may be
actions wnh the world, private and public? This issue is closely related constructed about both instrumental gains and shared responsibilities.
to that of the very definition of foreign policy, on which a provisional Capabilities can be the better brought into line with expectations,
 fF
'!1!!I

1R The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy in international Relations 19

if some sophisticated understanding exists of the degree to which choices efficiency depend on a prior knowledge of how choices get formulated.
are constrained, and of the margin there might be for initiative. Only by who has most influence on them and how their feasibility may be eval-
analysing actors and their milieux in conjunction can this be done. uated. As any specialist knows, the answers to these questions are by no
How far can we generalize about foreign policy? The assumption of means always close to those which even an intelligent reader of a good
this book is that there are many common features and dilemmas which newspaper might infer. In particular, FPA has the capac1ty to md1cate
can be anatomized. Yet states clearly vary enormously in size, power the extent to which the nature of the dec1s1on-makmg process deter-
and internal composition, to say nothing of non-state actors. In the post- mines the outcomes of foreign policy, in terms of both the intrinsic qual-
1991 world this argument can be extended to the point where it might ity of a decision and its effective implementation. Too often pubilc
seem that the foreign policy of the world's only superpower is in a cat- discussion oscillates between fatalism about the imposs1b1l1ty of affect-
egory of its own. Indeed, the United States shows few signs of angst ing international affairs, and the personalization of policy through the
about whether foreign policy exists or counts in the world, unlike the high expectations held of individual leaders.
middle-range states. It is revealing that in the American study of
International Relations, the state and its power is still a central theme,
whether through the successful policy journals like Foreign Affairs and Argument and Structure
Foreign Policy, or through the dominant academic school of neo-realism,
Globalization theory, and constructivism, which tend to stress the Jn summary, the study of foreign policy faces perpetual challenges of
impact of international structures, have made far less ground than in both an intellectual and practical kind, as with any branch of soctal
Europe, or neighbouring Canada, Where you sit really does influence science. Equally, the exponents of foreign policy have to cope with a
what you see. c~nfusing, mixed-actor international environment where ~~stacles and
'The changing politics of foreign policy' is not, however, only about opportunities are by no means clearly delineated. Lastly, cJtJzens face a
perception. Even the USA has to cope with limitations on its freedom mass of events. information and competmg mterpretauons wh1ch leave
of action, despite its apparent hegemony after 199 L It is also just as many confused. It is the task of FPA to try to resolve some of this con-
subject to decision-making pathologies, and to ends-means problems as fusion by clarifying basic concepts as well as by showmg how agency
any other actor, What is more, the interpenetration of foreign with may be understood in the modem world. This does not mean. e1ther
domestic politics is universal, and varies only in degree. Different soci- reasserting traditional notions of the primacy of fore1gn pohcy, or
eties, perhaps different kinds of society, produce different sorts of accepting the common tendency to downgrade states and the1r mtema-
domestic input into foreign policy, including conceptions of a desirable tional relations. The challenge is to reconstitute the 1dea of pollllcal
world and expectations about what can be done to improve it. It is agency in world affairs, and to rethink the relationship between agency
commonplace to observe that the United States, for example, has con- and foreign policy. . .
sistently believed that its own values should be exported, whereas China Accordingly this book has begun with an exammatwn of where f~r~
bas never felt the need to proselytize, despite its own conviction of eign policy stands, in the world and in the academy. It contmues With
superiority. The nature of variation and the possible links to foreign pol- a more detailed discussion of the pohttcs of fore1gn pohcy - that IS, the
icy are themselves things to be charted, whether between democracies problem of acting in international affairs, through the state and other
and autocracies, rich states and poor, ancient cultures and new states actors and of balancing the competmg pressures and expectatwns
engaged in nation-building. which 'beset any foreign policy-maker. There are some diffic~lt theoret-
The principal practical challenge for any foreign policy analyst ical issues at stake in terms of the relationship between fore1gn pohcy
should be to make transparent and help spread to a wider public the and the state and its meaning in the context of the 'agency-structure
often arcane processes of foreign policy-making. In the present envi- debate' so prominent in social science during r_ece~t. deca_des.
ronment that means debating the evolving character of foreign policy - In the main body of the book the argument IS d1v1ded mto three sec-
JS Jt more than what foreign ministries do?- but ultimately identifying tions. The first deals with agency itself, that is the ways in which actions
the sJtes of decJSJon and meamngful action. Both accountability and are generated and conducted, and by whom, under the general heading
~ ''

'

'
20 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy

of foreign policy. The main 'actors' are conceived not as abstract enti-
ties but as the decision-makers who are formally responsible for mak-
Foreign Policy in International Relations 21

extent their values have been internalized through a process of social-

ization. By contrast, geopolitics is treated as a more 'e~du~ing f~amc­
ing decisions for the units which interact internationally - that is, work' in the sense that the very existence of separate tern tonal umts on
mainly but not exclusively states. These actors do not always manage to the face of the earth creates issues of 'foreignness', of regionalism and
achieve unity of purpose. In principle the 'agents' of responsible deci- of variable vulnerability to outside interference. Even if boundaries are
sion-makers are civil servants and other hired guns, and their important in a process of continual historical flux, the fact of the uneven dJstnbu-
discretionary powers are given separate attention in Chapter 3. tion of the world's resources among disparate commumt1es cannot.l~elp
A fourth chapter deals with the problem of acting rationally, which has but create problems of choice over security, friendship and poht1cal
exercised all policy analysts since the 1950s; the usefulness of 'rational economy. This Waltzian perspective need not, however, be treated Ill
actor' and 'rational choice' assumptions are examined in the context of a Waltzian way. Geographical and historical specifics are taken to be
the extensive literature on psychological factors in decision-making and more important than abstractions like bipolarity or multipolanty, while
on the difficulties of handling information overload. The ineluctable geopolitics produces great variation around the notiOns of threat and
process of 'leaming from history' is also central here. Finally, agency 'otherness'.
has to be understood in the context of the capabilities and instruments The second chapter in this section deals with the extent to which s_uch
at policy-makers' disposal, and the difficulties of using them to achieve choices have become complicated by transnational forces which mtght
I stated goals even where they appear to be extensive and efficiently simultaneously be making geography less significant and undermmmg
I
organized. 'Implementation' is now generally recognized as a distinct the sense of a distinctive community. Foreign policy might be becom-
and difticult dimension of acting in foreign policy.34 ing, in Walter Bagehot's terms, a 'dignified' rather than an 'efficient'
The second section of the book shifts the focus not so much from political institution if the world it purports to be dealmg With IS m fact
'agency' to 'structure'- since actors and agents are partly themselves less that of governments than of cross-national social, economiC and
str~[Link]- a.s to the .international context in which action is played out. political movements. .
This IS seen m classical terms as providing opportunities for initiating The third and last part of the book picks up on one further possible
change and for promoting particular concerns, as well as constraints on consequence of transnationalism, namely that it might hav~ a solvent
what can be done. A crucial theme will be the limits to determinism: effect on the separate community which a given foreign pohcy IS sup-
that is, states and other decision-generating entities always possess the posed to serve. Given the moral claims that can be made on behalf of
suicide option, or the capacity to fly in the face of pressures to be real- 'duties beyond borders', decision-makers are thus faced wtth the poten-
istic. !hey may take this option only rarely, but its very existence helps tial problem of serving competing constituencies, "':htle conv~rsely hav;
to defme what It IS to be an actor. The right and the ability to make one's ing other states taking a more duect mterest m theu domesuc
own mistakes is what makes us as individuals responsible adults and it environment36 Bearing this in mind, the section's theme is that of
is worth the risk of anthropomorphism to make the point that collective 'responsibility', or the sense of beholdenness which decision-makers
entities also have on occasions to be able to defy fate, whether in the have to the community on whose behalf foreign pohcy, m the first
form of logic, the inevitable, the international political system or some instance, is conducted, but also possibly to a perceived community of
deeper 'structure'. When they cannot even make their own decisions as a much wider ambit. .
with Lebanon in the 1980s, or a purely intergovernmental organization The examination begins with the general issue of how domesttc
hke the Western European U_nion (WEU), they lack, indeed, both polit- society relates to foreign policy, and which elements represent th: most
Ical and legal 'personality'.'' significant 'sources' of foreign policy, in the sense that acuons begm
. The international context is treated in two chapters which analyse the at home' even if they must be conducted abroad. Foreign policy is about
diverse forms of constramt and opportunity that actors experience. The mediating the two-way flow between intemal and exte:nal dynamics.
intemational political system- Hedley Bull's 'anarchical society'- is An attempt is made to grapple with the issue of comparative foretgn pol-
ex~mmed With a v1ew to Identifying how far international law, organi- icy studies, of how far certain kinds of society produce dJstmctive kmds
zatiOns and norms bear down on states and other actors and also to what of foreign policy. The 'democratic peace' hypotheSIS, that democmctes
 ~.,,

~11'!!

22 The Chang in~: Politics of Foreign Policy Foreign Policy in International Relations 23

do not fight wars against each other, is obviously the starting-point here, bad, and it needs bringing back into focus. It must play a major part in
but there are many other things to say about the impact of domestic filling the current hole in accounts of international relatwns wllh respect
structures (for this too is a fom1 of structural explanation) on extemal to 'agency', which is much discussed at the eptstemological level but
behaviour- for example. the impact of revolution and turmoil, or levels insufficiently operationalized. As Valene Hudson has recently pomted
of economic development, both of which can be seen as at least as ou' t 'IR requires a theory of human political choice ... one
.
area WJthm
.
im~~rtant i~ defining an actor's external strategies as geopolitical the study of IR that has begun to develop such a theoretical perspective
positiOn or formal capabilities. is foreign policy analysis'. 38 .
The second chapter in this section deals with the basic problem Foreign policy is at the hinge of domestic politics and internatJ~.nal
of democratic communities in international relations: that is, how to relations. Raymond Aron said that ·"the problem of foretgn policy ...
[is] the double problem of individual and collective survival: . If w~
39
reconcile the need for freedom of action in dealino-s0
with intractable
outsi?ers [Link] .the requirements of popular .consent and parliamentary substitute the word 'development' for the Cold War stress on survival .
scrutmy. Thts mvolves also considering the ever-increasing interest of we see that foreign policy is still central to the human predicament. Its
public opinion in international relations, to the point where many study represents~ wealth of possibilities for those not blinded by prej-
groups and individuals have lost patience with the governments that udice against 'state-centric' approaches or by stereotypes about FPA as
formally represent them and have begun either to agitate more loudly a branch of realism. Fred Halliday has argued that FPA needs to develop
for changes in foreign policy. not accepting the classical arguments for a theory of the state which connects its inherent functions with those of
~atwnal unity over 'natio!'al interests', or themselves to engage directly external action without falling back on realism, and thiS IS an Important
m mternatwnal relations:'' The 'no-global' protests at Seattle, Giiteborg next step. It can be done partly in terms of the way the twin needs of
40
and Genova dunng 2000--D I were a dramatic case in point democracy and efficiency are played out in the international context.
As the tripartite survey of agency, the global context and the con- On the one hand more and more of society's needs are dependent on
stituencies of foreign policy moves to its close, the book's last chapter effective action in international relations. On the other hand, democracy
takes stock by looking at the problem of responsibility in a wider frame. has the potential both to turn a state inward and to press it into external
It considers whether foreign pol icy in modern conditions can deliver crusades on the basis of what are perceived as universal values. Each
what is expected of it, whether by citizens, decision-makers or academ- of these tendencies means that foreign policy becomes crucial both as
ics. It argues that meaningful and intentional actions are still possible an expression of statehood, and as a means of brokering what is now
under the headmg of foreign policy so long as they are based on a good a simultaneous stream of internal and external demands upon govern-
understanding not just of external constraints but also of the various ment. As a crucial form of agency in international relations, foreign
kinds of interpenetration to be found between structures at home and Policy helps to shape the domestic and foreign environments in which
abroad,, and of the limits of unilateralism. While it accepts that 'respon- "" ' tnt
it operates, just as it must perpetually adapt to be euective ' hem.41
Sibility IS (and should be) mcreasmgly felt to people outside the imme- There is, after all, a serious problem of multiple responsthtlllles now·
diate foreign policy constituency (indeed, in some respects to humanity facing decision-makers. They are responsible to, variously: voters,
as a whole) It does not seek to resolve the ethical dilemmas arising from special interests active abroad, allies,_ expatriates, humanity as a whole,
the notiOn of duties beyond borders. It does, however, delineate the future generations, the like-minded, hngmsttc cousms, mtematwnallaw
parameters of responsibility within which all foreign policy-makers and principles of order, the United Nations, peoples requmng emergency
have to work, and for which the tem1 'national interest' is now a wholly assistance, those with historical claims. The list could be extended. No
madequate characterization. foreign policy can hope to reconcile so many competing claims; equally,
each single one is overlooked at leaders' periL Foreign policy is the chan-
*** nel by which extemal action and responsibilities have to be addressed,
The argument of this book is that foreign policy is a central part of our even if we do not use the term. Public policy has somehow to be related
understanding of international relations, even if it is far from being the to outsiders and if necessary raised to the higher level of international
whole story. It is currently neglected, for some good reasons, but many institutions. Foreign policy therefore faces a major challenge, needing to
"'!I'! II !"f'--.·

24 The Changing Politics of' Foreign Policy

be purposeful but not deluded, democratic but not paralysed, ethical but
stJ!l grounded m a particular society. If the gauntlet is not picked up it is
dtfficult to see where the initiatives and coordinating capacities which
2
tnternat~onal soctety t~cre~singly requires are going to come from.
InternatiOnal. cooperatiOn IS hardly, after all, self-executing. What
follows m th1s book is based on the knowledge generated by Foreign
The Politics of
Policy AnalysiS. thus far; tt attempts to assess what may be feasibly
expected of foretgn policy, and what may not.
Foreign Policy

The subject of this book is the politics of foreign policy in the broadest
sense- who gets what out of foreign policy actions, and what happens
when the values of separate communities collide. The main themes, of
agency, the international and responsibility illustrate the dilemmas faced
by states and other actors, and their consequences for the international
system as a whole. This, however, requires a certain theoretical ground-
clearing, in relation to key problems such as the nature of action and
actors, the limits to choice, and the varying hopes and political strategies
which attach themselves to the vehicle we call 'foreign policy'.
Accordingly, this chapter attempts to establish the starting point of the
analysis in relation to what kind of action is possible within the structures
we observe in international politics. It moves on to analyse the intimate
relationship between the state and foreign policy, dealing in passing with
the distraction of sovereignty, and then tackles the fundamental difficulty
of how far the distinction between the domestic and the foreign is evap"
orating. The chapter finally moves on to the issues which are political
in the more overt sense of whom and what foreign policy serves and is
expected to serve. Readers of a practical bent may wish to move directly
on to Part I, but this chapter is not intended as a mere scholastic prelude;
since no discussion of foreign policy can avoid the inherent conceptual
problems, it is best to confront them at the earliest opportunity.

Agency and Structure

One of the most interesting but inaccessible debates in social science

during recent years has concerned the relationship between 'agency'
 The Poli1ics of Foreign Policy 27
26 The Changing Polilics of Foreign Policy

and 'structure'. At the simplest level the debate has been about whether If one follows this line of thought the principal intellectual problems
agents (those who are capable of action) are shaped by structures (what- which arise in relation to structures are first their identification, second
ever they may be) or vice versa. 1 In one sense the agency-structure their inter-relations (possibly hierarchical) and lastly their relations with
debate has been good for foreign policy analysis. It has returned the agents. Agents for their part are the entities capable of decisions and
perennial issues of causation, freedom and determinism to the agenda actions in any given context. They may be smgle mdivtduals or collectives:
of International Relations and it has led to a sharper examination of the and they may be characterized by conscious intentions or by patterns ot
rather unsophisticated conceptual basis of some foreign policy studies. behaviour which at least in part do not result from dehberatron - for
On the other hand, it has been for the most part a highly abstract debate, example, the armed services may display inefficiency over a period of
focusing on meta-ontology and epistemology.' It has also often been pre- time while havinv a self-image of precision. The term actors Js, m my
sented as the agency-structure 'problem', which by extension should view, preferable;:, that of ·agents' given the latter's sense in English of
admit of a 'solution'. This is not the approach taken here, where the subordination to a higher authority (an 'agent of X or Y'). Thus despite
mathematical analogy is seen as inappropriate to the immense political the ubiquity of the 'agency-structure debate' in the acade~ic literatu~e.
and historical complexities facing all those who wish to understand 'actor' will be the preferred term in this book, with 'agents· used to refer
foreign policy. Rather it is assumed that causation always involves both to the bureaucratic entities at least nominally under the control of the
structures and agencies, and fhat- as a number of authors have pointed primary political actors. This also fits with the common usage of 'states
out, following Anthony Giddens - the two kinds of phenomena help to and other actors', in both the academic world and that of practical
constitute each ofher in a perpetual process of interaction 3 This means, international politics.
by definition, that it is impossible to come to fixed conclusions about Although the focus here is not on epistemology or ontology, the
the limits to agents' freedom of choice or fheir capacity for impact (two account given above of the agency-structure question needs some bnef
different things). We may analyse the parameters of choice, constraint contextualizing. In general, I follow the arguments made by both Barry
and change but human beings will always have the 'wiggle room' of Buzan and Walter Carlsnaes in their comments on structure and agency
specific historical circumstances in which to remake at least some of to the effect that a clear distinction must be made between units of
their world 4 analysis and modes of explanation. 6 This the old 'levels of ~alysis'
Structures, broadly speaking, are the sets of factors which make up model did not do, in and of itself.' Individuals, states and the mtema-
the multrple environments in which agents operate, and they shape the tional system are units of analysis, to be described in their own terms;
nature of choices, by setting limits to the possible but also, more pro- yet fhey do not necessarily explain ontcomes. Conversely, It IS unlikely
foundly, by determining the nature of the problems which occur there. that explanations of political phenomena will be found at one level
by shaping our very life-worlds. Structnres exist at all levels, from the alone. Rather, they should be looked for in sources such as strnctures,
family to the international system, and it is an error in foreign policy to processes and interactions between units/actors. It is then important to
suppose that 'structure' refers only to the external environment. The bear in mind four fundamental distinctions, between: · · '·.
political, bureaucratic and social structures which condition foreign
policy-making are of vital importance. 5 Structnres are as much concep- units and actors. Units are useful ways in which we divide the world
tual as concrete entities because they often represent processes, or pat-
• up conceptually, so as to calibrate space and time. They may include
terns of interaction. It is accordingly difficult to ascertain fheir existence periods such as the 'short twentieth century', or the component parts
and all too easy to imagine them into existence. Moreover, since struc- of a system, such as the international economy. They wrll often .be
tures are consistently influenced by agents, they are always in flux and contestable. Actors, by contrast, are entities capable of the exercrse
should not be regarded as fixed entities like an engineering jig, with pre- of independent will and decision-making, and are relatively easy to
else, !muted and determining qualities. The nature of a structure will identify. Actors can always be said to be units, but not all umts are
always be contested because even fhose at the less abstract end of the actors.
actors and structures, each of which may exist in many fom1s and
continuum, such as states, cannot be reduced to the sum of their visible
parts, such as institutions.
• with varying capacities for determining the other.
 28 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy The Politics of Foreign Policy 29

• positivism and constructivism, as epistemological starting-points for observation made about them and the complexity of their actions goes
understanding foreign policy; the one seeing 'facts' as things that far beyond that which can be captured by the correlation of variables or
scientific observation can establish, the other stressing that accounts a stimulus-response model. The greater the generalization, therefore,
of the world are shaped by preferences - and often power - so that the blander it will be.
if truth is possible at all it lies only in understanding how different On the issue of freedom it is from a broadly pluralist position that
versions of events have come to be produced and how they compete. I seek to examine foreign policy and its dilemmas. Human beings are
• the notion of free will for sentient beings, and the idea that choice is seen as always having choices, even if in many circumstances the dice
illusory given the power of historical forces. are heavily loaded in one direction or another. Individuals are the orig-
inal source of intentions, and they make a difference. But they never
It may be wmth giving a basic statement of the assumptions which the work in a vacuum, and the pattern of their institutional and political
present book makes on these important issues. Even if the brevity will environment will have a big influence on how they see the world.
leave some readers dissatisfied it is better to be transparent and to make Moreover, at the level of the international system they are rarely promi-
it clear that the issues have been taken into account. nent. Here agency is multiple and various, with states the most impor-
As suggested already, the 'levels of analysis' approach will no longer tant single class of actors, given their preponderant influence over the
do except in the most basic sense of alerting newcomers to the different means of political mobilization. Pluralism exists mainly in the sense
perspectives that may be obtained by looking at things from the view- that the system is not highly determined; spaces for action open up often
points of the individual, the state and the international system as a and unpredictably. It is then a question of who is willing and able to
whole. Ultimately it is not clear whether this 'analysis' can go further occupy these spaces and on whose behalf decisions are taken. Although
to deliver an explanation of causation or prescriptions for change. it is usually the most powerful of states who take the initiative, even they
Accordingly it must be supplemented by the distinction between actors find it difficult to shift the contours of the system, as the history of inter-
and structures, some of which will be simultaneously actors within national communism or nuclear non-proliferation shows. The United
a \Vider structure (such as a foreign ministry, which is an importa_nt States' 'war on terrorism' after the terrible attacks of 11 September 2001
structure to its employees but also with certain actor-like qualities of its shows both that great states will try to change the whole system and that
own). Foreign policy-making is a complex process of interaction they face an enormous task in so doing.
between many actors, differentially embedded in a wide range of dif- On epistemological and methodological issues, it will by now be
ferent structures. Their interaction is a dynamic process, leading to the clear that I do not accept the well-known position of Martin Hollis and
constant evolution of both actors and structures. Steve Smith that there are always 'two stories to tell in International
In terms of how we might know anything about actors and structures, Relations'- that is, understanding why actors take the positions they
the approach here takes something from positivism, but it is not posi- do, and explaining their outputs- and that these two accounts cannot be
tivist. Neither, however, is it relativist, since it asserts that somethino- reconciled 8 If this were true, a great deal of illuminating historical
called empirical knowledge is possible, on the basis of professional"' scholarship would never have been possible. Technically, such work is
scholarship and a constantly critical attitude towards sources- certainly not scientific explanation in the sense of establishing if-then proposi-
on subjects like the intentions of the British and French governments tions, but the past thirty years have shown that significant versions of
during the Suez crisis of 1956, but even on more diffuse questions like the latter rarely tum out to be possible even using scientific method.
the changing nature of war. It accepts that some of the painstaking work Good history or traditional political science 'explains' in the sense of
in foreign policy analysis coming out of the behavioural stable, on highlighting key factors and the nature of their interplay on the basis
crises, misperceptions and bureaucratic politics, is of great use, being of analysis and evidence that most critical but reasonable readers find
suggestive and systematic. On the other hand, the belief that political convincing - that is, they survive the test of the intellectual market 9
and social behaviour can be reduced to law-like statements, made on Furthermore, 'understanding' is not just a matter of reconstructing
the basis of value-free observations of a whole 'class' of phenomena, is the world-view of actors themselves - one of the limitations of early
taken to be axiomatically mistaken. Human beings respond to any decision-making theory. 10 It also involves placing their perceptions in
~ I

30 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy The Politics of Foreign Policy 31

the contexts of the myriad pressures on decision-making, intemal and Sovereignty is a central legal concept in the current intemational sys-
extemal, and of historical change. 11 tem, and an attribute difficult to acquire- and to lose. 15 Equally, states·
As with agency and structure, both explaining and understanding are capacity to exercise the independent choices implied by sovereignty is
necessary parts of good foreign policy analysis. We need to account for often in practice curtailed, while their power varies widely and is never
foreign policy behaviour in a number of different ways, and to be able absolute. All too often in the political world sovereignty is merely con-
to analyse complexity sufficiently well to make possible normative fused with power, which leads many to believe that relative weakness
statements which are grounded in empirical knowledge. Like most phe- makes sovereignty meaningless, and some others (for example the
nomena in social science, foreign policy is both general and highly par- Soviet Union) to make the opposite error of assuming that sovereignty
ticular to context. It is not sensible to limit our chances of doing justice depends on maximizing power. 16
to these different dimensions by limiting the approaches employed Foreign policy exists in the space created by states' existence and by
more than we have to. Our ontology should be wide-ranging (foreign their very lack of omnipotence. Its rationale is to mediate the impact
policy involves many actors), our epistemology open-ended (there are of the external on the domestic and to find ways of projecting a partic-
so many ways of deriving conventional wisdoms in this area) and our ular set of concerns in a very intractable world. It depends on sover-
methodologies diverse (middle-range theories, weak theories, history, eignty not being extinguished where it already exists, but otherwise is
!.! discourse analysis can all contribute). 12 This is what pluralism means more linked to the existence of a distinguishable set of domestic inter-
ii'
,.
when doing foreign policy analysis. ests, which vary independently of the given of sovereign statehood. The
formal possession of sovereignty makes it highly likely that a state will
have a foreign policy. Conversely, where sovereignty is denied or the
The State, Sovereignty and Foreign Policy capacity to exercise it severely impeded, foreign policy becomes par-
ticularly difficult - but not impossible. Ultimately foreign policy rests
No serious treatment of international politics can avoid taking a view on the effectiveness of the state at home and abroad, which is more
on the state. Yet foreign policy analysis has rarely attempted to theorize a matter of political sociology than of law.
the state. 13 This is a triple failing given (i) that it has been state-centric In what different ways may the state be described, and how do they
(but not, let it be repeated, therefore realist); (ii) that it seeks to bridge bear on foreign policy? There is now a great deal of literature extant and
International Relations and comparative politics; (iii) that an increasing many competing versions of what the state is about. 17 This is not
amount of attention has been paid to the state in recent decades, includ- the place for an exhaustive survey of the possibilities, but it is important
ing in JR. A theory of what the state does, and what it is for, is necessary to note that the interpretations broadly divide into those which are
in order to clarify the various confusions which arise in terminology. outside-in, where the extemal role determines the state's internal char-
Also, more importantly, it helps us to examine how far the domestic and acter, and those which are inside-out, where the constitutional nature
the international roles of the state gel. If they are at odds, what space of the state is primordial and has distinctive effects on intematiomil
does this create for other actors, and what limitations does it impose on relations. 18 Into the first category fall the view that the state was formed
foreign policy? through competitive politics in Renaissance Europe, and the growing
There is a link here to the problem of sovereignty, which has a operations of an international market. 19 It became consolidated in
domestic meaning, as in 'the sovereign people', as well as the external the Westphalian system, which gradually made possible territorial
conception of 'the sovereign state'. In the by now extensive and stalled nation-states, through external recognition and the principle of non-
debate on the subject, sovereignty and its meaning have become a bat- intervention in domestic affairs. A refinement would be the imperialist
tleground between those who wish to see the state dethroned from its state whose myths and militarism shape the character of its domestic
position as a central factor in international relations and those who institutions. 20 Into the second category falls the view that the state is
defend its primacy. 14 Although those who study foreign policy can essentially the product of a social contract to engage in common cause,
hardly help but be more identified with the latter position, there is as would variations on the theme that the state is perpetually being
no need for them to become trapped in a dichotomized argument. fought over by competing classes or elites, at times in a condition of
~~I

32 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy The Politics of Foreign Policy 33

revolutionary struggle. 21 Each of these endogenous versions would have the capacity to change types, as through democratization - but nonethe-
its own particular consequences for the conduct of foreign affairs. less revolving around certain essential features which provide us with a
No interpretation of the state which fails to bind the domestic and the baseline against which to measure variance. These features are seen as
international aspects together can be very convincing. The history of the relating in unbreakable interconnection to both the internal and external
emergence of states shows that they developed very slowly in the cru- circumstances of a given society of people. Whether the society preceded
cible of both general forces like the Reformation and particular, internal international recognition, or was the product of international events, mat-
conditions like the transformation of English government carried out by ters less than whether the state as a whole works well for the people who
the Tudors or the centralization of France under Louis XIV. Who can say find themselves living within it, but who have simultaneously to live in a
whether the chicken of engagement in war or the egg of domestic change condition of interdependence with other peoples.
was the primary factor in producing the history of statehood, and the The first feature of a well-functioning state is the set of institutions
international power which ensued? It is important to conceive of the state representing the res publica, or the elements of legitimated power which
in a way which does justice to its simultaneous internal and external a government runs in trust for the people (in this era of popular sover-
roles, and this will be attempted below on the basis of an ideal-type from eignty). These include the machinery of justice, the police and armed
which, naturally, there is a wide range of deviation in practice. forces, public administration and the institutions of political life. Their
Before this can be done we need to make it clear what the state is not. purpose is to ensure continuity, order and common purpose, and they
Notwithstanding the constant slippage even in professional usage, the are supposed not to fall into the hands of any particular class, party or
state is to be clearly distinguished from government, from civil society elite. This can never be guaranteed and at worst the state can become a
and from the nation. The very existence of international relations encour- private instrument - a 'prebendal state' - when the unit created by
ages an elision of these terms since from au eyrie overlooking the whole external recognition and territoriality becomes an empty shell to be
system the distinctions are far less sharp than they seem from within the filled by those possessing force majeure 23 In that event, however, the
state. But it is vital to recognize that a government is a temporary holder sharp contrast between the external status of the state and its lack of
of power and a state is the set of institutions, dispositions and territory public content creates in modern conditions not only domestic tensions
which makes it possible for governments to exist - and to change. lt is but also pressure from the outside to bring things back in line. Less dra-
only extinguished very occasionally, usually in conditions of trauma. matically, states will vary in the extensiveness and dominance of their
Equally, civil society exists separately from the state. If the latter becomes public institutions, especially in relation to economic life and conscrip-
overbearing it erodes the liberties of the people; if it identifies society tion into the armed services. This is a matter of legitimate diversity, and
completely with itself it creates totalitarianism. Lastly, even if the tenn neither third parties' security needs nor the homogenizing force of
'nation' is just as elusive as that of 'state' the two things are very distinct. human rights and democratization provide any justification for intrud-
A nation is a group of people that conceives itself to have a common iden- ing on all aspects of the state-society relationship.
tity, history and destiny. It seeks statehood, but may exist independently It might be argued that the above is a description of the 'constitu-
of it, just as the state does not need to be coterminous with any particular tional state', while more common historically is the state as an agglom-
nation - although when working well it will usually breed a moderate eration of power, pressing down upon the citizenry. 24 The response to
sense of nationhood delineated by its own borders. The 'nation-state' is this is that the latter is not a true state but the mere instrument of power
an historic compromise which like most such does not display patholog- of a dominant class or dynasty, even if functional in the international
ical symptoms until an excessive symmetry is pursued. 22 relations sense of a state. This is why we do not describe mediaeval
What then is the state, seen in the round? A brief sketch follows of an kingdoms as 'states', for there was no machinery independent of the
ideal-type, in the sense that it is seen as containing the core features of a royal household being held in trust for society (which itself would have
state that exists simultaneously for its people and in the world, in a condi- been an anachronistic concept). Certainly the claims and aspirations of
tion of some equilibrium. It contains normative elements in that the denial most people around the world, politicians and citizens, now extend well
of popular sovereignty and aggressive international behaviour are counted beyond Hobbesian visions of mere order - except in the immediate
as deviant qualities. States are seen as being of diverse types- indeed with aftermath of war or other crises. The very idea of the (modern) state
34 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy The Politics of Foreign Policy 35

requires institutions which are robust enough to remain separate from The last major definitional attribute of the state is the fact of its recog-
government and to keep the country functioning in the event of an inter- nition by the international system- the key outside-in criterion. This is
regnum. 25 This has external as well as intenial significance because with- indispensable to statehood because if recognition is not forthcoming of
out such institutions outside powers are drawn to intervene, as in Egypt the right of the state to exist inside its territorial boundaries, the way is
and Ottoman Turkey in the nineteenth century, or Albania very recently. opened for other states to contest its position, with invasion, civil war and
Constitutionalism, indeed, is the second defining feature of modern chaos - or mere resentment and uncooperativeness ~ the possible conse-
statehood. The state, to acquire legitimacy, has to act as a guardian of quences. What is more, the consequent absence of diplomatic recogni-
civil society, ensuring equity of treatment, including 'Ia carriere tion and membership of international organizations deprives the state of
ouverte aux talents', basic rights before the law, the accountability of a standing in international law and of an effective personality in interna-
those in positions of power, and the protection of public funds. The state tional political relations. It is the grossest handicap, which is why the
must, in a Hegelian sense, be the means through which freedom is breakaway Yugoslav republics sought recognition in 1991 so keenly.
enlarged as well as protected, the focal point of public discourse on the Accordingly recognition is not awarded indiscriminately. Although
basic purposes of society and political organization. If it does not do states vary in their attitudes, thereby often creating conflict, the usual
this, but instead becomes the oppressor and controller of the people, minimum conditions now are internal legitimacy, effective control over
presenting itself as the source of their legitimacy rather than vice versa, a given territory which does not derive from conquest in the recent past,
then it has become by definition a special interest group exploiting the and the capacity to enter into relations with other such entities 26 Where
state. Moreover, where the state partially fails to provide the guarantees the 'international community' does confer recognition by admitting a
outlined above, as it has done in Italy, it falls into disrepute and other new state to the UN, it is not on a particular government but on the fact
solutions are sought (in Italy this means either private 'protection' or, of the state's existence on equal terms with others, sharing the same
more respectably, 'Europe'). rights and duties in international law. 27 It is also, more than fifty years on
In the early twenty-first century the constitutional state does not exist from Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, not a carte blanche for statehood to
in a vacuum. It is reinforced by external human rights regimes, the UN develop inside the citadel of sovereignty in whatever way a dominant
system and the power of the western democracies- even if, on occasions, elite might wish. The growing presumption of humanitarian intervention
it is undermined by their double standards and by the perceived exigen- means that the worst excesses will draw external condemnation and quite
cies of national security. It also has to reinforce its own legitimacy by not probably some form of pressure for change. That this tendency is incon-
ignoring the fate of those in other states where liberties are far from guar- sistently and often inadequately felt is not a reason for discounting its
anteed. How far to go in that obligation is one of the central dilemmas of arrival as an important new factor in statehood.
foreign policy. It is clear, however, that it is not possible to be insouciant Thus the essential features of modem statehood all involve both inter-
about repression elsewhere without the state itself losing something in nal and external aspects and it is not sensible to privilege one side over
relation to the claim of upholding basic rights. The project of constitu- the other. The definition given here of the state has certainly been a
tionalism is now at least in part a universal one, which is not to say,that liberal one, but liberalism has its variants, such as that of the minimal'
all states have to follow the same model of democracy, let alone that the ist state dedicated to facilitating free economic enterprise. History helps
United States and its allies have reached a satisfactory level of democratic to explain these varying manifestations, but for an understanding of the
practice. What it does say is that the notion of the state as the enemy of relationship between foreign policy and the state we need more. What a
democracy inside and out, as indelibly associated with the values of theory of the state does is to provide an account of the state's distinctive
machtpolitik, is not only outdated but fundamentally wrong. Many functions, inside and outside, and of the links which connect them.
individual states have been misappropriated, in both their domestic and It may well be that the state is a transient historical phenomenon -
foreign. contexts. By contrast, statehood itself is an aspect of modernity what is not? - but its demise as an institution of world politics cannot
which, in Weberian terms, inherently fosters the idea of the public good. but be a slow and complex evolution in which conscious choice and
It needs reclaiming for liberalism, even if on occasions liberal states will agency will not figure prominently. Ultimately, the multiple decisions
need to follow the dictates of realism in order to ensure their own survival. of millions over many generations will decide what kind of successor
 36 The Changing Polirics of Foreign Policy The Politics of Foreign Policy 37

institution we end up with, and public policy will only grope its way shot through with problems. The approach presented in this book is thus
slowly towards new dispositions- as in the case of the European Union, one of liberal realism, which acknowledges the contingency and insecu-
where a single European state is still a rel'note possibility nearly half a rity of world politics while being convinced that existential choice is
I
,I
century from its launch in that direction.
Bearing the fog of history in mind, there are two possible answers
possible, that human agency continually displays the capacity to make a
difference and that the state is not necessarily the defensive, paranoid mil-
to the question of what functions states perform, one foreign policy- itary fortress that is often described. 28 Liberal realism wishes the demo-
II related and one domestic. The combined answer they provide is closely cratic state to survive but also to grow and to promote constitutional
related to the formal definition of statehood given above, but it is not the values internationally, so that inter-state, and also inter-societal relations
II
i same; it engages directly with the political and normative question of can be conducted on a basis of secure and cooperative diversity, with the
the values attaching to statehood and the issue of whether scepticism state as an important source of order held in common, not least because
about the usefulness of the state is justified. of a converging understanding of what statehood entails. 29 If the argu-
The foreign policy answer has three parts, and amounts to the argu- ment holds, then there are clearly still a number of important functions for
ment that welfare in a global system of (patchy) interdependence foreign policy to perform, and the identity of those acting on behalf of the
requires socio-political units which are both manageable and accessible state becomes a matter of some importance.
to their citizens. For: (i) the world is not yet so secure that we can trust
in international organization to ensure our physical and political sur-
vival; at some level 'we' therefore need to look after ourselves by tak- Between Home and Abroad30
!'' ing out an insurance policy against damaging exogenous change; (ii) the
international system, political and economic, is sufficiently large and The argument so far has stressed the interconnections between the
l complex that without some vehicle in which to travel it is easy to get domestic and the foreign. Foreign policy can never be abstracted from
I lost; states provide identity, direction and agency; (iii) without states the domestic context out of which it springs. Without domestic society
.J
a given society would have no 'private space', that is, the capacity to and the state there would be no foreign policy. This is not wholly to dis-
regulate social behaviour in a particular way, to manage admission and miss the realist perception that the nature of international politics tends
to cherish particular traditions (if these things are anathema to some, to discipline foreign policy and to reduce its degree of variation - in
then they must be balanced against the costs of global openness). other words, that to play the game you have to stick to the rules. It is,
The domestic answer is that the state is there to provide the condi- rather, to argue that foreign policy cannot be reduced to a game like
tions of peace, order and organization required for individuals to flour- chess, with set rules, a single dominant value, and a unitary, optimizing
ish. This is not just a matter of a Hobbesian concern over the war of all decision-maker. Robert Putnam has pointed out that foreign policy is at
against all, but how an industrialized or industrializing society can so the least a two-level game, but the diverse manifestations of domestic
II
,I
arrange itself that chaos is averted and the weak do not go straight to society make interaction much more than a garne. 31
the wall. Vital services like energy supply, air traffic control, policing This is not to say that either the domestic or the foreign represents a
and transport cannot simply be provided by the free market, let alone by hard and fast category. Writers like R.B.J. Walker and Cynthia Weber
a combination of local and global governance. They require an effective have challenged the very distinction between 'inside' and 'outside' and
intermediate level of political organization to regulate, facilitate, lead there can be little doubt that in many countries there is a noticeable grey
and underwrite. This we currently call the state and something like it area between what is regarded as distinctively 'home affairs' and what
would have to be invented if it did not exist. is international, or mixed up with the domestic environment of another
If we combine these two answers it can be seen that the argument is state. 32 Ireland, with its large cultural overlap with the United Kingdom,
really about three things: manageability of scale, protection and democ- widespread diaspora and heavy dependence on EU programmes, is a
racy. If these values are important we must acknowledge both that they good example. Nonetheless, palpable domestic communities still exist,
cannot be provided without some balance being struck between domestic usually supported (and limited) by the state, while their constraints
and international goals and that the alternatives to the state are themselves and advantages are keenly felt by their citizens. This is not a matter of
 38 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy The Politics of Foreign Policy 39

nationalism, although in many places the latter strengthens feelings of There may be limits to what governments can do to promote these
distinctiveness. Rather, shared historical experiences, inyths,_culture in values, but citizens expect them to be able to do something, given that
i. in most cases there are no alternatives. Companies' obligations are to
the widest sense, including food, language, architecture, jokes, music,
I' sport and newspapers all help to create the emotion of 'belonging' pri- their shareholders, and international banks' to principles of good
marily in one society. This is true for all those except the international finance (if not to certain powerful governments).
elite which dominates writing about international relations, and which Through foreign policy one can also raise questions of morality in
understandably tends to project its own experiences onto the mass. 33 international relations. 38 To a certain extent this can be done by refer-
The domestic and the foreign are two ends of a continuum rather than ence to individual responsibility and to the functions of the United
being sharply demarcated. 34 Yet it is still possible to use the idea of Nations and its specialized agencies, but mostly it comes down to what
domestic society at both practical and theoretical levels. Indeed, it is should be expected of national governments - not least in the UN.
almost impossible to do without it. The world cannot be explained only which is almost wholly dependent on foreign policy decisions taken by
in holistic terms, and even writers like Susan Strange who resist the states. It is just as difficult at the practical as at the philosophical level
conventional categories are forced to include states and security in to decide on the extent of one community's obligations to others, and to
their system of interpretation. 35 In terms of policy, international institu- the principles of international order. Without reference to foreign policy
tions and summits are geared almost wholly to intergovernmental com- and its instruments, however, it becomes impossible.
promises, and the most powerful figures in world business have to Both the practitioner and the analyst of foreign policy must take
acknowledge the difference made by a particular political context - notice of the two-way flows which arise from the distinction between
I as Rupert Murdoch has done assiduously in China, and the world's the foreign and the domestic: foreign policy has its domestic sources,
airlines have had to do since the attacks on New York and Washington and domestic policy has its foreign influences. 39 It is important to trace
of 11 September 2001. 36 the pattern of forces, to distinguish them and to be aware that there is a
The idea of the domestic is particularly indispensable when we con- great deal of variation, spatial and historical. But the basic distinction
front the issues of democracy and accountability. 37 How are popular cannot be ignored. Although there are some elements of domestication
concerns to be expressed and protected if not through the mechanisms evident in the international system, with challenges to the rule of non-
of specific societies and polities? Internationally, the issue of democ- intervention, and many avenues through which public policy is coordi-
racy largely relates to the artificial issue of equal rights between states nated, no serious observer would argue that this is anything but tentative
of differing sizes and power, as over voting in the UN. In the European and patchy. Conversely, although all states have to factor international
Union, the only serious supranational entity, there is an acknowl- considerations in their decision-making on issues from education to
edged 'democratic deficit' due to the weakness of the directly-elected waste disposal, this is not the same as saying that their internal poli-
European Parliament. Even at the national level in established liberal cies are determined by interdependence or globalization. Their own
states, democracy is often all too rudimentary (particularly in the area structures, paths of development and political will represent crucial
of foreign policy), but at least the structures and presuppositions exist intervening variables between external trends and policy outcomes.
for asserting the rights to representation, scrutiny and due process. This Thus the domestic and the foreign are distinguishable both in degree
is not the case with such entities as pressure groups, opinion polls and and in kind. What is more, every country fits the general model. The
phone-ins, however desirable in themselves, while their transnational greatest powers may be dislocated by faraway events, as the United States
manifestations are even less substantial. found with the Vietnam War, while the smallest states may have their
A focus on foreign policy is therefore the most feasible way of international position shaped by domestic inputs, as when Malta rejected
addressing the question of how democracy works (or not) in the global the offer of a place in the queue for EU membership after the result of a
context. Through foreign policy one can measure how far the needs of General Election.40 Every society has its particular cluster of traditions,
a particular society are being protected or advanced in the context of the groups, procedures and needs, just as it has a peculiar geopolitical posi-
outside forces which affect them. This is most obviously true in the tion and place in the World Bank's league tables. All have a practical
area of defence, but also in the wider categories of security and welfare. as well as emotional sense of the distinction between home and abroad.
40 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy The Politics of Foreign Policy 41

The interplay between these two sets of characteristics, overlapping but within tolerable limits 41 It is not even clear that businesses have a clear
not identical, shapes not just the country's foreign policy but also its interest in peace over war, or vice versa, either of which might lead
general development It therefore merits serious intellectual attention. them to greater political interventionism. War will bring profits to some,
and bankruptcies to others.
On the other hand, in their diversity and egoism, transnational com-
Foreign Policy for Whom? panies are no different from most states. States and businesses both have
their internal environments, even if the companies are geographically
States and foreign policies are nearly Siamese twins, but not quite. There dispersed. Both have to compute the best ways to survive, and with luck
are other actors which generate activities resembling foreign policies, prosper, in an increasingly intractable external environment which on! y
and this complicates the conventional domestic/foreign divide further. It a few actors seem to have the capacity to shape. As Stopford and
is not always clear who is representing whom in international relations. Strange observe: 'World-class firms almost need a kind of foreign min-
Some unrecognized states effectively conduct independent external istry and a cadre of corporate diplomats that combine local expertise
strategies, even if the lack of normal representative facilities and/or and broad experience of dealing with governments in other countries.' 42
dependence on what is often an overbearing supporter makes them difti- On the wide definition of foreign policy introduced earlier, there is no
cult to implement. Taiwan and Northern Cyprus since 1974 are promi- reason to restrict foreign policy analysis to states, even if there will be
nent examples. Hong Kong has maintained extensive external relations more to say about the latter. The same is true of cities, regions, churches
in the sphere of political economy since becoming a Special Administra- and transnational pressure groups, all of which are increasingly taking
tive Region of the People's Republic of China in 1997, including becom- a direct role in international relations. The problem here is whether they
ing a member of the WTO before China itself. It does not assert a profile truly qualify as independent actors. The Vatican clearly has a foreign
on traditional foreign policy issues, but civil society's views on human policy- it is a micro-state as well as the possessor of formidable finan-
rights and democratic governance seep out into the world through the cial and ideological resources. Other churches, by contrast, are either
still relatively free media. It thus has something like a partial foreign more diffused and divided or dependent on states for assistance in the
policy, even if it would never dare to use the term. There are also cases process of global projection 43 Yet sects like the Mormons, Hamas or
of dispossessed peoples without any clear-cut territorial base, such as the Opus Dei have had the capacity to pursue strategies across state lines,
Palestinians before 1994 and the African National Congress, represent- often with political consequences. 44 Regions, especially in federal sys-
ing most black South Africans, between 1961-91. tems, are also capable of using the spaces created by democracy and
Most of these cases are relatively straightforward, since they repre- free trade to take initiatives on commercial matters, and the activities of
sent actors wanting to be states and trying to emulate state foreign Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Oxfam all have political as well
policies. More problematic are the global strategies of transnational as humanitarian dimensions. 45 Thus, even where an actor is not wholly
companies. Few would pretend that News International, Microsoft and independent of states, lacks a clear constituency and has only a limited
Nestle do not involve themselves in politics. But whether their political range of concerns, it may still be worth viewing in terms of foreign
activities can be described as foreign policies is another matter. They do policy. The AI Qaeda terrorist network has demonstrated this with chill-
have global strategies, which go well beyond mere marketing or even ing consequences. Sovereignty, and even identifiability, may be lacking,
production. Rupert Murdoch's activities with satellite television make but the entity concerned may still have scope for autonomous decisions
him a major player in the international politics of Asia, just as his which affect others- in short, a degree of actorness. These transnational
TV and newspaper interests have made it necessary for the last three actors represent a significant form of agency in inter-national relations,
British prime ministers to keep him onside. But businesses do not and they should not only be discussed at the level of the system, in terms
represent societies and they have little ability to participate directly in of interdependence or global civil society. 46 Their aims, policy-making
the evolution of the general international order through institutions, processes and impact need serious analysis.
Jaw and security arrangements. Their interest in international politics is The transnational aspect is, however, marginal by comparison to the
intensely narrow, focused on maintaining a small number of variables traditional meaning of the question as to whom foreign policy is for.
42 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy The Politics of Foreign Policy 43

This relates to the relationship between elite and mass which has pre- relations, if not at the mass level then at least among younger and more
occupied commentators since the First World War, when the pitiless educated citizens, The number of pressure groups is rising and the notion
sacrifice of millions led to the rise of the Union of Democratic Control that governments cannot be criticized on foreign pol1cy matters without
in Britain and Woodrow Wilson's rejection of the old order from his endangering the national interest has almost disappeared, The intercon-
position as President of the United States- and then leader of his coun- nections between domestic and foreign affairs are more widely under-
try's delegation at the Paris Peace Conference 47 The basic issue here, on stood, especially within the European Union, There is thus a need to
which so far there has been little progress, can be put in the form of reassess the relationship between foreign policy and democratic politics,
another question: if democracy and popular sovereignty are to be the from both an analytical and a normative viewpoint The foreign policy of
hallmarks of modem statehood, is it acceptable for foreign and defence a state is now a complex balance between: concerns for the overall wel-
policies to be delegated almost wholly to a small elite, on the grounds fare of society, as interpreted by governments in debate with various par-
that dealings with other states require secrecy, continuity, experience and ticular stakeholders: concerns for general principles of international order
personal contacts? Most people would reply in the negative, but striking and justice; and concerns for selected groups of foreigners designated as
the right balance between democracy and efficiency in this context has friends or as especially deserving of help, How these criteria are related
so far proved an almost impossible task, The 'open diplomacy' aspira- to each other, and by whom, should be a key concern of contemporary
tions of Wilson soon proved unworkable, and even today few liberal foreign policy analysis and a start will be made later in this volume,
democracies have procedures for accountability in foreign policy which
come near those that apply in domestic areas, The United States has the
most developed system of legislative participation in foreign affairs, but Expectations of Foreign Policy
the executive also found many ways to get around the Congress during
the Cold War - being able to appeal to a present danger is a powerful Domestic politics produces pressures for more democracy in foreign
weapon, This has not stopped other states complaining bitterly that the policy, but this does not mean that 'efficiency' is any less valued,
United States has gone too far in the direction of obeisance to the Indeed, most citizens probably rank efficiency higher in the sense that
Congress, making its foreign policy irresponsible and inconsistent they want their government to defend their interests effectively abroad,
Foreign policy may be 'for the people' in a fundamental sense, but it and only want to get involved at times of crisis, Yet efficiency is not a
is largely still made on their behalf by cognoscenti who complain about value-neutral term, and since it applies as much to the content of policy
having their hands tied by public opinion yet evince little evidence of as to its process, nonnative issues arise all the time, not least in terms of
constraint in practice, What is more, these experts increasingly form pursuing measures which will lead the country into avoidable crises in
a transnational class underpinned by personal relations, intermarriage, the first place, This problem means that even among the relatively small
subsidized conferences and multilingualism- all of which tend to dis- elites which follow foreign affairs, there are varying expectations of
tance them from their own domestic constituencies. This is reminiscent what a successful foreign policy will entail. Although in the nature of
of the aristocratic world of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries - things such competing views cannot be reconciled by mere analysis, the
the 'freemasonry of diplomacy'- but it extends much further to include field can be narrowed by a consideration of what might be feasible,
business, academe, interest-groups, the media and all forms of interna- given the current international system, as well as broadly desirable,
tional organizations and para-organizations, What is, more, the interna- What follows is a brief attempt to identify the principal expectations
tional human rights discourse, steadily growing in importance since which most citizens, and indeed policy-makers, will have of their
1945, has put the needs of the citizens of other states on the foreign country's foreign policy,
policy agenda of most democracies, thus further confusing the question To some extent this is a similar exercise to that which used to be con-
of whose interests foreign policy is supposed to be serving 48 ducted by those who believed in immutable national interests, But there
The growth of an international middle class has, on the other hand, are fundamental differences, In an era in which the intellectual and
stimulated an impatience in many states with the torpor of their legisla- moral shortcomings of realism have been exposed it is difficult to
tors, and there are now signs of an awakening interest in international believe in self-evident objective interests, 49 It is much more convincing
 '!"""
T

44 The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy The Politics of Foreign Policy 45

to focus on the functions of states as mechanisms for relating the will act internationally to promote the country's economic well-
expressed wishes of the domestic constituency, the demands of the being. The formal side of foreign economic policy includes trade
external milieu, and (indeed) the basic needs of the state qua state. This negotiations, trade promotion and monetary diplomacy. Less visible
allows us to bring in the subjective element arising from domestic are the benefits deriving from public-private cooperation over export
politics, decision-makers' own perceptions, and the evolving nature of credits, aid programmes, defence spending and cultural diplomacy.
international politics, where the pursuit of empire is no longer a vital In this context in particular it is an important function of foreign pol-
interest and a conception of 'planet earth' has quickly become part of icy to ensure that state resources do not fall into the hands of vested
the mental furniture of even cynical politicians. interests, and that a clear sense of public good prevails.
There are seven main expectations which we tend to have of foreign • Making decisions on hzterventions abroad: this is partly a matter of
policy. They apply to states in the first instance, but can, mutatis mutan- judgements on what the country's security requires - is deterrence
dis, be adapted to non-state actors. They naturally vary over time and or military action required to protect energy supplies or to stop a
place, and certainly in their detailed manifestations. Nonetheless, it is not distant state from acquiring nuclear weapons?- and partly a matter
unreasonable to see them in broad terms as being held in common by the of the moral calculus required to know whose suffering deserves a
inhabitants of all but the most unstable or inward-looking states. They particular humanitarian commitment. On both counts the contempo-
are listed in broad order from the most particular to the most general: rary tendency is towards multilateral action legitimized by interna-
tional law, but national decisions are always required about entty
• Protecting citizens abroad: foreign policy has both to work towards into a coalition in the first place, or the possibilities of going it alone
achieving the general conditions in which expatriates will be secure to if one does not materialize.
pursue life and work abroad, and to help them when they get into trou- • Negotiating a stable international order: at both political and eco-
ble. This can range from prison sentences for the possession of drugs, nomic levels foreign policy should not just be looking to protect
through the exploitation of cheap labour to the taking of hostages by narrow and otien short-term national concerns but should also be
a hostile government. At none of these levels is it sufficient -let alone working towards a more secure global system, from which threats
seen domestically as being sufficient- to leave matters in the hands will emanate less often and less unpredictably. International organi-
of the international lawyers. zations and regimes are prime sites for work on these 'milieu goals' .50
• Projecting identity abroad: this is a problematic function as in many • Protecting the glohal commons: this is not something that would
states there would be a strong reaction against the government act- have been expected of foreign policy until the past two decades, but
ing as gatekeeper to the cultural activities of its own citizens. now it is of crucial importance that certain aspects of environmental
Culture is rarely best served by the dead hand of public bureaucracy. degradation be halted. Paradoxically, this can only be achieved
Nonetheless, countries cannot have good mutual relations without by both universal agreement and national action. There are no other
such things as state visits and subsidized exchanges, while intel- mechanisms available than states negotiating in the forum of inter-
ligently run short-wave radio stations or language acquisition pro- national organization if cooperative agreements are to be re~ched on
grammes can overcome the natural suspicion of propaganda and the things which go beyond the concern and the power of individual
create significant increments of goodwill, even new business. states, such as CFC emissions or over-fishing. International agree-
• Homeostasis, or the maintenance of territorial integrity and social ments are painfully reached and often represent only lowest com-
peace against external threats. Challenges which come from inside, mon denominator outcomes, but the alternative, of no agreement
such as demands for regional autonomy, are not the proper business and leaving matters to the private decisions of responsible citizens
of foreign policy until they become connected to outside pressures, and businesses, is hardly more promising.
when decision-makers have to be careful not to be drawn into con-
fusing 'enemies' within and without. One could add more detail on the expectations that are held of for-
• Advancing prosperity: despite the advance of monetarism and pri- eign policy, whether by decision-makers or citizenry. It should be borne
vatization there is still a heavy expectation on governments that they in mind that it is common to have exaggerated political expectations of
 46 The Changing Politics o.f' Foreign Policy

what can be done with foreign policy (witness the demands for 'solu-
r The Politics of Foreign Policy 47

Each category that we use in social science is a generalization, whether

tions' in Bosnia and for 'victories' against terrorism), jUst as there is an it be large, as with types of international system, or relatively small. as
academic trend towards expecting too little. Foreign policy is the way in with the impact of physical illness on leaders' perfom1ance. Each will be
which most political action in international relations occurs, albeit often subject to scrutiny and debate, and it is through that very process that we
through coordinated strategies, and, with all its problems, people still are getting as near to the 'truth' as we are ever likely to. In the study or
look to it for both protection and change. foreign policy the central category is that of actors, and we have already
All those involved in the processes of foreign policy and international suggested that this includes various kinds of non-state actors. Yet states
politics, including the relatively detached analyst, have expectations of represent the main source of foreign policies, and it is important to
foreign policy. To the extent that they relate mostly to issues of content acknowledge at the outset that they too include a range of different types.
and 'efficiency' they should be (but often are not) kept in harness with In saying this we are referring to both internal and external characteris-
the requirements of democratic process. Equally if they are allowed to tics, welded together in a particular constellation - of position, size,
get too much out of sync with the levels of available capabilities, fatal borders and physical patrimony on the other hand, and political system.
misunderstandings may arise as to what a state is able or willing to do. culture and level of development on the other. All of these dimensions
Failing to deliver on implicit promises, or conversely (as with the may be used to generate statements about differentiated behaviour.
People's Republic of China) having immense resources which outsiders Separate literatures exist, for example, on the foreign policies of small
do not expect you to use, are recipes for misunderstandings which can states, developing countries and middle range powers. 52 The 'democratic
lead to conflict both inside a state and with others. In practice it is dif- peace' debate essentially concems the impact of political systems on
ficult to live up to this injunction, and it is part of the task of the foreign foreign policy, and there has been much speculation about the external
pohcy analyst to trace diverging patterns of expectations and to meas- performance of 'strong' and 'weak', corporatist or decentralized states. 53
ure any capability-expectations gaps which may arise. 51 This cannot be The latest round of theory concerns 'post-modem states' and their sup-
a matter of scientific exactitude, but it can be done comparatively and posed commillnent to multi-level systems of international governance. 54
with a theoretically-derived sensitivity to the interaction of domestic These ways of breaking down the broad category of 'state foreign
and international political forces. If articulated, expectations will also policies' are useful and suggestive, even if they are all also inherently
lead to debate over normative preferences, since by their nature they contestable. They can become obstacles to understanding, however, if
JOin practical outcomes to underlying principles. used as means of generating mere correlations between outputs and
national attributes, as in the old behaviouralist interest in whether
'closed' regimes produced inflexible or unpredictable policies. Such
The Diversity of States questions are only the beginning. If, as with the democratic peace
debate, they lead us to probe into the nature of the subtle interconnec-
In this chapter we have looked at the problems which lie just beneath the tions between domestic structures and foreign policy positions, all well
surface in any discussion of the politics of foreign policy - the nature of and good. But they are unlikely to be able to do that without an under-
action and constraint; the role of the state; the demarcation of the domes- standing of decision-making, choice, and internal politics on the one
tic and the foreign; the nature of the constituencies of foreign policy; and hand, and the dynamics of the international system on the other. We
the problem of purpose and expectations. All this has involved a good now turn to the first of these two fields of analysis, with a view to
deal of generalization. Just as in the book as a whole, however_ the issue observing foreign policy in action.
is less that of the fact of generalization than of its extent. Th~ aim is to
establish the parameters within which foreign policy-making takes place,
rather than to assert broad truths which would quite properly be contested
by others and subjected to qualification on the basis of context. The aim
is to reveal the dialectical relationships between shared and distinctive
experiences, between the common dilemma and the specific response.
r·.···
l -· -
I

Part I
Agency
3
Actors: the Responsible
Decision-makers

Decision-making must be the starting-point if we wish to understand the

dilemmas of acting in the international system. Agency entails individ-
ual human beings taking decisions and implementing them on behalf of
entities which possess varying degrees of coherence, organization and
power- of which the most effective are generally states. Any analysis
of this activity needs to focus in tum on the political dimension, where
named individuals have formal responsibility for foreign policy, on the
associated bureaucracies, which provide so much of the continuity and
expertise which make action meaningful, and on the problem of ration-
ality, or the capacity to pursue objectives in a logical, intentional man-
ner in what is a particularly inchoate environment. Finally, foreign
policy actions cannot be understood without an appreciation of their
implementation phase, which is at least as important as that of decision-
making, given that outcomes are so often markedly different from orig-
inal intentions. This first section of the book tackles these four aspects
of agency in sequence, beginning with the most visible, political level
of activity.
When the level of discussion is that of the international system, states
or other entities can perfectly well be treated as unified actors. Although
short-hand, it still makes sense to say that 'Iraq invaded Kuwait', or
'Japan wishes to become a permanent member of the UN Security
Council'. That is, after the processes of decision-making appropriate to
the countries concerned, the state took up an external position which
was acknowledged as a move in international relations by other stales,
which then reacted in their turn. Tracing these various moves gives us
many of the events of international politics and we can attempt to
analyse the patterns they produce.
 52 Agency Actors 53

Realists generally believe that the information thus generated can uncover the practical meaning of 'responsibility' for those conducting
explam a good deal of international relations, including the behaviour foreign policy at the highest level.
of mdJVIdual states. That is not the position of foreign policy analysis.
which iS premised on the belief that we can only fully understand what
states do by looking at two interactions: between their international Who Governs, in Foreign Policy?
position and their domestic context; and between the problem being
faced and the nature of the decision-making process employed to han- If the application of Robert Dahl's famous question to foreign policy is
dle it. Further, we must now accept that there are other international one of the main purposes of this book as a whole, a short answer can
actors than states, including some based in particular societies but in still be given at this stage. In most stales the fonnal office-holders deal-
competition· with their own government, and that the border-zone ing with foreign policy questions are limited in number, although the
between the external and the internal, often termed 'intermestic ', is now growing scope of foreign and intermestic policies is bringing more
both wide and fuzzy.' Nissan's support for the single European currency people into play by the year.
proJect, or Greenpeace's opposition to nuclear testing, are just as much The nominal chief of foreign policy operations in most states is
mternatwnal actwns as those of Iraq and Japan cited above. the foreign minister, whatever his or her precise title (for example,
. It soon becomes indispensable, however, when trying to understand an 'Secretary of State' in Washington, DC). Foreign ministers are still of
mternatwnal event or a particular actor's behaviour, to break down the considerable importance by virtue of specializing in external policy but
~ction into its various levels and components. Was Iraq's decision to they struggle to keep control of their vast portfolio, increasingly invaded
mvade Iran really Saddam Hussein's alone? If it was, did he nonetheless as it is by colleagues running other ministries, and they are always
have the broad support of his populace? What was the thinking behind the likely to be trumped by a head of government who decides to take a
calculall?ns that must have gone on inside the Iraqi military establish- direct interest in foreign affairs. Their relationship and activities are dis-
ment? Similarly, wl!h the less dramatic case of Japan, how far was the cussed in the next section; for the moment it is enough to stress that
change in policy on the Security Council the product of painful consensus- heads of government, whether they intend to or not, are invariably
bmldmg, and how far the result of leadership? What were the positions drawn into foreign affairs, and a large proportion of their time is spent
held m the various ministries which might be differentially affected by an upon it. Conversely, outsiders rarely assume that a foreign minister has
mcrease J.n the [Link]'s responsibilities for international security? These full powers and often prefer to open up direct channels to the head of
are questiOns which need regional specialists to give answers, but their government. A further potential confusion is opened up by the fact that
effecllve formulation depends on the body of theory and analysis which some heads of government are also heads of state (as in France, the
has been built up in the comparative study of foreign policy. United States and South Africa), and therefore have ceremonial as well
Those who are formally responsible for taking decisions in foreign as executive functions which place them on a higher level of protocol,
pohcy, and who therefore carry the can at home and abroad, are politi- with more weight but less accessibility than a simple head of govern"
cmns of vanous descriptions. Their precise titles and locations in the ment 2 In most states the functions are separated between two individu"
political structure will vary a great deal according to the type of state or als. The separate head of state, whether dynastic monarch or elected
other international actors they represent. The heads of multinational personality, has some function in foreign relations, but is much less of
corporatio~s, or financiers such as George Soros, may resemble more a figure than the chief executive. Most infonned outsiders, for example,
the strategic players of game theory, working to a limited number of would know that in 2001 Silvio Berlusconi was the Prime Minister of
concer~s, than true politicians. But they share the high profile and vul- Italy. Only a small proportion would also identify Carlo Azeglio Ciampi
nerability when thmgs go badly wrong, in contrast to the much larger as the Italian President. Nonetheless, a figure such as Cian1pi can have
number of bureaucrats behmd the scenes. The delineation of the roles of real influence in improving relations with other countries, and with
~esponsible decision-makers will involve a discussion of the various symbolizing the state's outlook in a way that is above factional politics.
mst~tutions which tend to be involved, such as executive councils, inner After Berlusconi's gaffe in talking about a clash of civilizations after the
cabmets and the providers of intelligence. The aim is ultimately to attack on the World Trade Center, there were calls for the President to
 54 Agency Actors 55

speak for the whole country on the matter. Richard von Weizsacker was ay also be a director or vice president with special responsibility for
4
very successful in this role for the Federal Republic ofGennany between ': international division, only loosely responsible to shareholders
1984--94, embodying its democratic and pacific values and making it ~lobalization has involved much integration of transnational production
clear that his compatriots accepted responsibility for their past 3 and communication networks, although 'the emergence of the truly
The other members of the political foreign policy elite vary more "placeless" global corporations is still a long way on::' For an Inter-
widely from country to country. Where there is some form of cabinet gov- national pressure group or political party the Situation 1s d1fferent. The
ernment the foreign minister will have to keep all colleagues infonned former run on small budgets and cannot afford to have many executive
on the main lines of policy and get their active support on an issue of high officers flying the world on diplomatic business, even if the need for
signiticance. Some will be continually involved in aspects of external negotiations with governments is more pressmg than Jt ts_ for ~omp~~1es.
relations by virtue of their own responsibilities (such as agriculture min- What is more, they tend to prize the collective nature of their decision-
isters inside the EU) and their actions will need coordinating, both with making. Nonetheless, the two or three individuals at the top of orgam-
each other and with the foreign ministry. In general more and more zations like Amnesty International become very well-known and
departmental ministers are discovering an external dimension to their job. engage in much para-diplomacy6 Political entities are usually more
but it would be wrong to suggest that many of them make it their priority directly imitative of state structures, because they wish ultimately to
or indeed that they have an international conception of public policy. acquire them. Thus Oliver Tambo was the fore1g~ secretary m exile of
This is still a matter of great variability. The key colleagues for a foreign the African National Congress (AN C) for all the tnne that Its president,
minister will normally be the ministers of defence, economics and trade, Nelson Mandela, was in prison, and he ran an extremely effective inter-
in that order. national policy - albeit reliant on the political and logistical support
A few other key individuals should be included in any description of sympathetic governments 7 Similarly the Palestine Liberation Organ-
of the top office-holders in the area of foreign policy. The chief of the ization (PLO) ran a foreign policy in all but name for many years under
foreign intelligence service could be a visible political figure but the leadership of Yasser Arafat. The latter has not become noticeably
equally he could be a bureaucrat operating in the shadows. Either way better known (or more powerful) since he has become a legitimate
he (exceptionally she) will be answerable to the head of government head of government in a (semi-) sovereign state. These revolutionary
and/or the foreign minister, and will be a central figure in any high-level movements did not survive, however, by relymg on one man for their
discussions on policy. Similarly the chairman of the chiefs of staff, on strategy. They usually rested on a tight-knit cell of leaders operating in
one definition strictly a bureaucrat, is likely to have permanent and a disciplined but collective way. Otherwise arrests and deaths would
direct access to the highest circles of foreign policy-making, particu- have decimated the movement. Osama bin Laden's AI Qaeda network
larly where armed conflict is a possible outcome. In a completely dif- has skilfully exploited its leader's wealth and charisma while remaining
ferent vein, the chair of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, diffuse and horizontal in structure.
where one exists, may sometimes- be drawn into top-level consultations The issue of who holds formal office is not the trivial question that
where the need for wider political consensus is particularly strong. Such some behaviouralist writers, critical of the aridity of the public admin-
a figure can certainly be used as a mouthpiece, with a useful ambiguity istration approach, once thought. Although it is crucial to distinguish
as to authenticity built in. Where there is actually a formal division of between formal and real power, and never to assume that deciSions are
power on foreign policy as in the United States the key chairs and sen- made as the official flow charts would have it, those who occupy the
ators become almost parallel foreign policy-makers to the President, highest positions in a state have the opportunity to dispos~ of a great
and have to be courted assiduously by the White House so as to avoid deal of influence. In foreign policy they have at their disposal the
embarrassing divisions in relations with other states. resources of the state, and- because external policy requires relatively
In the case of transnational enterprises the responsibility for interna- little legislation - a fairly unstructured decisional environment to
tional strategy is less clear. Normally the chief executive of a multi- exploit. They can also, even today, often work away from the pubhc eye.
national company will be party to any decisions with political This provides a considerable opportumty for the relatively small group
implications -that is, which involve dealing with governments. There of men and women who are the formal, poht1cal deciSIOn-makers to
 jf,k ·'"

56 Agency Actors 57

exert leadership in foreign policy and to personify the state in their arises is disproportionately high, giving the advantage in policy-making
actions. At this level individuals have considerable scope to influence to those who hold the power of initiative and response. Foreign policy
events. How they do so depends, as we shall see, on a mix of factors: problems are also often unstructured in advance, in the sense that there
the personal and political qualities of the personalities involved, the is no obvious framework or timetable for their consideration in the way
nature of the issue being decided, and the political structures of the state that a domestic issue, often based on a manifesto commitment, expert
in question. report or parliamentary legislation, tends to be. Once again this means
that responsibility falls onto the shoulders of the small number of politi-
cians with the special knowledge and flexibility to respond.
The Foreign Policy Executive There is a degree of overlap between the kinds of issues I have
described and the nature of crisis. But the argument is not that foreign
In most political systems any given area of policy will be conducted at policy is mostly conducted in conditions of crisis, or that crises tend to
the highest level by a combination of the head of government, free of be run by a few individuals at the top. Foreign policy is almost as much
any particular portfolio, and the departmental minister, the specialist. a matter of routine business as is domestic policy, and crisis is compar-
This is particularly the case with foreign policy, where the expectations °
atively rare. 1 Furthermore, even crisis does not automatically produce
of head of government involvement, from inside and outside, are high a highly personalized decision-making system- examples can easily be
and where it is difficult for others to develop an equivalent level of found of deliberate attempts to build consensus and to spread responsi-
expertise. On the other hand, some of what goes to make up foreign bility around a wider group than the foreign policy executive, even if
policy in a developed state is handled by economic ministers who them- purely operational matters have a restricted circulation list. In fact,
selves participate directly in international meetings on finance or trade crises sometimes heighten the desire not to risk going too far out on a
and therefore possess a knowledge which the foreign ministry general- limb from the domestic political base, as can be seen with John
ist will struggle to match. Insofar as foreign policy, therefore, seeks to Kennedy's careful consultations during the Cuban Missile Crisis of
integrate the various straods of external relations, it will be conducted 1962 and the Soviet vacillation over the Czech problem in the summer
by what cao be termed the 'foreign policy executive', consisting in the of 1968. 11 The point is, rather, that even non-crisis foreign policy issues
first instance of the head of government and the foreign minister, but are often only loosely structured and represent something of a black
often widened according to circumstances to include defence, finance, canvas on which it is difficult for a committee to work collectively in
economics and trade ministers. There may often also be other ministers sketching the way forward. Thus the foreign policy executive tends to
without particular portfolios, close to the head of government, whose take the initiative, to outline proposals and to invite responses from col-
job is to help on matters of high politics (in the sense of something con- leagues which will inevitably deal more with matters of detail than with
ceived of as involving the government's central values and objectives)8 fundamental direction. An autocratic political system exacerbates this
The reason why foreign policy, even on a wide definition, is particu- tendency, but even in democracies the political structure is usually
larly susceptible to being made by an inner executive, is twofold: on the canted towards making foreign policy a special area, with maximum
one hand most politicians spend much time looking over their shoulders freedom for the key elite. In France, for example, foreign policy very
to their domestic base, aod do not wish to 'waste' time on cultivating for- much gravitates towards the president and the Elysee Palace, and the
eign contacts from which there might be little return. On the other hand. foreign minister may be forced to work more with the president than
the international environment still presents a long and steep learning- with his own prime minister.
curve for any politiciao wishing to feel at home in it. Consequently, On a minority of occasions a foreign policy issue will turn out to be
when that curve has been surmounted, a minister is usually on the cir- highly structured, with a clear issue, documents on the table and a rea-
cuit for life, since their hard-won expertise is valued if not at home then sonably long time period for consideration. In those circumstances the
in the various IGOs and INGOs where openings can be found -witness foreign policy executive will either choose, or be forced, to allow wider
the careers of David Owen, Javier Solana and Mikhail Gorbachev9 participation from Cabinet colleagues, or whatever the relevant political
Moreover, in foreign policy the number of unforeseen issues which group might be. Examples of the kind of issue in question are treaty
 58 Agency Actors 59

negotiations, such as the Anglo-Soviet negotiations over an alliance in with the EC, but less predictably in reviving policy towards eastern
the spring of 1939, when prime minister Neville Chamberlain was Europe and in creating a special relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev.
forced to make concession after concession to Cabinet colleagues more Leaders of her type often hanker after a place in history, and it is obvi-
eager than he was to see an agreement. This could happen because con- ous that this is more likely to be achieved by intluence at the world level
crete proposals were being taken line by line by a Cabinet committee. than by actions inside one country.
and the full Cabinet was able to monitor progress with some precision. For better or for worse, therefore, many heads of government end up
It was also perceived by most ministers to be an issue of the highest by having a distinct impact on their country's foreign relations. This is
importance. I'- w
true for both big and small states, as a list which includes Chou En lai,
A similar issue would be the application of any state to join the EU. Ronald Reagan, Nikita Khrushchev, Menachem Begin, Lee Kuan Yew
This is not something that can be rushed through by sleight of hand. and Georges Papandreou easily demonstrates. It follows that changes in
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the front-runners, have had a government can have a disruptive effect on foreign policy depending on
huge range of legislative issues to consider in detail, and the question of whether a major personality is leaving or entering office - and in the
accession penetrates deep into domestic society. No small foreign latter case it is rarely evident in advance. When Fran~ois Mitterrand
policy executive could manage all this alone, or would be allowed to. became President of France in May 1981 he arrived as a shop-soiled
Conversely, from the EU side the creation of policy on enlargement was character who had been twice defeated - by de Gaulle and Giscard
a classic case of a fluid, general and creative process in which leaders d'Estaing- and seemed desperate for power at any cost. By the time he
holding the initiative set the parameters for everyone else and pushed left office in 1995 he and Helmut Kohl were the acknowledged archi-
the policy on, while leaving the ramifications and details for later. 13 It is tects of the new European Union. Likewise Harry Truman in 1945
also true that even when the issues are clear from the start, some seemed a provincial figure in comparison to his predecessor Franklin D.
detailed negotiations, like those in the framework of the General Roosevelt. Yet by 1949 Truman was the dominant intluence over the
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade West's role in the emerging Cold War.
Organization (WTO) are usually so specialized and long-drawn-out as The ability to lead is dependent on circumstances being ripe. 14
to induce terminal boredom in all those trying to follow from the mar- Conversely, some apparently intluential figures are more significant for
gins. There is a powerful tendency to leave things in the hands of the their ability to embody either the wishes of a particular political move-
two or three ministers who have to deal with them. This can be resisted ment or the zeitgeist than for a sharp personal contribution. Ronald
but it does represent the default setting. Reagan is the best contemporary example. His grasp of detail was noto-
This means that an individual personality, particularly in the two riously weak, but he brilliantly articulated 'a cultural narrative of
positions of head of government and foreign minister, can have a sig- American myths' in the interests of restoring confidence and assertive-
nificant influence on policy. The psychological dimension of such intlu- ness to the foreign policy of the United States, particularly in relation to
ence is considered in Chapter 5, but here the need is to show how and dealings with the Soviet Union. 15 As the leader of Russia, Boris Yeltsin
to what extent this impact takes place. was less slick than Reagan, but came to be regarded (especially abroad)
The foreign policy executive always gathers around it an inner coterie as being of vital importance, less for what he did than for the way he
of trusted colleagues, security advisers and eminences grises, but with- symbolized reform and forestalled the arrival in office of potentially
out strong personalities at the helm little may happen. Prior knowledge more dangerous individuals. Such types can come to personify their
of foreign affairs is not even necessary. Motivated leaders learn on the country's international position, which is a potentially dangerous devel-
job, as with Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister of Britain. For most of opment given the narcissism this then encourages.
her first term of office (1979-83) she was dependent on the expertise of If heads of government have a natural tendency to get drawn into for-
her Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington. After his departure over the eign policy and to become their own foreign minister, there is no iron law
Falklands invasion the Prime Minister quickly became one of the most that they will end up in a dominant position. This is not only because the
active and notable figures in world diplomacy. Thatcher undoubtedly summits at which leaders are most visible are relatively infrequent or
made her mark on Britain's foreign policy, most obviously in relations because not all possess the personal capacity for statesmanship. 16 Just as
60 Agency Actors 61

important is the fact that some political cultures are more resistant to the Table 3.1 Head of government-foreign minister relations: three models
cult of personality than others (the Scandinavian states have generally Equality: trust, ability and matching reputations can creme a strong temn and
produced neither dramatic foreign policies nor charismatic leaders), and continuity. The weakness is the danger of becoming detached from other colleagues and
that many governments simply do not last long enough to provide the of appearing too dominanl. Examples of ·effective partnerships: Truman and Marshall
time an individual leader needs to make a major impact. Even if there is (US, 1947-9); Truman and Acheson (US, 1949-53); Nixon and Kissinger (US. 1973--4):
some continuity, and the will to be assertive, over-work, illness or polit- Geisel and Azereido da Silveira (Brazil, 1974--9); Bush and Baker (US, 19R9-93);
Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (USSR, 1985-90); Andreol!i and De Michelis (Italy.
ical distractions can prove serious impediments. Georges Pompidou
1989-92). Alternatively equal strength can lead to antagonism, as with Churchill and
struggled as French President with the illness that was to kill him in Eden (see below), Mitterrand and Cheysson in France (1981-3) or Kohl and Genscher
1974. The Soviet Union had sick or otherwise incapacitated leaders for (FRO, 1982-92), where their different political parties exacerbated personal tensions,
perhaps eighteen of its sixty-seven years of history before Gorbachev. 17 and blindness, as with Galtieri <.md Costa Mendez (Argentina, 198 l-2).
The arrival ofYeltsin in 1991 simply meant nine years more of the same. 2 Subordinate foreign minister: where a politically or personally weak individual is
In terms of mental strain, Richard Nixon, generally thought of as a for- appointed, oflen deliberately. it gives the head of government a free hand and turns the
eign affairs expert and highly innovative in diplomacy, was reduced to minister into a functionary. The weakness is the danger of an excessive concentration of
power and an increasing arrogance of judgement. Examples: Eden and Selwyn Lloyd
virtual hysteria by the Watergate crisis. On one night at its height, he
(UK, 1955-6): Khrushchev and Gromyko (USSR, 1957---64); Saddam Hussein and
made 51 phone calls between 9 pm and 4 am. His image, and his posi- Tariq Aziz (Iraq, 1979-); Nehru (India, 1947-64) who held the position of foreign
tion, thus soon became irretrievable. As for foreign ministers, they suffer minister himself. I \I
notoriously from an excess of work and travel. In 1991 American
3 Established roreign minister: this can work surprisingly well where there is a clear
Secretary of State James Baker travelled 235 000 miles in visiting 35 division of labour and excellent communications. It works badly where there is less
countries. Over 30 years before, the British Cabinet had commissioned a a lack of interest on the part of the head of government than a lack of competence,
report on the subject from former Prime Minister Lord Attlee, who con- and/or where political rivalry develops between the two figures. Examples of the
cluded that the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer fonner: Attlee and Bevin (UK, 1945-51 ); Reagan and Schultz (US, 1981-5). Of the
latter: Eisenhower and Dulles (US, 1953-8); Chernenko and Gromyko (USSR, 1984--5);
were over-burdened in comparison to all other ministers, including the
Kohl and Gcnscher (FRO, in the early part of Kohl's Chancellorship, when his main
premier. 18 concerns were domestic); Clinton and Warren Christopher (US, 1993-7).
The Nixon-Kissinger period demonstrated the vital importance of the
relationship between chief executive and foreign minister. Kissinger had
been National Security Adviser in the first Nixon administration from
1969-73, but this had undercut the State Department and he was more There seems to be surprisingly little self-consciousness about this
than willing to take on the position of Secretary of State himself the sec- crucial relationship. Pairings arise more out of the need for political
ond time round. The trust which he and Nixon shared was of vital impor- balance, or from the whim of the head of government (who possesses
tance in allowing these two assertive foreign affairs specialists to work the crucial power to hire and fire) than from any attempt to meet the ·
together, and permitted Kissinger to run US foreign policy more or less demands of the situation. In the first Blair administration in Britain for
effectively during Nixon's fmal crisis. The famous move towards China, example, Robin Cook rather unwillingly took on the post of Foreign
from 1969-71, was in the first instance Nixon's doing, but it only went Secretary as the only one available at a suitable level of seniority. As a
forward so successfully because Kissinger respected the limits of his own result he and the Prime Minister did not make up so happy a team as that
position. While his diplomatic skills were indispensable he did not engage between Blair and Gordon Brown (Chancellor of the Exchequer) on
in the kind of competitive leaking that often damages US diplomacy. economic affairs, where the bases of agreement and a division of labour
There are, broadly speaking, three possible models of the relationship had clearly been established in advance. 20 Two strong personalities inside
between head of government and foreign minister, each with its the foreign policy executive can cause serious problems. Anthony Eden
strengths and weaknesses depending on how the personalities involved regarded himself as more expert than the ageing Winston Churchill by the
handle the situation and how they interact with events. Table 3.1 sets out time the latter formed his second administration in 1951, and his reluc-
the possibilities. tance to accept interference with his duties as Foreign Secretary caused
62 Agency Actors 63

personal tensions and errors of policy. 21 Where personal differences Cabinets, Security Councils and Politburos
reinforce political divisions, as within a coalition goVernment, the
clashes can be savage and burst into the public realm. This was the case Although it is sometimes easy to get the impression that the foreign pol-
with the relationship between Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain icy executive monopolizes key decisions- an impression the individu-
and his Foreign Minister Fernando Moran (who eventually resigned). als themselves often do little to discourage- the government as a whole
On one occasion Mor:in was so upset by a pro-NATO speech made by rarely becomes completely detached from foreign affairs. In times of
Gonzalez in Germany that he left the official entourage and returned war and crisis the issues cannot be avoided; in times of peace the exter-
home. 22 In September 2001, during the crisis after the World Trade nal dimension of economic policy broadens ministers' perspective.
Center attack, Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon vetoed the meeting Most leaders use what is conventionally called a 'cabinet', even if it
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres had arranged with Yasser Arafat, push- sometimes bears little resemblance to the British original. The United
ing their relationship near to breaking-point. 23 States pioneered the idea of a National Security Council on foreign and
Foreign ministers are vulnerable to removal in the early phases of defence matters in 1947 and by 1950, boosted by the Korean War, this
their tenure, in particular being made scapegoats for failure, but the had become a more significant body in its area than the routine
longer they survive the more vital their experience and contacts become. Cabinet 27 In the states of the Soviet bloc the key hierarchy was the
Maxim Litvinov was sacrificed readily by Stalin to his change of policy Communist Party, not the formal government, and the top decision-
towards Germany in I939; Alexander Haig paid the price in 1983 for making unit the Party's Politburo, not the state's Council of Ministers.
pressing too hard and too quickly to run foreign policy by himself. In other types of states other designations have been used - in Colonel
Antonio Samaras of Greece was dismissed by Prime Minister Mitsotakis Gaddafi's Libya it is the Revolutionary Command Council, in Taliban
of Greece for being excessively nationalist over the 'Macedonian' prob- Afghanistan it was the Interim Council of Ministers. The fact remains
lem, and responded by setting up his own political party to prolong the that all but the most tyrannical leaders need some forum in which to
dispute 24 bring together senior colleagues, so as to share ideas and coordinate
On the other side of the coin Molotov survived for ten years (and strategy 28 These can be generically referred to as cabinets.
returned for three more after Stalin's death), Gromyko for 28, and Hans- On various occasions leaders will convene ad hoc inner cabinets to
Dietrich Genscher for I 7, becoming steadily more indispensable. deal with particularly difficult problems, especially in war-time. Prime
Sheikh Yamani, as the oil minister of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Minister Blair, notably dismissive of cabinet government, was per-
performed much the same vital function of continuity for nearly two suaded of the value of a war cabinet four weeks after the attacks on New
decades. The position of these individuals was strengthened by the fact York and Washington in 2001. It can happen in more routine times that
that they had become important not just to their own state but to the an informal inner cabinet congeals around the foreign policy executive,
network of international relations as a whole. So long as they are not dealing with what are perceived of as the highest matters of state. This
perceived at home as having 'gone native' (as Sir Geoffrey Howe was can be related to what R.A.W. Rhodes has called the 'core executive'
by Mrs Thatcher and her circle) then the way they have come to embody in a state- the 'final arbiters of conflict between different parts of the
international society and diplomacy makes them difficult to sack. If they government machine'- key political figures and their advisers. 29 But
resign on a point of principle, as Anthony Eden did from Chamberlain's such arrangements are rarely fixed; formal arrangements always create
government in 1938, Cyrus Vance did over President Carter's approval problems as to who is in and who excluded from any given special com-
of the hostage rescue mission in his absence in 1980, and as Ismail mittee. It is much better for the leadership, although not for cabinet
Fahmi did in protest against Egyptian President Sadat's personal deci- accountability, to encourage a certain amount of uncertainty as to the
sion to go to Jerusalem in 1977, the consequences can ultimately be extent of informal consultations in those private meetings which in any
very damaging. 25 Even Howe had his revenge; Mrs Thatcher was political system have the capacity to decide the outcome in the larger
brought down by an undeclared and subtle coalition of opponents from forum. 30
her own Cabinet and other European leaders, all of whom saw Howe's To some extent the membership of such groupings on foreign policy
humiliation as the last straw26 questions is self-selecting. There is usually only a small number of
64 Agency Actors 65

senior politicians who are familiar with foreign leaders and can be Despite the weight of specialization the full cabinet (or politiburo, or
trusted with intelligence information. This self-perpetuating process security council) can never be taken for granted. It can come to life unex-
was particularly evident in Italy between 1960-92, when the same pectedly, and if united can even threaten the political survival of the head
names appeared and reappeared as either prime minister or foreign min- of government. This was the case in Britain before the fact, when a
ister. In the 33 governments formed during that period, Aldo Mora was rumbling cabinet rebellion may have headed off Chamberlain and
prime minister five times and foreign minister nine. Mariano Rumor Halifax from further appeasement after Hitler's invasion of Poland on
was prime minister five and foreign secretary three; Giulio Andreotti I September 1939, and after the fact over the Suez crisis of 1956, when
was prime minister seven times and foreign minister on five occa- the way in which Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Foreign Secretary
sions31 In Britain the circulation of the elite has been more vigorous but Selwyn Lloyd had committed the government to a disastrous invasion of
a restricted access on matters of state is formalized in the title of Privy Egypt without consultation, led to a quiet revolt that ousted both within
Councillor, which is conferred for life on current and former ministers six months. 35 The fact that this can happen, admittedly most often during
of the Crown and other 'distinguished subjects' including the leader of crises, makes the foreign policy executive more cautious about overlook-
the Opposition. Councillors have to swear an oath of secrecy, which ing colleagues than they might otherwise be. In the case of P.W. Botha,
allows consultation on a highly confidential basis in 'the national inter- last President of apartheid South Africa, the reverse was true. The failure
est'. 32 Michael Foot, Leader of the Opposition in 1982, famously of Foreign Minister Pik Botha and heir-apparent F.W. de Klerk (the
refused confidential information on these terms so that he would remain Education Minister!) to consult Botha over their decision to visit Kenneth
free to criticize the government over the Falklands War." In France, Kuanda in Zambia forced him into open protest and resignation 36
because of the preeminence of the Elysee Palace in the Fifth Republic, This uncertainty does not amount to a real system of checks and bal-
it is even easier to draw certain key figures into decision-making infor- ances. Two ministers resigned from the British Cabinet in August 1914,
mally. By the same token systematic coordination on important matters but it was not enough to stop the war proceeding. 37 Stalin was in shock
becomes very hit-and-miss, with the prime minister and some of his col- for three days after the German invasion of 22 June 1941, but no-one
leagues often out of the loop. It is for this reason that discussions began dared replace him, and when he recovered his control became even
in the early 1990s on whether France should follow the US lead and set more absolute. 38 More important is the political culture in which the
up a formal National Security Council where all the major security and institution exists. By 1964 the Soviet system had become resistant to
intelligence players would sit. 34 Stalinism, and ironically one of its main critics, Khrushchev, fell partly
Full cabinets remain in the background on routine foreign policy as a result of losing colleagues' confidence over his handling of the
matters. They can easily become pro forma institutions, with the Cuban missile crisis and preceding foreign policy problems 39 In Japan,
real work being left to a small number of relatively expert politicians, by contrast, no nail ever sticks up from the floorboards for too long, and
usually in a standing sub-committee. This is more due to the weight of foreign policy decisions, like cabinet government in general, tend to be
documentation to be digested in a short time than to manipulation on the by consensus. In 1986 the then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone was
part of the foreign policy executive; most ministers are more concerned criticized for departing from this tradition, partly through a minor cult
to make sure they do not drop the ball in their own area than to trespass of personality (he established the 'Ron-Yasu' relationship with Ronald
on those of others. Moreover, given that trade and monetary questions Reagan) and partly for daring to sack - under foreign pressure - the
are even more arcane than security problems, it is an illusion to suppose education minister who had denied in public that Japan had committed
that the changing nature of diplomacy has broadened the base of cabi- war-time atrocities against China. Nakasone did not have, subsequently,
net discussions on international questions. Instead, it has simply created the prominent career he expected 40
a new problem of coordination, between different kinds of· externally- Thus, if we consider together the foreign policy executive and the
oriented responsibilities - for defence, finance, trade and development. 'cabinets' to which it is answerable, rarely a group of more than
Foreign ministers, and heads of government, naturally want to take on 20 in total, we can see that the political office-holders enjoy a good deal
this role of coordination, but the atomization of the process is difficult of freedom in which to make decisions. The foreign policy executive
to resist. in particular holds the powers of initiative, information, convening
66 Agency Actors 67

meetings and (in the case of the head of government) also the appoint- ability to reach political leaders; leaders' judgements; and the inde-
ment of colleagues. This means that much foreign policy business is pendent actions of the intelligence community. It is the last two which
handled by a small number of specialists. Only when a problem is both concern us here.
of high priority and structured in such a way as to make it possible for A secure executive has wide diScretion whether or not to take notice
a committee to follow the issues does the balance of advantage swing to of intelligence. De Gaulle was sceptical of it and preferred to pursue his
the larger group. This is sometimes the case in crises, when what is at own previously thought out 'grandes lignes'.' 6 Moreover, if the official
stake is well known, but often crisis simply exacerbates the tendency to intelligence services cannot or will not fol1ow instructions, it is always
rely on the foreign policy executive for rapid and creative responses. It possible to set up informal, parallel systems, as did President Reaaan
is, therefore, not wholly surprising if the executive is seen from outside with Colonel Oliver North and his operatives in the Iran-Contra sc~n­
as personifying the state. Individual leaders have a range of opportuni- dal, or Fran('ois Mitterrand with the 'Elysee cell' he set up in dissatis-
ties to be real foreign policy actors. faction with the state counter-terrorism operation. 47 There is barely any
public scrutiny to check these actions except after the fact when things
go wrong and/or illegalities get exposed. 48 The phenomen,on of built-in
Intelligence: a Special Case? deniability, a Ia Henry II and Thomas a Becket, is a great advantage,
although both the Iraqi Supergun and Sierra Leone affairs in Britain
One of the key elements in foreign policy-making is the use of intelli- have shown that the converse sometimes applies - that mud sticks to
gence material, gained from both foreign operations and domestic everyone, especially those ultimately responsible. The fact that most
counter-intelligence. 41 It raises interesting questions about how infor- intelligence services are fragmented between home security, foreign
mation is assessed and about a particular kind of bureaucratic politics, operations and military intelligence (with each of the armed services
but in this context the issue is whether the intelligence services are capa- often having its own branch of intelligence) makes it often difficult to
ble of running an alternative policy to their political superiors, under the decide on the most useful information amidst all the 'noise', but it also
cover of official foreign policy42 The relationship between intelligence makes it possible for politicians to operate the strategy of divide and
and politics is of crucial importance to the success of foreign policy, and rule. The CIA's various failures, for example, have given the White
although much routine information-gathering is a low-level business, House some leverage over this potential state within a state, while the
ultimately the issues are played out at the highest level. Intelligence sits rival Defence Intelligence Agency is institutionally limited from stray-
right in the middle of the civil-military relation, which can be crucial mg too far into non-military subjects.
even in a democracy, as we saw when General Eisenhower became The intelligence services naturally have an interest, in the carefully-
President of the United States during the Korean War, or when General selected information they Jet out, in playing down their role vis a vis
de Gaulle put a decisive end to the Fourth French Republic in 1958. their political masters. This should not lead us to underestimate the
Because both the successes and the failures of intelligence are spec- degree of autonomy they often enjoy in foreign policy matters. This is
tacular, the foreign policy executive has to pay the closest attention to partly operational, as with snooping on allies' communications, which
the advice of intelligence chiefs.4 3 Political leaders can be raised on could be diplomatically embarrassing, and partly strategic, in that they
high or brought right down by the results of their judgements about are able to plant their people inside the head of government's entourage,
intelligence forecasts. Jimmy Carter, for example, never rec'overed from and tn nval sources of analysis, such as research institutes and universi-
gambling in 1980 on the attempt to liberate the American hostages in ties. Most important, their information is fundamentally uncheckable by
Teheran by military means. He was ill-advised by his special forces, and anyone outside their own circle, unlike that of the academic, journalist
paid the price at the presidential election the following November44 or even career diplomat. Few leaders have the time or inclination to look
Winston Churchill, by contrast, attained his mythical status as a great at raw data, and those, like Churchill or Margaret Thatcher, who do have
war leader in part because of his astute and experienced use of a tendency to be their own intelligence officer have no basis, other than
intelligence- an area where he constantly wrong-footed Hitler. 45 The key intuition, and a limited capacity for cross-checking, for evaluating it.
variables in this process are fourfold: the quality of the intelligence; its They all have to rely on human filters 49
68 Agency Actors 69

A great deal, again, depends on the political culture of the particular Leading Responsibly
country. In Soviet Russia the secret police methods of Stalin, combined
with the state's sense of being under perpetual siege by hostile foreign Most scholars agree that leaders make a difference in foreign policy.
powers, led to the KGB becoming institutionalized as a major force in Had Rabin and Peres rather than Begin and Sharon been leading Israel
all aspects of top decision-making. If the Communist Party was the par- in 1982, says Shlomo Gazit, there would probably have been no inva-
allel power structure to the state, then the KGB was the parallel struc- sion of the Lebanon. 55 It is true that Begin and the Likud Party had been
ture to the party. Often the most able people would gravitate towards the elected by the Israeli people precisely because they were more hawkish
intelligence services because of the relative freedom, personal and intel- on security questions, but that still left the prime minister and his col-
lectual, which they could enjoy there compared to the ideologically leagues a lot of scope for taking their own decisions. Since Israel is a
top-heavy party cadres. These were the people with the clearest sense democracy, they were supposed to lead responsibly, that is, bearing in
of what life was like in the West and of how far the Soviet Union was the mind the wishes of their party and the electorate but still using their
slipping behind under Leonid Brezhnev. 50 It was not therefore wholly own judgement and values to assess what the circumstances required.
surprising that their candidates, first Yuri Andropov and then Mikhail For 'responsible' is an ambiguous word, referring on the one hand
Gorbachev, should have found themselves in the position of supreme to behaviour which is generally sober and sensitive to context, and on
power in the USSR. 5 1 After ten years of post Soviet Russia, its current the other to a person's answerability to specified others. This is the
leader, Vladimir Putin, is from the same stable. Weberian ideal-type of modern, legal-bureaucratic leadership 56
This kind of power is less likely to be found in countries with a wider Political leadership in every area of policy involves quite a small
range of effective institutions, although this is not to say that the intel- group of people- cabinets rarely number many more than 20. In foreign
ligence services cannot veto the advance of key individuals they dis- policy this elite is generally even smaller, because of the nature of the
trust. 52 In general, intelligence is a factor which must be reckoned with issues, at once specialized and overwhelmingly comprehensive, which
in any analysis of foreign policy53 It is all too easy to skim over the sur- sets limits on those who can or wish to participate. The circuits of those
face of events without asking about the advice top leaders were getting who operate at the highest levels of international politics are still sur-
from their 'permanent government', or about the extent to which the prisingly restricted in numbers. This makes it possible for the foreign
latter were engaged in covert operations - with or without explicit policy of the state to be 'captured' by a coterie of individuals, circulat-
authorization- that did not always square with declaratory policy. Clear ing over many years, with a particular perspective or even set of private
answers to such questions can rarely be found, but on the basis of the interests. This is what the isolationists said, not wholly without justice,
historical record it is not unreasonable to conclude that intelligence about the east coast WASPs who committed the USA to the defence
services are occasionally pro-active, and intermittently decisive, in a of western Europe after 1947. It is more obviously true (but not just of
state's foreign relations. 54 By the same token their internal divisions, foreign policy) in the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf.
relatively limited resources and rather narrow range of concerns mean Yet even when a small elite monopolizes foreign policy, it does not
that they should not be seen as the hidden string-pullers of political mar- follow that they are able or willing to exploit the state in the narrow
ionettes. Political leaders usually manage to set their own broad foreign sense of venality. More likely is that they come to identify themselves
policy parameters, and where there is consensus and continuity they tend with the state, holding strongly to a particular image of what foreign
to have been determined by deeper forces than the influence of MI6 or policy should be doing and seeing their own line of policy as so much
the DGSE. Intelligence can become crucial when it is least expected, more 'responsible' than the alternatives. For it is all too easy both for
but most politicians in office have plenty of other things to worry about, insiders and outsiders to confuse the personalities of state foreign policy-
at home and abroad, than the machinations of their own secret services. the visible foreign policy executive- with 'national character' or with the
What is more, spectacular failures such as the inability to predict the interests of the whole community. The same mistake may be made with
terrorist attacks of II September 2001 do damage to reputations which INGOs, when the Roman Catholic Church is identified with the pontiff
can take decades to repair. of the day, or the problems of a multinational company are reduced to
 .t

70 Agency Actors 71

the dynastic politics of an Agnelli or a Murdoch. lt happens less in the ~umber of personal assistants. A formidable bureaucracy geared to
'faceless' corporate environment, but in a world of collective actors, and mternatJOnal pohcy has now grown up around most points of decision,
where states of all sizes enjoy formal equaliiy, some personification is and 1t IS to the questiOn of how far these seemingly non-political offi-
inevitable. Sometimes this is consciously exploited; more often, it leads cmls are obedJCnt agents, and how far themselves shapers, or actors, that
to confusions on all sides as to who is really speaking for whom, and for we now turn.
which interests. Gorbachev, for instance, revolutionized Soviet foreign
policy, but turned out not to be so representative of the country's people
as most outsiders assumed. Like Churchill in 1945, Gorbachev was
summarily expelled from office at the hour of his greatest fame.
Foreign policy has its peculiarities as an area of public policy.
Whereas health, education and transport are always close to the centre
of popular concerns, but only rarely bring forth great dramas, foreign
policy can run in its own channels unseen by all except the specialists,
only to break into the collective consciousness as a grand guignol, with
the potential to do serious damage to the very fabric of the state and to
its citizens' lives. This means that responsible leadership consists in not
being lulled into complacency by the lack of daily domestic interest,
and in not confusing the processes of decision-making by elites with the
structures of multilayered international politics. It has to take the long
view, trying to manage affairs so to avoid getting into the dangerous
crises (whether military, political or economic) which are inherently
transformational and restrictive of choice. It is crisis- (not conflict-)
prevention which should be the touchstone of foreign policy, given that
conflict in some fonn is inevitable and crisis is not. At the same time.
an excessive emphasis on foreign affairs, with a corresponding over-
insurance in costly defence policies against notional risks, can bankrupt
the state and pervert its values. Both superpowers suffered from this
to some degree during the Cold War, and the Soviet Union collapsed as
a resultY
The responsibility of foreign policy does not always weigh heavily on
decision-makers' shoulders, even if it ought to. Some insist on a partic-
ular version of 'the national interest' that is little more than a costly bet
with history. Either way, there is a good deal of scope for actorness for
the individuals and small groups who find themselves 'deciding on
behalf of peoples in international relations. They have quite a margin in
which to err or to show wisdom, even allowing for the constraints of the
structures in which they are operating, international, transnational and
domestic. They interpret a society's needs, for security, prosperity and
independence, in a long perspective and with some degree of institu-
tional freedom. Yet in so doing, they do not act alone. In the modern era
foreign relations cannot be conducted by gifted amateurs with a small
 Agents 73

Agents not Agency

4 The arrival of industrialization and a complex division of labour in
nineteenth-century Europe fostered existing developments towards
Agents: Bureaucracy and modern systems of government and administration. In particular the twin
doctrines of democracy and meritocracy began to shape the expanding
the Proliferation of External apparatus of the state. So far as foreign policy-making was concerned the
impact of the new meritocratic thinking was evident rather earlier than
Relations that of democratic philosophy. Both had been present in the great symbol
of modern upheaval, the French Revolution. Napoleon's revolution in
French administration, with its key notion of Ia carriere ouverte aux
talents, had been made possible by the sweeping away of feudal privileges
between 1789-93, just as the great idea of popular sovereignty had been
unleashed on the world by the Revolution. However disappointing its
practical application in the Paris of Jacobins, Bonapartists and then
restored Bourbons, there was to be no going back in terms of the discourse
All modem leaders are heavily dependent on their professional staff, of European politics. But whereas even the aspiration for a democratic
from the eminences grises who participate in summits, like Chancellor foreign policy, in the form of the policies of Woodrow Wilson, would not
Kohl's Joachim Bitterlich, to the desk officers hidden away in ministries reach the political agenda for more than another hundred years, the pres-
who follow day-to-day events in the Gambia or the Food and sure for greater efficiency and the mobilization of more state resources
Agriculture Organization. This is true even of autocrats like Saddam meant that the introduction of meritocratic measures into the official class
Hussein; they may ensure obedience by terror rather than by legitimacy, began to take place around the middle of the nineteenth century.
as in democratic states, but they cannot run a complex set of external In Britain, for example, the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1854 led
relations and social control solely through the clan-members of their eventually to the civil service reforms of 1871 whereby formal grades of
power-base. Every system requires its janissaries to run embassies, administrative and executive service were introduced as part of the move
manage the armed forces, gather and assess the mountains of informa- against corruption and incompetence. The army and navy reforms begun
tion now available and not least assist in the many technical negotiations in the 1870 were designed to the same general end, so that position could
which constitute contemporary international relations. Policy-making no longer so easily be gained on the basis of birth and connections. This
works on the basis of formal operating rules, but also through trust and was partly the consequence of demonstrable incompetence during the
informal job-sharing.' Crimean War of 1854--6. Similarly in France, the devastating defeats of
The importance of these cadres in foreign policy-making has long been 1870--71 led to a reconsideration of many aspects of state policy, includ-
recognized by scholars, and much literature now exists on the political ing education and the armed forces. The subsequent reforms meant that
impact of bureaucrats and the extent to which foreign policy is really in the country was to provide a far more formidable adversary for Germany
their hands. This chapter will examine the hypothesis of bureaucratic con- in 1914. For its part, the newly unified Germany, with Prussia at its core,
trol by comparing the Weberian ideal-type with practice across different was proving a model of new administrative practice for other countries,
systems of society and government, with the help of the theories of even if the element of promotion on merit was still circumscribed by the
'bureaucratic politics' which have been developed by political scientists powerful presence of the Junkers' elite in both army and government.
and students of International Relations. It will also discuss the way in The ideas of rational conduct and a clear chain of command/author-
which the foreign policy bureaucracy is no longer confined to ministries ity were important to the new German model of administration, but they
of foreign affairs, but extends horizontally across most governmental were by no means unproblematical, as the foremost theorist of modem
departments, provoking new problems of coordination and control. bureaucracy, Max Weber, was subsequently to make clear2 A modern
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74 Agency Agents 75

system had to go beyond the notion of unqualified obedience to the next This new class was to consist of reliable agents, in the sense of acting
rung in the hierarchy; this had, after all, been the motif of absolutist on behalf of others. But in today's terms they were not themselves either
forms of government The ethos of democracy increasingly demanded a the repository of agency or independent foreign policy actors.
system in which obedience was owed only to legitimate government, This was the theory. Certain states, like Britain, started to implement
and where legitimacy derived from the popular wilL Moreover, obedi- it much earlier than others, and it is in any case a job, like the painting
ence had to go hand in hand at all levels with accountability: politicians of the Forth Bridge, which can never be completed. Arguably some
were to become ever more accountable to electorates, and to the press, states, even developed ones, have still not made much progress on it
while their subordinates were accountable both to their immediate supe- today. But wherever one looks, foreign policy was almost the last area
riors and to a growing corpus of written rules, necessary to systematize to be reformed. The association of foreign policy with international elite
an ever more complex administration of interlinked parts. Finally, it was networks meant that the impact of democratic and meritocratic thought
slowly becoming clear that both bureaucrats and their masters needed to fed through slowly, sometimes on the basis of two steps forward, one-
be sensitive, and to some extent open, to inputs from mass society, from and-a-half steps back.
whom they took their rationale.
In pre-modem days, the clerks and secretaries who were the forerun-
ners of today's 'secretaries of state' were judged by a particular form of Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy
efficiency - their ability to perform the prince's will, or at most their
ability to persuade him to do what he surely would have wanted to do The 'age of the masses' affected diplomacy in only piecemeal fashion,
in any case. Until the age of mercantilism, there were no abstract indi- even if the two world wars caused major upheavals. Woodrow Wilson
cators, whether economic or relating to 'power', against which per- articulated the principles of 'open covenants, openly arrived at' in 1917,
formance could be measured. With the arrival of meritocratic thinking, with its assumption that the old 'freemasonry' of international diplo-
however, in the wake of the enlightenment, came a sense of loyalty to macy had been responsible for the disastrous errors leading to the Great
the res publica, independent in the last analysis of the orders of any War. Efficiency, merit and democracy were conjoined in a new philos-
politician. This was a reworking of the classical distinction between the ophy of foreign policy as a form of public service. As it happens, the
private and the public spheres in the light of notions of popular sover- values of professionalism had already begun to creep into the British,
eignty.3 By the late nineteenth century it was becoming accepted that an French, Japanese and American foreign ministries by 1914, with a grad-
official should serve both legitimate political authority and some higher ual acceptance that intellectual ability was as important as social con-
notion of the national interest in the event that the former proved cor- nections. After 1918 further changes were seen in Soviet Russia (where,
rupt or particularly inept (as in the case of those officials in the 1930s however, one form of caste soon replaced another in the diplomatic
who leaked information on Britain's weak defences to an out-of-office corps), and Germany, although the highly turbulent and ideological
Winston Churchill). It was, of course, to be hoped that such a funda- · thirty years which followed made this a period in which the advancing
mental conflict of loyalties would arise only rarely. For the most part role of civil servants was inevitably stalled. 5
the new breed of civil servant was to be loyal, professional, clear- Diplomatic dynasties continued to survive in the twentieth century -
sighted and non-political. The ideal-type of the modem official as artic- but the era of the gentleman diplomat was steadily giving way to an
ulated (but not invented) by Weber was that of someone who had been order in which officials were seen as both indispensable and wholly
trained to implement policy decided upon by those engaged in politics, subordinate. This was as true of the United States, where state service
without themselves becoming politicized 4 The human temptation to enjoyed only moderate prestige and where each presidential election
play politics was to be neutralized by the provision of proper job secu- produced a new raft of political appointees to control the higher eche-
rity and salaries, as well as by an ethos of responsibility and esprit de lons of the State Department, as it was of the Soviet Union, where the
corps. More negatively the incentives to use office in the traditional way organs of the state soon came to be infiltrated and controlled by the
for the pursuit of personal wealth and advancement were diminished Communist Party - as late as 1956 Khrushchev could boast that
by supervision and by the fear of denied promotion or even dismissal. 'Gromyko only says what we tell him to' .6 In Britain, the ideological
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76 Agency Agents 77

hostilities of the 1920s, when the Foreign Office barely concealed its increasingly come under the ministry's control) represent a formidable
lack of trust in the first Labour government's ability to defend the engine in the making of policy. The ministry still perfonns three vital
national interest, were put to rest- at least·so far as the leadership was functions:
concerned- during Labour's first full term (1945-50) when the prime
minister and foreign secretary worked closely with senior officials to • Routine information-gathering; no state can manage without the
construct a new order in Europe. With France finally settling down means to collect and analyse information on the range of issues in
under the Fifth Republic to an era in which respected presidents were which it has interests. Although journalists now have better and
served by able, loyal functionaries from the grandes ecoles, the second quicker sources on developments in wider society, there is no substi-
half of the twentieth century seemed to have established bureaucracy as .tute for the first-hand knowledge of their interlocuteurs in host admin-
the neutral buffer in the political process, responsible for logistics, istrations which good diplomats possess. In conjunction with the
implementation and advice, but always subject to the decisions of the intelligence services they can also monitor policy-implementation in
people's elected representatives. detail, when journalists have long ago moved on to other stories. This
Ironically it was just at this time, the 1950s and 1960s, that academ- is why one of the first steps of the British government after the fall of
ics were beginning to question the truth of such a neat model, and to see Kabul in November 2001 was to re-establish the embassy and to send
bureaucrats themselves as powerful players in the policy process. the Head of the South Asia Department of the FCO to run it.
Individual officials had already drawn attention to themselves, like • Policy-making: politicians formulate their foreign policies in oppo-
Sir Eyre Crowe and his famous memorandum on British foreign policy sition and have the assistance of their party machines in govern-
of 1907, or Andre Fran,ois-Poncet, the influential French Ambassador ment. But they still rely heavily on the experts in the foreign
in Berlin from 1931 to 1938 7 More common was the tendency of ad ministry to sift the vast quantities of incoming information, to inter-
hoc personal advisers, such as Woodrow Wilson's Colonel House, or pret and predict the actions of other states, and to formulate policy
Tsar Nicholas's Rasputin, to come to public attention as svengali fig- options on the thousand and one detailed questions which never
ures. Thereafter the steady growth in size of bureaucratic apparatuses, come to public attention. Only in one-party states can the party
the increased number of states in the international system, and with machine represent an alternative to this concentration of specialized
them diplomatic representations, plus the remarkable economic expan- advice, as in the Soviet Union or China, where the International
sion of the post-war years, all served tci highlight the changing balance Departments of the Communist Party became surrogate foreign
of power, in terms of numbers, resources and information (expertise), ministriesY
between politicians and officials. 8 • Memory; every system needs continuity in its external relations, and
In the area of foreign policy the loyal 'agents' seemed from the out- career diplomats institutionalize it by serving as the system's col-
side to constitute a particularly compact and manageable body, with a lective memory, with the help of their record-keeping system.
readily identifiable foreign ministry and diplomatic service at the serv- Without the capacity to relate myriad past commitments and treaties
ice of each state. Moreover, the strong sense of elite status and esprit de to the present, and to each other, decision-makers would be left
corps of diplomats, many of whom naturally served far from the super- floundering in chaos, given the complexity of the contemporary
vising eyes of their domestic masters, made them obvious candidates international system. Alternatively they would tum inwards, as with
for study as the real authors of foreign policy. countries like North Korea which have been too paranoid to permit
the development of civil service expertise. Conversely, the posses-
sion of this institutional memory does produce pressures for conser-
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs vatism in foreign affairs. If pacta sunt servanda, as diplomats and
their legal advisers usually believe, then it is difticult to strike out in
As we shall see, the past fifty years have seen the emergence of many new directions, and domestic radicals of various colours easily
rivals to conventional diplomats from within the bureaucracy. become frustrated with what they see as the inertia and obstructionism
Nonetheless, the foreign ministry and those serving abroad (who have of their own foreign ministry. This is exacerbated by the uncertainties
 78 Agency Agents 79

of the external environment and the tendency of the experts to rely the geographical and the functional principle. 12 The Dutch foreign min-
on the 'lessons' of the past. istry has dealt with the problem by consolidating its regional direc-
torates: political, economic and aid-related. 13 In general, however, it is
Apart from these broad functions, in most cases where foreign min- now generally recognized that a foreign ministry needs both area special-
istries are not demoralized and deliberately emasculated, they develop ists and experts in functional questions like energy and the environment.
certain institutional strengths. In the first instance they usually attract themselves partly reflecting the emergence of ever-more specialized
high-quality personnel, selected in the modern era by competitive international organizations. 14 Foreign ministries are increasingly stretched
examinations. The social and intellectual sources of recruitment may thin in the attempt to cater for this range of knowledge, but only they
still be narrow - history and law graduates from comfortable back- possess the combination of the different skills required.
grounds for the most part- but the meritocratic principle is now domi- Naturally these continuing strengths are only part of the story. Indeed
nant: the diplomatic service represents an elite of ability as well as current conventional wisdom tends to see foreign ministries and their
ethos. In I984, 28 per cent of all French ambassadors had been educated employees as dinosaurs being supplanted by home-based experts and
at the top-ranking Ecole Nationale d' Administration (ENA), while non-governmental para-diplomats. Let us examine the reasons why
75-80 per cent of ENA's own recruits came from Paris's lnstitut des diplomatic services are under challenge, in the very era when they have
Etudes Politiques ('Sciences Po'). And there is no doubt that both ENA finally become modem, professional organizations:
and Sciences Po and their equivalents elsewhere are funnels for students
of the highest calibre. Even in very small countries like Ireland and • Technical incompetence: diplomats are seen as over-generalist and
Luxembourg, the quality of their officials is perceived abroad as being over-stretched, incapable of discussion on equal terms with econo-
high - in the two cases cited running the six-month revolving presi- mists, scientists and businessmen. Even the 'specialism in abroad'
dency of the EU has never proved a technical problem, even if at times counts for less now that travel is so easy and so common. Typical
the volume of work has been excessive. JO was the day trip made by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to
Secondly, where they do enjoy trust, foreign ministries will have a Ankara in May 1998. 15 Mr Cook was also particularly aware of the
considerable degree of autonomy, virtually constituting a sub-elite 'infomatic' challenge. He introduced a secure electronic mail sys-
within the machinery of government. Their control over external repre- tem, since his officials were receiving hot information later than the
sentations, their privileged contacts with foreigners and the continued foreign editors of most newspapers.
mystique of international affairs gives them a certain carapace which • The spread of mini-foreign offices: most domestic departments now
protects against interference by other parts of the domestic administra- engage directly in international relations by sending their own
tion. In the long run this can attract resentment and hostility, as with experts out to meet their equivalents in another state or to participate
Truman's often-expressed view of foreign service officers as 'the in a specialized international organization. This is particularly the
striped pants boys', or the Nazi Party's determination to control its too- case in the European Union, where the Council of Finance Ministers
reasonable diplomats by compelling them to become members of the (ECOFIN) is now a serious rival to the Council of (Foreign) Ministers
Party. 11 Still, for countries as diverse as Argentina, Egypt, Norway and as the working 'Cabinet' of the EU. In Japan the Ministry of
Canada the foreign ministry and its diplomats constitute a distinctive International Trade and Industry has more prestige than the foreign
and high-status profession without which the state would be signifi- ministry, together with its own network of external contacts. In
cantly disadvantaged in the international system. - the 1980s it caused problems by encouraging Toshiba, for commer-
Lastly, foreign ministries have adapted during the current century to cial reasons, to break the rules of the CoCom (the Coordinating
the vastly greater range of business which confronts states by organiz- Committee associated with NATO from 1949-93 to control the
ing themselves on both geographical and functional lines. At various export of strategic goods to hostile countries) by selling computers to
times each has been in fashion; for example, the European Commission, the USSR. This was obviously within the purview of classical foreign
which in one respect is a proto-European foreign ministry, has had three policy. In Mexico 'almost every Ministry has a Direcci6n General
reorganizations in less than a decade, swinging back and forth between de Asuntos lnternaciona/es' . 16 These days hardly any government
80 Agency Agents 81

department anywhere can be regarded as wholly 'home' in its remit. attracted away to private industry. This trend has begun to be
Between 1960 and 1980, for example, the number of domestic reversed, as awareness has grown of the limits of a business vision
ministries with their own international units in Finland and Sweden of the world.
rose from two in each case to six and ten respectively. 17 Similarly,
as early as 1975 the US's Murphy Commission investigating These foreign service weaknesses are real. It is not beyond the
'the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign bounds of possibility that the formal, separate diplomatic apparatus as
Policy' found that of more than 20,000 civilian employees working we know it might disappear over the next few decades to be replaced by
full-time on foreign affairs (excluding the many in support agen- what Britain's Berrill Report envisaged in 1977 as 'a foreign service
cies and in intelligence) only about 4000 worked in the Depart- group' within the wider civil service- in other words, a bureaucracy in
ment of State. Abroad, in 1982 there were 126,520 civilian employees which service overseas at some point becomes normal for most staff,
of the Executive branch, from 25 departments and agencies. Of and where 'external' policy is simply one aspect of policy in general. On
these, 15,339 worked for the State Department, including foreign the other hand, a terminal prognosis misses some important vital signs.
nationals. 18 For instance on the issue of technical competence, the more effective
• Poverty of resources: foreign ministries use up very small amounts foreign ministries have adapted by increasing training in economics,
of public expenditure - in general less than 1 per cent of the total. and by allowing some staff to specialize. Furthermore, the greater diver-
The State Department's budget is rather less than the Pentagon's jet sification of external relations has created new needs for coordination
fuel bill. Yet far from strengthening their position, not being a burden and synthesis that foreign ministries, if they can escape the more tradi-
turns out to be a political disadvantage. It is one of the paradoxes of tional elements of their mind-set, are well-placed to meet. It is by no
modern government that those departments which use most means obvious in any case that specialized currency issues are best
resources, and cause most headaches, such as education, health and negotiated by monetary economists, or chemical weapons questions set-
social security, seem most able to protect their budgets, while the tled by natural scientists. The ability to understand political and histor-
foreign ministry, whose outputs are less tangible but far less expen- ical context is vital, together with the ability to keep experts 'on tap and
sive, is constantly vulnerable to cut-backs and bad publicity. 19 What not on top'.
is more, cuts here mean the loss of trained manpower, whose effects To the extent that a foreign ministry can do this without falling back
cannot quickly be reversed 20 on the spurious justifications that only diplomats understand foreigners
• Lack of domestic constituency: following on tram the above, foreign or the processes of negotiation, then they will maintain the high status
ministries have few natural supporters within their own societies. that even today attaches to their profession and to the post of minister
Foreign policy requires little domestic legislation and in conse- of foreign affairs. Despite their domestic vulnerabilities diplomats con-
quence few members of parliament are drawn into policy-making, tinued to be valued by the members of a formidable network, national
with the potential to become allies of the department. Whereas and international, of influential figures, not least those politicians (and
defence ministries can look to those manning bases or employed in journalists) who lean on their skills in daily life, and who have seen at
the arms industry, and finance ministries always find allies in those close hand how the profession has become more stressful, demanding
who wish to cut taxes, the foreign ministry easily becomes labelled- and often physically dangerous since 1945. Diplomats have been held
as by Margaret Thatcher in Britain, and Jessie Helms in the USA - hostage and sometimes killed in many postings as a result of embody-
as the department for foreigners. Indeed it is all too easy for ing their countries' policies and being the most obvious point of
diplomats to get out of touch with their domestic base. Even when national weakness. The four-month siege in the Japanese embassy in
they return home for a period, they only serve in the nation's capi- Lima in 1997, and the killing of American diplomats in bomb attacks in
tal. In recent years, moreover, diplomacy has acquired a stuffy Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 are vivid recent examples. The 08
image, the opposite of street and business credibility, not least as summits may take all the headlines, with political advisers, 'sherpas' and
relative salaries have declined, with the result that many of the best flown-out domestic officials to the fore, but behind all the fanfare is a
and the brightest have gone elsewhere. Even French 'enarques' were great deal of indispensable routine daily grind in which foreign ministries
82 Agency Agents 83

have a prime role. Few presidential or prime ministerial offices, even in own network of attaches and intelligence sources it clearly has the
the most prominent cases of Washington, Bonn and Pa-ris, would wish capacity to embarrass conventional diplomacy. This is to say nothing of
to do without the extensive diplomatic machinery that is also at their the numerous countries-in which at one time or another the military has
disposal. Even Henry Kissinger, who was very hard on American played a disproportionate part in government, and therefore been able to
diplomats, dedicated a major book to 'the men and women of the invert the normal servant-master relationship of defence to foreign pol-
Foreign Service of the United States of America, whose professionalism icy. In the United States the military was not hindered by having
and dedication sustain American diplomacy'. 21 General Eisenhower as President for eight years, even If General
MacArthur's attempt to subvert democratic policy-making during the
Korean War had been rebuffed by Truman, and his successor was aware
Proliferating Rivals of the need to tread carefully in civil-military relations. In the Soviet
Union the military remained cowed until the death of Stalin by its losses
Outsiders dealing with a particular state are always thrown into a in the purges of 1937-8, but thereafter soon became a massive force for
quandary when they have to deal with a range of different departmenls over-insurance in the arms race which eventually brought their state to
or agencies. Is the adversary playing a strategic game by speaking with its knees. The Third World continues to produce examples of military
competing voices, or is there a genuine problem of fragmented deci- dictatorships which are often cautious in their foreign policies but
sion-making? There is clearly a great deal of room for misunderstand- almost always lacking in the finesse and cooperative capacity which
ing when many states are incapable of speaking with one voice. experienced diplomats bring to bear. 23 Brazil in the 1960s, Greece in the
This happens increasingly because foreign ministries now find them- 1970s, Turkey in the 1980s, Nigeria and Burma in the 1990s, are all
selves in a situation of structural rivalry with domestic competitors and cases in point.
because they do not always succeed in rising to the new challenge of The second category of rival to the foreign ministry is that of the eco-
coordination. Whether it is because of the international phenomenon of nomic ministries. These will vary in number and title according to the
'complex interdependence' or because of endogenous changes in the state, which might possess one or more departments dealing with for-
state (and the two processes are difficult to separate out) many states are eign trade/commerce, finance, development/foreign aid, industry, agri-
now facing what has been termed the 'horizontal decentralization' of culture, fisheries and shipping - to say nothing of central banks, an
their foreign relations, or the foreign ministry's loss of control over increasing number of which are constitutionally independent of politi-
many external issues to other parts of the state bureaucracy. From the cal control although the other side of their lack of malleability is that
wider perspective of the interests of state and society the problem of their strict' moneta;y remit usually makes them conservative and pre-
unitary action means that opportunities for linkage may be missed in dictable. These entities are the basis of the hypothesis that interdepend-
international negotiation, that outsiders will be able to play on internal ence is dissolving foreign policy and replacing it by a mosaic of
divisions or confusions, and that long-term strategic planning becomes functional, trans governmental networks. The important roles of finance
almost impossible. officials in IMF and EMU meetings and of trade officials in
Who are the rivals to foreign ministries which have been proliferating GATT/WTO negotiations seems to bear out the argument. Karvonen
in recent decades? They may be listed in four categories, three with sub- and Sundelius, however, have made a detailed empirical study of this
stantive concerns and one with a procedural mission. First is the military, question, largely in relation to Finland and Sweden but also carefully
which can act as an ally to the foreign ministry, but which has its own located in a comparative frame of analysis. 24 They conclude that
sizeable vested interests and direct links with its equivalents overseas. Its although the picture is inevitably variegated, given the variety of state
actions can, not always intentionally, constitute a form of parallel foreign cultures and the genuine uncertainties about the best way to proceed,
policy which then boxes in the official version- as did the Anglo-French foreign ministries have often reasserted their central role in the 'man-
military conversations of I 905-14, with their growing presumption of an agement of interdependence'. Indeed, in 1983 the Swedish Commerce
automatic alliance between the two countries. 22 Since the military pos- Ministry was dismantled and its international trade functions transferred
sesses considerable physical resources, a domestic constituency and its to the foreign ministry. On the other hand, there is no doubt both that
84 Agency Agents 85

'domestic' parts of the machinery of government have grown at a faster manipulated for purely political reasons or distorted by ideological pre-
rate than the 'international' part, through their very expansion into the occupations, with unpleasant surprises the eventual result. The chal-
latter's territory (as we saw above with the notion of 'mini-foreign lenge for foreign policy-makers today, therefore, is to build on the
offices'), and that problems of coordination and control have conse- foreign ministry.'s unique capacity to understand how a state's activities
quently increased. 25 look from the outside, and to judge how much of a united front is actu-
The third form of rival is the intelligence services, whose role we ally desirable, while ensuring that no gap arises between classical for-
have already surveyed in Chapter 3. These are at once the most difficult eign policy and the various international dimensions of domestic policy.
to keep in line and the least able to participate in routine policy-making Striking the balance, and keeping the major departments of state in har-
and international negotiations. They are to some extent hamstrung by mony with each other along the way, is one of the great tests of modern
their own strengths. Nonetheless, when western states are at a loss to government.
decide which branch of Syrian intelligence might have been responsible
for a bomb attack on a jet airliner, as with the Hindawi affair of 1986, it
is clear that a state's foreign policy can at times be splintered by pow- The Theory of Bureaucratic Politics
erful internal elements running their own line- or it can appear to be so.
when it suits various parties not to assume a single locus of responsi- So far theory has hardly entered the discussion. Yet if we are fully to
bility within the acting state. Conversely, in a democratic state the lead- understand the simultaneously fragmented and unitary character of for-
ership can sometimes be forced to take responsibility for a policy failure eign policy-making, we need theories which address the roles of
which was really that of an importunate intelligence service. John bureaucracy, of choice and of government. Fortunately a rich literature
Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs operation against Cuba of 1961, and of precisely this kind has grown up over the past thirty years under the
Robin Cook and the Sierra Leone affair of 1998 are two prominent general heading of 'bureaucratic politics'.
examples. Few intelligence agencies can resist the temptation to move The theory of bureaucratic politics was introduced thirty years ago by
on from information collection to assessment and action, as the role of Grahana Allison, building on previous work done by Charles Lindblom,
Pakistan's Military Intelligence in supporting the Taliban in the war of Richard Neustadt, Herbert Simon and others 26 It has been developed
2001-2, despite President Musharraf's support for the United States, since by Allison himself, Morton Halperin, Robert Gallucci and others,
demonstrated. and applied in numerous case-studies 27 Although it has also been sub-
The consequences of proliferating external relations leads us to the ject to healthy criticism it is in ever-wider use empirically, not least
last, and rather different, set of rivals facing the modem foreign ministty- among historians. Outside academe, however, things are rather differ-
those who think they can pull the threads of complexity together rather ent. Although practitioners would not quarrel with the model, and often
more effectively than can the diplomatic generalists. These people live up to its predictions, they are barely aware of its propositions, let
reside either in the prime minister's office and/or cabinet secretariat (in alone its implications for the wider issues of choice, democracy and
a parliamentary system), in the president's personal 'cabinet' (in a pres- responsibility. A fortiori, the citizenry has little clue that foreign policy
idential system) or in the party machine in a one-party state. They have decisions might be being made in the less than ideal way described by
the advantages of being close to the head of government and being free the theory of bureaucratic politics. They have a healthy sense of the self-
of departmental bias, with an overview of the whole system. They often interest and incompetence of individual politicians, but probably
also control high-level appointments across the bureaucracy. All this assume that in foreign policy it is not too much to expect the major
makes for formidable rivals to the foreign ministry as it seeks to recon- departments of their country's bureaucracy to pull broadly in the same
cile the many different strands of external relations. Yet the latter is not direction.
without its own advantages. A prime ministerial or presidential office Yet this is precisely what does not happen, according to the theory.
can set the main outlines of policy, but it can easily get out of touch with Allison's two models, soon collapsed into a single theory entitled 'gov-
detail, expertise and implementation. The concern with public policy as ernmental politics', are well enough known by now not to need recount-
a whole can lead to the external dimension being unjustly neglected, ing in detail. 28 Put baldly, the hypothesis, worked out in a case-study of
86 Agency Agents 87

superpower behaviour during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, was that players ... men in jobs-3° Are they mostly acting irrationally, or just
ministries and other bureaucratic units pursue at best thetr own versions sub-optimally? Are they, conversely, acting in the same way that is
of the national interest and at worst their own parochial concerns, so that described in the famous 'rational actor model' of the tirst part of the
foreign policy-making becomes an inward-looking battleground in book, but at the level of individuals and departments rather than unitary
which decisions are produced by horse-trading more than logtc. But states? Either way, does it make a crucial difference to foreign policy
the fundamental assumptions of the argument should be examined, not outcomes, and the location of responsibility for decisions? These ques-
least because they have been sharply criticized and because they have tions touch on the biggest weakness of the theory: that the springs of
important implications for any attempt to address the problem of ~ction choice are left unclear. If policy-makers, instead of trying to liaise in
in foreign policy. If we wish to know where agency hes m modem mter- the best way possible to construct an effective, united national position.
national relations, we must consider the proposition that the state tends prefer rather to pursue the interests of their own ministry, department or
to decompose into its various separate parts, and the degree to which the office, why should this be so? In what way might they profit (for at base.
fissiparous tendencies of bureaucracy might be countered through intel- the analogy is an economic one) if the state as a whole is served less
ligent leadership or constitutional provisions. well than their parochial departmental loyalty? Why, indeed, is it obvi-
The bureaucratic politics approach has two general consequences for ous that separate administrative units have competing interests, beyond
the study of foreign policy: it reinforces the whole domestic politics the trivial level of finance and survival? One can argue that the same
approach, against the scepticism of realism, neo-realism and some problem of rational actomess applies at both levels, the unitary state of
forms of historicism, and it presents a picture of dectswn-making m Model I and the bureaucratic entity of Model III: that is, are human
which 'foul-ups', as opposed to either rationality or inevitability, are beings really desiccated calculating machines who optimize on the basis
very prominent. In both these respects it is thus central to the subject of of as much information as they can gather, without much regard for
foreign policy analysis, which came to the fore precisely because it has political beliefs, moral values, personal loyalties or sense of identity? It
forced the domestic environment onto the agenda of Internatwnal seems very unlikely, even if, to turn Allison on his head, they are more
Relations and because it has subverted the claims of decision-makers likely to make the effort in the service of a collectivity like the state,
always to be acting intelligently and/or in the public interest. For our whose very survival might be thought to rest on their ability to relate
purposes, however, although the bureaucratic politics model highlights ends systematically to means. It would be almost bizarre to deploy the
the importance of agency, it also complicates the questton stgmficantly. same resources in the interests of a sub-unit.
This occurs for one fairly self-evident reason and two more subtle If the bureaucratic politics model is correct it does have profound
ones. The basic reason is that bureaucratic politics insists that clear, implications for our notions of foreign policy action. It would make it
rational decisions dealing with the merits of a problem tend to be sup- very difficult to rely on a notion of state-as-actor in international rela-
planted by the mere 'resultants' of an internal process of bargaining and tions. States would become less important, not because of the familiar
manoeuvring, in which, as Lamborn and Mummie have pointed out, the forces of interdependence but because the state apparatus would have
outcome will probably not correspond to the initial preference-order- become little more than an arena in which competing fiefdoms fought
ings of any particular actor29 In other words, internal dynamics invari- out their inward-looking games. Foreign policy in this perspective either
ably shape policy to produce compromises that are unsatisfactory in gets made by accident, or it is captured unpredictably by different ele-
terms of their external competence. This is, in practic,e, another verswn ments at different times. This was, indeed, the line taken by Allison and
of the view that democracies are at a disadvantage in their dealings with Halperin, particularly in the latter's book on the US Anti-Ballistic
autocratic states, which we shall encounter in Chapter II, but it adds the Missile System decision of 1967. 31 Here he showed that a system orig-
problem of competing foreign policies being run from the same state, inally designed to protect against the USSR was described as being
with no certainty for outsiders or insiders as to which might prevail. deployed against China, with all the obvious consequences for relations
The agency problem is more tangentially affected by a second aspect with Beijing, largely because of the battles which had been fought
of the bureaucratic politics theory, namely that of its assumptions about within the government, particularly between Secretary McNamara and
the place of rationality in the calculations of what Allison calls 'the the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
88 Age11cy Agents H9

If this is a true description and one of general applicability then we If there is a relationship between organizational context and substan-
have to live with the fact. But as Jerel Rosati once pointed out in a tive policy preference, then it is a more subtle affair than this. Martin
famous attack on the theory of bureaucratiC politics, it makes the idea Hollis and Steve Smith have been the most effective critics of this part
of responsible, democratic decision-making difficult to sustain. 32 Rosati of the bureaucratic politics model, and their amendments make it much
made a category error in presuming that because bureaucratic politics more useable. 33 Instead of a mechanical system which either reproduces
undercuts the constitution and presidency of the United States the the problems of rational action or depicts decision-makers as robots
theory must be mistaken. It may describe something which is undesir- wholly programmed by their position in the administrative order, they
able, but that does not make it fanciful. On the other hand Rosati has suggest that the roles individuals take on when they become part of an
certainly happened upon an important issue. If policy-making is a organization should be regarded as both constraining and enabling.
seething mass of intertwined bureaucratic conflicts, then the formal Bureaucratic animals are constrained by their terms of reference, their
responsibility of office-holders for final decisions becomes more nomi- superiors and the culture (or 'expectations') of their group, and they
nal than real. Moreover, if the culture permits individuals and units to also have opportunities to interpret their given roles in new ways on the
behave in this way then it must signify that a sense of duty to the gov- basis of their own personalities and particular circumstances. This
ernment of the day, and to the public behind them (to say nothing of description does justice to the evident fact that we are all shaped pro-
wider societal or universal values), has not been widely disseminated. foundly by the goals and values of the work we do, while allowing for
Bureaucratic politics and agency are mutually entangled for one tina! change and an important element of indeterminacy.
reason. One of the key ideas underpinning the theory is that of role- A key question in social science is 'where do preferences (values,
socialization -even if Allison does not put it in quite these tenns. By ideas, and so forth) come from?'- a question which pinches sharply on
this is meant the presumed ability of an organizational context to social- the theory of bureaucratic politics, given the assumption that roles are the
ize its staff into a particular set of values attached to that unit, over and source of key preferences. In practice, there is no substitute for empiri-
above apparently superordinate value-systems such as the 'national cal flexibility on this: that is, being aware when it comes to the analysis
interest'. Thus foreign ministry personnel will pursue concerns which of particular cases and countries that outcomes may well have been
are very different from those of the military. Even more obviously, inter- strongly influenced by bureaucratic competition, while at the same time
service rivalry will be a fact of policy-making life, as the navy is never not falling into the trap of using the model in too rigid or exclusive a
going to agree that boats should be mothballed while more tanks are manner. There are, after all, many key variables involved in the making
bought, and so on. The trouble with this all too plausible picture of how of foreign policy, and the theory of bureaucratic politics deserves the
individuals become 'organization man' (or woman- it is often forgot- status of single-factor explanation no more than any other.
ten that in Margaret Thatcher's first Cabinet post as Secretary of State Assuming that bureaucratic roles condition preferences to some
for Education, she was a high-spending minister in favour of state degree - if only by making it difficult to change positions radically
schools!) is twofold. Firstly, it is by no means clear what the 'unit' is when new political bosses arrive- there remains the question of inter-
that has such detennining effects on a person's behaviour. Is it, for action between the separate agencies responsible for external relations,
example, in the case of a high-ranking defence official, the department and how far competition between them undennines an effective foreign
as a whole, the minister's inner group, or the particular anned service/ policy. The theory has problems here too, notably in taking an overly nar-
functional division for which he or she happens to have responsibility? row view of what constitutes 'politics' within the policy-making system. 34
And do lower-level functionaries only identify themselves with their The tendency to assume that bureaucratic units are characterized by the
immediate unit, or with all the divisions which are on top and around pursuit of power in some fonn of micro-imperialist scramble does less
them? Secondly, even if we can identify stable units for given 'players'. than justice to the evident differences of fonnal responsibility (it is a
what is the 'line' which they are supposed to be pushing, and how treasury's purpose to try to ensure sound finances) and modes of under-
do they know? Such suppositions as 'the military are hawkish' or standing the world that exist between, say, career diplomats and those
'diplomats tend to appeasement' do not withstand a moment's serious who make their living from working in the field on development aid
scrutiny. projects. These different groups will engage in politics, but usually at a
 ''1

90 Agency A&ents 91

rather more serious and elevated level than that of mere pork-barrelling. Department officials, or had the Shah not been admitted to the USA in
For example, it is clear that in Japan at the present time most officials October 1979, these broader problems would have remained'. 17
in the foreign ministry are in favour of JaPan becoming a permanent Officials themselves, in memoirs and interviews, naturally tend to high-
member of the UN Security Council because it will enhance the min- light problems of resources and coordination, but a different vantage-
istry's domestic position vis a vis rivals such as MIT!. On the other point, and in particular a longer historical perspective, may well make
hand, there are plenty of officials outside the foreign ministry who their concerns seem more ephemeral.
favour the move for broader reasons to do with Japan's future place in This raft of qualitications is only worth making because the theory of
world politics, and few who would oppose it just so as to scupper the bureaucratic politics has at its core a set of insights which is both strong
diplomatic corps. and parsimonious. In the next section I want to show that the most use-
This means that the bureaucratic politics theory must be used in con- ful of them derive less from the idea of interdepartmental conflict than
junction with an understanding of both wider conceptions of politics from that of organizational process, but there is certainly much empiri-
and the roles of the formal political actors. Through their power of hir- cal evidence to suggest that the former is also a common and influential
ing and firing, but also through the manifesto commitments which they phenomenon. Allison argued that if he could show that governmental
embody, the agreements they reach with foreign leaders and the sheer politics occurred even in conditions of extreme crisi;, it must be
capacity for heroic transcendence of routine which all powerful leaders endemic, and even after accepting the more pertinent criticisms of the
enjoy, a head of government can change the rules of the bureaucratic historical basis of his case study enough remains to make the point
game and start the whole dance off again to different music. This hap- plausible. On the Soviet side, recent documents have suggested that
pens most obviously in the United States, but there are plenty of exam- there was confusion between Moscow and its military in the field as
ples from other systems, as we saw in Chapter 3. It must also take to who was supposed to be in control of the anti-aircraft batteries on
account of the variability of contexts in which bureaucratic politics are Cuba which shot down an American U2 38 As for the United States,
played out - there are many different levels of state power and eco- the navy was certainly reluctant to pull back the blockade line so as to
nomic development - as well as varying particular circumstances, his- create more time for diplomacy, and some air force chiefs (notably
torical periods and political cultures. Halperin was myopic when he Curtis LeMay) pushed so hard for air-strikes, even after a deal had been
wrote that 'as we believe, all Governments are similar to the US gov- done, that President Kennedy had to exert maximum authority to ensure
ernment as we have described it here' 35 Most observers have concluded control over events.
that although the United States system is indeed beset by bureaucratic In more normal times, budget allocations invariably produce inter-
infighting (which is why the literature originated there) the degree and departmental rivalries of an intensity that can leave foreign policy the
quality of the problem are unmatched anywhere else. 36 Some other cu 1- victim. This was the case with the Navy vs Air Force dispute of the early
tures, indeed, display some of the opposite pathologies, as with Japan, 1960s which led to the cancellation of the Skybolt missile programme
where there is an obsessive concern with consensus ('ringi-sei') and to despite the fact that the system had already been oft"ered to the UK. 39
a lesser degree the centralized states of France and the United Kingdom, Outside the US there are also many examples of at least intermittent
where the structure favours the forces of coordination over those of bureaucratic politics. In the Soviet Union after 1978 the newly created
fragmentation. Moreover, most systems have informal networks which Department of International Information provided yet another rival to
cut across the nominal interdepartmental divisions and produce elites the Foreign Ministry, and Gromyko complained strenuously about the
with a strong sense of overall direction and/or common interest. existence of parallel systems 40 The Israeli secret services are known to
It is also important not to exaggerate the importance of officials. have put agents into their own prime minister's office, while the
Some foreign policy disasters have less to do with decision-making Coalition's war in Afghanistan in late 200 l saw the Italian foreign min-
fiascoes- whether bureaucratic or otherwise- than with more 'structural' istry at odds with the more cautious officials of the defence ministry 41
forces such as geo-politics, ideological conflict or the configuration of Less dramatic have been the tensions inside the German state between
classes. As Fred Halliday pointed out in relation to the Iranian revolu- the Chancellor's Office, the foreign ministry (often feeling itself
tion, 'had there been dozens of wise Persian-speaking C.I.A. and State excluded) and the economics ministry - to say nothing of the fiercely
92 Agency Agents 93

independent Bundesbank in its heyday. At times the German position on the converse is also true. Thus, US diplomacy on the law of the
a future European monetary union oscillated wildly according to which sea in the late 1970s and early 1980s was hampered by the fact
institution was briefing the press. 42 that the State Department's 'Bureau of Oceans and International
Thus any bureaucracy which is big enough to have a normal division Environment and Scientific Affairs' was evidently inadequate 45 If it
of labour between ministries is likely to have a tendency to bureaucratic had been stronger it would surely have led the United States to take
politics, however much the culture encourages solidarity. In complex a more pro-active, and perhaps constructive, role in the negotiations
systems, decisions are almost always the result of inter-agency compro- over a Law of the Sea Treaty. Even where knowledge is not the
mises, and therefore in strict terms are sub-optimal, although as we shall issue, factoring can cause severe problems. From 1984 the CIA had
see in the next chapter the checks and balances involved can tum out to critical data on Iraqi stores of nerve gas, but it failed to ensure that
be valuable. 43 If decision-making matters at all in terms of affecting the US troops who blew up the bunker in Khamisiyah in 1991 were
outcomes, and of providing choices over different courses of action, warned about their possible exposure to toxic agents 46
then relations between politicians and their officials will matter too, and • Bureaucracies cannot work without 'standard operating procedures'
a theory of the politics which occurs between them must be taken seri- (SOPs- a key concept in Essence of Decision). That is, they need to
ously. It is just as important, however, to look at the characteristics of have formal rules, almost always written down, which individuals
bureaucracies which are not strictly political at all. are extremely reluctant to over-rule. Personal initiative is discour-
aged precisely because the system is seen as the source of efficiency.
The rules usually only get changed under the pressure of a catastro-
The Heart of the Matter - Organizational Process phe which has already happened. Thus the Soviet Union's eastern
air defences shot down the Korean civil airliner KAL007 in 1983
There is a great tradition of writing about bureaucracy which long pre- without proper reference to Moscow because they had orders not to
dates the work of Allison. From Weber, Michels and Ostrogorski allow hostile incursions which could be a missile attack on pain of
through to Herbert Simon and Chester Barnard a body of thought has their jobs (and possibly their lives). 47 It was easier to 'obey orders'
built up from which the pathologies of modern organizational life have than to take initiatives and to act on the basis of lateral thinking. It
become clear. These general theories of organization focus particularly may have been a similar problem which led the US Navy ship
on the routines of bureaucratic procedure and on the handling of infor- Vincennes to shoot down an Iranair airbus in 1988, also with com-
mation. What they have to say about the problem of rationality is of plete loss of life. The most famous SOPs are sometimes said to have
great interest, and this will be dealt with in the next chapter. The main had even more serious consequences: the Austrian need in 1914 to
point of interest here is the way in which officials shape policy by their get the harvest in before calling up their reserves for war, together
quiet but ubiquitous presence. As Richard Betts noted in relation to the with the Germ'an Schlieffen Plan which led rigidly to the invasion of
power of the military, 'the real problem ... is indirect influence and the Belgium in the event of war with France, may between them have
extent to which it may condition the decision-makers' frame of refer- ensured that a limited conflict turned into a continent-wide disas-
ence' .44 There are at least five ways in which this happens, independent ter.48 Greater flexibility would at least have created more contin-
of any bureaucratic politics: gency plans and more political room for manoeuvre.
• Conservatism is another iron law of bureaucracies. Even at the level
• Administrative systems 'factor' problems so as to be able to deal of basic competences, decision-makers often do not take measures
with them more efficiently. That is, everything is broken down into to change the existing order of things. Thus the administration of EU
its component parts and classified into headings and systems that development policy continued unreformed throughout the 1990s,
suit the pre-existing organizational structures but may not suit the despite its evident inability even to spend the funds allocated. 49
problem itself. This is a partly rational, partly historical process and When problems are anticipated, change -in the form of retraining
it militates against seeing the problem in the round, strategically. or new recruitment policies - takes decades to implement. The
Where competence exists, the problem will be dealt with well, but 'young turks' in the Italian foreign ministry demanded reform for
94 Agency Agents 95

years before the measures announced in 1998 which have begun the and other problems of secure communications are other factors
slow process of modernization 50 1n actual foreign policy behaviour which make size and sophistication to some extent a disadvantage.
conservatism usually takes the form of being 'risk-averse', in Nor does privatization reduce ~he size and unwieldiness of bureau-
Allison's terms, and of over-insurance. That is, not wanting to be cracy. Although some ideas have been floated about sub-contracting
exposed as having failed to do the job, bureaucrats tend to stick to embassy work (as with some prisons), it is not really feasible to
what they know has worked in the past and to err on the safe side. expect that a society as a whole can be represented abroad, often in
They often see their job as holding on to politicians 'by their coat- highly political negotiations, by private interests. Whether central-
tails' to prevent fanciful initiatives. It is of course thoroughly desir- ized, like China, or federal, like Gennany, the administration of for-
able to think things through and not to take stupid risks, especially eign relations is complex and growing in proportion to the increased
with other people's lives and taxes. But it can also be a fatal error number of states, international organizations and private transac-
not to change in time, as the French armed services found with their tions that a foreign policy process has at the least to track and quite
attachment to the Maginot line in 1940 and the entire communist probably relate to. At the extreme this can have dire consequences:
bureaucracies of the USSR and eastern Europe discovered in the CIA is said to have received advance warning in 1981 that
198951 Margaret Thatcher was disdainful of 'the Foreign Office President Sadat of Egypt was going to be assassinated; there were,
where comp;omise and negotiation were ends in themselves' and however, so many pieces of information to process that the warning
even more of ministers who could not break free of its 'spell' .52 was not read until after the murder had taken place.
• The quality of bureaucracy most prominent in the public mind - not
without justice - is pettiness. Most citizens associate their state with
administrative nightmares to do with long queues, unnecessary paper- Politicians and Officials: Can the Dog be Separated from his Tail?
work and 'officious' behaviour. In the area of foreign affairs the image
is bad because of problems getting visas, passing through border con- Given the theory of civil service responsibility and obedience to elected
trols and getting consular assistance (despite the fact that the first two politicians, but the evident reality of the former's monopoly of expert-
of these are in fact not the responsibility of the foreign ministry). ise, detail and continuity, the question inevitably arises of whether the
Behind the scenes the reality does sometimes live up to the stereotype. tail wags the dog. The theory of bureaucratic politics and its empirical
The small-mindedness of the British officials who refused to accept follow-ups have shown convincingly enough that in certain circum-
the evidence before them of genocide against the Jews was stagger- stances an administration can indeed have a mind of its own. It is, for
ing, rather like the wall of unseeing which characterized so many of instance, notoriously difficult for politicians to intervene in the processes
those in the service of apartheid in South Africa. 'I was just doing my of weapons development and procurement 55 More interesting, however,
job' - the definition of the reliable bureaucrat - has unfortunately in the light of the equally clear weaknesses of this approach, is to
become a synonym for lack of imagination and humanity. 53 ask whether in the complex circumstances of modern foreign policy-
• The comparative study of organizations tends, lastly, to highlight the making, the dog can be sensibly considered separately from its by now
inherent tendency of bureaucracy to expand when not positively extremely bushy tail. The American use of the terrn 'official' to cover
checked. This can also be termed elephantiasis. As Kissinger both politicians and bureaucrats is revealing, placing both sets of peo-
observed, 'the vast bureaucratic mechanisms that emerge develop a ple in the category of accountable public servants, and with the impli-
momentum and a vested interest of their own'. 54 Problems of coor- cation that it is naive to look upon professional administrators as being
dination abound, particularly given the steady expansion of external in some sense apolitical. Nor is this any longer a phenomenon peculiar
relations and the information overloads evident in the second half of to the United States. The past two British governments have tended
the twentieth century. The sheer technical problems of filing, copy- to look sceptically on the notion of neutral advice from their top civil
ing, and personnel management present formidable obstacles to effi- servants, and some personnel changes have been made accordingly. The
ciency in the biggest systems. Information technology has simply Mandela government in South Africa was understandably keen to get
increased the amount of transactions, while the need for encryption blacks into senior positions in the Department of Foreign Affairs and
96 Agency

other ministries, at the same time as it acknowledges the importance of

not alienating the existing white cadres. 5
The ideal-type, whereby bureaucrats provide the 'permanent govern-
ment' for transient politicians, while at the same time leaving policy-
making to the people's legitimate representatives, has by no means Rationality in
disappeared, and indeed there are strong nonnative reasons for aspiring
to it. Still, it is idle to pretend that bureaucrats do not also make policy, Foreign Policy
and that their discretionary powers over, and impact on, the vital imple-
mentation phase of policy are not considerable. 56 The whole thrust of
the reaction against dry public administration studies in the 1960s was
to frame the 'policy-making process' as an integrated whole. In the
context of foreign policy, Roger Hilsman, the archetypal scholar-
practitioner, formulated a concentric circles model which accepts that
there are different kinds of 'power centres' in the policy process, some-
times competing but also overlapping and engaged in a continuous
search for consensus based on shared values. In this process some, both Rationality is one of the most central and difficult problems in all social
politicians and officials, will be closer to the centre of final decisio_n science, and it figured prominently in the study of politics during
7
than others, who orbit the inner group in varying degrees of proximity.' the twentieth century. Any attempt to understand or prescribe action
As Hitsman pointed out, 'policy-making is politics', and the bureau- cannot but make some reckoning with the concept, since it has come
crats responsible for high level foreign policy decisions are political to represent an ideal-type for both individual and collective decision-
animals whether they recognize the fact or not. They are a key element making. Indeed, the very idea of making 'decisions' and 'policies'
of the elite which runs foreign policy, albeit with ever increasing pres- seems to be a modern notion indelibly associated with the attempt to
sures from the domestic society they represent but are not closely in exert rational control over events - as opposed to allowing destiny,
touch with. Divisions of view and interest within the elite are of central God's will, chance or arbitrary (mere) power to determine one's lot.
importance, but they must not be mistaken for the more profound forms This said, it immediately becomes controversial as to how far human
of politics which arise from the clashes between differing value-systems beings are capable of behaving rationally, how rationality is defined in
and sets of social interests. The range and depth of these differences the first place, and whether what we deem rational behaviour is in any
almost always goes well beyond those apparent within the foreign pol- case so desirable. These and other doubts have produced raging debates
icy elite, whether between bureaucrats and politicians or (more likely) between, inter alia, the profession of economics, where the idea of
between different departments, including both levels of action. From rationality has undoubtedly been of central importance, and other soda!
this point of view the dog and its tail wag in reasonable harmony. scientists, for many of whom the concept looks like a straitjacket
Different animals will snap at each other from time to time, but the real imposed on the rich diversity of human motives and interactions, and
problem is the ability of the pack as a whole to take all the juiciest bones one which assumes a greater degree of calculation (often quantitative)
for itself. As we shall see in Part III, those excluded'from the inner in the business of choosing futures than is either possible or desirable.
circle still find it difficult to share in the process of setting directions in At the present time this debate has extended into political science,
foreign policy, despite the often grievous consequences for themselves. where rational choice approaches, having made considerable inroads,
In terms of causation both politicians and officials contribute to foreign are encountering stiff resistance from those allergic to the idea that
policy agency, but in terms of democracy, they count only intermittently politics is best explained in terms of the interactions between egoistic
and ambiguously as agents of the people. individuals continually assessing the degree to which their preferences
will be served by a given outcome - in short, through game theory and
its variants. 1
98 Agency Rationality in Foreign Policy 99

Rationality in Policy-making assessment of what rationality means in the context of foreign policy.
with special reference to the range of constraints on rationality which
In the subject of International Relations the same issues are at stake, but have by now been extensively explored in the specialist literature.
there are also some very particular complications 2 In the first place, the Although by the end of this discussion it may well seem that any clear-
'rational actor model', described by Graham Allison as the counterpoint sighted thinking in foreign policy is likely to occur more by accident
to his bureaucratic politics approach, is too often blurred with realism, than by design, the fundamental aim is to show how responsible agency
the historically dominant way of thinking about foreign policy. In fact is still possible despite the major obstacles of a complex, uncertain and
the two are logically distinct: realism privileges national security as the intensely political environment.
criterion for state decision-makers, whereas the 'rational actor' refers
principally to the idea of the state as unitary decision-maker - what
kinds of criteria the unitary actor employs in foreign policy are left Procedure vs Substance
open. Conversely, many would challenge the idea that realism operates
by rational processes. In the second place, 'rationalism' is well known It was Herbert Simon who first made the formal distinction between
in IR as one label for the principal alternative to realism as an explana- procedural and substantive rationality, although it had been present in
tion of international politics. Often termed 'Grotianism', and sometimes the writings of Max Weber and implicit in those of Adam Smith and
'liberalism', it suggests that states often prefer cooperation to conflict J .S. Mill. 6 It can also be formulated as a distinction between process and
and that in fact they have already constructed 'a society of states'. 3 This outcome rationality. 7 Procedural rationality occurs when an actor
too is simply a different matter from employing the idea of rationality engages in a systematic process, including reasoning, to enable him or
to explain decision procedures. Lastly, where rational choice assump- her to achieve the goals which are already in mind. The focus here is on
tions have made progress in IR, as they have through neo-realism and identifying the best means by which any given value may be optimized-
neo-liberal institutionalism, they have run into not just the predictable or, more realistically, on avoiding those ways of behaving which seem
opposition from traditionalists and historicists, but a rather specific likely to be counterproductive. Substantive rationality, by contrast, tells
group of opponents, usually labelled 'constructivists', who argue that us what is the 'correct' outcome, given specified goals. One might
interests, preferences and values cannot be taken as given 4 They vary argue, for example, that the 'only' rational path forward for Russia in its
widely and are shaped by a range of personal, intra-state and interna- desperate economic condition of 1998 was to throw itself on the mercy
tional factors. Indeed, the main aim of foreign policy analysis from this of the International Monetary Fund - other strategies might have been
viewpoint is to probe 'the deeper questions of the formation of identi- possible, but they would have been 'irrational', just as Czechoslovakia
ties and the structural forces at the domestic level' 5 There is an element could have resisted Hitler in October 1938 despite the loss of Anglo-
of US-European difference in this rationalist-<:onstructivist tension, but French support at Munich, but it would hardly have been rational so to
again, it tells us little about whether foreign policy-making might or do: The trouble with this kind of proposition is that it is barely distin-
ntight not be a rational process. Together with the other distinctions in gmshable from a normative statement. Most observers would argue,
this paragraph, it is outlined so as to clear the ground of the principal more modestly, that there is a link between procedural and substantive
confusions which habitually attend the discussion of rationality and rationality, in that the former is a necessary but not sufficient condition
foreign policy, of achieving the latter, and that an 'action rationality' is necessary
After ground-clearing but before substance comes definition. In this to make the connection; that is, proper information gathering and
case, however, definitions cannot be separated out from the discussion decisional procedures still have to be translated into action before a
of policy practice, given the wide scope of problems and possibilities sati~factory outcome can be achieved. 8 Much of foreign policy analy-
which the term rationality invokes. In what follows, four fundamental SIS IS confused because these basic distinctions are elided. An out-

tensions will be sketched out- between procedure and substance, the come might seem rational but have been fortuitously reached by a
individual and the collective, efficiency and democracy, normative and non-rational route; procedures might be meticulously rational but still
positive- before the bulk of the chapter is devoted to a more concrete of no use because the view taken of the adversary was fundamentally
100 Agency
Rationality in Foreign Policy 101

flawed. US policy-makers in the late 1960s could simply not understand Efficien(y vs Democraq'
why they were losing the Vietnam War, when tl1e latest techniques of
policy analysis were being used (not to mention an avalanche of In a modem constitutional state there is always a tension between the
weaponry)." requirements of efficiency and those of democracy. Sometimes the very
secunty of the state, sometimes merely its established policies, can be
The Individual vs the Collective perceived as under threat if the people's will is done, or merely if the
time is taken to consult them. This was Franklin D. Roosevelt's reason-
The issue here is where to pitch rationality; is the unit whose behaviour ing as he took every step possible to help a beleaguered United
is under the microscope the individual, or the group? If the latter, which Kingdom in 1940, despite Congressional opposition. 13 Efficiency, in the
group? Inevitably the answer is that rationality starts with the individ- sense of the ability to achieve one's aims, is closely related to rational-
ual, because the latter is the ultimate source of intentional behaviour, ity in that most people would regard procedural rationality- or the abil-
but has to extend to the group, from where the problem becomes that of ity to relate ends intelligently to means - as a precondition of efficiency.
levels of analysis. 10 In this respect rationality epitomizes the general Democracy, however, provides a separate set of values which cannot be
problem of agency and foreign policy: who is/are the agents producing gainsaid. Clearly the rational pursuit of efficiency could be compro-
the decisions and actions? All individuals involved, politicians and mised by the need to follow democratic values; at the least there would
bureaucrats, have to be assumed to be facing the dilemma of how to act be opportunity costs involved. It is indeed a well-established line in
rationally, in terms of both personal interests and their professional writing about international relations that democratic states have one
responsibility (roles and reasons). Their pursuit of purely personal inter- hand tied behind their back when dealing with autocratic states and
ests is only likely to matter for our purposes, however, where they enjoy should make a conscious effort to avoid disunity. Conversely some have
such seniority as to be able to exercise discretion and have an impact on argued that democratic debates make for a stronger and more resilient
policy. More significant is the problem of collective rationality. Can a foreign policy in the long run. 14 Probably we should be better off by
decision-making group, let alone a state or other entity, make calcula- including the need for democratic legitimacy in our definitions of effi-
tions, whether rational or otherwise? The point of this chapter is to sug- ciency and rationality in the first place. That is, policy will only be
gest some answers to this question, but for now it is enough to point out effective if it is seen to serve the general ends of the people as a whole
that the field of foreign policy analysis has grown up on the back of and if it attracts their support. Equally, a policy which does not take into
research which has blown holes in the notion of policy being made by account (in a democratic society for sure, but arguably in any) the fac-
a unitary collective actor. Theories of bureaucratic politics, of domestic tor of legitimacy can hardly be deemed rational, in either the procedural
politics and of competing perceptions have all suggested that it is very or the substantive sense. This is broadly the position of the present
difficult for a state to aggregate the myriad preferences of the human book, although as we shall see, the phrase 'taking into account' begs a
beings who constitute its 'agency' into a single, consistently pursued set great many questions.
of preferences. 11 Moreover, the inherent problems of any collective action
are magnified in international relations by the multiple levels of coordi- Normative vs Positive
nation and decision involved - domestic, national, intra-governmental,
regional, international and transnational. If the firm is a collective not We have already seen that substantive rationality is barely distinguish-
always in harmony with the interests of its employees, at least its goals able from a debate over values, and it cannot be denied that the very
are relatively limited: profit, growth, cohesiveness, and so on. For notion of rationality carries within it a particular, contestable view of the
foreign policy-makers the goals are multiple, complex, and subject world. To the extent that this view derives from modernity, few are able
to many different opinions on the part of the many participants in the to opt out of it, but in its emphasis on flexible choices between options
decision-making process. To understand the place of rationality in this which can be ranked in terms of how far they 'optimize' preferences, it
context is a challenge indeed. 12 is certainly quite alien to societies such as Japan or Egypt, with their
 T"·-·

102 Agency Rationality in Foreign Policy 103

very different religious and historical frameworks. 15 This is not to In foreign policy in particular there is a conscious tradition of avoidin2
imply that the West has a monopoly on rational behaviour; simply [Link] abstractio~ and attempts at structural change, given the evi~
that its procedural rationality is not the universal and self-evident good dent drfficulty even for hegemons of reshaping entire systems, whether
it sometimes seems. Even in the West there is room for a good deal of regronal or global. Thus the famous metaphor of statesmen as canoeists.
legitimate disagreement about how much rational procedure might be following the flow and avoiding the rocks rather than having the exis-
desirable in decision-making, and as to how big a risk might be run by tentral capacrty to set their own direction. 19
neglecting the dicta of rationality. Many - as we shall see below - Practical observations and metaphors have been given formal.
would regard excessive attachment to information gathering and the theoretrcal shape over the past half-century through various scholars
weighing of alternatives as counterproductive, and would prefer to rely working in the area of administrative studies, first among them Herbert
on assets such as intuition, leadership or 'pragmatism'. At the extreme Srmon and Charles Lmdblom. The former's notion of 'bounded ration-
there might also be occasions when decision-makers wish to employ the ality' and the latter's concept of 'muddling through' have now become
'rationality of irrationality', or convincing an adversary that one is part of the established vocabulary, not just of academic students of
irrational in order to deter them from pressing their case. 16 public affairs but even of the more sophisticated practitioners. What is
One advantage of the idea of rationality is that while few these days their utility for the contemporary study of foreign policy?
pretend that it is adequate as a description of how decisions actually get The rd~a of bou~ded ;ationality refers essentially to the futility of
made, it provides a clear and attractive vision of how they should be trymg to maxrmrze ones values. Instead, rt rs preferable to 'satisfice',
made, especially in procedural terms. The 'is' and the 'ought' are clearly or _ac~ept the first outcome which approximates to one's preferences.
separated out, so that if the 'ought' does not appeal it can be clearly T~rs, m the lan~uage of the psychotherapist Bruno Bettelheim, is being
rejected or amended. This is not the case with some of the models which a good enough polrtrcran (or parent) rather than striving for perfection,
have been proposed as an improvement on classical rationality. In giv- whrch wtll rncur huge costs and in any case be unattainable 2 0 We do not
ing us better pictures of what happens in real-world decision-making, know enough about consequences, and we cannot imagine all possible
they blur the distinction between description and their own prescrip- optrons well enough to optimize, even if there were the time and polit-
tions, and do indeed sometimes smuggle in the latter unacknowledged. rcal space to do so. As Robert Keohane has pointed out, this fits well
Let us then turn to the main ways in which the limits on rationality have with the need in politics, but particularly in international politics, to
been interpreted, with particular reference to foreign policy. compromrse and to agree working 'regimes' through which various
Issue-areas can be managed and expectations stabilized. 21 Just as with
the necessary SOPs of domestic bureaucracies, regimes discourage policy-
Bounded Rationality makers from thinking of their agenda as a tabula rasa, on which level
surface they might be able to construct great monuments to their own
The huge problems of uncertainty, information overload and complex- memory. The temptation is always great, as we have seen with the
ity which confront any public policy-maker make it almost impossible diverse hopes of Woodrow Wilson, Hitler and George Bush Snr, but
to live up to the ideal of rational method, with its clear subordination of most are less ambitious and accept the need to pursue rationality within
means to ends, its stress on a comprehensive analysis of options, and its the limits of existing assumptions and institutions. In fact we have little
assumption of what Simon has called 'a preposterous omniscience' . 17 choice other than to go for 'acceptable' levels of, say, security rather
What is more, it takes only a short acquaintance with actual patterns of than 'complete security'.
behaviour to understand that something well short of classical rational- Satisficing, however, only takes us so far down the road of how to
ity obtains in practice, at both individual and collective levels. We have make policy in an uncertain, intractable environment (which is not a bad
already observed this with respect to certain bureaucratic pathologies, definition of international relations). In order to cope with this process
but it is evident to all those close to the practice of politics that policy- over trme and change, just as the canoeist has to, many would have
making is predominantly an empirical, pragmatic business in which recourse to the idea of 'muddling through', or more formally, disjoimed
planning and sustained control of programmes are at a premium. 18 incrementalism. 22 By this is meant not just changing policy only by
104 Agency Rationality in Foreign Policy I 05

small steps, avoiding revolutionary transformations, which has been the broken down into small parcels, the full import of the cumulative
traditional gradualist philosophy of English politics since 1689, articu- change will not be apparent until it is too late. It is not even necessary
lated best by Edmund Burke. 23 It also involves, inter alia, restricting the for there to be an author, with a conspiracy or a grand narrative to fol-
number of alternatives to be considered, using the methods of trial and low; certain interests can simply- nudge policy along in a direction
error, accepting that ends and means are difficult to distinguish, con- which perhaps even they do not wholly understand at first. In foreign
centrating on fixing problems rather than constructing 'positive goals' policy the prime example of this is the development of the European
and, not least, ensuring that a consensus is reached between the many, Communities (EC). Although Jean Monnet most unusually combined a
disjointed points of consultation that exist in modern democracies. highly strategic vision with a pragmatic subtle and gradualist method.
If agreement can be reached, the theory holds, the option chosen must never forcing the pace when that might have been counterproductive,
be the best in the circumstances, on the grounds that (i) two minds are most of his successors have usually just denied any move towards fed-
better than one; (ii) it will be possible to carry the policy through. eralism while seizing any opportunity to push things marginally in that
The attractions of this approach, as both description and prescription, direction, under the cover of particular practical improvements. In this
are easy to see. There is, however, at least one significant objection to they have been helped by the prevalent ideology in the EC of neo-
the theory of disjointed incrementalism, and it is one which brings us functionalism and graduated integration. Accordingly even their fiercest
back to the understanding of rationality, in all its variants, as an essen- opponent, Margaret Thatcher, found herself supporting the Single
tially contested concept. Lindblom, for example, clearly recommends European Act (SEA) for its initiation of the Single Market, when the
muddling through as the preferred 'strategy' in policy-making, although SEA also introduced various institutional changes which ratcheted on
one might think this comes close to being an oxymoron. The same is the integration process towards the eventual Treaties of Maastricht and
true of satisficing, which Simon represents as a much more realistic, Amsterdam, which she found anathema.
24
useable notion than that epitomized by 'economic man' Yet both these Other examples of what might be termed 'deceptive incrementalism'
models have the capacity to mislead by their very realism. Accepting the are the creation of Bizonia in post -war Germany and the consequent
virtues of muddling through, for example, can legitimize an unwilling- onset of the Cold War, and the imperceptible start of the US commit-
ness to ask fundamental questions, and to criticize the general direction ment to South Vietnam between 1961-5, by the sending of first advis-
of policy. 25 Arms races are incremental, by definition, once they have ers, then air support and finally ground troops. This is how undeclared
begun, but few would pretend that they are a sensible way of proceed- wars come to pass. Just as undesirable, however, might be the less dra-
ing. The British stumbled along with an over-valued pound for nearly matic but more common tendencies towards drift and snowballing, both
twenty-five years after the Second World War, without daring to do more of which are forms of incrementalism. The first is typified by the appar-
than adjust economic policy marginally within a harmful stop-go cycle. ent inability of the rich states to get hold of the problem of Third World
When the inevitable crisis came, it had serious ramifications for defence debt, even though the arguments for the status quo are generally
policy as well as for sterling 26 Similarly, the satisficing approach in for- accepted to be threadbare. The latter can be seen in the steady move of
eign policy can, if ill-judged, produce fiascoes like the US invasion of Japan towards the status of a well-armed state, despite the limits
Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, when the new President Kennedy did imposed on its defence expenditure by the 1946 Constitution. No one
not subject the line of least resistance placed before him by advisers to now believes that Japan keeps within the 1 per cent of GNP limit used
a sufficiently strong scrutiny. from 1976-87, but it would be a mistake to believe that successive gov-
An awareness of these problems has led some critics, including ernments in Tokyo set out deliberately to transform the situation. Their
Lindblom himself, to suggest that a middle [Link] found between the commitments, looked on benignly by the United States, have just
classical and the bounded versions of rationality. The possibility will be steadily drifted upwards, compounding each other. 27
considered in the last section of this chapter. But it should also be noted There is one more important aspect of the theory of bounded ration-
that incrementalism carries with it the opposite danger, of making pos- ality to explore, and this too raises the is/ought dilemma. John
sible radical change by stealth, out of the visual range of democratic Steinbruner's theory of cybernetic decision-making has provided acute
institutions. This will by necessity be a slow process, but because it is insights into the way the mind and organizations work, and in the
106 Agency Rationality in Foreign Policy I07

context offoreign policy. 28 Building on the work of other cognitive ana- research which are primarily concerned to enlarge our understanding of
lysts before him, Steinbruner argued that the human mmd cannot cope foreign policy-making, and which leave the improvement of practice to
with the mass of information which flows towards it and thus develops others.
repertoires for monitoring a very limited number of variables, indeed
often only one major variable. Nor are abstract calculations made about Non-decisions in Foreign Policy
this factor; rather, ends and means are blurred together and adjustments
made on a semi-automatic basis. A good example is the way the brain The concept of non-decisions is familiar in political science but little
adjusts to the roll of a boat at sea, so that when we step onto dry land, has been done to transplant it to International Relations. 31 This is a mis-
we feel unsteady until the next readjustment takes place. Stmtlarly, tf a take as the three possible meanings of the term all have considerable
tennis player consciously thinks about how to volley when at the net, the resonance for foreign policy behaviour. Firstly, a non-decision is simply
likelihood of success is diminished. In collective policy-making, the a decision not to act, to do nothing, despite considerable temptation,
theory brings us back to organizational process, as when one armed and possibly both the need and pressure to act. An example might be the
service monitors its own well-being rather than security as a whole, but Arab countries' decisions not to make Israel's invasion of the Lebanon
also alerts us to the fact that allowing those closest to events to make in June 1982 a casus belli (although there were long-term responses in
their own, parochial adjustments, may be the only way to get anything other ways, as through international terrorism). Saddam Hussein, con-
done, as with the Berlin airlift of 1948, when the USAF and RAF found versely, might have been better advised in 1980 to take Anwar Sadat's
ways to achieve what some of their political masters thought both advice 'not to make war on a revolution' .32 The failure to make a non-
dangerous and .tmposst'ble.29 decision, and the inability to resist exploiting Iran's weakness after its
The difficulty with the cybernetic approach is that it is highly con- revolution led to the devastating consequences for both sides of the war
vincing as an account of how the individual mind copes with informa- of 1980-8. Secondly, there is decision m•oidance, or the failure to act.
tion overload, but rather less convincing on collective operatiOns. What This is associated at the extreme with the paralysis of the decision-
is more, although there is an implicit seal of approval given to the making system, as during Richard Nixon's Watergate period, but a more
approach as an alternative for the inadequate 'analytical' (rational) usual (and important) example would be the perpetual inability of
method, it is difficult to find examples of the cybernetic process whtch countries to formulate clear war aims, either in the approach to conflict
are not negative. There have been plenty of foul-ups in history because or during its evolution. This can be deliberate, in order to increase mar-
decision-makers have been one-eyed, as with US Army intelligence gin for manoeuvre, but more often it is simply the result of policy
being preoccupied with internal sabotage before Pearl Harbor, or the drift. 33 Third, and perhaps the most significant theoretical development,
Soviet elite over decades paying too much attention to the texts of given its implicit critique of the pluralism dominant in policy studies, is
30
Marx and Lenin, but it is more difficult to find successes Perhaps the idea that certain options are excluded from the agenda, at times
Churchill's wilful insistence on rearmament in the 1930s, or Konrad by sleight of hand but more effectively by what Schattschneider called
Adenauer's determination to locate West Germany within the western 'the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while
alliance, count. But even they were strong individuals, not complex others are organized out-34 Another way of looking at this is to see it
organizations. as 'the weight of the existing order of things', which raises profound
Although rational foreign policy-making is certainly bounded by the questions in history and political science, such as why the colonialist
problems of information-processing, this does not mean that the cyber- countries would not consider the possibility of withdrawal from empire
netic, or the incremental, approaches are the inevitable or desirable before the Second World War, and why any government in France and
replacements. There is a considerable difference between demonstrating Britain even today would find it almost impossible to dismantle their
that the rational approach to policy is deeply flawed, and proposmg a respective nuclear deterrents.
working alternative, particularly when little care is taken to distinguish Everything does come to an end, eventually, and it is a fascinating
the descriptive from the prescriptive elements in the theory. We shall process to observe the 'unthinkable' finally becoming thinkable, often
return to this problem, but for the moment we can move on to areas of with the more dramatic consequences because the wall of prejudice
 ·r_,.
·-;

108 Agency Rarionaliry in Foreign Policy I 09

against change had been erected so high in the first place. This is most the psychology of decision-making. This has been explored extensively
clearly true in recent times of the revolution wrought by Gorbachev in in the context of foreign policy, unlike some of the concepts discussed
Soviet foreign policy, but other examples would be the crumbling of above, at the level of both individual leader and the group. 36 Most of the
apartheid in South Africa, and the sudden switch of American policy attention has been directed towards the cognirive aspects of the human
towards China in 1971, after two decades of structural inhibition. The mind, that is the intellectual functions, as opposed to the afj'ecrive
power to ignore is one of the most important of political weapons, but it aspects, or the emotional roots of behaviour. In part this has been the
can rebound decisively in the long term. It should not be forgotten that the reaction of academic psychologists, as well as political and organiza-
apparently conservative attachment to gradual change of Burke, and in our tional scientists, to the overwhelming intluence of Freud and the notion
own day Michael Oakeshott, always included an injunction to anticipate of the dominant unconscious in the first half of the twentieth century.
events by intelligent adaptation, so as to avoid the eventual need for revo- The work which Simon, Lindblom and Steinbruner drew on dealt
lution. Policy analysis should never neglect the importance of time: some largely with the Jess dramatic but arguably more important subject of
historical periods are more open for change, of a general or particular information-processing. Nonetheless, the wheel has turned again, and
kind, than others. Some policies seem rational at one time, irrational at as we shall see below, the emotional aspects of group solidarity and
another. Which is to say, firstly, that rationality is contingent, not just on social identity are now well to the fore. The strength of the psychologi-
place and culture, but also on period, and secondly, that history seems to cal approach to foreign policy-making is in fact that it fruitfully combines
provide certain openings in which major restructuring may be attempted, insights into both cognitive and affective processes.
or at least begun, before events once again begin to congeal into stable Predating the emergence of foreign policy analysis, and to some
patterns. 1945-8, and 1988 onwards, may have been such windows. extent continuing in parallel with it, has been work which arose from
The idea of non-decisions has considerable applicability in foreign the age of the masses and in particular from the spectre of totalitarian-
policy analysis because it takes us beyond mere process to the political ism. The first is of only indirect relevance here, dealing as it does with
and social structures beneath, from which power, in its domestic but the psychology of crowd behaviour and such mass hysteria as was
also possibly transnational forms, derives. More precisely, it enables us evinced in Ia grande peur (of the Revolution, in rural France) in 1791.37
to link process to certain key structures, in the way that another neg- Given some of the scenes in post-revolutionary Iran, or in the genocide
lected theory, that of elites, also does, but with more purchase on the and refugee crises of the African Great Lakes zone in the 1990s, to say
ideas and on policy itself than elite theory, which tended to concentrate nothing of the Nuremberg rallies, it would be imprudent to neglect this
on the identity of those who monopolize oftice, largely in their own dimension of international relations. More central to the understanding
self-interest 35 When certain ideas are excluded from the policy agenda, of foreign policy action is Adorno's theory of the authoritarian person-
or when certain attempts at change are systematically blocked, we need ality38 This idea has generated considerable controversy, but some
to ask not just the questions 'how?' and 'with what consequences?' but central propositions remain, viz., that certain personalities display
also 'why, and by whom?' It may be that there will be no clear answers symptoms of personal and intellectual rigidity which simultaneously
to such questions, and more than probable that there will be no con- advance them to positions of political power and damage their per-
spiracy to uncover, but the serious ramifications of foreign policy deci- formance in power. They tend to be hierarchical (that is, dominant, but
sions make it imperative that we probe beneath the surface of current also uncritical of those above them), ethnocentric and unable to cope
affairs and at least try to identify the structures that might be shaping with ambiguity and non-conformity39 At its extreme this can produce
agency. The concept of non-decisions is a very useful point of entry. the pure paranoia of Stalin's and Saddam's purges, but even in a more
muted form it is likely to distort the decision-making process, as with
Margaret Thatcher's impatience with dissent in Cabinet or Lee Kuan
The Psychological Factor Yew's determination to control every aspect of life in Singapore.
A good many 'psychobiographies' have been produced on the lives of
A major limit on pure rationality, albeit one which has to be located within key statesmen and women, but relatively few have attempted the serious
the kind of historical and social contexts we have just been referring to, is task of trying to place personality in the context of the process of political
 110 Agency

causation, weighing up the respective impact of individual and contex-

r Rationality in Foreif(n Policy III

Ariel Sharon are examples from our own time. Peace, security and pros-
tual factors. One successful attempt was that by Alexander and Juliette perity usually require less glamorous and more concrete methods.
George on the life of Woodrow Wilson, whose particular form of sell~ One of the richest areas of scholarship of foreign policy decision-
righteousness was rooted in his experiences with a caustic father and, making has been that relating to perception and misperception. There is
later, as professor and then President at Princeton University. Wilson's not the space here to do justice to all the subtleties of the extensive
character and idealism turned out to be of particular significance given literature, but certain key points must be made in order to clarify further
the 'window' for change represented by the allied victory of 1918 and the limits on rationality and ultimately to advance the argument about
the subsequent peace 40 Other attempts - of variable success - have the nature of agency in foreign policy.
been made to explain the lives of Luther, Hitler, Lyndon Johnson and There is at base with any discussion of perception a set of contentious
Margaret Thatcher. 41 In any case the key issue is less the peculiarities of philosophical issues relating to the way we apprehend the world and the
a leader's personality than the political space which might or might not extent to which our subjective understandings of it vary. There is a com-
exist to allow these qualities to impact on events. In this respect Fred mon view. attributable to R.G. Collingwood and in the present context
Greenstein has produced an indispensable analysis of how, in particular, to Charles Reynolds, which holds that it is not possible to make legiti-
an individual personality has more scope for impact on events in less mate statements about human behaviour except through a reconstruc-
stable regimes, and/or in more fluid circumstances than norma! 42 tion of the views of the relevant individuals themselves: that is, in most
Personality and context can sometimes be usefully connected by cases, through historical enquiry43 This is not at all incompatible with
using the concept of charisma, formulated by Max Weber to refer to the foreign policy analysis in principle, but it would rule out the kind of
magical, semi-religious appeal that some leaders can have, in the first positivist approach taken by much of the American literature, which
place to their own followers, but sometimes, as with Nelson Mandela, seeks to test 'if-then' hypotheses just as much in this area as in any
much more widely. The leader requires first of all qualities of brilliance, other- for example, as Vertzberger concludes, 'a certain level of mis-
strength, and emotional insight, and then circumstances in which there perception is inevitable in every decision-making system' 44 Most com-
is some kind of political or emotional vacuum to be filled in mass poli- mentators fall between two stools, using the notion of misperception,
tics. Henry Kissinger rather disparagingly referred to charisma as an which does imply a 'reality' that an actor might not perceive 'correctly',
instrument of primitive, Third World polities (perhaps because he did but largely as a lever to open up particular historical problems, accept-
not possess it himself), and at times it is difficult to distinguish from ing that grand generalization is only likely to lead to bland results. This
the characteristics of a mere icon, like Che Guevara. Margaret Thatcher, is the approach taken here, on the assumption that there is a difference,
like Gorbachev, was charismatic internationally but not domestically, however uncertain, between decision-makers' psychological environ·
while John Kennedy's charisma was immeasurably enhanced by his ment (how they perceive the world) and their operational environment
violent death. Nasser and the Ayatollah Khomeini were compelling (events as they happen independent of any one person's perception) 45
figures to their own people but somewhat perplexing elsewhere. It is Decision-makers cannot avoid having images of others which will be
clearly not necessary to have charisma to be an effective leader, let as affected by their own cultural and political baggage as much as by
alone in foreign policy, but equally its possession sometimes bestows the objective evidence. Images are clusters of perceptions which make
advantages. De Gaulle, Sadat, Willy Brandt of West Germany and Felipe us make sense of the world. Once established, they change relatively
Gonzalez of Spain would all have been far less influential world-wide, slowly, as with the two super-powers' images of each other during the
and perhaps have retained power less easily at home, if they had come Cold War. If an actor has no choice but to change an image overnight, it
across in public like some of their greyer colleagues - for example, can be personally and politically catastrophic. After Neville Chamberlain
Mubarak or Kiesinger- or if circumstances had-not made them seem was forced to acknowledge in September 1939 that his image of Hitler
something like Hegel's 'world historical individuals'. Of course the use had been too benign, he fell from office within nine months, and died of
of charisma also risks high costs. When politicians let loose the power cancer within the year. When the German invasion of 22 June 1941
of mass emotion, they run the risk of believing their own propaganda, forced Stalin to recognize that the Nazi-Soviet Pact had been a sham,
subordinating rationality and alarming outsiders. Colonel Gaddafi and he was paralysed with shock for three days.
 'I

112 Agency Rationaiiry in Foreign Policy 113

All too often, images harden into stereotypes, losing the capacity to At the affective level, decision-makers almost inevitably display the
evolve and becoming ever more remote from the evidence. Lyndon human tendency to intermittent bias, whether for or against another actor
Johnson held quasi-racist views of the North Vietnamese for which he or country. Personal relationships develop- 'sentimental alliances'-
and his soldiers were to pay dearly. The images held of continental that while initially advantageous, can prove obstacles if policy tensions
Europeans by some British politicians have verged on the comic over arise 47 Thatcher and Reagan, Kohl and Mitterrand are the clearest
the years, and any bilateral conflict will produce symmetrical prejudices contemporary cases. Conversely, some negative views prove almost
that are very difficult to dislodge. Stereotypes are brittle, inflexible sim- impossible to shift, as with a whole generation of Israeli leaders against
plitications, and any decision-making system of the slightest sophisti- Yasser Arafat.
cation will have built-in mechanisms to challenge them. But if the Another primarily emotional predisposition is the common tendency
politics of a country is buill on 'olhering', or tinding its own identity in to over-emphasize self, so that understanding an adversary proves
contradistinction to a feared and hated outsider(s), then stereotypes will difficult. This can fall well short of full-blooded narcissism (also not
persist and compound the existing problems. uncommon in powerful leaders) and still do damage to foreign relations.
Misperceptions may be regarded as the most common form of psy- As Robert Kennedy pointed out in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile
chological pathology affecting decision-making. Common as garden Crisis, the failure to put oneself in the other side's shoes (empathy) is
weeds, they can either be trivial or of the highest significance, depend- potentially the most fatal of errors. It will prove difficult to predict or
ing on the context and the system's capacity for auto-correction. The understand their responses, and will mean that you are not capable of
passage of time means that not all misperceptions are subject to test, giving them ways of saving face in the event of a climb-down. 48 It is
given changing conditions and natural loss of impetus. Those which all too common to assume fhat others operate on the same assumptions
involve explicit predictions, however, can be exposed as incorrect, just as oneself- or if not, that they are hostile barbarians, beyond the pale.
as the domino fheory, which predicted the fall of all South East Asia to Nationalism produces this last effect, frequently. One way in which
communism should Soufh Vietnam go down, was falsified by events. decision-makers try to cope with what is effectively cultural diversity as
The· statement that 'decisions are taken in the psychological environ- well as psychological narrowness is to assume universal rationality,
ment but implemented in the operational environment' may seem banal, and/or realism. If, as it has been said, we are all 'pretty rational', then
but it is an important insight. Decision-makers have no choice but to this may be a good, working principle. If not, it can come spectacularly
take continual bets on how ofher actors will behave and events unfold. unstuck, as over Saddarn Hussein 49
By committing themselves to 'actions', that is, making commitments in One of the sources of misperception which is both affective and cog-
the external environment, they find out the fate of their bets and the nitive is tracked thinking, or tunnel vision. This is the difficulty human
accuracy of their assessments. The external, operational environment beings often have in relinquishing a view, or an assumption, once taken
provides relentless feedback. Misperceptions are then discovered to up. This is partly because we become emotionally attached to 'our' way
have been of various kinds: of intentions, where it is easy to exaggerate of seeing fhings but also because when a pattern appears in information
bofh enmity and alliance, and of capabilities, where an adversary tends flows or the behaviour of other people, the human mind grasps at it as
to be excessively feared in peacetime and underestimated in time of a way of reducing uncertainty and providing predictability. This will be
war; of both friends and enemies; of those well-known and those far reinforced by various organizational SOPs. Thus, when the British
away. Action always teeters on the edge of incompetence because of the diplomatic and intelligence services received warnings about an
uncertain nature of the underlying perceptions. For example, the Argentine attack on the Falkland Islands in March 1982, they did not
favourable judgements which the West made about Boris Yeltsin and, take them seriously until too late because so many similar warnings had
most crucially, his impact inside Russia, risked severe consequences for proved barren in the past 50 Tracked thinking almost by definition pre-
both Russia and international order. vents creative initiatives. If only the Indonesian elite could have relaxed
Misperceptions can arise from various sorts of problem, affective, their assumptions about East Timor being crucial to the security of their
cognitive and organizational, and usually a combination of all three. A state they would have been able to move forward more rapidly on tind-
small number of examples will be given here by way of illustration 46 ing a solution to the insurgency in the ex-Portuguese colony.
114 Agency Rationality in Foreign Policy I I5

A similar syndrome is the search for consistency that we all engage When we come to the collective psychology of foreign policy decision-
in. People feel uncomfortable with contradictions in their outlook and making, we arrive first at the theory of t:roupthink. This concept, intro-
generally try to resolve them - often at the expense of understanding duced by Irving Janis in 1972, represents a major qualification of the
subtlety and complexity. When new information arrives which is at theory of rational decision. 59 Although, following Lindblom, we might
odds with existing views, it causes stress, famously labelled by Leon wish to argue that whatever consensus a decision-making group can
Festinger 'cognitive dissonance'. 51 This term was used in the House of reach is in and of itself rational, the 'fiascoes' which Janis analyses sug-
Commons by Denis Healey in order to characterize Margaret Thatcher gest that the outcomes produced by groupthink are almost always sub-
as being in need of psychiatric assistance. 52 More scientifically, we can optimal. This is because he shows how consensus is often reached, not
say that this is a normal part of information-processing, and that when by the free discussion of a range of options (that is, close to rationality)
it occurs there are three possible responses: ignore the new data and but by a mix of fear, hierarchy, conformism and ignorance. Groupthink
continue with existing beliefs; rationalize the data so that it is incorpo- essentially consists in the tendency of groups to seek rapid internal
rated into existing beliefs; adapt the beliefs to take the new data into agreement even at the expense of the merits of a problem, and then
account. The path taken will depend on the individual and the extent to to stick to their consensus even when the evidence seems to demand it.
which the decision-making system is open or closed with regard to new Criticisms of the orthodoxy, especially when that is associated with
developments. Robert Axelrod has shown that decision-makers operate the group's leader, become exceptionally difficult, sometimes because
on the basis of 'cognitive maps' which are not easy to change, and Janis there are actually some members ('mindguards ') whose function is,
and Mann have stressed the way in which both individuals and systems rather like party whips in the British House of Commons, to discipline
are 'vigilant' in heading off uncomfortable insights. 53 There is an affec- dissent - even at this level of private debate.
tive component as well in that decision-makers also display a peace of Janis's theory of groupthink, with its associated critical case-studies
mind imperative, because the alternatives are often too alarming for of some of the worst foul-ups in US foreign policy, has excited a good
their whole belief system. 54 This is why Soviet leaders saw Alexander deal of comment and criticism. 60 Despite the evident facts that (i) not
Dubcek's 'Prague Spring' of 1968 as a reactionary plot rather than as all groupthink causes serious problems; (ii) there are other causes of
a necessary reform to avert crisis in the communist system. concurrence-seeking than groupthink; (iii) countervailing pressures -
A final source of misperception is the drive for cognitive economy, or bureaucratic politics for one - exist to unsettle comfortable consen-
simplicity. This is what Steinbruner has called the 'universal tendency suses; (iv) there are other forms of small group behaviour; (v) small
to generalize'. 55 Intellectually the desire for manageability is in cont1ict groups cannot be understood except in a wider institutional and politi-
with the drive to understand complexity, but in a political environment cal context, there is still a core of truthfulness to the approach. In par-
the former is powerfully reinforced at the expense of the latter. 56 Too ticular, it is worth emphasizing that if decision-makers wish to avoid
much detail, or expertise, kills understanding in an over-burdened irrationality then they would be well advised to avoid an atmosphere of
decision-maker and leads to an hostility to the 'academic' approach. clubby back-scratching or, worse, servility in their top-level groups. A
Thus Churchill demanded, even of his high-powered scientific adviser certain amount of built-in political and intellectual tension within such
Lord Cherwell, 'action this day' and conclusions on one side of a sheet groups (too much will cause the opposite problems) is a necessary but
of paper only57 There is also a tendency, which can be seen at work not sufficient condition of effective policy-making. The siege mentality
in some of the other sources of misperception cited, for an economy of of the Johnson 'Tuesday lunch' group does seem to have made changes
values, that is, avoiding having to reconcile too many criteria at once, of direction difficult, just as the British Cabinet in March 1939 did not
leading to unmanageable trade-offs in one's own mind and across the like to challenge the authority of prime minister and foreign secretary,
decisional system. This is probably the origin of~the persistent prefer- despite their sudden and bizarre change of policy on Germany. 61
ence for presidential 'doctrines' in US foreign policy from the Truman Participation in almost any committee or political group is enough to
Doctrine on, although since the same tendency is not evident in most convince one of the utility of the groupthink insights.
other countries one would have to say that a cultural factor and/or an The evidence synthesized above shows that foreign policy decision-
imitative process is at work here. 5 8 making is subject to a wide range of psychological pressures, at both
116 Agency Rarionalit}' in Foreign Policy I 17

individual and group levels. In the face of this it is simply not possible to government. As individuals they have personal memories, as represen-
maintain that decisions are mostly made on the basis of classical ration- tatives of a political class they inherit certain dominant myths, rituals
ality. Even bounded rationality presents severe problems, some of them and pieces of conventional thinking which they use and abuse but are
normative. Expecting decision-makers to act effectively- which means in also themselves trapped within.
fhis context being able to satisfy their domestic constituency that fhey are It is a common phenomenon for decision-makers to assume that there
being consistently influential over the country's external environment in are 'lessons' to be drawn from history and indeed most human beings
the pursuit of security and other wider values the society may be attached constantly refer to the past, so as directly or indirectly to measure their
to- means juggling a vast array offactors with the dexterity of Uri Geller current situation against it. Historical thinking in this sense is inevitable.
and the wisdom of Solomon. Still, leaders do manage. They take deci- and not a matter of choice. Social scientists in particular spend their
sions, they act and they often give the impression of managing to take a lives analysing history and seeking to discern patterns in it. Those who
serious, reflective approach to foreign policy. How is this possible? literally have no sense of the past are amnesiac and as severely disabled
Sometimes the answer is luck. The British diplomat Sir Robert as it is possible to be. Despite this, International Relations scholars in
Vansittart suffered from a visceral distrust of Germans which made him recent years have been at pains to stress that there are no clear lessons
constantly demand action against Hitler. Despite being promoted out of to be drawn from history and that, as Hegel said, 'we learn from history
harm's way he was eventually proved right in his policy prescription, but that we do not learn from history'. 65 This is for a number of different
for fhe wrong reason. 62 On the other hand, even this might have been less reasons, some philosophical, some practical. Chief among them is the
luck than hunch, or intuition. It would be foolish to disregard the impor- evident tendency of decision-makers to use simple historical compar-
tance of this ability - which is essentially a mixture of judgement, expe- isons and analogies, and then to end up in difticulty 66 In particular the
rience, imagination and the capacity to empathize - in foreign policy, crude use by British and American leaders of the spectre of 'appease-
where no amount of efficiency is going to render everyfhing knowable. ment' has been amply documented, with anti-Soviet policies justified
Decision-makers at times have no choice but to accept the limits on (and probably genuinely inspired) by a fear of repeating the mistakes of
rationality and to bring other qualities into play, some of them using the the 1930s in expecting reasonable behaviour from dictators. Similar
emotional rather than the calculating side of the brain. Miriam Steiner instances, however, can be found in relation to the 'lessons' often
has argued, in a brilliant and still unsurpassed article, that 'in a world cited of the Versailles Peace, of the Great Crash, of the Berlin airlift,
with important nonrationalistic elements, true rationality requires that of the Suez and Bay of Pigs debacles, of Vietnam and of the Rwandan
nonrationalistic capabilities and skills be appreciated and developed side genocide of 1994. And indeed it would be perverse not to draw some
by side wifh the rationalistic ones' 63 Feeling and intuition are just as conclusions for the future from these and other traumatic events.
vital attributes of decision-makers as fhinking and sense-based observa- The need is to look on history not as a store cupboard of the off-
tion. Thus the overwhelming mass of impediments to rationality are fhe-shelf possible solutions, but as something integral to ourselves and
not quite the obstacles fhey seem; some, indeed, cry out for a-rational, if our sense of identity in both time and space. If history is looked upon as
not non-rational, techniques, and concepts like judgement, leadership, perpetual flux, with familiar objects bobbing up regularly in the stream
empafhy and charisma always imply at fhe very least a combination of of change, the present becomes intimately connected to bofh past and
the intellectual and emotional sides of personality. Ultimately, both cog- future. It becomes possible to be aware of both difference and similar-
nitive psychology and psychoanalysis have a lot to contribute to our ity without attempting to follow a particular model. Richard Neustadt
understanding of how foreign policy decisions are and should be made. 64 and Ernest May have provided detailed and intelligent guidance for
decision-makers on how to be critically aware of history without falling
into the traps of simplistic analogy and teleology67 Even if it has to be
The Power of Historical Thinking doubted that leaders will often sit down during weekends at Camp David
or Chequers to read their manual, there is a chance that its philosophy
History provides politicians with a welcome form of structure amidst will filter down through education, staff training and generational
uncertainty, as well as a way of mobilizing public opinion behind the change.
 118 Agency Rationality in Foreign Policy 119

Much of the time decision-makers refer to history naturally and dissect their own real goals, which will inevitably be partisan as well as
unselfconsciously. Some of the time, however, they exploit it knowingly. high-minded, with some rather more feasible than others.
to make a point in foreign relations but mote often to mobilize domes- The idea of the national interest is inadequate as a guide to foreign
tic support by wrapping themselves in the national past, as it were. policy goals primarily because it is tautologous. No policy-maker is
Pageantry, anniversaries and history teaching in schools are all grist to going to declare against the interests of his or her own state (since it is
this mill and public opinion is a fairly passive recipient of what is a fonn states we are speaking of, not nations, 'raison d' eta( is the more accu-
of propaganda. Defeats and crises, victories and revolutions, imperial rate term) and therefore all can be assumed to be pursuing in a general
pride and imperial guilt all provide fertile ground for connecting current sense the national interest. The real question is, paraphrasing James
policy to the most potent symbols of national life. Rosenau, 'which interests are deemed to be national, and why?' 69 The
In any area of public policy those responsible have to strike a balance analysis of subjective and competing versions of the national interest
between being too insouciant about the past and being dominated by it. then leads us into the important areas of ideology, values and private
It is not rational either to expect a tabula rasa or never to admit the possi- interests. Indeed, in this writer's view the national interest is not some-
bility of change. In any case, subjective conceptions of what history does thing that can be usefully objectified in terrns of power, security, pros-
or does not mean will always have a significant bearing on what decisions perity, independence and the like, all of which can be taken for granted
get taken. Decision-makers would therefore be well-advised to distinguish as the high level goals of all state foreign policy, but which lead to dis-
between three kinds of legacy, in terrns of their own freedom of choice agreement as soon as discussion becomes more specific. Rather, it is
and ability to act: those so deeply engrained, in institutions, dispositions only of use as a measuring stick. On the one hand it enables us to judge
or culture as to be virtually ineradicable by acts of policy - such as the whether a given policy is genuinely a national, or public, collective con-
United States' current position as first power in the world; those which cern, or instead a private, group or sub-national goal masquerading as
are still deeply rooted but which might with a considerable effort be turned the former. On the other, it should help us to see whether a goal or pol-
around within a political generation - British attitudes to Europe might icy is really derived from an interest, in the sense of a stake which a
fall into this category; and those which are either relatively recent, or given unit has in a problem, as opposed to being a value, preference or
superficially established, and can therefore be averted, or manipulated mere aspiration. Both sets of distinctions are vital, but combining the
without too much difficulty- German embarrassment over the 1991 terms 'national' and 'interest' only confuses the matter.
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia is an example here 68 If a given prob- Decision-makers are not going to give up thinking in terms of the
lem is seen as having the wrong degree of rootedness in the past - too national interest overnight. But unless they engage in more self-analysis
much or too little- problems will undoubtedly follow, as Imre Nagy trag- of their objectives they risk confusion and worse. As a British news-
ically discovered after his challenge to the Warsaw Pact's presence in paper observed of the US President during the phoney period of the
Hungary in 1956. This was not simply a matter of underestimating Soviet Gulf War,
power; Nagy got wrong Moscow's sense that history now demanded a
buffer zone against Germany. Unfortunately for Hungary, it and the other thus far Mr Bush's reasons for going to war have criss-crossed
central European states were the chosen instruments of this new history. between a bewildering variety of causes from defence of oil fields, to
upholding international law, to stamping on a new Hitler, to building
a new regional security system and upholding American values. The
Own Goals latest reason, offered by an obviously frustrated Mr. Baker [Secretary
of State], is 'to save Americanjobs'. 70
Foreign policy actors pursue different goals simultaneously, with
varying degrees of self-consciousness and clarity. When pressed they Even allowing for a certain amount of tactical obfuscation, this multiple
usually take refuge in the old notion of the national interest, which these reasoning betrayed a degree of policy uncertainty which made it more
days will not stand analytical scrutiny. They prefer to hide behind difficult to make the eventual decision to use force seem legitimate,
a screen of presumed unity and collective responsibility rather than particularly amongst those already hostile to the United States.
 120 Agency Rationality in Foreign Policy 121

It is not an argument for excessive rationality to say that decision- which are taken wholly for granted, being part of the 'habits and furni-
makers should understand the taxonomy of foreign policy goals. If they ture of our minds'; 71 those gently floated but without any real hope of
have no sense of direction or priority they will be forced back on achievement, just as the idea of unification was kept alive by the FRG
serendipity and chance. At the very least they should be able to differ- during the Cold War, but in the most discreet manner; and those which
entiate their objectives along four separate continuums. are consciously pushed as major priorities - like Vietnam's determina-
First, they should have a sense of the time-frame they wish to deal in. tion in the late 1970s to counter Chinese influence in Cambodia. Goals
A goal such as 'rolling back communism' is something that most intel- may move from one level to another, but if they do so it should always
ligent politicians would only consider as a long-term strategy; if it were be with the appropriate degree of self-consciousness and consensus.
attempted even in the middle-term it involves very high risk. China A large part of the problem that Britain has encountered over the EC in
understands re Taiwan what General Galtieri did not over the Falklands/ recent decades is the fact that some opinion-formers have stopped
Malvinas, namely that urgency will be counterproductive when others· assuming that national sovereignty is an inviolable value, without tak-
conceptions of vital interest are at stake. Conversely, an overly long- ing enough voters with them. Conversely, Anwar Sadat paid the ulti-
term perspective can lead to missed opportunities, as some people argue mate price in Egypt because he shifted his country's foreign policy
is now the case with the British government's 'wait and see' policy on objectives away from the destruction of Israel towards compromise.
the European single currency. The most difficult assessments fall into In doing this he could not have been clearer, but he also misjudged
the middle-range category, that is, within the maximum period of a the extent to which such a change required advance preparation of the
democratic government's life. All new policies have to start somewhere, ground at home.
but if a government starts down a difficult road towards a destination This brings us to the third continuum, that of the values at stake.
it has little chance of reaching, it must expect problems. The classic case Decision-makers, but also the citizens who criticize them, often fail to
in recent years is Turkey, which has kept pressing for membership of distinguish between their own state's particular stakes, and those which
the EU without any real chance of success. This has produced angry dis- involve all participants in the international system. This is Arnold
appointment at home, and persistent conflicts with the governments Wolfer's distinction between 'possession' and 'milieu' goals, and it
seen as responsible for a veto on Turkey. Ankara might have been comes close to (but is not identical with) the difference between poli-
better advised to have accepted that the question of entry would be kept cies which for the most part can be pursued unilaterally and those which
on the back burner while extracting a high price from the EU Member- require multilateral, if not universal, action. 72 At either level the concern
States for doing so. can be revisionist or conservative, that is, fOr perceived improvements
The second continuum is that of explicitness. All actors display a or to stop things being changed. But it makes a huge difference, for
difference between their declaratory and their operational goals, that is example, as to whether a state's concern is principally to see the United
between those they claim in public and those they are really pursuing. Nations become a more effective player in international politics by, say,
Nor is this a matter of the contrast between open, democratic regimes reforming the Security Council, or just to maintain/acquire its own seat:
and deceitful autocracies. Few foreign policies have been more trans- Naturally the preferred position is to bring the selfish and the collective
parently clear in their ultimate aim than those of Hitler or Mussolini, interest into line, particularly in terms of public relations, but it is an
while Britain, France and Israel each had well-disguised hidden agen- illusion to suppose that this can be done for most states most of the time.
das during the Suez crisis of 1956. Governments of any colour can At this point the analysis can no longer be restricted to ends; means
sometimes be unaware that their actual criteria have drifted away from are inherently part of the equation. For few actors are indifferent to the
those they are publicly known for. It is no surprise that Joschka Fischer, ways in which they (and certainly others) pursue their goals, particu-
as Germany's Foreign Minister, maintains the rl)etoric of his Green larly when they affect others, as by definition they almost always do in
Party origins while pursuing policies barely distinguishable from those a world where there is no longer any terra nulla. If the best way forward
of his FDP predecessor. is seen to be the acquisition and insouciant use of power, then equal and
In terms of explicitness, goals fall into three main categories which opposite reactions will usually be forthcoming. At the opposite extreme,
in practice are often confused: those, like the United States' world role, if considerations of power are wholly neglected, not only is it unlikely
 122 Agency Rationality in Foreign Policy 123

that the desired aims will be achieved but it is quite possible that the for influence. For example it took the EC states some years to realize
status quo will change for the worse. This was most obviously the case the practical importance, in order to move on the Middle East peace
with Belgium and the Netherlands in the late·l930s. It will be noted that process, not just of shaping attitudes in Washington as well as Tel Aviv.
these two end points of the continuum of values, what Wolfers called but also of congressional and public opinion within the United States.
'the pole of power and the pole of indifference', correspond to power Within the EC, likewise, Mrs Thatcher showed increasing frustration as
politics and the balance of power on the one hand, and isolationism and it became ever clearer that she had no real idea of whom to intluence
introversion on the other.7 3 Neither, in these times, can be seriously among the Twelve if she wanted to give her own views a better chance
counted as foreign policy strategies in its own right; they are rather ten- of success. Italian leaders, by contrast, understood much more clear! y
dencies which some states lean towards more than others, partial means the importance of keeping open lines of communication to Paris and
towards more: substantive ends. Bonn, and were accordingly able to play a much weaker hand more
Despite this qualification, it is of the highest importance for a given effectively. More dramatically, had President Truman realized in the
set of decision-makers to consider whether or not a given value is par- autumn of 1950 how crucial it was to convince China that his policy was
ticular to their unit, shared with a like-minded group or genuinely uni- neither to reunify Korea nor to undermine the Chinese revolution, he
versal. All too often policies suffer from ethnocentrism in assuming that might have been able to avoid Beijing's military intervention and
the interests of x coincide with those of the whole society of states, or the appalling waste of life on all sides which followed over the next
in the reverse circumstances when a general consensus fails to take three years.
account of the view of a particular state in a crucial position, as when The targets of foreign policy will vary, from individual states to
Malta's acceptance of the Helsinki Accords was wrongly taken for elements within a state, from whole groups of governments to transna-
granted in 1974-5. The most dramatic examples of this kind of category tional actors. What is important is not to be blundering about in the dark
error in foreign policy come when a state decides to crusade abroad as to whom or what one is trying to communicate with and/or influence.
for its own set of domestic values. Attempting to export your own In this respect the point is the same as with the other three parts of the
values according to a parochial sense of self-righteousness is always taxonomy offoreign policy goals. Nothing is fixed in stone; goals are in
a recipe for conflict and usually for disaster, whether conducted by a constant and necessary evolution. But serious blurring either within or
great power seeking to recast the whole system (Napoleonic France, across the categories mentioned will usually cause problems. If nuclear
the Wilsonian United States) or a smaller state in the grip of revolution- non-proliferation, or human rights, are thought to be desirable goals to
ary fury (Gaddafi 's Libya in the 1970s, Taliban Afghanistan in the be pursued in the long-term, but particular targets are then singled out
late 1990s). according to the exigencies of the moment, a whole new raft of prob-
Perhaps more mundane and more common is simply deciding on lems will suddenly spring up. If a short-term goal, deemed urgent, is
where the boundary of the like-minded, or the region, stops. The pursued without it being made sufficiently explicit or communicated to
Organization of African Unity has been weakened by uncertainties over the relevant other party, as was the case with the Soviet attempt to assist
the degree of common purpose shared by its sub-Saharan and north Cuba with missiles in 1962, it is not wholly surprising if a crisis results.
African members, just as the Organization of American States has been Even retrospectively, if we want to evaluate the success of a foreign
by disputes over whether or not to include Cuba. The European Union policy we need to be able to know how directly the policy was being
is in a deep state of uncertainty as to how far it can enlarge itself to the pursued, in what time frame, and on what criteria. This should not be
east without changing its fundamental character. So a foreign policy has too much to ask even of a bounded rational actor.
often been launched more on the basis of hoping for the best than of a
clear-sighted appreciation of who, and which values, might· actually be Avoiding the Worst
served by the action in question.
The last continuum of foreign policy goals is that of the specific /Gr- Bearing in mind the many constraints on decision-makers deriving from
gets of action, and the same kind of problems occur here. For any given their multiple environments - bureaucratic, political, psychological,
policy it usually matters a great deal as to who or what is being targeted external - it almost seems absurd to expect them to behave rationally.
124 Agmcy Rationalhy in Foreign Policy 125

Certainly the classic picture of a group operating on the basis of clearly would, more often than not, lead to serious problems in foreign policy: 7'
thought-through goals, leading to choices made on maximum information acting on impulse, or whim; failing to ensure a basic level of inter-
in conditions of calm, will only come near the truth on rare occasions. departmental coordination; disregarding the need for good quality infor-
And yet it seems equally invalid to abandon the idea of rationality alto- mation and analysis; neglecting cohsequences beyond the immediate;
gether, in favour of a chaotic picture of stochastic decision-making. failing to communicate intentions and vital interests to other actors;
Leaders themselves tend to believe they are acting rationally, and citi- failing to ensure domestic support, Naturally there is no one-to-one
zens have to trust that they are being governed on that basis, What is correspondence between the occurrence of one of these pathologies
more, most governments set broad strategic directions within which and policy failure, Indeed, some may at times be turned to advantage,
bureaucratic and domestic politics (each with its own, subordinate especially in making possible rapid and counter-intuitive actions, But
logic) take place, How then, are we to make sense of the tension persistence in them is very likely to be counterproductive, The career of
between the persistent aspiration to rationality and the practical imped- Adolf Hitler is the supreme case in point,
iments to its achievement? This negative approach, through clearing the ground of sloppiness in
One way forward is to accept that substantive rationality is impossi- decision-making, might be thought nearer to mere reasonableness than
ble to agree on, Who can say if it is inherently rational for a developing to rationality, It is not, however, a trivial matter, as self-indulgence in
country like Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons, or for a rich one like official decision-making is likely to be serious in terms of outcomes, not
Switzerland to hold on to neutrality, given the political judgements least for the masses who bear the consequences of high-level foul-ups,
which immediately come into play? Even lowering our sights to proce- In the late twentieth century an increasing proportion of foreign policy-
dural rationality does not remove all the problems, as Steiner has makers recognize that they have a responsibility both to their own citi-
shown. In some circumstances we may need to trust in the intuition and zens and to the international system as a whole, They therefore should
emotional capabilities of our leaders, which goes against the grain of the not conduct themselves in an 'irresponsible' manner, that is by taking
cerebral, knowledge-based paradigm nonnally associated with the word excessive risks in the manner in which potentially explosive issues are
'rational', The modernity which the West has given to the world is dis- decided, Linklater puts this in a wider context by arguing that rational-
trustful of chance, superstition and fate, and puts a premium on the abil- ism requires an acceptance of 'multiple communities of discourse
ity to control actions and the environment. This approach has many [which] can promote new relations between universality and differ-
achievements to its name, but even in natural science breakthroughs ence' ,75 However that might be - and it is devoutly to be wished - if
often occur by short-circuiting recommended procedures, those responsible for official policy consciously try to put aside those
The study of foreign policy suggests that the best way out of this approaches to making decisions which downgrade thought, empathy,
impasse may be to invert the usual process and to ask whether or not we consultation and clarity, they will be demonstrating a commitment
can identify those approaches to policy-making which are positively towards reasonableness and responsibility in this most dangerous of
irrational, and for which the risks far outweigh the occasional possible arenas, international politics, without limiting themselves to the higher
benefit. This will primarily involve matters of procedure, but there is selfishness of concern for their own society alone, As Vertz,berger has
also a certain convergence of procedure with substance, in that the pointed out, 'to recognize that decisionmakers cannot always be opti-
extremes of irrationality are undoubtedly associated in international mally rational,, does not preclude judging their responsibility,, the
relations with the tendency to use the state as a private instrument, price of power and authority is responsibility, no matter what', 76
regardless of the wishes of its citizens, and with a proclivity for hostil- We shall see in Part III how a sense of responsibility pulls in differ-
ity towards foreigners, Most observers would regard these tendencies as ent ways, and how the tension between internal and external con-
irrational to a degree that goes far beyond the miscalculation over the stituencies can to some extent only be resolved by a philosophical
ends-means relationship. discussion of the ethics of foreign policy. Nonetheless, decision-makers
Thus, although we cannot specify, say, that 'multiple advocacy' is still need some guidance on praxis, and whether they use the word or
inherently rational and always desirable in decision-making, we should not they will usually cast around for a 'rational' approach, in terms of
be on surer ground in arguing that the following types of behaviour how best to translate values into achievements, And in this respect the
126 Agency

now extensive foreign policy analysis literature suggests two broad

conclusions: first, that since it is all too easy to confuse ends with 6
means, or different types of goals with each other, a degree of self-con-
sciousness is to be recommended, with basic assumptions being thought
through and articulated, both by individuals and groups- decision-mak- Implementation: Translating
ers would then stand a better chance of being able to hold to a strategy
without being blown off course by the multi-layered politics in which Decisions and Capabilities
they are perpetually engaged, or entangled in their own overlapping
goals. For example EU leaders really should have thought through more into Actions
clearly what they wanted to achieve with the policy of eastern enlarge-
ment, and what the trade-offs with other goals would be, before com-
mitting themselves at Copenhagen in 1993 to what has turned out to be
an increasingly messy and difficult process. Second, they should adopt
what we might call 'flexi-planning', that is, setting broad strategies
without specifying too much detail, and without being excessively com-
mitted to them where things are evidently not working out. A general
openness of thought and process is desirable if obstacles are to be If the problem of agency in international politics is in the first place a
circumvented and new possibilities are to be exploited. A sense of matter of identifying the decision-makers who make a difference, and
direction, however, together with a broad coherence of activity, is indis- those to whom they are responsible, the dimension of implementation
pensable in most human endeavours, and medium-term planning need must not be neglected. We must ask whether decisions once taken do get
not be a straitjacket. translated into the actions they imply, or whether what is actually done
Thus the notion of rationality need not be abandoned altogether, so is the product of delay, distortion and a further round of political con-
long as it is not interpreted too narrowly or too prescriptively. In foreign flict. A great deal of literature now exists which suggests the latter pic-
policy the stakes are certainly too high to risk a conduct of affairs which ture is far nearer to the truth than the former, which is peddled by
dispenses with, or even just downgrades, the values associated with rea- politicians and, not unreasonably, expected by the public.
son and rational process. There are many examples from the twentieth Implementation has two distinct aspects: that of slippage between
century alone of what happens when rationality is out of proportion, political decision and administrative execution, and that of the capacity
at one extreme scorned and at the other elevated to the status of science. to do what is intended, given the limitations of the capabilities and
It should be seen as a vital background value, not a godhead to worship instruments at the disposal of foreign policy. The first is closely related
or destroy. 77 to the problem of bureaucratic politics discussed in Chapter 3, and the
current chapter accordingly gives more attention to the second. Yet
before either can be tackled the concepts of acting and action themselves
need further attention.

More than a Technicality

The first thing to say about action is that it can barely be separated con-
ceptually from the stages of decision-formulation and decision itself in
the policy process. A flow chart typically represents the process as start-
ing with the identification of a problem, continuing with the collection

127
128 Agency Implementation 129

of information, followed by the formulation of options, until the point the military, the economic and the cultural- but they are almost always
of decision is reached. The implementation phase, wheri action occurs, used either in combination or with some potential held in reserve. The
is then something of a coda, consequential on the taking of decisions_ differential uses of these instruments will be analysed in the main part
Quite apart from the fact that such a picture sets up the ideal-type of of this chapter, but except in a highly structured relationship between
rationality heavily qualified in Chapter 4, it also makes the various like-minded states (as, for instance, in trade relations between the
stages of policy-making seem rather more separated than they tend to be United States and western Europe) it is rarely possible to compartmen-
in practice. For example, a problem can arise out of a state's own deci- talize, to deny oneself recourse to the full range of possible pressures.
sions, as with Cyprus's agreement in January 1997 to buy Russian Even in transatlantic relations there have sometimes been unpleasant
ground-to-air missiles, which then provoked a whole host of problems surprises, as action has suddenly spilled out of the accepted channels
for the government in Nicosia, well before any implementation. Indeed. into other, more unstable ones, as with the US pressures on sterling over
it can be sunmised that Cyprus hoped not to have to go through with the Britain's invasion of Suez in 1956, or European refusals to allow US
purchase, and was gambling on giving itself more leverage on the USA overflights for the attack on Libya in 1986. In conditions of flux the
and western Europe. 1 Similarly, a decision can itself amount to an choice of instruments becomes at once more uncertain and more cru-
action, especially when made public, as with that of Romano Prodi's cial. The Soviet Union's installation of missiles in Cuba in 1962, and
Italy in late 1996 to throw all its energies into seeking entry into the the United States' move to a DEFCON III alert of its forces during the
European common currency, in the face of widespread scepticism. That Middle East war of October 1973 both precipitated major crises.
simple expression of priority changed the environment for its partner
states, particularly Spain and Greece. Lastly, although the tenm 'action'
implies a physical, concrete set of activities, it often takes a purely lin- Power and Foreign Policy
guistic fonm. A declaration can be a demarche, or a way of changing
direction. It is no less a way of changing the political environment than Power is a foundational concept of political science and a central pillar
a movement of troops or the selling of gold reserves-' Even decisions of International Relations. Its relationship to foreign policy, however,
which are kept secret are actions in the sense that they ignite a new has been neglected, partly because foreign policy has just been sub-
chain of events, they do something (the dictionary definition of an sumed in general discussions about conflict and the rationale of the
action), even if this is not at first noticed by others. state. Hans Morgenthau 's Politics among Nations gave us the classic
Thus when confronting the problem of implementation we should billiard-ball realist view, while George Modelski's A Theory of Foreign
always be aware of the fundamental misconceptions which tend to Policy made an explicit attempt to operationalize power as the currency
attach to it. The first is that outlined above, namely that implementation in which foreign policy-makers deal. 3 The huge amount of writing
is not merely technical, but integral to the whole policy-making cycle which has subsequently appeared on power at the international level
and very often difficult to distinguish from its other phases. At the least, makes it important to take stock of what power means in the sphere of
implementation feeds back into the original decision and often also foreign policy.
begets new problems. The second arises out of the discussion conducted The practitioner seeking to act on behalf of his or her country faces
in Chapter 3: namely, the operations of the bureaucracy are important three different dimensions of power, even if it is a rare individual who
to, but not synonymous with, implementation; it was argued, further- is willing to begin, like the analyst, from first principles. These are:
more, that it is not helpful to consider bureaucrats' and politicians' roles power as an end; power as a currency, or means; and power as a con-
in foreign policy-making except in relation to each other. The third is an text, or structure.4 These themes have not always been distinguished, or
extension of the critique of classical rationality: when it comes to decid- connected up to the problem of agency. For the most part they have been
ing how to put decisions into practice, the analogies of the golf club or used to generalize about the character of international politics. What
the surgeon's scalpel are inappropriate. It is not just a matter of choosing, follows seeks to correct this imbalance.
precisely, the best tool for the job. In foreign policy there are a limited Power as an end in itself represents a popular view of politicians and
number of possible instruments - they can be classed as the diplomatic, their motives. Actors are seen as out to maximize their own personal
130 Agency Implementation 131

power, for the psychological satisfaction involved in controlling others, to coerce and to dominate. What is then done with the capacity to dom-
and for the glory, money and opportunities that come with it When act- inate may be seen as the underlying value for which power is sought But
ing on behalf of states they blur, in this view, the distinction between this is a scholastic distinction which cannot be sustained in practice when
their own aggrandizement and that of the state and come to identify the dealing with the overall careers of a Hitler or a Stalin. The most that can
fate of the latter with themselves. be said is that some dictators begin with a vision for which power is only
Needless to say, this is largely a caricatured picture. But it is not the means, even a noble vision, but that this is all too soon subordinated,
always false. There are examples of Harold Laswell's 'mad Caesars', and then forgotten, in the determination not to relinquish power once
willing to subjugate whole peoples, even continents, in the pursuit of gained. This- following Lord Acton's view of absolute power corrupt-
their personal lunacy. The very terminology assumes that orgies of ing absolutely- is now a commonly held view of Lenin, for example. On
power and cruelty were the norm in the pre-modern past and have the other hand in the context of foreign policy it must not be forgotten
become virtually unknown in our own era. 5 Both assumptions are inac- that many of those who seem intoxicated by power domestically are per-
curate. Most mediaeval rulers exercised caution, even cooperation, in fectly capable of acting prudently, even reasonably, in relation to other
foreign relations, while the twentieth century has witnessed not just the members of international society. Men like General Pinochet in Chile or
excesses of Hitler and Stalin but also those of more mundane gangster- Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya have had a shrewd sense of the limits of their
politicians, such as Saddam Hussein and Pol Pot. The truth is that while external power. Lenin himself came to power precisely because of his
individual cases of power-worship can erupt unpredictably, for most of ability to know that what could be done at home depended on accepting
the time states are in the hands of those who, however ruthless, are the need to surrender to Germany in the Great War.
essentially concerned with power for what it can do to bring them closer Arnold Wolfers' analysis of the spectrum between 'the pole of power
to objectives with a much wider reach. Even Hitler had far higher ambi- and the pole of indifference' is still the most useful way of approaching
tions than the mere accumulation of power for its own sake. He had a the problem-' Wolfers sees foreign policy actors as varying widely in
view, warped and bizarre as it was, of a particular kind of civilization to their attitudes to power, with most situated between the two extremes of
be extended across the globe, not least as the best way of destroying the an obsession with an all-out struggle for power on the one hand and an
twin evils of communism and international finance capital. 6 The apparent indifference to that same struggle (as with Switzerland) on the
advance of the Nazi Party was identified with this vision. other. In most cases, says Wolfers, 'to treat the quest for power, posi-
Even when leaders may seem to be pursuing an improvement in their tively or negatively, outside the context of ends and purposes which it is
international power position (or what is known these days as 'relative expected to serve ... robs it of any intelligible meaning and also makes
gains') for its own sake, there are always implicit questions to be it impossible to judge its appropriateness or excessiveness'. 9 One of
answered about the extent and the nature of the expansion. How much these very ends, however, is the 'security dilemma' of which Wolfers
power is enough? For the relatively small numbers of the megalomaniac also talks, following Rousseau and anticipating Kenneth Waltz, namely
tendency the problem is that they are precisely incapable of such that in an uncertain world the craving for security makes most leaders
rational calculations; any gain simply whets the appetite for more. But seek an insurance policy against unforeseen dangers, some margin of
by the same token, those who pursue revisionist ends while accepting capacity over that which is necessary in a stable environment. 10 Thus
some limits are almost certainly concerned with specific objectives and power becomes important both in its basic sense of the ability to act for
not with the drive for hegemony. Gamal Abdel Nasser, for example, oneself to achieve one's own ends, and in that of a reserve capacity to
leader of Egypt between 1954-70, was intermittently demonized in the be drawn on in crises. This is the justification for standing armed forces
West as a threat to world peace when he was in fact concerned to reassert and for the whole modem apparatus of defence policy, currency reserves
Egyptian interests and to counter the growing strength of Israel- policies and emergency powers. It is, indeed, logical and instrumental to pursue
unpalatable in many quarters, but perfectly compatible with the classi- some degree of general power. Whether it follows that policies like
cal, instrumental model of statecraft 7 Britain's Two Power Standard or the US desire for a perpetual lead over
There is a fine line between power as a value in itself and power as a the USSR were rational, rather than aggressive and counterproductive,
mea~s to an end. After all, power-worship is always to do with the desire is then a matter for debate.
132 Agency Implementation 133

Power as currency explicitly deals with the question of power as the By power as context is meant the proposition that foreign policy
means to further ends derived from other values. Model ski's econo- actors operate m an environment where they cannot sensibly disregard
mistic metaphor implies the idea of reserves discussed above and can be power (Wolfers' term 'indifference' does not quite hit the mark; even the
turned on its head to include the idea of a strong economy as the source most na·ive [Link] decision-inaker is still a politician). The waves
of power in international relations. 11 If states have both interests (I) and of theoretical attacks on realism in recent decades have led to the absurd
values (V) which they wish to preserve and project, then the two can implications not only that states are of subsidiary importance in inter-
be subsumed in the idea of core concerns (I+ V =C). These all revolve national relations but also that the uneven distribution of strength
around one or other of four universal issues- security, prosperity, iden- between them is a matter of quite minor intellectual interest. It sho~ld
tity and prestige - although they will be interpreted very diffierently be axiomatic, and without implying the whole baggage of realism, to
according to context. All will require both a measure of generalized accept that power is a critical element in all social relations, and, by def-
power, ideally with a margin of surplus in reserve, and particular kinds mthon, m pohttcs. In international relations, moreover. the means of
of resources appropriate to the purpose. attenuating the exercise of power are still only patchy, and it is a fool-
What counts as generalized power may itself change over time. A cur- hardy person who writes it out of the script.
rency only has value if it is recognized by others, and power thus always Practitioners quite commonly, and disastrously, overlook the external
has a relational element.I 2 If an adversary does not fear your warpaint, or 'realities', by which is meant simply those factors outside the control of
your nuclear weapon, or the general system stops valuing gold, or mem- the actors in question. Chamberlain in 1938-9 and Stalin in 1941 are the
bership of the UN Security Council, then your assets can rapidly waste twentiet~ century's most notorious examples, but the government of
before your eyes. One of the best examples of this is the Austro-Hungarian Cyprus m 1974, and Fran<;ois Mitterrand's economic policy in his first
Empire in the nineteenth century, when the waning mystique of historical two years in power, 1981-3, are just as relevant and probably more typ-
monarchy could no longer inspire respect among subject peoples or Ical. However elevated the actor and however limited the problem, those
abroad, leading to a final spasm of self-assertion before final collapse. 13 who Ignore the intractability of the external context risk ending up in
Just as a money supply can be fixed or inflated, and rewards can be deep water. President Clinton's humiliating about-face in Somalia in
absolute or relative (in this sense the political science use of the term 1993, unable to cope with the local warlords, simply continued the long
'relative gains' is inverted) so power in international relations can at lme of superpower embarrassments, from Yugoslavia and Vietnam to
times be zero-sum and others variable sum. If Ireland gains a given net Afghanistan and the Lebanon. It in tum has been [Link] the terror-
sum from the European Community budget then it follows that there is ISt attacks of 2001, made possible by the deep solipsism of US security
so much less for everyone else (unless the budget is expanded). culture m the 1990s. Even Henry Kissinger, the arch-priest of the
Conversely, the growing membership of the European Union might pro- rational use of power, misjudged the docility and ineffectiveness of the
duce short-term costs but long-term gains even for those who have Europeans in 1973-4, and suffered an embarrassing set-back as a result
financed enlargement. Actors have to make continual judgements as to Smaller powers find proportionately greater problems. If Finland had
which game they might be playing. Equally, when they are required to behaved towards the Soviet Union with the same cavalier disregard of
translate their strengths into action, they should be aware that power is potential threats that the Low Countries displayed in the 1930s. it would
not exercised in a vacuum, but rather over some party [Link] some pur- either have been quickly absorbed into the Warsaw Pact or have pro-
pose. Moreover, it requires an understanding as much of its limits as its voked a world crisis.
possibilities. That is, at some point the coerciveness and the threats will Those who behave in the opposite way, as if foreign policy were only
have to stop, and the dealing will have to begin. The possession of about power, are just as doomed to hit trouble. Mussolini, dazzled by
power means that one's own fate can always be determined to some the gams of war and by the dominance of his German ally, increasingly
degree. The question is, what is that degree, and what kinds of compro- parted company from his more realist foreign minister, Count Ciano. I4
mises with others can be struck? A state with many advantages on paper Ciano paid with his life for doubting the durability of these assets;
can misuse its power, whether through over- or under-estimation, if its Mussolini and thousands of others eventually paid with their Jives
leaders do not have a good sense of its scope - and its context. through the Duce 's blind faith in them. In the 1970s the Shah of Iran
134 Agency Implementation 135

believed that the combination of repression and American support made second of a pyramidal model showing the interrelationships between
his regime in Iran inviolable. In fact it simply made the violence of the the resources, capabilities and instruments of foreign policy.
revolution which overthrew him the greater. A decade later the leaders A useful starting-point in this task is the distinction between hard and
of the Soviet Union trusted too much in the formidable apparatus of soft power. 17 Hard power is that which is targeted, coercive, often
conventional power they had built. The fate of their regime is the great- immediate and physical. Soft power is that which is indirect, long-term
est single testimony to the weakness of power politics as a guide to and works more through persuasion than force. It has been defined as
action and adaptation. 'getting others to want what you want', through co-optationls Some
The context of power also means understanding structures. Susan observers take the view that hard power is becoming increasingly
Strange argued that structural power was fundamental, and that there redundant and that soft power is the way in which foreign policy will be
were four priOcipal structures in international relations, focusing on conducted in future. Carrots are replacing sticks. Be that as it may, there
security, money, trade and information. If, like the United States, a has always been a distinction between power and influence, and the
country is able to dominate one or more structures then it will have a hard/soft distinction is an evolution of that idea, as Figure 6.1 shows.
decisive role in international affairs. This is a point of great relevance to Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy arg~ed - somewhat
the present argument, in that not only do foreign policy actors have to defensively- that 'soft power does not mean wimp power'. 19 The use
cope with the power of the structure(s) in which they operate, but they of slow-acting, opinion-shaping instruments can still be a form of coer-
also have to face the issue of who has the power to set the structure(s). cion, albeit barely understood by the target. They may also need to work
Henry Kissinger has said that 'structures are instruments that do not of in conjunction with traditional means. Whereas hard power focuses on
15
themselves evoke commitments in the hearts and minds of a society'. the target itself, soft power seeks primarily to change the target's envi-
They are abstract entities. Nonetheless, both the power to act and the ronment. This is the realm, at the international level, of Vance Packard's
ability to exert power over another require an understanding of the nature 'hidden persuaders' and of agenda-setting. Governments have come to
16
of the wider context in which action has to take place. The problems of recognize more explicitly in recent years that the capacity to shape
system-dominance and system-change will be dealt with in the next images and values can have concrete pay-offs. 20 This is not to say that
chapter of this book. For the time being it is enough to note that states they no longer show interest in instruments at the hard end of the spec-
vary enormously in their ability to shape the external 'milieu'. The very trum or reap dividends from them. But the wider range of foreign
language of foreign policy- 'superpowers', 'great powers', middle policy instruments now available, and their overlap with the values of
range powers', 'small states' and 'micro-states'- is a way of trying to conflict versus cooperation, makes decisions on which route to go down
express these differentials. Indeed, it might be argued that the defimtton particularly problematical. In some societies there may be political
of a superpower is that of a state with the capacity to act globally and pressures for 'civilian' means to be used, even if the risk of failure is
the potential to change the whole system, whereas a middle power's itself likely to be high. The issues of cost and time-frame are also cenc
influence is confined to a particular region and/or issue-area. tral: military strength can be exponentially expensive; the policy of pro-
jecting a country abroad, as with the French rayonnement of language
and culture, can itself represent a major drain on the public purse.
The Spectrum of Means Diplomats are cheap by comparison. Yet the links between investment
and gain are never likely to be wholly clear. Whereas the non-use of
The problem of the means available to foreign policy-makers is not at
all as straightforward as it might seem. To be sure, a taxonomy of means
Physical
can easily be constructed and individual subjects, like economic sanc- coercion deterrence subversion propaganda culture
tions, analysed. But means are rarely so easily separable in practice, and 1
1 -''--~1----'1--,
POWERJr -'- - - - , , - - - - - - ' - - - r 1 --L...., INFLUENCE
1
they vary in the situations and time-frames in which they can be used. (Hard) Blackmail coercive sanctions diplomacy {Soft power)
diplomacy
What follows tries to address these two forms of variance and to pro-
vide some integrative framework, in the form first of a continuum, and Figure 6.1 The continuum of power in foreign policy
 '.

136 Agency 137

costly armed services at least suggests that deterrence might be work- RESOURCES
ing, favourable attitudes towards a country and its products might be the (history and
geography)
result of factors wholly separate from pubHc policy. Who needs the
Voice of America when you have Hollywood and CNN?
Most actors with the luxury of choice will prefer to have a range of
instruments at their disposal, from both hard and soft ends of the spec-
trum, and will often need to use them in combination. The measurement
of costs and benefits therefore has to be taken on trust because of this
very multifacetedness of foreign policy and because of the long time-
CAPABILITIES
lags involved. More relevant is the 'insurance policy' approach, (operational resources}
whereby states decide how much cover they need and can afford, and
which time-frame is most important to them. They then adjust their
policies and outlays as circumstances change, both for better and worse.
This was almost literally the view taken in relation to the post-1990
'peace dividend', although the inertia of alliance systems meant that it
proved surprisingly difficult to cash in on the end of the Cold War. Still,
the approach should give democratic legislatures and public opinion
some way of getting to grips with the previously arcane and over-
protected area of spending on external policy. POWER and {to) INFLUENCE What capabilities to
use for which goal
Before discussing the substance of the major instruments of foreign
policy, one last theoretical issue needs clarifying. This is the pyramidal
relationship between resources, capabilities and instruments. Figure 6.2
shows that the distinction between these three terms is far more than X's ability to compel Y
X's ability to sway Y' s
decisions
semantic.
Resources are the elements, derived from history and geography,
which constitute what Renouvin and Duroselle called the 'basic forces'
of foreign policy, which determine the limits of a country's impact on
the world - if not of its ambition 21 These include the minerals in the FORCE DETERRENCE PERSUASION DEFERENCE
ground, the fertility of the soil and the quality of the climate. Position, (the stick) (threat of force) (the carrot) (latent influence)
size (of both territory and population) and degree of development, are
all things which governments inherit and can only be changed over gen-
erations, if at all, assuming that territorial aggression is ruled out.
French governments, for example, tried strenuously to increase their
country's population size after 1870 but with very limited success.
Resources matter immensely, but they are not in themselves operational
instruments of foreign policy.
To reach the level of instruments, indeed, resources must be opera-
tionalized into capabilities. These are the recognizable elements of a
modern government's responsibilities for which separate departments
might exist and where decisions may hope to have an effect, at least
ii i i
ENDLESS VARIATIONS OF TECHNIQUE FOR ALL ASPECTS OF
THE EXERCISE OF POWER AND INFLUENCE

in the medium term. They include the armed services, technological Figure 6.2 Resources, capabilities and instruments
138 Agency Implemenrarion 139

capacity, levels of education, patterns of trade and diplomatic represen- colleagues, and the latter's advice should be taken seriously, even if it is
tation and the general strength of the nation's economy. Unlike power not always followed. If Sierra Leone had had an effective diplomatic
and its use, capabilities tend to be measurable, and decisions need tak- cadre, for example, its 27-year-old president would probably not have
ing continually to shape their character and evolution. Such decisions come within an ace of expelling the ambassador of its biggest aid donor
usually affect foreign policy problems, but they do not always follow a (Germany) in 1993 26 For their part, the specialists are fighting a losing
foreign policy logic. Japan rebuilt its whole economy after 1945 for rea- battle if they seek to preserve a monopoly over diplomacy. They need t~
sons of survival; the unexpected consequence was the emergence of an work with their 'domestic' colleagues, not against them.
economic superpower. British financial retrenchment after 1979 inci- As a means of implementing policy, diplomacy is particularly impor-
dentally damaged the effectiveness of institutions with a key external tant to weak states. With few resources they have little choice but to play
role, such as the diplomatic service, the BBC and the universities. On a poor hand as skilfully as possible. Yet these are also the states with the
the other hand, the Soviet Union set out quite deliberately to repair its smallest and least experienced diplomatic services. As with the biblical
post-war technological vulnerability and, by major (if ultimately self- dictum that 'to those who have, more shall be given', so it is the case
defeating) efforts, managed to beat the United States into space, with that the more powerful states, with a wide range of instruments at their
both machine (Sputnik in 1957) and man (Yuri Gagarin in 1961). disposal, tend to be the most effective at the use of diplomacy. Yet all
Capabilities, however, do not provide decision-makers with manage- kinds of state rely on diplomacy for the bulk of their external activity,
able instruments, which amount to what Don Puchala called 'externally and as the crucial conduit through which other means can be funnelled.
projectable power' 22 While being both more numerous and more specific Most radical governments start with Trotsky's intention of 'issuing
than capabilities instruments fall into four broad categories: diplomatic, some revolutionary proclamations to the people and then shut up the
military, economic and cultural. Coercive (hard) strategies draw on instru- shop', but soon turn to conventional diplomatic methods as part oh:om-
ments from the first three of these categories, and persuasive (soft) strate- ing to terms with an unignorable outside world. For diplomacy turns out
gies may use all four? 3 Endless varieties of technique exist for any given to be an inherent part of any kind of action, from serious crisis ('crisis-
instrument, none of which should be allowed to run ahead of capabilities. management') through tough negotiations (the Oslo Accords on the
Each instrument has its own distinctive problems of agency. Middle East) to routine, 'low' politics (diplomatic exemptions from
parking fines). Only unsophisticated regimes conclude that they can
rely on the self-executing effects of power, unmediated by diplomacy.
Diplomacy There are four functions which diplomacy in this broad sense per-
forms for the international actor: communication; negotiation; participa-
Diplomacy is the human face of getting your own way in international tion in multilateral institutions; and the promotion of economic goods.
politics, as well as a crucial instrument for building international stabil- The four are continuous, unavoidable, and to an extent, overlapping.
ity. In these two competing roles lies the source of much of the argu- The key function of communication does not mean, as is too often
ment over whether diplomacy is anachronistic and reactionary, or irenic assumed, miscommunication. To be sure, any independent actor has to
and indispensable. The confusion is compounded because of the fact keep some information private in order to serve its own ends the better.
that most diplomatic agency is still the preserve of states, with the UN Key judgements on the timing of initiatives and concessions are simply
Secretary General and other international civil servants outnumbered not possible in conditions of publicity. But this does not mean that
and themselves hemmed in by intergovernmentalism 24 proactive deception makes for good diplomacy. Harold Nicolson
Professional diplomats do not, however, have a monopoly on diplo- pointed out over sixty years ago that policy should be in the open even
macy. As we saw in Chapter 4, many parts of the state machinery, apart if negotiation required contidentiality27 Indeed, if long-term intentions
from the ministry of foreign affairs, now engage in international rela- are not communicated clearly to both friends and adversaries the
tions. 25 As such, they have many openings to practise diplomacy in their consequences can be disastrous. In his unjustly neglected first book,
dealings with foreign counterparts. In this respect all agents of the state Robert Jervis showed how actors read each other's intentions from a
should be aware of the considerations important to their diplomat combination of signals (deliberate) and indices (inherent characteristics,
140 Agency Implementation 141

not intentionally manipulated, such as monthly trade figures). 28 Unfor- on the outcome, as with the Paris Peace Talks at the end of the Vietnam
tunately both are easy to misread even when not manipulated. Ambiguity War, or the build-up to the Oslo Accords of 1993, tl1e identity of indi-
is so quintessential to diplomacy that governments need to be highly vidual diplomats, and their degree of experience, may tum out to be cru-
self-conscious about the signals they wish to send on matters of impor- cial. In other negotiations, such as almost all those on arms control
tance. Did the United Kingdom, for example, intend to distance itself between the superpowers, or in those between Britain and China over
so significantly from the original Six when it sent only a junior official Hong Kong between 1982-4, and again in the 1990s, considerable
to the Messina Conference of 1955? When six years later the Macmillan stamina is required, together with a deep understanding of the culture of
government decided to apply for entry to the European Economic Com- the interlocutorY Even on what might seem a secondary matter such as
munity it had an uphill struggle in part because of the negative messages Switzerland's discussions with third parties over what to do about the
conveyed by such off-hand gestures. Conversely, when General de gold stored in its vaults which had been stolen from victims of the
Gaulle shouted 'vive /e Quebec libre' from the balcony of the Montreal Holocaust, both negotiating ability and a wide range of technical expert-
City Hall in 1967 he intended to demonstrate support for French Canada ise were required in order to deal with the legal, political and moral
but had probably not envisaged provoking the diplomatic crisis dimensions of relations with Israel, the United States, the United
with Ottawa which ensued. 29 Even more seriously, one can narrate Kingdom and many other states. Negotiation in the international envi-
the onset of the two world wars quite plausibly in terms of signals ronment, in other words, is now less than ever a game for the gifted
wrongly calibrated and misunderstood. Certainly the nature and timing amateur.
of the outbreak of both conflicts owed much to failures of diplomatic Diplomacy in multilateral institutions is an important part of any for-
communication. 30 eign policy. States, and indeed non-state actors who increasingly have
As an instrument of policy, diplomacy also has the capacity to be a access to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), have to know how to
force for sophistication and caution, as the European Left began to real- conduct themselves in an environment which requires a balancing of
ize in the 1980s after decades of berating appeasement. It is a way of national concerns with the purposes for which the !GO exists in the first
breaking log-jams and avoiding the risks and costs of violence, so long place. Part of this involves coalition-building and the maintenance of
as not everything is wagered on its success. Without skilful diplomacy diplomatic solidarity among like-minded states which are nonetheless
the Federal Republic of Germany would not have been able to launch subject to many centrifugal forces. Part involves balancing private nego-
Ostpolitik in the late 1960s and thus prepare the ground for eventual tiation with the posturing of a public diplomacy intended to appeal to
reunification- itself a triumph of imaginative negotiation. Similarly, hearts and minds, often across national boundaries. There are also many
only patient, pure diplomacy by Nixon and Kissinger was able finally to specialized multi-partner dialogues, such as the 93-member network
put an end to the damaging rupture between the United States and linking the European Union and states from Africa, the Caribbean
China, which, lasting from 1949-71, long outlived its original ration- and the Pacific, or the 52-member Organization on Security and
ale.31 Many key individuals, particularly in vulnerable states, have been Cooperation in Europe. The challenge here from the viewpoint of the
able to preserve their countries from potentially catastrophic conse- individual actor is to achieve collective goals, such as the transfer of
quences. The most dramatic example of this is the late King Hussein. resources to the poorest LDCs, or the stabilization of potential flash-
It is easy to think what might have happened to Jordan, caught as it points, without incurring disproportionate national costs or compromis-
is between Israel, Iraq and Syria, without his subtle ability to balance ing particular interests. Success is sometimes simply impossible, and it
relationships within the region 32 In the wider international system, can require political as well as technical flair, as the Italian Ambassador
statesmen like Tito and Nehru managed to loosen the structure of the to the United Nations, Paolo Fulci, showed in the 1990s with his effec-
Cold War and to give a voice to many smaller states by their creation of tive campaign to mobilize the smaller countries in favour of a more
the Non-Aligned Movement. Diplomatic communication in this sense 'democratic' reform of the Security Council than that represented by the
is a political activity of the highest importance. plan to admit two new members, in Germany and Japan. 34 In 1982 the
The second function of diplomacy is the capacity to conduct technical British Ambassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, had also showed the value of
negotiations, often of extreme complexity. Where a great deal hangs understanding how the UN worked, when he rushed through a Security
 142 Agency !mplemel1fation 143

Council Resolution condemning the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Assemblee Nationale recognizing the Armenian genocide of 1915."
Islands before the friends of Buenos Aires could mobilize. Multinational enterprises may have more turnover than many states, but
Economic diplomacy is ever more important. It derives from the need they still have to engage in complex and often costly diplomacy with
to promote national prosperity and to conduct a foreign economic governments in order to secure rights to build bridges, drill for oil, beam
policy to that end. Much of it derives from the 'management of inter- in satellite programmes and buy up parts of the economy deemed strate-
dependence', through organizations like the OECD, G8, IMF and World gically important. It is no wonder that political consultancy, or nsk
Bank, and is thus subject to the same observations as those made imme- analysis, has been one of the fastest-growing corporate sectors in the
diately above. But here more sharply than the UN most states face the past twenty years. TNEs, like states, cannot do their business without
hegemony problem, or how to deal with the preponderance of the engaging in politics and therefore in diplomacy ~ with each other, and
United States. In extremis this means negotiating from a position of with states.
weakness in the pursuit of loans or the rescheduling of debts, as even
Britain discovered in 1976. It means trying to preserve as much of sov-
ereign independence as possible without forgoing the desired help~ a The Military Arm
recipe for internal upheaval, as Argentina discovered in 2001. Arguably
most western European states managed to do this in the discussions If the use of force is always political, as Clausewitz famously asserted,
over the proffered Marshall aid in 1947~8, but Soviet diplomacy was then foreign policy almost always carries with it the implicit threat of
not sufficiently confident or adept to be able to bind in the United States force. Not violent force, necessarily, as the 'democratic peace' between
to commitments while retaining its own commitment to socialist eco- OECD states currently illustrates. But some implication of possible
nomic planning35 threats and coercion is ever-present in international politics. This is, in
Most economic diplomacy is, however, more routine than Marshall effect, blackmail, and it can take many forms, from the United States
aid or an IMF visitation. It consists in giving a boost to the export efforts threatening to ban the import of cashmere sweaters from Scotland to
of the country's enterprises and attracting the inward investment which Yeltsin 's warnings of conflagration if NATO intervened in Serbia.
will produce jobs. Japan was the most effective state in the post-war Sometimes, therefore, diplomacy is more coercive than cooperative;
period at forging a public~private partnership in export promotion, but just as military force is usually more implicit than actual. This overlap
the German government has also succeeded in managing capitalism between diplomacy and force is what has been termed 'coercive diplo-
both at home and abroad to the direct benefit of its population. Britain macy' by Alexander George and his colleagues. 39 As we saw WI'th t h e
under Thatcher and her successors has been able to attract a surprising theoretical analysis of power, threats to withdraw ambassadors, impose
flow of inward investment, helped by legislation to weaken the labour economic sanctions or subject a state's population to a barrage of prop-
movement and a limited, but strategically important, number of inter- aganda are no less coercive in purpose than threats to invade or mount
ventions in such firms as Rover, Rolls Royce and British Aerospace, punitive air raids, even if they are designed to limit the escalation of
where there is an international dimension. Furthermore, in order to get conflict in the first instance.
contracts abroad various governments resort to under-the-counter Those threats which, by contrast, carry an explicit reference to possi-
promises of development or military assistance, which risks legal and ble military action if the target does not comply always risk events spin-
political embarrassment if the news becomes public. 36 It can only work ning wildly out of control. They are a gamble on big returns and big
if decision-making is strongly centralized and lacking in transparency. losses, which is why cautious democratic decision-makers are usually
For its part the private sector usually welcomes he! p from the state, so averse to them, while less restricted autocrats will at times be unable to
long as it is not too discriminatory. Export credit support is effectively resist the temptation. In relations between states not already entwined,
a form of subsidy, and diplomats often have valuable local contacts. whether by formal pact or sheer political proximity, the possibility of
Thus British firms successfully protested against cutbacks in embassy military force being used swirls darkly around the periphery of events.
staff in the Gulf in 1993." Conversely, French commercial relations This in itself can be a discipline for rational policy-makers, but the mere
with Turkey were damaged by the bill which went through the existence of sizeable armed forces and military expertise is a standing
 144 Agency Implementation 145

reminder of the fact that there is always one instrument in reserve if triumphalism has passed. This means the military is often regarded as
diplomacy does not work. just another part of the state bureaucracy. It is worth examining in a lit-
'Diplomatic history is littered with conflicts that escalated far beyond tle more detail, however, the differing possibilities of revisionism and
the goals either party initially perceived to be in conflict as a result of deterrence which they represent for foreign policy-makers, given the
needlessly severe coercive tactics employed by one or both parties' 40 special autonomy and access to resources the military enjoy.
The work of many authors shows that although the threat of military So far as revisionism is concerned, or a state's ability to improve its
force sometimes works, it is also likely to lead to its protagonists sur- perceived position, it is an unfortunate truth that military force does on
rendering their initial control over their own actions, as they become occasions work. Even in the post-1945 era there have been many exam-
squeezed between unforeseen reactions abroad and the expectations ples: Israel in occupying and holding onto new territory from 1967:
unleashed at home. Force can be threatened in secret, as with Prime India in occupying Goa in 1961 and creating Bangladesh in 1971:
Minister James Callaghan's successful deterrence of an Argentine inva- Turkey in dividing Cyprus in 1974; Serbia and Croatia in gaining terTi-
sion of the Falklands in 1977 by dispatching a small taskforce to the tory from Bosnia between 1992-5; the United States in changing the
South Atlantic, but secrecy will rarely prove feasible for long. President regimes in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Grenada in 1983. These
Kennedy conducted the first part of the Cuban missile crisis in private, examples could be multiplied- but equally, they could be countered by
but journalists got wind of the lights burning late in the State those of the failed use of force. The Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin
Department, and after only a week some public announcement became in 1948, and invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 both back-fired; the
inevitable. The possibility of humiliation in the eyes of the world thus United States suffered humiliations in Cuba in 1961, Vietnam between
became a dangerous extra pressure towards escalation. 41 In the seven 1964-75, and Iran in 1980; North Korea, Argentina and Iraq all
cases studied by George and Simons, only two (Laos 1961-2 and Cuba launched invasions which were then reversed.
1962) are seen as examples of successful coercive diplomacy. The other The conclusions to be drawn from this mixed record are fourfold:
five (pressure on Japan in 1941 before Pearl Harbor, on North Vietnam (i) the overwhelming, decisive and short-term use of force can work;
in 1965, on Nicaragua under Ronald Reagan, on Libya in 1986 and on (ii) force is only an option for the already powerful, but even then success
Iraq in 1990-1) display more evidence of dangerous complications is far from guaranteed; (iii) the use of anned force is increasingly seen
than of productive results. At the most, the authors conclude, coercive as dangerous and unacceptable by the international community, because
diplomacy 'is highly context dependent'. 42 it tends to sow more dragons' teeth for the future; states are therefore
If this is true for the threat of military action, it is even more so for ever more concerned that their actions should be legitimized, usually by
the actual use of force. One of the reasons why Saddam Hussein did not the United Nations; (iv) force is more likely to work when the apple is
soften under the pressure of coercive diplomacy between August 1990 already so ripe as to be about to fall- that is, when the target is already
and 15 January 1991 was that he did notbelieve that the US and its allies vulnerable. Given these factors, decision-makers should regard the
would risk the dangers of unleashing war. In this he was mistaken, and use of their armed forces more as an exceptional eventuality than as one
his army was quickly driven out of Kuwait by overwhelming force once of the principal instruments of their foreign policy. Conversely, it is
the ultimatum had expired. It remains true, however, that the use of vio- foolish in the extreme to rule it out ab initio, as NATO did with ground
lence is evidence of the failure of foreign policy, even where it succeeds troops in the conflict over Kosovo in 1999. There are some actions,
spectacularly, and it may have long-term consequences which are both unfortunately, which just cannot be reversed by other means.
harmful and unforeseeable. Military action can cut through the Gordian The same sorts of consideration, particularly those relating to the
knot which diplomacy has failed to unravel, but it also rarely 'solves possibility of acts back-firing, apply to the variant of military force
problems in the sense of relegating conflicts to the history books. It which we call subversion. The assumption that even a superpower can
often simply postpones their recrudescence and exacerbates them. 43 manipulate the evolution of another society by covert means is a dubi-
Armed forces are a relatively crude instrument, whether used proac- ous one. It is likely that in the long run subversion breeds even more
tively or, as is more often the case, as a deterrent. For most states most antagonism and resistance than invasion and occupation, which do at
of the time success consists in their not being used. The age of military least clarify the nature of the enemy. The US Cold War involvements in
146 Agency lmplemelltation 147

Latin America (notably Guatemala, Chile and El Salvador) and in Iran Why is this? The answers are straightforward. First, even with modem
left Washington with a legacy of profound hatred that will take decades technology, the costs of an advanced research programm_e _o_n nucl~<.u
lo fade 44 Revolutionary Iran, Libya and Afghanistan all over-played warheads, including testing, security and delivery are proh1bltlvely h1gh
their hands with their encouragement of transnational terrorism ...t.."i for all but the richest or most detem\ined. Second, developing a nuclear
This strategy simply exacerbated divisions within the Islamic world. weapon is a most dangerous step. It will create fear in neighbours, draw
Apartheid South Africa's ruthless interventions in the neighbouring the artention of the great powers and possibly lead to the kind of pre-
black-ruled states probably hastened its own demise by reinforcing the emptive strike that the USSR is rumoured to have considered against
solidarity of the front-line stales and their links to the AN C. Subversion. China in 1969, and which Israel actually carried out against Iraq in
in short, like most forms of violent attack, can succeed in its own terms. 1981. Third, nuclear weapons have only marginal utility. They are only
But the costs are no less high for being delayed. likely to be of use in deterring a nuclear attack, given that the outrage
The military arm is more conventionally deployed for reasons of caused by a nuclear power even threatening to use its weapons aga_mst
defence and deterrence. The full range of anned services fulfils this a state not possessing them would be enough to plunge the world mto
function, but the term deterrence is particularly associated with nuclear crisis. They tend to be seen as weapons of last resort by societies that
weapons. This is an error in the sense that certainly no more than a dozen can imagine themselves in desperate straits. This is why the white
states possess deliverable nuclear weapons, declared or undeclared, out government in South Africa developed some limited nuclear capacity,
of around 190 in the world. Why do some see nuclear weapons as indis- as has Israel, but Sweden, Australia, Nigeria, Thailand and many others
pensable, and others as irrelevant to their security? The answers are feel no such compulsion.
largely to be found in history and in strategic position. The United States, Conventional deterrence is a far more common and useful instrument
Britain and the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons as a direct con- of policy. When it does not work, then actual defence capabilities come
sequence of the need to defeat Hitler. They have found, partly through into play, and states vary enormously in their ability to protect them-
the competition of the Cold War which then immediately ensued, that it selves against attack, depending on the size and quality of their armed
is much more difficult to relinquish nuclear weapons than to gain them. forces, but also their inherent degree of vulnerability. Canada, for exam-
Nuclear disarmament has seemed to all three at times desirable in prin- ple, needs only a limited naval capacity for self-protection, assuming
ciple, but too likely lo send signals of weakness in practice. And large that the United States is not only no enemy but that It also prov1des a
vested interests have grown up around the nuclear armouries. nuclear umbrella. For the most part foreign and defence policy are
For its part, China acquired nuclear weapons as a consequence of its intended to work hand in hand so that a potential adversary always
deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and the fear that Moscow thinks twice before risking aggression. This is certainly Israel's strategy,
might launch a pre-emptive strike against it. This dyadic dynamic has which has succeeded beyond expectations. Despite its numerical inferi-
been repeated in the symmetrical acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel ority with respect to its enemies, the strength of Israel's conventional
and Egypt (both determinedly kept secret, however) and more recently by forces, demonstrated four times in battle since 1948, has led Egypt and
India and Pakistan. Argentina and Brazil were at one point going down Jordan to make peace, and Syna and Iraq to behave With great cautiOn.
the same road. Other states, like Iran, North Korea and Iraq have also This is independent of the strategic support which Israel receives from
made some moves towards acquiring nuclear weapons, although whether the United States. A limited use of military power may also be seen as
out of fear of attack or to induce fear in others is not wholly clear. The necessary for exemplary reasons, as when China briefly invaded
United States and its allies have taken an increasingly strong line as self- Vietnam to remind its assertive smaller neighbour of the realities of the
appointed enforcers of nuclear non-proliferation in recent years, which regional power balance in 1979.
has raised the costs significantly for any state wishing to cash in on its In this way the defensive functions of military force all too easily blur
theoretical sovereign right to acquire such weapons. into its offensive side, and the risks of any perceived military threat
Most states, however, have given no serious consideration to the can be readily seen. The military instrument is qualitatively different
possibility, and indeed see every virtue in promoting the nuclear from the other instruments of foreign policy in the threat it bears and
non-proliferation regime inaugurated by the multilateral treaty of 1968. the risks it unleashes. Even the build-up of apparently defensive arms in
 148 Agency Implementation 149

peacetime can be seen as an act of aggression and lead at best to unsta- heart of economic statecraft. Firms are often deeply unhappy about the
ble anns races and at worst to pre-emptive strikes. For this reason secu- restrictions imposed by boycotts and embargoes; governments see pri-
rity needs to be understood in a much wider and longer-term perspective vate industry as engaged in subversive sanctions-busting. Public money
than that provided by conventional defence analysis. 46 The history of can be used as sweeteners to obtain contracts for private enterprise
Alsace-Lorraine between 1870 and 1945, when it changed hands four where the 'national' interest may be less than clear; 'trade' can pioneer
times between France and Germany, shows that defence, even if elabo- a path where the 'flag' can only follow later. Moreover, despite the
rate, and deterrence, however formidable, do not in themselves produce ambiguities of the public-private relationship from the point of view of
more than short-term results. The problem was only finally resolved by the actor, from that of the recipient the distinction may seem trivial and
the complete remaking of the international politics of western Europe, the reality that of external pressure, even neo-colonialism.
and by the use of other instruments altogether, primarily economic and From whichever viewpoint economic instruments are viewed there
cultural, within that new structure. Military power is therefore at once a can be little doubt that they are slow-moving in their impact, and more
dramatically effective, even indispensable, arm of foreign policy and complex to operate in an era of relative laissez-faire than one of autarky,
one which is peculiarly limited, being vulnerable to ways of acting such as the 1930s, when politics and economics came together in such
which are more subtle and far-reaching in their ability to shape political straightforward demonstrations of power as the Japanese Greater Co-
and social structures. Prosperity Sphere in East Asia, and the Nazi penetration of south-eastern
Europe through tying its currencies to the Reichsmark. In the post-war
era the United States provided the liquidity vital for international recon-
Economic Statecraft47 struction but exacted the price, through the Bretton Woods system and
the Marshall Plan, of a system of free trade and fixed exchange rates
Economic statecraft goes beyond the economic diplomacy which we which in tum was used to insulate western Europe against communist
have already described as preoccupying public officials ever more in influence and promote European integration. 49 In the current system,
their conduct of external relations. It refers to the extent to which an where capital moves far more freely and trade liberalization has become
actor can pursue its goals through the use of economic instruments, entrenched, it is far more difficult for governments either to act unilat-
even when the content of the goal is not centrally economic. It is not erally on major aspects of political economy or to disrupt the normal
about foreign economic policy in the service of economic goals, impor- workings of the market for anything less than a national emergency.
tant as that is.'8 Given the starting point of linkage between politics and That said, the use of economic sanctions has paradoxically been on the
economics, between foreign policy and the pursuit of wealth, this means increase over the past twenty years, as states have sought alternatives to
analysing the extent to which economic instruments are indeed at the the dangers of military force and the pressures for an ethical component
disposal of the state, whether as carrots, sticks, or forms of structural in foreign policy have mounted. 5°
power. Sanctions represent the sticks of economic diplomacy, and include
Most economic statecraft is a question of making some use of what the boycott of imports, embargoes on exports, restrictions on private
is happening anyway, through trade, investtnent or development aid. In business and travel and the imposition of price rises through punitive
the economic realm, only sanctions represent a purpose-built foreign duties. (See Table 6.1 below, adapted from Baldwin, Economic
policy instrument, and even they cut across existing arrangements. For Statecraft, p. 41.) Although commonly thought not to work, in the sense
ten years before the Treaty of Maastricht the European Community of not achieving their political ends, they always impose some costs on
could not decide whether sanctions were an economic or a political the target (as well as on the author), and may serve various ends beyond
phenomenon. The other economic factors have to be nudged or those officially declared. 5 1 Moreover, there have been cases where sanc-
exploited as and when possible without damaging too much their exist- tions have had a dramatic impact on international politics, even if they
ing rationale. For international economic activity derives for the most have not always been well controlled. The US threat against sterling
part from the private sector, while foreign policy is largely the business helped to bring the Suez expedition to an end abruptly in 1956, and the
of states. There is therefore an uneasy public-private relationship at the oil supply restrictions (whether directly or by price) imposed by OPEC
 150 Agency Implementation 151

Table 6.1 The range of economic sanctions (actions and threats) It is the long-run use of economic power which has the most pro-
found impact. Indeed it has proved over the past fifty years to be the
Trade Cap~tal
most effective way of pursuing foreign policy goals- so long as you are
Embargo Freezing of assets rich, powerful and capitalist. 53 The sheer strength of the economies or
Boycott Controls on capital movements north America, western Europe and Japan has given them the capacity
Tariff increase Controls on money-laundering
to penetrate every part of the globe and to project their values and way
Tariff discrimination Aid suspension
Withdrawal of 'most-favoured nation' Expropriation of life onto other societies. This is partly through the deliberate use of
(MFN) treatment carrots such as trade preferences, loans and grants on privileged terms.
Blacklist Taxation (unfavoumble) but mainly through the normal workings of commercial expansion. 5•
Quotas (import or export) Withholding dues to international Admittedly a hit-and-miss process, this has conferred significant advan-
organizations
tages which the leaders of these countries show no sign of relinquish-
Licence denial (import or export)
Dumping ing. Indeed, they have gained confidence in the historical rightness of
Preclusive buying their policies since the end of the Cold War, and it is now standard prac-
tice to insist on political 'conditionality' for all kinds of development
Glossary
Embargo prohibition on exports, sometimes used to refer to a ban on all_ trade
assistance 55 Refusals, 'del inking' and ideological hostility are still all
Boycott prohibition on imports possible for those states facing this kind of friendly blackmail, and apart
Tariff discrimination imports from the target may be treated less favourably than those from from the general goals of democratization and economic liberalization
other countries
Withdrawal ofMFN ceasing to treat imports from a country as favourably as similar imports
it is difficult to tie particular outcomes to the exercise of economic dom-
from other countries arc treated inance. But there can be little doubt that spheres of influence have been
Blacklist ban on business with firms that trade with the target country constructed on the basis of the projection of wealth abroad, notably in
Quotas quantitative restrictions on particular imporLs or exports
Licence denial refusing permission to import or export particular goods
Latin America, where the United States has managed to maintain a con-
D11mjJing delibemte sale of exports at prices below production cost, e.g. to gain genial order without significant military effort, and in the Gulf, where
market advantage, or to disrupt the target's economy by depressing the Saudi Arabia's preponderant position among the oil producers makes it
world price of a key export
Prec/usi~>e buying buying up a commodity in order to deny it to others
also politically dominant (although not, it should be noted, to the point
Freezing of assets impounding financial assets where it could persuade Jordan to join the anti-Iraq coalition in 1990-1,
Controls on active investigations imo the purposes of bank accounts and transfers. always assuming that was its aim). In east and central Europe, the
nroney-lau!ldering conventional and off-shore
£rpropriation seizing property belonging to target states or enterprises
European Union's use of economic instruments is making it the key
Taxation (unfm•orlra!Jle) discriminatory taxation of target's assets player in the region.
Sourre: Adapted by kind pennission from David A. Baldwin, Economic Slatecraft (Princeton:
Not every wealthy state wants to use its potential for political impact.
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 41. Germany and Japan have moved only imperceptibly towards becoming
'normal' states in recent years despite their position as the third and sec-
ond largest economies in the world. They have their own regional zones
in 1973 and 1979 focused world attention very clearly again on the roots of influence, but prefer their economic leverage to be used in a multi-
of the Arab--Israel conflict and its dangers for the rest of the world. lateral context 56 Perhaps this is wise, for foreign policy can lose wealth
What is certainly true is that sanctions are not precise tools whose (through over-stretch, war, or simply an excessive sense of international
impact can be predicted with confidence. Rather, they can usually be responsibility) but it can rarely create solidly based prosperity. 57 Once
panied, if the target is prepared (as they usually are, given the threat to again, the Soviet Union is the exemplar of a state which felt its survival
their reputation for sovereign independence) to pay the inevitable price required priority being given to foreign and defence policies, which
for defying states on whom they are dependent, and at times the whole proved in the end, by their very unsustainability, to be the problem
international community. 52 Cuba's capacity to defy the forty-year long rather than the solution. Here the priority of politics over economics
US blockade is a case in point. ultimately caused collapse, albeit a very particular kind of politics.
 152 ARency Implementation 153

Nazism, by contrast, used foreign and domestic policies in harness to is against them. North Korea, Libya and Milosevic's Serbia all inter-
revive both the economy and national self-respect, until its inherent mittently abused their enemies and extolled na!vely the virtues of their
hubris brought Europe as well as Germany ·down in ruins. Arguably this own society. The Ayatollah Khomeini went so far as to send a letter to
excess was not inevitable, but the experience has led to the relative sep- Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988 advising him (presciently) that communism
aratiOn of economics and politics in the post-war system, which creates was about to collapse and that the only hope for the Soviet Union lay in
opportunities but also confusions for foreign policy-makers seeking the a mass conversion to Islam. For the most part no one listens to this kind
nght instrument with which to act. As with the European Community, the of thing, and if it serves any purpose at all it is for domestic consump-
preferred way forward has usually been to use economic and political tion. Much more effective, and a strategy the West became more adept
tools in parallel rather than tightly linked. This has the consequence- an at as the Cold War wore on, is the soft-sell approach, usually based on
advantage or disadvantage depending on the point of view- of making promoting desirable activities indirectly, rather than preaching at high
1t difficult to ass1gn responsibility for policy among the various bureau- volume. 61 Thus, while no measurement of effects is possible, it seems
cratic actors, national and intergovernmental. very likely, for example, that the reputation of the BBC's World Service
for impartiality, including on occasion criticisms of Britain, does more
to promote a sympathetic understanding of British positions, official
Culture and unofficial, than any amount of government handouts. Openness
towards foreign journalists, encouraging educational exchanges, and
Culture is entwined with propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy, the glad-handing of elites through such events as the Konigswinter
but the two are not identical. Little propaganda has any cultural value, and or Davos meetings are other examples of the shrewd use of culture for
most culture is a wholly spontaneous affair, independent of political broadly political purposes 62
exploitation. Moreover, whereas culture is right at the soft power or influ- Politicians must tread carefully, however, in their instinct to control.
~nce end of the continuum, propaganda is often coercive in its attempt to If they attempt to direct what professional people do and say in a free
1mpact forcefully on the attitudes of its targets 58 There is an arrogance society, they invite immediate reactions and bad publicity. They have
about the most self-conscious propagandists which reveals the attempt to little option but to encourage, to herd and to hope for the best. The con-
control quite clearly. Hitler said that 'by clever propaganda even heaven fidence to do this brings results. The CIA was eventually damaged by
can be represented to the people as hell, and the most wretched life -as the disclosure of the way in which it had secretly bank-rolled publish-
paradise', while for Goering rallying mass support meant that 'all you ing houses and serious magazines like Encounter. 63 The United States
have to do IS tell [the people] they are being attacked, and denounce the is better served simply by making its efficient library and information
pacifists for lack of patriotism' 59 Soft, cultural power is less at the behest facilities available to journalists and academics, who may then be drawn
of govemments and operates over a much longer term. barely consciously into the paradigms of US debate.
What culture and propaganda have in common is that they both seek Control is also counterproductive in relation to the arts. The British
to influence peoples more than governments. By changing the domestic Council or the Institut Fran~ais can facilitate tours by the Royal Ballet
environment of other states they are intended to undermine a hostile or the Comedic Fran~aise, but they cannot create art. Indeed, official
regime and/or to spread the values of those seeking to act. Success attempts to get too close to popular and avant-garde culture simply
requires some evidence of internal changes in the target as the result of produce embarrassment. At least Anglo-Saxon societies can rely on the
exogenous influence- what James Rosenau calls reactive or emulative power of the English language and the hugely popular film and music
linkages, whereby groups respond directly to social forces in other industries associated with it, disseminating themselves world-wide. The
states, either adversely or by imitation 60 In this case, they would not dilemma is more acute for societies like France, where there is the per-
always be aware that the linkage was being manipulated deliberately; ception of an excessive cultural onslaught from English. Even here,
that is, that it was the product of agency. however, Paris may be best advised not to fight an unwinnable global
Crude, didactic propaganda of the kind we associate with totalitari- war, and to concentrate on reinforcing existing historical and economic
anism of various kinds is still practised by regimes which feel the world links. This is what the German government is doing quietly in eastem
 154 Agency Implementation 155

and central Europe, where there is already a disposition to speak good order. There is no point in deciding on an action only to find that
Gem1an as a second language. In general, people are more receptive to the means do not exist, as Britain and France discovered when declar-
foreign cultural influence when the achievements of the source already ing war on behalf of Poland on 3 September 1939. Equally, no foreign
exist and simply need to be drawn to wider attention - and when they policy instrument is a panacea. Ec·onomic sanctions have been a popu-
do not perceive the foreigner as acting hegemonically. Thus in less than lar form of coercion from the 1980s on, but have only a limited record
two decades Japan was able to tum around the international image of of success. Other economic means, notably the exercise of structural
itself as a defeated, devastated aggressor because foreign consumers power in such policies as the Marshall Plan and EU enlargement, are
recognized the quality and availability of its products. difficult to manipulate in terms of specific consequences. They have
From this point of view, namely allowing the strength of an economy important impacts, but of a long-term and architectonic nature. Soft
and civil society to speak for itself, with only sophisticated and under- power, in the form of cultural diplomacy, is growing in importance but
stated mediation by the state, cultural diplomacy is an instrument of the raises the same public-private dilemma so evident in the economic
West. More dirigiste regimes may be able to enjoy a short-term coup by realm: when official policy-makers attempt to use it they risk embar-
playing host to the Olympic Games or to the World Cup, but they will rassing blow-backs. By contrast, diplomacy is ubiquitous and unavoid-
always have less attractive material at their disposal. That said, it able. It exists in every political action taken by one actor towards
depends on what the desired target of influence is. Iran and Saudi Arabia another, and is not the monopoly of diplomats. It is capable of achiev-
are largely concerned to use their resources to mobilize believers within ing far more than is generally thought, and is relatively inexpensive.
the Islamic world, and do not waste them elsewhere- although the Gulf It is, in fact, the paradigm of routine international politics.
regimes use airlines as badges of their wealth and modernity across the Still, diplomacy cannot be relied upon to implement all kinds of goals
globe. In the same way, Egypt under Nasser engaged in an extraordinary in the face of intractable outsiders and circumstances. Indeed all instru-
campaign of radio broadcasting and cultural sponsorship across the ments can backfire, especially if the elements of intervention and con-
Arab world in a largely successful attempt to establish its leadership trol are overemphasized, with the sole exception of targets which are so
role in the Middle East. 64 Whether dealing with liberal or closed soci- vulnerable as to be unable to resist decisive action. Policy-makers
eties, however, much the same rule applies as with military force: major should take on board David Baldwin's insistence that means, being
change is unlikely to take place unless the target is already ripe for inherently relational, require an understanding of the pattern of interac-
change. The Soviet Union may have been undermined by the yearning tion between actor and target. They should also take it as given that
of its people for a better standard of living, but the lure of designer jeans action in international relations requires a mix of instruments, both in
and BMWs would not have been so seductive if its own economy had reserve and working in parallel. The challenge of foreign policy action
not been defence-geared and demonstrably unable to deliver the goods from the technical point of view is how to manage relations along a
over seventy years. 65 number of dimensions simultaneously. From a wider, ethical viewpoint,
it is how to pursue one's own concerns without damaging the shared
structures of international life and without treating outsiders simply as
Seeking Balance 'others'. That is less likely to happen if implementation is not discon-
nected from the dilemmas of decision-making, and if instruments are
In the final analysis there are no rules for choosing and using foreign not permitted to take on too much of a life of their own.
policy instruments. None should be excluded on a priori grounds,
unfortunately even military force, unless the discourse is switched from
policy analysis to ethics. If states and some other international actors
wish to protect core concerns, from time to time they will need to
consider using violence, or by preference merely the threat of it. To that
end they will need to have considered well in advance the nature of the
armed forces they might conceivably need, and to have kept them in
Part II
The International
I

7
Living in the Anarchical
Society

Every effort has been made thus far to relate the discussion of the inherent
problems of agency and political decision-making to the particular con-
texts of foreign policy. Yet the focus on actors has meant that the nature
of the environment in which they operate has not been delineated. It is
time to rectify the omission, without changing the perspective com-
pletely. The next two chapters deal with 'the international', that milieu
in which every state is located and which indeed is in part made up of
states, but also of the economic, political and cultural forces which tran-
scend frontiers. This chapter deals with how states experience their
external environment, characterized by Hedley Bull as an 'anarchical
society' with elements of both cooperation and conflict in uneasy coex-
istence. 1 It looks at the interplay between material and human factors in
making up the outside world, and at the extent to which states are
caught in a web of institutions, rules and expectations which shapes
their foreign policy orientations. Chapter 8, by contrast, moves away
from the state system to analyse the less visible, but perhaps even more
determining, set of pressures deriving from globalization in its various
aspects, and from the other sites of agency which have arisen in inter-
national relations. The role of foreign policy in this evolving and multi-
layered international environment is an intriguing question.

The Outside World

Nearly forty years ago Joseph Frankel wrote that 'relations among sin-
gle states are ... intimately related to the matrix of international society
as a whole but the study of the latter is hampered by many difficulties

l'iQ
 I,

160 The International Living in the Anarchical Society 161

and has scarcely made a start' 2 The situation has been almost wholly Eventually, however, systemic perspectives won out. Once Kenneth
reversed since then. International society was launched as a subject in Waltz had invented neo-realism in 1979, American International
the 1960s by the 'English School' of International Relations scholars, Relations focused on the dynamics of bi- and multi-polarity and the
among whom Charles Manning, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Alan strategies, derived from game theory, which seemed necessary to sur-
James, Adam Watson and John Vincent were particularly influentia\. 3 vive in a condition of self-help anarchy 4 Just as with the English
Bull's book of 1977 soon became a key point of reference in the bur- School, but for very different reasons, foreign policy had become theo-
geoning subject of International Relations. It was therefore perhaps not retically disconnected from international politics.
surprising that a whole generation of scholars became preoccupied with Waltz advocated this very disconnection. He did not shrink from crit-
the extent to which there was such a thing as a society of states, and if icizing Morgenthau, Allison and Herbert Simon for their 'confusion' of
not, how they might best characterize the tout ensemble of international the explanation of 'the results produced by the uncoordinated actions of
relations, How the component parts of that society experienced its con- states' (that is, the international system) with 'the tendencies and styles
straints, and how they behaved in it, was only of interest to this school of different countries' policies' (that is, foreign policies). He accepted
insofar as they threw light on the central issues of realism and rational- that the two levels were linked and that each therefore tells us some-
ism, namely the tendency of states to go to war, and the conditions in thing about the other - but different things 5 As a result, neo-realists
which they discover common interests, The normative dilemmas lurk- abhor 'reductionist' approaches which try to explain the pattern of inter-
ing just beneath the surface were also beginning to be debated, princi- national politics by looking inside states, and they use very parsimo-
pally in terms of what justice at the international level might look like. nious assumptions about state motivations. 6 Their approach is really a
The more empirical or analytical questions, however, of what foreign variant of structuralism, which has dominated thinking about interna-
policy patterns could actually be discerned, and how the dilemmas of tional relations for two decades, and by definition tends to play down
choice played out in political decision-making, were generally passed the role of actors, states or otherwise. They tend to assume that states
over and left to the historians. 'weigh options and make decisions based primarily on their strategic
Thirtgs were not quite the same in the United States. While the British situation and an assessment of the external environment'. 7 If they do
were understandably preoccupied with coming to terms with the pres- not, they will 'fall by the wayside' 8 Even those who sympathize with
sures of the wider system, it was hardly possible for a countty rising to this external--determinist perspective are likely to view it as an overly
the position of superpower to neglect the dilemmas of action. The emer- Procrustean approach to the kinds of complex pressures experienced by,
gence of classical realism after 1945, articulated by Hans Morgenthau, say, Egypt as it operates simultaneously in the Arab League, the
Reinhold Niebuhr and Arnold Wolfers went hand in hand with an inter- regional balance and the international capitalist system, to say nothing
est in statecraft and even issues of moral responsibility. Soon, however, of coping with a rich and complex internal situation.
the evident power of scientific rationality had spawned the behavioural- World systems theorists, and those who see social movements as·the
is! movement, which focused among other things on foreign policy motor forces of world politics (sic) are also structuralists, in that they
decision-making and hoped to extend the logic of micro-economics to identify an overall framework, or set of forces, to which the .component
the study of politics. This created what we now know as foreign policy parts are ultimately subordinate. The same is largely true of those work-
analysis, but also increasingly distanced academic work from the sub- ing with interdependence or globalization assumptions. As with the
stance of political argument. neo-realists, foreign policy gets strangely bracketed out. The strong
The other main trend in the American study of International Relations, growth of interest in normative issues has returned some of the focus to
from the 1950s on, was the increasing sense of a bipolar strategic actors, but for many of those working in the field the key actor is now
system, geared to the emerging logic of nuclear deterrence. This also the individual, and the framework that of 'cosmopolitan democracy'. 9
had the effect of distracting attention from the pecularities of states and Foreign policy, or the collective political attempt to find a strategy for
their ideologies, even if the insistence in FPA on the connection to managing in the world, qua state or qua NGO, has seemed either contin-
domestic society, and on bureaucratic politics, helped to redress the gent or simply irrelevant to too many general theorists of International
balance - and was given a boost by some of the fiascoes of the 1960s. Relations.
162 The International Living in the Anarchical Society l63

For their part, regional or country specialists have continued to inter- community' exists, over and above the annexation of the tem1 by the
est themselves in foreign policy, but they rarely do more than sketch the major Western powers. 12 Yet it has still been extended in two ways: into
international environment in which their subjects are located. They usu- the normative sphere, by talk about the obligations of states to promote
ally assume that states and other actors are part of a system, based on certain universal values, in particUlar those of human rights; 13 and epis-
regular patterns of interaction, feedback and homeostasis. 10 They may temologically, in the sense that, in Alexander Wendt's words, even anar-
well also operate on the basis of the distinction between the psycholog- chy (and society) is what states make of it. The outside world ceases to
ical environment (in which decisions are made) and the operational be a dismal iron cage and becomes instead a realm which can be remade
environment (in which they have to be carried out). But neither assump- according to the will of actors - assuming their separate wills do not
tion is likely to be very explicit. cancel each other out. 14
The situation of the empiricist who wishes to relate his or her work So far as this book is concerned the main need is to do justice to the
to a general understanding of international relations is complicated by greater sophistication of contemporary thinking on the nature of the
the fact that even these two assumptions have become problematical. international system, and to indicate its implications for decision-
The constructivist movement means that the idea of a clear-structure to makers, who~e external environment can no longer be taken as given.
the world, let alone a discernible separation between it and what goes The neo-reahsts have sacrificed far too much in the pursuit of parsi-
on in our minds, is often now seen as unsophisticated. Many view inter- mony. If we return to Bul!'s 'anarchical society' we see that behind the
national reality as being made up of the norms and beliefs held by actors elegant paradox lies the basic truth that elements of society coexist with
(sic), and constantly renegotiated according to events. These beliefs elements of anarchy. By 'society' is meant the habit of cooperation, the
themselves result from the dialogistical processes of participation in the condition of being rule-governed. By 'anarchy' is meant the unpre-
multiple levels at which international politics takes place. This is why dtctabthty and untrustworthiness of the behaviour of some actors, some
the English School is once again attracting so much interest. of the time. We cannot and should not choose between these two ten-
It is noteworthy that the various forms of constructivism (for there are dencies. Clearly their coexistence makes for tension, uncertainty and
both strong and diluted versions to be found) require us in principle to dilemmas of policy which could require some degree of self-reliance,
place actors centre-stage, even while debates rage as how best to charac- and to some degree reinforce a fear of anarchy. Yet uncertainty and
terize their environment - as society of states, capitalist core-periphery patchmess do not lead to a universal falling-back on worst-case assump-
system, or global governance. It is thus difficult to escape from the idea ttons. Vanatwn ts partly geographical, where western Europe is close to
that there is something outside ourselves which we may or may not per- being a gemeinschaft and other regions are not even gesellschaften, and
ceive accurately, being rewarded or punished according to the accuracy partly chronological, in that zones like West Africa can go from stabil-
of our understandings. This means both that there is a vacuum to be filled ity to_ literal anarchy in a few years, while South East Asia shows signs
about the processes connecting actors and the system, and that the con- of bemg able to reverse the process. In this sense the international sys-
cepts of perception and misperception can hardly be avoided (for reasons tem resembles Cimabue's flood-damaged 'Crucifixion' in Santa Croce
expanded on in Chapter 5). It is around these two puints that this chap- Florence, with some areas sharp and detailed, others empty and impre~
ter revolves. Before proceeding with them, however, it is important to c1se. What there has not been, is a going into reverse. The achievements
clarify the conception of the external environment being used. of international law and organization in the past century were limited,
The idea of an international society sees states as developing com- but _they have gradually been consolidated. The failings of the League of
mon understandings and practices to the point where it can be argued Natwns, to which many attributed the outbreak of the Second World War
that governments are constrained in their actions not just by considera- led not to the abandonment of universal organizations, but to the devel~
tions of prudence but also by a certain sense of common cause. This opment at San Francisco in 1945 of a more robust and extensive model. 15
notion has been both attacked and extended, to the point where we now International law has steadily expanded its scope and transcended its
face a bewildering litany of alternative terms and interpretations. 11 It image of hope triumphing over experience.
has been attacked both for privileging the power of governments and for Anarchy still has an alarming capacity to break through, often in the
peddling liberal illusions over the extent to which a real 'international most unexpected ways. We cannot assume that we are advancing steadily
164 The International Living in the Anarchical Society 165

and inexorably towards a perpetual peace. The descent of Yugoslavia into that would imply that we can confidently identify the nature of the pri-
savagery was an existential shock to the post-modem societies of western mary system from which others t1ow. Despite the arguments which rage
Europe. 16 The acquisition of nuclear arms by ·India and Pakistan and the over this very question, over whether to privilege security and states.
deterioration of their already fragile relationship has exposed the thinness capital and firms, knowledge and technocrats, the fact is that we are in
of the constitutional provisions of international society. The attacks of an epistemological blind spot. We have no way of knowing the origins
11 September 2001 ended the fear-free lives of prosperous westerners. On and direction of the causal t1ow. Without that knowledge we have no
the other hand, elements of solidarism now extend well beyond inter- option but to conceive of a model - like the globe itself- with no top.
state relations, and indeed are to some degree independent of them. bottom, sides or centre, girdled by different bands of activity, distinct
'Cosmopolitan' networks between individuals or private associations may but often overlapping. Each band-width may be shaped or animated by
not live up to the expectations of fostering the unity of humankind often different forces, perhaps states, perhaps social movements or historical
placed upon them, but they do cut across the pretensions of states to speak trends. They may gradually be coming together, with a hierarchy of
always for their peoples, and they fill in some of the gaps left by the power emerging- as Susan Strange thought the United States tended to
sparse achievements of intergovemmentalism. 17 In short, they represent dominate her four power-authority nexuses. 18 Or they may come and
elements of 'world' society. By the same token they can complicate life go, with unforeseen dimensions yet to come, like a kaleidoscope. All we
for official foreign policies through creating other levels of agency. can usefully assume is that there are different dimensions of the inter-
Understanding agency requires bringing together the notions of inter- national system, and debate first how to identify them, and then how
national society and world society. In reality, as Henry Kissinger liked they relate to each other.
to say, everything is connected. Decision-makers have to work in an The assumption here is that the world has three distinctive logics: the
environment which is not neatly divided along the lines of competing logic of economics (including structures of trade, production and
academic paradigms. On the other hand they have their own conven- investment); the logic of politics (which is the competition over how the
tional divisions, enabling them to make sense of what would otherwise world is to be organized and resources to be allocated); and the logic of
be a teeming, incomprehensible mass of sense-data. What then, from knowledge, which deserves to be seen as an equally autonomous realm
the viewpoint of the actors (and our understanding of them, which is not because of the impossibility of confining ideas, which t1ow like water
the same thing), is the 'international' like? What are the predominant through every crack. Naturally economics is a preoccupation of politi-
features of their external environment? cians, and economic- actors sometimes play politics. Scientists and
The most accurate response is that decision-makers have a sense of thinkers deal in everything. The point is not that subject matter can be
international relations more than anything else as a system. That is, there sealed into separate compartments, which it obviously cannot. Rather,
is a regular pattern of interactions, across many if not most of the issue- that the processes of behaving economically, politically or intellectually
areas affecting human life, between separate societies still ultimately have each their distinctive priorities and dynamics, which can be influ-
'foreign' to each other. Some of these interactions operate in more enced and interfered with from outside but not substituted. It might·be
established channels and on a more intensive basis than others. Yet the possible temporarily to extinguish one logic, but if one is run according
globe is now more united than fragmented, in the sense that virtually all to the precepts of another, the desired results will not be forthcoming.
its territory is now politically accounted for, and all regions are exposed This has been historically the case for scientific life under theocracies,
to myriad contacts from the outside. The units of the system are states as the persecution of Galileo reminds us, just as it was for the economies
but also other actors and communities which cut across states. Its of the Soviet bloc. Conversely, where political life is monetized and
boundaries are twofold: those where human activity encounters the reduced to a pale imitation of the market, as is virtually the case in the
physical world, of climate, topography and so on, and those (more United States today, democracy will be compromised.
blurred) where international transactions stop and the life which is pri- This non-hierarchical, multi-banded system is far from the limited
marily domestic begins. anarchical society of states with which we began. It encompasses the
This system has various different levels, mysteriously but definitely whole range of competing actors on the world scene, together with ele-
interconnected. It would be wrong to call them 'sub-systems' because ments of both cont1ict and cooperation, fragmentation and solidarity.
166 The International Living in the Anarchical Society 167

Different dimensions, and issue-areas within them, will exhibit different 500, or even in the 5th century BC, the age ofThucydides. Physical fea-
patterns of authority and/or dominance. Some will be chaotic, some tures are difficult to change by human action even where sovereign con-
well enough organized to be denoted 'regimes' . 19 The only thing certain trol is undisputed. All decision-makers have to cope with this fact, but
is that from each will come bubbling up an endless supply of new also with the changing relationship between the physical, the political
events, initiatives, problems and ideas, all of them affecting the actors and the technological in every age.
and logics of the other dimensions in a fascinating array of unpre- Some major changes have bee~ made to nature by deliberate political
dictable chemical reactions. This is the tumult of change which many actiOn, and for a variety of strategic, economic and cultural reasons. Of
see as defining the modem world, and which James Rosenau has cap- these the most dramatic have been the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal and
tured in terms like 'turbulence' and 'cascade'. 20 It makes understanding, now the Channel Tunnel, but of equal importance in terms of opening up
let alone acting, whether on behalf of Nestle, the Moslem Brotherhood connecttons between dtfferent regions have been the Alpine railway and
or the People's Republic of China, a challenging and often costly affair. road tunnels between Italy and its neighbours France, Switzerland and
This has been little more than a sketch of what the modern world Austria. The great motorway networks which link Germany, the Low
system means. From our perspective of agency and responsibility in Countries and France, as well as the above-mentioned countries, have
foreign policy, it is important to look more closely at how things work. also facilitated trade and population movements. All of these achieve-
What follows does this on the basis of the diluted structurationist ments, it is true, are highly susceptible to interruption by detennined
assumptions laid out in Chapter I, namely that actors constitute some subversion, just as that even greater challenge to nature, air travel, is
structures in themselves and that they interact all the time with the struc- vulnerable. But the fact remains that they are very rarely blocked, and
tures in which they are embedded. Thus they both live in the interna- then usually when war has already broken out. The Suez Canal has
tional system and its various bands, or dimensions, and are shaped by twice been put out of action, but only once for any length of time,
it; they help to constitute the system, giving it life, and are constrained between 1967-75, and the Panama Canal has never been seriously
by it. Hierarchies exist, but are multiple and always subject to move- threatened. These human constructs soon become perceived as part of
ment. On this basis, the analysis will cover: the material, or physical the geographical givens themselves, not least because the great powers
aspects of actors' environment; the semi-material aspects, including usually have a powerful interest in keeping them open 22
political geography and political economy; and the political aspects, It is also the case that we have changed our physical environment
which actors largely make for themselves. without intending to. The advance of science means that the airwaves
and space have become a crucial dimension of life and politics while
mountains and rivers are less important. The industrialization of much
Material Conditions of the globe, meanwhile, has placed a premium on resources such as oil,
uranium, water, fish and manganese, with the result that the seabed,
The international system may consist of the various dimensions of over-flying rights and access to secure energy supplies have moved, to
human action, but the actions themselves are also played out in a phys- the top of states' concerns. By contrast, grain, coal, iron ore and now
ical world which is as external, independent and slow-changing as any- gold have become relatively less important. The ecosphere has also dra-
thing can be in history. This is why geography is often included in the matically come into play as an issue in both domestic and international
category of the external environment in foreign policy analysis, when it politics. Burning forests no less than drilling for oil invites instant for-
is perfectly evident that teuitory, resources and topography are all eign interest. Not only has the quality of our air and food been placed
divided up by states and constitute part of their internal configuration, in question through a combination of increased dependence on external
together indeed with airspace and territorial waters 21 The pattern supplies and pathologies which are no respecters of frontiers, but our
of geography, with its distribution of features, is largely independent very climate and sea-levels may be at risk. It would take rather less than
of political action, even if competition for its advantages is perennial. the catastrophic changes imagined by the doomsayers to have a very
A contoured map of the world, naked of political divisions, looks much disruptive effect on international politics, particularly in regions like
as it would have done, had cartography been up to the task, in 1492, in South East Asia or Oceania.
168 The Intemational Living in the Anarchical Society 169

The physical world, therefore, consists in much which we inherit and civilizations' have their lure, but they will soon be like geopolitics in the
must find a way to live with, plus other phenomena which we may have old sense, a mere curiosity. 16 Decision-makers are generally more aware
collectively created but are no less. difficult to manage. Together these of the complexity of their environment.
things shape security concerns, in that they present states with particu- Geography is now important in terms of the location and renewabil-
lar problems according to position, size- and period of history. The mil- ity of resources, and the ecological consequences of pollution. It still
itary balance and the economic league tables are intimately connected affects political action through the position, size and boundaries of
to a society's physical patrimony. In the first half of the twentieth century states, but in much more subtle ways than was previously allowed. In
some influential academic work on geopolitics, which we may recogmze place of the classical notion of 'natural frontiers', which only ever
as a primitive form of International Relations theory, produced largely applied to a few locations, we now discuss 'border regions' which over-
by geographers, suggested that this matrix had a decisive effect on a lap legal frontiers, and where economic and cultural life, if not political
state's foreign policy, and indeed on the global balance of power. arrangements, changes only gradually over hundreds of kilometres.
Various factors were identified at different phases of this intellectual This approach is important in relation to societies' sense of identity,
fashion; when taken up by policy-makers they became semi-fulfilling which is inevitably complex: feared neighbours often have an uncom-
prophecies, ultimately with disastrous results. All revealed the obses- fortably large number of shared characteristics, and differences may
sion of the times with a nco-Darwinian view of internatiOnal relations seem less sharp in the context of a common regional identity, or climate
23
as struggle and sun:ival, which reached its nadir in fascism and topography held in common.
Of the main variants of geopolitical theory, Alfred Mahan was the The random way in which frontiers are superimposed on the world
first to influence policy, through his stress on the importance of means that states vary enormously in size, mineral wealth, access to the
seapower and President Theodore Roosevelt's subsequent decisions to sea, vulnerability and cohesiveness. This is the real meaning of geopol-
build up the Navy and to ensure US control of the new Panama Canal itics. Some come under great pressure through being in difficult physi-
(in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903). 24 The most rna j'rgn, 1'f cal circumstances, such as Bangladesh. Others, like the United States,
scarcely intentional influence, was exerted in combination by the seem to possess every card in the pack. But this is the product of geog-
Englishman Halford Mackinder and the German Klaus Haushofer, raphy in conjunction with history, and political action. The United
whose contrary belief that power had now shifted to those controlling States was created by immigration, war, political creativity and eco-
great land masses, and in particular the 'heartland' of the 'world-island' nomic vitality. Bangladesh is in the situation it is, in the first instance at
of Eurasia, provided Hitler with some of the conceptual arch !lecture he least, because of the artificiality of the divided Pakistan created on inde-
25
needed for the policies of lebensraum and world domination. The pendence in 1947, and because of the dangerous international conse-
madness of 1939-45 then discredited overtly geopolitical theories but It quences which would have followed any attempt to absorb East
did not prevent ideas like the 'iron curtain', 'containment' and 'the Pakistan into India in 1971. States therefore have to work with the polit-
domino theory' perpetuating the belief that foreign policy had to follow ical geography they have, however unjust. They cannot be indifferent to
strategic imperatives deriving from the territorial distribution of power it, and they can only change it at the margin. Their physical character-
across the earth's surface. istics have important implications for all areas of public policy, not least
This kind of grand strategy seems no longer relevant after the end of foreign policy. Even distance, which many thought had been rendered
the Cold War. Even before 1989 it was not the central reality for the insignificant by technology, must still be factored in, as Russia knows
majority of states. The twin developments of intercontinental ballistic only too well through the high costs of sustaining its remote eastern
missiles and a widely disseminated sense of the futility of territorial provinces.
expansionism had meant that the increasing numbers of new states had Size, location and the rest always denote costs and benefits for any
little stake in the 'great game'. It would be idle to deny that local and given state. These are not straightforward to calculate. Bigness does not
regional balances of power exist, or that geography is still important. It necessarily mean great resources. It depends on terrain and population,
is just that, for once, some lessons have presented themselves, and been as the histories of Russia, China and India show. Conversely smallness
learnt. Single-factor explanations like globalization or 'the clash of can work to a state's advantage, as in Switzerland and Singapore. States,
170 The International Living in the Anarchical Society 171

through their decision-makers and ultimately their peoples, always have chickens to come home to roost when states can no longer bear the costs
choices about how to interpret their physical situation, although these of pursuing inherently difficult enterprises. A contemporary case might
choices can only be implemented over a long term, through intergener- be thought to be the Gulf sheikhdoms. So long as the price and supply of
ational consensus. Perceptions, abilities and determination are all oil is sufficient, these statelets will be wealthy enough to make gardens
important. In response to R.G. Collingwood's argument that it is how in the desert, and to build up sophisticated armed forces. If that circum-
the people living on an island respond to their situation that determines stance should change, their basic vulnerability will lead to an upheaval
their degree of insularity, O.K. Pate drily responded that 'people cannot in the politics of the region. In short, while the material environment in
conceive of their insular position in any way unless they live on an itself does nothing, it must always be factored into decision-making.
island' _27 If ignored it may eventually be cruelly felt.
Because the physical environment in which political actions take
place is in one sense more genuinely 'external' than the social world of
'foreigners', it has a particular impact on choice. On the one hand it Semi-material Conditions - or the Politics of Human Geography
imposes costs, limits and difficulties. If a government tries to ignore the
vulnerability of its borders, or gambles on good harvests it cannot be The international system operates inside a physical context which is
sure of, it may well be severely punished by events. On the other hand, itself, as we have seen, in constant interaction with human thought and
it shapes attitudes and decisions by providing, in interaction with poli- agency. The grand theories of geopolitics have been exposed as inca-
tics and technology, differentiated opportunities. This is not the anthro- pable of doing justice to the complexity of this interaction. This has pro-
pomorphic 'beckoning' of what the Sprouts called 'environmental duced a more truthful 'political geography' which interlocks with
possibilism', but the simple recognition of the fact that territorial states sociology or International Relations 29 It has also begun to link up with
are bound to operate on notions of proximity, region and potential threat- another important channel through which the physical world is medi-
which might come from floods or depleted fishing stocks as much as ated, that of international political economy (IPE).
aggressive neighbours. 28 The territorial state is a material, not a virtual Although IPE covers a great range of subjects, in this context it refers
entity. Thus Turkey finds itself inherently torn between European, only to the set of factors which foreign policy actors encounter when
Transcaucasian and Middle Eastern patterns of friendship, while com- engaged in the pursuit of wealth- external but man-made. Features such
munist Cuba, at odds with its giant neighbour, had little choice but to as ports or international airports can be built and structures improved. Yet
seek support from outside the western hemisphere. in practice it takes a long time to acquire new assets, since patterns have
These choices are in no way inevitable. What matters is the long-run to be shifted which are systemic in nature. The Dutch ports, with their
pattern of reactions to the matrix of constraints and opportunities which big hinterland, are still as important to Europe's trade as they were three
the material situation provides. Through successive governments and hundred years ago. The London docks, by contrast, gradually declined
phases of domestic politics, states take responsibility for their own ori- with the loss of empire, and instead Britain had to develop the world's
entations, as the number of apparent geopolitical anomalies testifies. biggest international airport, at Heathrow. This reinforced the century-
Yugoslavia, for example, might be considered the paradigm case of an old 'fact' of London being an international crossroads, which would take
artificial state, created by treaty in the face of geographical and ethnic decades for Amsterdam or Frankfurt to supplant. This fact is 'external'
obstacles, and ultimately foundering. But one should also ask how was to the Netherlands and Germany, but not permanent, at least not in the
it that such a state managed to survive between 1919 and 1992. To which sense that the Atlantic Ocean is permanent.
the answer, crudely, is: through a combination of international political Technology, however, has changed the significance even of oceans
necessity and domestic leadership. Other examples of politics tlying in and mountain ranges. They hardly represent the same obstacles as even
the face of geography are the European seaborne empires, and the fact I 00 years ago. Some observers hold that the creation of virtual networks
that Italy remained fragmented rather than united between c. 455 and through high-speed computers has neutralized most of the geographical
1861. But all such cases suggest both the complexity of causation, with features of the earth. 30 This is too extreme. What has happened is sim-
internal and external factors interacting, and the tendency of geographical ply a change in relative costs: if a society can afford to pay the costs of
 172 The lllfernational Living in the Anarchical Society 173

air freight it can import exotic foods to eat with the same freshness as point of view of international political economy as much as classical
local producers. If not, that and other options, such as the projection of security. Despite their many advantages, for example, the cities of Latin
military force or even the participation of officials in international meet- America do not figure prominently in the provision of key services in the
ings, will prove impossible. Computers can only make up some part of international political economy. Indeed, it is diflicult to resist the conclu-
this kind of capacity, not least because they too consume expensive sion that the centre-periphery model introduced by critics such as Raul
resources, including highly educated labour. Not all of this is true Prebisch and Andre Gunder Frank from the 1950s on has some descrip-
dependence, since the year-round supply of fresh avocados, or even the tive power. It is revealing that skilled labour continues to drain from those
tenure of a far-flung base, is not a vital interest. places where it is sorely needed to those in which it already exists.
In the same way, the possession of key physical resources such as There is one special case where position and physical conditions still
minerals, water and fish stocks only takes on significance in relation directly affect the quality of human enterprise, namely agriculture. The
both to the ability to exploit them, and to the premium put on them by examples of the Soviet Union and India show that where the climate is
the global system at any given point of history. Mines and oil rigs can adverse and social organization inappropriate, it is immensely difficult
be opened or shut down with considerable flexibility and deals done to produce food surpluses at affordable prices. States which then get
with multinational companies if the indigenous capacity does not exist. locked into the cycle of expensive imports and weak currencies are
What is less amenable to change is the possession of facilities which always on the defensive in their foreign relations, and fall into various
require not just market advantage but also recognition (and persistent forms of dependency, such as that of Iceland, rich but over-reliant on
use) by a substantial proportion of other members of the system. These fish, on the United States. 31 Those, by contrast, which enjoy the tem-
facilities, which equate to the factors of modem production, are princi- perate conditions supposedly ideal for human life to prosper, not only
pally labour, plus various kinds of services, particularly education, incur fewer costs but also generate surpluses to exchange for other
finance, commerce and transport. It may seem paradoxical that these resources. 32 It is certainly easy to see how Poland's harsh environment,
elements, so much more abstract than mines and factories, should be in comparison, say, to California, makes its situation particularly diffi.
considered part of the semi-material world, but in practice the cultural cult. On the other hand the limits of this single-factor explanation are
attributes needed to make stock markets, banking centres and transport exposed by the evidence of the Scandinavian countries' ability to pros-
networks can only be acquired slowly, and they soon take on a material per despite their cold climate. It will be interesting to see how Poland
solidity which cannot easily be substituted. Indeed, it is difficult to cre- progresses now that it finally seems to have been released from the
ate them by design. Thus the People's Republic of China recognized the political domination of its two great neighbours. The signs are promising
valuable international asset that was Hong Kong, and conducted nego- but it will probably take decades before we are able to judge.
tiations with Britain so as to preserve and incorporate it. Similarly the In general a state needs a combination of features if it is to be in a
states (or rather, the elites) of the Third World have continued to look to position to create a favourable human geography. Certainly the lack of
the old metropoles such as Paris and London for investment services, one crucial element such as population (in particular a large skilled
freight forwarding, medicine, secondary and tertiary education, sport workforce) will restrict a state's international influence. Canada and
and entertainment, consultancies, and technical standards. The City of Saudi Arabia are cases in point, despite their wealth. India, Nigeria and
London, the Dow Jones Index, Volkswagen, the Nobel Prize Committee, Brazil, which suffer from poverty and problems of infrastructure, all
the Italian Serie A and the Academic Fran9aise are all examples of insti- have more long-term potential to become power-centres. That said, such
tutions which set the highest standards and provide services which are predictions have been made for many years, and the two first -mentioned
difficult to replicate. They therefore form an important part of the semi- states demonstrate the importance of intervening social and political
material, external environment in which states and other international variables in determining influence in both the international political
actors have to work. economy and the international political system. What is more, how long
What is more, these services tend to have fixed physical locations, in is the 'long term' in international relations?
countries with particular historical or geographical advantages. It does The external environment, therefore, is both vital to any foreign
still matter where on the earth's surface an actor is located, from the policy actor and made up of matter which is far from inert. 'External'
 174 The International Li\'ing in the Anarchical Society 175

does not mean just those things outside the territorial boundaries and it is not random or evanescent. On the contrary. there is a generational
sovereign jurisdiction of an actor; it means all those things which are accumulation of beliefs, procedures and expectations, much of it writ-
outside the social and political processes by which the actor comes to ten down and some of it taking an institutional form. This makes it not
its choices. Some of these things are purely physical, and may occur so susceptible to change by any given actor, although the converse is
inside territorial limits, as with topography, climate and mineral also true, that there are few formal enforcement mechanisms. In the
resources. Even more of them are semi-material, created by human context of foreign policy-making, the important thing to note is that the
beings acting on the physical world, but slow-changing and relatively international political system cannot be discounted. Most actors there-
immune to political intervention for all that. In this context the scope for fore factor it prominently into their decision-making, sometimes indeed
agency is limited. to the intense irritation of domestic critics who think too much notice is
being taken of external considerations and that not enough political will
is being displayed. What is more, states' own identity is increasingly
Political Interdependence shaped by their political context.
Actors tend to expect both elements of anarchy and elements of order
The political band, or logic, of the international system is wholly a in their external political environment, although the balance may vary
human product, and it exists mostly in the minds of decision-makers. In over time. Most are thus plagued by a constant sense of the difficulty of
material terms the international political system can only be glimpsed, managing the affairs of the state or organization for which they are
in the form of the various institutions which enable states to come responsible while trying at one and the same time to; (i) accrue benefits;
together, and judgements to be made on their behaviour. Of these the (ii) achieve protection from actual and potential threats; (iii) avoid
most important are the buildings of the United Nations in New York incurring too many costs and constraints imposed from the outside;
and Geneva, and the International Court of Justice, plus the new (iv) uphold what are perceived as impm1ant rules of order; (v) build a
International Criminal Court, in The Hague. The regional institutions, degree of international solidarity, both for its inherent value and for the
notably those of the European Union in Brussels, are also manifesta- technical advantages in specific fields (such as non-proliferation). In
tions of the international political system. facing this perpetual balancing-act, decision-makers find themselves
An observer who expected the outputs of these institutions to reveal caught in the condition of interdependence.
the workings of the system as a whole, however, would be sadly misled. Interdependence is mostly associated with international economic life,
Although they now total around 400, in comparison to only 37 in 1909, but it is a concept which is at the heart of the very idea of an international
intergovernmental organizations constitute only one of the five main political system. 35 Its key attributes, sensitivity and vulnerability,
sources of political constraint and interdependence at the globallevei. 33 describe very well the conditions which even powerful actors encounter
The others are; international law; informal norms; other states' foreign as part of their involvement in international politics. 36 That is, when
policies, and in particular the hierarchy of states; transnational change occurs in one actor others also experience some disturbance,
processes, including international non-governmental organizations because their internal system is in part plugged into that of the outsider.
(INGOs). Before each is discussed briefly in turn, the notional charac- This will show itself either through the 'sensitivity' of immediate but
ter of the international political system needs further explanation. ultimately manageable reactions (such as the transfer of price inflation)
A set of relationships with a regular pattern and a character that goes or in a more serious 'vulnerability' to actual dislocations (such as
beyond the sum of its parts constitutes a significant structure for any of reduced oil supplies during war in the Gulf). Both the examples given are
its constituent units, even if the relationships are only lightly institu- from political economy, and many more could be cited, particularly in
tionalized.34 Thus the international political system, which is undoubt- relation to the environment and debt rescheduling (no-one wants to risk
edly only partial, intermittent and contested, and which consists mostly the ripple effects of a country like Mexico going bankrupt).
in the expectations and assumptions of its participants, is nonetheless an Classical politics often operates in the same way. One state's domes-
important structure for those responsible for foreign policy. It both con- tic 'solutions' can easily be another's problems, as the history of almost
strains them and shapes their opportunities. Despite its notional quality any revolution demonstrates. 37 The French and Russian revolutions
 I76 The International Living in the Anarchical Society I 77

spread alarm far and wide beyond their frontiers (partly through hyste- US opinion as a platform for criticisms of the host country, is a standing
ria, but that is another story), precipitating two decades of war. The reminder to the government in Washington that participation in an inter-
mechanism of interdependence works in the first instance through direct national organization is not a one-way street, even for a superpower.
knock-on effects inside domestic society. These cannot easily be insu- Security Council Resolutions may be relatively easy to manipulate, but
lated from foreign policy, and soon complicate relations between gov- reform of the UN institutions requires a wide consensus in the form of a
ernments. This is particularly so where states are intensively connected, two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.
whether through some regional community, or conversely through an International organizations also provide a platform for ideas that the
adversary partnership. An example of the former is ASEAN, where bigger powers do not always find acceptable, such as the critiques of
despite the importance of sovereignty as a founding principle, any neo-colonialism which grew up in the Group of77 (soon 120 plus) in the
upheaval in one member state closely affects the others ~ even if the 1970s, accompanied by the setting up of UNCTAD (the United Nations
smaller members are more at risk than the bigger, interdependence usu- Conference on Trade and Development). The demands for a 'new inter-
ally being asymmetrical. 38 An example of the latter is the Indo-Pakistan national economic order' changed the agenda of international politics.
relationship. When the Bharatiya Janata Party (the BJP) came to power and if they did not succeed in their own terms, may well have contributed
in New Delhi in 1996, with its militant Hindu rhetoric, it caused alarm to the growing confidence of various new states and transnational polit-
in Karachi and exacerbated the problems over Kashmir, which ulti- ical groups in challenging what they perceived as the hegemony of the
mately led to nuclear testing on both sides. In this sense, as we shall rich western grouping. This could not be ignored, as the subsequent chal-
see in Chapter 9, domestic and foreign policy developments are often lenge emanating (albeit in different ways) from states like Libya and Iran
intimately connected. on the one hand, and Malaysia and Singapore on the other, demon-
This is, however, only one side of 'political interdependence'. The strated. This access to agenda-setting has also been evident in the ability
other derives from the common membership of the anarchical society. of the smaller and more progressive western countries to push environ-
The effects of the latter in shaping the attitudes and behaviour of foreign mental and human rights concerns through special conferences like that
policy actors should not be underestimated. They derive from, and are on the Environment in Stockholm in 1972 and on Women in Beijing in
evident in, the five sources of interdependence mentioned earlier, and 1995. Such states have also found regional groupings of great usefulness
it is to these that we now return. in raising their individual profiles and projecting their own concerns, as
The first is the institutional web of international organizations. Ireland did with the European Political Cooperation/Common Foreign
Whatever the variable performance of these organizations, the norm for and Security Policy of the EC/EU, and as the Irish government did
states is now participation. All states are members of some, and most take °
with its realignment of neutrality in the 1990s. 4 Canada, likewise, has
part in many, whether they are universal or regional, technical or security- managed to emerge from the shadow of its neighbour and ally through
related.39 This shows both that such institutions serve timctional purposes its distinctive commitment to UN peacekeeping.
and that states are concerned not to be left out of a common system. International law is much better understood as a source of political
Together they certainly represent a complex and growing network which interdependence than as a framework of governance. Whereas interna-
generates a vast range of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic exchanges. tional1aw is too basic and patchy to be 'obeyed' by states its gradual
Various socializing and constraining effects cannot be avoided, which is evolution has produced a set of agreements and principles that operate
why some states still exert their right not to join, as with the refusal of the as points of reference across the variety of ideological viewpoints in the
Swiss people in 1985 to join the UN (finally reversed in the referendum international system. After all, international law largely derives from
of 2002), and Norway's referenda decisions in 1972 and 1994 to stay out states themselves and serves the vital, formal function of both estab-
of the European Community. The weak feel these more than the strong, lishing and delimiting their sovereignty. Beyond this, it draws them into
as with the imposition by the US-dominated World Bank of structural · a process of common dialogue and shared procedures which makes
adjustment policies on the Third World, but even the strong have to accept them, in Stanley Hoffmann's words 'system-conscious'."' More partic-
the process of negotiation and compromise which IGOs epitomize. The ularly, as Louis Henkin pointed out, foreign ministries become 'treaty-
very presence of the UN General Assembly in New York, perceived by geared' because they cannot afford to risk a possible disadvantage if
178 The lmernationa/ Livin?, in the Anarchical Society 179

new law is left to be made by others. 41 This kind of 'prisoners' dilemma' The rest derives from their existence as common discourses between
stimulus means that governments are appointing ever- more interna- states, extending perforce to other actors. The nature of a discourse is to
tional lawyers, and often need to hire freelance top-guns for important include and highlight certain values, while excluding or ignoring others.
disputes - as both sides have done over the issue of a divided Cyprus at Such discourses are generated by intergovernmental relations on the
the International Court of Justice. one hand and the cosmopolitan processes which eat away at state
On the other side of the coin, states always feel the need to justify any monopolies on the other. Yet these two things cannot be kept in separate
breach of international law, and usually to tind some legal justifica- compartments. Much of the thinking about human rights which has
tion.43 A country can always choose to ignore the ICJ and its judge- become increasingly prominent in the past fifty years derives from what
ments, but it thereby gives its critics a potent argument which may take the victorious states did at Nuremberg, at San Francisco in 1945 and in
decades to recede, as the United States did in its high-handed treatment the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. To be sure, com-
of the Court over Nicaragua. The Soviet Union's gradual isolation mitments made then have taken a long time to ferment, but that is pre-
in international politics after its invasions of Hungary in 1956 and cisely the point about discourse and norms. In the intemational political
Czechoslovakia in 1968 came about partly through its inability to con- system it is not enough to announce a new principle; it has to become
vince most states that the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' of limited sovereignty internalized and achieve a consensus before it will appear in actions.
was a desirable innovation in international law, let alone a retrospective That happens dialectically, through the slow process of interaction
justification. 44 Ultimately, all states need international law so as to con- between governments, some keener than others, and private groups. The
duct transactions, to regulate specialist areas like atomic energy or civil same was true of civil rights in eastern Europe, where spontaneous
aviation, for protection against illicit interference and to establish resistance to Soviet authoritarianism was given a considerable boost by
the principle of reciprocity. The fact that they exploit the law as well Moscow's agreement to the final principles of the Helsinki Accord of
as observing it, and do so differentially, just means that decision- the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. Almost
makers have to be even more attentive to this dimension of their external without noticing, the Soviet government had acknowledged the legiti-
environment. macy of human rights concerns and given its dissidents crucial interna-
Closely related to international law, but not synonymous with it, is tional footholds in their ascent towards liberty.
the third source of political interdependence, namely informal norms. In this process of establishing norms, publicity and transparency are
These can run ahead of formal rules, or lag behind them. They have of crucial importance, as Kant foresaw two hundred years ago: 'all
none the less force for being even more diffuse than international law. actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their
By 'norms' is meant the general principles and working assumptions maxim is not compatible with their being made public'. 45 In the mod-
that states acknowledge in their daily participation in international rela- em world international actors have no choice but to have their deeds, if
tions. They are many and various, and tend to be general, imprecise and not their manoeuvres, appear in public on a daily basis. This means that
often observed in the breach. What is more, they are in a condition of what is usually termed- with more than a touch of reification- 'world
evolution, and in a number of different directions simultaneously. opinion', casts perpetual judgement on decision-makers, some of whom
Among the most prominent are: pacta sunt servanda; the illegitimacy are unused to any kind of exposure to democratic comment. World opin-
of aggressive war, the value of peaceful coexistence and the rights of ion is a difficult idea to pin down, but it is clear that it means something
non-intervention and self-determination; the illegitimacy of terrorism; to those who participate professionally in international affairs, as the
the right of interested parties to an action to be consulted; the responsi- term is in constant use 46 It is the expression of a myriad official and
bility of states and individuals for 'crimes against humanity', that is, unofficial voices, and may be linked to the idea of co11fidence, which we
genocide and the wanton murder of civilians; the right to sell goods know is crucial in currency markets and may also affect the operation
abroad. Most if not all of these principles are articulated either in of the fragile international political system. To the extent that actors
the UN Charter or in some particular international convention. They show concern for world opinion, or general confidence, they reveal
represent to some extent the ius co gens. Yet law is only part of their themselves to have internalized certain common values, to do wjth
legitimacy, given their generality and the impossibility of enforcement. not wishing to alienate or outrage foreigners, or to be unduly isolated.
 180 The International Living in the Anarchical Society 181

They do not wish to give outside critics the capacity to link up with The fourth source of political interdependence is the hierarchy of"
domestic opposition, and they do uot wish to destabilize their diplomatic states. This is not a mere synonym for the balance of power, which is far
relationships 47 If confidence breaks down, long-established patterns of too crude a notion to cover the richness of what occurs in the modern
alliance or stability may be called into question. international system. In any social environment the actors, or units, have
This concern, as Woodrow Wilson also hoped, is connected with the to have some way of understanding their relative positions in the system.
notion of civilized behaviour, which no decent government would wish and this usually involves some kind of pecking order, or league table. In
to transgress. The practice may be far from being implemented, but the international relations this seems straightforward, given the disparities in
notion, or norm, is in circulation. The international community cannot size and power between states, but it is not, and not just for the familiar
prevent genocide, but states no longer feel able to walk by on the other reason that some multinational enterprises dispose of more wealth than
side on the grounds of non-intervention and cultural relativism. The many states. It also derives from the fact that the majority of the mem-
NATO action against Serbia in Kosovo was an indication that interna- bers of the United Nations exist between the two extremes of superpower
tional standards are beginning to be acknowledged even for internal and micro-state. The international middle class is by far the most numer-
affairs, and indeed that domestic and foreign policy are once again ous and growing level of the social stratification.
being seen, as they were finally in relation to Hitler, as two sides of the In day-to-day diplomacy states know their place quite well, in the
same coin. 48 sense that they understand where they can exert influence and where
Concern over genocide, or enforced population movements, is at they cannot. They do not follow any formal classification of wealth or
once the most dramatic and the most difficult example of how interna- power, along the lines of the OECD indicators, but they have to have
tional norms shape behaviour. Most foreign policy, by contrast, is rou- some way of understanding the international system, even of visualiz-
tine, dull and rule-bound - with the rules generated as the result of ing it. Decision-makers therefore tend to think of their state as operat-
incessant international dialogue. Certainly most have more to do with ing in a particular region or issue-area, according to its circumstances,
gradually internalizing shared norms than with any fear of incurring and do not pretend to the global range that the United States takes for
sanctions. The United States sometimes behaved with appalling feroc- granted. Needing a simple model to provide guidance they tend to fall
ity in the Vietnam War. The fact remains that it did not use all its over- back on geographical proximity or the law of comparative advantage as
whelming force, including battlefield nuclear weapons, and eventually rules of thumb.
had to accept defeat. In the last analysis there was no question of trying No doubt conservative by disposition, foreign policy-makers rarely
to annihilate North Vietnam, knowing as the administration did that display signs of radical revisionism, and when they do they find the
it would be opposed by critics at home and abroad, and having, as whole weight of the existing order of things (Schattschneider's 'mobi-
Johnson and even Nixon did, some moral sensibility49 Similarly, lization of bias') against them. The hierarchy of states presses strongly
although the United Kingdom fought four 'Cod Wars' against Iceland down from the top, and rebellion against its ordering is difficult. Only
between 1958-73, it did not employ its superior naval strength and thus the most determined and reckless leaders rise to the challenge, of whom
had to accept Reykjavik's extension of its coastal waters to a twelve- Napoleon and Hitler are the archetypes, and ultimately they both man-
mile limit. No doubt NATO unity and US concern had something to do aged to unite a winning coalition against them. This is not to revert to
with this, but a modern British government could not be seen to be the traditional argument that the balance of power determines states'
imposing violence on a small country if there was any risk of appearing choices- although at times the strategic situation is compelling. Rather,
to be in the wrong. 50 Less dramatic than either of these wars are the it is to say that any state which wishes to alter some or other element of
many instances of states conforming with diplomatic practice, for the informal hierarchy which exists throughout international relations,
instance in granting immunity to embassy personnel accused of crimes, whether in the workings of international institutions or decisions on
over and above domestic protests. The sending of emergency aid in nat- selective interventions, has to expect powerful opposition from those
ural disasters, even when there is no likelihood of reciprocity, is another who benefit from the existing order of things.
sign that there are certain values which are diffused among states even The current beneficiaries of the status quo are, for the most part, the
where they are not codified or enforceable. states of what is loosely called the West, but we simply do not have
182 The Imernational Living in the Anarchical Society 183

enough experience with a global system of 190 states to know whether the political environment of foreign policy, but some certainly is. The
their advantages are primarily those of historical positioning, or those of medical community's transmission of knowledge across frontiers about
more effective socio-economic systems. The answer is probably both. hip replacement surgery is technical and low profile; yet what it does
Certainly after the collapse of the Soviet Union it has become even more about AIDS (in conjunction with the World Health Organization) is
difficult for any smaller state which wants to defy western-generated highly political. The Spice Girls' world tour was of only commercial
orthodoxies, especially in foreign policy. The price of sovereign inde- and cultural significance; by contrast the world-wide emotional appeal
pendence, which seems such an anomaly for many small and/or weak of John Lennon's pacifism arguably made a contribution to undennin-
states, is avoiding pretensions in international relations. Seeking to pre- ing the values of the Cold War through generational change. These
serve and protect one's existing position, which often means the simple examples suggest that world society can influence foreign policies, just
fact of statehood, is the most that the majority of states can aspire to in as foreign policies can shape world society. The influences are felt.
terms of their contribution to how the international system is run (if however, in very different ways and time-frames.
'run' it is). In times of flux, or when a major power is in difficulties,
some states may see tempting possibilities, but the onset of a major
crisis usually shows all too starkly the limits of such aspirations. The Opting Out and Other Forms of Resistance
hopes of the new Armenian state in 1920 were soon crushed by Turkey
and Russia. Hungary's weaknesses were badly exposed in 1956, just as Although the international system displays considerable elements of
Egypt's were to be by the war of June 1967. interdependence, both political and economic, this does not mean that
If all foreign policy is constricted by other states, the actions of inter- there is no way for particular actors to retain or to create space for them-
national nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and other trans- selves. There have always been examples of states managing to defy the
national processes also create points of political sensitivity and great powers, if only for a period, not least because the system is too
vulnerability. This issue will be dealt with more fully in Chapter 8, and big, geographically, and too complicated to be policed by a few states.
for the moment it is simply worth observing that lNGOs both interact Thus there are always differing general strategies available and a wide
with governments and have their own, more autonomous realm of inter- range of possible responses to the same conditions. The external envi-
action. They have developed close lobbying relations across the range ronment looms large, and it may not be foolish at times to talk of
of national administrations, and with intergovernmental organizations. 'system-dominance', but it is not determining. Apparent anomalies like
Equally, they by-pass governments and can have direct effects on pub- the survival of Castro's Cuban regime may be explained by reference to
lic opinion inside states. This complicates official policy-making con- the balance of power (although it is now ten years since support from
siderably, as the two-level game becomes triangular. It also has the Moscow ended) but cases like Ceau10escu's Romania, which balanced
capacity to generate new phenomena altogether, known as 'private' or internal conformism with a foreign policy defiance of the Soviet Union,
'municipal' foreign policies because they flow from elements of civil do not fit into that mould. The same was true, for a time, of Nyerere's
society and local government. Tanzania, which pursued its own model of development independent of
Thus state decision-makers encounter INGOs as an inherent part of pressures from East and West, led by a distinctive figure who simulta-
the environment to which they must respond, intermittently capable of neously coruscated capitalism and translated Shakespeare into Swahili.
exerting a leverage which can be costly to resist. In this respect the Many states choose to cope with the pressures of the system by con-
international political system bears some resemblance to the cobweb formity, to the wishes of a powerful neighbour, to an alliance or other
model of a 'world society' associated with John Burton, but subse- form of diplomatic coalition, or to the general rules set by by a combi-
quently developed in varying directions. It departs from Burton, how- nation of consensus and hegemonic leadership. Those who do not fit into
ever, in that it incorporates both the network of inter-state contacts, and these categories- and many states change their positions over time- still
institutions, and that of non-governmental activities. 51 It is, for instance, have a number of different ways of manifesting their independent
constituted in part by what we called earlier in this chapter the 'knowl- capacity for agency. They may be summarized as neutrality, self-assertion,
edge band' of the international system. Much of this is not relevant to isolationism and eccentricity.
 184 The International Living in the Anarchical Sociery 185

Neutrality takes a wide variety of forms and goes well beyond the anachronistic and self-defeating. Isolation is, however, the natural reac-
technical meaning of staying out of armed conflicts. It may be used to tion of some governments (their peoples usually have no choice, since
cover the wide range of means used to avoid commitments to the major isolation requires authoritarianism to enforce it) to what they see as i Ile-
groupings in international politics. Under this heading we may group gitimate external interference or cultural contamination - at the time of
the many states who associated themselves with the Non-Aligned writing, Robert Mugabe is taking Zimbabwe down the same road. In its
Movement as a way of achieving solidarity among those who resisted way this is an assertion of independent agency in an ever more confining
the gravitational pulls of the two Cold War camps. The neutral and non- international environment, although perhaps the exception that proves the
aligned (the former name of groupings at the UN and the OSCE) rule, since few wish to emulate Burma. Isolation may be valued for its
include states like Switzerland, and Sweden, with the resolute and his- own sake, as a form of self-reliance and sovereign independence, but it
torical determination not to get dragged into great power conflict, and may simply be seen as preferable to the alternatives. This 'ourselves
well-prepared to defend themselves, as well as Finland and Yugoslavia, alone' image is a very powerful one, as embattled Serbia demonstrated in
engaged between 1948 and 1989 in a desperate and skilful balancing act 1999. On the other hand, isolation, like neutrality, is never absolute. There
between East and West. The category also contains Ireland, a thor- will always be some contact, some trade deal which will be quietly wel-
oughly western state which has used neutrality as a way of differentiat- come54 Finally there is the small group of relatively isolated countries
ing itself from the UK, and Laos, which as a land-locked state has tried which desperately wish to escape the condition, usually through diplo-
traditionally to avoid throwing in its lot with any of its neighbours - matic recognition. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the best
Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. current case in point, although as with Taiwan, the practical problems of
If far more states pursue neutralist strategies than at first appears then isolation are alleviated by having a powerful patron.
the reverse is true of self-assertion. Great power rhetoric makes it Eccentricity is a less durable strategy for resisting the weight of the
appear that maverick states are regularly endangering international international system than the other three. It is mostly associated with
order. In practice, very few countries risk drawing hostile attention to particular leaders, and can be seen as a residual category for the various
themselves by challenging the status quo, certainly in general terms but foreign policy stances which are sui generis. New Zealand under David
even on issues of importance to themselves. When a state does behave Lange rather startlingly departed from its normal pro-western quietism
in a self-assertive and unmanageable way, it soon finds itself a pariah, to criticize strongly French and American nuclear tests in the Pacific.
which tells us something about the conformist nature of the interna- The consequence was a raising of the profile of both New Zealand and
tional system. At least in the Cold War a state which was anathema to the issue, but at a political price relentlessly imposed at home and
one side usually found support on the other, although geopolitics also abroad. New Zealand exerted its sovereign right to ban visits from
played its part, as Dubcek discovered in Czechoslovakia in 1968 nuclear weapon carrying ships, but thereby lost its US security guaran-
and Allende in Chile in 1973. Some pariahs, like Libya and post- tee, and domestic opposition to the government was stirred up from out-
revolutionary Iran, avoided this Procrustean bed. They partly chose their side.55 By contrast, Malawi drifted further and further into unnecessary
status and partly had it thrust upon them. In the post Cold War period, isolation as the result of the idiosyncrasies of Hastings Banda's personal
having an unpleasant internal regime brings a state to the verge of rule, from which it has only just emerged, and Slovakia made one of the
pariah status, as South Africa became under apartheid. 52 As before, biggest blunders in contemporary history when it voluntarily separated
however, it is the perception (on the part of the dominant powers) that from the richer Czech Republic in 1993. National independence might
a state represents a threat to the existing order, as with the prospect of have been served, and the beliefs of Vladimir Meciar and his party, but
North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons, or Serbia apparently seeking the standard of living of the Slovakian people, and their chances of
hegemony in the Balkans, that confirms the image. Libya may gradually entering the European Union, were clearly damaged.
be coming in from the cold, but it will be far more difficult for Iran. Only the peoples of these states, and history, can judge whether the
Isolation can go with being a pariah, or it can be deliberately various strategies employed to resist, opt out or merely diverge from the
sought. 53 Albania in the Cold War, and Burma/Myanmar now, are the orthodox paths in foreign policy have been worthwhile. What is certain,
best examples of states pursuing a strategy that seems to most observers however, is that there remains plenty of scope for divergence among the
 186 The International

actors of the international system despite the pressures for conforn1ity

and conservatism which it contains. It largely depends on which set of 8
costs a community prefers to incur- assuming the political choice is so
clearly and rationally set before them.
Transnational
System Change Reformulations
This chapter has tried to show that the external environment remains
central to any foreign policy, even if it is not its only rationale, as might
have been thought in previous generations. This 'outside world' has var-
ious dimensions, according to separate functional logics, involving the
co-existence of the society of states with transnational relations.
Nonetheless it remains external in the sense that it is not easily suscep-
tible to change and it is not part of the political process which generates The international has always consisted in part of the transnational.
decisions. It also consists to a large degree of material or semi-material Not only has there never been an era of purely inter-state relations, but
conditions, which may be misperceived but which make their presence it is perfectly arguable that the proportion of transactions controlled by
felt at some stage or other of the decision cycle. governments has been lower in the past - for example during the
The question then remains of how the international system changes. Reformation and the Counter-Reformation- than it is now. 1 The world
It is not static and it is not equally 'external', that is outside the control of governments and the world of peoples have always co-existed, over-
of an actor, to all. Is the system driven by impersonal historical forces lapped and interfered with each other. Adding the distinction between
at work, or by a small group of privileged actors? Or is it pluralist, in the internal and the external we get a four-box quadrant with mearting
perpetual motion and the sum of all its parts interacting? The three to both the scholar and the practitioner (Figure 8.1).
possibilities are hardly incompatible, and all have their element of truth. Where governments dominate internally, the state is powerful;
What is difficult to deny is that the world is not only in flux but that it where they dominate externally, they produce official diplomacy, inter-
can move a very long way in a mere half century, at no-one's particular governmental institutions and war. Where peoples have more scope,
behest. The Europe of the iron curtain was not envisaged by any of the they produce a strong civil society inside the state and transnational
victors of World War, yet it determined much of their politics from 1947 relations internationally. Since no quadrant is sealed off from the
to 1989. Imperialism was opposed by many, states and peoples, but no- others, and positions vary on both axes, all the phenomena noted are
one imagined that almost all the European colonies would disappear
between 1947 and 1964. History is always on the move, and it manifests WORLD OF GOVERNMENTS

itself to us largely in the form of the changing world of which our indi- diplomacy;
vidual agency, even at the level of powerful states, constitutes only a international
institutions
small part. Philosophers and commentators, whether Hegel and Marx,
Fukuyama and Paul Kennedy, seek to unlock its secrets for us and to INTERNAL EXTERNAL

identify the reason of change. But there are no short cuts to under- civil transnational
standing this massive system in which foreign policies provide points of society relations
reference for action and responsibility. Policy-makers have little choice
but to take a series of bets on the international trends which will provide WORLD OF PEOPLES
new challenges, and those which will consign some of their policies to
the rubbish heap. It is no wonder they are generally cautious. Figure 8.1 Governments, peoples and international relations

187
188 The International Transnarional Reformulations 189

subject to influence from the others, and indeed tend to blur into them. take place in the international sphere, relating to mutual involvement in
Politics both within the state and outside it will therefore need to be such matters as the international whaling regime, arms control or Lhc
conducted with some sensitivity to the proximity of other forces and negotiation of a Multilateral Investment Agreement. Finally, they may
kinds of activity. involve a direct clash between a state's foreign policy and the TNA.
All this is fairly well-known. While Thomas Risse-Kappen wanted to These categories are based on the assumption that it is by no means so
'bring transnational relations back in', they never in fact went away difficult to distinguish between the domestic and the international as
after first being noticed in the pioneering work of Rosenau, Keohane many contend, inherently connected as they are 4 It is the last two cate-
and Nye at the start of the 1970s. They had become part of the orthodox gories which provide the focus of this chapter.
analysis of international relations for all but that rather naive tendency
which assumed that nco-realist theory was co-terminous with thought
about international politics in the global epistemic community. There A Transnational Environment
has been a lot of general writing about transnational relations and the
state, and about the state's impact on transnational relations. Indeed, a Although it makes sense to start with the inter-state environment when
genealogical approach to the current preoccupation with globalization analysing foreign policy, for any decision-maker the outside world is
would discover close connections with this well-established debate. holistic, including at once material conditions, interactions between
Far less developed, however, whether in the transnational or in the states ('the state system') and the inchoate mass of links between peo-
globalization literature, have been the implications for foreign policy. ples and private associations that we call transnationalism. It is possible
This is surprising given the fact that the concept of transnational relations that in the course of time the importance of states will shrink, and the
first arose in the context of foreign policy analysis, as a refinement of the state system with it, to become a merely ceremonial part of this transna-
government-to-government model of interactions. 2 We have learned a tional environment, or world society; for now the balance is much more
good deal about the state, and about world politics, but not about the spe- evenly struck. Still, the nature of the wider environment in which states
cific category of state actions which is foreign policy. As we saw in and other actors have to operate needs clarifying precisely because of
Chapter I, this is probably because many have come to regard foreign the uncertainty about its extent and evolution.
policy as almost a residual category, but the effect is to elide the distinc- The definition of transnational relations is relatively straightforward,
tion between structure and agency and that between world politics and the given the work that has gone before. Nye and Keohane said that
actors it contains. There is a real lacuna in terms of focusing on the transnational relations consisted in 'contacts, coalitions and interac-
actions of both states and transnational actors (TNAs) at the international tions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central for-
level, and not just in terms of 'sovereignty at bay' 3 This is the gap tack- eign policy organs of government' .5 Transnational actors are those
led in the present chapter, with due regard to the conceptual problem of private groups or even individuals who, while they require physical
distinguishing between foreign policy and foreign economic policy. Just facilities inside states, do not need governments in order to conduct
as not every action of a TNA is automatically political, so not every aspect international relations. They act directly either upon other TNAs or on
of state activity abroad need be counted as foreign policy (as opposed to other governments. These definitions exclude the transgovemmental
'external relations'). Foreign economic policy will be foreign policy contacts discussed in Chapter 4, but otherwise include the whole range
when it seeks to shape the international environment and/or projects the of activities of 'world society'. Only a small part of them will be rele-
fundamental concerns of the society from which it derives. Otherwise it vant to foreign policy at any one point and time.
will be mere economic diplomacy, just as much of the activity even of a The quality of the transnational environment in which actors move is
foreign ministry is diplomacy rather than foreign policy proper. ,. highly variable. It includes elements from all three of the 'bands' or log-
It follows that relations between TNAs and states vary in their nature. ics in the international system identified in Chapter 7, to do with eco-
Sometimes they take place largely inside the state, and relate to the eco- nomics, politics and knowledge. These distinctions cut across those
nomic structure of the country, through such matters as the siting of fac- between the state system and transnationalism, as all three logics
tories or the criticism of a human rights record. At other times they will involve official and unofficial actors. Equally, states and TNAs operate
190 The International Transnational Reformulations 191

in an environment which is both physical and of their own making in assume the primacy of the political, may already be barely relevant.
relation to all three logics. This is true even in the area of knowledge, This is because both hyperglobalists and transformationalists adhere to
for example, where the splitting of the atom cannot be forgotten and two basic propositions: first, that a single world market is coming rap-
therefore constitutes a material circumstance to be taken into account. idly into being; second, following Marshall McLuhan 's arguments of
This analysis is required so as to demonstrate not only that agency at the 1960s, that a global village is being created, where we share the
the international level involves different kinds of actors, but also that the same news, concerns, gossip and consequences, across the full range
actors operate in a multi-layer environment not easy to reshape, and in of human activity. In this second sense globalization goes far beyond
time-frames which are longer than the career of the average politician. the economic indicators with which it is often associated. 7 We are mem-
This is as true of the transnational environment as of the state system. bers of an immanent world community, which limits the nature of the
The transnational environment could be equated with globalization, politics which can be conducted within it. States, indeed, increasingly
the dominant way of understanding the world for both politicians and have to give ground to other actors more adapted to the new realities.
informed citizens during the 1990s. This has its advantages, but in rela- What value do these two central propositions have, and how far should
tion to foreign policy it is something of a red herring. The advantages our understanding of international politics be based on them? The first
lie in the fact that the term is instantly recognizable, and that it connects certainly has a good deal of force. It would be foolish to discount the
up to the everyday experience of those who lose their jobs because of experience of those working in finance, trade and labour markets who
an economic down-tum on the other side of the world, or who watch the feel their environment to have changed radically and need to look
Kosovan crisis unfold on real-time television and then find refugees from increasingly beyond their traditional protectors (governments, trades
that conflict housed within days in the next street. It is also true that the unions) when they want action on their concerns. The disciplines of the
term is comprehensive in scope, indeed holistic, that it has been taken up global market are now felt inside every producing country. Yet even here
by politicians like Tony Blair and that it is the daily intellectual currency it is easy to oversimplify, given that many states have powerful instru-
of opinion-forming reviews like the Economist. The media, and univer- ments at their disposal for economic management, and that global trends
sity courses, help to reproduce the idea and to make it self-fulfilling are far from uniform. The market, indeed, is hardly a level playing field
among the mobile, international classes. It is truly an idea of its time, in in any area of economic life. The globalization thesis also suggests little
that it provides us with a way of understanding the post-Cold War world, - beyond the logic of commerce and profit-seeking - about where
no longer artificially divided, and in its post-modem challenge to all agency should be expected, if not at the old sites, and it is therefore fatal-
understanding based on fixed points. Given the way we live now, it is istic in its import about the political management of globalization and its
both a necessary simplification and a dominant elite construct. consequences. It certainly has few connections with foreign policy, even
The globalization literature is so immense that any generalization via foreign economic policy, as the assumption is that gradually the state
about it is risky. David Held has suggested that its protagonists fall will have to surrender ever more to the private sector and will come to
either into the 'hyperglobalist' or into the 'transformationalist' school. see the futility of attempting to intervene, whether at home or on the'
The hyperglobalists believe that the emerging world market dominates world markets. The problem of resolving the differences between exist-
most aspects of our life on the planet and renders nugatory attempts to ing territorial communities is left to one side. 8 As a hypothesis, global-
pursue distinctive, let alone reactionary, paths of development. The ization points to an ever smaller area for public policy, with the defeat of
transformationalists are more cautious, arguing only that the present is sterling by currency speculators in September 1992 the classic case in
an epoch of rapid and wide-ranging change, driven by global socio- point. The best that can be hoped for is extended intergovernmental coor-
economic processes which are loosening, if not destroying, the bonds of dination, partly through institutions like the IMF and 08, but particularly
traditional political communities. 6 through powerful regional groupings.
The implications of both schools for foreign policy are clear enough- The _second proposition remains the same interesting general insight
although barely addressed in the globalization literature. Most political it was 35 years ago, with no particular build-up of evidence to justify a
action by governments which does not try to harness globalization is step-change to the status of accepted truth. Most observers would regard
doomed to failure, and traditional foreign policy, with its tendency to the idea of a global community as inherently less convincing than the
192 The International Transnational Reformulations 193

economic proposition, and even if taken as a point of reference it has to Behind the slogan of globalization is a more interesting, subtle real-
be so hedged about with qualifications as to lose most of its meaning. ity. The co-existence of states and TNAs produces a swirling interplay
This is particularly so in relation to politics, in the implication that we of forces heading in no clear direction. The most important characteris-
are all increasingly involved in the same events, and share their conse- tics of this interaction are constant change, mixed actorness and lack
quences. For while we may well be more aware of events in places like of structure. Both states and TNAs have to come to terms with these
Kosovo or East Timor (and does this 'we' include the hundreds of mil- features in virtually all issue-areas. To this extent the prophets of holism
lions who still live peasant Jives, whether in rural China or Poland?) are correct.
awareness is a very different thing from the politically crucial attributes Constant change is the human condition, but one of the key issues in
of caring, acting and effecting. What is more, the state exists partly to understanding ourselves is to be able to distinguish between change
mediate the tide of happenings in the world, and we expect it to act as which is superficial and that which confronts us with significantly new
a tilter, according to whether we need, or are able, to do anything about conditions of life. In international relations the evolution of the state
them. We want the state to set an agenda, and to help us make sense of system over 400 years has involved managing change and providing a
a challenging world. It should enable us to choose whether or not structure for an otherwise anarchic set of relationships. 10 The society of
we share the same consequences as others in other parts of the states has therefore been both progressive and conservative, in that it
world- whether unfortunates, involved in war, or fortunates, taking part has provided meliorist possibilities but has also often legitimized a
in prosperous joint ventures like the EU. To say, as is often said by those particular order against demands for change which have seemed too
disposed to interpret the world through the lens of globalization, that radical or disruptive. International society does change, and not only
'we have no choice but to be involved' in x or y is to engage in a sleight through war, as we have seen with the major expansion in the number
of hand. There may well be new pressures on an American government of states since the end of colonialism, and with the astonishingly peace-
to take a hand in the Northern Ireland peace process, or on us all to be ful end to the Cold War. Nonetheless, given that most states have a
concerned about the slaughter in Algeria, but this does not mean that our vested interest in preventing the system's complete breakdown, it is fun-
acting, so as 'to do something', is inevitable? Furthermore, our engage- damentally slow-moving in the way it confronts new possibilities."
ment is of a wholly different kind from that of those directly involved, By contrast, the transnational environment is in constant flux because
who either have participation forced upon them or whose values are so it has no structure, and no institutions of its own. It is entirely actor-
intimately affected as to make responding a matter of instinct and iden- generated- a new Kenneth Waltz has yet to emerge to identify its struc-
tity. Choices, complexity and differential political processes make for tural features. This means that at one level all of its outputs are changes,
a wide range of barriers to isomorphism in the case of globalization as but equally that it is difficult to sift the ephemeral from the structural,
a cultural and social mechanism. and the intentional from the incidental. Even those running TNAs will
Thus the transnational milieu is not best discussed in terms of glob- not know whether what they are doing is making a difference, let alone
alization, which both misleads and claims too much, especially in the having a long-term effect. State actors are in the same position. Both
domain of international politics. It is ironic that this is particularly the also have to cope with the mixed actor environment. 12 TNAs .can hardly
case where analysts of globalization have been imaginative enough to ignore states; indeed their rationale is often to change state policies, and
see that more is at stake than market integration and a crnde form of in certain cases, like that of the environment, if they cannot affect state
material determinism. The wider the scope, and the bigger the general- decision-making and/or get Green parties elected to power, they face
izations, the more the issue of agency is left behind, and foreign policy immense frustration. For their part, governments will be punished by
gets treated as a specialist side-channel. Even those who believe enough events if they assume that international politics consists simply in nego-
in globalization to take to the streets against it display a baffled anger as ,- tiations with other states. In each policy area they now have to calculate
to whom they expect to do what. Those for whom international agency the mix of different kinds of actor they need to deal with, and what kind
is not only vital but connected significantly to foreign policy undoubt- of rainbow coalition it might be necessary to assemble to influence the
edly need to cast their understanding of the transnational environment various forces in civil societies and private enterprise, as well as inter-
in less general terms. governmental institutions. As Hocking and Smith say, much policy has
 194 The lntemational Transnational Reformulations 195

to be conducted 'through a variety of bilateral, multilateral and plurilateral soon becomes unsatisfactory, since the comparison is rarely of like with
channels' _13 like. How, for instance, can the size, let alone the power, of the Catholic
The transnational environment is the result of a quantitative shift Church be compared to that of the Ford Motor Company, or to Amnesty
which may now have become a qualitative one. That is, there have International? Simply to pose the question is to establish its futility.
always been non-state actors and transnational political forces. It is just A more useful basis for categorization is to distinguish between
that now the number and degree of organization of TNAs has put them those TNAs which are (i) territorial, that is, they either use or seek
on a more equal (but still not a substantively equal) footing with states. some territorial base, like states; (ii) ideo/ogicallcultural, since they
Whereas anyone running a church, pressure group or corporation seek to promote ideas or ways of thinking across national frontiers;
assumes that governments will be their interlocutors on many of the (iii) economic, because their primary focus is wealth-creation. This tri-
issues of concern to them, the truth of the converse has dawned more partite division has the advantage that virtually every TNA fits into it.
slowly in national capitals. While politicians and public officials still that the powerful but rather particular group of transnational corpora-
look first to their peers when engaging in international deal-making, the tions gets its own category, and that those actors which do not funda-
growth of conferences like that at Davos is an acknowledgement that mentally challenge the state and the state system, but rather wish to get
their environment is changing. 14 The greater willingness of publics to on board, are not confused with those for whom states are either the
criticize authority means that governments can hardly afford to ignore problem or an irrelevancy.
organized opinion, even that which is transnational. The apparent Let us expand on the contents of the three categories. The territorial
importance of Papal visits to diverse regimes, even in countries where group contains the best known and perhaps the most forrnidable antag-
Catholics are in a minority, is another indication of the mixed nature of onists of individual states, if not states as such. The Palestine Liberati.;n
modern diplomacy. However, this very fact means that decision-makers Organization (PLO), the African National Congress (ANC) and the
are often confused as to the nature of the system they are working in, Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) are only the best known of many
and anxious about its seemingly constant quality of change. This well-organized politico-military organizations which have pursued
explains the attraction of one-stop ideas like globalization, whatever de facto foreign policies in pursuit of clear goals. 16 They have often
their scientific deficiencies. commanded the maximum attention of even the most powerful states. In
consequence they have sometimes been labelled mere terrorist groups,
but this is not helpful. Very few acts of terrorism have arisen from an
A Taxonomy of Actors anarchistic attachment of value to the act of creating terror in itself.
Most, however cruel and unjustifiable, have been committed in the pur-
The range of transnational actors is surprisingly wide. All kinds of dif- suit of a political cause. What is more, they have sometimes produced
ferent entities of varying sizes now 'act' in international relations and results, although whether the end can ever justify these means is another
complicate the environment of states. A first step in the process of try- matter, and one for political philosophy. It is ironic that actors in this
ing to make sense of this variety and the activities being pursued is to category so often put themselves beyond the pale, for by definition they
construct a taxonomy of the TNAs. want to join the club, not to destroy it.
The most straightforward way to do this is to categorize according to Success in their endeavour would mean that a territorial TNA would
type of organization. Thus we can distinguish churches, multinational disappear from the category, as the ANC has done. On the other hand
corporations, trades unions, political parties and terrorist groups from those who do not manage to replace a regime or create a new state then
each other. This is helpful in terrns of giving us a sense of the breadth fmd it difficult to continue an international campaign indefinitely. The
of the category- just as states themselves vary greatly. 15 What it cannot Kurds are having to face the fact that a state of their own is unlikely to
do is give guidance on the roles or importance of these actors. Another be achieved, just as for long years both the Jews and the Arrnenians had
approach would be simply to rank TNAs in terrns of size and/or power, to accept the fruitlessness of their struggles for statehood. Actors of this
so that one would have some equivalent of the hierarchy of states to kind sometimes form coalitions of pure pragmatism in the struggle with
work with, and indeed a sense of the major rivals to states. Yet this also states. Thts was the case with the gun-running activities of the Irish
196 The International Transnational Reformulations 197

Republican Army (IRA) and its contacts with radical Arab groups in the and possibly losing prominence thereafter. The European Nuclear
1980s. They can also be adept at making alliances with sympathetic Disarmament movement in the 1980s was a noticeable case in point.
states. as the IRA did with Libya. or with particular groups inside other growing as it had done out of the purely British Campaign for Nuclear
states. as Sinn Fein, the IRA's political wing, did in the United States. Disarmament (CND) and exerting considerable pressure in favour of a
The other kind of territorial actor to be found is the sub-national unit. theatre nuclear arms negotiation. Another notable example is the Anti-
Cities, regions, states inside federations have all produced 'local' or Apartheid Movement, which mobilized opposition to the white regime
'municipal' foreign policies. 17 They have done this for diverse reasons, in South Africa most effectively for three decades. Less political~ but
even if all share a dissatisfaction with the monopoly of central govern- still a considerable factor with its five million members and offices in
ment over foreign policy (defence policy being usually a step too far). forty countries, is the World Wildlife Fund, which attempts to shame
The mayors of cities like Paris, Moscow and New York are inherently (and help) countries which do not protect their endangered species.
well-known international figures who exploit their profile for domestic Much more durable ideological actors are those which might be
political advantage, and conversely use their strong constituency base to described as the proselytizers, those who seek to promote a vision of the
act directly in international affairs, as with Mayor of New York Dinkins' good life despite. or indeed because of, the resistance to be found in
visit to South Africa or Ken Livingstone in London advocating British many states to their message. Here we find churches and religious sects,
membership of the Euro. Less instrumentally, the German Lander have the Socialist and Communist Internationals, and their modern imitators
a constitutional role in foreign policy, while individual Canadian and in the form of the Liberal and Christian Democratic international
US states, notably Quebec, Florida and California have been quick to networks, idealist groups of various persuasions, including the United
take their own positions on international issues close to their own inter- Nations Association, together with Amnesty International and Greenpeace,
ests- in this case Ia ji'ancophonie, Cuba and immigration from Mexico which have moved beyond their pressure group origins to promote a
respectively. 18 Regions tend to be particularly active in commercial self- whole way of life. These actors are helping to construct a common global
promotion and other aspects of political economy, but towns and cities discourse on politics, although discourse. of course, is very far from being
have been notable for their involvement in peace-building exercises, the same as consensus. The politically inclined may wish to win over gov-
whether through twin-towning or the declaration of nuclear-free zones. ernments, but their basic aim is convergence between the units of the
These naturally have zero impact in the short run but may well influence international system around their preferred values.
civil society over time. 19 They can be influenced and coopted by gov- The churches, and in particular the Roman Catholic Church. are not
ernments but depend on genuinely local common interests to sustain only the transnational actors with the longest historical roots, they are
them, as with the post-war ties between the two steel cities of Sheffield older than states, older indeed than the idea of the state. They have had
(UK) and Donetz (USSR). Municipal foreign policy may be too grand to come to terms with the power of states, as with Anglicanism or the
a term for this kind of thing, but because they are literally grounded in Gallican compromise in France, but they retain extensive transnational
territory as well as in legitimate political institutions, the activities of networks. and a claim on the ultimate loyalty of the believer. Nor is this
cities and regions can represent very concrete outputs, backed by a matter solely of private faith. The Papacy still has the capacity to influ-
resources. They therefore have the capacity both to embarrass govern- ence the birth control patterns of millions in poorer countries such as
ments and to create new international networks of their own. Mexico and the Philippines, and has acted as a form of political oppo-
The second category into which we may group TNAs is the sition in communist Poland and El Salvador. No other Christian church
ideological/cultural. This in turn contains different kinds of actor, but has had such potential, but the importance of Archbishop Desmond Tutu
they share a commitment to spreading ideas and a relative disinterest to black South Africans and to the international campaign for sanctions
in territory, and in the conventional bases of power. They are therefore against South Africa should remind us of the legacy of protestant mis-
at once competitive with states in the transnational environment and sionaries in Africa. where a 'black theology' has grown up which cuts
focused on influencing them, since they lack the means to achieve their across already artificial state boundaries, and where evangelicanism has
desired ends by themselves. An obvious sub-group here is the single- taken hold. On the other hand, Christianity is not always a subversive
issue cause organization, promoting one particular end internationally force in such situations. The biggest church in southern Africa is the
 198 The International Transnational Reformulations 199

Zionist Christian Church of Moria, which, while wholly black, it has arisen out of the foreign policies of particular states, namely Iran
preached the value of accepting law and order even under apartheid 20 and Taliban Afghanistan- representing a Shia and a (very particular)
The transnational qualities of religion have been underestimated by Sunni version of Islam respectively.
secular-minded state decision-makers, in particular in the West. 21 Political proselytizers come and go, transnationally as nationally. The
Where the historical pattern of communities of faith does not coincide links between political parties are in any case always stronger when
with state boundaries (as it rarely does, in fact) there is potential for the parties in question are in government, as is currently the case with
serious conflict, as we have seen in Nigeria, in Bosnia and in parts of the European centre-left. When not, transnational solidarity is usually
South East Asia. This is less a matter of fundamentalist crusading brittle, as in the famous case of the re-nationalization of international
(although a trend in that direction can be discerned in a number of the socialism in the run-up to the First World War. The workers of the world
world's religions) than of political identity becoming expressed through could not unite, even where they were free from chains. In more recent
religion, which almost always has a transnational reach and structure times activities of this kind have been less ambitious and arguably more
rather than being coterminous with the state. influential. The German party foundations in particular have made all
Transnationalism does not, any more than statehood, imply unifor- kinds of links with their equivalents abroad, at both ends of the political
mity or homogeneity. Jews world-wide have suffered the consequences spectrum. 23 The political groups of the European Parliament have made
of being stereotyped as a people without loyalty to the states in which slow but steady progress towards becoming transnational parties.24
they live. The culmination of this persecution is that probably the only Party operations may be transnational but they are also para-statal.
thing which unites Jews everywhere is a determination not to see the This is not true of organizations like Amnesty and Greenpeace, which
state of Israel destroyed. Some fundamentalist Jews have, nonetheless, began with limited, functional goals and have grown almost despite
operated transnationally in attempts to push Israel in their favoured, themselves into de facto international parties, far in advance of single-
theocratic direction, and US foreign policy into a commitment to 'eretz issue politics and able to influence political agendas and affect policy-
Israel'. In doing so they have demonstrated the divisions within the making in states of many different types. Oxfam is another pressure
world of Jewry, like any other religion. group that has become a brand name, with the capacity to raise voluntary
Islam is also too readily seen by non-believers as a single entity, taxes world-wide and link both technical expertise and political activists
rather like the Vatican with a guerrilla army at its disposal. In practice, on the ground in the pursuit of developmental goals. The changes in
the world of Islam is as variegated as that of Christianity, with a wide western policies in recent years in the areas of both development and
range of different positions held on politics and international affairs 22 human rights certainly owe a good deal to the persistent campaigning
Furthermore, the institutions of the Islamic world, such as the Organi- and ability to harness resources transnationally of these major organiza-
zation of the Islamic Conference, created in 1972, are resolutely inter- tions. They have spawned many imitators, but remain in a separate cate-
governmental and powerfully influenced by the patronage of Saudi gory from the specialized pressure groups discussed earlier.
Arabia. Yet the fact that Islamic theology sees church, state and civil More at the cultural than the ideological end of the spectrum aie
society as integrally connected means that there is much potential for those in the knowledge business, who have an interest in spreading
political activism, and long before Al Qaeda the activities of organiza- information and ideas independent of the needs of the state they are
tions like the Muslim Brothers and Hamas have made governments based in. They include the media (but the media empires of Rupert
tremble, notably in Egypt (with the assassination of Anwar Sadat) and Murdoch and others belong more in the business category), plus scien-
during the current civil war in Algeria. There is a transnational element tists and educators. In essence they are the functional networks of
to this activism, although not as much as is commonly supposed. It is in experts- meaning those whose first concern is to understand the world-
fact important to distinguish between Islam as an important (and highly who have come to be known as 'epistemic communities'. 25 This
differentiated) factor in the interaction between domestic and foreign 'knowledge band' of the international system has the capacity to gener-
policies, and Islam as a transnational actor, in which capacity it largely ate structural changes, as we have seen to dramatic effect with infor-
exists in the form of specific groups. To the extent, indeed, that there mation technology in the past twenty years, simply as the result of
has been any kind of movement to create an Islamic 'world society' professional activity. States thus find that while they can intervene and
200 The International Transnational Reformulations 20 I

even control some areas of knowledge-development- nuclear weapons possible some of the breakthroughs in nuclear arms control of the
and outer space are prime examples- much of the rapidly changing sci- 1980s. The Soviet Union confirmed the hypothesis that a state which is
entific environment leaves them with little choice but to adapt. The difficult for transnational actors to penetrate initially can change quite
same is true of news. Once a story breaks it is impossible to confine it, quickly under their impact once access has been gained. Once influ-
given the speed of communications and the way the world's media now enced at the top, an authoritarian system can ensure relatively quick
feed off each other. The international news agencies in particular have a responses further down the ladder. 28
key role in deciding on news priorities and shaping debate. The 'CNN A tina!, but significant, example of an epistemic community achieving
effect' (meaning that governments now have to be sensitive to opinion policy impact is that of the economics profession. As economists became
at home and abroad because their actions are exposed in real-time, sceptical about the benefits of Keynesian, demand-led economic poli-
world-wide) is grossly exaggerated, but it remains true that a regime can cies, particularly in the United States, so they turned to supply-side
no longer avoid opposition or embarrassment just by closing down its analysis and followed through the logic of liberalism by recommending
own press and TV. There exists what has been called in the European monetary discipline, privatization and free trade. These ideas have been
Union context the 'communauti de vues', which soon filters through taken up by governments which ten years earlier would have been their
into intergovernmental relations and which through linkage politics (see mortal enemy. The profession naturally covers a wide range of views
below) can strengthen domestic opposition. 26 but it is striking how quickly the Keynesian orthodoxy has been
On occasions epistemic communities are capable of mobilizing replaced, first at the intellectual, and then at the political, level. This can
themselves to become temporary international actors, with the aim of be interpreted as reason working its way through, but few social scien-
changing public policy. International media campaigns are not unknown tists would be willing to accept such a naive view of the role of ideas in
on relatively 'soft' subjects such as famine relief, but on anything more politics. There are many causes of the revolution in economic policies
conttoversial they tend to be forestalled by editorial diversity. Effective which occurred after 1980, but one of them was the power of the top
humanitarian action is more likely to be mobilized by ad hoc coalitions university departments in the United States to engineer a new consen-
of specialists, preferably with wide reputations and operating out of sus among academic economists. In Thomas Risse-Kappen's phrase,
universities. Midecins sans frontieres is an example of an actual organ- ideas are not 'free-floating' 29 This is true, indeed, of transnational phe-
ization produced by doctors concerned with the relief of suffering in the nomena-in general.
Third World, founded in 1971 by the French humanitarian activist The third and last category of TNAs is the economic. In part this
Bernard Kouchner, who eventually rode into ministerial office on the includes the familiar multinational producers such as General Motors,
back of its success. Less structured but equally effective have been Philips and IBM, but it now extends to the corporations in the service
the groupings of environmental scientists which have kept up the pres- industries such as McDonald's or Lufthansa, and media giants such as
sure on governments to acknowledge such problems as the polar holes Mediaset. Sport and crime now also generate big transnational busic
in the ozone layer, not least by suggesting constructive responses. They nesses. The activities of these enterprises is undoubtedly one of the most
have worked hand in hand with pressure groups, and have determined important facts of the early twenty-first century. They impact directly on
the agendas of intergovernmental conferences, if not the outcomes 27 the lives of millions, and they are a central factor in the making of state
Even more striking is the impact of senior US and Soviet scientists economic policy. The whole issue of the evolution, and possible decline,
on arms control negotiations between the superpowers. Fear of nuclear of the state is closely related to the nature of their power. The very
war led to the starting of the transnational Pugwash conferences in 1957 importance of these questions, however, leads to a certain repetition and
and, despite the security problems, figures from both sides managed to lack of discrimination in the debate. The issue here is distinctive and
stay in touch through the Cold War - partly because they represented more specific: in what respect are transnational businesses independent
potentially useful back-channels for Moscow and Washington. Given actors in international politics?
the nature of this issue-area it is impossible to know the full truth of At one level the answer to this question is disarmingly straight-
the matter, but it has been argued quite convincingly by Matthew forward. Within the international economy, and collectively, the
Evangelista that these transnational networks were crucial in making Transnational Enterprises (TNEs) are big players. Given that they have
202 The International Transnational Reformulations 203

certain values and interest' in common they are able to exert powerful action. 31 It is not in the nature ofTNEs to set out to achieve such ends:
pressures in favour of trade liberalization, tax incentiveS and havens, consequences and intentions must always be distinguished. Nonethe-
favourable regimes for the free movement of labour and the exploitation less, some TNE activity has a considerable impact on the general envi-
of minerals. They did, for instance, manage to undermine the project for ronment in which state foreign policies are implemented. This can be
30 negative, as with the sanctions-busting operation run by Shell into
the mining of the seabed in the common interests ofmankind. Equally,
either individually or in groups, they may occasionally be able to pre- South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, or the ability of European firms
cipitate change in particular states, as famously happened in Guatemala in 1981-2 to invoke trade rules against Ronald Reagan's attempt to
in 1954 with the United Fruit Company and Chile in 1973 with ITT. stop the new gas pipeline being constructed from the Soviet Union
TNEs represent a heavy weight in favour of a particular order of things, towards western Europe. In these cases the business-as-usual instinct
particularly in the international economic 'band' of the international sys- cut across political strategy. It can also be more positive, especially in
tem. In relation to their interests they play politics persistently. the case of the media, which are capable of articulating and amplifying
The other side of this coin is that the TNEs are inherently competi- concerns like human rights independent of the wishes of host or parent
tive amongst themselves and rarely have the will or the capacity to act governments. That said, they thereby risk effective counteractions.
collectively, as states to some extent can do. What is more, they need to When Rupert Murdoch decided to remove BBC World from his Star
work with states, and not for their destruction. TNEs' objectives occupy satellite he was anticipating the damage that could be done by the gov-
a relatively narrow spectrum, relating to profit, expansion, stability and ernment in Beijing to his chances of penetrating the valuable Chinese
modernization. They rarely show interest in becoming quasi-polities by market.
taking responsibilities for communities and striking positions in politi- Economic actors in the transnational environment thus enjoy consid-
cal debates. Even Cadbury and Walt Disney, which have gone some way erable autonomy in their own business, the conduct of which will have
down the road of social action, quickly discovered the limits of their a big effect on the international economy and on what states try to do in
impact on wider society. Indeed corporations are often accused of being it. They intermittently impact on international politics, not always by
only interested in profit, with an amoral attitude towards the values of design. In this context, but also in that of the international political
the regimes they deal with. In consequence they have become con- economy, they should always be analysed in terms of their interaction
cerned with the public relations value of achieving an image of 'corpo- with states. In particular, although multinational businesses are broadly
rate responsibility', but the nature of their agency in international independent of control by governments, they are not immune from the
politics is very restricted. Qua international actors they generate inputs, culture and values of the relatively small number of rich, capitalist soci-
beyond the logic of their daily business activities, to inter-state discus- eties from which they spring. Indeed, they are a powerful influence on
sions on the relevant regimes of the international political economy, that culture. This means that TNEs and states will often be pressing in
such as trade, the environment and intellectual property. Yet their most the same general direction - as with the opening up of markets in the
notorious political interventions are in the internal affairs of particular ex-Warsaw Pact countries- and against the preferences of others. Yet
states, if not at the actual behest of their own parent government then at there are many points of divergence. While TNEs' political agency is of
least in line with its policies. On the other issues of international rela- a general, contextual kind, states have varying, peculiar interests and a
tions, such as war, security, international institutions, border disputes or wider range of instruments to boot. Since politics is their business and
human rights they have little distinctive to say. their priority, they are the agents likely to have a more direct influence
This generalization must be qualified, in that it covers the criminal on international political life.
entities capable of actually creating some security problems, as with
drug-running in the Caribbean or small arms sales in the Third World.
More positively, organizations like Eurovision or UEFA have probably Foreign Policy and Transnational Actors: a Model
done more to create a sense of shared experience among the peoples of
Europe than the rhetoric of a thousand politicians. Still, even these things Distinguishing the different types of transnational actors helps us to appre-
are by-products of their normal activity, examples of functionalism in ciate the range of activity which goes under the heading of international
 204 The !llternalional

politics, and the nature of the challenges they pose to states. It is now time
r
..

Table 8.1 TNA-state relationships in international politics

205

to focus more directly on the nature of the relationship which exists

WhatTNAs What states Nature of Examples Advantage
between these incommensurable. actors, with their contrasting aims and may do may do interaction with?
responsibilities.
Three forms of this relationship may be observed. They are derived (I) request policy accept compromise; Montreal balanced.
Normal, change; lobby. legitimacy of deals; and Kyoto
from the problems which arise for state foreign policies, and the
bargaining input; engage cooperative Conventions;
attempts ofTNAs to conduct equivalent strategies, but they may also be relationship in dialogue; ventures: Lome
applied, with the proviso that weak, poor states are significantly dis- coopt/incorporate continuing Conventions;
advantaged in their relations with corporations over internal issues, to in policy- relations. electoral
state-TNA relations in general. The three are: normal, bargaining rela- making; exploit monitoring.
TNA acces~· for
tions; competitive, power relations; and what can be called, following
own purposes.
Samuel Huntington, transcending relations 32 Their structures and
(2) act directly on ignore; use hostility; may Human rights usually
implications are set out in Table 8.1. Competitive, domestic powers over be zero-sum: clashes; with
The first of these relationships is termed 'normal' more because it power environment, borders and polarized; Rainbow states.
represents a functioning relationship, unlike the other two, than on any relationship using public legislation to unstable~ Warrior
assumption that it represents the norm. The number of actors and issue- opinion as a deny access states possibly intrusion into
means of or weaken divided inter nuclear test
areas involved is too large for us to be able lo generalize safely about
pressure; form position of se. TNAs zones; disputes
what sort of relations are prevalent. What occurs here is that the TNA local cells; try TNA; suppress; possibly out over
envisages being able to co-exist with a state's foreign policy, but wishes to dislocate military action; of their depth technology
to negotiate about those elements it has problems with. It thus lobbies a state power inter- politically; transfer;
government directly. The state in turn is relatively relaxed about dealing and reduce its governmental rclmes to Lockheed
with the TNA (which by definition will not be 'foreign' but will have a monopoly; cooperation. specific issues. scandal;
divide states would-be
foothold in the state's own society) and thus engages in dialogue. It may against each states.
even seek to incorporate the TNA in some way, and exploit its channels other; outflank
for its own advantage. In consequence, deals are struck, and even when single
they are not, relations proceed on a routinized, trauma-tree basis. In this governments by
way the two kinds of actor have managed to co-exist productively transnational
opinion
enough in the complex build-ups to the Lome Conventions signed coalitions.
between the European Community and the 78 African, Caribbean and
(3) get on with try to move uneasy; churches; usually
Pacific states, and in various attempts at assisting political transitions, Transcending their own issue to (I) or intermittent: TNE.<;; with
as in South Africa and Bosnia. relationship business; (2); ignore; absent; epistemic TNAs.
The second kind of relationship is competitive. It involves a more ignore frontiers exhibit diverging communities.
overt use of power in a struggle for advantage that may involve one or as much as confusion; try assumptions
possible; states to recruit 'own' and modus
both sides contesting the legitimacy of the other. TNAs tend to see little
not main TNAs and operandi;
advantage in dealings with particular governments and therefore go interlocutors. other private relates mostly
behind their backs directly to domestic society. At its most provocative counter- to strucwral
this may be deemed subversion, but more usually it simply involves the weights. issues.
strengthening of local organizations, appeals to public opinion and
attempts to weaken the hold of governments by opening up the discus-
sion of policy options. The more sophisticated may also try to play
states off against each other. In response, governments have a range of
 206 The International
j Transnational Reformulations 207

options at their disposal. They may call the TNA's bluff by ignoring their by technology and the free movement of people, goods and ideas.
activity, reinforcing the strength of their position by coordinating with Governments arc not the principal interlocutors.
other states. More seriously, they may use their powers pre-emptively to When faced by TNAs in 'transcending' mode governments may well
control frontiers or to enact legislation, as ways of denying TNAs free- feel unmoved and opt to do nothing. Equally, if they feel threatened
dom of movement. At the extreme end of the continuum autocratic by the actions they will probably try in effect to move the issue into
regimes may use security forces to suppress the interfering 'foreigners', category one or two. That is, they will either try to engage the TNA in
while democratic governments may tum to military force against ter- straightforward negotiation, or to take countermeasures. Unfortunately.
rorism, striking bases abroad or adopting draconian controls over the however, the very nature of the problem means that they may not suc-
movements of people and money. ceed in the endeavour, either because there is no obvious point of
The consequence of this mutual suspicion is escalating hostility, with responsibility to engage with or because the TNA is interested in neither
cont1icts increasingly seen as polarized and zero-sum. The relationship deals nor confrontation. In this case a government will probably exhibit
is at best unstable, with states likely to overreact as a result of the pres- signs of confusion. The more astute will learn how to play the TNA
sures of having to play a two-level game, and TNAs beginning to get out game by using private groups or individuals based in their own society
of their depth through the head-on cont1ict with states, sometimes to counter transnationalism in its own terms, or taking its ground by
becoming involved in issues - such as political authority structures - adopting certain policy stances as their own.
which they are nOt equipped to handle, and which touch on the most In general, the nature of the interaction in a transcending relationship
sensitive spots of state sovereignty. The classic case was the determina- will be uneasy and intermittent, like the sound of one hand clapping.
tion of Greenpeace's Rainbow Warrior crew to intrude on French The relationship may simply be absent, as diverging assumptions and
nuclear testing areas in the Pacific, which produced a state terrorist forms of agency make engagement inherently difticult. A good example
response 33 Equally dramatic were the hostile reactions of the of this form of relationship is the West's baffled reaction to the interna-
Indonesian and Chinese governments in the 1990s to foreign human tional resurgence of the Islamic faith. The constant tendency to place
rights activity over East Timor and the incarceration of dissidents. Any responsibility for certain developments on a small number of govern-
TNA with a territorial or explicitly political claim is by definition on a ments, and to identify a few groups or individuals as bogeymen, reveals
collision course with the states affected by the claim. In political econ- a misunderstanding of the religion and its political role. Islam is too
omy, international businesses have at times intervened in election cam- varied, too transnational and too diffused in society for western states
paigns, by illicit funding to their preferred candidates. Above board, but to be able to confront it as such 36 An intelligent foreign policy needs to
no less of a challenge, was Toshiba's lobbying of Congress in 1987 discriminate between the faith and particular adherents, and in particu-
which undercut the political momentum for an embargo after its sub- lar between beliefs and actions, but the temptation to treat Islam as an
sidiaries had sold sensitive equipment to the USSR against US policy34 accountable political entity is often too great. It was a mark of statesc
Notwithstanding this example, governments generally hold more cards manship that in the serious crisis after 11 September 2001, the United
in a competitive relationship. In overt conflict their powers are more States resisted it.
concrete and extensive, although much depends on the particular state The relationship which governments have with transnational business
involved. is often of the same order. Although the two sets of actors cannot afford
The third kind of relationship, termed 'transcending', is more subtle. to ignore each other, it would be a mistake to assume that they are con-
Samuel Huntington argued that the real strength of transnational actors tinually locked in a struggle over sovereignty and control of the inter-
was that they 'transcended' inter-state relations - they operated in national economy. Most corporations are, as the French say laconically
another dimension. 35 From this viewpoint TNAs are simply uninter- about dogs, 'nuichants ... ils se defend en/ quand on /es attaque', but
ested in much state activity. In pursuing their own goals - whether otherwise they are happy for governments to get on with running
profit, the dissemination of an ideology, or the protection of fauna and society37 For their part governments vary in their degree of interest in
t1ora- they act as if a world society were already in existence. Frontiers trying to control TNEs, but in this age of privatization they generally
then become a marginal irritation, to be circumvented without difficulty accept that their role in business is limited. They need, as Stopford and
 'I

208 The International Transnational Reformulations 209

Strange pointed out, to engage in negotiations with tirms over invest- up with, a net of transnational connections. We have catalogued the
ment sites, tax breaks and regulation, which is important, complex different types of transnational actor engaged in this process, and pre-
and time-consuming. 38 But this is hardly the sum total of international sented a model of the kinds of relationship they may have with states,
relations, and whether it is even crucial involves a value judgement through their governments. The next step is to examine the ways in
about the relative importance of political economy, security and identity which TNAs penetrate into states, impacting upon civil society and
questions. On many key questions, such as the collapse of order in the therefore at times both by-passing and embarrassing governments.
9
Balkans, the emergence of Palestine, or even North-South relations, This is what James Rosenau called 'linkage politics-3 It is to be
governments and TNEs simply do not have much to say to each other. distinguished from the advocacy of linkages associated with Henry
Epistemic communities are perhaps the best example of actors which Kissinger; that is, the attempt by a government to pressurize another by
transcend conventional international politics, for good or ill. Although as bringing an unrelated matter to the negotiating table 40 This kind of
we have seen they are at times capable of pressuring governments to good linkage happens all the time in conventional diplomacy, more or less
effect, their rationale is quite otherwise - the sharing and extension of subtly, as with US hints of a weakening commitment to NATO if, say.
knowledge with other experts regardless of nationality. Scientists, for the EU were to become too protectionist in trade. Most of the time the
example, tend to pursue links with colleagues all over the world, regard- potential linkages barely need spelling out. When they do, it is usually
less of government-to-government problems. They may decide to follow a sign that diplomacy is failing.
their own conscience in breaking off links with a given country, but in Linkage politics in Rosenau's sense is a way of understanding: that
general professional ties survive. Unless, that is, governments actually is, the nature of agency at the transnational level; the kinds of difficulty
prevent travel, as happened during the Cold War, with both sides denying that governments face when their foreign policy is being circumvented;
visas to academics, or suspending the exchange clauses of cultural agree- and the sets of links which exist between the international system and
ments during times of tension. Democratic governments are faced in these the domestic environment. The latter is crucial to foreign policy-making
circumstances with the very embarrassing prospect of restricting the free- and will be the subject of the two chapters which follow, but it is hardly
dom of their own citizens in the pursuit of a foreign policy goal. They do insulated from the outside world. Linkage politics shows how, further-
not wish, or know how, to intervene much in the worlds of culture and more, any aspirations that governments might have to be gatekeepers,
sport. In Iran, by contrast, young people are currently exhibiting a strong that is to have the exclusive capacity to mediate between the world and
interest in western dance music, much to the consternation of the clergy. their own society, are doomed to failure.
Short of a return to the most puritan and authoritarian phase of the revo- The original definition of linkage politics still holds, namely that a
lutionary regime, there is little to be done about it. The French govern- linkage is 'a recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one state
ment has discovered much the same thing in its attempts to protect the and is reacted to in another', with the caveat that given the ambiguity of
41
French language. The spread of computer technology and its associated the word 'state' it might be best to replace it here with 'society'.
English language terms is on a plane of internaTional activity where gov- Rosenau originally wished to escape from the 'conceptual gaols' of
ernments do not belong. It is for this reason that in fhe 'transcending' state-centrism, and was en route to a paradigm shift into 'cascading
aspect of the relationship between states and TNAs, the latter have the interdependence'. For this reason Linkage Politics is usually regarded as
advantage. They are playing on home ground. a mere curiosity or way-station in his intellectual journey. It is also
disregarded because the complex matrix which it proposes as the way
to study linkages is inherently unworkable 42 Yet the scheme is worth
Linkage Politics retrieving for its central set of distinctions, grafted onto the basic
definition of linkage. Rosenau distinguished between three kinds
Up to this point we have shown how the international environment, of linkage: reactive, emulative, and penetrative. The simplicity and
never wholly dominated by states, is now significantly transnational. accuracy of this insight make it curious that it has been so neglected.
Governments have no choice but to co-exist with a wide range of dif- Reactive linkages occur when an event in one society leads to spon-
ferent actors, and the state system operates alongside, is indeed tangled taneous reactions in another, unprompted by governments. An early
210 The International Transnational Reformulations 211

example was the demonstrations in London in 1851 in favour of the of this kind, even before the age of telecommunications, The sixteenth-
visiting Hungarian liberal exile Lajos Kossuth, which contributed to the century Reformation spread rapidly across societies, as did the abortive
dismissal of Palmerston as Foreign Secretary43 With modem communi- revolutions of 1848, The potential for emulation is the very reason why
cations hostile, popular reactions are almost guaranteed if co-nationals foreign governments are often hostile towards the prospect of revolu-
are maltreated abroad, Thus the taking of US hostages in the Lebanon tion, as with the Holy Alliance of 1815 or the intervention in Russia in
led to various manifestations of anti-Arab and anti-Islamic feeling 1918, There tends to be an exaggerated fear of political contagion,
inside the United States, The expressions of mass concern in the Federal Nonetheless, spillovers of this kind take place often enough, when the
Republic for the citizens of the DDR in 1989 were of the same type, underlying conditions are favourable, and in all political directions,
Even when fellow citizens are not involved, a reactive linkage can take This happened with the spread of both fascism and communism, and in
place, as when New York dockers voted to boycott Soviet goods after more recent times with the spread of the peace movement across west-
the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 198], Not infre- ern Europe during the early 1980s,
quently these actions, while genuinely independent of governments, are The third kind of linkage is penetrative, by which is meant the delib-
not unwelcome to them, as they send signals to another state without the erate attempt on the part of elements of one society to enter, influence
need for official responsibility, But they can also be embarrassing, even and, on occasions, manipulate another, This may be aimed ultimately at
damaging, to the coherent conduct of foreign policy, Thus when the a government, and indeed may sometimes be difficult to distinguish
State of Massachusetts passed a Selective Purchasing Law barring the from the operations of government agents, But there is an undoubted
State from purchasing from firms doing business with the repressive transnational dimension, Historically various forms of imperialism and
regime in Burma, it was seen by the Federal government as a challenge neo-colonialism have occurred through the direct operations of mis-
to its and Congress's powers to conduct foreign policy and regulate sionaries, traders and soldiers of fortune, Allowing for changes of con-
foreign trade, This could not be allowed to pass, and the law was chal- text, they continue to do so, Many French officials and intellectuals, for
lenged successfully in the US Court of Appeals,44 example, continue to regard the efflux of American cultural products, in
An emulative linkage is essentially what the economists call a particular those in the areas of film and popular music, as acts of infor-
demonstration effect, An event takes place in one society and is soon mal empire, Yet there can be no doubt that these products are welcomed
imitated by the citizens of others, like the 'Mexican wave' in a crowd, by many ordinary French people - indeed part of the fear of the French
Once again the demonstrations in eastern Europe in 1989 are the best elite is precisely the prospect of popular emulation, The consequence
example, After decades of repression, the coming of crowds onto the is a continuing underlying tension in Franco-American relations, for all
streets in the German Democratic Republic, and the movement of the progress in high politics, Australia has suffered something similar
refugees to the West through Hungary, detonated similar events in with the penetration of its coastal areas by Japanese capital and tourism,
Czechoslovakia, The subsequent peaceful demolition of the Berlin Wall The result has been a degree of popular backlash (although penetration
on 7 November was an event of the greatest symbolic significance, creates its own local vested interests) and intermittent diplomatic ten"
and made impossible the position of all the repressive regimes of the sions, The United States has suffered the same in reverse, with the ·
Warsaw Pact, Crucial here was the loss of nerve of the Communist appeal of Japanese cars and electronics to the American consumer, The
authorities, and the unwillingness of the Gorbachev government in result is that US-Japanese relations have become steadily more delicate
Moscow to sanction bloodshed like that of 1956 in Hungary, But it was than security considerations alone would dictate, If Japanese firms had
also clear that the societies of eastern Europe felt themselves linked by not very skilfully built up a base in the US, and if consumers had not
common experience, and were reacting spontaneously to each other proved deaf to appeals to prefer inferior home-made products, relations
regardless of particular governments, Thus even the Ceall§escu regime between Tokyo and Washington might have remained consensual and
in Romania suddenly collapsed in the December, despite the fact that it largely unruffled,
had always advertised its independence from Moscow, The result of accumulation of these three different kinds of linkage is
1989 was a 'world historical event' in Hegel's terms, and revolutions that the nature of both domestic and international politics has changed,
have almost always spawned some emulative, bandwagoning behaviour with concomitant complications for policy-makers at home and abroad,
212 The International Trans11ational Rej(Jrmulations 213

With due acknowledgement to the existence of transnational relations two sides increasingly engage. While achieving their objectives tends to
right from the start of the history of the state system, the modern be more a dream than a practical prospect, they act in many different
system is far more extensive and intensive, and the prevalence of issue-areas in international politics, including those of high politics, and
transnationalism demonstrates that the state system itself exists in a cannot be lightly disregarded. As a result of their varied activity most
wider context, with agency therefore occurring at different levels. societies in the world are directly linked into others; intermittently, and
Figure 8.2 shows how the funnel model, which was never wholly accu- incoherently to be sure, but with sufficient continuity to ensure that gov-
rate but does represent what many governments would like to believe ernments not only look over their shoulders into the domestic environ-
is foreign relations, is a gross simplification compared to the linkage ment (as we shall see in Chapters 9 and 10) but also have to assume an
politics model, let alone to that of the overlapping jurisdictions which autonomous interaction between that environment and those of other
are to be found in a diplomatic alliance between like-minded states, as states. The information technology aspects of globalization have made
in the European Union. The arrows provide examples of the kind of this even more routine and extensive.
political transactions which can exist between societies, and between It is at this point that the politics of linkage come in. There are count-
groups and foreign governments, without going through the parent less linkages across societies - connecting art historians, steam train
government. enthusiasts and retired politicians. Only some of them produce political
Linkage politics is prevalent because transnational actors are proac- difficulties, whether in the transnational realm itself or between TNAs
tive, reactive and imitative. They follow their own agendas, react to states and governments. When these issues arise it is because of competing
and imitate each other's successful tactics. Yet their actions are far from views about how society should be organized or resources distributed,
always being designed to cause problems for governments- indeed, the either domestically or internationally. The transnational dimension then
adds a particular tension over the legitimacy of participation and an
uncertainty over the location of the authority to act.
(i) The funnel model
On the face of things most of the channels of action - such as
pressure group coalitions, press campaigns, scientific conferences- are
46
legitimate and innocuous, especially in open societies. In practice
they will not always be seen, or even intended, as such. Moreover, what
the law allows is one thing; what is regarded as politically acceptable
quite another. There is a fine line, for example, between fraternal assis-
(ii) The linkage politics model
tance to a like-minded party in an election campaign, and unacceptable
Society A Society B
Groups and individuals Groups and individuals interference in another society's internal affairs. This will be even
more true where the TNA is prepared to break laws, and in societies
where it seeks to behave in a way not permitted to local citizens. Hence
the mutual hostility between western TV crews and state authorities
during events such as the repression in East Timor. The very act of seek-
ing to interview a local citizen (probably themselves too frighten~d
to speak) is often perceived as a political intervention, although It Will
(iii) The overlapping jurisdictions mode/ 45
be seen by the journalist and the society from which he or she comes
as performing a service both to themselves and the community of
mankind.
Society A Society B
The web of linkage politics is the outcome of the mass of transna-
tional activity produced by the various categories of transational actor.
It feeds back constantly into all the 'bands' of the international system,
Figure 8.2 lntersocietal connections: three models affecting both TNAs themselves and states. It constitutes a distinctive
214 The lntemational Transnational Reformulations 215

form of agency in itself and thus exerts distinctive pressures on the France, the United Kingdom and the United States. A strong degree of
agency of states. As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult to know ofticial encouragement was probably forthcoming. On the other hand the
what decisions are being made, where and by whom. This has implica- government was almost certainly not in a position to manage the inter-
tions both for our understanding and for democratic accountability. vention once begun, and was vulnerable to the political damage which
ensues from failure, or even success, on the wrong terms. In this delicate
and dangerous environment, where religion and human rights were as
Confusing Responsibilities prominent as oil and patronage, all actors, whether external or Algerian,
were groping in the dark and were, to some extent, interdependent.
Actors no less than citizens tend to be confused as to where power and Transnational actors are responsible only for themselves, whereas
authority lie when considering international and transnational politics. governments are responsible for the welfare of their people and often
Accordingly states tend to overstate and TNAs to understate their make even wider claims. Yet many of them exist precisely to pursue
respective roles; the one not to have their responsibilities diminished, common interests, and their increasing prevalence among the more
the other not to attract unnecessary attention. If analytically one can talk educated parts of the citizenry bestows a legitimacy that even states are
about a continuum between the domain of the state and the domain of coming to acknowledge. Some TNAs are being coopted into the
intergovernmental relations, at the mid-point of which exists the grey, processes of policy implementation, particularly in the Third World or in
'intermestic' zone, this is of no help in terms of specifying the different the aftermath of conflict, while others are coming to have an important
functions of governments and transnational actors. role in standard-setting. The more this happens the more they will come
Let us take a specific example to make the point more clearly. In 1995 to take on the bureaucratic character of states themselves, and the more
the tragic civil war in Algeria was beginning to take tens of thousands necessary it will become to find ways of holding them to account.
of lives, with western governments apparently either powerless to inter- External policy traditionally gives more scope for evading such prob-
vene or uninterested. At this point the Rome-based Catholic pressure lems, but as we shall see in Part III, civil society is increasingly reluctant
group San Egidio began an attempt at mediation between the Algerian to leave world politics to governments. States thus face a double bind
government and its fundamentalist opponents which soon made the in trying to relate both foreign policy and the complex of transnational
headlines. After prolonged efforts, including a preliminary meeting, relations to recognizable democratic processes.
the effort was rebuffed by the military government, but it remains the
single most constructive external intervention.47
How are we to interpret the actions of San Egidio, of whom few
non-Italians had heard before these events? A realist might waste little
time in concluding that the TNA was probably a convenient front for the
Italian government, and possibly behind them other western govern-
ments which could not afford to be seen as publicly active. From here it
is a short distance to the conspiracy theories which have always been
common about those who cross borders, whether Freemasons, arms
dealers or peace-makers. A believer in international civil society, by
contrast, would stress the autonomous will and capacity of San Egidio
in the vacuum created by the cynicism and 'prudence' of the neigh-
bouring states. More likely than either of these competing interpreta-
tions, however, is one which combines the two and accepts the messy
character of events like these. Thus it is highly unlikely that the Italian
government was either unaware of or opposed to the actions of San
Egidio. The same can probably be said of its major allies such as
Part III
Responsibility
9
The Domestic Sources
of Foreign Policy

Those responsible for foreign policy have to face many different directions
at once: towards the states of the international political system, but also
towards transnational actors; towards the close and the distant, geo-
graphically and politically; most tangibly, they must address their own
constituents- the 'inside' of their own community, as opposed to the
'outside' for which they have no formal responsibility. They must face
the fact that policy outcomes are vulnerable to events which are prima-
rily 'domestic' and, conversely, that foreign policy impacts upon
domestic politics. This chapter and the next deal with these two dimen-
sions. The current chapter discusses the general relationship between
the domestic and the foreign, with special reference both to the gener-
alizations often made about the domestic 'sources' of foreign policy,
and to the impact of domestic events, constitutional structures and types
of regime. Chapter I 0 moves the argument in a more normative direc-
tion, by considering how far foreign policy is meaningful to modem cit-
izens and how far they are able to participate through it in the central
political dilemmas which international relations raise. If most political
action now has an international dimension, then the problems of choice
between responsibilities inside and out, or over where to use scarce
resources, become even sharper than in the days of the autarkic or the
Keynesian state. If globalization also throws up a challenge to our iden-
tity, and to our ethics, then we shall also need to respond precisely
through 'foreign' policy, albeit much altered from that conducted by
Bismarck or even Adenauer. The domestic and the foreign, in other
words, literally make no sense except in relation to each other. But this
is not the same as saying that they are identical.

219
 220 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 221

Sources, Constraints and Actors policy would change and new possibilities for peace would open up in
the Middle East. This is a gross oversimplification. The United States
No-one now believes that foreign policy is unaffected by what occurs has strategic and moral interests in the survival oflsrael independent of
within states. The billiard ball metaphor has been discarded, together lobby pressures- which certainly exist and have their impact. It is also
with the notion that foreign policy is essentially a problem of strategy remarkable how much continuity there has been over decades in
like chess. 1 Even neo-realists concede that there are important things American foreign policy despite the vicissitudes of electoral politics.
which cannot be explained by international dynamics. Some analysts Continuity itself can also be explained through the concept of the
have gone to the other extreme, taking the view that 'for us only inter- primacy of domestic sources. through linking regime type or the hege-
nal politics counts' as Richard Pipes remarked of US policy towards the mony of a particular class to a certain kind of foreign policy orientation.
war in Chechnya, or that 'foreign policy behaviour is often determined We shall return to this approach below. For the moment two points will
primarily by domestic politics', as Alexander Wendt observed in the suffice. First, any such view renders too one-dimensional the nature of
context of discussing the limits of international socialization. 2 Be that domestic influence on foreign policy. Single-factor explanations rarely
as it may, careful observers have been pointing out since fhe 1920s convince where multiple actors and levels of activity are involved, let
that the nature of the modern state could not help but impinge on alone where problems are revisited over long, evolving historical peri-
foreign policy, with its elements of mass mobilization, populism and ods. Most political systems, or for that matter, the internal affairs of
economism. Eckart Kehr anticipated the arguments of Fritz Fischer most transnational actors, are too robust to be dominated by one
about the distinctively 'Prussian' nature of German foreign policy, and pressure group, or set of stake-holders. Second, the United States is
most critics of fascism or Soviet communism made connections untypical. Its constitution contains unparalleled opportunities for the
between domestic authoritarianism and external aggression. 3 For its legislature to check the foreign policy powers of the executive, and its
part, US foreign policy was often seen as being at the mercy of isola- political culture is coloured by both parochialism and anti-government
tionist domestic opinion - understandably, if not wholly accurately, attitudes- neither of which necessarily wins out, but which make pres-
after the disavowal by Congress of the Treaty of Versailles and the pass- idents nervous about international commitments.
ing of the neutrality legislation in fhe 1930s. It was logical, therefore, A more realistic approach to the domestic sources of foreign policy is
that the phrase 'fhe domestic sources of foreign policy' should have to build on Robert Putnam's concept of the 'two-level game', in which
become part of standard academic vocabulary by the mid-1960s 4 'chiefs of governments' are seen as playing politics simultaneously on
What does this notion refer to? It is important to distinguish between two boards, the domestic and international.' There are strict limits to the
the different ways in which the domestic environment impinges on uses of this game-theoretic, negotiation-centred paradigm - adding a
foreign policy. 'Sources' is an umbrella term, but it suggests more second, domestic arena hardly transcends the failings of the familiar
proactive inputs into foreign policy than the more concrete term of rational actor model - but it does capture the inextricability of foreign
'constraints', or limits. Neither tells us much about fhe identity of the and domestic concerns from the viewpoint of the policy-maker. By
various actors which operate at the domestic level and provide both starting from the position that foreign policy decision-makers are
inputs and constraints. These need to be specified separately. always 'Janus-faced', and fhat fhe two sets of concerns continually
The most sweeping interpretation of fhe idea of domestic sources is that interact, we can bofh avoid the errors of single-factor explanation and
which sees foreign policy as primarily generated from within- das primal observe what space might be available for leadership to 'make a differ-
den innenpolitik, referred to by Kehr. In powerful, quite self-sufficient ence'. The very fact that the two environments have different logics
countries like the United States, it may certainly seem to be the case fhat means that choices have to be made about both priorities and the man-
the complex politics of Capitol Hill are more crucial for international agement of complexity. This imposes considerable responsibility - and
relations than any amount of speeches in the United Nations, or even some freedom- on those conducting public policy. Even in the relatively
bilateral negotiations with ofher major powers. It has often been assumed narrow conception of Putnam and colleagues, a leader can manipulate
that if only the power of the Jewish lobby to determine the outcome the 'win-set', that is, 'the set of potential agreements that would be
of certain swing states in US elections could be diminished, American ratified by domestic constituencies in a straight up-or-down vote against
 222 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 223

the status quo of "no agreement"' 6 The set is not self-executing, but or war policy can take for granted the support of the population who
requires considerable political effort, skill and creativity. Equally, for- ultimately must sustain it.
eign policy must be understood as subject to a continuous stream of An intelligent government will thus anticipate likely opposition at
domestic inputs, no less than international. Its 'sources' are multiple. home and build into its foreign policy a sense of what the country will
This notion of a stream of influences deriving from domestic politics stand - something that the Soviet leaders, too used to assuming the
goes well beyond the image of a decision-maker playing chess on two obedience of their people, failed to take into account in December 1979
boards. It allows us to see that many of the domestic sources of foreign when launching the war in Afghanistan, which all too soon turned into
policy are unexpected, and do not conform to pre-set expectations or rules their own Vietnam. It is possible for leaders, indeed, to exploit the con-
of strategy. Foreign policy is not immune from the impact of values, ideas, straints which domestic politics imposes on them in negotiations with
initiatives and upheavals, transnational in many respects but often also other states. This is the 'my hands are tied' strategy, which, however, is
internally-generated. In the most dramatic instances, or in important likely to work only when the third party is disproportionately keen to
states, these forces can even wash over the wider international system, reach an agreement. In the end it only encourages direct intervention in
channelled to begin with through the foreign policy of the state in ques- one's own domestic politics, to 'untie the hands', or produces a waiting
tion7 This happened with both the French Revolution and the Third Reich. game in the knowledge that domestic political constellations always
Less dramatically, pressure group activity and internal party politics pro- change in the end 8 Conversely, the prospect of changes of government,
duced Britain's more ethically-oriented foreign policy after New Labour's democratic or otherwise, makes any foreign policy-maker cautious
victory in the election of May 1997, just as the pressure for land reform about what he or she can promise to outsiders. Ultimately no govern-
from disgruntled war veterans in Zimbabwe, combined with President ment can tie the hands of its successors on the major issues of foreign
Mugabe's need of an election-winning gambit, led to the occupation of policy, whatever the particular constitutional provisions.
white farms and an eventual crisis with Britain during 1999--2000. The domestic environment is hardly monochrome. It consists of differ-
Domestic society also imposes constraints on foreign policy-makers, ent actors and kinds of activity, which may best be conceptualized here in
in the sense of fairly stable and known limits to their freedom of terms of concentric circles." Since Snyder, Bruck and Sapin first con-
manoeuvre by virtue of the particular society they represent in interna- ceived of the notion of a foreign policy decision-making system in which
tional relations. The interests of French farmers, inhibiting any wish a official leaders are the central but not exclusive site of actorness we have
Paris government might have to reform the Common Agricultural steadily added further circles of activity. Part I of this book dealt with
Policy of the European Union, are a well-known example. However intra-governmental politics, involving competing elites and bureaucratic
much leaders get seduced into making international affairs their prior- interests. Moving outwards into domestic society, we encounter what may
ity, they are always pulled back by the elastic which connects them to be apophthegmized as the four Ps: parliaments, public opinion, pressure
their domestic base, often with rudely shocking results. This is partly a groups and the press (including other media). These will mainly .be
matter of intra-elite disputes, or the lack of resources with which to pur- covered in Chapter 10 in relation to the problem of the 'constituencies' of
sue ambitious plans, but it can also be the result of running ahead of foreign policy - those to whom leaders feel practically and morally
domestic opinion. Although it varies with the nature of the state, certain responsible. But there are other forces (if not quite actors) which the plu-
groups will have a veto power in the sense that an initiative will require ralism of the four Ps tends to conceal, namely social classes and regime-
their 'ratification' (to use Moravcsik's term) if it is to have credibility type. Both are dealt with in this chapter as instances of determining
abroad. The military are the traditional case in point, but in foreign eco- domestic factors, whose importance can be assessed on an empirical
nomic policy banking and investment opinion (both home and abroad) basis. There is a grey area between the individuals or groups which all too
will be crucial for the confidence which sustains a national currency. evidently possess some degree of conscious actomess, and who therefore
Even mass opinion can have this braking effect through referenda, as participate in the policy process, and those elements of society which may
the French and Danish governments discovered in 1992-3 with their well shape policy but have no clear voice or mechanism for mobilizing
attempts to ratify the Treaty of Maastricht. The Russian Revolution of interests. Thus 'the peasants', the 'working class', an ethnic minority such
1917 was an even more clear demonstration of the fact that no foreign as 'the Hispanics' (in the US) or even the gastarbeiter (in Germany) may
224 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 225

all have the potential to affect foreign policy, but they will have great are many actors who busy themselves simultaneously in both arenas,
difficulty in producing collective positions and are consequently difficult impacting on policy without much regard for formal boundaries.
to observe 'in action'. All that can be done is to hazard limited general- Equally, while issues sometimes present zero-sum choices between
izations on the kind of connections which might exist between foreign domestic and external goals, they usually reverberate both inside and
policy and particular configurations of class, regime or development. outside the state. or transnational actor. This interconnection is most
More evanescent are the individual actors who can emerge from almost obvious in resource questions, but it also appears in relation to political
anywhere, with an impact of unpredictable nature and duration. Who culture and to the consequences of domestic change. Each of these three
would have said that Princess Diana would have become a crusader against dimensions deserves further discussion.
land-mines, causing controversy inside her own state on a matter of On the resources front the issue involves the detail of public expen-
defence policy? Or that an Orthodox Rabbi in Jerusalem would have not diture decisions as well as the long-term allocation of resources.
only described the Palestinians as 'snakes' at a sensitive time in the peace Foreign policy is not, as we saw in Chapter 6, the most expensive area
negotiations but also dismissed six million Holocaust victims as deserving of state activity, at least in the nanow terms of diplomacy. But its asso-
their fate since they represented the souls of past sinners? 10 These may be ciated instruments, of defence, trade promotion, and overseas develop-
extreme examples, but the emergence of more durable political forces such ment assistance, are far more costly. They provoke regular controversies
as the Greens in western Europe, or nuclear nationalism in India can also over value-for-money, which all too easily degenerate into 'us' versus
surprise conventional politicians and analysts. Every domestic environ- 'them' polarities. Do we need: another aircraft carrier, far-flung bases,
ment is unique and is in a condition of perpetual movement. embassies in Kiev or Mogadishu, membership of UNESCO, a national
This means that generalizations are always contingent- in particular airline or consulates to help our more feckless compatriots around the
with respect to the extent to which states function normally, at home world? Especially when the alternatives seem to be more hospitals,
before they even think of abroad. We have touched on this issue in schools and roads, or simply mouths fed and children vaccinated against
Chapter 2, but it bears repeating here that some- perhaps even a sizeable killer diseases. The issues are always more complicated than these stark
minority- of the world's nearly 200 states so lack stable administrative, choices. But there is no avoiding the facts that big commitments in
political and social systems, that it is difficult to conceptualize the rela- international relations do imply fewer resources available for state
tionship between foreign policy and their domestic environment. Where expenditure at home, and that public debate often sets up the problem
we find weak, 'failed', 'quasi' or 'prebendal' states we shall probably in this kind of way - charity begins at home, elections are won on the
find weak, erratic and dependent foreign policies. 11 It is notable how tax issue, and other commonplaces of domestic political life.
little impact the Lebanon makes on its regional environment, compared The more debate proceeds the more evident it becomes that domestic
to its equally small but not fractured neighbours, Syria and Jordan. The society is itself divided on the need for what might be termed 'spending
same is true of all too many African states, The penetration of the Taliban beyond borders'. There are divisions between consumers, who generally
Afghan state by the private interests of AI Qaeda before long exposed favour tax cuts, and producers, some of whose jobs will depend on the
that country to devastating foreign intervention. By contrast, where the arms industry, the military or the various other forms of government-
military take power it is usually a sign that the state has already failed subsidized international activity. Producers may also have privileged
(and may be subject to more looting by the soldiery) and however unde- access to the bureaucracy which is so important in the policy-making
sirable for human rights reasons, this can have the effect of restoring process, and defence expenditure in particular has been traditionally
statehood at the international level, and even a predictable foreign policy. ring-fenced because national security has been seen as the sine qua non
of achieving other social goals. A point will sometimes be reached,
nonetheless, where high expenditure on external goals imposes a crip-
Complications from Domestic Events pling burden on a state, often leading to foreign policy decisions being
taken for financial, domestic reasons. 13 Even the United States had
In general, foreign and domestic politics are separate but not separable, to reverse its whole foreign economic policy in 1971 as the result of
as has been said since 1996 of European forces within NATOP There domestic stagnation brought on by the huge costs of the Vietnam War. 14
 226 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 227

An effective foreign policy should avoid getting to this point of high vulnerability when they are prepared, paradoxically, to commit resources
drama where major decisions have to be taken in one realm for reasons to internal reform. Finally, the current members of the European Union
more to do with the other. will soon have to face the painful need to spend rather more on defence
Essentially the pressures coming from the domestic and international if they are serious about creating a military identity independent of
environments are of contrasting types. The former can be insistent, NATO. A European army would have significant consequences domes-
practical, but also the product of relatively ephemeral political rows. tically no less than internationally.
Misjudgements, however, can lead to the fall of a government, which is That foreign policy is subject to the swirls and eddies of domestic
why even trivial domestic problems loom large on the horizons of dem- politics while remaining a distinctive arena can also be seen in relation
ocratic decision-makers and why autocrats overreact to the hint of a to domestic culture. The latter is partly formed by traumas encountered
challenge to their position. International pressures, by contrast, will be in world politics, but once certain social attitudes and political forces
ignored in extremis because of supervening domestic concerns, but may are established they feed back to affect future foreign policy choices,
ultimately have greater long-term significance, because they are seen as often with serious consequences. The most prominent case of modern
central to the state's very survival, through the need for either defence times was that of white-ruled South Africa. The regime in Pretoria tried
and/or alliance or the creation of a favourable international milieu. to separate domestic and foreign politics, by denying the legitimacy of
Bearing in mind that foreign policy-makers are often bound together foreign criticisms of apartheid and seeking to engage in diplomatic
internationally by common concerns and personal contacts, it can be business as usual. It also sought to use classic realist tactics by dividing
seen why heavy domestic costs, both financial and political, are some- its opponents abroad. In particular, this meant wooing those leaders
times accepted for external reasons -as with the German willingness to of black African states willing to deal with them, notably Felix
finance the war against Iraq in 1991, or Australia's dispatch of troops to Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Hastings Banda of Malawi.
help the United States in Vietnam. In both cases the international situa- This approach had some temporary success but in the long run was
tion was perceived to be so serious, and the need not to alienate brought down by the impossibility of keeping apartheid in a sealed
Washington so strong, that governments accepted the inevitability of political compartment. The oppression of the black majority in South
damage to other policies and to their own popularity. Africa ultimately conditioned South Africa's external relations, not just
If some can act as a free-rider, and therefore have it both ways - as because of the success of private, transnational groups (as we saw in
when the US does not pay its dues to the UN or Sweden does not join Chapter 8) but also because few governments wished ultimately to asso-
NATO - for most there is a perpetual balancing-act to be conducted ciate with a system which was historically doomed and which they and
between the external and internal aspects of resource-allocation, with their peoples found repugnant. If it took time for this view to become
external commitments, once made, relatively inelastic. This is easiest to established that was because domestic and foreign politics tend to run
see in relation to the environment, where commitments to reduce CFC at different paces.
emissions or to preserve rainforests have practical consequences in Other examples are not difficult to find. The anti-Americanism which
terms of lost revenue or higher production costs. Despite the powerful is never far from the surface in Greek politics has its roots in the events
lead it could give in terms of reduced oil consumption the United States of the civil war of 1946-9, the military coup of 1967 and the Turkish
will not consider serious taxes on petrol, because of the huge domestic invasion of Cyprus in 1974 (which Washington, to say the least, allowed
protests which even a rise in price of a few cents provokes. The need for to happen). 15 It continues to cause difficulties for those Greek politi-
balance usually asserts itself in the end, however, as when two decades cians and technocrats who feel they have no choice but to seek better
of taking cheap oil for granted came to an abrupt end in late 1973, or relations with their biggest NATO ally. Events in the Balkans in the
when France's neglect of its deteriorating competitive position vis-a-vis 1990s have reinforced both the domestic antagonism and the external
the newly unified Germany led to devastating defeat in 1870. Britain's tensions, because Greek opinion saw Serbia as having been unjustly
painfully slow coming to terms with the changed nature of continental scapegoated and its own concerns over Macedonia and Albania as
Europe after 1950 can be interpreted in the same light, while Israel's having been largely ignored. This vicious circle of mutually reinforcing
Arab neighbours will only be in a position to rectify their regional internal and external suspicions might be breakable by decisive action
 228 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 229

in one realm or another but it cannot be treated either as only a domes- effort had to be mounted to prevent the building up of international
tic or as only an international problem. 16 support for the breakaway province of Biafra. Civil wars create situa-
An even clearer case of a government being at odds with its domestic tions of great danger both for the state concerned and for the interna-
political culture is Switzerland, where the whole set of indigenous insti- tional system, as shown by the way the North nearly found itself at war
tutions and political forces combines to make internationalism of the with Britain in 1861-2 during the American civil war, and by the costly
kind represented by membership of the UN and the EU, which most intervention of the western powers in Russia between 1918-20, which
serving politicians and decision-makers would probably welcome, an arguably contributed to the subsequent siege mentality of the Soviet
unrealistic proposition. Norway is in a similar situation relative to the regime. 23
EU, while the United States, it is sometimes argued, has its own cycles Short of revolution or civil war, there are other ways in which domes-
of introversion and extroversion independent of the rhythms of interna- tic instability can shake up foreign policy arrangements. Even common
tional politics. 17 A less orthodox, but no less striking, case is Afghanistan, or garden political turmoil can undermine the credibility of external pol-
where the persistence of internal tribal and warrior traditions make the icy, as was the case with the many short-lived Italian governments in the
country both extremely difficult to subjugate and an uncomfortable ally, second half of the twentieth century. The similarly hamstrung French
as the Soviet Union, the United States and Iran have all discovered over Fourth Republic managed to sound the death-knell in 1954 of the
the past twenty years. Here the Afghans' long experience of external European Defence Community France itself had initiated in 1950. Yet it
interference has produced a fierce culture of independence- and inter- was to provide the further leadership necessary for the setting up of the
nal divisions - which then produce foreign relations far removed from European Economic Community. The severe crisis occasioned by the
those of more conventional members of international society. 18 From our Algerian war of independence eventually brought down the fragile
analytical perspective, the important point is that the deep interrelation- political system, to be replaced by the very different model of the
ship of the foreign and domestic dimensions can only be properly under- Fifth Republic, with an assertive, independent foreign policy as one of
stood by ensuring that they are not blurred into one. its prime objectives. 24
The impact of domestic change on foreign policy has spawned a great There can be little doubt that whereas for a small country a period of
deal of literature, particularly within the positivist tradition of internal instability will only matter if it provokes intervention from the
Comparative Foreign Policy. Rummel, for example, confirming Sorokin, outside, for a major power it can reverberate through a range of key for-
argued that conflicts inside and outside the state are unrelated. 19 That is, eign policy problems. The United States found that the weakness of the
foreign policy is not affected by internal upheaval, and vice versa. This second Nixon administration resulting from the Watergate scandal made
counter-intuitive finding is contestable, given the difficulties of coding even more problematical its contemporary difficulties with the Soviet
conflict events and of interpreting statistics. The more traditional Union, the Middle East and even its European allies. It was no coinci-
scholar, Geoffrey Blainey, once pointed out that half of the wars dence that this was the era in which Henry Kissinger talked a great deal
between 1815-1939 were preceded by major internal turmoil in at least about 'linkage politics'. By linkage Kissinger meant the trading off of
one participant. 20 It hardly needs stressing that this meant that the other different diplomatic issues, and never far from his mind was the weak-
fifty per cent were not so preceded. ness of his own position in international negotiations (not least in the
A more subjective, but still historically sensitive, generalization is that end-game of the Vietnam war) occasioned by the chaos in Washington.
'if a near-revolutionary situation exists internally, foreign policy paraly- On the other side of the Cold War conflict, foreign policy often had to
sis and quiescence are more likely than belligerence'. 21 The corollary is be put on hold for the quite long periods when ageing leaders were inca-
that once a revolution has settled down, the twin consequences of its pable either of action or of stepping down. The same painful saga was
own fervour and the hostility of external conservatism can spark, for a played out by Boris Yeltsin in the second half of the 1990s. Immobilism
time, a powerfully assertive, even expansionist foreign policy22 Civil meant that the Russian political system cut a poor tigure abroad, with
war, by contrast, will simply paralyse foreign policy while making it at Moscow virtually powerless to oppose NATO enlargement.
the same time more vital, as a way to cope with meddling outsiders. This Internal events, therefore, like domestic culture and debates over
was the case in Nigeria between 1964--7 when a full-scale diplomatic resources, are perpetually connected to foreign policy in a two-way
230 Responsihility The Domestic Sources o(Foreign Policy 23 I

flow of influence which by definition implies some separation of the Reich after 1871, for example, allowed the hundesstaten as well as the
two realms. The scopes, issues and actors of the two arenas do overlap, federal government to have foreign relations. Thus, following Bismarck's
which makes it sensible to talk at times of 'intermestic' politics, or of view that the centre should not have more power 'than is absolutely nec-
cross-cutting 'policy modes'. Yet they can still be distinguished. The essary for the cohesion of the whole and for the effect presented to the
contrasting rhythms and legal-normative structures of the foreign and outside', large staten like Bavaria and Wlirttemberg retained some of
domestic mean that they each always retain the capacity to surprise, their diplomatic Iegations. 27 The German state subsequently turned
upset and divert the best laid plans of the other25 through a full historical circle, with federalism suspended by the Third
Reich and its unrestrained machtpolitik, only to be reintroduced by the
Basic Law of the Federal Republic in 1949. The Lander were then
Constitutional Structures restrained by circumstances from asserting themselves in international
relations, but over the past few decades it has become clear that the
The domestic environment is framed by a number of different forces, widening agenda of foreign affairs has brought them into more direct
social, political and economic. But few things are more important for international involvement. Certainly the Bonn government has had to
any entity than its basic constitutional structure, often outlined in a accept that the consent of the Lander must be obtained for the conclusion
foundational document. This is even true for states which do not pretend of treaties which touch on matters normally under their competence- as
to be 'constitutional' in the sense of subscribing to the principle of the do, for example, the treaties establishing the European Communities.28
supremacy of the law, and of liberal notions about the rights of the peo- Conversely, the Lander have been increasingly active in direct relations
ple.26 No formal constitution is ever fully lived-up to, but even under with other sub-national units, following a general trend which while
autocracy there will be some form of basic pattern of government, while mostly limited to commercial and cultural activity does have the effect of
theory always conditions practice in the sense of creating expectations squeezing national foreign policy in certain areas into a smaller space
inside and outside the state as to what proper conduct should be. between global, regional and local pressures. On environmental issues,
In the area of foreign policy the elements of the constitutional struc- for example, where agreeing globally and acting locally are both vital,
ture which most affect outcomes are those dealing with executive- the regions will be indispensable partners. 29
legislative relations. In federal systems the relations between central A federal structure both controls potential actors (units like Quebec
government and the constituent states are also of increasing importance. or California evidently could be effective nation-states if given the
There are at least live different broad models of constitutional structure chance) and privileges them, in the sense that they have a pre-formed
which are relevant here, and the differences between and within them identity, visibility and an infrastructure which makes some kind of inter-
can affect the style and the substance of a country's foreign policy. national actomess feasible. Thus a number of US states have been able
These models are: federalism; the executive inside a multi-party leg- either to frustrate central government's external relations (as with
islative chamber; a unitary state but with powers divided between the Washington's inability to compel full domestic compliance with the
legislature and a presidency; de facto dominance by a single party provisions of the US-UK Tax Treaty) or to build up pressure for a
within a democratic structure; one-party systems. Although there is not change in official foreign policy by engaging in human rights motivated
the space to recite in detail the characteristics of the live, certain differ- embargoes of countries like apartheid South Africa, or Burma, often
ences do need highlighting, with reference to key states like the United against world trade rules as well as official national policy30 The con-
States, France, Britain, Japan and the Soviet Union. stant struggle between federal government and the states over aspects of
Foreign policy is one of the areas which in federalist states is most foreign policy swings back and forth according to wider circumstances.
clearly reserved for central government - indeed, it is the key rationale The human rights concerns of the 1990s advantaged the states, but after
for an otherwise decentralized body. This means that in principle the I I September 2001 the pendulum swung back with a vengeance.
non-central government (NCG) parts of the constitution are not permit- The other important dimension of the relationship between federal-
ted to conduct their own international relations. This varies, however, ism and foreign policy is the check on executive freedom of action con-
according to the nature and maturity of the system. The new German stituted by the division of responsibilities and the sharing of powers.
232 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 233

There is a tendency to assume that federalism implies a foreign policy Gaulle precisely cast the constitution of the Fifth Republic so as to free
which is constantly subject to restrictions and interference from within. the hand of the executive from parliamentary interference, in part
This view is much influenced by the example of the United States. with the aim of ending the view of France as 'the sick man of Europe',
whose constitution provides for an unparalleled degree of participation so that 'today [ 1962] its intluences and prestige are recognized through-
in central foreign policy-making on the part of the Congress. The lat- out the world>3 3 This put France on a par with the United Kingdom for
ter's assent is required for the ratitication of treaties, for declarations the first time, arguably, since before the Third Republic, in terms of not
of war (since 1973) and even for the appointments of ambassadors. having a foreign policy regarded by all as perpetually undermined by
The judiciary also has a role to play in settling disputes over decision- domestic political weakness and introspection. Italy is currently making
making, and the power of the purse is attenuated in federal systems. efforts to break out of the same trap. The endless governments of the
Such characteristics are also to be seen in some measure in other feder- 'First Republic' set up after the Second World War have not yet been
ations, notably the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland, in replaced by a 'Second Republic' of alternating majorities based on clear
both of which the conduct of foreign policy is to a degree constitution- electoral victories, which many want, but reforms have begun in the
ally decentralized. electoral system designed to achieve that goal. Part of the motivation for
Against this picture of a distinctively strong domestic environment in change has come from foreign policy, with a growing realization that
federal states must be placed the fact that the US Presidency has not Italian foreign policy was paralysed for years in part because of a
found it so difficult in practice to assert its authority over foreign policy parochial obsession with the politics of coalition-making in Rome, and
by the use of devices such as executive agreements instead of treaties or the consequent tendency abroad not to regard Italy as 'a serious coun-
'military advisers' sent to conduct undeclared wars. Moreover, the try'- that is, one with strong, stable leadership in which foreign policy
United States is exceptional in the degree of authority which has to be is not perpetually hostage to the manoeuvres of domestic politicking 34
shared with the legislature in foreign affairs. The Presidency may talk A constitution which produces endless coalition governments need
up the restraints imposed by Congress, and they may be intermittent, not always be subject to rapid change. The Federal Republic of
but where else has foreign policy debate produced such actions as with- Germany has managed for years with a stable government consisting of
drawal from the League of Nations (1919), the televised Senate Foreign the majority party, whether Christian Democrats or Social Democrats,
Relations Committee hearings into the Vietnam War, the War Powers supported in government by the minority Free Democrats (FDP) -who
Act of 1973, or the Freedom of Information Act of 1967? Other feder- usually held the office of foreign minister. The model currently oper-
ations, like Australia, Canada, Nigeria or Brazil, display a more con- ates with the Greens in the place of the FDP. Even the transition to a
ventional pattern of executive dominance over foreign policy. Even Green Minister of Foreign Affairs, J oschka Fischer, has taken place
where the constituent states have tried to take the opportunities which smoothly. In Israel, by contrast, whose system combines elements of the
modern conditions offer them of a direct international participation, the British model with some characteristics of the French Fourth Republic,
executive has usually managed to limit their incursions, generally we can see that the constant difficulty of putting together a majority
backed up by the courts' interpretation of the constitution. 31 government in a multi-party system, combined with the unusual
Beyond the variations of circumstance it is clear that the specific salience of foreign policy in the day-to-day politics of the country,
legal provisions of a constitution do make a difference. Australian fed- makes for a high degree of unpredictability. That this would become
eralism gives the foreign policy executive advantages compared to that ever more problematic for Israel (and by extension for those trying to
of the United States and this is borne out in practice, where the govern- negotiate with it) was predicted twenty years ago by Avi Shlaim and
ment in Canberra sometimes seems to enjoy freedoms more akin to the Avner Yaniv, who pointed out that 'the extraordinary publicity given to
Westminster model than to those associated with federalism. 32 The cabinet discussions and the complete absence of secrecy facilitate pres-
same is true in unitary states. While, as we showed above, the differ- sures, since parties can observe their representatives hewing to the party
ences between the French Fourth and Fifth Republics did not prevent line'. They concluded that the compounding of intra-party divisions
continuity in foreign policy, they certainly did affect the relationship by inter-party ones produced 'a complex multiple fragmentation of all
between domestic politics and foreign policy-making. General de mainstream political forces' which would continue to damage Israeli
234 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 235

foreign policy35 This analysis has certainly been borne out by the revealing example is that of Japan. Here the post bellum created a fairly
tortuous history of the peace process since Camp David. stable democratic system with none of the apparent weaknesses of the
The last example worth noting of how constitutional structure can Italian state. Yet the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remained
affect foreign policy relates to one-party systems. There are two modes the governing party right up to the economic and corruption crisis of
in which single parties can dominate domestic politics. The first is 1993. The constitution allowed for change, but the people, embedded in
through a socialist or communist approach in which the popular will is a corporatist political culture which valued continuity, consensus and
supposed to be served not by parties competing for votes, but by a dom- discipline, returned the same party to power persistently. The effect was
inant, monolithic party, which embodies that will and operates on the to make the politics within the LDP more important than that between
basis of delegation instead of representation. The major historical exam- the parties, and in the case of foreign policy to reinforce the pro-
ples here are the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Americanism and caution which had been the watchwords since the
Although some realists might take the view that the foreign policies of Peace Treaty of 1951. 37 In its turn, this foreign policy reinforced the
these states is primarily determined by the logic of the international sys- domestic order associated with it, which was hardly surprising given
tem, most observers believe fhat fhe dominance of the Communist Party that both were the products of the victors' peace imposed on Japan, and
has been at least of equal importance- which is not at all to repeat the that the combination seemed responsible for an era of unparalleled pros-
Cold War cliche that totalitarianism is inherently aggressive. The perity38 Despite the worsening economic outlook, the LDP returned to
change from the Soviet Union to Russia provides a unique test-case in power in 1996, and foreign policy continues to display continuity.
this respect. Problems in relations between Moscow and the West have Constitutional structure, therefore, is an important factor in shaping
not gone away, and new tensions have arisen. Nonetheless, much of fhe foreign policy conduct. It can bestow strengfhs and weaknesses on a
adversary relationship has been dissipated, making possible disarma- state vis-a-vis others, but it does not alone determine behaviour, let
ment, a Russia-NATO cooperation agreement, and an end to proxy wars alone outcomes. An effective foreign policy may be achieved despite
in fhe Third World. 36 Some of the change is naturally due to the collapse constitutional problems, but only by the expenditure of considerable
of one side and the victory of the other, but had the Soviet Union effort to overcome the costs the latter impose. This will apply whether
remained communist and simply suffered an economic crisis and/or the the problems are those of an over-weak or an over-strong executive.
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, it is unimaginable fhat the degree of coop- Although at first sight it may seem that compared to the role of pressure
eration which has occurred could have taken place. China's foreign pol- groups or the media, constitutions are a relatively arcane and marginal
icy, for example, while not generally threatening to outsiders, remains influence on foreign policy, the examination of particular countries
locked in the posture of suspicion and secrecy long associated with the shows that, in interaction with other domestic factors, the legal basis of
rule of the Communist Party. Indeed, that very rule has ensured a a polity matters greatly. As realism and the tradition of bipartisanism
continuity in policy which might not have been so sustainable (for steadily weaken, this will be ever more true. Where effective constitu-
example, over Taiwan) under an alternative regime. tions (and constitutionalism) are lacking altogether, as is still sadly
The ofher mode of single-party dominance, however, suggests fhat the case in some parts of Africa, the chances of any kind of identifiable,
constitutional structure needs understanding in conjunction with politi- accountable foreign policy are reduced still further39
cal culture. This is the kind of system which is democratic in every
respect, and in which governments may actually fall with some regular-
ity, but where fhe same party dominates the government for decades on Autres Rigimes, Autres Mreurs?
end. This was the case in Italy between 1947-92, when the Christian
Democrats were always the principal coalition partner, and usually Over fhe past decade an extensive academic debate has arisen over the
occupied the key posts of prime minister and foreign minister, despite links between foreign policy and the actual nature of a regime, beyond
(or perhaps because of) the regular collapse and reformation of cabinets. broad constitutional structure and principles. This is the 'democratic
Key individuals like Giulio Andreotti or Francesco Cossiga continued to peace' hypothesis, which harks back to Kant and was formulated by
bob to the surface whatever the particular political storm. An even more Michael Doyle 40 It states that democracies are a force for peace, or at
 236 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of' Foreign Policy 237

least that democracies 'feel guilty about the use of force'.4 1 The argu- script 45 Thus we have barely a century's experience to go on, a period
ments which have raged since the mid-1980s have usefully brought in which war regularly led to the suspension of normal rights, and in
empirical and normative political science together, just as they have which the number of new, unsteady states was rapidly growing.
joined up Intemational Relations, Political Philosophy and Comparative Defining democracy also raises the problem of what kind of democracy.
Politics. Strangely, they have not attracted many foreign policy analysts, and how much of it. We may decide without difficulty that we mean here
despite the fact that the problem of the extent to which the internal liberal democracy, with its stress on political competition, individual
nature of a state determines foreign policy is a central question for rights and a free economy, rather than the one-party democracy claimed
FPA.42 The subject had identified the issue empirically but had become by socialist states. But that still leaves a great deal of variety to take into
bogged down in behavioural attempts to give a definitive answer43 account- between degrees of mass suffrage (may we only count systems
If it can be established that democracies are less war-prone, or more where women have the vote?), between degrees of efficacy, and between
cooperative, or indeed display any particular pattern of external behav- systems where the economy is wholly 'free' and those where the state con-
iour, then it would demonstrate conclusively that the domestic factor is trols some or all of the movement of capital, goods, persons, information
of central importance in international relations- pace Kenneth Waltz and and services. Is modem Russia, with a rip-roaring, Klondyke capitalism
other 'international structuralists' 44 Unfortunately the question is not grafted onto the old nomenklatura of communism, truly a democracy? Is
quite so straightforward as it seems, to say nothing of the answer. There Singapore, with its paternalist guided democracy of efficiency and clean-
are two major caveats to note before any conclusions can be drawn. living, to be counted in the same category as messy, individualistic Britain
The first is that it is possible to formulate the problem in subtly dif- or stable, participatory Canada? Non-democracies make an equally wide
ferent ways, with the result that much debate takes place over whether category, not least because there is such a grey area between the two. So
findings are commensurable. Some consider whether or not democra- many states are in transition, or display elements of autocracy and liberal-
cies are intrinsically pacifistic; others only how they behave towards ism simultaneously. And can any group which contains the murderous
each other. Some restrict their interest to the problem of war; others are tyranny of Pol Pot's Cambodia and the relatively benign monarchy of
interested in whether democracies are as 'constitutional', or respectful Hashemite Jordan really be a good basis for generalization?
of law, in their external relations as they are in internal affairs. Lurking Despite these difficulties, there are three conclusions to be drawn
behind the whole debate, but not so often brought into central focus, are from the democratic peace debate and which tell us something about the
the issues of whether historical period makes a difference, and of the role of domestic factors in foreign policy. The first is often seen as the
differences between proselytizing and non-intervening democracies in most 'robust' empirical finding in all International Relations, namely
world affairs. Thus there exist various possible lines of argument, some that established democratic states do not (so far) tend to fight each other.
much more ambitious than others. All, however, presuppose a link of This proposition can only be qualified at the margins, by including
some kind between domestic regime and foreign policy behaviour. minor affairs like the four Anglo-Icelandic 'cod wars', which in truth
The second caveat is that the categories of 'democracy' and 'non- are exceptions that prove the rule, since neither side wanted an all-out
democracy' (for the debate necessarily involves the discussion of non- shooting war with a like-minded neighbour and NATO ally. The reasons
democracies) are wider and more elusive than might be supposed. why democracies should not wish to fight each other can be speculated
Despite the common tendency to include classical Athens in the former over at length, but it is highly unlikely that international factors, such as
category, and to talk as if the democratic era began in 1816, it is highly the need for unity against a common enemy, can explain the persistence
dubious as to whether we can justify talking about established democ- and universality of the norm. Clearly certain aspects of democratic life
racies until after the First World War. This is because of the de facto dis- predispose towards peaceful conflict resolution with others of the same
enfranchisement of the black population in the United States (which kind. These aspects do not relate only to the political regime. It is quite
arguably continued until the 1960s), the lack of votes for women in probable that civil society and the way it constrains executives (or, is
Britain (and even of votes by right for men) before 1918, and the thought to constrain them) are at least as important.
strongly authoritariah nature of Wilhelmine Germany. Republican The second finding is that democracies do not hold back in their
France would quality as a democracy if women were written out of the willingness to use violence against those they regard as 'others': that is,
 238 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 239

not of their own type. Although such statements subsume complicated In practice this is a political position. There is no convincing evidence
debates about the responsibility of starting the major wars of the past which suggests that autocracies pursue their ends internationally
century, what can be said is that democratic states have been willing to through aggression, terrorism or general uncooperativeness. Because
declare wars, that they may sometimes have created the conditions in some examples can easily be found of tyrants who do so behave does
which war was likely, and that they have often pursued war with grim not justify the larger statement. There are just as many cases, perhaps
vigour~ as the tragic slaughters on the Somme, in Korea and in Vietnam indeed a majority, where a deeply illiberal regime has behaved with
testify~ when it was not so infeasible to consider a negotiated peace. 46 great caution, even propriety, in its foreign relations. Many Latin
This argument has been put even more strongly; that the self-styled American states in the 1960s and 1970s, Spain under Franco and Iran
democracies are hypocritical in their foreign policies, since they often under the Shah are examples. The People's Republic of China has been
treat non-westerners in a ruthless, even racist way, and continue to -another although it took the United States 22 years to accept that it
engage in various forms of oppressive imperialism.47 At the least one could c~nduct ;ormal diplomatic business with Peking, partly no doubt
must conclude that the proposition that democracies have an intrinsic because of the prevalent belief that left-wing autocracies exported
aversion to war as such is simply wrong. danger in a way that right wing autocracies did not. 4 " Military regimes,
This does not mean that foreign policies towards non-democracies likewise, are far from being inherently militarist. The armed forces
are the result of international rather than domestic factors, viz., that increase defence spending, to be sure, and usually degrade the societies
democracies suddenly switch into cynical realism when they step they control, but on balance they are more cautious over external adven-
outside the freemasonry of relations between 'like-minded' states. tures than are their civilian counterparts 49 It is easier to suppress the
Domestic factors also have a part to play here, in that the conviction enemy within~ usually the reason for taking power in the first place- than
of rectitude so common in liberal states, can lead to a determination to to unleash unpredictable international conflicts.
pursue a civilizing mission, an anti-communist crusade or a struggle The result of this survey of the democratic peace problem is one posi-
against a would-be hegemon (the enemy is usually bent on hegemony; tive statement~ that democracies shy away from war with each other~
one's own side is naturally defending the right). This has been one of and two negative propositions, about democracies not displaying any
the most paradoxical aspects of the western debate about Kosovo. War particular pattern of behaviour towards other states, and non-democracies
has moved from being the epitome of failure or domination to being a not behaving in a distinctive, let alone a unifonnly aggressive, manner.
necessary instrument of humanitarianism. It is a switch which has left The latter two tend to suggest that the nature of a regime is only signif-
many, particularly on the left, confused. Either way, the use of force by icant in the relatively narrow circumstances of inter-democratic rela-
western states is likely to be powerfully affected by domestic political tions. This would, however, be too restricted a conclusion. Foreign
argument for the foreseeable future. policy is not only about the war problem, and the nature of a regime also ,
The third and last foundation on which to build future work is the matters in terms of how closely states are prepared to work together~
< finding that non-democracies do not necessarily engage in aggressive or contrary to traditional views of the inconstancy of democracies, it may
uncooperative behaviour internationally, however unpleasant they may be that they are capable of considerable continuity in their alliances and
be towards their own people. That they were inherently dangerous was other commitments. 5°
a common assumption among western scholars at the height of the Cold When we move beyond the single-factor approach and add in a sen-
War, especially those who identified 'totalitarianism' as a distinct phe- sitivity to historical period or to the extent to which the regime in ques-
nomenon, and those hawks who saw the Soviet Union and its Third tion has universalizing aspirations (as some do, independently of their
World friends as the successors to the Third Reich in posing a threat to democratic or undemocratic character), we may see that the nature of
world peace and to democracy (usually equated). After a pause during any domestic political system does help to determine the direction of a
detente there is now a similar tendency evident in relation to democra- foreign policy. In part this is merely to impart the truism that when gov-
tization. Those who resist the Hegelian spirit of history, it seems, are ernments change there may well be an impact on foreign policy; more
likely to be a danger to the international community as well as to their profoundly, it suggests that certain regimes evolve historically, through
own people. the very interplay of domestic and external forces, into international
 240 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 241

actors which are assertive or introverted, cooperative or domineerin 2 . for a straightforward relationship between class and politics in any area.
ineffectual or responsible. And once institutionalized, this mix of regi~e The most that could be said is that foreign pol1cy-makmg IS often the
and policy w!ll take time to change even if the current pressures for reserve of a sub-class, or specialized elite familiar w1th other lan-
p ages and 'abroad'. This may or may not be neste d wn. h'm a persistent.
democrat1zat10n assume that the domestic is the key, and that political gu . .
engmeenng IS poss1ble. Ultimately, domestic and international factors 'ruling class'. On the other hand, it stretches a point to assume, as It IS
~ogether represent a, powerful, evolving matrix, determining a country's all too often by liberal commentators, that the masses have by definrtmn
place m the world , as With the hm1ts on modem Gennany's foreign
pol1cy actiVIsm. It follows that too much external pressure will prove
II
their views represented in democratically elected govemme~ts. I~ IS r~rc
to find a person of working-class culture (or even extraction) m h1g,h
counterproductive at both levels. The post-Cold War regime in Russia, I office and dealing with foreign policy.
;
·1
for example, w1ll not conform to a western model for a long time (if ever) In the immediate aftermath of a successful revolution, a different
and 1t Will take decades for its Soviet characteristics to fade completely. sociaJ class may enter power. It will then wish to put its stamp on for-
Tts fore1gn pohcy IS then a key point at which the domestic system eign policy -perhaps most particularly, given the association of diplo-
encounters [Link] Influence~ and expresses its identity in a suddenly macy with a narrow caste. The fact of havmg to deal wl!h the contmumg
more overweanmg world. Regimes need foreign policies. dominance of that caste across the rest of the international system tends
to diminish the ardour of the purge sooner rather than later, but in the
period before acculturation takes place some unusual moves may be
Class, Development and Foreign Policy made. It took Libya almost twenty years to relmqmsh lts self-styled
radicaJism and use of the 'People's Bureaux' as bases for terrorism. The
Beyond regimes, constitutions and politics lies the broader social and Soviet Union soon learned to play the diplomatic game after Trotsky's
economic context of a state. Its possible impact on external activity is early threat to 'shut up shop', but continued for some time to behave as
both a neglected subject and one too large to do more than introduce if diplomacy was a supplement to secret intelligence, rather than VIce
here. But foreign policy cannot be fully understood if it is abstracted versa. The style of Chinese diplomacy after the 1949 revolutwn, rather
from the society and productive system which it serves, particularly as more than the substance, was parochial, ideologicaJ and somewhat hec-
52
econom1c goals are central to modern governments' concerns and since toring, at least until after Mao's death in 1976. Given the experiences
civil society now has an international dimension. In the sketch which of the men who had fought long and hard to overthrow from below the
follows of the most relevant elements, the main focus will be on class feudal order in China, a more cosmopolitan approach was hardly likely.
and on levels of development, but some reference will also be made to The same is true of the ZANU-PF regime in Zimbabwe.
the great socio-political forces of nationalism, religion and gender. Class is not the only way in which to approach the sociology of the
The twentieth century produced a great deal of taJk about 'socialist' domestic environment of foreign policy. Nationalism, religion and gen-
or 'bourgeois' foreign policies - evolving from John Bright's der are prominent elements in most societies, and all have the potential
nmeteenth-century view that it was 'a gigantic system of outdoor relief to bear on foreign affairs- the first directly, and the latter two by VIrtue
for the aristocracy'. 51 Most of this was mere rhetoric. It is difficult to of their transnational qualities. All have been written about extensively
imagine that any foreign policy, given the complex of pressures and by IR scholars, but rarely in specific relation to foreign policy. .
mfluences which act upon it, could be the simple arm of any given dom- Nationalism and populism by definition figure prommently m the
mant class, aJways assuming one could be identified. Even the fact that history of foreign policies. It is not difficult to think of examples where
foreign policy, like_ most other aspects of government, is usually han- assertive, even xenophobic, campaigns have been conducted agamst
dled by an mternat1onally mobile and sophisticated elite of dirigeants, other states, or have undermined attempts at international cooperation.
and that the1r perceptwns and judgements will be crucial to its out- The Balkans is only the latest in a series of outbreaks over the past two
comes, does not mean that foreign policy will reflect the interests of a centuries. Some of this can be put down to the cynical exploitation by
particular social class. This has been a familiar problem in the debate elites of the popular factor so as to justify acts of aggression, and/or to
over l\1arxian analyses of society in general, and few would now argue distract their disgruntled populations. But whether domestic movements
242 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 243

inherently sweep foreign policy up in their tide is another matter. The Union. and even for the EU as such. The Defence Minister Werner
beginnings of European nationalism were associated with the creation Fassalend (from the conservative People's Party) immediately replied
of conscript armies and the idea of 'the nation in arms', while national- that 'we absolutely reject the possibility of accepting that foreigners can
ism, as opposed to the nationality principle, is a sociological phenome- make decisions over us'. 55
non with a mass element. 53 Moreover, although the idea that our nation Nationalism, therefore, by its nature spills over into foreign policy
is the highest good need not entail xenophobia, it is difficult for profes- even when it is not violent or does not spring directly from international
sional diplomats to contain its effects. Within their own states poor problems. The connections between the two phenomena are revealing
immigrants are always the first victims, on the streets, of any national- and would repay further research, especially in the context of the new
ist resurgence. Foreign policy is structurally vulnerable to the same post-Cold War nationalisms of the Balkans and Transcaucasus. The
process, as two recent examples illustrate. same is true of religion, although as argued in Chapter 8, this is mostly
In India the dominance of the Congress Party after independence a force for transnationalism. Occasionally a state will become theo-
produced a foreign policy of pacifistic non-alignment, qualified only cratic, as Iran still is in important respects more than 20 years after the
by a powerful assertiveness where borders were in question, whether in revolution of 1979, and as Saudi Arabia has always been in part. Israel
Kashmir, Bengal or the Himalayas. There seemed no interest in becom- is more an ethnie-state than a theocracy, but it is possible to imagine it
ing a great power or in acquiring the relevant military strength. The in the hands of Orthodox Jewry. Under right-wing Republicans the
inequalities and problems of domestic society were also managed in a United States can come close to vitiating its constitutional church-state
surprisingly quietist mode. From the late 1980s, however, the Congress separation and to institutionalizing the evangelical agenda. In these cir-
Party, weakened by the failings of any dynastic order, and by the sharp- cumstances foreign policy will always be affected, largely because of
ening contradictions of modernization, came increasingly under chal- the projection of particular codes of morality abroad, but also through
lenge from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which eventually came to the blurring together of the instruments of foreign policy. Italy under the
power in 1996. This militant Hindu party arose from nowhere on a tide Christian Democrats sometimes harnessed its foreign policy to that of
of discontent with corruption and stagnation, but it also soon developed the Vatican, and in Iran's pursuit ofthefatwa against Salman Rushdie it
a distinctive foreign policy, in part genuine and in part an effective way was almost impossible to distinguish the roles of politicians and imam.
of accusing the old order of not having defended India's interests. The German Catholics had some influence over Germany's concern to rec-
result, by 1998, was that India had taken the momentous step to explode ognize Croaiia. When religion is important domestically, there will
a nuclear device. This immediately led to a tit-for-tat Pakistani explo- always be a limit to what can be tolerated abroad. As with Britain and
sion, but it was wildly popular in India. The nationalism of the BJP the Bulgarian atrocities of 1877, if fellow members of the community
had thus taken India's foreign policy very rapidly down a new and risky seem in danger of persecution, there will be pressure on the government
path, compelling other parties to jump on the bandwagon if they wished to act. Muslim states cannot be indifferent to the sufferings of Bosnia,
to survive. 54 or to the Palestinian position on Jerusalem. This is, however, a long way
Almost as dramatic was the emergence of the far-right nationalistJorg from saying that they will act, even in a crisis, while for the routine
Haider in Austria. Although Haider is only Governor of the province of business of foreign policy religion is mostly a background factor.
Carinthia, his populist appeals to a notion of a pristine Austria free from Gender is a social dimension which can bear on foreign policy, but
the contamination of immigrants and other forms of external 'interfer- even more indirectly. The concern with gender which has burgeoned in
ence' meant that his Freedom Party gained 27 per cent of the vote and IR studies over the past fifteen years has primarily been a nonnative and
was taken into the governing coalition in February 1999. This in itself philosophical one. There are important cases to be made about the dif-
would not have changed Austrian foreign policy, but the strong reactions ferential sufferings of women in development, and about their neglected
from fellow Member States of the European Union, and their imposition part in war. The view that orthodox thinking about international relations
of sanctions on Austria (in the form of exclusion from meetings), not has been too suffused with masculinist values also has a great deal to be
surprisingly evoked a further nationalist reaction in the country itself said for it. 5 6 In terms of an analytical approach to the impact of the gen-
which has weakened Austria's support for the enlargement policy of the der dimension from within particular states on foreign policy, however,
244 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 245

there is less of interest to be said. Women and men do not divide on · tance. Diplomacy in these circumstances is successful if it can
mg · 1· I
gender lines in terms of attitudes to war or any other foreign policy widen the negotiating margin of manoeuvre of a. supplicant even a tt.t e.
issue, although opinion polls sometimes show a limited (and variable) Although many of these states have wasted preciOus resources on budd-
degree of differentiation. It is true that 'women's issues' have started to ing armed forces, there is little which can m fact be done w1th the
force their way onto foreign policy agendas. In particular, the Greenham military instrument, except engaging in ruinous wars, such as those
Common women's movement against nuclear weapons had a wide which plague the Horn of Africa.
impact on public attitudes, and well beyond Britain. The United Nations These generalizations do not do justice to all LDCs or to all phases
has promoted awareness of gender-specific human rights concerns. For f their history. Countries like Nigeria, particularly when mi-nch, Egypt
the most part, however, discourse changes more than facts. The sadness India are in a distinct category as states wlth huge potentwl, and some
of the mothers of the disappeared young people in Argentina or of the actual clout. But many others, whether Angola or zam b'Ia, v·. wtnam or
~
sailors drowned in the Kursk submarine, is only acknowledged after Bangladesh, Guatemala or Cuba, are in very dlfficultsltuatJons. They
the event, and at best helps to forge better intentions for the future. 57 m ay
not as the 1960s conventional wisdom had 1t, ex1st m a complete
' . f
The scandal of sex tourism to the Third World is publicized, but left condition of 'dependency' on particular rich states or on the dJctates o
largely untouched. It should not be forgotten, either, that there are global capitalism in general, but their foreign poli~ies perSIStently diS-
just as many fathers mourning their lost sons, from Verdun through play passivity and highly restncted chmce. JamaiCa s M1chaei Manley m
Stalingrad to the Iran-Iraq war, and that men, women and children the 1970s consciously reacted against the perception of dependence, and
suffer equally the horrors of invasion, displacement and civil war. The attempted to use foreign policy to break out of it, as had Fidel Castro,
issue then becomes less that of the impact of gender on foreign policy, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, but with the same largely counter-
than whether there is any scope at all for 'the voice from below' .58 productive resuits.s9 LDCs do not have the options of the average devel-
Deve/opmellt is another point at which domestic society and foreign oped state, that is of a relaxed independence, w1th more or less free
policy can intersect, and another where a vast literature fails to give choice over association and cooperatiOn wtth other states. Th~tr dom~s­
much. coverage to the intersection. Notwithstanding this neglect it is tic situation presents them in theory with five options, but m practice
important to say something about two issues, the relationship between often only with the first- that of accepting the disciplines of structural
levels of development and foreign policy, and the impact of the type of adjustment presented by international economic mstttuttons, and not
socio-economic system on foreign policy. seeking to rock the boat by political activism. The other four are ail unat-
In terms of the level of development the question can be focused fur- tractive or costly in various ways: (1) internatiOnal trades um~msm, or
ther by asking whether or not less developed countries (LDCs) manifest combining in a strategy of resistance with other poor states. Th1s looked
particular kinds of foreign policies. Although there is an argument to be like the way forward in the 1970s with the Group of 77; now the diVI-
had as to whether the widening of the category since the 1970s to sions within the group are too great. (2) ConfrontatiOn, rhetoncal or
include the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) at one end and the practical: this was a line pursued variously by Libya, Cuba, Iran, Chma
Least Less Developed Countries (LLDCs) at the other does not invali- and Iraq. The costs can only be borne by states with secure sources of
date it, there is still a big enough gap between the income levels of the funds, and an impregnable domestic baSIS. (3) Chentehsm, or attachmg
OECD states and those of the poor, agricultural states to justify a the fate of the state to a more powerful friend. Cuba, North Korea and
hypothesis about differential behaviour. South Vietnam have ail followed this path, only to discover their vulner-
These poor states constitute all but about 70 of the 189 members of ability to changes in external patterns of power or in the regime of the
the UN, and have a per capita income (GDP) of less than $5000 a year. patron. (4) Isolation, which we dealt with more generally m Chapter 7.
As a result they are structurally on the defensive. Not only do they lack All of these options are relatively extreme, and Jllustrate how LDCs
the resources to be pro-active in international affairs, intervening far have to make big sacrifices if they wish to assert theu poh!lcai values
from home or helping to shape the milieu as a whole, but they also find and independence. It is not surprising that most do not try, or are forced
it difficult to protect themselves from external interference. Their foreign to change course after a costly attempt. More often than not whlic
policy is dominated by the need for economic development and financial poverty combined with a relatively pitiless external env1ronment
 246 Responsibility The Dmnesric Sources of Foreign Policy 247

(witness the dragging of feet over the cancellation of Third World debts) overseas were eventually refuted by the work of historians like David
ensure limited choices in public policy, it is the elite rather than the Fieldhouse who showed both that the arguments over surplus capacity
people of these states who determine which trade-off to go for and who were exaggerated and that the new territories were the least promising
will incur its costs. places to ._absorb it -most exports going to pl~ces where industria~iz~~
This said, it should not be assumed that the LDCs do not also face the tion was already underway, such as the Umted States or Russia. -
same general foreign policy issues as other states that is securitv Nonetheless, this does not mean that socio-economic factors have no
regionalism, balancing the internal with the external,' and ide~logy. It;; role in imperialist foreign policies. At the least one can say that if impe-
just that their constraints are more pressing, and that foreign policy may rialism is pursued its form will be related to the socio-economic system
also have to be used more frequently for nation-building, or consolidat- of the metropole. England acquired far-flung colonies not just because
ing the borders and structure of the new state itself. In time, the same it was an island with a strong navy but also because its Crown was one
kind of decision-making issues and domestic pressures will occur in of the first to make deals with private adventurers and then to encour-
LDCs as in richer states: bureaucratic politics, groupthink, domestic age joint-stock companies like the East India Company or Hudson's
factionalism and even press criticisms are not the preserve of the devel- Bay. In our own epoch, now that colonialism has been discredited,
oped alone. All foreign policy-making is prone to a greater or lesser 'informal empires' are enabled through the many subtle processes made
degree to these syndromes. 60 They are just more spasmodic and embry- available by advanced capitalism. What governments lose in political
onic in the poorer countries, whose domestic and international environ- control they gain in reduced responsibility and visibility. Thus the
ments tend to blur into one around the needs of development. When United States has never needed to have colonies in central America, as
poverty coincides with potential importance and geopolitical position, its economic interests already penetrate deep into most states of the
however, the resulting 'pivotal states' may generate foreign policies of region. By the same token it has inexorably supplanted British and
great consequence for themselves and for others 61 French influence in the Caribbean. Meanwhile, the Europeans have
The issue of the impact of the type of economic system, as opposed to retained influence in many parts of the Third World via a combination
its level of development, in a way boils down to whether capitalism pro- of private capital and the European Union's association agreements
duces different foreign policies from communism. This issue was so sul- with the 78 ACP countries.
lied by the political disputes of the Cold War that it is difficult to separate Imperialism has hardly been a preserve of the capitalist countries.
it out from that of the responsibilities of the USA and the USSR. It also Accordingly communist states, or more broadly state-trading countries,
tends to merge into the more contemporary debate as to whether the have their own mode of seeking external control. They can use barter
spread of capitalism will itself promote democracy, and in time therefore trade or tied currencies up to a point, but have had mostly to rely on mil-
also a more peaceful, post-military world - two giant steps for logical itary force and formal occupation on the one hand, or informal penetra-
argument. The answer to that lies in the future, although we can all make tion through party connections on the other. 63 Thus the Soviet Union
our best guesses. It is also to some extent beside the point, now that the created a huge, territorially contiguous empire which when it fell apart
major alternative to capitalism has collapsed. Of more use here is a brief between 1989-91 had far more fundamental consequences for the
demonstration of the fact that political regime and socio-economic system Soviet state than the collapse of the European empires had had for their
cannot always be kept analytically apart, and that in certain circumstances mother countries. Involvement further afield also required large com-
their mutual interplay will have a dramatic impact on foreign policy. mitments of men and materiel which fostered bloody wars (as in Angola
The history of imperialism, for example, has raised huge controversy and Ethiopia) with largely counterproductive results. For their part, of
over the relative parts played by domestic and international factors in course, the capitalist countries can also play this game, but more
pushing or pulling the European states into the scramble for Africa and deniably and not as their only instrument. Capitalism does not always
other territories at the end of the nineteenth century. Within the domes- generate informal empire - as the histories of Switzerland, Denmark
tic category there have also been debates about whether or not economic and Canada show- but it certainly makes it possible.
forces were decisive. The propositions of Hobson and then Lenin that Fascism is another major historical phenomenon of great interest to
surplus production capacity led the Europeans to acquire new markets the student of domestic factors in foreign policy. Was fascism generated
 248 Responsibility The Domestic Sources of Foreig11 Policy 249

by a particular type of economic and class configuration which required policy, and in some sense it always provides the key starting-point, in
aggressive i~perialism to sustain it? This is an enonnously complex relation to ultimate purpose, as we shall see in Chapter II. Nonetheless,
problem wh1ch cannot be done justice to here. Even if fascism histori- foreign policy is 'foreign' policy and it cannot be regarded simply as the
cally was expansionist, is that because of a particular ideology or were external face of pre-determined state positions. The interplay between
there deeper, inherent forces at work? Was Nazism the classic case, or the domestic and the international is perpetual, and complex, to the point
a critical variant? Although we have (thankfully) few cases to base con- that in terms of causation the two sets of pressures cannot always be fully
clusions on, it seems likely that fascism is far more than a matter of disentangled. This is evident from a number of examples, such as fas-
regime. It goes beyond autocracy and one-partyism to engage in vio- cism, or what are increasingJy known as 'transitional states', where the
lence, messianic nationalism/racism, and mass mobilization behind a very process of constitution or re-constitution involves simultaneous
crusading disrespect for pluralism. 64 Probably fascism was an historical attention to problems of borders, recognition, regime, aid and nation-
phenomenon of a particular period, but there is always the possibility building, all of which have both 'inside' and 'outside' connotations 67
that it could return in some form. In that event we should always be alert A concern with the domestic dimension ultimately goes beyond
to any state in which there is considerable domestic upheaval, demand- questions of influence, explanation and determinism, which may be
mg lebensraum or producing a racist, xenophobic regime. That would analysed with some pretensions to neutrality. It also directs us to the
be very likely to have contempt for its neighbours and for any notion of question of choice; that is, how far can a polity, a people, control their
international society. By definition fascists are not interested in realpoli- own foreign policy executive, and how much influence can they exert
tik and co-ex1stence. They are revolutionaries with a commitment to an over the content of policy? What are the most important means by
aesthetic of violence, at home and abroad. 65 Their sense of historical which domestic participation is made possible- and how far does prac-
rectitude and supremacy means thilt their agitation is unlikely to stop at tice vary? These are matters for informed analysis, but they also bring
their own frontier. us close to the realm of political and normative debate, from which for-
eign policy should not be abstracted. In dealing with them, the chapter
which follows thus prepares the ground for the book's conclusion,
Foreign Policy as Output- and Choice which attempts to make sense of the changing place of foreign policy
in our political and ethical life.
The domestic environment undoubtedly shapes foreign policy regularly,
and Importantly. But it does so in interaction with international factors.
Both are filtered through the decision-making process, which makes its
own contribution to outcomes. This process then produces a set of posi-
tiOns and attitudes which amount together to a foreign policy tradition,
wh1ch m1ght also be described as a matrix, or a discourse, according to
taste. They represent the continuity of foreign policy and to some extent
become institutionalized in processes, language and institutions. 66
. From this point of view foreign policy can be seen as an output, some-
tlmes deriving principally from domestic sources. Certainly it will be the
domestic setting which will seem to embody foreign policy traditions,
even 1f they have not been primarily generated at home, given that their
rationale is primarily national. Often they will also be~ severely con-
strained by domestic factors and actors. None of this, however, is enough
to justify generalizations about the 'primacy of domestic politics' fur
smgle countr1es or particular periods, let alone across the board. The
domestic factor is frequently central to our ability to understand foreign
 The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 251

of hundreds of millions between 1914-89. Yet the children and

10 randchildren of those who suffered, perhaps precisely because of a
painful awareness of the past, are only too happy to sink back into a
routine existence, whose essential parochialism remains unchallenged
The Constituencies by occasional travel to foreign beach resorts or real-time news of crises
in exotic countries of which they know little. To an extent this is a
of Foreign Policy ·~--·Eurocentric perspective. The populations of the Middle East, Indo-China
and parts of Africa know only too well how the international can tear into
their lives, through war, environmental degradation, alien ideologies ami
the continuing consequences of imperialism. Yet by the same token they
resent the incursions and hold the more fiercely onto their local identity.
Only a few are able to embrace globalization or to harvest its benefits.
Given these uncertainties about what the sovereign people might want,
A democratic decision-maker is always aware of being responsible to expect and need their governments to do in relation to the world beyond
the society which lies behind the political process. Even autocrats are their immediate community, this chapter investigates the relationship
not always insensate in this respect. But responsibility is ambiguous and between foreign policy and the political constituencies which lie behind
relational, because there are many constituencies which must be borne it. A path is steered between the traditional paternalist assumption of a
in mind simultaneously: at home there are colleagues in government, necessarily elite-run foreign policy on behalf of the general good, and the
the party machine, the constituency voters who brought you to power in implication of globalization theory that foreign policy is an empty vessel,
the first place, sponsors of various kinds, and ultimately the electorate incapable of delivering any goods, general or particular. The questions are
as a whole. In the international realm there are allies, neighbours and posed: for whom is foreign policy conducted, in principle and in practice?
colleagues in a network of similar parties, together possibly with 'the Who lays claim to it, and by what means are decision-makers held to
international community'. All this is to say nothing of future genera- account? And a version of the old question, cui bono, who sees them-
tions, whether at home or abroad. selves as benefiting from foreign policy? The analysis begins with the
It is a matter of practical and theoretical importance as to whom formal mechanisms of foreign policy accountability, building on the
decision-makers feel responsible, and to whom they are expected to be discussion of constitutional structures in Chapter 9. This is followed by
responsible. Yet these feelings and expectations are highly variable, discussion of the key institutions connecting decision-makers to wider
according to individuals and contexts. This is partly because of the society, namely public opinion, interest groups and the mass media, lead-
obscure nature of the evidence about the extent to which domestic pop- ing to an assessment of the view that since civil society and domestic pol-
ulations are concerned about foreign policy. Little research has been itics themselves are constituted by foreign policy activity, they cannot be
done on this question, although much has been presumed, not least by seen as independent constraints. The chapter ends by showing how lead-
politicians. While it is clear that some aspects of domestic and foreign ers increasingly feel the need to engage in dialogue with foreign publics
policy have come to be intertwined, and therefore that certain groups as well as their own, which tells us something about the evolving mean-
have come to have stakes in external policy which they did not previ- ing of responsibility in the modem era, and about how the constituencies
ously possess, at the same time there is much which remains specialized, of foreign policy have become more extensive, and more complex.
arcane and remote to the silent majority still rooted in one particular
society- until it smashes unexpectedly into their lives, as so literally and
horribly happened to the people of New York on I I September 200 I. Accountability versus the Security State
Even under the impact of such events we cannot assume that there is
necessarily a steadily growing international awareness. The tragic Accountability is not the same as responsibility. Responsibility is about
upheavals of war and totalitarianism destroyed or rearranged the lives the awareness of acting for others as well as oneself; it begins with

250
 ~-

252 Responsihility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 253

perceptions and values. Accountability is more formal, and refers to the hands if the state is to be effectively protected. Yet parliaments are pow-
ability to make someone answerable for their actions, and to pay a penalty erful symbols of popular political control, and are focal points for both
if, according to the prevalent rules, their account is unsatisfactory. 1 In for- insurgents and nervous leaders - as Boris Yeltsin revealed when sus-
eign policy the issue of accountability has been widely discussed since pending and shelling the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1993 3 It is worth
the First World War (and in the United States for much longer). In few asking in the context of the contemporary triumph of liberal democracy
countries, however, have very clear mechanisms been established, and whether even foreign policy is now becoming more open to democratic
even where they have, actual practice often does not live up to theory. influences -or if not, why not?
Indeed, it can be argued that provisions for accountability have often been Always the exception, as we saw in the last chapter's discussion of
deliberately sacrificed in the presumed interests of security and an effec- constitutional structures, has been the United States. ln terms of basic
tive executive- and that legislators have been all too willing to go along powers over foreign policy-making the US Congress has no rival. The
with the attenuation of their powers. When one adds in the dimension of constitution gives it the right to declare war, to raise and to support armed
the enormous growth in the apparatuses of foreign, defence and intelli- forces and to ratify treaties (by a two-thirds majority of the Senate- and of
gence policy-making in the twentieth century, we can see how difficult those present). It also has the crucial power of the purse; appropriations
democratic accountability is to achieve in practice against the presump- for foreign policy purposes are not excluded (as in Britain) from the gen-
tions of the 'security state', all too often bloated, secretive and prepotent. eral requirement to be specified in a budget with legislative approval.
The discussion of accountability primarily involves liberal demo- This is vital given the immense size of the military-industrial complex
cratic states, which make it an article of faith to restrain executive power and of the United States' global presence. Finally, the Senate's approval
and to seek a popular consensus for public policy. Even one-party sys- is required for senior ambassadorial appointments.< In the past thirty
tems, however, usually have formal provisions for some degree of years the Congress has extended these nineteenth-century powers by
answerability and participation in foreign policy-making. The Supreme approving the War Powers Resolution (in 1973) which sets limits· on
Soviet had powers over the ratification of treaties, and the Chinese the period in which the presidency can pursue an undeclared war, and
National People's Congress (NPC) likewise. That in practice they per- by requiring the secretary of state to give the Congress the [Link] of
formed the function of rubber-stamps does not mean that their constitu- executive agreements (previously the way around Congressional powers
tional powers could not have been asserted more, with meaningful over treaties) within sixty days of their signature 5
debates and more genuine transmission of views upwards from local Other democratic systems, mature or not, do not have these provi-
party representatives 2 The political systems of the Soviet Union and of sions for parliamentary control. In some the executive tends to be
the People's Republic were forged in war and revolution and never extremely cautious about not running too far ahead of the legislature,
evolved beyond their original command culture, at least on foreign for historical reasons. The Federal Republic of Germany is a case in
policy. In many other states parliaments are equally ineffective - point, where the Basic Law of 1949 does not in so many words forbid
unrepresentative, cowed or suspended sine die. the use of troops 'out of area', but where the conventional political
Since 1989 there has, nonetheless, been a general move towards interpretation until the Constitutional Court ruling of 1994 was that it
democratization, which means that it is particularly important to exam- did. 6 The French National Assembly voted down the European Defence
ine the experience of pluralist states. Here formal accountability has Community in 1954 just as the US Senate had done with the League of
two main aspects: parliamentary control and the verdict of the electors. Nations thirty-five years before. The Japanese Diet in 1955 threw out
These things are inter-related since legislatures consist of elected the idea of an extension of the Japanese-American security treaty,
representatives who then exercise powers in the light of the views of the despite Foreign Minister Shigemitsu having signed a joint communique
voters who gave them power, but members of parliament in a represen- agreeing to it 7 The House of Commons has given British governments
tative system follow the dictates of party and conscience, the first of a very hard time over every treaty relating to accession to the European
which in particular tends to take precedence. In foreign policy-making Communities and their development.
in any case they generally have few constitutional levers to pull because What is common to these cases is not the formal powers which par-
of the presumption in most constitutions that the executive needs free liaments have over foreign policy; these vary considerably, not least in
 254 Responsibility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 255

their implementation. More important is the interpretation of the law, or cede territory. The UK government, well aware only two years after
which itself depends partly on general political culture and partly on the Falklands War of how sensitive an issue the cession of Hong Kong
particular circumstances. Given the number"of occasions when even the to China would be, ensured that the Westminster Parliament had plenty
parliaments with relevant powers do not assert themselves to halt of opportunities to discuss the Sino-British Agreement, even though
treaties or to interrogate the foreign and defence budgets, it is clear that only the Queen's signature was constitutionally required for ratification
it will take an unusual combination of circumstances for the executive of a treaty, which technically this was not. 11 Apart from legal consider-
to have its agreement with another state overturned by parliament at ations, parliamentary divisions stimulate public awareness and pres-
home. Even in the United States there will need to be both a deep lack sures on government. When legislation was sought in the New Zealand
of confidence in the government of the day plus a high degree of parliament to enshrine in law the ban on visits by nuclear-armed ships,
salience and concern about the foreign policy issue concerned- probably it stirred up debate and precipitated a serious clash with the United
as the result of a long sequence of frustrations which have brought States. The outcome was that the US suspended its guarantees, and the
things to boiling point. Thus both President Carter and the Congress had ANZUS Treaty, between 1986-94." Similarly, once the European
had enough of Soviet behaviour in the Third World by the time they Parliament had acquired in 1987 the 'power of assent' over association
ended the SALT II negotiations after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan agreements concluded by the European Community, debate on the
in December 1979. But the Congress was ready to throw out a treaty policy-making of external relations became notably more substantial.
whatever Carter decided, and it is the knowledge of its potential power Against these cases, however, may be set many more, equally 'high
which is most inhibiting to a president. politics' in character, where executives have been able to circumvent
At times, given these are always two-level games, the potential parliamentary powers without difficulty, or simply to drive a coach and
obstruction is useful to an executive. When the European states were horses through the gaps not covered by the constitution. With hubris, the
reluctant to go along with American sanctions against Iran in April1980 law may simply be broken, as Reagan did when continuing to arm the
they pointed out that since any action would have to be ratified by the Contras in defiance of the Boland Amendment, or as Nixon and
nine national parliaments involved, they would therefore only apply to Kissinger had done through the secret bombing of Cambodia - which
new contracts and not to existing ones. This was a successful delaying certainly breached the spirit, if not the letter, of the War Powers
tactic, although arguably short-sighted in terms of its effect on the Resolution. 13 At least the latter had closed the loophole exploited by
United States. 8 At other times, the blind eye tactic suits the legislature President Johnson nine years before, in 1964, when he got almost unan-
itself. The Congress was generally opposed to President Reagan's imous Congressional support for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and thus
covert actions with the Contras in Central America, but at much the a free hand to prosecute a war against North Vietnam, on the basis of
same time was prepared to overlook the arming of the mujahideen in the most flimsy, indeed fabricated casus bellil 4 Much will depend in
Afghanistan. More constructively, where a legislature has a signiticant the United States on whether the president's party has a majority in
role in foreign policy-making, as with the Danish Folketing, it creates a Congress and/or on whether he is already in difficulties with Congress.
greater certainty, both at home and abroad, that commitments entered In Britain and France, by contrast, war may still be undertake.n by exec-
into are legitimate and will hold. 9 utive fiat, although the lofty disregard of parliamentary support may
One sensitive point where legislative activism can generally be later come home to haunt leaders, as during the Suez crisis of 1956-7.
expected is where a treaty, or agreement, has implications for sover- Mrs Thatcher was wise enough to allow an emergency debate in the
eignty, in terms of ceding powers or territory, or both. The Israeli House of Commons on a Saturday (3 April1982) before sending a Task
Knesset passed a law in 1999, at the behest of the settlers in the Golan Force to the Falklands three days later. Had the debate gone wholly
Heights, specifying that no territory can be ceded to another country against a military response it would have been difficult for the Prime
without a majority in the 120-member house. 10 This is the ultimate Minister to have ignored it.
power of a parliament which makes any democratic leader cautious; It will be clear from the above that even the power over the purse
legislators exist to make law, and sometimes they do, thus even moving strings may be circumvented - this is precisely what Colonel Oliver
the goalposts in foreign affairs. In the US only the Congress can acquire North was doing for President Reagan in arranging the secret arms deal
256 Responsibility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 257

with Iran which funded the Contras in Nicaragua. 15 The British govern- which all too often go unnoticed or are out of date by the time they
ment, when it decided to upgrade the Polaris missile system at a time of appear. As in the relatively infrequent plenary debates which take place
considerable public support for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament on foreign policy in national assemblies, it is all too evident that only a
in 1977, simply slipped through the necessary funding in the general small proportion of members is informed and interested about foreign
Defence Estimates placed before the House of Commons, without affairs, while some of those will be pursuing special interests, such as
drawing attention to it. 16 The Italian government moved in the 1990s the need to gain a particular defence contract for their own constituency.
to being one of the major contributors to UN peace-keeping efforts Granted the deficiencies of parliamentarians in relation to foreign
with the Chamber of Deputies barely noticing 17 In Malaysia in 1988 policy, it is the FACs which represent the best hope of exerting sustained
the Leader of the Opposition demanded that full details of a proposed pressure on an executive. They are more able to build up expertise
$1 billion arms deal with Britain be made public; his speech in the over time with which to challenge the diplomatic specialists. They may,
budget debate was not even reported in the local media. 18 if able to insist on the presence of ministers (and even better, the
On a day-to-day level, parliaments relate to foreign policy less release of documents), expose errors and dissimulations through cross-
through the exercise of formal powers than through supervision, questioning and written analysis. Their reports- especially those inves-
scrutiny and investigation. Here too their capacity to constrain and tigating policy fiascoes - carry the weight of a public body and will
participate is limited, but it can be expected to grow as foreign policy often be taken up by journalists and scholars. If at times they provoke
becomes ever more central to normal political life, and as the presump- sharp controversy, unwelcome to decision-makers, this is essential for
tion of bipartisanism breaks down. In the first place, representatives quality control and shows they are doing their job. So long as the com-
usually have some means of questioning the executive on its activities. mittees can avoid being recruited into the process of diplomacy itself-
In the Westminster model, still in use in many ex-colonies, this occurs for example by acting as spokesmen abroad- and if they can tinct them-
through scheduled question and answer sessions. Unfortunately, civil selves an air pocket, free from the control of party managers, then they
servants soon become skilled in briefing ministers on how not to give will at least be able to engage the executive in a meaningful dialogue.
away information, and on how to use the occasion for sending signals Although the foreign relations committees of the US Congress are now
to other states as much as to their own citizens- insofar as foreign pol- less in the public eye than during the Vietnam War, together with others
icy is ever the focus of questioning. 19 Elsewhere, foreign ministers may such as the committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce,
be brought more regularly under the spotlight and cross-questioned on and Intelligence, they keep up a remorseless pressure on the White
particular themes. But this will normally rely on the existence of a lively House, which knows that if it wants to get measures approved it needs
and independent foreign affairs committee (FAC). to invest in a major political effort, involving side-payments and con-
It is only in the past twenty years that it has become normal for leg- cessions. This is particularly evident in foreign trade policy, where the
islatures to have a committee specializing in foreign affairs on the lobbies proliferate, but it can also happen on purely political matters,
American model (both chambers in Washington have such a committee, since key groups can exert a veto on official policy simply by the threat··
and more besides, relevant to external policy). All member states of the of publicity and filibustering.
European Union, for example, now have FACs, and they are also well- No other national system yet has the resources to rival the US effort
established in the major Commonwealth democracies and in Japan. (the total staff of Congress is nearly 30000), or indeed the political cul-
This should not lead us to conclude that the committees consistently act ture which requires it, but most parliaments are coming to realize that
like Senator Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee in the 1960s, detailed forensic work through committees is the essential precondition
which for a time was in the eye of the storm over the Vietnam War. Even of plenary debate and ultimately of the very principle of democratic
for the United States this was exceptional. All too often they are per- control. Otherwise such control as exists ends up in the hands of special
ceived as 'a nice club of honoured personalities who are satisfied to interests, which claim all too easily to be representing 'the national
have regular exchanges of views with the foreign minister without interest'. This was the case with the Falkland Islands in the late 1970s
claiming directly to control and influence the government's strategy'.Z0 and early 1980s, when a small group in the House of Commons were
They also provide opportunities to travel abroad, leading to reports able to talk out a government proposal for a negotiated solution with
258 Responsibility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 259

Argentina. The British government simply decided not to invest the polit- even if detailed knowledge is lacking. In 1945 the world was astonished
ical effort in over-ruling them, and paid the price later with a major crisis. to see the British people vote out of office, in a landslide victory for the
If parliaments do master the details on a regular basis they keep govern- Labour Party, the war hero Winston Churchill. This result did not arise
ments looking over their shoulder, as with the Netherlands, which sug- from any disapproval of Churchill's conduct of the war- he remained
gested to its European partners in the last Intergovernmental Conference popular with people of all parties for that- but was the product of years
that it should have one more vote than the other middle-ranking countries, of discontent with the old social and political order. Having made the
in order to prevent trouble in their parliament in The Hague. 21 huge effort for victory, the British people were determined to reap some
The second way in which formal accountability is exercised over for- reward at home. In that they thought that the war had been brought on
eign policy is through the verdict of the electors, who can make gov- by the failures of the Chamberlain government in 1938-9, voters were
ernments pay the price for errors or simply decide to change direction also punishing the Conservative Party, and not Churchill, who had him-
by voting in a new party or coalition. At one level it is difficult to see self been marginalized in the 1930s. 23 This kind of sophistication was
how elections do give citizens a role in foreign policy. They take place also evident in the election of Clinton in 1992, which was a slap in the
only every four to seven years, and represent crude choices between the face for the Republican presidents who had been in office from 1981,
large package deals offered by the main parties. Voters seem to be con- and who had 'won the Cold War' so dramatically. On the other hand
cerned principally with tax and welfare issues, and in any case the the low US electoral tum-out (c. 50 per cent) and the cyclical nature of
parties either do not talk much about foreign policy, or do not differ sig- party successes qualifies any generalization about American popular
nificantly in the options they present. In periods of war, when voters attitudes.
might actually wish to have a say in the foreign policy questions decid- Only in countries with (1) active foreign policies, and (2) well-
ing their fate, elections are often suspended. At best there will be established democracies will any effective foreign policy debate be
pressure not to undermine the government by voting for peace parties. possible at election time. It is the kind of higher order activity that is
It is not surprising if the outcomes of elections usually seem to have difficult to achieve even in mature systems. What is true is that 'foreign
little to do with foreign policy. In the 1983 German election, for exam- policy is ... a prism through which voters judge the basic soundness of
ple, the conservative CDU/CSU party was returned to government at a a candidate to govern the country'. 24 The ability to run a foreign policy
time when there was considerable unrest in the country over the safely and successfully in a dangerous world is an attribute valued
Euromissiles affair. Whether this was a vote of confidence in the mis- widely, and one which contributes significantly to general images of
siles policy, or simply a demonstration of the irrelevance of foreign pol- competence. This attribute is therefore played on by the spin-doctors
icy to voting behaviour, is difficult to tell. In 1992 and 1996 Bill Clinton who have dominated elections since at least the arrival of President
deliberately campaigned on domestic issues alone, partly because he Kennedy's 'Camelot' in 1960. Of course Kennedy, however glamorous,
genuinely wished to concentrate on internal priorities but partly because was inexperienced and untried in foreign policy at perhaps the most
he correctly deduced that foreign policy was not a strong suit for the dangerous time of the Cold War, and that weakness was reflected in his
Democrats in general, and (certainly in 1996) for himself in particular22 victory over Richard Nixon by the narrowest of margins (some indeed
The case can be made generally that conservative parties find it easier have said that the result was fixed by malpractice in Chicago, and that
to 'wrap themselves in the flag' and to portray progressive parties as Nixon was the true victor). Other American elections, such as that of
'soft' on the national interest. On the other hand this would suggest that Eisenhower in 1952, and Reagan in 1980, were also determined in part
conservatives ought to campaign on foreign policy questions more by the wish of the voters to have a president who could resolve diffi-
frequently than seems to be the case, and it does not allow for biparti- culties in foreign policy - the Korean War, and the humiliations of
sanism. Moreover, the arrival of human rights concerns on the foreign Carter by Iran and the USSR, respectively. 25 More recently Vladimir
policy agenda may have reversed this advantage. Putin won the office of president in Russia largely by emphasizing that
At times voters do seem willing to distinguish between foreign and he would win the war in Chechnya and thereby restore Russia's inter-
domestic policy issues and to favour the former - and in making such national image as a country to be reckoned with 26 In Singapore in 1997
distinctions they show themselves to have the capacity for judgement, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong argued, less than credibly, that his word
260 Responsibility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 261

would count for less in international circles if a particular opposition policy at elections. One is the way in which the politicization of foreign
candidate were returned who had questioned the predominance of policy weakens both bipartisanism and internal party discipline, aid~d
English-speakers in the Singapore Cabinet.'" Elections are always by the end of the Cold War but predating it in origin. This means that
an opportunity to play up the gravitas that comes with office and the external issues can cut across parties-and sometimes lead to severe inter-
opportunities for international statesmanship. nal divisions, as with the British political parties over European inte-
It may be just as well that personality and foreign events both have gration since 1959. This may make for less than effective decisions
their roles, for there are very few occasions when voters actually get a from the viewpoint of outsiders, but it certainly opens up the political
choice on key issues. In 1968 there was a crucial opportunity for the two space for prolonged internal debate. The same has been true in
main American parties to offer the voters a choice of strategies at the Germany, over the use of military force for humanitarian interventions.
most difficult time in the Vietnam War, when Lyndon Johnson had with- The result may not favour clear electoral choices, but it does weaken the
drawn from the race in a funk, and the best way forward was genuinely ability of parties to manage the argument.
uncertain. In the event, neither Nixon nor Humphrey gave a clear lead The second relevant development is the way foreign and domestic
as to peace or war; both promised vaguely to achieve both peace and issues are now generally intimately interconnected; a domestic issue
honour, but without specifying the policy implications. In office Nixon often has a foreign dimension, and vice versa. This means that it will not
then escalated the war while trying to scale down the number of US be easy to focus an election wholly on domestic issues, or to seal off
troops. This was a major failure for democracy. Foreign policy does not foreign policy into a separate, bipartisan compartment. The prolonged
need to dominate elections often, but this was the obvious exception. Zimbabwean election campaign of 1999-2000, in which President
Neither party trusted the American people, or indeed itself. Mugabe encouraged his supporters to occupy white farms as a way of
The same is true in other states. The United Kingdom has had appealing to the landless poor, inevitably had a foreign dimension. The
14 general elections since the war. Arguably in three of them (1964, white farmers appealed to Britain, the United States and the European
1983 and 1987) the Labour Party was damaged by having an image of Union for help both in upholding the law and ensuring fair elections.
being unreliable on defence, in particular through association with the For its part Mugabe's ZANU-PF party combined anti-white with anti-
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The second two of these were lost, British rhetoric throughout as a way of reawakening anti-colonialist
not least because the two leaders of the time, Michael Foot and Neil sentiment. The President was no doubt delighted when the British
Kinnock, were presented (mostly by the media) as being particularly government, in the form of FCO Minister Peter Hain, rose to the bait
unsound on defence. Foot held few cards on foreign policy; he was and engaged in an angry public slanging-match 29
proud of never even having visited the United States, and Mrs Thatcher Elections may, therefore, offer more platforms for the politics of for-
had just conducted the victorious campaign in the Falklands. Thus eign policy in the future. But debate will remain general, and voters will
defence was used largely as a means of strengthening the image of the be able to do little more than to indicate broad preferences and to make
Conservative Party. Labour ran scared and actively tried to avoid giving judgements on their leaders' performances of the kind familiar in a
the voters a clear foreign policy choice. In all the other elections, despite Roman amphitheatre- thumbs up, or down. They act as a backup to the
the obvious possibilities for debates on international matters (Korea in more formal powers of parliaments, themselves difficult to establish,
1950 and 1951, Suez in 1959, east of Suez in 1970, the Middle East in assert and implement. At least both elections and legislators possess
1974) the campaigns were almost wholly domestic in tone and voters enough ammunition to keep an executive guessing. It is striking how
would have had difficulty in obtaining information on the parties' for- most foreign policy-makers still take care to avoid riding roughshod
eign policy differences. 28 over the processes of accountability, even if they well exploit the lacu-
It is clear that there are structural limits on the extent to which for- nae they find there. For democratic politicians and officials an embar-
eign policy accountability can be achieved through democratic elec- rassing row over foreign policy, in parliament or at election time, is a
tions, and these are both inherent in the complexity of the process and prospect to be feared and avoided. US foreign policy virtually shuts
the product of a security state ethos among elites. There are, however, down in an election year30 Whether justifiably or not, public opinion
some signs of change which might tend to raise the profile of foreign looms large in their minds as a potential constraint.
262 Responsibility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 263

Public Opinion the mass of people attribute to domestic affairs, compared to the generally
more internationalist attentive public. According to a series of American
Politicians often argue that their hands are tied by public opinion, or at focus groups in 1996, most people believed that 'domestic needs have
the least that they have to work within the limits set by it. Campaigners been neglected at the expense offoreign affairs'. In a separate poll, 84 per
also set store by this belief. Martin Dent, who is both an academic and cent of 'the elite' were willing to go to war to defend South Korea from
an activist for Third World debt relief, rests his hopes on the claim an invasion by North Korea, but only 45 per cent of the general public
of the Anti-Slavery Review in the nineteenth century that public opinion took the same view. 35 Whether this is judged to be parochial isolationism.
was 'the steam which [would] enable Parliament to extinguish slavery or historical memory of the costs of war, is a matter of political taste.
in one massive stroke'-' 1 Political scientists tend to be sceptical and side The second proposition which most students of foreign policy would
more with those radical critics who claim that public opinion is paid lip- accept is that there is a widespread degree of ignorance about the details
service to but in practice ignored. All these positions need scrutinizing of international affairs. This even applies to the basics of geography. It
within the special context of foreign policy. is difficult to form an opinion about the European Union if you do not
The concept of public opinion is difficult to pin down. It refers at know the names of its member states, or where to find them on a map. 36
once to an actor in the political process and to an object of influence. In the midst of the arguments raging in the early 1970s about Britain's
Michel Tatu says it is 'both an instrument and a factor in the conduct of entry into the European Communities only 17 per cent of those ques-
foreign policy'. 32 In this, however, it resembles a number of problems tioned in the UK knew that the EEC had nine members and the location
in social life, and academic writing has done a good deal to establish the of its headquarters. 37 At the end of the decade, in 1979, only 60 per cent
parameters of the problem over the past forty years. On that basis there correctly identified what the initials EEC stood for. The figures for
are four preliminary conclusions which may be drawn. NATO and the IMF were even lower, at 33 per cent and 44 per cent
First is the fundamental distinction between mass and attentive opin- respectively, although interestingly the UN was identified by 85 per cent
ion, particularly important in relation to any issue which is remote from of people and the IRA, whose actions were very much closer to home,
everyday life and which cannot even be conceptualized without spe- by 75 per cent 38
cialized knowledge (unlike, for example, the state of the nation's hospi- In the United States, the National Geographic Society commissioned
tals). This is not the same as a distinction between the educated and the a Gallup poll in 1988 to measure geographical knowledge and to com-
lumpen, as mass opinion includes all sections of society, from the illit- pare with a similar poll from 1947-8. Not only did they discover that
erate to Nobel Prize winners. But it does differentiate between the there had been a distinct falling off over time, but the actual levels of
whole, which will only rarely be sufficiently focused on a foreign pol- ignorance were alarming. One in five could not name a single European
icy issue as to display a collective animus, and the minority which takes country, one in two could not find South Africa on the map (at a time
a persistent and knowledgeable interest in international affairs 33 The when the issue of support for the black majority was a big political issue
latter will vary in size according to the location, culture and degree of in the US) and only one in three could find Vietnam, where nearly
development of a country, but even in western Europe it is unlikely to 60 000 Americans had died 39 Respondents from other countries,
be more than 20 per cent of the adult population, and may be much less. notably Sweden and West Germany, displayed better knowledge, but it
Yet in one opinion poll in 1984, 60 per cent of Europeans said that they would be a mistake to assume that these data can be explained by
almost never thought about the Third World, which means that 40 per Anglo-Saxon insularity.
cent did reflect on the matter from time to time, and 10 per cent even Most people do not have the knowledge of geography and world pol-
said they would be prepared to give up I per cent of their income for itics taken for granted by diplomats and journalists, just as they do not
development assistance. 34 It is not that the majority of the population is seek to find out how their car works unless compelled by circumstances.
never concerned; only that interest goes up and down according to Of course ignorance does not stop people having opinions or making
the issue and to its degree of perceived urgency or moral importance. judgements, nor should it. In a developed democracy, at least, people
The 'attentive' group can swell quickly, especially in times of crisis. can improve their knowledge quite quickly if they so wish. But lack of
More routinely there is a contrast between the basic importance which knowledge does undermine individuals' confidence in their ability to
 ·r.
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264 Responsibility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 265

participate in the political process, and to heighten the elite perception for evidence of what the public is thinking, especially in foreign policy,
of a hopelessly ill-informed mass whom it would be irresponsible to which is rarely touched on in opinion polls. They may assume that
trust with decisions. When Mikhail Gorbachev started to liberalize the silence means consent, or they may take the hubbub in press and televi-
Soviet Union, one of his key ideas was glasnost, or openness. Glasnost, sion to be widely representative - a transmission belt of democratic
however, only applied to domestic affairs 40 Despite the importance of feeling, rather than one particular source of opinion. The same is true
issues such as the war in Afghanistan and the negotiations with the West for members of parliament, who exist to 'represent' their constituen-
on intermediate nuclear forces, the taboo on entrusting the people with cies44 In modern conditions leaders are particularly likely to interpret
a debate on foreign and security policy remained in force - until the the activity of attentive opinion, in the form of pressure groups, as the
point where the people intervened with direct action. voices which matter most, Pluralist theories of politics tend to make
For at times, even on foreign policy, public opinion bursts forth with the same assumption.
unexpected vigour and impact, This is actually the consequence of the Steven Lukes and others have shown that this distorts the truth 45
third of our general conclusions, that the public is usually a follower, not MPs. journalists and pressure groups may have a better idea than most
a leader, when it comes to shaping policy. The combination of ignorance, as to grassroots opinion (and the methodological obstacles to anyone
apathy and other priorities means that the general public is often passive, being able to generalize about public opinion are enormous), but they
and therefore able to be ignored, divided or used by the politically active, also have their own special interests and perceptual blinkers. It is all too
whether in governmental or NGO circles. The public's instinct is not easy for decision-makers and their privileged interviewers to embrace
necessarily to trust leaders but to be fatalistic about the possibilities of in a closed circle of complacency as to what politics is about. Thus,
change 41 Indeed decision-makers hold four vital cards: (i) the power of on occasions, they all get taken by surprise 46 The bitter outpourings in
initiative; (ii) the capacity to detine external threats; (iii) control over Russia in the summer of 2000 against the arrogance of the military in
information and propaganda; (iv) the ultimate power of the state to not seeking foreign help early enough to save the crew of the founder-
coerce. Leaders issue the cues and the public tends to pick them up. The ing submarine Kursk was a sharp lesson for Vladimir Putin, previously
prime example of this remains the sad spectacle of millions of men insulated from the people by his past as a KGB officer and by his facile
accepting their fate in the First World War, condemned by the rigidity of entry into office. The greatest lesson of all was administered by the
their military high commands and their blinkered politicians. 42 peoples of eastern Europe when they finally managed to throw off
On rare occasions this norm breaks down. The apparently content and Moscow-imposed communism through peaceful revolution. That this
suggestible public turns out to have been taken for granted. In 1999 the was possible in 1989, and had not been earlier, for example in the
UN conducted what it claimed was 'the largest survey of public opinion abortive risings of 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia, tells
ever conducted - of 57 000 adults in 60 countries, spread across all us something about the need for conditions to be ripe before popular
six continents'. This found that while most people thought elections resistance can succeed. But it also demonstrated the immense strength
in their country were fair, 'two-thirds of all respondents considered that of the people when united, and facing a government whose will to use
their country was not governed by the will of the people. This opinion force had been weakened through loss of legitimacy. It was spectacular
held even in some of the oldest democracies in the world' .43 This shows evidence of how even elites disposing of the fullest apparatus of inter-
that the conditions of distrust and cynicism exist for occasional resist- nal surveillance can misperceive the feelings of their own citizens.
ance. When a government ignores the actual feelings of its people, as Their sonar picked up 'merely the echo of their own propellors' Y
opposed to its perceptions of their views, a political earthquake can It will always be the case that some decision-makers are misled by
ensue, with unpredictable consequences, even over foreign policy. their own values or vanity to interpret public opinion wrongly. Neville
When this happens it is because of the impact of the last of our four Chamberlain was so entranced by the welcome he received at Heston
parameters of the relationship between government and public opinion: Airport on his return from Munich in October 1938, and by his over-
the tendency on the part of the former to confuse the voice of the public whelmingly favourable postbag, that he came to believe in the myth of
with a particular channel through which it is being transmitted. his own ability to know what the people wanted. Thus when he received
Decision-makers naturally look to the most articulate elements in society a critical postbag after taking Britain into war in September 1939, he
 266 Responsibility
·r··
:.- : :.~.;L·'·.·~.:~.~ - .
The Constituencies of Foreifin Policy 267

interpreted it as the product of an unrepresentative minority. He could not

believe that the majority had not followed his own change of direction 4 ' I hands of the prime minister, it's in the hands ofpeople'. 52 Even a close
result may be a humiliation for a government, as De Gaulle decided
Some indicators of public opinion are -evidently more objective than
others. Unless amounting to wholescale revolution, demonstrations will
I when he resigned in 1969 after failing to win the support he expected in
a referendum that turned into a vote of confidence.
always be subject to the kind of rationalizations employed by Anthony Attention to opinion polls represents either a fetishizing of the l'O.r
Eden in 1956, when citing a bus-driver's letter to the effect that 80 per populi or a fiendish instrument of political spinning, according to one's
cent of a hostile demonstration in London over Suez was composed of point of view. Polls, like any statistics, are certainly not inherently neu-
foreigners, and therefore did not count. 49 Referenda and opinion polls. --. - tral and reliable. In 1987 Jerzy Urban, the Polish Foreign Minister cited
however, are more difficult to overlook, and they have been used a poll done for Polish radio and TV in 1985 in which 73 per cent judged
increasingly after 1945, as party managers have sought to know how to the USSR a friendly country - this after the rise of Solidarity and only
please voters before elections, and how to stave off embarrassing media four years before the overthrow of communism. More accurate, para-
criticisms. 50 Referenda are still unusual on foreign policy issues, and doxically, were the police reports on censored letters which Mussolini
they always contain the dangers of manipulation and populism, but in saw in 1942-3, and which showed clearly the extent of popular disillu-
that tum-out tends to be high they are evidently welcomed by citizens. sion with his rule. 53 Although opinion polling, which George Gallup
The results set the outline of policy for the medium term and make began in the United States in 1935, has become a refined and indispen-
backsliding by government difficult. The Swiss, for whom referenda are sable instrument of government in the past few decades, it is rarely used
a way of life, could not possibly enter the EU without popular approval to measure views on foreign policy, except in crises where the Vietnam
in a referendum. Indeed, in 1985 75 per cent of the poll voted against syndrome, of the fear of haemorrhaging support from TV spectators
Switzerland even entering the United Nations, with all 26 cantons vot- appalled at the sight of body bags, is all too evident. When foreign pol-
ing against. After that few could be in any doubt as to public opinion on icy becomes a test of the government's competence, image or leadership
the issue, until the question was raised again in 1997, leading to accept- qualities, opinion polls will be used incessantly. When foreign issues
ance of entry in the referendum of 2002. The narrow vote in 1992 drop below the horizon of daily visibility, whatever the polls say on
against joining the European Economic Area, headed off any possibil- international issues will be secondary to other factors.
ity of accession to the EU, just as the two votes in Norwegian referenda There are transnational elements to governments' concern for public
against EC/EU entry, of 1972 and 1994, made it impossible for the more opinion. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's advisers con-
integration-minded elites in Oslo to push on strongly with their project. cluded that his best chance of reaching the Russian immigrants in his
Referenda in Denmark, Ireland and France on aspects of European country was to appear on the Russian-language TV shows most of them
integration, including defence, also forced the governments of these watch on cable. Accordingly Netanyahu's trip to Georgia, the Ukraine
countries to take on board the greater caution of their populations. 51 and Moscow in March 1999 was 'first and foremost a campaign trip' ..
It is true that after such setbacks governments then become even Given the forthcoming general election, and the tendency of the large
more cautious about embarking on referenda, and about their wording, number of immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union to vote in blocs, this
and they pursue other means of getting the same result - so that was crucial, and reaped dividends in terms of the 'reams of articles,
Denmark, for example, has now signed up to a European defence force, stacks of photographs and many minutes of campaign time dedicated to
after the softening of domestic opposition. Still, a referendum made Netanyahu and his pitch'. 54 Diasporas play important roles in and for
legitimate by a good tum-out makes it impossible for a government particular countries. Otherwise, however, decision-makers tend to per-
to interpret the public's wishes on that issue in a cavalier way, and will ceive public opinion as being firmly part of their own and others'
always increase their circumspection. That is why the supporters of the domestic environments. Thus it is very common to come across discus-
settlers in the occupied territories have ensured that any cession of sions of how Europeans and Americans may be growing apart because
Israel's territory in future will require not only a parliamentary major- of divergences in their respective public opinions, or of how US foreign
ity, but approval in a popular vote. As the Head of the Golan Heights policy may be forced in this direction or that by popular pressure. 55
Residents' Committee, Avi Zeira, pointed out, 'the decision is not in the Whatever the truth of transnational coalitions, or public lack of interest,
 ·rh·
0 ....

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....
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__

268 Responsibility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 269

'
decision-makers still conceptualize public opinion as being important and direct pressure on politicians; and through preparation and full-time
because it is so distinctively national. organization. Risse-Kappen's study concluded that in established
Ultimately conceptualizations matter, for public opinion is a democracies the more decentralized the system and the stronger the
'notional constraint' .56 By this is meant a constraint which exists at least social groups capable of mobilizing public opinion, the more opportu-
as much in the minds of decision-makers as it is embodied in substan- nities the latter had for influencing policy-makers 58 It is evident that the
tive elements like law, institutions, demonstrations. It is what is now groups seeking to influence foreign policy have multiplied since 1945,
termed a 'constructed' reality. On any given foreign policy issue even if they are hardly as new a phenomenon as is often assumed. They
decision-makers will have an image of the public's view and degree of are more visible, and they have acquired a degree of informal legitimacy
interest which may or may not be supported by 'the facts'. Indeed the in the political systems of complex societies, where governments
nature of the facts will be particularly contestable, given that the public require dialogue with their citizens on an increasing range of issues. 59
is large, amorphous, divided and reliant on transmission belts. There Unfortunately the serious study of the impact of societal groups on
may thus be a tendency to over-rely on the 'scientific' evidence of foreign policy has only just begun 60
opinion polls and focus groups, or on personal impressions. If the view Societal groups should not be regarded only as transmission belts for
of what the public wants is held strongly enough it may become a the conveyance of mass opinion to the centre. They perform that func-
self-fulfilling prophecy in that decision-makers will feel inclined to bow tion, but also have their own specific concerns, relating to particular
the knee, and the myth of an influential public is born. This happened 'stakes' in society or distinctive cherished values. A double distinction
during the Vietnam War, where the US is commonly thought to have must be made at the outset, between interest groups and pressure
withdrawn because of opposition at home, but where there is evidence groups, and between interest groups and cause groups. Pressure groups
to show that public opinion was not ahead of official decisions, and by definition exist to exert pressure on government policy. Many inter-
indeed was generally permissive. 5 7 est groups will wish to influence policy and are therefore also pressure
Thus leaders do not always exploit the inherent incapacity of the pub- groups. But some exist simply to enable citizens to mobilize themselves
lic to mobilize the general will as ruthlessly or as effectively as theories around common interests - sporting federations are a good example -
of elitism might lead us to believe. They are, after all, fallible human and they will only occasionally need to take on the role of pressure
beings themselves, as immersed in their country's political culture as group. Cause groups also exist in order to change the world, but instead
anyone else, and often convinced democrats. In other guises they, too, of relating to stakes which the members hold jointly, whether as dock
are members of the public. They want and need to believe in accounta- workers or athletes, they arise out of common value positions, and a
bility both because it relieves them of some responsibility, and because desire to achieve a given good independent of their connection to it.
it avoids the cognitive dissonance which would result from speechify- Those groups in rich countries which devote themselves to helping
ing about democracy while behaving like Stalin. On any given occasion developing countries are a prime case in point. Thus cause, interest and
this does give the alert politician the opportunity to have it both ways, pressure groups are overlapping but distinct categories 61 ·
but for the most part decision-makers tend to keep a close eye on the Many of these groups have developed considerable expertise,
shadow which flickers in the cave behind them. resources and (as we have seen in Chapter 8), transnational scope. It can
no longer be concluded, as Milbraith did in relation to the United States
in the late 1960s, that their influence is even weaker than slight. 62 The
Interest Groups and the Mobilization of Civil Society more important, like Oxfam, Amnesty, or the Stockholm Peace Research
Institute, do not target only the government of their host country, and
Even attentive public opinion requires organization, if it is to be an actor their influence must therefore be assessed on a regional or global basis.
in the policy process as well as an object of it. Broadly speaking there Furthermore, interest and cause groups, in contrast to pressure groups,
are three major ways for public opinion to exert an active influence over act more on civil society, nationally or transnationally, than on govern-
foreign policy: through populist political movements, whether parties or ments. The Foreign Policy Association of the United States, which does
less structured demonstrations; in crises, through heightened awareness a huge amount of work to spread knowledge of international issues
 270 Respomihi/ity The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 271

among schools, colleges and citizens • groups, is a foremost example _ in the early 1980s was strenuously opposed by AIPAC but went ahead
even if it is fighting an uphill battlc 63 regardless. Nonetheless, such disputes helped to forge Jewish unity
In terms of individual issue-areas, pressure groups can be effective, in the USA and AIPAC's organizational strength. According to Fortune
although there is much variability according to historical and national magazine in 1997 it was the only foreign policy group in the top
context. British overseas aid levels rose (temporarily) after the huge 25 lobbies, and the second most powerful in the country after the
publicity obtained by Bob Geldof in creating BandAid in 1984, a~d American Association of Retired Persons 67 As a result, the Jewish
the European Nuclear Disarmament movement (END) pushed west lobby is widely believed, especially outside the US, to determine
European members of NATO into a much less enthusiastic stance re the American policy on the Arab-Israel dispute, a perception which has
modernization of theatre nuclear weapons and the countering of Soviet important consequences.
SS20s. Although END failed to get the installation of Cruise and When key values are at stake, or where there is a risk of serious
Pershing missiles unilaterally reversed, it compelled the SPD govern- upheaval, some groups will have to be heard. No Greek government
ment in Bonn to make arms control and detente their first priority. could have ignored the nationalist outrage against the former Yugoslav
Indeed, Helmut Schmidt's famous speech in London in 1977 which Republic of Macedonia, for having taken the name of Macedonia on
started the whole debate, did not in fact mention the SS20s, and stressed independence. Similarly, it was impossible even for the centre-left ele-
non-military security, out of deference to his domestic anti-militarists. 64 ments in the government of Concertaci6n Democratica in Chile in 1999
Groups in particular sectors where the government either rates the not to protest to the British government over the arrest of General
issue low on its agenda, or is concerned not to engage in a public strug- Pinochet. In a dangerously divided country, the organized right was
gle, may have a veto on the way in which policy develops. Various simply too strong to be allowed the luxury of painting the government
national and ethnic groups within the United States are seen as havinn in anti-patriotic colours 68 On anything less central to the character
this capacity, particularly the Cubans, the Irish, the Jews, the Poles and of the state, governments have many ways of averting pressure from
the Greeks, although matters are rarely so simple. While these groups sectoral or cause groups.
may well be better organized and have more electoral clout, than, say, It is in their collective impact that societal groups have most impact
the native American population, it is by no means clear that US policy on foreign policy. Pluralist democracy means both freedom for individ-
in relation to their concerns would be any different without their input. ual actors and a web of common activity, in which governments as well
In any case, the more a group's influence is celebrated, by itself or oth- as interest groups get caught, and in which a number of groups may be
ers, the more a government will wish to show its independence. This is acting in broadly the same direction even if not in an actual coalition. In
beginning to happen with both the Cuban and the Jewish lobbies, and foreign policy this has produced a number of examples of the signifi-
the Turkish lobby, set up to counterbalance Athens, has certainly not cant, cumulative impact of different groups operating simultaneously
gone unheard in Washington, as is clear from US pressure on the EU to and giving a government no rest. Thus the Conservative administrations
admit Turkey65 In a pluralist system groups compete in the political of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain in the 1930s came to adopt
market and can cancel each other out. This is particularly true of eco- the quietist policy of appeasement under persistent pressure from organ-
nomic groups, which are amongst the most active now that economic ized groups reminding them of the need to avoid another war and to
policy almost always has an international dimension 66 follow the road of agreement rather than force. This was despite their
Even powerful lobbies may be outflanked by governments when they huge majority in the House of Commons 69 Likewise the French right,
choose to ride out a public storm, as they often can, given the relative acting through various extra-parliamentary groups, some involved in
mfrequency of elections. All American presidents have to tread care- violence, others not, brought down the Fourth Republic over the
fully when they consider withdrawing support from Israel, but this does Algerian crisis. The number and extent of the foreign aid lobbies in the
not mean to say that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee Netherlands and Scandinavian countries make it difficult for those
(AIPAC) always has a veto on US policy in the Middle East- even leav- countries to reduce their ODA spending down to, say, Spanish levels, to
ing aside the fact that American Jews are far from being of one mind on say nothing of the huge range of companies, trades unions and towns
foreign policy. Ronald Reagan's sale of AWACs aircraft to Saudi Arabia with a vested interest in the continuance of a global military role for the
 272 Responsibility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 273

United Slates. Their collective pressure does not even need to be World. The risk, as with the Green Party in Germany which entered the
brought lo bear on policy. It is so structural as lo be a given 70 governing coalition in 1998, is that the pr~ce~s of taking res~[Link]
Organized opinion has the advantage of being able t~ get close to the alienates natural supporters without convmcmg general opmwn. The
seat of power. By the same token it may be drawn in too close, and lose whole point about interest groups is that they offer alternative defini-
some of its independence. If this becomes a permanent arrangement tions of responsible behaviour; once in partnership with decision-makers
groups become what has been called 'parastate organizations', effec- they imperceptibly change roles and the pressure for accountability
tively serving the functions of the state while remaining privale. 71 In must come from elsewhere.
such form they may be subsidized directly or indirectly by the state, and If there are to be democratic struggles over the direction of foreign
develop common definitions of problems and solutions. Inderjeet policy, expert officials can only be engaged by those with a degree of
Parmar and others have argued from a Gramscian perspective that while knowledge and professionalism. Accordingly, pressure groups become
ideas, groups and individuals make a difference, if they come to share a career choice like everything else, and their permanent statfs can end
the same 'state spirit', the necessary tensions between those in power up in too cosy a relationship with their erstwhile targets. Nonetheless,
and those seeking accountability will become lost in a form of intellec- on foreign policy the general public has little choice but to rely on these
tual (and sometimes institutional) corporatism 72 It is certainly no acci- groups to keep governments up to the mark and aware of attitudes
dent that in most countries the principal institute of foreign affairs is within the society which they serve. The same is true of an even more
close to government, and often significantly subsidized by it. Even when important social institution.
not, as is currently the case with the Royal Institute of International
Affairs in London, it is difficult not to take cues from officialdom, in
terms of research projects, conferences and visiting speakers. The Media as Gatekeepers
Such institutes are perceived abroad as staffed by what Chadwick
Alger has called 'external bureaucrats'. 73 The Council of Foreign In the age of television the mass media look like kings. They seem to be
Relations in New York is the most studied example, and indeed o~e the key to influence over public opinion, and they have the ear and eye
which has been important in creating and reproducing consensus over of government. With real-time broadcasts from even remote spots in the
American foreign policy, particularly during the move away from isola- world to the homes of hundreds of millions, the 'CNN effect'- of for-
tionism and during the Cold War. Such a privileged position, however, eign policy shaped by the latest media feeding frenzy - seems palpable.
carries with it the inevitable risk of becoming detached from wider If the press was the 'fourth estate' so radio, and in particular television,
society, and overtaken by powerful new ideas and groups. Thus the are now the fifth -the constituency which holds most informal power.
Council of Foreign Relations was seen by the radical right as part of the Despite this there have been few serious studies produced of the rela-
very east coast establishment which needed supplanting in the late tionship between the media and foreign policy. 74 As with much of the
1970s, and struggled to have influence over the Reagan administration domestic environment, commentators are long on opinion and short On
and its newly assertive foreign policy. evidence. It is not surprising if many journalists exaggerate their own
Each era tends to produce its own activist groups, some of which importance, or if politicians like to paint themselves as boxed in by con-
gradually get drawn into the process of policy-making. They thus stant media pressure, but academics can use a wider angle lens. In this
exchange influence for compromise, and a certain distancing from their respect, such work as has so far been done tends to qualify the picture
own roots, They also create for decision-makers the sense of being in of the dominant media.
touch with public opinion, when in practice the boundary between ins Historically the 'age of the masses' and the growing importance of
and outs may simply have been moved a little further out. This process, the media go hand in hand, the one fostering the other. If print was
meluctable more than dishonourable, can be seen in the way the Blair important in fostering first the emergence of the state, and then the
government in Britain encouraged human rights and development 'imagined communities' of nationalism, the development of rapidly
groups to enter into structured dialogues with ofticialdom, and has published and widely disseminated broadsheets was fundamental to th<:
come to rely on them for help with policy implementation in the Third organization of modem industrial society, both liberal and totalitarian 7 '
 274 Responsibility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 275

The daily newspaper was soon recognized as a key instrument of the literature which may have a long-run impact, but even they never exist in
dissemination of information and the mobilization of the mass, whether isolation from the dominant discourse conducted at the national, indeed
for constructive or manipulative [Link]. Nor did it take long to often transnational, level by the big battalions. It is not difficult to thmk
become apparent that the flow of influence went in two directions - of cases where the media have created almost out of nothing a public
from the public via the press to government, as well as from the top mood of concern which has then rebounded onto government. Afncan
down- or that the press itself could be a formidable independent factor famines have produced many such moments in western societies, but
in politics. The arrival of press barons like Beaverbrook, Rothennere probably the most revealing of recent times was the publicizing of the
and Northcliffe had a major impact in the British Commonwealth coun- plight of Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq at the end of the Gulf War,
tries between the two world wars, just as William Randolph Hearst which led first the British, then other governments, mto a commitment to
dominated the press in the United States, exerting a powerful influence 'safe havens' from Iraqi attack and thus a de facto policy of intervention
for isolationism and nationalism. As early as 1922 there was an exam- inside northern Iraq 77 Since journalists and editors have their own news
ple of a politician using the press, when Lloyd George let journalists values and are also restricted by circumstances in their access (it was
know during the Chanak crisis that he would be calling on Canadian and easier 'for them to film in northern Iraq, via Turkey, than in the south,
Australian troops - this without informing the government of either where the Shias were also in revolt) they only publicize certain prob-
country, while exploiting the advantage of time zones and print dead- lems, and to a large extent their selectivity determines public debate.
lines. The resulting storm may have gone beyond what Lloyd George On the other hand although the media appear to have almost monop-
intended, but it certainly exerted pressure in favour of the principle of olistic access to the public, there are limitations to their impact. For one
imperialloyalty76 thing even the serious newspapers only devote between 33--45 per cent
With the proliferation of war correspondents, diplomatic correspon- of their space to international affairs." Television news does the same,
dents, film crews and 'star' reporters this kind of 'media event' has but as Theodore Sorensen points out, '45 per cent of the 22 mmutes of
become commonplace. A constant struggle takes place for advantage news contained in a 30 minute newscast does not convey enough words
between the press corps (used here to refer to journalists of all kinds) to fill one-third of one page of a stan dd . newspaper •791
ar -s1ze . mage
and those responsible for official policy. At one moment the former will therefore predominates over information and analysis. This is not
have the advantage, creating embarrassment or setting the agenda. The always a superficial matter, since an emotional and visual appeal c":"
next moment, those we now call 'spin-doctors' will be planting a story leave a more lasting effect than metres of the wntten word. But 11 IS
or distracting attention from the real issue of the day. It also happens not usually evanescent, and leaves the watcherill-equipped to do more
infrequently that the two sides develop a common way of looking at the than telephone in a credit card donation. Th1s JS particularly the case
world, even common interests, and behave in an incestuous way which given that the evidence suggests that most readers and v1ewers are not
closes the circle against public involvement. Each of these three patterns much interested in foreign affairs. D1stance counts, m the sense that
of relationship bears some further examination. without some involvement of 'our people' (usually co-nationals) only
The power of the media is exerted in two distinct ways: over public the most massive events will halt the tendency to switch off, literally, or
opinion, and then over decision-makers, including indirectly via the more likely, psychologically. Thus much of the media will play up the
political class. There is no doubt that in the relatively restricted area of simplistic and even the xenophobic aspects of the1r coverage to ensure
foreign policy- however widely we define it- the media have an almost the attention their proprietors and advertisers require 80 This does have
exclusive gatekeeping role with respect to the public. Only very few a dumbing-down effect on the audience. More insidious is the opportu-
individuals even in a highly educated society are in a position to acquire nity cost of denying clear informatiOn and analys1s to the mass of
information or to express their views on international relations without people, who are far from being as coarse or as mcapable as cymcal
relying on the media - although the internet may transform this in the journalists assume. The public is thus not qmte so moulded by the
future. Such public debate as exists on foreign policy is almost entirely media as it might seem, but nor is it empowered. . .
focused on the noticeboards provided by newspapers and television. The more direct power of the media, as an actor in the pohcy-makmg
Public meetings, word of mouth and interest groups produce a samizdat process, is exerted both through personal contacts and through prov1dmg
 276 Re,ponsihility The Constituencies of Foreign Policy 277

a means of communication between foreign policy professionals and in a complex issue to take cues from governments -which in this case,
the attentive public, particularly those inner rings which might be polit- although for diverse reasons, have manufactured a consensus in favour
Ically active. Decision-makers do .not have much time to read the press of the principle of enlargement. The issue is presented as closed, with
or watch television, and at times they affect not to do so. But they only implementation at stake. The media have thus failed to ensure that
employ advisers to summanze who is saying what and anything which a massive question of public interest and accountability is properly
shows a weakness or starts a trend is soon spotted. Key opinion-fanners. debated, and no other institution has been able to do any better. Given the
like Josef Joffe of the Siiddeutschezeitung in Germany, or Stanley number of constituencies affected by enlargement this neglect could lead
Hoffmann m both France and the United States, do not go unheard. In to a considerable political backlash in the future.
this respect the media have the capacity to influence political argument Not only do the media often fail to rise to the occasion, but they can
by ventilating debate which might otherwise stay behind closed doors: be more easily manipulated by policy-makers than the general public
by subjecting the official line to critical scrutiny and by tilting the bal- realizes. The press has long been used to launch diplomatic trial bal-
ance m favour of one position over another. Even on what was for the loons, and not infrequently infonnation is released which has only the
average citizen the arcane subject of NATO enlargement it was not pos- most tenuous relationship to the truth. Particularly in war-time, actual
Sible to take policy forward without an extensive debate in the press on disinformation is frequently reported faithfully by the media. Whole
both Sides of the Atlantic. This interacted with argument in Congress squads of public relations experts have now moved into the foreign pol-
(and no doubt inside western ministries) to ensure that the policy did not icy area in order to present parties in the best policy light. Many foreign
escape interrogation. The same ordeal by fire may have contributed to trips are essentially media events, designed to use press, radio and tele-
President Clinton's decision in August 2000 not to go ahead with the vision as instruments of projection, at home and abroad. 83 The expert-
Nuclear Missile Defence system he had previously announced. The ise and continuity of public officials as opposed to the short newspaper
combination of difficulties with Russia, and strenuous opposition within memory caused by the torrent of deadlines, gives the fanner a great
NATO countries, made him calculate that it was too big a political risk advantage. The media lack both stamina and gravitas when it comes to
to leave the policy hanging round the neck of AI Gore (the Vice pursuing complex foreign issues over time, compared to parliamentary
President, hoping to be elected to the White House in his tum). committees, disadvantaged in a different way84 Both also tend to chase
. In democracies many other cases of media influence over foreign pol- the game. As James Reston said, 'we will send 500 correspondents to
Icy can be found, but there are an equal number where their role has been Vietnam after the war breaks out. .. but we will not send five reporters
exaggerated. This is the conclusion of Halliday's study of the Gulf War, there when the danger of war IS . deve Iopmg- ' .85
and of Carruthers' survey of other cases in the 1990s, including Somalia, It is also evident that the relationship between the media and govern-
Yugoslavia and Rwanda 81 It is also the view taken of television in the ment in many respects suits both sides very welL Publicity and the two-
research done by Nik Gowing, himself a distinguished TV reporter. 82 way transmission of infonnation are exchanged for privileged access
If we look at the other big enlargement issue of the 1990s, for example, and (often) seats on the presidential or prime ministerial plane. Some
that of the European Union, we find that there has been little serious critics have concluded from this element of collusion that the press corps
debate, and that the press coverage has been muddling and diffuse. This is structurally rotten and part of the self-serving elites it is supposed to
IS because the issue is less clear-cut, and the timetable much longer than be scrutinizing. 86 It is certainly true that some journalists have subverted
that of the NATO enlargement, where there was polarization around one their own independence by acting as diplomatic 'couriers', or even as
more or less clear proposition. With respect to the EU, the timetable is actual spies. Nervous governments often assume that foreign journalists
l~ng and shifting, the pennutations endless and the issues multiple- and are agents of influence. Systematic subordination is a serious problem
difficult for all actors to synthesize. In this situation the serious press, to in autocracies, but in democracies it is a relatively trivial problem com-
say nothmg of television and the tabloids, has failed even to identify the pared to the structural difficulty of developing foreign policy themes in
mam outhnes of a debate, let alone to insist on one taking place. The an ever more commercial and trivializing environment. In any case, m
problem IS compounded by the need for a Europe-wide debate, whereas the post-Cold War era it is not clear what the ideology of a power elite
the press is still predominantly national in its focus, and by the tendency means when applied to foreign policy, unless it is the simple injunction
 278 Responsibility The Constit11encies of Foreign Policy 279

not to criticize official policy, which holds little water. On many of the The Rise of Public Diplomacy
problems confronting us, like the future of Taiwan, the Middle East
peace process and Third World debt, it is simple-minded to suppose that An important new dimension of the domestic environ.m~nt in recent
there is an obvious line which serves the interests of the most powerful. decades has been the emergence of public diplomacy. Thts ts the process
Complexity produces divided opinion inside both officialdom and the whereby governments by-pass their equivalents in another country and
media. The latter could be much more alert, sceptical and creative in target the wider political process, including civil society. They do thts on
their approach to the reporting of international affairs, but anyone the assumptions that opinion matters, that [Link] IS un~vm~­
familiar with Le Monde, The lntemational Herald Tribune or the BBC's ble and that they can influence outcomes by dtrect mterventton m
'Newsnight' programme (watched extensively in Belgium and the :Uother country - not least because of the increased freedom of ~ove­
Netherlands as well as the UK) will not think that western governments, ment of capital, goods and people governments themselves have stgned
at least, have things all their own way87 up to. States therefore have to work out strategies both of pubhc dtplo-
The media are hardly a flawless example of a pluralism in action, macy and of coping with others' activity behind their own backs.
given the power of the big proprietors like Murdoch, Berlusconi and As a result of this deliberate crossing of the publtc/pnvate boundary,
Springer, and the real problem is the excessively narrow range of there can be some confusion as to the nature of the actors and actions
options which journalists tend to consider as 'realistic'. This is less a involved. Mark Leonard and Vidhya Alakeson argue that 'people [ar~]
matter of radical writers being denied platforms - which does happen - at the heart of the agenda rather than states' but the key word her~ ts
than of conventional thinking within a self-regarding media world. It is 'agenda'. Most of the discussion arising from the soft power p~radtg~
true that there is still competition in the treatment of foreign policy is directed to the necessity for governments to understand that people
issues, and that various functions are performed for political debate: are now a necessary target, and that they must be drawn into the diplo-
between them press, radio and TV can bring new issues to the public's matic process. This is a different thing from the direct people-to-people
attention, transmit opinion back to the centre, act as noticeboards for contacts which we discussed in Chapter 8, which create a new environ-
88
discussion, conduct informal diplomacy, make transnational links ment for states independent of their attempts at controlling it. Public
between national debates and put governments under pressure. The dif- diplomacy involves a government deliberately attempting to manipulate
ficulty is that the process is hit and miss, with few being sure as to (even if at times, with benign intentions) a foreign soctety. Thts ts ltttle
which function is being served at any one time, and little continuity. different in principle from the familiar uses of propaganda to target
Some pressures merely cancel out, leaving governments freer to go morale or belief in another state. Yet public diplomacy ts more subtle
their own way. Popularizing can lead to a crude jingoism which serves than the megaphone operations of the Cold War, and is generally per-
no-one 's interests. ceived as more legitimate. This is because it builds upon an tmphctt
More significantly, the short-termism of the media means that funda- recognition of shared, or at least over-lapping, constituencies between
mental or long-term questions are rarely pursued, and the basic assump- separate states. Issues such as reparations for war-tu_ne cnmes .(for
tions of decision-makers too often go unquestioned. The debate about instance the theft of Jewish gold), the future of genettcally modifted
foreign policy will often take place within too narrow limits, with both food, or the treatment of refugees from the Balkans play differently in
policy-makers and commentators accepting the same conventional wis- different societies. but they stimulate enough of a common debate for
doms. The media may, therefore, be gatekeepers between politicians governments to accept that they are involved in dialogues not just with
and their domestic environment, but in so doing they do not serve their own public opinion, but with opinion more broadly ..
democracy particularly well. That there is some variety evident between In its more manipulative, or coercive, modes pubhc dtplomacy may
different capitalist countries - as between British tabloid culture, which actively seek advantage in the decisions taken within a foreign politi-
affects even the broadsheets, and the more serious Dutch or German cal process or even to undermine a governmen~. The v:estern alh~s
press - suggests that this is not an inevitable outcome. But the costs of attempted the latter during the Kosovo war by usmg the mternet. Thts
running modem mass media mean that once a pattern of ownership, and proved unworkable, because the authorities in Belgrade ';;',ere able to
a culture, has been established, it can be changed only slowly, if at all. flood the NATO server and put it out of action for ten days. Chma and
 280 Responsihility The Constituencies of Foreign Polic_v 281

Singapore too have proved adept at limiting their citizens' access to this new image around the world, with the aid of diasporas. What is
foreign information on the web. More usual is the simple attempt to gain more, an excessive enthusiasm for a new image, as in Britain, invites a
access to another state's decision-making pfocess. Thus foreign govem- satirical response from the sophisticated, and is superfluous for those
ments employ not just their own lobbyists but also professional market- who know about the country in the first place. The fashion for this kind
ing firms in Washington, sometimes advised by those who have recently of public diplomacy, however, does reveal both the continued differen-
left positions of responsibility in the US government. The number of tiation of national approaches, and a certain anxiety about how to pur-
firms involved grew from 468 in 1967 to 824 in 1986, and the number of sue national economic goals in an era of privatization. The various
new foreign clients from 118 in 1987 to 453 in 1987.90 These hired guns paradoxes which public diplomacy thus presents do at least help us to
are part of an increasingly professional approach in the work which understand the changing nature of foreign policy instruments, and their
diplomats are doing within a foreign society. Ambassadors were already increasingly close ties with civil society.
rare among functionaries in having any kind of public profile, with their Finally, the rise of public diplomacy presents us with two interesting
occasional appearances on television in their host country, but they are moral issues. The first is about the public's right to know. If we take
now much more active in reaching out to the regions and to citizens' seriously the need for information and accountability, then citizens need
groups. They have to work with marketing and opinion survey special- to have access to the views of other governments than their own, and not
Ists, as well as to take rather more seriously the functions of cultural just filtered through their own diplomats or national media. Well-
diplomacy, seen during the Cold War as something of a poor relation. grounded political systems have little to fear from this cross-fertilization,
. One aspect of this is a curious revival of statism in this age of global- but they are not, unhappily, in the majority.
tzatJon. A state has become something to sell, through an image which The second issue revolves around the ethics of intervening in the
effectively promotes its strengths and downplays its weaknesses. States internal affairs of another state. Hiring a public relations firm might
with obvious image problems, like Rhodesia in the 1970s, or Malaysia seem innocuous enough, but when it involves senior tlgures recently
in 1999, have tried to improve their reputations by such means as hiring retired from the host country's civil service, tensions soon arise. Even
Image-consultants or advertising their economic achievements in west- advertising campaigns or cultural diplomacy can seem acts of aggres-
ern newspapers. But there is a limit as to what can be achieved in the sion to some regimes. Yet more problematic were the moves by the
face of obviously negative messages coming from what Manheim calls Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi to improve his international image by
'historical reality' - that is, problems of human rights or incompetent helping to liberate hostages in the Philippines. The paying of ransoms
management which just cannot be kept out of the news.9 1 With less prob- did not delight the western states, which nonetheless had to express
lematic behaviour, matters become easier. 'Old states' wishing to escape public thanks for having got their citizens back 94
from outdated images, like Britain and the City gent, or Germany and the
jackboot, may take active measures to rectify them. Thus the campaigns
for 'cool Britannia' and 'cool Germani a'. Conversely, new states without In Conclusion
'name recognition', like the Baltic states, may have an urgent need to
raise their pr?file, not just at the popular level but also among elites, If Chapter 9 dealt with the issue of how far foreign policy was primarily
given their wish to enter the European Union at the earliest opportunity. a domestic formation,. this chapter has been concerned with the more
Slovema has been particularly active in marketing its brand, and in directly political dimension of decision-makers' answerability to their
distinguishing itself from the other ex-Yugoslav republics as a modern domestic constituents. It is evident that with respect to foreign policy the
and peaceable country which would fit easily into the EU 92 function of intermediary institutions between government and public is
Striking as this kind of activity is at first sight, it is clear that only lim- even more significant than usual. Individual citizens, usually aggregated
ited progress is possible through re-branding 93 Much more effective under the heading of public opinion, have few opportunities to get to
than marketing are substantive achievements, such as Ireland's self- grips with the substance of foreign policy, for all the conventional
transformation from a poor agricultural backwater to thriving post-modern talk of the 'vetoes' or 'limits' imposed on those who make it. Apart from
economy and centre of youth culture. Word of mouth has transmitted constitutional procedures, they have to rely on their parliamentary
 282 Responsibility

representatives, pressure groups and the media, all of whom take on

the role of speaking for public opinion with relish but less concem for
accuracy. Thus decision-makers have to deal with a range of different
11
insti~utions and interests, in which concern for the common weal is
contmuously blurred with special interests. On Purpose in Foreign
The foreign policy process is broadly pluralist, even where societies arc
not fully developed economically or liberal in their politics. Except under Policy: Action, Choice
condrtrons of terror there will always be some domestic inputs from those
wrth specral degrees of concern for, or knowledge about, the outside and Responsibility
world. Yet this is not at all to say that even in established democracies the
processes of foreign policy scrutiny work well. They do not. Formal
accountability usually amounts to a light and loose set of obligations on
the executrve, and the day-to-day influence of interest groups and the
medra works only rn a patchy, indirect and post hoc way. Actual partici-
patiOn rn ongorng foreign policy decision-making is still immensely diffi-
cult even for the informed and articulate, who continue to be in a small
minority on all but exceptional occasions. Politicians and officials do On the face of things the 'changing politics' of foreign policy involves
internalize an ideology of responsibility, even democracy - what I have a shift from the realism of the great power conflicts of the twentieth
called 'the notional constraint'- and as a result they sometimes aim off for century into the ideas of liberal interdependence which many policy-
fear of anticipated opposition or accusations of illegitimacy. Nonetheless makers came to espouse in the 1990s, after two decades of discussion
they enjoy considerable space in which to interpret the needs of thei~ in academic and business circles. This book has attempted to go beyond
people, and they rarely live up to their own self-image of responsiveness. such simplicities, not least in contesting a clear correspondence
Thrs Grarnscian picture, of elitism fleshed out by a sense of duty and between changes in thought about international relations and changes in
the need for consensus, must be qualified in two ways to fit modern con- the pattern of world politics. The association of foreign policy with real-
ditions .. First, the relationship between foreign policy-making and its ism has been challenged at a more fundamental level: not only is
domestic constituencies is unpredictable, and can erupt in ways which realism itself a broad church, but since foreign policy is an activity
drsturb both the governing elite and the pattern of international relations. rather than an outlook it may be harnessed to all kinds of political posi-
Although even the foreign policy professionals among the attentive pub- tions, from crusading parochialism to abstract cosmopolitanism, of
he usually struggle to shape or restrain policy, at times a conjuncture of which realism is merely one. This has become gradually more apparent
f?rces wrll occur whrch empowers parts of the citizenry and cuts deci- over a much longer period than the decline and fall of the Cold War.,''
SIVely across the normal pattern. This is why decision-makers tend to All the central notions of modern politics are implicated in the con-
look nervously over their shoulders, even when there seems little to be duct of foreign policy, and it is always a mistake to regard the latter as
concerned about. Secondly, historical (and geographical) contexts matter some specialized form of conduct, sealed away from the rest of public
a great deal, and it seems clear that there is now a trend towards greater life. Civil society, the state and the values which they serve are shapers
domestiC mterest m foreign policy in some states, not least because the of foreign policy and may be shaped by it in turn. In an era where every
scope of foreign policy has expanded to include much of what is famil- society is affected by globalization and democratization this is even
iar in everyday life. We thus observe a heightened activism in liberal more true. Foreign policy faces the challenge of coping with the impact
democracies, and some other states, deriving from a generally reduced of structural economic forces which if left to themselves would have an
sense that foreign policy is a reserved domain, protected from normal homogenizing effect, but which individual political communities have
pohtrcs, and with its own distinctive (a)moral ambience. Foreign policy the capacity to mediate and diversify. It must also cope with not just an
always mattered to us all. It is now increasingly seen to matter. increased public interest in external policy but also an increasingly

283
 284 Responsibility On Purpose in Foreign Policy 285

direct participation by citizens in international relations, fuelled by the They may not always be aware that this involves judgements about the
knov.:Iedge that legitimate 'domestic' concerns are to some extent purpose of foreign policy, and its role in linking a society to the wider
dependent on international and transnational contexts. This heightens world community, but it does. What is more, their actions in the foreign
the responsibilities of foreign policy-makers as weB as making more policy arena may well tum out to have significant implications for the
complex the technical, managerial tasks they face. kind of polity, even the kind of society, they are developing at home.
This chapter seeks to pull the argument of the book together by mak- War in the Balkans has helped extend European integration into
ing sense of the changing place of foreign policy in our political and the field of defence; conflicts with the United States and France
ethical life, which starts in the state but does not finish there. It does this over nuclear power had radicalizing effects on domestic politics in
by focusing on three concepts: action, choice and responsibility. Action New Zealand.
is the missing link in contemporary accounts of international relations, Foreign policy is, ultimately, purposive action with a view to pro-
which tend to focus on system-wide trends while dismissing what can moting the concerns of a single community, even if it often falls short
be done by individual units. Choice is the central issue in any consider- in so doing. The concerns will often be particular and self-regarding but
ation of decision-making, itself a concept which western social science they will also frequently relate to the wider milieux, or structures, in
brought to public life after the Second World War, as part of a new scep- which the state is located. The hopes, fears and values which lie behind
ticism over formal appearances and rhetorical claims, and a desire to such purposes will overlap with those of other political communities
probe beneath the surface. Responsibility is a crucial notion because and occasionally may even retlect a majority view. Thus analysing for-
it connects technical issues of democratic accountability to wider eign policy is an important intellectual task. It involves outlining the
concerns over the consequences of public policy, in this case for those parameters of the extent to which actions and choices are intended
outside the constituency of a particular state. (that is, done 'on purpose') and of the ways in which polities formulate
Those conducting foreign policy, as well as the rest of us, who know their underlying purposes in relation to the wider world- not just
that governments dispose of considerable assets in the protection of our how their primary concerns translate into international activity, but how
interests and/or the promotion of our values, have to consider where and far their very purposes or senses of themselves are derived from inter-
how they may act, and with what effect. They have to choose between actions with 'abroad'. It also involves continually bearing in mind the
those problems in which they might make a difference and those where issue of the proper purposes of foreign policy, where philosophers and
their involvement might prove counterproductive. And they need some public debate set the tone. Here some kind of balance has to be struck
reasonably coherent notion as to whom, in a chaotic world of compet- between communitarian concerns (which all communities generate, by
ing claims and demands, they are responsible and to what degree. Since definition) and cosmopolitan concerns (which can no longer be ignored).
the state has no choice but to work with others towards most of its ends Foreign policy has to be at the cusp of this great debate, as acknowl-
and since some of its citizens identify with other human beings outsid~ edged by theorists of international justice like John Rawls, who set
their own community, foreign policy is a perpetual process otengaging himself the task of elaborating the 'foreign policy of a liberal people'. 1
in forms of multilateralism. It is also political theory in perpetual Whatever a country's size or weaknesses, its conduct of foreign
motion, inasmuch as principles over intervention, genocide or develop- policy can 'make a difference'. 2 Both realists and liberal globalists have
ment tend to be forged through individual events in which interests and underestimated this capacity, with their respective emphases on military
values jostle confusingly for all concerned. Only the distance attained force and market integration. Decision-makers, by contrast, have few
by theory, or the historian's rear-view mirror, provide some eventual doubts. Australia's first White Paper on foreign and trade policy, for
clarity of vision. example, (despite its concern with global economic trends), stressed the
At the time, immersed in the swirling events and conflicts which 'contribution that foreign and trade policy makes to the advancement of
make up politics, leaders are faced with the need to locate the decisional Australia's core national interests: the security of the Australian nation
space on a given issue - that is, what is to be decided, and in which and the jobs and standard of living of the Australian people'. 3 And this
forum - and to insert themselves into it as much as possible whenever from one of the most progressive foreign policy elites, which since
their primary concerns (and those of their fellow citizens) are at stake. 1972 has stressed the need to abandon the old defence-based verities 4
286 Responsibility On Purpose in Foreign Policy 287

For their part, states like Germany and Italy in Europe, or Argentina and presence. This is, however, a non sequitur of a high order. States vary-
Brazil in Latin America, have been rediscovering the importance of for- in size, development, coherence and power- and many are capable of
eign policy in making it possible to realize goals through partnership as sustaining significant actions such as war-making, maintaining complex
much as competition. For those carrying public responsibility, foreign programmes of international assistance or building an alliance. Some
policy is an even more critical site of action and choice than ever before. are capable of none of these things but still manage to pursue consistent
damage-limitation strategies of various kinds. Only a very few are so
splintered or ineffectual, perhaps through external interference and/or
Action civil war, that they have no foreign policy worth the name.
What, then, does 'the state' mean in today's foreign policy context''
All states, but only certain transnational actors, have a foreign policy in The extensive debates about the nature of the state internally, in the
some form. Thus states are the main players in the realm of foreign pol- international system, historically or in particular contexts like that of
icy. What is more, since there are now nearly four times as many states the EU, have touched surprisingly rarely on issues of foreign policy7
as there were in 1945, there are proportionately more foreign ministries, One has almost to start from tirst principles. If we take it as given that
more diplomatic missions and more diplomats employed across the the territorial state 'has not succumbed to transnational or localist influ-
world 5 Nor is this the end of the story. The proliferation of multilateral ences', that it still provides an 'arena in which individuals can decide
institutions has created a huge need for the coordination of national or at least influence their collective fates', then it follows that some
positions, while the expansion of the contents of international relations collective means of relating to other such arenas will be necessary8 The
(prefigured by the UN Charter, which stressed the importance of the state furnishes a people, a society or a community, whichever term is
economic and social conditions of peace) has implicated the majority of preferred, with a means of bundling their concerns together when that
domestic ministries in the 'foreign policy process' 6 International coop- might be necessary in dealings with outsiders - at its most extreme in
eration, together with the internationalization of domestic politics, has war, but more routinely in discussions over borders, travel, trade and
placed more of a premium on foreign policy, not less. various kinds of joint enterprise, reaching up to the heights of diplo-
Quantitative changes of this magnitude can amount to qualitative macy on nuclear non-proliferation or global warming. Very often full
change, and it is understandable that some should have perceived the bundling will not be necessary, but that does not mean that the separate
dissolution of foreign policy in the outflanking of professional diplo- parts of a state, bureaucratic or regional, will be free to conduct their
mats by functional experts and bureaucratic rivals. Certainly the idea own, private foreign policies. Empirical work shows that they do often
that foreign policy-making is a discrete area with sharply distinct achieve degrees of autonomy which then pose problems for the coher-
boundaries must be abandoned. It is, rather, a broad area of interface ence of 'staatspolitik', but as a matter of principle this is regarded by
between the public policies of one state or community and the external most participants as pathological unless constitutionally authorized,
environment, which itself has many different dimensions. Regular as is the case to a limited degree with the German Lander and other
attempts will be needed to pull together the strands of these myriad sub-state units."
external relations, and the general image or 'brand' of a countty pro- The growth of the world economy, and of the private sector within it,
vides another stimulus to achieve a broad foreign policy. Distinctive has tended to obscure this fact. Even those who study 'international
historical, regional and ethical concerns push in the same direction. But political economy' or 'foreign economic policy' tend to be at ann's
it is wholly anachronistic to imagine that foreign policy is only what length from political scientists studying FPA, with the regrettable result
foreign ministries do and that the latter constitute gatekeepers between that the divide between economics and politics is preserved. But it is
a government (let alone a society) and the world. evident both that states and firrns are deeply intertwined in the mutual
One significant difficulty for the modem study of foreign policy has pursuit of prosperity and that classical problems of security or diplo-
been the apparent need to conclude from the diversification of govern- macy have always had an economic dim'ension - witness the debate
mental and societal actors involved in 'external relations' that the state over economic reparations in the 1920s, the history of CoCom during
has become atomized and no longer has a meaningful international the Cold War, or the importance of oil in naval rivalries before the First
288 Responsibility On Pwpose in Foreign Policy 289

World War. That there are problems in interrelating the economic and Europe was in part a foreign policy mechanism for dealing with
political complexities of these issues, and indeed the action/structure transnational political change. 13
dimensions, is not a reason for deprecating foreign policy. International • The taking on ofnen' obligations, or orientations, through alliances.
organizations and transnational enterprises have their own problems in treaties, even foreign friendships. Spain's agreement with the United
this same regard, but with a different balance of strengths and weak- States to provide nuclear bases in 1953 set the path for an eventual
nesses with which to confront them. accession to NATO in the post-Franco years, despite contemporary
It is not necessary, therefore, before taking a position on foreign pol- public opinion. 14 British military conversations with France from
icy, to choose between the liberal, nightwatchman version of the state 1905 on virtually tied the hands of the House of Commons over
and a realist emphasis on collective strength and identity. 10 The tirst a decision for war in August 1914. 15
requires the state to perforrn some external political functions, such as • The mediating of new values and culture from abroad. There are
ensuring stability and the honouring of agreements, but also helping to limits to what state policy can do to help or to hinder this process,
promote domestic enterprises abroad and what Rosecrance calls 'super- but the clashes in the World Trade Organization over audiovisual
vising and protecting the market'"- Conversely the second, even in a trade, and the Asian Values debate about resistance to western
neo-Hegelian form where the state might seem to embody the national human rights pressure are both examples of how states have become
will, must allow for mediation between internal and external dynamics, deeply implicated in it. Foreign policy, indeed, is in the front line of
and variation across issue-areas- which is where foreign policy comes the new cultural issues in international relations, from the G8 and
in, not as a robotic arrn of state power but as a forrnal means whereby globalization to the accounts given in Japanese schoolbooks of the
societies engage with each other, and cope with their differences. 12 war in Korea. 16
For its part, a focus on foreign policy can tell us things about the state • The weakening of state cohesion through the development of sub-
which 'inside' perspectives are likely to miss. Among the more impor- state foreign policies, or more conventionally, the ability of other
tant are: states to find interlocutors other than central government. If, for
example, outsiders prefer, and are able to talk directly to the mili-
• The creation of a military-industrial complex, whereby parts of tary, by-passing civil government, then constitutionalism is under-
society might become dependent on the armed services and the pro- mined. Conversely, if the regions develop a significant ability to
duction of weapons. This can even lead to internal repression conduct something which seems to resemble official foreign policy,
through the formation of a security state, or worse, through the then we may reasonably suspect that fault lines are opening up in the
hostile reactions of outsiders, to a garrison state. very construction of the state.
• The disproportionate hearing of the costs of the international sys-
tem, through, for instance, having a reserve currency or acting as a This last development is noteworthy because it might indeed represent
world policeman. Here the notion, implicit in liberal contract theory, a challenge to the idea of a central foreign policy. If a state, federal or
that the state, and therefore its foreign policy, exists primarily to otherwise, could prosper without central government insisting on a
serve its own citizens, gets reversed. monopoly over foreign policy, and without disintegrating, as Hobbesians
• The relieving of external pressures which threaten the state, by help- would predict, into a plurality of smaller states, then it would represent
ing to build a safer, more durable milieu, thus in its tum enabling a revolution in the theory and practice of statehood (International
new domestic developments. Relations theory has already canvassed the possibility). As it is, sub-state
• The reinforcement- or destabilizing- of a particular regime. This 'foreign policies' are not yet worthy of the name. Quebec was the excep-
might happen through direct intervention, the spread of revolution, tion which proved the rule, in that its challenge to Canadian sovereignty
or mere distraction, as when Kwarne Nkrumah was overthrown in through relations with France quickly led to a reassertion of federal
Ghana in 1966 while visiting Peking. competence. The German Lander have important powers within the
• The mediation of new political trends- or forms of polity. This is the European Communities, but no significant role in the Common Foreign
case inside the EU, and even the Commonwealth. The Concert of and Security Policy or in Germany's bilateral political relationships.
 - I ... : "

290 Responsibility On Purpose in Foreign Policy 291

The Australian states have a profile independent of the Canberra that tbis complexity will soon resolve itself into any simpler structure;
government, including oftlces overseas, but their activity is almost foreign policy is at the heart of the ways in which separate societies are
wholly limited to trade and tourism promotion, The Chinese provinces trying to reframe their identities in a testing, evolving world, but it is a
are increasingly important points of contact for foreign consulates and means·, not a solution.
business but their capacity for external affairs stops well short of anv- Transnational actors, as we saw in Chapter 8, are now major factors
thing political or controversiaL 17 The same is broadly true of the stat~s in the environments of states. Their ability to dispose of resources com-
of the American Union, despite their long heritage, The shadow of the plicates state foreign policies, and to some extent they have their own
Civil War still has its disciplining effects. international strategies which are the virtual equivalent. Nonetheless,
Foreign policy from below, therefore, is more an intermittent impulse _ they operate alongside states not in place of them. As Lord Marshall.
than a widespread reality, To the extent that it represents a genuine Chairman of British Airways, has insisted, big companies have no
desire to be free of a metropole then it reinforces the notion of foreian desire to run society or to take on any other political functions. 18 They
policy by showing how much it matters to be able to conduct separ,:;e act upon all levels of world politics, from national societies through
relations with third parties. This in turn could have a profoundly solvent governments and international organizations to the management of the
effect on a state, The United Kingdom is now at the point where resist- global economy. But their capacity to take responsibility for actions,
ance to a nuclear weapons policy associated with London might con- structures and consequences is profoundly limited. Since foreign policy
ceivably push Scotland (where British nuclear submarine bases are is about the latter, and therefore a prime site of politics, the power of
located) into full independence -although a government in Edinburgh transnational actors is of no more (or less) significance than the power
could only envisage such a momentous step under the shelter of a com- represented by ideology, class or religion in previous eras. To see the
mon European defence policy, Small units often want distinctive for- two phenomena as rivals is to make a category mistake. 19
eign policies, and can achieve them- but they are ill-advised not to find States and their foreign policies have a crucial role to play in knitting
means of systematic cooperation with like-minded neighbours or allies. together the burgeoning activities of the international system. The world
Actions in international relations still occur significantly through is politically pluralist in the sense that it consists of multiple actors
fore1gn policies, despite their highly pluralist environment The state operating in many different kinds of forum. Moreover, the system has
itself is constantly engaged in a process of internal debate, sometimes no true hegemon or commanding set of rules. Thus the means of expres-
fragmenting and coming together again through bureaucratic politics, sion of the major actors and the nature of their inter-relationships are of
sometimes deliberately using multiple entities to engage with the out- critical importance. The actual conduct of foreign policy cannot be eval-
Side world, Some pressures for devolved diplomacy exist within certain uated through scientific measurement, ]Jut actions can be analysed with
states and certainly the many international organizations in which states a view to identifying the most effective, and the most risky, patterns of
and NGOs now participate produce pressures for coordination, In devel- °
behaviour. 2 Chapters 5 and 6 argued that foreign policy necessarily
oped systems like those of the EU this may amount to foreign policy involves the pursuit of many goals simultaneously, with no simple way
from above, with a new layer of diplomatic activity superimposed on of ordering them; similarly, that there are no rules of thumb for employ-
(but not replacing) that of the nation-states, and the external relations ing the instruments of foreign policy. What is decisive is the context On
engaged in by sub-state units and transnational actors, Other intergov- the one hand the criteria have to involve certain elements from classical
ernmental organizations, like ASEAN, are following the same path realism, such as balance, flexibility, self-preservation, prudence and the
more cautiously, and yet others, like NAFTA or MERCOSUR, will have need to ensure the resources to back up aspirations. On the other hand,
at some point to decide whether they too might not develop a political they must also involve empathy and imagination, the ability to under-
capacny. stand what can be achieved through cooperation, and the capacity to
Foreign policy is thus now a far more contested and complex area, make cooperation work, bilaterally and multilaterally. This means
but it is far from disappearing. Indeed, the lack of clear paths for action understanding where possessional goals must be folded into milieu
in th~ current international system has placed a premium on organized, goals, as well as the limits of joint action, and the stripping away of
legJt1mate poltt1cal actions beyond borders, There is no need to assume illusions about who does or does not share the same values. It is at this
292 Responsibility On Purpose in Foreign Policy 293

point that advice about foreign policy action must engage with debates regaling the preferences of individual decision-makers. There are
agg many of them, and the values at st ake are. d·t·t- I · l'f
1 rcu t to srmp 1 y,
about the ethics of foreign policy. We shall come to this when dis- 100
cussing the last theme, that of responsibility. Before immersion in the involving as they do few obvious pay-offs and drffuse notwns such as
normative dimension, however, it is necessary to consider hmv foreign international stability, prestige and historical memory. On the occasiOns
policy choices tend to be made. when governments do take decisions on the basis of a conventional
rationalism, as arguably Israel did in relation to Syria and the Lebanon
~in ]982, they risk disastrous miscalculations.
I
23

Choice Since the nature and sources of preferences in foreign policy cannot
..~ be~taken as given it follows that choice is a complex matter- certainly
The making of choices is central to modern economics and to much much too complex for the old-fashioned notion of pursuing the national
political science. In the latter, the theories of rational choice and public interest. The environments in which it is conducted (including the
choice have come to dominate American scholarship and are steadily domestic) have no clear structure, and are characterized by perpetual
extending their sway elsewhere 2 ' They have not, however, made much flux, if not actual anarchy. States and the international organizations or
impact on foreign policy analysis. In part this is a matter of training and regimes they have manufactured provide some points of reference, but
basic preference; yet there are also some good reasons why the insights since the internal affairs of states are just as much part of the environ-
of these individualist approaches provide only limited insights for stu- ment as is diplomacy the world presents a cosmopolitan challenge. The
dents of foreign policy. range of differences which exists between societies and polities rules
It is not that formal methods might not in principle be useful. Game out making policy on the basis of a single, parsimonious set of criteria.
theory evidently helps us to understand patterns of conflict and cooper- Making rational choices in the area of foreign policy means in the
ation, and the strategy required in structured, limited-participant nego- tirst instance not making irrational choices, as by pursuing personal
tiations. Where voting and coalition-building is a principal activity, as obsessions or relying on stereotypes of 'people of whom we know
in the United Nations or the EU General Affairs Council, the problems nothing', to adapt Neville Chamberlain's famous words. It also means
of collective action, such as free-riding, which public choice theory having the flexibility to adjust policy within the framework created by
addresses, must be high on the research agenda. The problem lies in the the broad strategies which are indispensable if any kind of intellectual
fact that such activities are only one part of foreign policy, and a rela- order is to be maintained and progressive change achieved. Hardly any
tively small one at that. The character of a policy arena, the number of actor believes that the international system is satisfactory as it is, and so
parties, and the nature of the problems which it presents between them there is a persistent pressure towards change. This movement represents
determine the kind of social science which is most illuminating. risks as well as possibilities, as some believe that they possess the secret
If, for example, we take the problem of preference formation so of remaking the world and may take on too much in the attempt to has;
central to political science, we run straight into the question of 'whose ten events. Some will adopt the ostrich posture in a spasm of suspicious
preferences?' The work of Neustadt, Allison and others in the 1960s laid conservatism. Furthermore, this variety of attitudes is to be found in
to rest the notion that the state was generally a unitary, 'rational actor' every regional and micro context as well as the macro frame of the sys-
in international affairs. At the very least, foreign policy is subject to tem as a whole.
competition from differing parts of the national bureaucracy, so that Foreign policy decision-making thus needs to start from the assump-
even in monolithic systems like that of the Soviet Union during the tion that even more than in any other area choices are a very different
Cuban missile crisis one cannot assume that leadership will be consis- matter from outcomes. Leads and lags are exceptionally long, whether
tently exerted. Of course the bureaucratic politics model was itself in relation to nuclear missile defence or the enlargement of the
based on a form of methodological individualism which assumes that European Union. Almost every strategy needs negotiating with a wide
individuals, or even political sub-units, might follow the precepts of range of other actors, many of them bewildering and intractable in their
rational choice. 22 But subsequent work in International Relations has conduct. Even if it makes little sense not to have any planning function,
made it clear that understanding foreign policy requires far more than built in to any idea of implementation must be an acceptance that the
294 Responsibility On Pwpose in Foreign Policy 295

eventual outcomes may be unrecognizable to their initiators, or simply domestic and external environments cannot be taken always as inde-
null. Certainly they are unlikely to be 'final', for international relations pendent variables. A reasonable observer must surely agree that while
are made mainly in minds and on paper. Some institutions achieve phys~ at times foreign policy is at the mercy of various kinds of circumstances.
ical presence, but in general the outcomes of foreign policy are contin- conversely it may also be the site of significant initiatives with the
gent and perpetually contestable. Attempts to tix matters through capacity to shape aspects of both domestic and international systems.
measures such as iron curtains or forced migration just attract opposition. This dialectical relationship may be seen as structurationism applied
The issue of how to choose is closely tied to that of how much choice to foreign policy analysis: structures shape actors, and actors make
exists. The emphasis thus far on the complexity of the environment has structures. Yet such an observation should be a starting point and not an
probably given the impression that the margins of manoeuvre in foreign end itself. Empirical research is the only way to show how interaction
policy are barely perceptible. But this is by no means the whole story. takes place, and when opportunities are real or illusory. It is also the
For one thing, the lack of homogeneity and ramshackle structure of the means by which we do justice to historical periods, and analyse which
international system create air pockets in which individual players may actors make most contribution to shaping structures, as well as their
operate relatively undisturbed. One good example is small states. An own fates - the answers .are often far from obvious, as with Slovenia's
extensive literature has demonstrated that smaller states have often role in the break-up of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, just because actors and
enjoyed a surprising latitude of choice, resisting both powerful neigh- structures are tied together in endless systemic loops does not mean
bours and apparently irresistible forces 24 The continuity of Swiss that they dissolve into each other. The existence of identifiable foreign
policy in the face of the diverse challenges of war and European inte- policy-making processes tells us where attempts at choosing and self-
gration is a case in point, but North Vietnam, Cuba, Romania, Finland assertion are being made. For example, the claims for, and institutions
and Yugoslavia managed to plough their own furrows during the Cold of, an EU foreign policy also enable us to analyse the extent to which a
War, and Burma, Singapore and Taiwan provide other kinds of example collective diplomacy is genuinely emerging in parallel to that of the
today. The decision-makers in these countries have benefited from self- Member States, and to measure its degree of independent impact on the
fulfilling prophecies. Because some degree of independence has been international environment. The degree to which attempts at choice
asserted in the past, their options seem wider in the present and they are effective is beside the point, except in the special case of client
may consider themselves to have the luxury of choice. states, as with East German foreign policy during the Cold War, when
This is in part a matter of the continuum between voluntarism and rhetoric and reality diverged almost completely. 25
determinism which is an inherent part of the human experience. It is a At times states may perceive too much freedom of choice. There are
truism that even for powerful states, foreign policy lies closer to the many examples of decision-makers asserting themselves, often when
latter end of the continuum than the former. Yet this does not mean that newly entered into office, by restructuring their countries' foreign poli-
choice is so restricted as to become politically or intellectually uninter- cies26 Not all of these are successful. Either the policy turns out to have
esting. Foreign policy exists always on the cusp between choice and been the product of mere hubris or the external environment is itself
constraint. Depending on the actor, the moment and the situation, in the process of becoming less malleable through other dynamics. An
opportunities are constantly being carved out from unpromising cir- example which combines the two is Anwar Sadat's reorientation of
cumstances, producing actions which then constrain both the self and Egyptian foreign policy in 1977 so as to make peace with Israel. This
others in the future. The attainment from time to time of a decisional succeeded in its immediate goal, and indeed relations between the two
space, in which choices may be considered and made with some sense countries remain normalized, but it cost the President his own life in
of freedom, is a precondition of having a foreign policy, rather than a 1981 and Egypt has had to pay high maintenance costs ever since both
mere set of pressurized reactions to external events. Choices and con- on the domestic front and in the wider Arab world.
straints, exercised by the multiple exponents of foreign policy, are in There is, ultimately, no need to make a choice between actors and
a continuous process of making and remaking each other. To put it in structures in terms of the main sources of explanation of foreign policy,
conventional social science terms, foreign policy is not a dependent nor yet to take refuge in an undifferentiated process of structuration.
variable. That is to say, it is not always a dependent variable, just as the Robert Gilpin· has provided a notable version of the realist 'solution' to
 ~
j- ....

296 Responsibility On Purpose in Foreign Policy 297

this problem, whereby all states have to adapt to living in a hostile, any particular external action might be - will it be too costly, or
lawless world, but some have the capacity to shape the system in their draw the enmity of a powerful neighbour, or distract tfom other, less
own image, with the consequence that the weak do 'as they must'- in grandiose priorities, and so on. In that sense foreign policy choices are
Thucydides' timeless formulation. 27 More open-ended, and allowing for entangled with those of domestic society and both are sub-sets of some
the possibility of interplay between the triad of international system, notion, however ill thought-out, of a desirable world. In this, however,
decision-makers and domestic environment, is Wolfram Hanrieder's they run into the difficult obstacle of how much responsibility to take,
unjustly neglected schema. Hanrieder saw foreign policy as needing and for whom. In any country's foreign policy, the practical and the
both consensus and compatibility: consensus in the sense of support for ethical converge inexorably.
a policy in the domestic context, where it is generated, and compatibil-
ity in terms of it being a feasible move in the outside world, where it has
to be implemented. 28 If it failed on the first criterion then achievement Responsibility
on the other would be undermined, and vice versa. Ideally some sort of
equilibrium would be reached between internal and external demands, Good foreign policy analysis must find ways of doing justice, in
even if at times one might be particularly pressing and the other explanatory as well as prescriptive terrns, to this convergence. It is a
relatively insignificant Over a period of years, however, it would be persistent challenge and there is no panacea. But the notion of respon-
dangerous to conduct foreign policy as if it were primarily about either sibility does give us a useful handle on the problem. It enables us to ask
domestic politics or international affairs.29 In their different ways both who is responsible for what (and why) thus bringing together formal
Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton discovered the truth of this. considerations of accountability and statehood with the issue of the best
The two big issues in relation to choice in foreign policy are the way approach to the international milieu. Like power, responsibility is a rela-
choices get framed (decision-making) and the extent to which choice is tional concept in that it does not make sense if applied to a person or an
illusory (determinism). They are interrelated in that policy-makers actor in isolation. Foreign policy-makers have little option but to juggle
always have to estimate how much room for creativity they have, and multiple constituencies and competing criteria; they are no more able to
that will have some impact on whose views are heard or how many suspend the practical procedures within which they work than to avoid
options are considered. Conversely, gambles sometimes come off and having norrns implicit in their actions. But in this at least they are grap-
an apparently constricting situation can be loosened by particular ini- pling with real political problems, in contrast to the undifferentiated
tiatives (witness the use of the oil weapon in 1973). More commonly, pursuit of 'global responsibilities' held up as a totem by Third Way
ambitious efforts to make a mark on history are reeled in remorselessly, politicians and anti-globalization protesters alike. They have particular
not by opposition from any one adversary, but by the unbreakable force responsibilities - even if too often they do not live up to them.
of circumstance. In the event of particularly dire failure, foreign policy What does 'responsibility' mean? There are two linked parts to any
can bring down a leader or even a regime. definition. First are the formal duties which a person has to others by
Foreign policy-makers have to have some broad guidelines (which virtue of their role. For example a doctor has a responsibility to all those
they will conventionally cast in the unhelpful language of 'national patients listed on his or her list. But this is only within reasonable
interest'). On the one side will be factors arising from the very existence limits. If the doctor comes across a road accident then professional duty
of the state for which they are responsible, like self-preservation, inde- instinctively leads him or her to take charge. On the other hand, no-one
pendence, security and prosperity. On the other will be the interesting would expect doctors to accept responsibility for the health care of all
but more problematical matter of domestic values, by which is meant their friends and neighbours. The relational element here is both official
the particular set of principles which the government asserts, as well as and personal, in terms of the trust which is naturally placed in some-
those which society as a whole (or the 'nation') seems to embody. Both one who is responsible- the French word 'responsable' also means
will involve taking the foreign policy positions which seem most likely to 'digne de confiance', or worthy of trust. Either way, someone who 'has
promote the preferred way of life, at home and abroad. And these posi- a responsibility' for something knows that he or she must live up to their
tions will automatically contain judgements about how counterproductive office and take into account the needs of specified others.
298 Responsihiliry
• .....;;);
·-·--.
-.. ·."<··.··,·.··"'-····
-.
1
"_c_,,_,_,;_,,:-_, .....
-~--...-.--~-

On Purpose in Foreign Policy 299

The second aspect of responsibility is the internalized sense of duty

found in 'un responsahle'. Taking responsibility for oneself means not II then has turned into a wholly inadequate notion now. There may be no
clear advice to be given on how to reconcile these many, competing
blaming others for one's mistakes; it is often taken to be a detinition of responsibilities, but at least the extent of the challenge should be more
adulthood. The captain of a sinking ship is the last to leave - the buck apparent. States and TNAs will naturally look to their own members
stops with him. In this sense responsibility means accepting the burden ··-·first, while they will vary in their positions on any given third party
of taking decisions together with their consequences, however unjust. problem because of their diverse internal characteristics. What is more,
Conversely, behaving irresponsibly means ignoring any actual obliga- every particular focus of responsibility may be understood better by
tions one might have to others and being carefree in relation to conse- reference to three key dimensions: legitimacy, identity and ethics. To the
quences -even for oneself. 30 extent that a constituency is perceived as (i) having legitimate rights to
In the context of foreign policy the above definitions alert us to the · · ask for action on its behalf; (ii) being part, in some sense, of one's own
formal responsibilities which decision-makers take on by virtue of their group, and (iii) having a strong moral claim, it is very likely to attract
role, for their own citizens but also- depending on ideology and polit- foreign policy support. Where it is perceived as Jacking something on
ical tradition - for certain features of the international system. These one or more of these criteria, it will struggle to do so.
could be 'leadership of the free world', the relief of poverty, debts In this context legirimacy involves the two-way relationship between
incurred through war guilt or many other things. In other words the state those making foreign policy and those on whose behalf the policy is
apparatus creates clear and heavy responsibilities but they are by no being made. Although decision-makers get their basic legitimacy from
means confined within its frontiers. Furthermore, an internalized sense the constitutional position in their state or organization, the interna-
of responsibility adds further ideas about international commitments tional system will also have an important say through the need for
according to the individual and the elite within which they are located. recognition. The leaders of Taiwan, for example, while clearly legiti-
Some are all too eager to take on the weight of decision-making for a mate internally, represent problems for other governments who also
wider constituency; others will take a minimalist view. This is by no wish to deal with the People's Republic of China. 31 Accordingly their
means determined only by the geopolitical situation of the state, as a foreign policy is more restricted than it would otherwise be. Conversely,
realist might presume. It also depends on the interactions between if support is being considered for a group (such as the Kosovan
domestic and world politics. Albanians) whose right to independence or to help against oppression is
A list of the likely constituencies of responsibility perceived by dem- regarded with some ambivalence, the foreign policy being constructed
ocratic foreign policy-makers would be extensive. It would begin with may be fatally undermined. Thus both policy-makers and the objects of
the constitutional remit to serve the sovereign people and its political policy need to be seen as legitimate.
equivalent, public opinion. It would include the responsibilities felt to The most basic legitimacy problem occurs when leaders' rights to
government and to party colleagues, and would then move outside the govern are contested within their own country, although ironically they
state to the links with allies or privileged partners. The list would extend may be seen as legitimate abroad. This was the case for the Spanish
to some elements of the 'international community', as democratic Republican government in 1936, and it was soon brought down in civil
politicians usually feel some responsibility to observe international law, war, assisted by the ideological divisions which were spilling across
to participate in international organizations and to take note, at least, of every European frontier. A Jess extreme but still serious case is Northern
the erratic expressions of world opinion. More abstractly, foreign pol- Ireland, where the representatives of Sinn Fein contest the right of what
icy-makers are very likely also to have some sense of responsibility to they always refer to as 'the British (sic) government' to speak for the
their own conscience, to history (in the sense both of past generations Catholic community on the world stage. Indeed, they have managed
who have made sacrifices and grandchildren yet unborn) and even to very effectively to assert that right themselves, and to impede the
humanity as a whole, although these latter categories will vary greatly capacity of the UK to speak with one voice, which is the traditional
in their content and relative importance. presumption of national foreign policy.
It might have seemed self-evident in the past as to whom statesmen Where both internal and external legitimacy exists a government can,
were responsible- their own countrymen. But what was a simplification and indeed should, act internationally to exercise its responsibilities.
 300 Responsibility On Purpose in Foreign Policy 30 I

Where neither exists to any great degree an actor may enjoy a supert!- Direct action and transnational pressure groups have an important role
cially attractive freedom from responsibility, but will almost certainly in placing and keeping issues on the political agenda, but they are a
be marginalized in the process. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan necessary rather than a sufficient condition of democratic participation.
contemptuously dismissed outside opinion over many things, from Multinational parliaments like the NATO Assembly are at best
women's rights to the destruction of Buddhist statues. This succeeds gatherings of specialists and at worse excuses for political tourism.
only up to the point where the regime needs cooperation from others 'Cosmopolitan democracy' resembles the latest version of idealist inter-
in order to achieve its goals, or where the patience of outsiders nationalism far more than a working model of popular sovereignty
is exhausted. Then the weakness of a self-regarding foreign policy ·at the global level. However unpalatable it may be, the way the US
becomes apparent. The same is true of the present Israeli govern- Congress obstructs the UN is an example of democracy influencing
ment's determination to ignore the widespread condemnation of its events through the foreign policy process. Amnesty International's
treatment of the Palestinians. Only the United States' continued support campaign against capital punishment world-wide is not- it represents,
protects Israel from having to face some deeply difficult international rather, the vital freedom enabled by democracy to raise the level of
dilemmas. civilized discourse about politics, which is another matter. The familiar
The twin aspects of legitimacy, internal and external, connote the challenge is therefore to ensure that democracy has its voice while
structure within which foreign policy operates. In Martha Finnemore's attempting to provide leadership in an international environment in
words, 'states are embedded in an international social fabric that which there will be robust differences of view.
extends from the local to the transnational'. 32 The patterns of this fabric A balancing act of this kind is most likely to succeed where both
may resemble those of a kaleidoscope, but they are much more easily subjects and objects of foreign policy share some sense of common
identifiable than those of globalization, where neither agents nor struc- identity. Ultimately this should mean simultaneous feelings of citizen-
tures can be identified with any confidence, and where the sites of polit- ship and common humanity for all of us, world-wide, but for the pres-
ical decision are accordingly absent. The current chaos, whereby ent the ambition must be more limited. Responsibility is likely to be felt
protesters assume that the G8 rules the world, while the G8 itself has no more keenly where there is a clear sense of roots, or loyalty. Even where
other form of accountability than to respond to street protest, is partly mechanisms for foreign policy accountability are inadequate (as is
the result of the neglect of foreign policy, and its role in international mostly the case), internalized 'notional constraints' of the kind referred
organizations, by party politicians, parliaments, and intellectuals, who to in relation to public opinion (in Chapter I0) represent important
have glibly assumed that (the United States apart) not much can be done anchor points. Accepting responsibility means both acknowledging the
through foreign policy. obligation on the subject (in this case, the foreign policy decision-
Legitimacy fosters a sense of responsibility because it is a two-way maker) and the attachment to the object, which can be certain groups of
relationship. Thus if democracy, much talked about but little specified in 'foreigners', as well as domestic constituents. 35
the globalization debate, is to have an international meaning beyond the If there is no such identification, policy will be personalized and
proliferation of national democracies, it will need to be anchored to sites unreliable. Too much attachment is just as big a problem. Hitler and
of decision-making which have legitimacy, and which entail particular Mussolini both began by asserting the superiority of their own volk
responsibilities. Rosecrance has said that the rise of the virtual state and history, but ended with bitter contempt for the way their own
'portends a crisis for democratic politics ... because national govern- peoples had 'failed' them. It is also important not to take a crudely
ments have insufficient jurisdiction to deal with global problems' .33 On majoritarian view, which can lead to the suppression of minority needs,
the other hand, he also concludes that 'democracy does not exist in any thus pushing some groups in the direction of foreign help- as with the
other place [than the nation-state] -religious, corporate or cultural '.'4 Algerian or Turkish governments, which assert a particular identity for
Foreign policy certainly represents our only serious means of holding the country at the expense of internal Islamic parties, and of ethnic
to account those who negotiate in the international arena. It is at last groups such as the Berbers and the Kurds. On the other side of the coin,
attracting more sustained interest from domestic publics and is now Fidel Castro's persistent hopes for international revolution led him to
accepted as an integral part of public policy, rather than a world apart. expend scarce resources on armed forces which in !985 ranked third in
 302 Responsibility
011 Pwpose i11 Foreign Policy 303

size behind only the US and Brazil in the Americas, and on entangle- Some decision-makers have already articulated practical versions of
ments m Angola, the Congo and a number of Latin American trouble these conclusions, notably Tony Blair and Robin Cook in Britain -
spots. Allowing for the evident uncertainty about US intentions, this still not surprisingly given the access of Tony Giddens, the author of Third
meant that he neglected his responsibility for the well-being of his own . . . Way politics, to Downing Street. In doing so they have given ethics
people36
::~~~~:~=-a-·much more prominent place in the spectrum of their foreign policy
. David Campbell has argued that while 'identity is an inescapable ··· .. responsibilities 39
dimension of being' it is also 'a site in which political struggles are The content of an ethical foreign policy is a problem which goes
enacted'." He also distinguishes between 'foreign policy' (the repre- --JI~::--.:;,;,,.nn<l the ambitions of this book. It has generated an extensive and
sentatiOnal pracl!ces of a general kind which lead us to dichotomize ""'""'" political theory literature. 4° Certain contextual comments
relationships between self and 'other') and 'Foreign Policy', which is are, however, in order. Firstly, foreign policy cannot but have an ethical
the 'conventional' phenomenon associated with the state. In his view dimension, even if it is only discussed overtly at certain junctures. The
the latter is a privileged discourse which reproduces the boundaries of Thousand Year Reich was, in its grotesque way, an ethic pursued
identity already achieved by the persistent association in any society of through foreign policy. Foreign policy always has consequences for
dangers and enmity with outsiders. 38 Either way, 'foreign' policy is others, and even apparently technical agreements, such as those over
a key means of ensuring that an 'us and them' mentality, an exclusive fishing rights, make implicit judgements about the rights of one com-
rather than inclusive form of identity, is perpetuated within the sover- munity over another41 Secondly, if ethical concerns are to be acted
eign states out of which it has grown. upon in international relations there are few other sites available than
. The position of this book is significantly different. The argument here foreign policy. It is a true optimist who has faith in the self-executing
IS that the changing politics of both state and international relations properties of cosmopolitan democracy.
have drawn foreign policy-makers in many states to reconfigure their Thirdly, it is also true that by definition foreign policy cannot be
approaches, given that the sense of identity of themselves and their fel- wholly cosmopolitan in its ethic. It exists, in the first instance, as the
low citizens is no longer uncomplicatedly confined within the paradigm instrument of a very particular political process and set of concerns -
of the nation-state (if, indeed, it ever was). Accordingly it is neither pos- which is why, in the current wave of cosmopolitan enthusiasm, foreign
Sible nor desirable to define just in domestic terms the particular set of policy has otien been dismissed as inherently reactionary. Foreign pol-
concerns which lie behind every foreign policy- a given 'solution' will icy has to be about many other things than the strictly ethical. Fourthly,
almost always involve changes in other states or in the international however, these 'concerns' are precisely not synonymous with, or con-
system as a whole. Identification with outsiders, however intermittent or fined to, self-regarding interests. They will also include ideas about pre-
partial, changes the nature of the game and means that responsibilities ferred ways of living in which the nation-state in question may simply
also come to be perceived as extending outside the formal boundaries of be one part of a wider whole, as in the European Union. They will often
thestate. Yet identity certainly is a 'site for political struggles', many of include more particular goals which are still difficult to tie to clear self-
which occur precisely over the extent to which identity might be transna- interests, as with Denmark's persistent support for the anti-apartheid
tiOnal and over the role of official policy in encouraging or restricting movement in South Africa.
change (the aforementioned Australian arguments over how far the Fifthly, therefore, the old antithesis between interests and morals in
country should be seen as Asian is a prime example). It is just that these foreign policy must finally be put to rest. Every community has many
struggles do not always go the way of the exclusivists and dichotomizers. concerns which are particular and some which are general (but possibly
Indeed it is arguable that modem foreign policy is unavoidably about a more important). This is Wolfers' key distinction between possessional
society commg to terms with how to live in the world, rather than despite and milieu goals. Furthermore, the two types cannot always be sharply
It, about how an agent must be understood as embedded within its struc- distinguished, as a number of possessional goals will either be identical
tures, not separate from them. The subjects and objects of foreign policy with those of some other states, or will signiticantly overlap with them.
are far from always sharmg the same sense of identity, but to the extent What may seem a pure 'interest' can indeed shade into a general prin-
that there is an overlap, the ties of responsibility will be strengthened. ciple. Nor is this always a matter of gradually creating a bigger unit
 ,
::
.
>•>!"" '"""'':•w••c•

304 Responsibility On Pwpose in Foreign Policy 305

through integration. Often the overlapping will be with states or groups · irtually a tenn of abuse. Citizens are increasingly told by elites that
v . f. . . I ct 43 v t
beyond the partners in a regional grouping, and/or it will be partial and they must make nc\v sacnfices for the sake o 1~1tern~t10na or. ~r. 1e
Intermittent. If_ intern~tional relations imposes many cross-cutting 'ordinary' men and women do not always fall mto hne. Ambil!ons for
cleavages, foreign policy can be about the obverse: creating cross- -foreign policy often run beyond what can actually be achieved and/
binding. There will thus be a real sense of ethical responsibility towards ··or sustained in terms of domestic support as well as capabihttes
outsiders, if without clear boundaries or structure. The idea of 'good provi'de d.44 .
international citizenship', formulated by Gareth Evans when Austr;lian ( Over-extension, however, is not just a matter of what might be called
Foreign Minister, is to be welcomed as an attempt to provide guidelines . ---the Atlas complex of the powerful- the intermittent temptation to run
from the perspective, for once, of the actors who have to use them 42 crusades, to remake the world in their own image. More common is the
At the highest level of generality foreign policy can be seen as a ·desire to do something to respond to the challenges of an ever-changing
means of mediating between community and cosmopolis, each of which and all-encompassing world, out of the control of even the most
entails choices over resources, values and privileged partners. It is rarely assertive of actors. The existential reaction to global detem1inism is
used simply as a battering ram for maximizing national interests reo-ard·- wholly understandable. Foreign policy has an indispensable part to play
less of the wider impact. While hard choices have sometimes to be ~ade in helping human beings to assert some control over their own fates. As
a~d subtle strategies are invariably at work, national diplomats get we have seen, it is a key route-centre where different issues meet and
cnttcized at home precisely because they are necessarily immersed in trade-offs are made. Yet it also represents one of the few opportunities
the international environment, and have to represent its needs to a for organized communities to express their distinctive identities and
domestic audience quite as much as vice versa. They are therefore in concerns in a common context.
a double bind: of having responsibilities to a number of different The United Nations Organization is the established forum for inter-
constituencies but possibly the backing of none. This is a formidable national discussion, and much of what takes place there is foreign
ethical and practical challenge. policy. But as is well known, it also suffers from such severe lii~itations
that expectations have almost fallen below the orgamzatwn s actual
capability4 5 Foreign policy may be renamed 'global strategy', and
Hopes and Prospects ministries of foreign affairs 'departments of world politics' so as to fill
this vacuum. but it will not change the reality that no world organiza-
As the twenty-first century begins, foreign policy is in the situation of tion (let alone 'global governance') is capable of delivering in and of
having both too little and too much expected of it. Academic specialists itself serious and specific decisions on change. Tt is the actors, primarily
m InternatiOnal Relations have been so taken with rediscovering their states which do that by reaching collective agreement- sometimes m
subject as ~ fully-tledged social science, with all the epistemological inter~ational organizations, but just as often outside them. Until the
and theoretical scaffolding required, that too many have tended to see world no longer consists of self-standing, constitutionally independent
foreign policy as part of the prehistory of the subject. Tn the United communities which have a perpetual need to engage in systematic rela-
S_tates, where the focus is predictably more on agency, the majority is tions with each other. then there will always exist something with the
either preoccupied with the unique nature of the American position, or substance of foreign policy, if not its title.
works on the basis of the limiting assumptions of rational choice. To The purposes of foreign policy are articulated by elites and to some
practitioners such questions matter little, but here too there is a tendency extent are shaped by mass society. As stated, they usually seem banal.
to see foreign policy as the chasse gardee of professional diplomats, and Yet beneath the surface this is one of the most creative, demanding and
therefore increasingly cut off from the 'realities' of tinance trade and exciting of human activities, worthy of the most serious intellectual
information technology. ' attention. It is probably the principal site of political action and choice
In the world of political argument, by contrast, too much is often in international affairs. It carries the heaviest responsibilities for the
expected of foreign policy. Certainly for liberal states the default setting lives of ordinary people across the planet, in terms of their vulnerabil-
IS to take on ever more external responsibilities, and 'isolationism' is ity not just to the war and devastation of which we have seen so much
306 Responsibility On Purpose in Foreign Policy 307

in the last hundred years, but also to environmental degradation, popu- - ;in itself48 Foreign policy is emerging from the bonds of realism: a~d
lation pressure, economic dislocation and ideological conflict. These . contains within it the potential for use by many dJfferent political
problems cannot be 'solved', but they have to be managed. Agreements a roaches. It does not have to be a discourse or a practtce of feat
reached through foreign policy, which is a channel for negotiation pre- p~ antagonism.
. _an ...
Foreign policy serves our hopes, as well as our
..
cisely because it derives from the expression of diverse perceptions and understandable insecunttes.
competing interests, are the only way forward. Foreign policy and inter-
national organization (including INGOs as well as IGOs) are necessary
but not sufficient conditions of international order. They are partners,
not opposites.
The political strategies of international actors confront, mutatis
mutandis, the same great challenge as politics within a single commu-
nity, which has exercised political philosophers down the centuries: how
to reconcile 'our' legitimate needs and preoccupations, whether as indi-
viduals or sub-groups, with (i) fhe equivalent concerns of others; (ii) the
less tangible issues of collective goods and structures; (iii) obligations
to future generations (abstract), including our children and grand-
children (compelling). In its fundamentals, foreign policy is about these
first order questions, which is why theorists like Walzer and Rawls have
been drawn inexorably outwards, to reflect on the nature of 'liberal
foreign policy'.
Globalization has provoked a generalized sense of anxiety in states."'
They feel their independence and governing capacities threatened, not I '
least because the 'decline' of the state, or its transmogrification into
the 'virtual' state, is the orthodoxy of the day. Accordingly some have
borrowed the strategies of business by reinventing or 'rebranding' them-
selves. Even fhe Quai d'Orsay in France produced a new magazine
whose title may be loosely translated as 'Brand France' _47 Much of this
is ephemeral in the extreme, but when taken together wifh fhe revived
interest in 'public diplomacy' (discussed in Chapter 10) it can be seen
as part of a process of perpetual evolution. Foreign policy has to
respond to change in the world and in the demands of citizens. A recog-
nition of the importance of perceptions and the mass market is simply
the latest manifestation of fhis fact.
For some global activists and students of International Relations for-
eign policy is the enemy - the embodiment of necessarily reactionary
state policies in a world which will soon render them as redundant
as the principle of absolute monarchy. A more reasonable view is to
compare foreign policy to Michelangelo's great unfinished statue The
Prisoners', where the human forrn is visible emerging from the great
blocks of stone but remains trapped within them - truly a metaphor
 Nares and References to pp. 1-6 309

influence or manage event'> outside the slate's boundaries', see Jan !\'tanners and Richard G.

Notes and References Whitman (eds), The Foreign Policies of [Link] Member States (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2000) p. 2. . .
David Baldwin makes pertinent criticisms Qf the way in which the distmct!O~l leads both
4.
ics and politics to be undervalued at various times. See his Economrc [Link]
econOm · If d ·
(Princeton. NJ: Prince!On University Press, 198.5) p. 6'1. Th_e distinction use? en~e~
from functionalist approaches. See Stanley Hoflmann, Obstmatc or obsolete. The fate
of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe'. Daedalus, vol. XCV, no: 3. _1966,
pp. 862-915; Edward L. Morse, Foreign Policy and Inte~·dependenc: i~1 Gaull1st Franc~
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1973) pp. :l-6: and Wilham _Wallace .. ~lu
Foreign Policy Process in Britain (London: Royal lnstilllte of InternatiOnal Aflmrs.
Preface 1975) pp. ll-l5. . .
Michael Smith has argued in relation to the EU that the concept of ~ore1~~ policy does
5.
I. Joseph Frankel, The Makint.: of Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963}. not do juscice to the increased interpenetration of domestic and foretg~ allmrs. ~md that
2. Lloyd Jensen, Explaining f-Oreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, l\'J: Prentice Hall, 1982}: 'external relations' is the betLer term to use. See, for example, Bnan Hockmg and
Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: the Foreign Policy Michael Smith, Beyond Foreign Economic Policy: the United Suues, the S~ngle [Link]
Systems Approach (Aidcrshot: Edward Elgar, 1989). Further very useful surveys are to be and the Changing World Economy (London: Pinter, 1997) pp. 21-2; also M1chael Sm~th,
found in P.A. Reynolds, An /nlroduction to lnternarional Relations, 3rd edn (london: 'Docs the flag follow tmde'? ''Politicisation" and the emergence of a Em:opcan ~ore1gn
Longmans, 1994), Parts II & IV, and Margot Light, 'Foreign policy analysi~', in policy', in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds), A Common Fore1gn :ailey for
A.J.R. Groom and Margot Li"ght, Contemporary International Relations: a Guide ro Europe: Competing Visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge, 1998) PP· 77~? · .
Theory (London: Frances Pinter, 1994). An example of a good country-study is Charles W. See D.C. Watt, Persmwlities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of Brmsh fiJreJgt~
6.
Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattems and Process, Policy in the Twemieth Century (london: Longmans, 1965), and What about the People·
5th edn (London: Macmillan, 1996), while a classic of middle-range theory is Grah<Jm T. Abstraction and Reality in History and the Social Sciences: An bwugural Lecture
Allison, Esse11ce of Deci~·ion: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little. (London: LSE, 1983). .
Brown, 1971, with a 2nd edn in 1999). See Chri!>topher Hill, 'History and International RelaLions', in Steve ~nHth (ed.),
7.
3. Any such list would include (in alphabetical order): Graham Allison, David Baldwin, International Relations: British and American Perspectives (Oxford: Bas1l Blackwell,
James Barber, Michael Brecher, Walter Carlsnacs, Bernard C. Cohen, Adeed Dawisha, 1985), and 'The Study of International Relations in the United Kingd~m·, ~n
Karen Dawisha, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Lawrence Freedman, Alexander George, Fred Millennium: Journal of international Studies. vol. 16, no. 2, Summer 198~, repnnted m
Halliday, Brian Hocking, Kalevi Holsti, Ole Holsti, Irving Janis. Robert Jervis, Roy Jones, Hugh Over and Leon [Link] (eds), The Study of lntemational Relatwm: the_ Sta~e
Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, Baghat Korany, Ned Lebow, Margot Light, Ernest May. of the A~·r (London: Macmillan, 1989). Good examples of the spirit ~f co~laboratJOn m
Marcel Merle, Richard Neustadt, Pierre Renouvin, Philip Reynolds, Thomas Risse. the United States are Paul Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches Ill H1story. Theory
James Rosenau, Avi Shlaim, Michael Smith, Steve Smith, John Steinbruner, Yaacov and Policy (New York: Free Press. 1979); Ernest May and Richard Neustadt, Thinking
Vertzberger, Ole Wrever, William Wallace. in Trme: ;he Uses of History for Decision Maker~· (New York: Free Press, 1986);. and
This list reflects my own approach and is not exhaustive. It is dominated by American Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds), Bridges and Boundaries: Histonans,
names, as is FPA itself, but there are enough Europeans to show that the subject has some Political Scientists and tile Study of lntemational Relations (Cambridge, Mass: the MLT
healthy roots elsewhere. Press, 2001). hl' h
4. See in particular Arnold Wolfers' classic set of css<Jys Discord and Collaboration 8. The notable exception. of course, was Raymond Aron. See his imperial. Repu 1c: 1 e
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), and Stanley Hoffmann's more recent United States and the World (London: Weidenfeid & Nicolson, 1975). Chnstopher C?ker
collection Essays 011 Sisyphus: Essays on Europe 1964-94 (Oxford: Westview, 1995). has also wriuen tellingly from an external standpoint, in Reflectiom· on Amencan
Foreign Policy (London: Pinter, 1989). .
The relevant national works here are too many to list. On the groups. see, tor example,
Chaptel' 1 9.
Stephen Wright (ed.), African Foreign Policies (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1999) and
Christopher Hill (ed.), The Acrors in _E11rope's Foreign Policy (London: Routledge,
I. The Cold War encouraged this belief, but so, unfortunately, has its demise - witne~s
events in the Balkans, Chechnya, the Gulf, West and Central Africa and Afghanistan. 1996). . .
lO. Some of these gaps are being filled. Michael Leifer's The Foreig1~ P~hcy of Smgap~re:
2. For further discussion see Christopher Hill, 'Foreign policy', in Joel Krieger (ed.), Oxfiml
Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000) is a~ authonta~ve t_reatme~t ol .an
Companion to World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, and Revised
'exceptional state' whose external impact is disproportionate to ~ts stze.' whtle Jtm
Edition, 200 I).
Broderick, Gary Burford and Gordon Freer (eds). South Africa's Fomgn Pohcr (London:
3. Definitions of foreign policy have been offered surprisingly rarely. For a recent attempt
Pal grave, 2001) updates the story of another key state regarded as a model by many.
to wrestle with the problem, defining foreign policy as 'attempts by governments to

308
 310 Notes and R4erences to PP- 6-10 Notes and References to pp. I 0-13 311

II. For examples of recent \vork which qualify the stereotypes in this respect sec Timothy Leon Mangasarian, The Study of International Relations_: the Star~ of !heAr~ (Lond~n:
Dunne. lm•enting International Society: a Hisrory of the English School (Basingstokc: Macmillan in a:->sociation with J'I:Jil!ennium: Journal oj lntenwtwnaf Swdres. 19R)l.
Macmillan, 1998) and Michael Cox (ed.). E.H. Carr.~ a Critical Appraisal (Basingstokc: Valerie M. Hudson, with Christopher S. Yore, 'Foreign policy analysis yesterday. today
Palgravc. 2000). The relevant writings of the writers listed are: E. H. Carr, The 7il'en/Y and tomorrow', Mershon lmemarional Swdies Reril'\1' (1995) P· 39.
Years' Crisis: an/ntmductionro the Swdy of /mana tiona! Relations, first published i~l For a fair-minded hut inevitably defensive account of the work done in ~FP see Char\~s
23.
1939 but reissued with an Introduction by Michael Cox (Houndmills, Basin~stoke: F. Hermann and Gregory Peacock, 'The evolution and future of theorettcal research tn
the comparative study of foreign policy', in Charles F. Hermann, C_harles ~ • Kegley Jt.·
1
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001): Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations (Ne~· York:
Alfred P. Knopf, 1948); Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problem.\ and James N. Rosenau (eds). New Directions in tile Swdy of Forergn Policy (London.
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953); Martin Wight, Power Politics. first published George Allen & Unwin. 1987) pp. 13-32. . . , . .
in 1946 but reissued with an Introduction by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad 24. On middle-range theories see Margot Light. 'Foreign pohcy analysts . tn ~.J.R. Gtoom
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978); Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: and Margot Light (eds), Contemporary intemmional Relarion~·: a Gurde r~ ~hem_·y
Essays on Infernationai Politics, with a Foreword by Reinhold Neibuhr (Baltimore: Johns (London: Pinter, 1994) pp. 97-100. Also Ole Waever, 'Thinktn~ and rethmkmg _111
Hopkins University Press, I 962). foreign policy·, Cooperation and Conflict, XXV. 1990, p. 15~. Mtddle-rang~ theor_tes
12. A point made effectively by Brian White in his Understanding Emvpean Foreign Polin· were first discussed by Raben Merton. Sec Charles Reynolds, Theory and Etplanatwn
(London: PaJgrave, 2001) pp. 32--6. in fntenta!ional Politics (London: Martin Robertson, 1973) PP· 51-~8.
25. ·weak theory' is what the ·scandinavian school' wishes to promote, in :ont~st to 'over-
13. It is an elementary error, for example, to suppose that because realists study foreign
policy, all those who study foreign policy are realists. John Vasquez comes close to ambitious American grand theory and/or raw empiricism [and] the En~ltsh mtddle-~ang.e
this position in his The Power of Power Politics: a Critique (London: Pinter, 19!:0) theory and/or historical studies'. Tt focuses on 'a specific idea, thest.~. problematlque ·
pp. 47-79 and 205-15. See Ole Wrcver. 'Resisting the temptation of post foreign policy analysis', in _carlsnaes
14. Kenneth Waltz, TheOI)' of Imemational Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979). and Smith, European Foreix 11 Policy, [Link]., p. 25 1. Apart from W::ever hunself, he
15. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy in International Relations: names Carlsnaes, Hans Mouritzen and Kjell Goldmann as members of the school.
Neorealism to Strucmral Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Waever invented the school in his 'The language of foreign policy', Journal of Peace
16_ Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: the American and British Research, vaL 27, no. 3. 1990, p. 335. .
EJperience (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967). 26. See Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: rhe Foretgn
17. For a contrary view, see Colin Elman and Kenneth Waltz, 'Horses for courses: whv not Policy Systems Approach (Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 1989). Systet~ls theory too has be~n
a nco-realist theory of foreign policy?' Security Studies, vol. 6, no. l, Autumn 1996. unjustly neglected in recent years. For a strong recent reevaluatiOn, _see Robert_ Jerv_ts,
18_ David Lake, 'Realism', in Joel Krieger (ed.), O>.ford Companion to World Po!itir:s. System Effects: Complexity in Polirical and Social Life (Princeton: Pnnceton Umvemty
Revised Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 200 1) p. 716. Press, 1997), in particular Chapter 7, 'Acting in a system·. The _best cx~mple of systems
19. MiChael Nicholson, in Formal Theories in lmemational Relations (Cambridge: theory used for empirical work on foreign policy. and one whtch has mfluenced many
Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp. 206-15, recognizes this and makes an ingeniou::. subsequent case-studies. is Michael Brecher's The Foreign Policy System of !:~mel:
attempt to overcome the simplification by reference to satisficing, hypergames and cog- Setting, Images, Processes (London: Oxford [Link] Press, _1972_); also Mtchael
nitive maps. See also Nicholson's Rationality and the Analysi~· of International Conflict Brecher, Decisions in Israel's FOreign Policy (London: Oxford Umvcrstty Press, 1974).
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), especially pp. 53-7 and 138-41. 27. Fred Halliday, The World at 2000 (London: Palgrave, 2001) pp. 19-2_2·. ,
28. See Robin Niblett, 'France and Europe at the end of the Cold War: rcstst~ng change , and
20. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of
Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992; Revised Edition, 1998); Christopher Hill and Filippo Andreatta, 'Struggling to change: the ltal_tan. state and the
Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Ewvpe new order', both in Robin Niblett and William Wallace (eds), Rethmkmg European
(London: Routledge, I 997); Ole Waever, 'The language of foreign policy', Journal of Order: West European Responses, /989-1997 (London: Pal grave, 20~1).
Peace Research, vol. 27, no. 3, 1990, and 'Resisting the temptation of post foreign 29. The major works have been orchestrated by David Held. Sec D~~td Held. A?thony
policy analysis', in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds), European Foreign Policy: McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Permton, Globa!Transformariom: PolitiCS, EconomiCS and
the EC and Changing Foreign Policy Perspectil'es in Europe, [Link].; Roxanne Doty. Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) and David Held eta/. (~ds), The Global
Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in North-Sowh Relations Transformarions Reader {Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). In the co11_1bmed 995 pages of
{Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Roxanne Doty, 'Foreign policy as these well-indexed and valuable volumes. foreign policy gets not a stnglc refen.:nce. The
social construction: a post-positivist analysis of U.S. counter-insurgency in the same is true of Jan Art Schulte's Globalization: a Critical Introduction (Ba~m~sloke:
Philippines', lnternariona/ Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 3, 1993. Palgrave, 2000). These authors are much more cautious than the _'l~ypcrglob~ltsts abm_tt
21. For example, Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis, p. 198: 'the framework of the Jikelv impact of the changes they chart on the state and its poltttcal capactty. :ct _thetr
meaning around the political processes remains national'. main th;me is system transfonnation, with little interest in engaging with the maJOr tssuc
22. For surveys of FPA and its evolution see Christopher Hill 'The credentials of foreiun of foreign policy, or even agency. . .
policy analysis', Millennium: Journal of lntenw!ion~l Studies, Autumn 1974: JQ_ Peter Hain. The End of Foreign Policy? British Interests, Global Lrnkages and Na~wal
Steve Smith, 'Foreign policy analysis and International Relations', in Hugh Dyer and Limits (London: Fabian Society. Green Alliance and the Royal Institute of lnternattonal
 312 Notes and References to pp. 13-23 Notes and References to pp. 23-7 313

Affairs, 200 I). A close reading reveals that the question-mark in this apparently dramatic Fred Halliday, Rethinking ['''''rnational Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994)
title (from a serving UK foreign minister) is cmcial. The call is realty for an interna-
lionalist. multilateral foreign policy, based on the idea of global commons. This is in
110 the argument o f th e book is· broadly 'structurmionist'. This is explained further in
pp. 13-14.
Thus
way incompatible with the idea of a national foreign policy.
the first pages of Chapter 2.
3 I. A point made powerfully by Tony Smith in his survey of the influence of special ethnic
imerests over American foreign policy. Tony Smith, fOreign Artachmems: the Power of
Erhnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard ~,o.c·: :·Chapter 2
University Press, 2000) for example, pp. 7-8.
32. On Blair's proposal, made in his Chicago speech during 1he Kosovo war in April 1999, . . . hed throuoh Colin Hay's 'Structure and <.~gency', in David
see Christopher Hill, 'Foreign policy', in Anthony Seldon (ed.), The Blair t]fect - -------~. This dc~ate IS be~t ~ppr~aceds ' The~ry and Methods in Political Scimce (Lon_don:
(London: Little, Brown, 2001). Also Rhiannon Vickers, 'Labour's search for a third way Marsh. a~ld ~~r~;) S okeiS~-266. Alexander Wendt, Soda! Theory of lnternanonal
in foreign policy', in Richard Little and Mark Wickham Jones (eds), New Labour'. ·- -~..,..--.-.-- ~~~J_1"l'l~~n~mbridoe:~~mbridoe University Press, 1999) is a rich discussion of the prob-
1 o Jt~csthc contex; ;f lnternati'oml Rel<.~tions. See also Gil Friedman, and_ l~arvey St~r.r~
1
Foreign Policy: a New Moral Crusade? (Manchester: Manchester University Press.
2000) pp. 41-2. t _______ . em lll p r. F· Ontolo?,y to [Link] Enqun\
Agency Srructun• and lntemarional o mcs: mm . ~ PG C .~
33. Authoritative commentaries on this developmem are to be found in Nicholas J. Wheeler, , . R I d e 1997). One of the first to articulate these Jssucs was . ·. crny, 111
(London. oul c g · .. . . A , nc , and the Future of the Swte
Sm•ing Strangers: Humanitarianlllterwmion in International Society (Oxford: Oxford Tile Clwngill!{ Architecture of Polwcs: Srruume, ge )
University Press, 2000), and Chris Brown, So1•ereignty, Rights and Justice: International
Political Theory Today (Polity, 2002). ~Lond~on~t~~:·.. l~:coLse the debate largely focused on philosophi~al issues such~ _'he
34. See Steve Smith and Michael Clarke (eds), fOreign Policy Implementation (London: 2. Meta
. eo)
f ·free' .
agency without con [Link] f mg 'tl1e first-order·
· quest 1ons
. of what
. entitles,.F
nature o . d ., f . world politics. Alexander Wendt, both m Socwl Theory OJ
George Allen & Unwin, 1985). The groundwork had been laid in Graham T. Allison. actors umrs to a m1 o m • (R · , r·
Essence of Decision: Elplaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Lillie, Brown, I 97 J) Imem~tional Politics and in his earlier 'Bridging the theory/mct~-theor~ ~~pget ~:~~ ~o
which is, in essence, a study of implementation problems. See also the second, revised lntemational Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, October 1991), stresses tle nee
edition, with Philip Zelikow (New York: Longman, 1999) which relates the original
substantive or first-order argument. . · structures and struc-
For Giddens' notion of structuration, whereby ag;~,e~ ~el;~ t~ 'f~:,:a/ Them)'" Action,
rational actor model to subsequent rational choice work, as well as using the vast amount
3.
of new historical material which has emerged since 1971.
lUres agencies, sec Anthony Giddens, Cen~ra ro J ~~~,. ': . • : 69-73.

Structure and Comrad~(~tion in So~·ia_l A~wlrs~~ ~~~ ~ : ;~~~~c:~~=;~sl ~ ~~:~urational

1
35. The concept of legal personality entails recognition on the part of states and international 1 0 7

organizations of the right to participate in negotiations, to be an 'interlocuteur valable'. 4. Philip G. Cerny, 'Political agency Ill a go a . . 4 D mber 2000
Some entitles, like the European Union (cf. the European Communities), still lack this approach'' European Journal of International Relatwns, vol. 6. no. ' cce '
legal capacity but evidently enjoy political personality in the sense that they are gener-
ally acknowledged to have the capacity to make decisions and to impact on others. See ~s4~~rtin Hollis and Steve Smith showed in the~r
'Roles and reasons in foreign policy
Nanette A.E.M. Neuwahl. 'A partner with a troubled personality: EU tre1.1ty-making in 5. decision-making', British Joumal of Political Sue nee, ( 1~86),
vol. 1_6, no. 3. "d . d'
matters of CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam', European Foreign Affairs Rel'iew, vol. 3. B B . 'The levels of analysis problem in lntematJOnal Relations reconst ete :
no. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 177-95. 6. . any uzan, d S Smith (cds) lntemational Relations TheOJ)' Today (Oxford.
m Ken Booth an teve ' · f · l"cy
36. Stanley Hoffmann, Dillies beyond Borders: qn
the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical Polity Press, 1995); Waiter Carlsnaes, 'The agency-structure probl~n~~lt:;~~~~~:a~s,
International Politics (Symcuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981). analysis', International Studies Qum·terly (1992) vol. 36, no .. ~.' . f . policy
37. By 'direct engagement' is meant either attempting to influence a foreign govemmem 'In lieu of a conclusion: compatJ"hTt I I y amI the aocncy
e - structure tssue
. . Ill p oretgn
!' . h EC
directly, without going through one's own government, or forming a transnational social . . 1 · ' ·11 Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds), European Fore1gn ° Icy. t e h
dna )'SIS , L • d .S 1994) pp 274-87. See also t e
movement. For an early survey of such activities, see Peter Wiltetts (ed.), Pressure· and Changing Perspectil•es m Europe ~Lon on. d"age,_ AI Wendt 'Bridging the
groups in the Global System: the Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non- exchanges in lhe Review of lnternatwnal ~tu ,'es, I.e. ex 4 3s3-92· Martin
Governmental Organizations (Oxford: Pinter, 1982); see also Peter Willetts (ed.), The h in international relauons , vol. 17 • no. • PP· '
Conscience of the World: the Influence of Non-Governme11tal Organizations in the UN ~e~?'~~~~~~~,:oi'm~~p 'Beware of gurus: structure and aclion in intemational relations':
System (London: Hurst, 1995); Katsuya Kodama and Unto Yes (eds). Towards a o LS a 4 393~10· Alex Wendt, 'Levels of analysis vs. agents and structu~es.
Comparative Analysis of Peace MoPements (Alders hot: Dartmouth, 1990); and Jan Aart Part ill', voL , no. 2, PP· isl-5·' Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Slructure and actJOn:
vol. 17' no. •18pp.
Scholte, International Relations of Social Change (Buckingham: Open University
Press, 1993). funher [Link]',lv~l.
18, ~~- ~~~pb~.,:~i-!;1
Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State and W(lr
7 The levels o ana VSIS mcx · J 0 ·d s ·n er 'The
38. Valerie M. Hudson, with Christopher S. Yore, 'Foreign policy analysis yesterday, today . C I ·b. U ·versity Press 1959) and explicated ill . avt I g '
(New York: o urn Ia Ill ' . , . Kl . K . and Sidney Verba
and tomorrow', Mershon International Studies Re1•iew (1995), voL 39, p. 210.
level of analysis problem in International ~elatmns • ~~~rin:~:on~;~~nceton University
39. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of lntemational Relations (London: (eds), Tile /ntemarional System: Theoretu;a/ Essays ( .
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966) p. 17.
Press, 1961 ).
 314 Notes and References to pp. 28-31 Notes and References to pp. 31-7 315

S. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Etplaining and Under.s!anding Intemationa! Relation\ One of the most sophisticated treatments is still Kenneth Dyson's The Swte Tradition in
17.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). As Walter Carlsnaes put:. it, -if 'we define the H:t-srem Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980).
agency-structure issue as a question not of combining two accounts but rather of the 18. This is also the [Link] of Georg Sprensen 's insightful Clwnges in Starehood: the
~eed fo~ a single int~gralil'e conceptual framework in terms of which the empirical Tramformation of lmemational Relation~· (Houndmills: Pal grave. 200 I).
mreracuon of agential and structural factors in social behaviour c<m be properly 19. See John A. Hall. Powers and Liberties: the Causes and Consequences of the Rise o{rhc
analysed, then we can escape the implications of this harsh logic'. Carlsnaes. 'In lieu of West (London: Penguin, 1992) pp. 133-41.
a conclusion', in Carisnaes and Smith, 1994, p. 280.
20. The importance of military power in the evolution of the modem state is ~liscussed in
9. This is obviously close to the position of Karl Popper, who argued that theories should detail in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National State.~ in Europe (Pnnceton. NJ:
~falsified empirically, yet without denying the sociological factors which mean thm the Princeton University Press, 1975), and Michael Mann, The Source.~ of Social Po\\"er, two
mtcllectual market' is coloured by its time- a view arising from the work of Thomas volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986 and 1993), especially vol. II.
Ku~~·. For the debate between the two see Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (cds). 21. See, for example, Vendulka Kub<ilkov:i and Albert Cruickshank, Marxism al!d !mer-
Cruu:tsm and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridoe University Press national Relatiom, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1985).
1970). e ·· ·
22. For analysis of the genesis of nationalism in the context of international relations, sec
10. T~e e~r.ly_ works of foreign policy decision-making theory are panicularly open to Anthonv D. Smith. Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge. 1998), pp. 70-96.
th1s _c~ltlCism. _See Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policr and J<J~cs Mayall, Nationalism and lmernarional Society (Cambridge: Cambridge
Dec/S/Of!-Makmg (New York: Free Press, 1962), <md Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision: University Press, 1990).
June 24-301950 (New York: Free Press, 1968). 23. The ·prebendal state' is a notion coined by Richmd Joseph, adapting the ideas of Max
11. A point made by Charles Reynolds, Theory and Elplanation in lTJtemational Politics Weber. Sec James Mayall, 'The variety of states', in Cornelia Navari (ed.), The
(London: Martin Robertson, 1973) pp. 339-54. See also the revised edition, The World Condition of States: a Study in lntemational Po/itical17teory (Milton Keynes: Open
of States: an Introduction to [Link] and Theo!}' (Aldcrshor: Edward Elgar, 1992) University Press, 1991) pp. 53-6 and 60. See also James Mayall, Nationalism and
pp. 41-.5. Jntemational Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 35-49, and
12. For 'weak theory' see note 25 in Chapter I .
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignry, lmemational Relations and the Third
13. But see Roy E. Jones, The Principles of Foreign Policy: the Civil State in its World
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Chapter I.
Selling (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979) for example, pp. 84-5, where the difference 24. The bluntest form of this view is that held by anarchists, but Marxists, realists and
that can be made by a 'constitmional state' is explored. elitists have all held it in varying forms, often in reaction to the perceived dangers
14. To a Jesse~ exten~ this has also involved the constructivist-positivist debate. See Cynthia from the external environment. See Dyson, Tl1e State Tradition in Western Europe,
Weber,. Swmlatmg. Sovereignty: lfllerveJUion, the Stale and Symbolic Exchange pp. 101-7.
(C~b~dge: Cam_bndge University Press, 1995) Richard Ashley, 'The poverty of neo- 25. Max Weber is the founder of this modernist conception of the state. See, for example,
real•sm, lnternatwnal Organization, vol. 38, no. 2, Spring 1984; Richard Ashley and his 'Politics as a Vocation', in trans., intra. and cds H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills.
R.B.J .. Walk:r, _'Reading dissidence/writing the discipline: crisis and the questiOn of From Max Weber: Essays in SociolOJ?Y (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948)
sovereignty m mtemational studies', International Studie~· Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 80-2 and p. 95.
September 1990. For the classical approach see Alan James, Sm·ereign Statehood: the 26. Alan James, Sovereign Statehood, pp. 147-8 and p. 271 (for recognition as a political
~asis of_lmernational Society (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1986). Unfortunately act); also Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), United Nations, Divided World:
. debate' IS not a correct description. The two schools of thought carefully avoid ever ha;- the UN's Roles in /ntematimwl Relations, 2nd cdn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993),
m~ to talk to each other, a fact illustmted by Walker's bizarre claim that writers like F.H. pp. 56-7; Ian Brownlie, Principles of International Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon
~Insley existed 'somewhere in the more obscure margins of the literature'. R.B.J. Walker, Press, 1966) pp. 80-7; and M.N. Shaw. International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
The concept of the political', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), llllemati"onal Relations University Press, 1991), pp. 138-42 and 242-75.
Theory Today (Oxford: Polity Press, 199.5) p. 318.
27. Articles 4 and 18 of the UN Charter provide for admission of a state by a two-thirds vote
15. ":'[Link] theoretically absolute, in practice there are various examples of states coping with
in the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council (where the
diVIded or po~led sovereignties. The EU Members are cases in point, while West veto would apply). Recognition of a new regime in any given state is a more piecemeal
Germany provtdes a prominent example before 1989 and even, arguably, afterwards. See matter, and depends on bilateral relations as well as the UN. On recognition in this sense
Peter [Link].' Policy and Politics in West Germany: the Growth of a Semi-Sol'erei~n see Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton
State (Phtladelphi~: Temple, 1987), and William E. Paterson, 'Beyond semi-sovereignty: University Press, 1999) pp. 14-20.
the ne~ ?ermany m the new Europe', German Politics, val. 5, no. 2, August 1996. 28. See, for example, David CampOCII, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy
16. ~e ongms of the modem doctrine of sovereignty are well traced in Alexander Passerin an(/ the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) p. 56: 'Both
D Entreves, The Notion of the State: an Introduction to Political Theory (Oxford: the state and the church require considerable effort to maintain order within and around
Clarendon Press: 1967), but for the international meaning see F.H. Hinsley, So~>ereignrv themselves, and thereby engage in an evangel ism of fear to ward off internal and external
2nd edn (Cambndge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) pp. 158-235. · threats. succumbing in the process to the temptation to treat difference as otherness·.
 316 Notes and References 10 pp. 37-9 Notes and Re(erences to pp. 39-46 317

29. On liberal realism, sec Chris10pher Hill, '1939: the origins of liberal realism', Re1·iew of study of German naval policy before the First World War: Scl!lachtflotlenbau und
lmemational Swdies, vol. 15, no. 4, October 1989. Also, John H. Herz, 'Political real- Parteipolitik 1894-1902 (Berlin, 1930). Gordon Craig brought thi::. back inlu promi-
ism revisited', and commems by lnis Claude and }lerz, ag<Jin, lnremational Studies nence more than forty years later. See his edition of Eckart Kehr, Economic lntcresr.
Quarterly, val. 25, no. 2, June 1981, pp. 182-203. Militarism and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History (Berkeley: University or
30. This seClion draw::. in part on the amhor's 'What is left of the domestic? A reverse angle California Press, 1977). Peter Gourevitch initiated the study of the international source.~
vic'W of foreign policy·, in Michi Ebata and Beverly Neufeld (eds), Confronting rlu: of domestic politics. See his 'The second image reversed: the international sources or
Political in Imernational Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). domestic politics'.lmemational Orum1i=ation, vol. 32, no. 4, 1978, pp. 881~912.
31. Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games·. in 40. In November 1996. Malia and Cyprus had bolh been alTered, at lhe Madrid European
lllfemationa/ Organization, 42 (Summer 1988) pp. 427--60, reprinted in Peter B. Evans, Council of December 1995, a start to negotiations on entry six months after the end of
Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds). Douhle-Edged Diplomacy: the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference. The position was reversed in Scp1ember
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California 1998 once the Nationalist Party returned to power in Malta. See Ulrich Sedelmeier and
Press, 1993)'. Helen Wallace, ·Eastern enlargement: strategy or second thoughts?', in Helen Wallace
32. R.B.J. Walker, hB·ide/Owside: lnremational Rdatiom as Political Theory (Cambridge: and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union 4th edn, (Oxford:
Cambridge University Press, 1993) p. 25: Cynthia Weber. Simulating Sol'ereigmy) Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 445 and 459.
pp. 10 and 6. 41. See John Stopford and Susan Stnmge. with John Henley, Rival State, Ril•al Firms:
33. I have developed this point in '"Where are we going?" International Relations and the Competition for WOrld Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge Universily Press, 1991)
voice from below', Review oflmemational Studies. vol. 24, no. I, January 1999. pp. 211-27.
34. See James N. Rosenau, Along the Domesth·~Foreign Frollfier: £rploring Gm•emance in 42. Ibid., p. 224.
a Turbulellf World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997). This forms a conti- 43. Adeed Dawisha (ed.), Islam in Foreiun Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
nuity with Rosenau's other works in the I 990s focusing on the difficulty of separating 1985).
micro and macro levels of international political causation. See his Turbulence in World 44. See Edward Luttwak, 'The missing dimension' and Barry Rubin, 'Religion and interna-
Polilics: a Theory of Change and Cominuity (Heme! Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, tional affairs', in Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds), Religion, the Missing
1990) pp. 141~77. Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 8~19 and 20~34
35. Susan Strange, Srates and Markets: an lmmduction to International Political Economv respectively. ,
(London: Pinter, 1988). . 45. On regions, see Brian Hocking (ed.), Mmwuinu Foreiun Relations in Federal States
36. Murdoch has been so keen to adapt and to do business with China that he removed the (London: Leicester University Press, 1993), and on international pressure groups note 37
BBC World TV station from his Astra satelli!C, and his papers are generally judged to in Chapter I above.
have toned down criticisms of the Beijing regime. 46. For a useful treatment, which does not, however, focus much on agency, see Thomas
37. Cf. David Held, Democracy and 1he Global Order: from the Modern State ro Risse-Kappen (ed.), Brin{iing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-Stare Actors,
Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), who sees globalization as Dome.1·tic Strucwres and llllemationallnstitution1· (Cambridge: Cambridge University
challenging the state so firmly that only <1 new 'cosmopolitan democmcy' can preserve Press, 1995).
liberty, through embedding common principles in the multiple system of authority which 47. On the Union of Democratic Control see Sally Harris, Out of Comrol: British Foreign
characterizes international relations. Policy and the Union of Democratic Control 1914~18 (Hull: University of Hull Press,
38. The last two decades have seen the welcome development of an extensive literature on 1996). On the different views taken about what and for whom foreign policy is for, see
ethics in international relations. Not all of it is targeted on the morality of state foreign Martin Ceadel, Thinking abom Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
policy, and indeed the location of responsibility- individual, government, region, UN- 48. R.J. Vincent, Human Rip,Jus and International Relations, and the same author's edited
is often ducked. Still, a great deal of it does in fact deal wilh the problem of ethics in volume Foreixn Policy and Human Rights (both Cambridge: Cambridge University
foreign policy. For the first influential works see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars Press, 1986).
(New York: Basic Books, 1977), Stanley Hoffmann, Dmies beyond Borders: On the 49. Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: a Crilique of the Realist Theory
Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse of International Relations (London: Verso, 1994), and Stefano Guzzini, Realism in
University Press, 1981), and Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New !11temational Relarions and lmemational Polirical Economy: rhe Continuing Story of
Normative Approaches (Heme! Hempstead: Harvester, 1992). There is a usefully clear a Death Foretold (London: Routledge, 1994).
statement in Christopher Brewin, 'Libera[ states and international obligations', in 50. The concept is that of Arnold Wolfers, who contrasted goals which aimed at
Cornelia Navari (ed.), The Condition of States: a Study in lllfernational Political TheOI)' changing the external environment (the milieu) with those which were 'possessional '.
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991). or deriving from the actor's particular needs. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and
39. James Rosenau was the first to concepwalize the 'domestic sources of foreign policy'. Collaboration: Essays onlmemational Polilics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962)
See his book of the same name published in New York by the Free Press in 1967. pp. 73-7.
Historians such as Fritz Fischer and Pierre Renouvin, however, were emphasizing the 51. For this concept see Christopher Hill, 'The capability-expectations gap, or conceptua-
domestic factor from the 1950s, following in the footsteps of Eckart Kehr's pioneering. lising Europe·s international role', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 3.
318 Notes and References to pp. 47-55 Notes and References to pp. 55-9 319

September 1993, rcprinled in Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scotl {eds), Economic and (London: Croom Helm. 1982) pp. 14-32; and Jan M. Clarke. The Spatial Organimtion
Political Imegration in Europe: lntemal Dynamics and Global Comext (Oxlord: of Multinational Corporations (London: Croom Helm, 1985) pp. 40--60. John Stopford
Blackwell, 1994 ). stresses that transnational corporations need to be 'diplomats' in protecting their global
52. For representative examples see Sheila Harden, Small Is Dangerous: Micro-States in interests in the political realm, not least in relations with governments. See his
a Macro lVorld (London: David Davies Institute, 1985): Christopher Clapham (cd.), 'Interdependence between TNCs and governments", in Companies without Borders:
Foreign Policy Making in Developing Srates {Hun borough: Saxon House, 1977); Carsten Transnational Corporations in the 1990s (London: lnternati6nul Thomson Business
Holhraad, Middle Powers in International Polirics (London: Macmillan, 1984). Press on behalf of UNCTAD, 1996) pp. 255-79.
53. On the democratic peace debate sec Chapter 9 below, pp. 11-13. The discussion of _ _ _ _ _ -'-· Jeremv Howells and Michelle Wood, The Globalisation of Pmdwtion and Tec/uwlogv,
state-society relations derives from the study of intcmational-political economy. See a Re;ort Prepared for the Commission of tiH' European Communities (London:
Peter Katzenstein, 'Intemational Relations and domestic structures: foreign economic Belhaven, 1993) p. 153. For example Japanese companies tend to follow a pyramidal
policies oLadvanced industrial states'. International Organization. vol. 30, no. 1. structure, and European/American companies a flatter and broader one.
Winter 1976; Stephen Krasner. Defending the National /merest: Raw Materials, 6. Jonathan Power, Like Water on Stone: the StoJ)' ofAmnesty International {London: Al!en
Jm·estmenrs and U.S. Foreif.:n Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) Lane, The Penguin Press, 200 I).
focused explicitly on the concept of weak and strong states. Dyson. The Stare Tradilion 7. See Nelson Mandcla, Long U-'alk 10 Freedom (London: Abacus, 1995) pp. 347 und 731.
in Western Europe ( 1980) also discusses the problem, although not in the context of Mandela himself refers to Tambo as "the best possible ambassador' for the AN C.
foreign policy. Thomas Rissc-Kappen refines the categories in his "Public opinion. 8. The concept of the 'foreign policy executive' derives from Christopher Hill. Cabinet
domestic structure and foreign policy in liberal democracies', World Politics, vol. 43, no. Decisions in Foreign Policy: rite British EJ:perience, September 1938-Jifne 1941
I, October 1990. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. xviii and 224-47.
54. See Georg S0rensen, Changes in Statehood: the Transformation of lmemational 9. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgcny Primakov has known Saddam Hussein
Relations, pp. 87-91, and Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order of Iraq for more than thirty years as the result of his various posts, and can thus always
(London: Demos, 1996). John Ruggie, however, was one of the first to write in this vein, pur himself forward as an intcnncdiary in crises. See, 'Fingerprints on Iraqi accord
using the concept of 'unbundled territoriality'. Sec his 'Territoriality and beyond: belong to Albright', New York Times, 25 February 1998. Jimmy Carter and Henry
problematizing modernity in International Relations'. lntemational Organization. Kissinger have been even more prominent examples.
vol. 47, no. I, 1993. 10. A crisis (in any walk of life) may be defined as deriving from: a threat to basic values,
a finite time for response, and a sense of compelled choice - the status quo is not an
option. This definition builds on, but significantly amends (in that it omits the criterion
Chapter 3 of the likelihood of war), that amhoritatively provided by Michael Brecher. See his
Decisions in Crisis: israel, 1967 and 1973, with Benjamin Geist (Berkeley, California:
L This term was first coined by Lincoln Bloomfield in his The Foreign Policy PmceH: University of California Press, 1980). Chapter I.
a Modern Primer (New York: Prentice Hall, 1982). II. Sec Graham Allison and Philip Zclikow, Esence of Decision: Etplaining the Cuhan
2. For example, General Geisel, head of state and government in Brazil between 1974-9 Missile Crisis, 2nd edn (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999) pp. 113-14; Adam Roberts
led the whole foreign policy process, even if ltamatary, the Foreign Ministry, usually ini- <1nd Philip Windsor, C:edwslovakia /968: Reform, Repression and Resistance (London:
tiated the process. See Leticia Pinheiro, Foreif.:n Policy-making under the Geisel Gor- Chalto and Windus for HSS, 1969) pp. 62-78; also Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the
emmelll: the President, the Military and the Foreign Ministry, unpublished PhD thesis. Praf.:ue Spring (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
London School of Economics and Political Sci-ence, 1995. 12. Hill, Cabinet Decisions in Foreign Policy, [Link]., pp. 48-84.
3. Although Meny and Knapp point out that von Weizsiicker took 'a back seat ... in the rush 13. William Wallace, Opening the Door: tile Enlargemelll of NATO and 1he European Union
to unification'. Yves MCny with Andrew Knapp, Governments and Politics in Western (London: Centre for European Refonn, 1996) pp. 1-29.
Europe: Britain, France, Italy, Germany, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 14. Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and
1993) pp. 240-1. Von Weizsiicker could not help but be involved in some of the delicate Conceptualization, 3rd edn (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987)
diplomacy of that period, however. See Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany pp. 40-62; bm also Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidelllial Difference: Leadership Style
Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard finm FDR to Clinton (New York: Martin Lessler Books, 2000) p. 193, where Greenstein
University Press, 1997), pp. 32-4. Alsop. 153 on the President's attempts to calm fears argues (re the Middle East) that 'Carter provides a reminder that presidents need not sim-
over the Polish frontier. ply respond to circumstances. They can make opportunity their servant, engaging in acts
4. For multinational corporations' decision-making structures see J.M.·Stopford and of political creativity.'
LT. Wells, Managing the Multinmiona/ Enterpri~·e: Organisation of the Firm and 15. Ellen Reid Gold, 'Polilics by word power: Ronald Reagan and the art of rhetoric', Times
Ownership of the Subsidiaries (London: Longman, 1972); M.J. Taylor and N.I. Thrift. Higher Edrtcation Supplement. 28 October 1988.
'Models of corporate development and the multinational corporation', in Michael 16. The infrequency of summits has led to what is called "funeral diplomacy', or the
Taylor and Nigel Thrift (cds), The Geography of Multinationals: Studies in the conducting of business while attending the funerals of major world figures, such as
Spatial Development and Economic Consequences of Mulrinmional Corporations Brczhnev or Indira Gandhi. See Geoffrey Berridge, 'Diplomacy after death: the rise of the
320 Notes and References to pp. 60-2 Notes and References to pp. 63-6 321

working funeral'. Diplomacy and Starecraft, val. 4, no. 2. July 1993. pp. 217-34. and count ... when we meet we feel like friends first and politicians second'. Intervie11
'Funeral summits', in David H. Dunn (ed), D1jJ/omacy at the Highest Lel'el (London: between Shevardnadze and Eugenio Scalfari of La Repuhhlica. translated in Th<.'
Macmilhm, 1996) pp. 106--17. Also Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Independent, 20 March ·1991.
Divided: a Memoir by the Archirect of Germany·~- Reunification (New York: Broadway. 27. Paul Schou Stevens, 'The National Security Council: past and prologue', Stmrcgi1
1998) pp. 174-5.206. Reriew, Winter 1989. pp. 55--62.
17. This figure comprises two years of Lenin after his strokes. seven years for Stalin after his 28. Saddam Hussein kept his colleagues in order through physical fear- he is supposed to
first stroke, seven for Brezhnev after his stroke in 1975. and the two years of Andropov have shot one minister personally outside the meeting room after a disagreement.
and Chernenko. both seriously ilL All of these figures died in office. the product, as in Fortunately this is not the rule in cabinet government.
modem China, of an ossifying gerontocracy. See Hugh L'Etang, Ailing Lmdr>rs in Poll'cr. 29. R.A.W. Rhodes, 'From prime ministerial power to core executive', in R.A.W. Rhode~
1914-1994 (London: Royal Society of Medicine, 1995). and Patrick Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executiw (New York:
18. Lionel Barber, 'All the world has been his stage', Financial Times. 27 December 1991. StMartin's Press. 1995) pp. 11-37.
On the Attlee Report of 1957. sec file PREM 11/2351 in the Public Record OJlice, Kew. 30. Peter Hennessy, Cabinet (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) stresses the overload problem:
UK. Jt was brought to public attention by Peter Hennessy in 'The Whitehall man's Thomas T. Mackie and Brian W. Hagwood. 'Decision-making in cabinet government"
burden', The Independent, 25 July 1989. On how one foreign minister dealt with over- and 'Cabinet committees in context', in Thomas T. Mackie and Brian W. Hagwood (eds).
work by discreetly arranging regular, group meetings with his French, American and Unlocking the Cahinet: Cabiner Struct11res in Comparath•e Perspectil•e (London: Sage.
British colleagues, see Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rehrtilding a House Dil•ir1ed, [Link]. 19!15) pp. 1-15 and 31-5: also Jean Blonde] and Ferdinand Miiller-Rommel, Cabinets in
p. 116. For an extract from Robin Cook's crowded diary, see Kevin Theakston, 'The ' Western Europe, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1997) p. 275.
changing role of the British Foreign Secretary', in Kevin Theakston (ed.), British Foreign 31. These were only the most prominent examples. Amintore Fanfani, Giuseppe Saragat,
Secretaries since 1974 (London: Frank Cass, forthcoming). Emilio Colombo and others fit the same pattern. Data computed from Appendix JI of
19. This has nor been uncommon, especially in developing countries. In 1965, 22 of the Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (cd.), Mamra!e della po!itica estera italiana 1947-1993 (Rome-
world's 123 heads of government also held the position of foreign minister. Dma from Sari: Laterza, 1996) pp. 517-21.
George Modelski, cited in P.J. Boyce, Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Question~· of 32. The Privy Council itself is a formalistic body. On 4 August 1914 it met to declare
Credentials (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977) p. 60. Silvio Berlusconi did war on Germany in the presence of the King, one minister and two court officials.
the same in 2002 after the resignation of his respected foreign minister Renata Ruggiero. A.J.P. Taylor, English Histm)' 1914-1945 (Oxford: Oxford Universiry Press, 1965) p. 2.
20. Peter Riddell, 'Blair as Prime Minister', in Anthony Seldon (ed.), Tire Blair Effect: the 33. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Pan, 1983)
Blair Gol•emment/997-2001 (London: Little. Brown, 2001) p. 37. Also Peter Hennessy. pp. 378-9.
The Prime Minister: the Office and its Holders since 1945 (Hannondswonh: Allen Lane. 34. Douglas Porch. The Fretlch Secret Services: from the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War
The Penguin Press, 2000) pp. 476-523. (London: Macmillan, 1996) pp. 465-7, and 494-5.
21. Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Salisbury, British Foreif{n Secretaries since 1945 35. On 1939, see Hill, Cabinet Decisions, [Link]., pp. 85-99. On Suez. opinions still differ
(Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1977) pp. 20-2; also Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to as to whether Eden's ill-heallh was the occasion or the cause of his going. See Keith
Suez: Diaries 1951-56 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), for example. pp. 28, 41. Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992) pp. 532-3; Anthony Gorst and
and 74-8. Lewis Johnman. The Suez Crisis (London: Routledge, 1997) pp. 147-9; Evelyn
22. Paul Preston and Denis Smyth, Spain. the EEC and NATO, Chatham House Papers 22 Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, [Link]., pp. 365-6.
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 36. The text of the President's resignation address to the nation is to be found in: 'I am being
pp. 76-8. ignored by ministers serving in my cabinet', Financial Times, 15 August 1989.
23. The Independent, 24 September 200\. 37. Keith Wilson, 'Grey', in Keith M. Wilson (ed.), British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign·
24. Samaras was sacked on 13 April 1992 and created his new party ('Political Spring') on Policy: from Crimean War w First World War (London: Croom Helm, 1987) pp. 172-97.
30 June. See Aristotle Tziampiris, Greek Foreign Policy: EPC and the Macedonian 38. Geoffrey Hosking. A Histo1y of the Sm·iet Union, 1917-/991 (London: Fontana, 1992)
Question (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) pp. 109-35. pp. 270-3.
25. On these three resignations, see Keith Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion: the British 39. Gradually, the principle of Politburo collective responsibility was re-established,
Government and Germany, 1937-39 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972) pp. 151-4; becoming a powerful norm even in the late Brezhnev years.
Barry Rubin, Secrets of State: the State Department and the Struggle over US Foreign 40. See Bert EdstrOm, Japan's Evolring Foreign Policy Doctrine: from Yoshida to Miyazawa
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) pp. 194--<5; Peter Calvert, The Foreign (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 119-30; also Mitsumi Hirano, The Implications of
Policy of New States (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986) p. 96. Hi~·tory Education for Extemal Relations: A Case Study of the Japanese History
26. See Howe's memoirs, Conjlict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994), especially Textbook Disputes in the 1980s (London School of Economics and Political Science
pp. 581-676 and Thatcher's The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993). PhD thesis. 2001) p. 138.
Howe regarded Eduard Shevardnadze as a hero for his courage and impact on events. See 41. It has grown in importance since 1940. See Reginald Hibbert, 'Intelligence and policy',
'Heroes and villains: Eduard Shevardnadze' by Sir Geoffrey Howe, The lndependenr Intelligence and National Sewrity, vol. 5, no. 1, January 1990, pp. 110-28. See also
Magazine, 3 August 1991, p. 46. For his part Shevardnadze valued his friendship with p. 126: 'The secret intelligence agencies have become actors on the diplomatic stage,
James Baker: 'I had 35 meetings with [George] Schultz. With Baker I've lost with something more than walk-on parts'.
 322 Notes and References to pp. 66--S Notes and References to pp. 68-75 323

42. As often asserted by some of those once involved themselves in intelligence operations. subject. An ex<Jmple is the journal Intelligence and National S('curity, which firq
See, for example, Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking Glass: British Foreif:n Potier appeared in 1986.
in an Age of lllusions (London: Cape, 1983) and Peter Wright. Spycatcher: th~· 54. Indeed Hibbert, a former British diplomat of some seniority, asks, 'would it not be
Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (1\'ew York: Viking. 1987}. healthy to try to manoeuvre the secret intelligence agencies a little more to the margin of
It is almost impossible to check how much of this kind of gaff-blowing is itself affairs'!', Hibbert, 'Intelligence and policy·, p. 126.
disinfonnation. 55. Shlomo Gazit, 'Intelligence estinmtes and 1hc decision-maker·. [Link]., p. 262.
43. For <m excellent analysis of the risks involved in intelligence forecasts, see Avi Shlaim. 56. Max Weber's mher two ideal-types were traditional and charismatic leadership. The
'Failures in national intelligence estimates: the case of the Yom Kippur war', lV(n"/d latter is not uncommon even today in foreign policy, as the examples of Gaddal'i.
Politics, vol. 28, no. 3, April 1976, pp. 348-80. Gorbachev and Mandela all show, although Gorbachev's ch<Jrisma was more effective
44. See Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force: the US Counter-Terrorist Unir outside his own country than in.
and the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission (London: Arms and Annour Press, 1984), and ··----.-.-51. This is a version of the Paul Kennedy over-stretch hypothesis, fonnulated before the end
Zbigniew BrLezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of !he National Security Ac/I'J:H'I: of the Cold War. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Pou·ers: Economi<
1977-1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983) pp. 491-500. Of course the hostage Change and Military Conflict from I500 to 2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988). After
mission failure was not the only reason for Caner's defeat. On the other hand. had it gone ca1aloguing the Soviet Union's problems, Kennedy no1ed that 'this does not mean that
well, his popularity would undoubtedly have soared. the USSR is close to collapse ... it does mean that it is facing awkward choices'- a state-
45. Christopher Andrew, 'Churchill and Intelligence', in Michael I. Handel (ed.), Leaders ment which shows that even if a particular prediction goes awry, a general thesis may
and lmeliigence (London: Cass, 1989) pp. 181-93. Also Michael Handel in the same still retain its explanatory power.
volume, pp. 6-8.
46. Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services, pp. 473-4.
47. Ibid., pp. 450--1; John Tower eta/., The Tower Commission Report (New York: Bantam Chapter 4
Books and the New York Times, 1987) especially pp. 102-48. And see Anne Annstrong.
'Bridging the gap: intelligence <md policy', Washington Quarterly, Winter 1989, 1. The increasing personalization of trust between politicians and bureaucrats is explored
pp. 28-9. in a pioneering comparative study, which unforlunately does not ex1end into foreign
48. See, for example, the Franks Report on the failure of British intelligence to predict policy. See Edward C. Page and Vincent Wright (eds), Bureaucratic Elites in Western
the invasion of the Falkand Islands in 1982. This, like most such exercises, showed European States: a Comparatiw Analysis ofTop Officials (New York: Oxford University
littlf: interest in probing too deep. Lord Franks, Falklands Islands Review: Report of Press, 1999).
a Committee of Privy Councillors, Cmnd 8787 (London: Pimlico edition, 1992, with 2. Writing in the midst of war in 1917, Weber looked back on an uneasy combination
introduction by Alex Danchev), also William Wallace, 'How frank was Franks?', of efficient administration and court politics, unbuffered by a responsible class of
International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 3, Summer 1983, pp. 453-8. The French report democratic politicians. See 'Rule by officials in furcih'll policy', section IV of Weber's
on responsibility for the sinking of Grccnpcacc's 'Rainbow Warrior' in Auckland 'Parliament and government in Germany', reproduced in Peter Lassman and Ronald
harbour in 1985 was brazenly mendacious. See Porch, The French Secret Serl'ices, Spiers (eds), Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
p. 462. pp. 196-209. Also pp. 145-6, and 161.
49. Handel, in his own Leaders and Intelligence, [Link]., pp. 27-8. In the same volume 3. The public sphere has historically often been confused with that of the political.
Jay Lavas shows that in very different times Napoleon was able to combine these func- See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
tions. See his 'Napoleon's use of intelligence: the Jena campaign of 1805', pp. 4-54. 1958) pp. 28-37.50-8.
Compare Shlomo Gazit, 'Intelligence estimates and !be decision-maker', pp. 261-81, 4. Weber saw modern administration <Js having originated in Renaissance Italy and as
which recounts how Golda Meir accidentally became aware of how small a proportion having been developed by the logic of capitalism. See 'The profession a_nd vocation
of actual intelligence reports she was seeing (pp. 271-2). of politics' (1919) in Peter Lassman and Ronald Spiers (eds), Weber: Political Writings,
50. 'The only groups which understood the need for refonn - without, however, being p. 322. He drew personally on the writings of Maisie Ostrogorski. See Lassman and
prepared to embrace the remedy - were the security services.' Henry Kissinger. Spier's 'Introduction', pp. xvii-xx.
Diplomacy (London: Simon and Shuster, 1994) p. 797. 5. For invaluable historical analysis see Zara Steiner (e(\.), The Times Swwy of Foreign
51. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (cds), Gorbachev's Russia and American Ministries of the World (London: Times Books, 1982). On the USA in particular see
Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview, 1988) pp. 277-8. William I. Bacchus, Staffing for Foreign Affairs: Personnel Systems for the 1980's and
52. Probably this happened with R.A. Butler, the senior Conservative politician that many 1990's (Princeton, New Jersey: Prince1on University Press, 1983) pp. 3-6; also Graham
expected to become party leader, after his indiscretions on peace moves in 1940 and Allison and Peter Sz<Jnton, Remakinx Foreign Policy: the Organizational Connection
other rumours of person<Jl problems. (New York: Basic Books. 1976) pp. ix-xiv. 24-43.
53. The growth of academic interest among historians <md political scientists over the past 6. Cited by Teddy J. Ulricks, 'The Tsarist and Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs', in
decade has made it possible to talk on a more infonned basis about a previously taboo Zara Steiner (ed.), The 1/mes Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World. p. 531.
 324 Notes and References to pp. 76-80 Notes and References to pp. 80-6 325

7. Amhony Adamthwaite, France a!Jd the Comin.r: of the Second WO,-/d War (London: Frank 20. A point presciently made by a Pakistani diplomat criticizing the US reliance on the CIA
Cass, 1977) pp. !52-3. Frano:;ois-Poncct \vas as significant as the mOre notorious :\cvik in Afghanistan while cutting back on conventional diplomacy. Letter Lo The Jndependem.
Henderson as an engineer of appea<>ement. 12 October 1987.
8. In the United States, the term 'offiCial' covers both politicians and administrators. 21. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon and Schuster. 1994) p. 9.
Here the term is used in its European sense. and refers just to the latter. 22. Samuel WilliamSon, Tile Politics o[Gnmd Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for ~~¥1r
9. In the USSR the foreign ministry, unlike other ministries, was directly responsible only 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969) pp. 59-88.
to the Politiburo. Arkady Shcvchcriko, Breaking with Moscow (London: Cape, 1985) 23. Richard K. Betts argued that 'military advice has been most persuasive as a veto of the
p. 188. In both the USSR and China we are limited by our lack of knowledge of policy use of force and least potent when it favored force', but admits that in 1965 politicians
processes at certain periods. See Carol Lee Hamrin, 'Elite Politics and the Development did not heed military wmnings about the scale of commitment involved 10 achieve
of China's Foreign Relations', in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (cds). victory in Vietnam. See his Soldien·, State~men and Cold lli"1r Cri~·n (Cambridge, Ma~~=
Chinese Fqreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Also Harvard University Press, 1977) pp. 209-12.
Lu Ning 'The central leadership, supraministry coordinating bodies, State Council 24. Lauri Karvonen and Bengt Sundelius, /11/emationali:ation and Foreign Policy
ministries and party departments', in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Management.
Foreign and Security Policy, I978-2000 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001 ). 25. Ibid., 'Findings', pp. 153-7. In both Norway and Sweden there has been a history of
especially pp. 45-60. Ning argues (p. 60) that the rise of economic issues and the decline to-ing and fro-ing between independent economic ministries and an inclusive foreign
of world communism has led to 'the subtle shift in power from the central political ministry, with Norway usually following the Swedish lead. At present the fashion is
leadership to the foreign affairs establishment', with the Party's International Liaison for independent Trade and Industry ministries. The situation in the two countries has
Department the biggest loser. been studied more than most. See. apart from Karvonen and Sundelius above, the many
10. See Patrick Keatinge, 'Ireland and common security: stretching the limits of commit- works of M.A. East, for example 'The organizational impact of interdependence on
ment?' and Pierre-Louis Lorenz, 'Luxembourg: new commitments, new assertiveness·. foreign policy-making: the case of Norway', in C.W, Kegley Jr and Patrick McGowan
in Christopher Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy (London: Routledge. (eds), The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behaviour (London: Sage, 1981).
1996) pp. 208-25 and 226-46 respectively. Also lver Neumann, 'The Foreign Ministry of Norway', in Brian Hocking (ed.),
II. On Gennany, see Kurt Doss, 'Gennany: the history of the Gennan Foreign Office', in fOreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation (New York: StMartin's Press, 1999)
Zard Steiner (ed.), The Times Swwy of Foreign Ministries of the World, pp. 244--6. pp. 152-69.
12. See Simon Nuttall, 'The Commission and foreign policy-making', in Geoffrey Edwards 26. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cr1han Missile Crisis (Boston:
and David Spence (eds), The European Commission, 2nd edn (London: Cartermill. Little, Brown, I 971 ). The theory had first appeared in an article in the American Political
1997) pp. 303-19. Science Review of 1969 (vol. 63, 3: 'Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis').
13. Steven Everts, 'Coming to tenns with Germany: the slow and arduous adjustment of 27. Morton Halperin, Burecmcratic Politics and Foreign Policy with the assistance of
Dutch foreign policy after 1989', in Robin Niblett and William Wallace (eds), Rethinking Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter (Washington D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 1974);
European Order: West European Responses, 1989-97 (Houndmills: Palgrave. 2001) and Robert Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honour: the Politics of American Military
pp. 172-4. Policy in Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). The second edi-
14. R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, 2nd edn (London: Longman, 1997) pp. 11-31. tion of Essence of Decision (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999) in which Allison was
15. Cook spent only five hours in the Turkish capital, and some of that rime was taken up joined by Philip Zelikow to assess the flood of historical and theoretical literature which
with a photo-call at the bedside of a human rights activist wounded in a shooting. had emerged since 1971, is a rich source and the best place to start.
Financial Times, 19 May 1998. 28. For discussion of the bureaucratic politics model, see, inter alia, Alan C. Lamborn and
16. Andres Rozema!, 'Mexico: change and adaptation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs', in Stephen P. Mummie, Statecraft, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Making: the
Brian Hocking (ed.), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation (New York: El Chami::_al Dispute (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1988) pp. 22-36; Steve Smith,
StMartin's Press, 1999) p. 151, note 24. The total resources of these units exceeds 'Perspectives on the foreign policy system: bureaucratic politics approaches', in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget by 20 per cent! They can also engage in direct Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy- the Foreign
foreign relations with their equivalents in other states. On such transgovernmentalism, Policy Systems Approach (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989) pp. I 09-34; Christopher Hill,
see Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'The real new world order', Foreign Affairs, September- 'A Theoretical Introduction', in William Wallace and W.E. Paterson (eds), Foreign Policy
October 1997, vol. 76, no. 5, pp. 183-97. Making in Westem Europe: a Comparative Approach (Famborough, Hants.: Saxon
17. See Lauri Karvonen and Bengt Sundelius. Internationalization and Foreign Polin· House, 1978) pp. 7-30; Jerel A. Rosati, 'Developing a systematic decision-
Management (Aidershot: Gower, 1987) pp. 30-l. making framework: bureaucmtic politics in perspective', World Politics, vol. XXX Ill.
18. WiHiam L Bacchus, Staffing for Foreif{ll Affairs, p. 28. no. 2, January 1981, pp. 246-52; and Lawrence Freedman, 'Logic, politics and foreign
19. It does, however, depend on the state. In Japan, where image and good relations have policy processes', International Affair~·, vol. 52, no. 3, July 1976, pp. 434-49.
been vital since 1945, the foreign ministry has been relatively privileged in terms of 29. Lamborn and Mummie, Statecraft, Domestic Polirics and Foreign Policy Making, pp. 24
resources. Kyoji Komachi, 'Japan: towards a more pro-active foreign ministry', in Brian and 32. They argue that the great omission in Allison's theoretical discussion is any
Hocking (ed.), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, reference to the problem of the non-transitivity of social choice, highlighted by Kenneth
1999) p. 103. ArrQ\v.
326 Notes and References to pp. 87-93 Notes and References to pp. 93-8 327

30. Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 164. Theory and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979) pp. 151-4; and David Stevenson, The
31. Halperin, Bureaucraric Politics and Foreign Policy, Chapters I and 16. First World ~Var and lnrenwrionai Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 198R)
32. Rosati, 'Developing a systematic decision-making fr£!-mework', pp. 246--52. pp. 23. 29, 33.
33. Marlin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and reasons in foreign policy decision making·. 49. P~tience finally snapped in British circles_. Commis.'.ioner Chris Patten initiated change
British Journal of Political Science. vol. 16, part 3, July 1986, pp. 269-86. wtth even more ovett criticisms than those contained in UK Secretary of State Clare
34. The central point of Freedman. 'Logic, politics and foreign policy processes', Short's Eliminating World Poverty: MakinR Globalisation Work for the Poor~ White Papf'r
pp. 434-49. on /ntemarional Development. Cm 5006 (London: HMSO, December 2000) pp. 95-6.
35. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 311. 50. 'Una Farnesina a misura d'Europa', II Sole-24 Ore. 24 December 1998.
36. William Wallace, 'Old states and new circumstances: the international predicament of -- 51. The communist collapse is the locus classinH for examples of bureaucratic. political and
Britain, France and Germany', in Wallace and Paterson (eds), Foreign Policy Making in psychological rigidity. One almost poignant result was that when policy finally changed.
We~·rem Europe, pp. 31-55 and Hill, 'Theoretical introduction', pp. 7-30 in the same with East Gennan leader Egon Krenz signing an order to pennit his people to make trips
volume; Karvonen and Sundelius, lmernationali:zation and Foreign Policy Management. abroad, his administration could hardly believe it. and there was a serious risk that
[Link].; Karen Dawisha, 'The limits of the bureaucratic politics model: observations border guard~· would fire on the many feliow-cilizcns who were thronging the Berlin
on the Soviet case·. Studies in Comparative Commu11ism. vol. XIII, no. 4. 1980. wall. Fortunately the guards themselves sensed the zeitgeist. 'The day the wall fell:
pp. 300-26. a series of historic accidents', lntemational Herald 7i"ilmne, 9 November 1990.
37. Fred Halliday, private communication. cf. Michael Donovan, 'National intelligence and 52. Margaret Thatcher, The Do•nrinu Street Years (London: HarperCollins. 1993) p. 309.
the Iranian revolution', in Rhodri Jeffreys-Janes and Christopher Andrew (eels). Eternal 53. The same accusation has been made against British diplomats and soldiers involved in
Vigilance: F1jty Years of the CIA (London: Frank Cass, 1997) pp. 143-63. Donovan the Balkans in the early 1990s. See Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: How Britain Helped
argues that bureaucratic game-playing, particularly by NSC Adviser Zbigniew to Destmy Bosnia (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. 2001 ).
Brzezinski, paralysed US policy at the critical time. 54. Henry A. Kissinger, 'Domestic structure and foreign policy', in Harold Karan Jacobson
38. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2nd edn, pp. 353-4. Khrushchev accused and William Zimmerman (eds), The Shaping of Foreign Policy (New York: Atherton
Castro of responsibility for shooting down the U2, but the most likely explanation is Press, 1969) p. 144.
confusion, with Moscow being unable properly to control its forces on the ground. 55. A problem discussed in Vincent A. Auger, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Analysis: The
39. Richard [Link], Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). This Carter Administration and the Neurmn Bomh (Lanham. Md.: Rowland and Littlefield,
pioneering book started life as a confidential report for Kennedy on what had gone 1996) p. 4 and panim. This is a study of a case which became unusually public, and
wrong and why for Anglo-American relations in the Suez and Skybolt crises. where the president eventually cancelled the project. Still, his decisions were only taken
40. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 189-90. with great difficuhy and the neutron bomb has become a classic 'fiasco' of foreign
41. See Shlomo Gazit, 'Intelligence estimates and the decision-maker', in Michael I. Handel policy analysis.
(ed.), Leaders and Intelligence (London: Cass, 1989) p. 266. On Italy, see 'Forze 56. Steve Smith and Michael Clarke (eds), Foreign Policy Implementation (London: George
italiane a Kabul: scontro Ruggiero-Martino', La Repubblica, 15 November 2001. Allen & Unwin, I 985).
42. Lisette Andreae and Karl Kaiser, 'The "fOreign policies" of specialized ministries·. in 57. Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy MakinR in Defen~·e and Foreign Affairs:
Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (eds). Germany's New 1-0reign Policy: Decision- Concepwal Models and Bureaucratic Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1987).
Makin~ in an Interdependent World (London: Pal grave, 200 I) pp. 38-57. Hilsman first sketched this approach in his .To Move a Nation: the Politics of Foreign
43. On complex system-induced compromises, see Robert Jervis, System Effects: Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1964).
Complexity in Political and Social Life (PrinCeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press. 1997), especially Chapter I.
44. Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises, p. 209. Chapter 5
45. William I. Bacchus, Staffing for ForeiRn A./fain·, p. 50. Of course the chicken and egg
problem occurs here: did key interests in the US government ensure that the relevant I. Michael Nicholson, 'The continued significance of positivism?' in Steve Smith, Ken
department was weak, because they were hostile to a law of the sea agreement in the tirst Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds), lntemational Theory: Positil'ism and Beyond
place? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 138-40_
46. Martin Walker, 'Mission implausible', The Guardian, 14Aprill997. The problem seems 2. For an insightful survey sec Miles Kahler, 'Rationality in International Relations', in
to have been in the different spellings of 'Khamisiyah', which impeded an effective Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert 0. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner (eds). E.\ploration and
computer search. Come station in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999)
47. Alexander Dallin, Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers (Berkeley: University of pp. 285-6.
California Press, 1985). 3. Martin Wight, International Theory: the Tlwee Traditiom. ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian
48. James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (London: Longman, 1984) pp. 12, 82-4. Porter (Leicester: Leicester University Press. I 991) pp. 37-40; and also Andre\\·
87; also Samuel R. Williamson Jr. 'Theories of organizatjonal process and foreign pol- Linklater, The Tram/ormation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity Press, 199R)
icy outcomes', in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History. pp. 59-60, 209-10.
 .'4:M2.•
y~,-

328 Notes and References to pp. 98-102 Notes and Re{erences to pp. 102-7 329

4. David Dessler. 'Constructivism within a positivist social science', Rel'iew of 16. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
lmemational Swdies, vol. 25. no. l. January 1999, pp. 123-37. Press, 1960) pp. 187-203.
5. Ole Wrever. 'Resisting the temptation of post foreign policy analysi::. •. in Walter 17. Simon, Administratil'e Belwl'iour, pp. xxvii. Classical rationality is sometimes referred
Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds), Eumpean Forei[Jn Policy: the EC and Changing to as the synoptic method.
Perspeclil'es in Europe (London: Sage. 1994) p. 256. 18. As Braybrooke and Lindblom point out, there is much talk of planning, especi:1lly in
6. Robert Nozick, The Narure of Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres~. one-party states, but the rhetoric rarely matches the reality. See A Snmegy of Decision.
1993) pp. 64-5. P- 77.
7. Herbert Simon, 'From substantive to procedural ralionality', in Anthony G. McGrew and 19. The metaphor was originally Lord Salisbury's, Foreign Secretary and then Prime
M.J. Wilson (eds), Decision Making: Appmaches and Anaiy~·is (Manchester: Manchester Minister of Britain at the end of the nineteenth cemury. See F.S. Northedgc, 'The nature
University Press, 1982) pp. 87-96. Simon had first published ideas along these lines in of foreign policy' in his edited book The Foreign Policies of the Powers (London:
1945, in 'A behavioral model of rational choice', Quarier!y Journal of Economics. Faber & Faber, 1968) pp. 9-38. Also James Joll (ed.), Britain and Europe: Pitt/0
February 1955, reprinted in Herbert A Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational Churchil/1793-1940 (London: Nicholas Kaye, 1950), especially the 'Introduction· and
Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behm,ior in a Social Serting (New York: John various speeches by Foreign Secretaries Canning and Palmcrston.
Wiley, 1957/1967) pp. 240--60; the tcm1s 'process' and 'outcome' are used by Yaacov Y.l. 20. Bruno Bettelheim, A Good Enough Parem (London: Thames & Hudson, 1987).
Vertzberger, The lVorld in their 1Hinds: Information Processing. Cognition and 21. Robert Keohane. Ajfer l/q~emony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, !984), Chapter 7, 'Bounded rationalily
1990) pp. 39-40 and 367_ and redefinilions of self-interest', pp. 110--32.
8. Vertzberger, ibid., p. 367. 22. For a full account of this theory see Brayrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision,
9. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: 1he System Worked (Washington: pp. 81-110, and Charles E. Lindblom, 'Still muddling, nol yet through', Public
Brookings Institution, 1979). Administration Review, vaL 39, 1979, pp. 517-26, reprinted in an abridged version in
IO. For an interesting discussion of this general problem, which concludes that 'it is not McGrew and Wilson (eds), Decision Making, pp. 125-38. Tile original article dates from
possible ... to understand human behaviour simply at the level of the individual', see 1959: Charles E. Lindblom, 'The science of muddling through', Public Administration
Richard Little, 'Belief systems in the social sciences', in Richard Little and Steve Smith RePiew, vaL XIX, no. 2, Spring 1959, pp. 79-88.
(eds), Belief Sys1ems and /ntemational Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell in associa- 23. After the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1689 John Locke began to emphasize the importance
tion with the British International Studies Association, 1988) pp. 37-56. of a political system which could adapt to change. But it was Burke who gave voice to
II. This is related to 'Arrow's paradox' about voting in democracies, whereby the economist the natural instincts of the English ruling class, with its ambivalent attitudes towards
Kenneth Arrow showed in 1954 that aggregating individual preferences runs the risk central authority, in his Reflections 011 the Rel'olution in France, edited and Introduc-
that no clear preference will emerge, or that the majority's preference will not win tion by Conor Cruise O'Brien (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969, first published
out. See M. Carley, 'Analytic rationality', in McGrew and Wilson, Decision Making. 1790).
p. 63. 24. Simon, Administrative Behavior, pp. xxix-xxxiv.
12. As Herbert Simon argued, 'the difference in direction of the individual's aims from those 25. Note the ambivalent language of ·muddling through' and 'disjointed' incrementalism.
of the larger organization is just one of those elements of non-rationality with which Lindblom himself recognized that this was 'pejorative and deliberately awkward'-
fthe] theory must deal'. He went on to say that the basic task of administration is to pro- presumably as a provocation. A Strategy of Decision, p. 105. See also G. Smith and
vide every employee with a decision environment 'such that behaviour which is rational D. May, 'The artificial debate between rationalist and incremental models of decision-
from the standpoint of this environment is also rational from the standpoint of the group making', in McGrew and Wilson, Decision Making, p. 118.
values and the group situation'. He gave the example of a soldier in combat, taking 26. Susan Strange, Sterlinf.: and Brilish Policy: A Study of an International Currency in
orders which have the potential to be disastrous for himself. Herbert A. Simon. Decline (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Philip Darby, British Policy East of
Administrative Beha~·ior, 3rd edn (New York: Free Press, 1976, first published 1946) Suez, 1947-1968 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).
pp. 41 and 243-4. 27. Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, Hugo Dobson, Japan's
13. On the other hand, because the president did not dare to declare his hand, the prepara- International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security (London: RoutJedge, 2001)
tions for war were at best incremental. See David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom. pp. 7, 132---6.458.
A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York: Free Press, 28. John D. Steinbruner, The Cybemetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton
1963) pp. 75-7. University Press, 1974).
14. Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: the American and British 29. Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade 1948-1949: a Study in Crisis
E.\]Jerience (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown, 1967). Decision-Makinp, (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1982) pp. 242-6.
15. As Vertzberger says, 'the norms of rationality are culture-bound'. He gives the example 30. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford
of how a Korean official describes lack of response to criticism as an indication of University Press, 1962).
a sense of guiltlessness, rather than the opposite, as would be the case in the West. 31. The original work was done by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and
Vertzberger, The World in their Minds, p. 270. Pover1y: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press. 1970). Steven Lukes'
 330 Notes and References to pp. 107-11 Notes and References to pp. I I 1-15 331
I
Power: a Radicall'iell' (1974) and Matthew A. Crenson's The Un-politics (!fAir (Swansea: Collingwood Society, 1994) pp. 59-75; also Charles Reynolds, Theory and
Pollution: a Strldy of Non-Decisionmakinf! in the Cities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1971) are also impo11anl sources.
I .. Explanation in lnternarimwl Politics .

32. The Times, I October 1980, cited in Fred Halliday; Revolution and World Polirics: rhc I 44.
45.
Vertzberger, The World in rheir Mi11ds, p. 40.
This crucial distinclion was formalized _by Harold and Margaret Sproul. See their
Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999) p. 256. 'Man~milieu' hypotheses in both their Foundarions of lllfernarional Polirics (Princeton.
33. David Stevenson, The First World War and lmemational Pofiric.~ (Oxford: Clarendon New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962) pp. 122~35 and in Tire Ecological Perspectire
Press, 1988) pp. 87-138; Victor Rothwell. British War Aim~· and Peace Diplomacy on Human Affairs (Princeton: Princeton Universily Press. 1965).
1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Christopher Hill. Cabinet Deci.~imB· on 46. The research behind these and other examples is analysed extensively in both
Foreign Polit~v: the British £rperience October [Link] 194/ (Cambridge: Cambridge Vertzberger, The World in their Minds, pp. 7-50, and Jervis, Perceprion and
University Press, 1991) pp. 188~223. Misperceplion inlnternmional Politics, pw·sim.
34. E.E. Schauschneidcr, Semi-So1•ereign People: a Reali.~t's View of Democracy in America Christopher Hill, "Reagan and Thatcher: the sentimental altiance', World Ourlook
(Hinsdale, New Jersey: The Dryden Press, 1975) p. 69. (Dartmouth College, New Hampshire), voL I, no. 2, Winter 1985-6.
35. On elite theory, and its nineteenth-century roots in both reali~m and Marxism. see 48. Robett F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: the Cuban M1:uile Crisis with forewords by Harold
Geraint Parry, Political Elites (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969). Little work has Macmillan and Robert McNamara (London: Pan Books, 1969).
been done on foreign policy elites, but see Indetjeet Pam1ar, 'The Carnegie Endowmem 49. It was lhe philosopher D.C. Dennett who suggested we might all be ·pretty rational".
for International Peace and American public opinion I939~1945", Review of lntemationaf See Richard Litllc, 'Belief systems in the social sciences·. in Little and Smith (eds),
Smdies, vol. 26, no. 1, January 2000, pp. 35-48. Belief Systems and lmernational Relations, [Link]., pp. 53-4.
36. The first relevant work was Kenneth Boulding's The Image (Ann Arbor: University uf 50. Sec Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: the
Michigan, 1956), followed by Joseph De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of" Anglo-Argentine Conflict of /982 (London: Faber and Faber, 1990).
Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1968), and Robert Jervis, Perception and 51. Leon Festinger, A Theory ofCognitil'e Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
Misperception in lnrernarional Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 1957).
The Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics ami 52. Hansard, 25 November 1988. Healey said: 'She finds herself practically alone now in the
Political Science was the first, to my knowledge, lO run a university course on 'the Western European Union, by pressing for lhe modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons.
Psychological Aspects of International Relations', from 1951 under the tutelage of I understand there is a medical term for lhe condition from which she suffers. It is known
Charles Manning and then F.S. Northedge. See Department of lfllemational Relarions: as cognitive dissonance~ a psychialric condition in which the patient finds it impossible
a Brief History, 1924~1971 (unpublished mss, 1971) p. 15. to accept a reality which contlicls with his or her prejudices or vanily.'
37. Alfred Cobban, A HistOI)' of Modern France, Vol. 1: 1715~1799, 3rd edn 53. Robert Axelrod (ed.), Stmcture of Decision: the Cognitil'e Maps of Political Elites
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963) p. 157. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision
38. T_W_ Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D.N. Levinson and R.N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Making: A Psychological Analysis ofCimice. Conflict and Commitme/11 (New York: Free
Personality (New York: Harper, 1950). Press, 1977) pp. 212~18.
39. A succinct discussion is lO be found in Vcrtzberger, The World in their Minds. 54. Nonnan Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incomperence (London: Cape, 1976)
pp. 172-3. pp. 164-8, 245.
40. Alexander L. George and Juliet L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel Home (New 55. Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision, p. 139.
York: John Den, 1965). Many would say that the opportunity of 1919 was missed mainly 56. See Tam Dalyell, 'Holding policy-makers to account: the problem of expertise', in
because of failings in Wilson's character. Others would stress the difficulties of making Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff (eds), Two Worlds of lntemational Relations:
an intelligent peace in the context of Congressional isolationism, French hostility to Academics. Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas (London: Routledge, 1994) pp. 118-35.
Gennany and British preoccupations with other problems. See also Miles Kahler_ 57. R.F. Harrod, The Prof: a Personal Memoir of Lord Cherwell (London: Macmillan, 1959)
'Rationality in International Relations', in Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (edsl. p. 217.
Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, pp. 285-6. 58. Michael Donelan, The Ideas of American Foreign Policy (London: Chapman & Hall,
41. Erik H. Erikson, Yormg Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York: 1963) pp. 59~66; Charles W. Kegley Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign
Norton, 1958); Robert Waite, Kaiser and Fiihrer: A Comparative Study of Personality Policy: Patrern and Process. 3rd edn (Houndmills: Macmillan Education, 1987)
and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998); Doris Keams, Lyndon Johnson pp. 78-9.
and rhe American Dream (London: Deutsch, 1976); Leo Abse, Margaret, Daughter of 59. Irving L Janis, Victims of Groupthink: a Psychological St11dy of Foreign Policy
Beatrice: a Politician's Psychohiography of Margaret Thatcher (London: Cape. 1989). Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); the second edition is
42. Fred L Greenstein, 'The impact of personality on politics: an attempt to clear the under- Groupthink: Psychological St11die~· of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston:
brush', American Political Science Review, vol. 61, 1967, pp. 629-41, and Persona/it\" Houghton Mifflin, 1982). Sec also his Crucial Decisions: Leadership ill Policy-Making
and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualisation (New York: and Crisis Management (New York: Free Press, 1989).
Norton, [975). 60. The mosl imporlant work in this respect has been done by Paul 't Harland a group of col-
43. William H. Dray, 'Was Collingwood an historical constructionist?', in David Boucher leagues. See Paul 't Hart, Eric K. Stern and Bcngt Sunde! ius (eds), Beyond Grouptl!ink:
(ed.), Collingwood Studies, vol. I, 1994, The Life and Thoughr of R.G. Collingwood Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor: University or
 332 Notes and References to pp. I 15-22 Notes and References to pp. 125-30 333

Michigan Press, 1997). This book puts groupthink sympathetically in context and lti le advocacy is 1hc notion, invenlcd by Alexander George, that rhe provision
extends considerably its importance by the very fact of not presenting_ it as a single-
Mu P b · · ·
of competing voices, and in patticular dcvil's advocales, should e tnstnuttona tze
r ct :n
factor explanation. - decision-making, in order to ensure that bad arguments arc not prote~ted ~y _an aulocrattc
61. Janis, Victims ofGroupthink, np;cir., pp. 102--6; Hill, Cabinet Deci~·ion.t on Forel,f!.n or excessively collegial atmosphere. However, it is not difficult to thmk of ctrc_umsta_nces
Policy, pp. 19-46. in which multiPle advocacy might lead to delays and overly mechanistic ~ltscusstons.
62. See David Dilks, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London: Cassell thereby falling into disrepute. It is not rationaliO pursu~ mulriple adv~cacy J~dcpcnd:nl
1971) pp. 27-9. • of circumstance. Alexander George, 'The case for multtple advocacy m makmg foretgn
63. Miriam Steiner, 'The search for order in a disorderly world: world views and prescriptive policy', American Political Science Rel'iew. 66, pp. 751-85, and Presiden:ial Decision-
decision paradigms'.fnternarional Organisation, voL 37, no. 3, Summer !983, p. 413. making in Foreign Policy: the Efj"ectil'e Use of Information and Adl'lce (Boulder:
64. See B. Ripley. 'Psychology, foreign policy and international relations', Political Westview Press, 1980); 't Harl et al., Beyond Grouptltink, pp. 328-31; Robert 0.
Psychology, vol. 14, pp. 403-16. Smith and May, 'The artificial debate between ratio- -Keohane, 'International multiple advocacy in US roreig_n policy', i~1 D. ~a-ld~·ell :•~d
nalist and incrementalist models of decision making'. arc less convinced. They regard T.J. McKeown (eds), Diplomacy. Force and Leaders/up (Boulder. WeslvJe.,.,, 199.J)
'intuition' and 'experience' as 'disconcertingly vague variables' (p. 121); rationality pp. 285-304. . .
provides a good prescription and incrementalism a good description. The problem is how Andrew Linklater, The Transformarion nf Political Commumty (Cambndge: Polity Pre:o.s.
75.
to bridge the gap. 1998) p. 211.
65. Ernest R. May, 'Lessons' of the Past: the Use and Misuse of History in American Foreip,n 76. Vertzbemer, The World in their Minds, p. 361.
Poli[)' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) p. 179. This is a"' version of the general posilion of JOrgen Habermas. Sec his critique of both
77.
66. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in lnternarional Politics, [Link]., positivism and post-modcmism in The Philosophical Discourse of Mndernity: Twelve
pp. 217-82; Lloyd Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? (Elmsford: Pergamon Press, Lectures (Cambridge: Polity and Basil Blackwell, 19~7).
1985); Yaacov J. Vertzberger, 'Foreign policy decision-makers as practical-intuitive his-
torians: applied history and its short-comings', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 30 Chapter 6
(1986) pp. 223-47 and reprinted in an expanded form in The World in their Minds,
[Link]., pp. 296-341; Michael Howard, The Lessons of Histor)' (Oxford: Oxford This was a high-risk strategy, which worked insofar as the visibility of th~ Cyprus
I.
University Press, 1991). question, and the perceived need to allow Cyprus into the EU, were both ~.etghtened,
67. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: the Uses of History f01 A way of not buying the missiles was eventually found. Clement H. Dodd, lhe Cyprus
Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, !986). Imbroglio (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1998) pp. 98--100.
68. These distinctions are further explored in Christopher Hill. 'The historical background: This point is expanded in a number of interesting ways in Raymond Cohen, Theatre of
2.
past and present in British foreign policy', in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian Power: the Art ofDiplomaricSignalling (London: Longman, 1987).
White (eds), British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Cominuity (London: Unwin 3. Hans J. Morgcnthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power a~rd Pea_ce
Hyman, 1988) pp. 25-49. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948/1950); George Modelski, A Theory of Fore1gn Policy
69. James N. Rosenau, 'The national interest', in The Sciemijic Study of Foreign Polic_\ (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962). . .
(New York: The Free Press, 1971) pp. 239-49. Some writers, notably Joseph Frankel in 4. There are more permutations possible, as with the nine meanmgs of the balance ~f
The National Interest (London: Macmillan, 1970) and Donald Nuechterlein, in 'National See Martin Wight. 'The balance of power', in Herbert Butterfield and Martm
power. ,f" I . I p J"t.
interests and foreign policy: a conceptual framework for analysis and decision-makin!!', Wight (cds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theor.~· OJ nternatr~na or ICS
British .Journal of Imemational Srudies, val. 2, no. 3, October 1976, pp. 246-66, ha:e (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966) pp. 149-75. The tnad used here IS no~ so ~ar
tried to resuscitate the notion of national interest. but they have only succeeded in from that of Kenneth Boulding in his Three Faces of Power (Newbury Park, Caltforma:
highlightjng the variety of uses of the term. Sage. 1989) but Boulding concentrates on relational aspects. _His ~hree f~~es are: coer-
70. The Independent, 15 November 1990. cion (threat power); exchange (economic power); and persuasiOn (mtegrahve powc~).'
71. The phrase comes from Lord Franks, who as Oliver Franks was British Ambassador in 5. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: a Framework for Poflttcal
Washington between 1948-1952. The remark was made in his Reith Lectures of 1954 Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), cited in Arnold Wolfer~, Disc~rd a~d
(cited in Alex Danchev, Oliver Franks [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993j p. 145) Collaboration: Essays onlntemational Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkms Untverstty
a propos of Britain's right to sit at the lop table, which only shows how quickly whal Press. 1962) p. 84. .
James Joll called the 'unspoken assumptiom' can come under challenge. James Jail, 71te 6. See Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (London: HarperColhns, 1991), a~d
Unspoken Assumptions: An Inaugural Lecture at the London Schoof of Economics and Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936: Hubris (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, The Pcngmn
Political Science (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968). Press. 1998), for example, pp. xxviii-xxx.
72. Arnold Wolfers, 'The goals of foreign policy', in his Discord and Collaboration: 7. Adeed 1. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arah World: the Elements of Foreign Policy (London:
Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962) Macmillan, !976) PP- 102-7; and see P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and h_is G~ne~·ation
pp. 67-80. (London: Croom Helm. 1978) pp. 325--47, who notes some western tdeahzatJon of
73. Ibid., 'The pole of power and the pole of indifference', pp. 81-102. Nasser.
 334 Notes and References to pp. 131-!3 Notes and References to pp. 138~144 335

8. Arnold Wolfers, 'The pole of power and the pole of indifference' in Dis,·o,·f and Guido Walraven (cds), The Politics of Persuasion: implementation of Foreign PolicY
. ' ( and
Collaboration, pp. 81-102. This essay was first published in WiH)d Poliric;s in October by the Netherlands (Aidershol: Ave bury. 1989). .
195 I (vol. IV, no. 1}. As do private groups and individuals. sometimes in loose harness With stat~s. [Link]
9. !bid., p. 89. Raymond Cohen, 'Putting diplomatic studies on the map', DSP Newsletter (Umverstty
10. Ibid., p. 84. John Herz formalized 'the security dilemma' in Political Realism d of Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, no. 4, M<~y 1998). and George Kennan.
Political Idealism: a Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: University of Chic:~o •Diplomacy without diplomats', Foreign Affairs, September-October 1997.
Press, 1951). It was subsequently refonnulated and developed as the Cold War wane~ Ambassador Karl Prinz was expelled because Gcnnany was protesting more than other
~otably by _Barry Buzan in his People. States and Fear: the National Security Problen; donors about government abuses in Sierra Leone.
m lnternatronal Relations (Brighton: Harvester Whcatsheaf,. 1983), especially cha t Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, with new introduction by Lord Butler, 3rd cdn (London:
6and7. pers
Oxford University Press, 1969- first published in 1939).
II. George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy, pp. 27-30. See also Klaus Knorr, Power Robert Jervis. The Logic of lmaf?es in International Relarions (Princeton: Princeton
and Wealth (London: Macmillan, 1973). University Press, 1970), especially pp. lS-40.
12. See in particular Susan Strange's distinction between relational and structural power in Another Canadian example is provided by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who wore
h~r Stares and Markets: an Introduction to !merna tiona/ Political Economy (London: trainers when he reviewed a Brazilian Guard of Honour. The insult to Brazil was almost
Pmter, 1988). certainly unintcntion<~l. but diplomacy to mend the broken fences was given a stern test.
13. But see Alan Sked's The Decline and Fall of the Habsbnrg Empire 1815-1918 (London: Cohen, Theatre of Power. p. 21.
Longman, 1989), where he argues thai only the war policy of 1914 brought down the 30. For the complex issues involved, see, among many others, James Joll, The Origins of the
Empire. First World War, cited earlier; Philip M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in
14. See Malcom Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano's Dim}' i939-1943 (London: Heinemann. 1947). Europe, 2nd edn (London: Longman, 1997); Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World ar Arms:
and ~acgregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-194i: Politics and Strategy in Fascist a Global History of World War JJ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
Italy s Last War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), for example, pp. 46---9. pp. 6-47; Donald Cameron Watt, i939: flow War Came (London: 1989).
15. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994) p. 731. 31. Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 719-30.
16. The 'wider context' has been usually called 'the external environment' in foreign policv 32. Uriel Dann, King Hussein's Strategy of Survival (Washington, DC: Washington Institute
analysis, following on from the work of Harold and Margaret Sprout. See their Th~ for Near East Policy, 1992).
Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs- with Special Reference 10 International 33. Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China's Challenge (London: Routledge, 1996); Percy
Politics (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1965/1979). Cradock, Experience of China (London: John Murray, 1994), Part liT; <~lso Cradock's In
17. Thanks largely to the work of Professor Joseph Nye. See his Bound to Lead: the Pursuit of Brirish interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and
Changing Narure of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990) pp. 29-35 <~nd John Major (London: Murray, 1997) pp. 203-5.
'Soft power', Foreign Policy, no. 80, Fall I 990, pp. 153-71. 34. Marco Pedrazzi, 'Italy's approach to UN Security Council reform', The Intemational
18. Nye, 'Soft power', p. 167. Spectator, vol. XXXV, no. 3, July-September 2000, pp. 49-56.
19. lnternarional Herald Tribune, 22 February 1999. 35. Hadley Arkes, Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan and the National !meres! (Princeton:
20. Alan Chong and Jana Valencic (cds), The Image, the Stare and International Relations: Princeton University Press, 1972) pp. 52-5.
Conference Proceedings (London: London School of Economics and Political Science 36. As it did for Douglas Hurd with the Pergau Dam affair, in which development aid to
EFPU Working Paper No. 2001/2, 2001). ' M<~laysia was given in order to secure £1.3 billion worth of arms orders. Financial Times,
21. Pierre Renouvin and Je<~n-Baptiste Durosdle, Introduction to the History of filter- 3 <~nd 8 March 1994.
national Relations (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968). 37. The Independent, 2 December 1993.
22. Donald J. Puchala, Imemational Politics Today (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) Delighting the 350 000 Armenian community in France, however. The Times, 19 January
38.
pp. 176-84. 2001.
23. If it is doubted that soft power can include the military instrument, consider the Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercil•e Diplomacy,
39.
Partnership for Peace system set up by NATO to help educate the military of the 2nd edn (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1994). The influential first edition, with the
ex-Warsaw Pact into western approaches to civil-military relations and confidence- same title and authors (plus David K. Hall), was published in Boston by Little, Brown,
building measures. in 1971. Although the term coercive diplomacy includes OOth blackmail and defensive
24. For various good treatments of diplomacy see Cohen, Theatre of Power; Ronald Barston. reactions (that is, auempts to slop an adversary doing something unwelcome by counter-
Modern Diplomacy, 2nd edn (London: Longman, 1997); Keith Hamilton and Richard threats) George eta/. restrict themselves to studying the second aspect. Their cases also
Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: its Emlution, Theory and Administrarion deal exclusivelv with American foreign policy.
(London: Routledge, 1994); Adam Watson, Diplomacy: the Dialogue between States 40. Charles Lockhart, Bargaining in lnternatimwl Conflicts (New York: Columbia
{London: Eyre Methuen, 1982); G.R. Benidge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Heme] University Press, 1979) p. 146, cited in Paul Gordon Lauren, 'Coercive diplomacy and
Hempstead: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1995); G.R. Benidge and Alan James, A Dicrionan· ultimata: theory and practice in history', in George and Simons, The Limits of Coercil·e
of Diplomacy (Houndmills: Pal grave, 2001). See also the country-study of Philip EveJ1~'> Diplomacy (1994) p. 45.
 336 Notes and References to pp. 144-50 Notes and References to pp. 151-60 337

41. The literature on the Cuban crisis is now voluminous and revealing See . . a failure) and sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy, where they have been
111
. All'1son an d Ph'tip Zeltkow,
Gra ham . Essence of Decision, 2nd cdn' {New
. York· partiCUlar
Lo success in a number of cases despite t he sma II er num be r o I' cmorcmg
" . st a tes.
1999_}; Er~~st R. May and ~h~lip D: ~elikow, ~he Kennedy Tapes: hm'd; rlu~7~~~~~ ·Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: the Third WOrld Against Global Uhera/ism
Howe Dm mg the Cuban M1ssJ/e Cns1s (Cambndge· Harv·1rd Universitv p (Berkele)': University of California Press._l985).
R d L . < - re~s. 1997)· I 18
a:m?n · Garthoff,. Reflecti~n~ on the Cuban Missile Crisis, revised ed~ · Cassen, Does Aid Work? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) pp. - ·
(':a~hmgton, DC: Brookmgs In~tltutmn, 1989); James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and ··.Karen E. Smith, 'The usc of political conditionality in the EU's relations with the third
Davrd A. Welch, Cuba on the Bnnk: Castro the Missile Crisis and the Soviet C world', European Forei!{ll Affairs Review, vol. 3, no. 2, Summer 1998.
11
(New York: Pamheon Books, 1993); Alex~nder George 'T~e Cuban m· .1 ~p_se ° Juichi Inada, 'Japan's aid diplomacy: economic, political or strategic?", Millennium.
• • ISS! C CfiSJS"
peaceful resoluuon through coercive diplomacy', in The Limits ofCoercil•e D. 1 · ·--:c-jc'-;;[Link];:'"=;';c-iioL 18, no. 3, Winter 1989.
(1994)[Link] -32. lpomacy classical works on this theme are Susan Strange, S ter1·mg mlt/B"IPI. ntiS I o 1c_,
42. The Limits a/Coercive DljJlomacy (1994) p. 291. Oxford UniversitY Press, 1971), and Paul Kennedy, The Ri.~e and Fall (4
43. See Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds), The Use of Force: Imernarimwl Politic\· the Great Powers: Economi~ Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London:
and Foreign P~lic~ (Boston: ~itlle, Bro~n, 1971 ), especially Pan [; F.S. Northcdge (cd.), Unwin Hyman, 1988).
The Use of F01ce mlmematwnal Re!arrons (London: Faber, 1974). 58 _ Philip M., Taylor, Mullitions of the Mind: a History of Propaganda ji·om Ihe Ancien/
44. Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action: the CIA and the Limits of lnren•enrhm in the World to the Present Day (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).
Postwar World (London: Tauris, 1987). --··:·::-·-;- _ Hitler made this remark in April !941. just before the invasion of the USSR. See David
59
45. State-fostered
. terrorism
. should be distimmished
- from that which is· pn'm·•c'ti)'
" t. .
J,lJlsna- Irving, HiTler's war 1939-1942 (London: Macmillan, 1977) p. 142. Goering's remark is
lional and Which embarrasses most governments. See Lawrence Freedman r cited in Wolfers. Discord and CollaboraTion, p. 94 n. Given the early successes of Nazi
1
. and! nte~·national ?rder (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul for the eRoyai
Toer~onsm a.. propaganda it was not surprising that E. H. Carr shou td "~ uuve devote{I ten pages o fT/Je
lnstr~ute of Intemauonal Affatrs, 1986) and Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Thmrv, Twentv Years Crisis to 'power over opinion'.
Tactics and Coumer-Measures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1~ 89 ). < 60. Jame; N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1969).
46. Buzan, People, States and Fear, and also Barry Buzan et ai., The European Securilv 6 1. The West itself fell sometimes into the same trap in the early Cold War. See Garry D.
Or~er Rec~st: Sce~arios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990) pp. 3_ 10_ " Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: the BBC and the \lOA i11 International
4 7. T~ts sub-title denves from David Baldwin's Economic Statecraft (Princeton. :'JJ: Politics, 1956--64 (London: Macmillan, 1996).
~nnceton University Press, 1985). Baldwin makes the fundamental points (i) that polit· 62 _ For a general survey of cultural diplomacy, see James Mitchell,lnten~ation~l Cultural
leal ~c~nomy can and should be looked at from a foreign policy perspective; (ii) that eco- Relations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986). Much more up to date, mcludmg recent
nom1c m~~men~ should be assessed on the same criteria as tools of statecraft, no more, image-making perspectives, is Michael Kunczik, images of Nations and International
~o les~; (m) t~at_mstruments, unlike capabilities, are always relational in character, that Public Relations (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997).
IS, the~r :un~tmmng depends on the interaction of actor and target. __ 63 _ Frances Stonor Saunders. Who Paid tire Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War
48. The dJstmctJon between foreign policy and foreign economic policy is not, of course. (London: Granta, 1999). See also Donald Cameron Wan's review artidc, 'The proper
alwa!s so clear. ~ee Chapter I, and also Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, Bn·ond study of propaganda', Intelligence and National Security, vol. 15, no. 4, Winter 2000.
Foreig~ Economic Policy: the United States, the Single European Marker am/ rhe pp. 143-63. Professor Watt excoriates Ms Saunders for selective criticisms of CIA
Ch~n~mg ~or~d Economy (London: Pinter, 1997), especially pp. 7-22 and 18 0-3 . funding. If governments fund intellectual magazines secretly, however, they must expect
49 · 11m 15 a stmphfi~ation of a complex series of problems, and of a huge literalUre. For a distaste when discovered.
valua~le ~rspect1~e, see Charles S. Maier, 'The politics of productivity: foundations of 64 _ Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World, pp. 164-77. Radio has been a powe~ful me~ium in
Amencan mtcmatronal economic policy after World War n', in Peter J. Katzenstein the twentieth century, not least because TV ownership is still not so drffused m poor
(ed.), Between Power and Plemy: Forei"gn Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial countries a.~ some imagine. See Julian Hale, Radio Power (London: Elek, 1975) and
States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, !978) pp. 23-49 . Donald R. Browne, International Radio Broadcasting: the Limits of the Limitless
50· See ~ary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economh Medium (New York: Praeger, 1982).
Sanctwns Reconsidered (two volumes, Washington: Institute for International 65 _ The reasons for the collapse of the USSR are subject to much debate. For a limpid
Econom~cs, 1990). Also Margaret Doxey, International Sanctions in Comemporan summary see Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in
Perspective, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1996); Kimberly Ann Elliott, 'The sanction-s the Twentieth Cenwry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) PP· 172-9.
glass:. half .full or completely empty'!'· , and Robert A. p,pe's reply, 'Why economJc ·
sanctmns still do not work', both in Intemationa/ Security, vol. 23, no. 1, Summer J99S.
pp. 50-77. Chapter 7
51. See James Barber, 'Economic sanctions as a policy instrument', lmemational Affairs.
vol. 55, no. 3, July 1979, pp. 367-84. 1. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977).
52. It is importum to distingui~h between sanctions as an instrument of collective security. 2. Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963)
used by the League of NatLons and the United Nations (where they have almo.~t alway.<; p. 63.
 338 Notes and References to pp. 160-3 Notes and References to pp. 163-9 339

3. On the 'English School', see Brunella Vigezzi, 'II "British Committee on the Th in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eels), Tile Expansion of fnremationa! Societ\"
International Politics" 1958-1985', in the Italian translation of Hedley Bull deary of·. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). . . .
W t
a son,_ ·I.e. L'E. spam:wne
· d an Adam
_ella_ Societit lnternazional: L 'Europa e if mmulo dalla Alexander Wendt. 'Anarchy is \vhat states make of Jt: the socml construcuon of power
del medmevo m IWSfrl tempr (Milano: Editoriale Jaca Book 1994) pp xi . fine . litics', Imemalional Organisation, 46 .. 1992. pp. 391-426: see al~o Wendt's book.
. . • · -xcv: a1soli
Dunne, lnventmg Imernatwnal Societv (London: Macmillan 1998) The .coocame
• • • < • •
sh l ~· roci~l Them}' ofllllernmimwl Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1999),
mto bemg m the 1950s. but was not so named until Roy E. Jones's article 'Tl E . ·especially Chapter 6 (pp. 246--312), 'Three cultures of anarchy'; and Ti~ Dunne, _'The
S · · · · le nghsh
chool of InternatiOnal Relatwns: a case for closure', Review of Imernmional Studi social conslruction of international society', European Journal of lmernal!ona!
vol. 7, no. 1, 198], pp. 1-14. es, Relations, I, pp. 367-89. Michael Donelan, Elements of lnternmional Political Theory
4. Kenneth Waltz, The01y of lnternmional Politin (Reading. Massachuseus: ·--':c.;~ ~----"-.''"'<'· Clarendon Press. 1984) makes both the normative and the epistemological
Wesley, 1979). points through ils erudite 'conversal~O~l' betw~en traditio~s ~f thou~ht.
5. Ibid.. pp. 122-3. Christopher Hill,' 1939. or the ongms of liberal reailsm, Rewew of International
6. Waltz's only book on foreign policy argued that the US foreign policy-makill" . Studies, vol. 15. no. 4, October 1989.
• . • e- system
was more effective than the• Bnttsh. See Foreign Policv · . h
and Democrmic p,' 1J·l 1lCS. Robert Cooper. The Post-Modem Swte and tile World Order, 2nd edn (London: Demos.
. • . ~ t e
~me~E~a_n_and Bnllsh E.\pe_ne~Jce (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).1Ls starting-point is the 2()()0).
capab1ht1es of democracJCs m the realm of foreign policy' (p. 1) and it argues that Influential in shaping the current understanding of a tension between the community of
success equa~es to setling 'sensible goals ... what interest requires and resources pennit' states and the cosmos of peoples, have been Andrew Linklater's Men and Citizens in
(p. 15)._ The 1mpact of democracy on foreign policy is thus reduced to the capacity 10 rhe Theory of /n!emational Relations, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1990) and
cope With the balance of power. Chris Brown's lllfemational Relations Theory: a New Normatil'e Approach (Heme!
7. Colin Elman, 'Horses for courses: why not nco-realist theories of foreion polic 'I' Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.).
~ecurity Stu~ies, vol._ ~·no. I, Autumn 1996, pp. 38-9. Elman's theorie~ have :e~; Susan Strange, Slates and Markets (London: Pinter, 1993) pp. 235-40.
httle to do w1th explammg complex foreign policy behaviour. He focuses on the straw Regimes are 'implicit or explicit principles. nonns, rules and decision-making proce-
man of prediction and does not descend to cases. dures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international
8. Waltz, Theory of lntemalional Politics, p. 118. relations.' Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as
9. !he main proponent of the idea of cosmopolitan democracy, that is, that since the state intervening variables', Jnremational Organizalion, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring 1982, p. 186.
IS no longer capable of maintaining a healthy democracy in the age of globalization, we 20. James N. Rosenau and Emst-OUo Cziempel (eds), Global Changes and Theoretical
should build a sense of solidarity among the peoples of the world, is David Held. See his Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for !he 1990s (Lexington, Massachusetts:
Democracy and the Global Order: from !he Modern State to Cosmopoli!al/ Cm·emance Lexington Books, 1989), and James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1995). Others broadly associated with advocating cosmopolitan of Change and Continuily (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). One of the first
democracy under the mantle of globalization include Boutros Boulros-Ghali, Johan works to focus on change was Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones (eds), Change and the
Galtung and Richard Falk. See their respective contributions in Bam• Holden (ed) Study of ln!emational Relations: the Evaded Dimension (London: Pinter, 1981 ).
Global Democracy: Key De bares (London: Routledge, 2000). ' .' 2!. In the past fifty years states have extended their territorial waters from three to twelve
10. A sophisticated example of this approach is the work of Michael Brecher. See, for exam- miles, and asserted their rights to have 'exclusive economic zones' up to 200 miles
ple, his The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Proces~· (Oxford: Oxford from their coasts. The 'global commons' have thus shrunk in extent as well as being
University Press, 1972). The idea of systems was made familiar in lR by .r..-torton diminished by over-use.
Kaplan's System and Process in lnternatimial Poli!ic~· (New York: Wiley. 1957) and first 22. The fires which blocked two Alpine tunnels between 1999-2002 threatened European
rela_ted to foreign policy by Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, in FOreiJ.:n trade, a factor which has also been a great pressure on an unhappy Switzerland to aJIOW
Polley Decision-Making: an Approach to !he Study of lnternalional Politics (New York: the passage of heavy lorries.
Free Press, 1962). 23. For a good general account of geopolitics and its influence, see W.H. Parker, Mackinder:
11. Chris Brown, 'Moral agency and international society', Ethics and ffllemmiona! Affairs, Geography as an aid to Statecraft (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
val. 15, no. 2, 2001, pp. 87-98. . 24. Alfred Mahan Jived from 1840--1914. His major work was The Influence of Seapower
12. For a helpful discussion, illferalia, of the extent to which the international system should Upon History 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890) which took ils cue from the rise of Britain to
be re~arded as a physical phenomenon, sec Hidemi Suganami, 'Agenls, structures, supremacy in the nineteenth century.
narrallves', European Journal of lmernational Relations, val. 5 no. 3 September 25. Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) was Director of the London School of Economics
1999. ' ' and Political Science from 1903-8. His main book in this context was Democra!ic Ideals
13. The work of _R.J. Vincent is the most notable here. See his edited book Human Rights and Realiry: a Study in the Polirics of Reconstruction (London: Constable and Compan.y.
a~d Imernatwnal Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press in association 1919). Like Mackinder, Klaus Haushofer was a professor of Geography. who founded m
w~th the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1986), and Foreign Policr and Human Munich in 1924 the influential journal Zeitschrift fiir Geopolitik.
R~ghts: Issues and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge Universily Press in association 26. Despite the occasional atlempts to launch the 'new geopolitics' particularly in South
With the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1986). Also relevant arc a number of America and in Italy. See Carlo Jean, Geopolitica (Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza, 1995).
 340 Notes and References to pp. 170-7 Notes and References to pp. 177-<J7 341

27. Cited in Harold and Margaret Sprout, 'Environmental factors in the study of i ~ Cited in Antonio Cassese, 'International law', in Joel Krieger (ed.), The D4ord
f I l. . , . J N nt~ma~
100a po ltlcs , m ames . Rosenau (ed.), lntemarional Polilic~· and Fort'fo 11 p . Companion to Politics of 1he WOrld (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. ~42.
( Ncw \CkF -~ 011
or : ree Press, 1969) p. 45. In a way this gets to the heart of the debctc. b CY Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreif?ll Policy, 2nd edn (New York:
· . . " a OUt
constru_ctJVISm. Advocates of the latter perspective might well argue that S\vitlerlanct i. ublished for the Council on Foreign Relations by Columbia University Press, 1979).
a standmg rebuttal to Pate. s I v.i'-Jt;.;~-_:: ·
~:::;:-p:-"~43.
~ven in such a selpiece of power politics as the Cuban Missile Crisis. See Abram
28. !he Spro~ts_ ~sed a con~i~uum between determinism, through free-will environmental- .;:.:1~1;1," Chayes. The Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) .
-~~;i,;,b,_
ISm, possJbthsm, cogmt1ve behaviouralism and probabilism not even botl" As Mikhail Gorbachev recognized. On entering power in 1985 he let it be known that the
. . · •
comiider voluntansm, where existential free will resides. Ibid .. pp. 44-6.
.~rtneto
-
''"'c'c
'"'l'-"':'-T
c44.
Soviet Union wished 10 change tack in foreign policy and to share responsibilities as
29. See, for example, the journal Geopolitics (London: Frank Cass). . '
-·-- ·:-::~~- --- a full member of the inlemational community. Michael McGv•:ire, Perestroika and Sorier
-"

30. Frances Caimcross, The Death of Distance: How the Communications Remlwion l~"l/ National Security (Washinglon, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991) pp. 174-86.
1
Change Our Lives (London: Orion Business Books, 1997). Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch', in Kam: Political ~Vriting.s,
[Link] do~s n~t appl~ for membership of the EU largely because adhesion to the ed. Hans Reiss, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 126.
Common Ftshenes Policy would destroy its main source of income. For a detailed analysis of the meaning of world opinion, sec Christopher Hill, 'World
32. Ellsworth Huntington (1876-1947) in his Civilisation and Climate (New Haven: y 1 opinion and the empire of circumstance', International AjJ'airs, vol. 72, no. I, January
U_n~~[Link]
· · Press, 1924) argued that average temperatures of 18-21 Centigrade promoted ac
1996.
ctvthzatton because peoples spent less time fighting the clemems and disease. citinn 47. See Frank Louis Rusciano and Roberta Fiske-Rusciano, 'Toward a notion of ·'world
ancient Babylon and the then cooler climate in the Tigris-Euphrates valley in evidenc:. opinion"', in Frank Louis Rusciano with Roberta Fiske-Rusciano, Bosah Ebo Sigfr~do
There has been speculation on climate's impact on civilization since Herodotus. See A. Hernandez and John Crothers Pollock, World Opinion and the Emerg111g
Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, One Volume Edition (London: Thames & Hud~on Jmernational Order (Weslpon, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998) pp. 13-28.
I 972) for example, pp. 95-6. ' While foreign policy aggression usually implies a form of domestic tyranny, the contrary
48.
33. Data from Mark Zacher's essay on 'International Organizations', in Joel Krieger tee!.),
is far from true.
The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (New York: Oxford Universitv Press 49. Lyndon Johnson explained in 1966, 'we are not trying to wipe out North Vietnam ... we
1993) p. 451. . • are trying to make them ... realize the price of aggression is 100 high' (cite~ in ~en_ry
34. Traditionalist scholars like Aron, Bull and Northedge did not trouble themselves \l.·ith the Kissinger, Diplomacy, London: Simon & Schus\er, 1994, pp. 661-2). And m thts, lor
problem of how we know whether or not a system or structure exists. It was enou<>h once, he was probably not being disingenuous.
for _t~em that it was axiomatic, and that intelligent observers, including participati~g 50. In this sense the Jesson of the Suez crisis of 1956, only two years before the first Cod
dectston-makers, could agree on its existence. War, was that of post-modem image-making~ don't look like a bully. . . .
35. Indeed, economics and security should be seen as part of a 'seamless web'. See Michael John Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambndge Umvemty
51.
Mastanduno, 'Economics and security in statecraft and [Link]', in Peter J. Press, 1968) and World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19~R). As
Katzenstein, Robert 0. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner (eds), Exploration and Chris Brown has pointed out, Burton saw the society of states and world soctel~ as
Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 19Y9) incompmible, rather than, as here, necessarily interwoven. Chris Brown, 'World soctety
pp. 185-214. and the English School: an "International Society" perspective on world society',
36. The definition of interdependence as involving mutual sensitivity and vulnewbilitv European Journal of llllemational Relations, vol. 7, no. 4, December 2001.
c~mes from Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Bostor;: 52. See Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South Africa's Foreign Policy-
Ltttle, Brown, 1977) pp. 11-19. Making (London: Macmillan, 1984), and Isolated States: a Comparative Analysis
37. David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993): Fred (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Hal!iday, Revolution and World Politics (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 199Y). 53. K.J. Holsti with Miguel Monterichard et al. Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy
Armstrong and Halliday represent different positions on the important issue of whether RestructurinJ? in the Posnvar World (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982). .
~~ international system socializes revolutionary states into conformity (ArmS!Tong) or 54. In this context it should be noted that the associations of the United Kingdom with
JS Itself shaped by the socio-economic dynamics underlying both revolution and capital- 'splendid isolation' and the United States with 'isolationism' are so misleading as to put
ist order (Halliday). them in a wholly different category
38. Michael_ Leifer, ASEAN and the Securiry of Souris-East Asia (London: Routledge. 1989). Jacob Berkovitch (ed.), ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance Management inlntemational Affairs
55.
39. In the mrd 1970s the UK subscribed to 126 separate international organizations, from the (London: Macmillan, J 988).
~omm?nwealth Secretariat to the International Municipal Parking Congress. Most other
nch. mtddle-range states are just as involved in the web of international organizations. Chapter 8
Rel'tew of Overseas Representation: Report by tire Celltral Policy Rel'iew Staff [lhl'
Berrill Report} (London: HMSO, 1977) p. 408. l. For an historical perspective on transnational ism sec F.S. Northedge, 'Transnationalism:
4D. Daniel Keohane, 'Realigning neutrality? Irish defence policy and the EU' (Paris: \Vcstern the American illusion', Millennium, vol. 5, no. I, Spring 1976, and Stephen D. Krasner,
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 24, March 2001). 'Power politics, institutions and transnalional relations', in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.).
 342 Notes and References to pp. 188-94 Notes and References to pp. 194-9 343

Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Strunures and p. 13. Hocking and Smith to some extent follow Scyom Brown's i_de.a of 'gl~~al
lmemational Institmions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). polyarchy' in tl1c latter's Neu· Forces, Old Forces, and the Fmure of World Pofiiin
2. The two principal works in this respect were James. N. Rosenau, Linkage Polilin (New (New York: HarpcrCollins, 1995). .
York: Free Press, 1969) and JosephS. Nye and Robert Keohane (cds). Transnational The World Economic Forum, in Davos, Swizerland, is attended by the world's busmess
Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971 ). See also elite, private and public. See [Link] For the transnational anti-
R. W. Mansbach eta/., Tile Web ofWor!d Politics: Non-State Actors in the Gloha! Srstem globalizers see Fran<;ois Houtart and Fran<;ois Pole! (cds), The Other Dm•os: rhe
(London: Prentice Hall, 1976). More recent, and with detailed case-materials. i:-. D;lphne Giohali~ation of Re~·isrance to the World Economic System (London: Zed Books, 2001 ).
Josselin and William Wallace (eds), Non-State Acton· in World Politio- (Basingstoke: James Mayall, 'The variety of states', in Cornelia Navari (ed.), The Condition of State~
Palgrave, 2002). a Study inlnremational Political Theory (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991)
3. The reference is to Raymond Vernon's early book Sovereignry at Bay: rhe Mulrinmional pp.44-60. .
Spread of US EJUerprises (Harlow: Longman, 197 J ), which set the tone for much On the PLO see Barry Rubin, Revolution w1til Vicrory: the Politics and H1story of the
subsequent" work on the 'decline' of the sl<lte. PLO (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994). On the ANC sec Scott
4. In this l broadly follow Ian Clark, in his 'Beyond the Great Divide: globalization and the Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: the Foreign Relations of the ANC since 1960
theory of international relations'. Review of Inrernational Studies (1998), vol. 24. no 4 (London: Tauris Academic, 1995).
pp. 479-98, although I think that Clark exaggerates the historical tendency to separ~t~ Brian Hocking has pioneered work in this area. See his Localizinf.: Foreign Policy: Non-
the domestic and the international. Central GOJ'erwnents and Multilayered Diplomacy (London: Macmillan. 1993) and
5. Nye and Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics, p. xi. Managing Foreign Relations in Federal States (London: Leicester University Press,
6. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Glohal 1993). See also Heidi Hobbs, City Hall Goes Abroad: the Foreign Policy of Local
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press. 1999) Politics (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994).
pp. 1-28. See also Jan Clark's historical contextualization in his Glohali:arion and On the U:[Link], see Karl H. Goetz, 'National governance and European integration: inter-
Fragmentation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and analysis in Globali:alion governmental relations in Gennany',Jormw/ of Common Market Studies, vol. 33, no. I,
and International Relations Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For a 1995. pp. 91-116. . .
powerful critique of the paradigm, see Jwain Rosenberg, The Follies of Globa!isation Chad Alger has long been associated with the study of cities in internauonal relatiOns.
Theory: Polemical Essays (London: Verso, 2000). See his "'Foreign" policies of US publics', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 21,
7. Marshall McLuhan, the Canadian media studies pioneer, is now virtually relegated lo the no. 2, June 1977, pp. 277-318; and 'The world relations of cities- closing the gap
status of curiosity. Some of his ideas. however, were insightful and innovative. between social science paradigms and everyday human experience', Inrenwlional
See Understanding Media: the £ttensions of Man (London: Routledge, 1964), <md The Studies Quarterly, December 1990, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 493-518. On twin-towning, see
Global Village: 'li·ansformations in World Life and Media in the 21st Centurv (New York: J.E. Farquharson and S.C. Holt, Europe from Below: an Assessme!lt of F:·anco-German
Oxford University Press, 1989). . Popular Contacts (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975). It is often actively promoted
8. The speeches of Tony Blair, notably in Chicago in April 1999, to the Labour Panv by governments, as with the EU funding and sponsorship of arrangements between
Conference in October 2000, and in Bangalore on 5 January 2002, arguably constitul~ western Europe and the former USSR under the TACIS aid scheme. . .
the most serious attempt yet to articulate what globalization implies for foreign policy 20. 1 lean here on Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds), Religion, the M1ssu~g
9. Chris Brown, 'Moral agency and international society', and Toni Erskine. 'Assigning Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press for the Center for Strategic
responsibility to institutional moral agent~: the case of slates and quasi-sta~es·, b;th i~ and International Studies. 1994), and in particular on the contributions by Henry
Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 15, no. 2; 2001. Wooster, 'Faith at the ramparts: the Philippine Catholic Church and the 1986 revolutio~'
I0. For an excellent discussion of globalization and the problem of causation sec R.J. Barrv and Douglas Johnston, 'The churches and Apartheid in South Africa'. .
Jones, 'Globalization and change in the international political economy· i~ 21. Barry Rubin, 'Religion and international affairs', in Johnston and Sampson, ~p.ct_t. .
International Affairs (1999), vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 357-66. 22. Fred Halliday has insisted on this truth for many years, in the face of much preJUdice.
11. Adam Warson, The Evolution of International Society: a Comparative Historim! See his Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (London: LB. Tauris, 1996), and Nation
Analysis (London: Routledge, 1992); see, for example, p. 318. and Religion in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2000); see, for example,
12. The sociology of Amitai Etzioni prefigured the understanding of international relations pp. 129-36.
as more complex than either balance of power or world society models would suggest. 23. The three principal foundations are: the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (SPD), the Ko~rad
He emphasized 'the need to treat social units and their change as multilayer phenomena. Adcnauer Foundation (CDU), and Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FDP). FoundatiOns
including at least a performance, a power (or control) and a communication layer·. for the Greens and the ex-Communists of the DDR are also becoming established as
Amitai Etzioni, 'The epigenesis of political communities at the international lever, international actors. The foundations were active in democracy-building ventures in
American Journal of Sociology, LXVII1, (1963), p. 421. Reprinted in James N. Rosenau Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, in central America in the 1980s an~ !n ~astern Europe
(ed.),International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969) pp. 346-5S. in the 1990s. The German stare provides funding, and party compet1Uon IS supposed to
I 3. Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, Beyond Foreign Economic Policy: the United Srares. ensure independence from government. Sec Sebastian Bartsch, 'Political found~tions:
the Single European Market and the Changing World Economy (London: Pinter. 1997) linking the worlds of foreign policy and transnational ism', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwem and
344 Notes and References to pp. 199-209 Notes and Ref"erences to pp. 209-21 345

Karl Kaiser (cds), Germany's New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an See William Wallace, 'Issue linkage among Atlantic governments', and Ann-Margaret
lmerdependent World (Houndmills: Pal grave, 2001 ). Walton, 'Atlantic bargaining over energy·, both in International Affairs, vol. 52, nu. 2.
24. See Donatella Viola, European Foreign Policy and rhe European Parliamem in rhc April 1976.
1990s: An lm·estfgation into the- Role and Votint.: Behaviour of the European Rosenau, Linkage Politics, p. 45.
Parliament's Political Groups (Aidershot: Ashgate, 2000). Rosenau proposed a matrix of up to 3888 cells, each to be studied independently. To ~o
25. See Peter Haas's keynote anicle in Knowledge, Power and lmemational Polin this he muhiplied six kinds of external environment by 24 domestic variab~cs, then _agam
Coordination, the special issue of International Organisation. vol. 46, no. I, Wint~r by three kinds of linkage and nine different kinds of output. Even he lound tlus too
1992, and book with the same title (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, exhaustin!l to follow up. Linkage Politics, pp. 49-51.
1997). E.L woodward, The Age of Reform 1815-1870 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954 l
26. On the CNN effect see Nick Gowing, 'Instant TV and foreign policy', The World Todav, pp. 236-9. A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Maker~·: Dissent over Foreign ~a/icy 1792-/939
October 1994. · (London: Pimlico, 1993) pp. 58-9. Austria was seeking to extradne [Link] from
27. Margaret E. Kcck and Kathryn Sikkink, [Link] beyond Borders: Transnational Turkey and Palmerston sympathized with the popular hostility _in ~ngland t? thl~- much
Ad1•ocacy Networks in World Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. to the fury of his prime minister, Lord Russell. Another mc1dent wh1ch tnflamed
1998); Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The PowerofHuma 11 Anglo-Austrian relations saw General Haynau roughly handled by London brewery
Rights: Imernational Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University workers. .
Press, 1999); Daniel C. Thomas, Boomerangs and Superpowers: the 'Helsinki nnwork' Boston Globe, 23 June 1999. Other states followed suit. Sec also Brannon P. Dennmg
and Human Rights in US Foreign Policy (Florence: European University Institute. 1999) and Jack H. McCall, 'States' rights and foreign policy: Some things should be left to
EUJ Working Paper, RSC 99/23. Washington', J-<Oreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. I, Janua?'~ebruary 20?0· . ,
28. Matthew Evangelista, 'Transnational relations, domestic structures and security policv This third diagram resembles quite closely, bm comc1dentally, F1gure 3 m Ian Clarks
in the USSR and Russia', in Thomas Risse-Kappc;:n (ed.), Bringing Trwwwtion;l 'Beyond the great divide: globalization and the theory of international relations', Review
Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and international Instiflltions. of International Studies (1998), vol. 24, p. 496. .
pp. 146-88. They are, however, partly contingent on international circumstances. For example, van-
29. Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas do not float freely: Transnational coalitions, domestic ous attempts at Sino-Japanese cultural and rrade links were crushed by the ~ol~ War.
structures, and the end of the Cold War', International Organization, vol. 48, no. 2, J.S. Hoadley and S. Hasegawa, 'Sino-Japanese relations 1950-1970: an apphcahon of
Spring 1994, pp. 185-214. the linkage model of international politics', International Studies Quar~erly, June 1971.
30. [Link] of this complex issue, which has rumbled on for more than two decades. On the other hand Anglo-Soviet commerce and cultural contacts grew m the 1960s-7?s
is to be found in David Armstrong, 'Law, justice and the idea of a world society', despite bad intergovernmental relations, largely becau~e no e~p!icit linkages (th~t IS,
International Affairs, vol. 75, no. 3, July 1999, pp. 566-7. sanctions) were attempted. Duncan Wilson, 'Anglo-Sov1et relat10ns: the effect of tdeas
31. By functionalism is meant the integrative consequences of transnational contacts between on reality', Jmemational Affairs, vol. 50, no. 3, July 1974, pp. 380-93. _ . _. ,
specialists, and indeed peoples, working together. See Paul Taylor, 'Functionalism: the 47. M. Giro, 'The Community of San Egidio and its peacc-makmg actiVIties .
theory of David Mitrany', in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (eds), Imenwtimwl The International Spectator, vol. XXXIll, no. 3, 1998.
Organisation (London: Pinter, 1978) pp. 236-52.
32. Samuel Huntington, 'Transnational Organisations in World Politics', World Politics. Chapter 9
vol. 25, April 1973, pp. 333-68.
33. See Chapter 3, above, Note 48. 1. As further developed in Christopher Hill, 'Introduction: the Falklands War and European
34. Peter Katzenstein and Yutaka Tsujinaka, '"Bullying", "buying" and "binding": US- foreign policy', in Stelios Stavridis and Christopher Hill (eds), Do~estic Sources of
Japanese transnational relations and domestic structures', in Risse-Kappen (ed.). Foreign Policy: Westem European Reactions to the Falklands Conjl1ct (Oxford: Berg,
Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, p. 79. 1996) pp. 5-1 I. .
35. Samuel Huntington, 'Transnational organisations in world politics'. It should be noted 2. Pipes quoted in Carriere della Sera, 9 August 2000 (m~ transla_tmn),- Alexander Wendt,
that Huntington's analysis is in part flawed by his insistence on including organizations Social Them}' of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambndge Umverstty Press, ~ 999? p. 2.
like the USAAF in the category of transnational actors. The US Air Force is guilty of 3. Eckart Kehr, Economic 1llferest, Militarism and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: Umvers•ty of
bureaucratic politics, but that is another category. California Press, 1977), with Introduction by Gordon Craig.
36. A conclusion which the excellent case studies in Adeed Dawisha (ed.), Islam in Foreign 4. James N. Rosenau (eel.), The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press,
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) make irresistible. 1967).
37. They are 'nasty ... they defend themselves when attacked'. 5. Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of t~·o-le\:el games'·
38. John Stopford and Susan Strange, Rival States, Ril'Ol Firms: Competition for World International Organization, vol. 42, Summer 1988, pp. 427-60; repnnted m Peter B.
Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Evans. Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds), Double~Edged Diplomac.~·:
39. James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics. lntemational Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of Califorma
346 Nores and Ref"erences to pp. 222-8 Nares and References ro pp. 228-33 347

Press, 1993). The work of Andrew Moravcsik on European integration has carried thi~ 20. Geoffrey Blainey. The Causes ofWars (London: Macmillan, 1973) pp. 70--1.
work further. Sec his The Choice for Europe: Social Pwposc dud State Pm1·er frum 21. Miles Kahler, 'lillroduction: liberalization and foreign policy', in Miles Kahler (ed.).
Messina to Maastricht (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998). The extra EU dimen- Liberalization and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press. I997) p. I 2.
sion arguably creates a third board cin which the game must be played. 22. Halliday identifies four phases of relations between a revolutionary power and the out-
6. Andrew Moruvcsik, 'Introduction: integrating international and domestic theories of side world: a period of grace: confrontation; accommodation; longer-run heterogeneous
intem<o~tional bargaining', in Evans, Jacobson and Putnam (eds). Double-Edged conflict. Halliday, Revolution and World Politics (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999)
Diplomacy, p. 23. pp. 135--40. Whoever has the responsibility for these events, it is certainly striking that
7. For a compelling analysis of these critical interactions, see Fred Halliday, Re1·olllfion and of the major states of the Westphalia system to have undergone violent revolution. the
World Politics: the Rise and Fall ofthe Sixth Great Pmver (London: Macmillan, 1999). majority (Brilain, America, France, Russia, China and Iran) have found themselves
especially chapter 5, 'The antimonies of revolutionary foreign policy'. engaged in serious warfare in the decade after their revolution succeeded.
8. Peter B. Evans, 'Building an integrative approach to international and domestic politics: -23. Richard Little, £rternallntervellfion in Civil Wars (London: Martin Robertson, 1975).
reflections and projections', in Evans, Jacobson and Pulnam (eds), Doublc-Edgcd 24. On Italy, sec Carlo M. Santoro, La Polilica Est era di Una Media Potenza (Bologna: II
Diplomacy, pp. 402-3. Mulino, 1991) pp. 177-246. On France, Dorothy Pickles, The Fijlh Republic, 2nd edn
9. The concentric circles model of policy-making was introduced by Roger Hilsman. in hi~ (London: Methuen, 1962).
To Movc a Nation: the Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of Jo/111 F 25. On 'policy modes' see Helen Wallace, 'An:llysing and explaining policies', in Helen
Kennedy (New York: Della, 1964) pp. 541-4. Hilsman acknowledges his debt to Gabriel Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn
Almond's model of public opinion and foreign policy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 71-2. Professor Wallace acknowledges
10. The Rabbi was Ovadiah Yosef. See The G11ardian, 8 August2000. a debt to the earlier work of John Peterson.
11. See Chapter 2, note 23. 26. For the nineteenth-century concept of the 'constitutional state', bm with particular
12. For an overview of foreign policy- domestic relations, see Avner Yaniv, 'Domestic reference to foreign policy, see Roy E. Jones, Principles of Foreign Policy (Oxford:
structure and external flexibility: a systemic restatemem of a neglected theme'. Martin Robertson, 1979), for example, pp. 83-7.
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 8, no. I, Spring 1979. 27. Uwe Leonardy, 'Federation and Liinder in German foreign relations: power-sharing in
13. Israel could not pursue its assertive and highly militarized stance in the Middle East treaty-making and European affairs', in Brian Hocking (ed.), Foreign Relations and
without the uniquely unconditional underwriting of its debts from the USA. The Federal States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993) pp. 236--51. The quotation
Argemine military junta in 1982 sought w escape from its chronic financial difficulties (p. 249) is from Bismarck's speech to the Reichstag of the North German Confederation
with a self-justifying war over the Falkland Islands, only to be forced to face realities in on 16 April 1869, and is itself a citation from Gennan sources.
the most humiliating fashion through military defeat. 28. Leonardy, [Link]., especially pp. 237--41.
14. See Warren L Cohen, America in rhe Age of Sm•iet Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 29. A point made by Brian Hocking, in his 'Patrolling the "frontier": globalization, local-
University Press, 1993) pp. 198-201. ization and the "actorncss" of non-central governments', Regional and f<'ederal Studies,
15. For a plausible version of the stronger view, that the United States actively sought the vo1.9,no.l, 1999,pp. 17-39.
division of Cyprus, and cynically engineered it, see Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig. 30. The sanctions have been imposed through public policies of disinvestment or elective
American E.~pionage and the Turkish Invasion (London: LB. Tauris, 1999). procurement at the NCG level. See John M. Kline, 'Managing intergovernmental
16. On Greece, see Thanos Veremis, Greece's Balkan Entanglement (Athens: HeHenic tensions: shaping a state and local role in US foreign relations', in Hocking (ed.), Foreign
Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1995). Relations and Federal Swtes, p. Ill; also Chapter 8 above.
17. FrankL. Klingberg, Cyclical Trends in Amei·ican Foreign Policy Moods (Lanham, Md: 31. See Hocking (ed.), Foreign Relations and Federal States_. passim. Also Michelmarm and
University Press of America, 1983). Also Jack E. Holmes, The Mood/Interest Theory of Soldatos (eds), Federalism and lnternatimral Relations (Oxford: Oxford University
American Foreign Policy (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1985). Press, 1990). The early history of Nigeria provides examples of the regional govern-
18. John Keegan, 'The ordeal of Afghanistan', The Atlantic Monthly, November 1985, ments going their own way. See Lloyd Jensen, E\plaining Foreign Policy (Englewood
pp. 94-105. Two important articles in Review of lntemational Studies, vol. 25, no. 4, Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1982) p. 116; also Stephen Wright and Julius Emeka Okolo,
OclOber 1999, concentrate on the extraordinary impact of the Afghanistan War of 'Nigeria: ·aspirations of regional power', in Stephen Wright (ed.), African Foreign
1979---89 on the Soviet Union and the Cold War: Fred Halliday, 'Soviet foreign policy- Policies (Boulder: Westview, 1999) especially pp. 123--4-. In India, Hyderabad and
making and the Afghanistan war: from "second Mongolia" to bleeding wound', Review. Kcrala have been opting out of international agreements on power-station installations
pp. 675-91; Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash, 'The Afghanistan war and the break- (Jam grateful to Ticn-Sze Feng for this infonnation).
down of the Soviet Union', Review, pp. 693-708. 32. Stuart Harris, in 'Federalism and Australian foreign policy', in Hocking (ed.), Foreign
19. Rudolph J. Rummel, 'The relationship between national attributes and foreign Relations and Federal States, pp. 90-104, makes it clear that the Australian states have
conflict behaviour', in J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative l!lfemational Politics: insights tended to have a diminished direct role in international dealings as they have come to
and Evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968) p. 208. Pitirim Sorokin was the noted soci- cooperate more with the Commonwealth (central) government (p. 103).
ologist of conflict. Rummel cites his Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: America 33. Sec Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971)
Book, 1937). p. 319.
 348 Notes and References to pp. 233-6 Notes and References to pp. 237-44 349
34. There were 48 ltalia~ governments between 1946--92. Even after 1992. when the process just the nco-realists who stress the importance of international structures over the domes-
of reform_ began, little changed until 2001, when the electoral victory of Silvio tic. See Christopher Hill. ·Introduction: the Falklands War and European foreign policy·,
Berluscom seemed to presage a four-year term of office. For the image of Italy abroad in Stelios Stavridis and Christopher Hill (eds), Domestic Sources of Foreif:n Potier.
see the acc?unt of one of the country's few specialized diplomatic correspondents: Din~ pp. 6-11. Brian ~hite picks up on this point in his 'The European Challenge to
Frescoba!dJ, Con g!i ocelli df'gli altri (Florence: Le Lettere, 2000). Foreign Policy Analysis', Eumpean Journal of International Relations, val. 5, no. I.
35. A vi Shlaim and Avner Yaniv, 'Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Israel'. in
January 1999, p. 38.
International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 1980, pp. 256 and 262. Sec also Yael Yishai 45. British male householders had the vote from 1885, but not all males over 21 until 1918.
'Domest_ic inputs i~to foreign policy-making: the case of the settlement issue'. Rel'iew
0
j Jn the same year women over 30 gained the vote. Women had to wait until 1928 for equal
lnternatwnal Stud1es, vol. 8, no. 3, July 1982. enfranchisement with men. In France universal male sulTrage came and went between
36. The 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and
1793-1848, when it returned for good. Women, however, did not get the vote until 1944.
the Russian Federation' was signed on 27 May 1997. --""··-·-46. Britain and France declared war on Germany in both 1914 and 1939, without having
37.
?n ~he links ~tween dom~stic ~ontinuity and i~1tcmational success, sec T.J. Pempcl. been auacked by her. They must share some responsibility at least for the tensions which
Japanese Fore1gn Economic Polley: the DomestiC Bases for International Behaviour' led to war in 1914, as must the United States for those before Pearl Harbor. Examples of
in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Between Pmver and P!emy: Foreign Economic Polich·; failures to consider compromise peaces are more contestable bm it is striking how the
of Advanced Industrial Countries (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. IIJ78) idea was regarded as unthinkable, even treasonable, in Britain in 1916-17 (over Lord
especially pp. 145-57. Lansdowne's peace initiative), or in the United States in 1951-2 (McCarthyism) and
38. This two-way process was reinforced by transgovemmental, inter-elite ties. See Peter
1965-8.
Katzenst~in and Yu~a Tsujinaka, '"Bullying". "Buying" and "Binding": US-Japanese 47. This thesis is propounded vigorously in the many writings ofNoam Chomsky and John
Tr~ns~altonal Relatmns and Domestic Structures', in Thomas Risse-Kappcn (ed.). Pilger. For an application of it to a single country, see Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of
Bnngmg Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Power: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (London: Zed Books, 1995).
1995). Another example of elections returning the same party for decades is Mexico 48. This was the doctrine notoriously enunciated by Jean Kirkpatrick, Ronald Reagan's
where the People's Revolutionary Party (PRJ) was in office from 1929 until expelled b): Ambassador to the UN. See her DictatorslujJs and Double Standards: Rationalism and
the voters in 2000.
Realism in Politics (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1982). The eponymous article of the
39. Stephen Wright, 'The Changing Context of African Foreign Policies', in Stephen Wrioht title first appeared in Commentary, November 1979, as a critique of Jimmy Carter's
(ed.), African Foreign Polides, pp. 10-19. "' foreign policy.
40. Mic~ael Doyle, 'Kant, liberal legacies and foreign affairs', Philosophy and Public 49. Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, pp. 130-5.
~ffmrs, vol. 12, no. 3-4, Summer-Autumn 1983, pp. 205-35 in no. 3 and pp. 323-53 50. As argued by Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, 'Democratic states and commitment in International
m no. 4. Also his 'Liberalism and world politics', American Political Science Reriew. Relations', in Miles Kahler (ed.), Liberalization and Foreign Policy, pp. 28-65.
vaL 80, no. 4, December 1986, pp. 1151-69. Immanuel Kant made the original argumen; 51. Speech by John Bright on 'Foreign policy', Birmingham, 29 October 1858, in Selected
in 'Perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch' in 1795. This is most easily avail:bk in Speeches of the Rt. fJonoumble John Bright MP on Public Questions (London:
Hans Reiss (ed.), Kam: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge Univcrsitv Press, J.M. Dent & Sons, 1907) p. 204.
1991) pp. 93-130. .
52. See Steven T. Levine, 'Perception and ideology in Chinese foreign policy', and Paul H.
41. Laurence Martin, The Two-edged Sword: Armed Force in the Modern World (Londow Kreisberg, 'China's Negotiating Behaviour', both in Thomas W. Robinson and David
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982) p. 90. .
Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Pracrice (Oxford: Clarendon
42. The main works since Doyle have been Bruce Russett's Grasping the Democratic Peace: Press, 1994).
Principlesf~r a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); 53. William R. Polk, Neighbours and Strangers: the Fundamentals of Foreign Affairs
Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Democratic peace - warlike democracies:1 A social (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) pp. 118 and 226.
constructivist interpretation of the liberal argument', European Journal of 54. See Bhabani Sen Gupta, 'Forget ideology, Give them onions!', The World Today,
International Relations, vaL I, no. 4, December 1995, pp. 491-517; R.J. Rummci, February 1998, vaL 54, no. 2, pp. 40-1.
'Democracies ARE less warlike than other regimes', European .Ioumal of 55. The Independent, 2 February 2000.
lnternaaonal Relations, vol. l, no. 4, December 1995, pp. 649-64; Robert Latham 56. For the first key work on feminist approaches to IR see Rebecca Grant and Kathleen
'Democracy and war-making: locating the international liberal context', Millennium.: Newland (eds), Gender and International Relations (Milton Keynes: Open University
Journal of International Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, Summer 1993; Michael E., Brown, Press, 1991); also Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations: an Introduction
Sean M., Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (cds), Debating the Democraric Puu·e (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). Gender theorists are building on work already begun
(Cambridge, Mass: MJT Press, 1996); Miles Kahler (ed.), Liberalization and Foreir;n in psychoanalysis about repression, control and violence. See Wilhelm Reich, The Sexual
Policy. '
Revolution: Towards a Self-Governing Character Struclllre (London: P. Nevill, 1951)
43. For one of the clearer examples see Erich Weede. 'Democracy and war involvement', and Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Cape, 1976).
Journal of Conflict Resolution, voL 28, no. 4, December 1984, pp. 649-64. 57. This is not to undervalue the role of the 'madres de Ia Plaza de Mayo' in Argentina, or
44. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Pre.~.s. 1959), any of those who struggle against powerlessness. In modern conditions of reduced labour
and Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979). It is not and role differentiation, however, men are increasingly in the same position.
 350 Notes and References to pp. 244-52 Notes and References to pp. 253-6 351
58. Christopher Hill, ''"Where are we going?" International Relations and the voice r
bei'R· . rom mainly through committees and is hardly a forum for open debate. See Elizabeth
ow, evww oflntematiOnal Studies. vol. 25. no. I, January 1999, pp. 107-22. See Economy and Michel Oksenberg (eds). China Joins tile WOrld: Pro[{ress and Pros peers
Chapter I 0 below.
(New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999).
59. Pameh.t Beshoff, Strucrura/ist and Realist Per.~pectires in !amaica 11 Foreion p .
? , . .. ·. ~ 1
01cy
3. Margot Light, 'Democracy, democratisation and foreign policy in post-socialist
197_-1980 (London School of EconomiCS and Poht1cal Science, unpublished PhD Russia'. in Hazel Smi1h (ed.), Democi·acy and International Relations: Critical
lhesis, 1988).
Theories/Problematic Practices (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) pp. 90--107.
60. Chr_istopher Hill. 'Theorie:>; of foreign policy-making for developing countries'. in 4. The literature on Executive-Congressional relations in foreign policy is voluminous.
Chnswphcr Clapham (ed.), Foreign Policy-Making in De1··eloping Coumries (London· Particularly useful for their comparative range are Stephen E. Ambrose, 'The Presidency
Sax?n Hou~e: 1977). For an alternative view see Bahgat Korany er al., How Foreig ; and foreign policy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 5, Winter 1991-2; Michael Lee.
1
Policy Decwons are Made in rhe Third World: a Comparative Approach (Boulder· 'Parliament and foreign policy: some reflections on Westminster and Congressional
Westview, 1985). .
experience', Irish Swdies in International Affairs, vol. 2, no. 4, 1988; Eugene R.
61.
Forth: Concept of pivotal s~tmes, see Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (eds), Wittkopf and James M. MeCom1ick (eds), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign
The Pn•otal States: a New framework for US Policy in the Developing World (New York· Polhy: Insights and Evidence (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
W.W. Norlon, 1999) pp. 1-Jl. The cases considered are Indonesia, India, Pakistan: 5. This wa" the Ca"e Act of 197 [. For that and the War Powers Act, see Francis 0. Wilcox.
Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Algeria and Mexico. and Richard A. Frank (eels), The Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy (New
62. See D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 1830-1914 (London: MacmiHan, 1984).
York: Praeger, 1976) pp. 83-138.
63. Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft: intervention in an A~e of !mer-
6. Rainer Baumann and Gumher Hellmann, 'Germany and the use of military force: "total
dependence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982). On the difficulties which war", the "culture of restraint" and the quest for normality', in Douglas Webber (ed.),
Moscow s~metimes had with sister communist panics, see Eric Hobsbawm, 'The New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? Special Issue of German Politics, vol.
"~oscow !me" and_ ~ntemationa~ communist policy', in Chris Wrigley (ed.), Htinfarc, 10, no. I, April 2001, pp. 68-74. Also Alan Sked, Cheap Excuses, or Life, Death and
Diplomacy and Politics: Essays m Honour of A J.P. Tavlor (London: Hamish Hamilton European Unity (London: the Brugcs Group, 1991). Whatever the exact legal position,
1986) pp. 163-88. - '
the Court's ruling helped create a new political consensus, previously hindered by
64.
For important aspects of the extensive historical debate on the origins, definition and differing legal interpretations.
meaning of fascism, see S.J. Woolf (ed.), The Nature of Fascism (London: Weidenteld & 7. LM. Destler era/., Managing an Alliance: the Polin'cs of US-Japanese Relations
Ni~~lson, I ~6-8), which contains a seminal piece by Tim Mason ('The primacy of (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976) p. 15, cited by Raymond Cohen, Negotiating
po!JtJcs- polJtlCS and economics in National Socialist Germany'). across Cultures: International Communication in an lnterdependenr World, rev. edn
65. It may be objected that the Brazilian para-fascist Vargas actually declared war on (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) p. 132.
the Axis i~ 1942 and sent troops to fight them in Italy. What is interesting about this, 8. Christopher Hill and James Mayall, 'The Sanctions Problem: International and European
however, lS not only the geopolitical factor (a wish not to fight the USA) but also the Perspectives', EUI Working Paper no. 59. European University Institute, Florence, July
inability to stay out of war.
66. 1983.
~ecordingly differences between lhese traditions can lead to diplomatic misunderstand-
mgs. See Raymond Cohen, 'Resolving conflict across languages', Negotiation Journal,
I 9. The point made in Lisa Martin's Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and Inter-
national Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
vol. 17, no. l, 2001, pp. 17-34.
67.
10. 'Peace nears, but selling il is Barak's test', The Guardian, 10 December 1999.
This i~portant question is developed in Ayla Gol, The Place of Foreign Policy 1i 1 the I I. The Chinese -~ide, taking the view that Hong Kong was their territory in the first
Transmon to Modernity: Turkish Policy towards the Somh Caucasus, 1918-1921 place, and therefore did not require a 'treaty', insisted on referring to the deal as
(London School of Economics and Political Science, PhD thesis, 2001). merely 'an agreed announcement'. Harold C. Hinton, 'China as an Asian Power', in
Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory
Chapter 10
and Practice, p. 355; Percy Cradock, Experiences of China (London: John Murray,
1994) pp. 214-16.
I.
R_es~on~ibility ~s disc_ussed f~rther in Chapter 11. It is worth noting that despite the [2. Keith Jackson and Jim Lamare, 'Politics, public opinion and international crisis:
dJstmctwns evtdent 10 English usage, in both French and Italian the same word the ANZUS issue in New Zealand politics', in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), ANZUS in
(responsable/responsabile) may be used for both 'accountable' and 'responsible', Crisis: Alliance Managemelll in International Affairs (London: Macmillan, 1988)
because in these cu!LUres the concept of trust is central to both. pp. 175-6.
2.
On the Supreme Soviet, see Vernon Aspaturian, Proces~- and Power in Soviet f-Oreign 13. Stephen E. Ambrose, 'The Presidency and foreign policy', Foreign Affairs, voi. 70,
Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) pp. 592-5 and 676-83. On China there is li!tle no. 5, Winter 1991-2, p. 127.
written, but see David Shambaugh, 'Patterns of interaction in Sino-American relations· 14. Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938, 7th edn
in Thorn~ W Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Po/i(y: Them"): (London: Penguin, 1993) pp. 199-20 l.
~nd Practtce_(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) p. 215. The NPC is beginning to become 15. John Tower eta!., Tower Commission Repol"t (New York: Bantam Books and New York
mvolved on ISSues such as human rights, the environment and information, but works Times, 1987).
 352 Notes and References to pp. 256-62 Notes and References to pp. 262-5 353

16. This was the Chevaline warhead enhancement project. See Lawrence Freedman
r • WN
n,.,·, 33.
The distinction was originally made by Gabriel Almond, in his The American People and
an d J:uc/ear Weapons (London: Macmillan, 1980). On this occasion the British govern- Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1950).
ment s news management, in tcnns of keeping the issue unremarked, \Vas particular[ The ACP-EEC Courier (Brussels: European Commission), No. 8. Novcmber/Dccembet
successful. y 34.
1984. . . . .,.
17. Filippo Andreatta and Christopher Hill, 'Italy', in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon Cited in Eric Altennan, 'Reading foreign pohcy: are those JOurnals talkmg to IB" · •
35.
(eds), The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge. 1997) The Nation, 27 October 1997.
pp. 78-9. A comeslant on a British TV general knowledge quiz, on being asked n11ice 'in which
36.
18. :Malaysia Supplement', Financial Times, 14 November 1988, p. 2l. In cases like this it European country is Mount Etna?' answered first 'Japan' and then 'Mexico'. Prnme
IS rather more likely that u ctrcision-maker will talk to a foreign journalist, than 1o hi~ Eye, no. 104-7,8-21 February 2002, p. 8. _.
own members of parliament. Roger Jowell and James D. Spence. The Grudging Europeans: a Swdy_ of Brmsh
37.
19. Ch~rles Carstairs and Richard Ware (eds), Par!iameJU and International Relation.\ Altitudes towards the EEC (London: SCPR, 1975) pp. 1-7. Remarkably, g1ven subse-
(M1Iton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991). quent events only 33 per cent thought the issue of UK membership 'very important'- a
20. Thi~ is the observation of Elfriede Regelsberger <1bou1 Germany, in Stelios Stavridis :md figure which rose only to 52 per cent when the category of ~i~portant' ~as added.
Chnstopher Hill (eds), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Western European Reactions 38. MORT poll (D) s/s 2022, in Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Ph1hp K. Hastmgs (eds), Index
to the Falklands Conflict (Oxford: Berg, 1996), p. 71. to International Public Opinion, 1979-1980 (Oxford: Clio Press, 1981) P· 89. The
21. Privale interview, 6 February 1998. Dutch negotiators told foreign colleagues that Strategic Anns Limitation Talks (SALT) were identified correctly by only 16 per cent.
they would have settled for parity but the Parliament was afraid that the Netherlands Interestingly there was a significant gender split in the results, with men being better
would :v~ntually_ end up with fewer votes than Romania. This may have been merely informed than women, and also a clear class split, with information levels falling geo-
a negohatmg tact1c. metrically. For example the EEC was identified by 72 per cent of men and 50 per cent
22. It has been ar~ued that in t_h~ United States foreign policy is generally to the advantage of women, by 76 per cent of social class AB, 71 per cent of C1, 61 per cent of C2 and
of the R~pubhc_an~. Sec W1lham A. Galston and Christopher J. Makins, 'Campaign '88 44 per cent of DE.
and fore1gn policy , Foreign Policy, Summer 1988, pp. 3-21. 39. Reported in The Economist, 30 July 1988. In a Washington PosT-ABC New~· poll of
23. Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London: 14---18 October 1981, 53 per cent of Americans had not been able to answer correctly the
Cape, 1975), for example, pp. 266-9. See also Angus Calder, The People's War question 'which country, the United States or the Soviet Union, is a member of NATO?'
(London: Granada, 1971 ). Washington Post, 21 October 1981.
24. William A. Galston and Christopher J. Makins, 'Campaign '88 and foreign policy' 40. Edward Mortimer, 'Parts that glasnost fails to reach', Financial Times, 22 Sep1ember 1987 ·
Foreign Policy, Summer 1988, p. 4. 41. As Yves Meny says, 'we have probably gone too far insulating the people from politics,
25. Ibid., pp. 3-4. except in rather conventional, ritualistic exercises such as elections. The populism which
26. Margot Light, 'Information war', The World Today, February 2000. is once again appearing on the stage mighl be understood as a signal, as the call and need
27. The Independent, I January 1997. for major involvement of the civil society'. Yves Meny, The People, the Elites and the
28. This is obvious from a study of the invaluable Nuffield Election Studies, produced afler Populist C hal!enge, Jean Monnet Chair Paper 4 7 (Fiesole: Robert Schuman Centre at the
ev~ry gene_rat election by David Butler and colleagues. See for example, David Butler and European University Inslitute, 1998) p. 22.
~Ichael Pmot-Duschinsky, The General Election of 1970 (London: Macmillan, 1971). 42. It is not surprising that mutinies broke out in 1917-18, or that they were suppressed. It
29. The complex world of Peter Hain', The Economist, 24 June 2000. is a testimony both to the power of the stale and the demoralization of the troops that
30. The election of2000 did not stop President Clinton continuing to mediate between Israel there were not more. See Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience: the French
and the Palestinians. But it did lead the US to inform other members of the UN Securitv Fifth Infantry Division during World War l (Princeton, NJ: Princet~n Unive~s~ty PreSS,
Cou~cil that it would permit an end to sanctions against Sudan - but only once th~ 1994) pp. 175-214; and David Englander, 'Discipline and morale m the Bntlsh Army
electiOns were over. Financial Times, 29 June 2000. 1917-18', in John Horne (ed.), State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the
31. ~r _Den! was a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Keele, and a First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 125-43.
d1stmgmshe_d ~fricanist, When he launched his campaign for a Millennia! amnesty for 43. We the Peoples: the Role of the Unired Nations in the Twenty-First Century, A/54/2000
poor _cou_ntn~s debt, together with ex-diplomat Bill Peters. The campaign snowballed. (New York: UN General Assembly, 27 March 2000) pp. 9-11.
culmmatmg m extensive demonstrations at the G7 summit in Birmingham in 1998. Dent 44. In theory this means, following Burke's classical formulation, that they pr~cisely do
a~d Peters drew_ the l~ss~n from the anti-slavery campaign that influence was only pos- not just acl as a megaphone for their conslituents, but are free to follow ~udge~ent
Sible on the bas1s of a stmple and radical goal', and they succeeded in movino official <1nd conscience. Edmund Burke, 'Speech at the Conclusion of the Poll m Bnstol.
opinion. Independent on Sunday, 17 May 1998. "' 3 November 1774', in Paul Langford (ed.), The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke.
32. Michel Tatu, 'Public opinion as both means and ends for policy-makers', in The Conduct Vo/.l/1: Party. Parliament, and the American War, 1774-1778 (Oxford: Clarendon Press.
of East-West Relations in the 1980s: Part Ill: Paper.~ from the llSS 25th Anmwl 1996) pp. 63-70. In practice they follow the Whips more than the voters. _
Conference, Summer 1984 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984) 45. Pluralism assigns political power to the self-assertive, 1he active and awculate, and
pp. 26-32. assumes !hat the introverted, the passive. and the silent are content lo act a~ speclators to
 354 Notes and References to pp. 265-8 Notes and References to pp. 269-72 355

democracy. This omits to address the issues of agcnda-seuing, education and access. K . . 1987) pp. 39-55. Herring refers to a contemporary study of poll data.
Press o f ansas, . . , A .·. p ["(·at
Steven Lukes, in Power: a Radical View (London: Macmillan. 1974). viz;. Sidney Verba ct a/ .. 'Public opinion and the warm V1etnam , me!!call o In
46. This is the result, as Cynthia Enloe has pointed out, of assuming that 'margins stay mar- Science Re1'iew. vol. 61, June !967. pp. 317-33.. . . . . .
ginal, the silent stay voiceless and ladders are neVer turned upside down'. Cynthia Enloe Thomas Rissc-Kappen, 'Public opinion, domestic structure and fore;n policy m hbeml
58.
'Margins, silences and bottom rungs: how to overcome the underestimation of power i~ democracies', World Politics, vol. 43, no. 41, July 1991, P_P· 479-5L. . . .
the study of intcmationa! relations', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski Certainly the number of individuals involved in imematmnal NGO actt~tty has ~~~en
(cds), /mernational Theory: Positil'ism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge Universitv ·I It ·s estimated that 2600 representatives attended the Fourth \\orld
enormous y. t · 35 000 h
Press, 1996) p. 189. See also Christopher Hill,' "Where are we going'!" lntcrnution~J Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995. and no fewer than-. . 1 :
Relations and the voice from below', Review of International Studies, val. 25, no. I, official forum held in parallel. See James A. Paul, 'Non-governmental organtzattons ,
January 1999, pp. 107-22. ~:Joel Krieger (ed.), Oxford Companion ro Politics of the Worhl, 2nd edn (New York:
47. This metaphor is taken from Beman! C. Cohen. The Public's Impact on Foreign Po!h.y - ·-·------ .. Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 598-601. . . .
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1973) pp. 178-9. Ironically Cohen took it from the perplexed · d b Heidi Hobbs in her review article of a book which seeks to recttfy tim,
60. Aspomtc ou 1 Y . . A ..
Captain of the US destroyer Maddox, the ship involved in the Gulf of Tonkin incident. · David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson (cds), The Lmuts of State utonm1~_, ·.
48. 'In three days last week I had 2450 letters and 1860 of them were stop the war in one ~~z;fetal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder, Col: Westview, _1993). He~d1
form or another' (Neville Chamberlain, letter to his sister Ida, 8 October 1939, NC · 1 1 · · foreign policy analysis' • Mcrshonlnternatwnal Studies
Hobbs, 'Theoreuca evo utwn m
18/1/1071-91, University of Birmingham Library). See also the Cabinet Minute of Review, vol.l, no. I, 1994, pp. 158-60. . . .
7 October 1939 (CAB65/I WM 39 [4]. Public Record Office), which shows that he took For further problems of definition, sec Lester Milbraith, 'Interest _groups _m toretgn pol~
61.
the letters to indicate that only 'a small section of society' was pacifist. icy', in James N. Rosenau (ed.), The Domestic Sources of Foreign Polley (New York.
49. Anthony Eden, Memoirs: Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960) p. 546. Eden went on to Free Press, 1967).
cite other evidence, including opinion polls, but all to the effect that the majoritv
62. Ibid., p. 251. fi k' 1 1 f10 n
had come to swing round behind him. A guess may be hazarded that the strain of th~ The FPA was founded in 1918 and is non-partisan and non-pro .ll~ma, mg. ts e ec .
63.
cognitive dissonance and denial contributed to his worsening physical health. briefings, special 'Headline Series' of briefmgs, and. 'Great ~~ctston~ ann~al publica-
50. It was one conclusion of the three-volume collective study on foreign policy and public tions draw attention to the foreign policy issues facm~ t~e [Link] ~n a way no, other
opinion in Europe between 1870 and 1981 that 1945 constituted a decisive break-point. country manages to equal- except possibly France, wtth ItS htgh quahty press co\erage
in that 'Ia notion de legitimite est totalemem remise en cause'. Philippe Levillain. of foreign affairs. See the FPA's website at [Link]. , . .· . .
'Opinion publiquc et politique ext€rieure de 1870 a 1981 ',in Opinion publique et Diana Johnstone, The Politics of Euromissiles: Europe_s Role m Ame11c~ s. W~rld
64.
politique exririeure, lll1945-1981 (Rome/Milan: UniversitA di Milano/Ecole Fraw;aise . .., 1984)· Thomas Risse-Kappen, CooperatiOn among Democwcws. the
(L ondon. verso, ' · U · 't p
de Rome, 1985) pp. 310-12. European bif/tlence 011 US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Pnncet;n mvers1 Y .ress,
51. Viz., the very close vote in favour of the Maastricht Treaty in France in 1992, that in J995), especially pp. 188-91. The previous [Link]~ over the neutron bomb had
Denmark which actually rejected the Treaty and compelled a Danish opt-out, and that in sensitized public opinion and strengthened the orgamzatwn o~ peace gro_ups. .· .
Ireland in 2001 which cast the ratification process of the Treaty of Nice into doubt. Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: the Power of Ethnic Groups Ill the Making ofAmnu:an
65.
52. The Guardian, 10 December 1999. The pressure was reinforced by demonstrations. Two Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000) .PP· .6~, 107. in
hundred thousand people were estimated to have demonstrated in Tel Aviv on 9 January It is interesting that the protests against the World T~ade O~gamzatwn m Seattle.
66.
2000 against handing over the Golan. 'Israelis show increasing reluctance to give up November 1999 were based on the coordination of thtrty natiOnal movements, V.:htch

53.
Golan', The Guardian, 12 January 2000.
Polish poll cited by Jerzy Urban in his lecture to the Royal Institute of International
continue to press for their own countries to withdraw from the w:o. The t,rans~atlo~
and the national dimensions should not therefore be seen as opposttes. Se: ~n S war·~·
Affairs, London, 17 February 1987, on 'the relationship between domestic and interna· · · · h • ~,·, Wol!"ch the Director of the US consumer organtzatlon Pubh
an mtervtew wt 1 LN " " , .
tional factors in Polish foreign policy'. The police censorship reports for 1942-3 were Citizen's offshoot Global Trade Watch. Foreign Policy, no. 118, Spnng 2000.
cited in the Italian TV Channel RA13's 'L'Ultimo Mussolini' of 4 September 2000. Sec Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments, pp. 110-15. .
67.
also Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano's Diary,l939-1943 (London: Heinemann, 1947) See, on Chile, Emilio Menesis. 'The military vote', The World ro~ay, vol. 5_5, no. ~2,
68.
pp. 519 and 527. ?3-5· and on Macedonia, Thanos Veremts, Greece s Balkan
D ecem b er 1999 , Pp · - • · r 1995)
54. Danna Hannan, 'Addressing the audience back home', Jerusalem Post, 23 March 1999. Emanglement (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European. and ~oret~n ~o tcy, .·
Netanyahu harvested the Soviet immigrant votes but still lost the election. For information on these groups see Manin Ceadel, Pacifism m Bnta!ll, I914-45. the
69.
55. Andrew J. Pierre (ed.), Domestic Change and Foreign Policy: a WideninR Arfamic."' Defining of a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). . .
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986). As with the 'military-industrial complex', a term first [Link]~ed by Etsenhow_e~ 111
70.
56. Christopher Hill, The Decision-MakinR Proce~·s in Relation to British Foreign Policy. his farewell address to the American people. The balance Wllhl~ the complex. may b~
I938-194I, unpublished [Link], University of Oxford, 1979, p. 378. shifting, with trends towards an ever more capital-intensive an~ ht_g~-t:ch ~rms _md.ustr)"~
57. George C. Herring, 'The War in Vietnam', in Robert A. Divine (ed.), The Johnson Yean t on private enterprise and a less tmhtanzed soctety. Se
1hestateevermo 'e dependen ' 11 f
Volume I: Foreign Policy, the Great Society and rhe White House (Lawrence: University David Held and Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perralon, G ow
 ~c·.
' -•-·"
! ..
356 Notes and References to pp. 272-7 Notes and References to pp. 277-85 357

Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press 1999) I'P· 85. Quoted by Simon Serfaty, in his The Media and Foreign Policy, p. 14.
137-9. . •
86. For example, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, 1\lanufacturing CoJJsew: the
71. The term is u~ed ?Y Eldon Eisenach, in his The Lost Promise of Pror:ressh'ism Political Economy of the Mass Media (London: Vintage, 1994); John Pilger, Distalll
(Lawr~nce: UmversJty Press of Kansas, 1994) cited by Inderjeet Parmar, '"Mobilizina Voices (London: Vintage, 1992).
Amenca for an internationalist foreign policy": the role of the Council on Fore·a"" 87. This still leaves many countries where debate, while ostensibly free, is thin or manipu-
Relations', Studies in American Political Del'elopmenr. vol. 13 Fall 1999 "37-?t;n lated, as in Putin's Russia. Encouragingly, however. there was some media criticism in
72. Ibid. ' ' pp. _, .·
India of the explosion of a nuclear weapon, a sensitive issue in any country. See Fran~
73. Chadwick Alger, 'The external bureaucracy in United States foreirrn affair-· Louis Rusciano, 'A world beyond civilisations: using global opinion theory to explain
~dministrative Science Quarterly, vol. 7, June 1962, cited in Inderjeet P~nnar, 'T~~ international order', in [Link] of Public Opinion Research. January 200 I.
Issue__ of state ~ower: the Council of Foreign Relations as a case study', Journal of Also Keith HindeH, 'The influence of the media on foreign policy', llllernational
Am~1rcan Studies, vol. 29, no. I, 1995, p. 73. Mr Pannar is almost alone in researchino Relations, vol. 12, no. 4, April 1995.
the important theme of foreign policy and expert opinion. "' 88. Mark Leonard and Yidhya Alakeson, Going Public: Diplomacy for r!re Information
74. For a use_ful earl.y set of essays, mostly on the US, see Simon Serfaty (ed.), The Media Society (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2000) p. 59.
an~ Forergn Policy (London: Macmillan. 1990). Serfaty's conclusion that the media are 89. As reported by NATO's press spokesman Jamie Shea at a seminar of the Foreign Policy
'nelth~r hero nor villain' is a useful reminder not to discount the wider political context. Centre, the BBC World Service, the British Council and Design Council, London,
75. Benedict ~~derson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991 ).
16 May 2000.
76. Th: D?mmion governments at the time were in the process of enlarging their forei~<n 90. The data is from Jarol B. Manheim, S!rategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign
polt~y tndependence from London. I am indebted for this example to the one-time dipl~- Policy: the El'olution of Injlllence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994)
matJ~ corre~pondent of The Guardian, Mr Patrick Keatley, and his seminar to the LSE\ pp. 15-16 and pp. 165-6.
Fore1gn PoiJcy workshop entitled 'The Press and the Diplomats'. 91. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy, pp. 145-7; on Malaysia see Wally Olins, Trading
77. See S~san L. Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the fdelfliries: why counrries and companies are taking 011 each others' roles (London: The
Twen{leth Ce~tury (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) pp. 210-13; and Nicholas J. Foreign Policy Centre, 1999) p. 17.
Wheeler, S~vm~ Strangers: Humanitarian Intervenrion in International Society (Oxford: 92. Olios, passim. See also Alan Chong and Jana Valencic (eds), The Image, the State and
Oxford Umvers!ly Press, 2000) pp. 165-6. As Wheeler points out, it would be wrono to Imemational Relations: (London: London School of Economics and Political Science,
account _for the s~f~ havens in tenns just of media influence- or any single factor_ ebm 2001, EFPU Working Papers 2001/2).
th: medta, at a mmimum, helped to legitimize the policy at home. 93. 'A positive image cannot be forced nor bought, and once it has been built it needs
78. Michael Clarke, British External Policy-Making in the I990s (London: Macm'J!
1 continuous cultivation'. Michael Kunczik, Images of Nations and lntemational Public
1992), Appendix on 'The British press and international affairs', pp. 319-28. an, Relations (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997) p. ix.
79. Theodore C. Sorensen, 'A changing America', in Andrew J. Pierre (ed.), DomestiL
94. 'II volta nuovo del Colonnello' (the new face of the Colonel), La Repubblica, 28 August
Change and Foreign Policy: A Widening Atlantic? p. 92. 2000.
80. Carruth~rs, The Media at War, pp. 231-4. Also Sorensen, pp. 92~3, summarizing his
work wtth public opinion surveys.
81. Carruth_ers, [Link].; Fred Halliday, 'Neither treason nor conspiracy: reflections Chapter 11
on medm coverage of the Gulf War 1990-91 ', Citizenship Studies vol. 1 no. 2 1997
pp. 157-72. . ' . . 1. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999)
82. Nik ?owing, 'Real~time television coverage of armed conflicts and diplomatic crises: p. 82. See also Michael Walzer, .lust and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argumem with Historical
does t_t pressure or dtstort foreign policy decisions?' (Cambridge, Mass: Joan Shorenstein ll!ustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
Workmg Pa~r, 94/~, Harvard University, 1994)- summarized in Nik Gowing, 'Instant 2. 'Foreign policy is one of the few things where being President [of the USA] matters',
TV ~d foretgn pohcy', The World Today, vol. 50, no. 10, October 1994; see also Nik The Economist, 6 May 2000.
Go~m.f,, _'Real-time television coverage from war: does it make or break government 3. In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy (Canberra: Department of
PO~i~Y · ~n J. G~w, R. Paterson and A. Preston (eds), Bosnia by Television (London: Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997), Foreword by Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign
Bnt1sh Ftlm Institute, 1996). Affairs, and Tim Fischer, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade, p. ii.
83. John Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office (London: Chapman, 1992) pp. 82-5, 247-8; and 4. The change in Australian foreign policy initiated by Gough Whitlam tended to increase
see note 54 above on Netanyahu 's trip to Russia. the emphasis on geography, by asserting that the country's future now lay with the
84. Important and honourable exceptions are individuals like Daniel Ellsberg, who achieved Asia-Pacific region. This was paradoxical given that geography was associated
the release of th~ Pentagon Papers by expertise and persistence, and Robert Fisk of with realism, at that time distinctly unfashionable. See the scathing critique of Australian
The ~ndepende~ll m London, known throughout the Middle East for his ability to keep foreign policy 1972-99 in David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith, Reilll'enting
certam themes m the public eye. For most newspapers, however, 'the age of the foreion Realism: Austmlia's Foreign and Defence Policy at the Millennium (London: Royal
correspondent' has passed. "' Institute of International Affairs. 2000).
 358 Notes and References to pp. 286-9
Notes and References to I'P. 289-95 359
5. For example the 15 Member States of the EU now have between them c 1377 b· ..
aroun [ th ld · · · em as-,1es 16. Mitsumi Hirano, The ImplicaTions of Histm-y Education for Exrenwl Relations: A Case-
l e wor , not countmg the 123 European Commission missions_ -10 a •
of 92 1 F · ' h.:l'<~"e study of rhe Japanese History rexthook Di~putes in the 1980s (London Schoo! of
c. eac l. tgures from a paper submitted to t_he Evian General Afl'airs Council , e
1 Economics and Political Science, PhD thesis, 2001 ). History books often cause interna-
September 2000 by the Secretary-General/High Representative Javier Sol· · :-·
reproduced in A 1 · M' · 1• ( ' <~na. and tional conflict. The latest example is Moldovan outrage at pro~ Russian accounts given to
n omo JSS!ro 1 ed.), Coherence for Europea11 Securilv Po!ic)"
Debat_es--Cases-Assessments (Paris: West European Institute for Securitv. Stud,~s· their own children. Th_e Independent, 26 February 2002.
OccasEOna1PaperNo.27,May2001)AnnexB I p 57Th. d d • · 17. See James Tang. 'The external relations of China's provinces' (with Peter Cheung) in
fi · , · · IS ocumenr ocs not contain
tgurcs for Greece and so l have added the current fioure of 78 Compare lh David M. Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Senwiry Policy in the Era (~!"
81 b · "' · eaveraoeof
. e~n ass1es for the then nine at the end of the 1970s. provided in Christopher Hill- Reform (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
1
WJ!IIam Wallace, 'Diplomatic Trends in the European Community' Jnr . · <~nc 18. Lord Marshall, 'Down to Business: the Pivotal Role of Commerce and Industry in
Aft"airs, January 1979, p. 58. ' elnarwnal Intematiomll Affairs', lecture given at Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
6. 17 January 2001. The damage done to the airline industry by the terrorist attacks of
A t_en_n first given prominence by William Wallace in his The Foreign PoliC\' Prou·\·. ·
1 111
Bmwn (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of Jntemati;nal Aff • September 2001 has painfully underlined companies' incapacity in this respect.
1976). · mrs, 19. Samy Cohen notes that states and non~state actors increasingly need each other: 'Rivalry
7. See, for example, the key works of: Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European goes with a sort of complicity'. See Samy Cohen, 'Decision~making power and r.:ttion-
States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Blackwell 1976) · do· f. · ality in foreign policy analysis', in Marie-Claude Smouts (ed.), J11e New International
1Is N awre, DeJ•elopmem and Prospects (Oxford: • an mn ranco Pogg1, The State·
Polit)' 1990) [Link] T"JJ p : Relations: Theory and Practice (London: Hurst, in association with Centre d'Etudes et
1 h · ' · r 1 y nor ogo 1
neg e_cts t e importance of war, or the international dimension as such (see for exa ~l~ de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 200 I) p. 41.
Poggi, PP· 70--2, ~3-5, 177-83), which makes it the more interesting t~t thev ~: ~t
1
20. This has not stopped various attempts to extend modem management measures to
to_uc~ on the questton of the _state's other external instruments, via foreign polic~. y foreign policy. See William Egerton, 'Beyond the Balanced Scorecard. Performance
8. Richard Rosecrance, The R1se of the l'irtua/ State· Wealth and Power in t' C Evaluation of Foreign Policy: how do the taxpayers know if they are getting a good
Ce nI ury (New ~ k ·
10r : Bas1c Books, 1999) p. 211. · r1e O!mn~
' deal?', MBA/DIC Dissertation, Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine,
9. On Gennany see Simon Bulmer, Andreas Maurer and William Paterson 'The E . London. September 1998. Roy Ginsberg has assembled systematic data on the 'foreign
policy~mak" o . h" · . • [Link]
m., mac mery m the Berlin Republic: hindrance or handmaiden?' in Dou2:las policy actions of the European Community'. where an action is defined as a 'specific.
~ebber (~d.), :'ew Eur~pe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Po/in conscious, goal-oriented undertaking'. See Roy H. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy ACiions of
smce Unificat~on, Spec~al Issue -~fGe~man_Politics, vol. ro, no. I, April200!, pp. 2 the European Communily: the Politics of Scale (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1989) p. 2.
18
and 198. The mfl~ence of the Lander 1s mamly felt indirectly, via consultations on EU 21. For the classical origins of rational choice theory sec Anthony Downs, An Economic
IG~s and on the Implementation of trade policy. Enlargement and migration are other Theory of DemocraL)', and Mancur Olson, The Logic ofCvllective Action: Public Goods
obvious areas where the federal government has to work with the L ·· d Th .. and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University ·Press, 1965).
h · · aner. Cj<Jso1
av~ a co?~tltUl!Onal role in the Bundesrat, which has commillees dealing with bo~h Important commentaries are to be found in Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and
f~~~~? affmrs and def~nce. In~ividual Lander like Bavaria only have occasi~nal forci •n Democracy (London: Collier~Macmillan, 1970); William C. Mitchell and Randy
VlSlbtllty on matters hke relauons with the Czech Republic or the r · 1· g Simmons, Beyond Politics: Politic~·. Welfare and the Failure of Bureaucracy (Boulder:
promotion. • po 1t1cs o export
Westview, 1994), especially pp. xiii-xv. and 39-65; Donald C. Green and Jan Shapiro,
10. Views described by John Hall in his essay 'State', in Joel Krieger (ed) Tl 0 ., ·I Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: a Critique of Applications in Political Science
Comp . I P, l" . ·• h . ' w .\,OJ( (New Haven, Conn.: Yctle University Press, 1994), especially pp. 1-32.
amon o a mcs OJ t e World, (New York: Oxford University Press 2nd rev ,etltl
2001) pp. 802-6. ' . . 22 Lawrence Freedman, 'Logic, politics and foreign policy processes', International ..
11. Ro_se~rance, The Rise of the l'irtual State, p. 211. Affairs, vol. 52, no. 3, July 1976. Also Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining
12. Thts IS not so distant from the view of diplomacy as 'a [Link]"on bet and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), chapter 7;
· d" · ween estranocd
Ill lVtduals, groups or entities' provided by James DerDerian in h"ts 0
G 1 ,r
o· I e.
n 1p oman
and Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, 'Rethinking Allison's models', American
a enea ogy OJ Western Estrangement (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). • Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 2, June 1992.
13. The Concert of Europe was supposed to deal only with diplomatic matters unlike 23. Raymond Cohen, 'Living and teaching across cultures', International Studies
the Ho~y Alliance, but practice showed that the distinction could not be s~~taincd. Penpectives, vol. 2, 200 I, p. 153.
F. H. Hmsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theorv and Pracrice · tl H · 24. Most useful in this respect are Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy
tory 0 r 1 1 . · R . • m re ls-
'J n e1 natwna1 e 1atwns (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ -, p 19 - in World War /1 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959); David Vital, The Surl'imlvf
pp. 213-37. erst y ress, 0 1J
Small States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971 ); Ron Barston (ed.), The Other
14. S~e ~n~el Viiias, Los pactos secre/os de Fra11co con Estado.~ Unidos: base~·. ayuda Powers (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973) and the Report of a Commonwealth
ewnom1c~, ~ecortes de soberania (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1981 ). Consuhative Group, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society (London:
15. (S~muei_Wdl.mmson, The :o/fl~cs of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for war Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995).
ambndge. Harvard Umvers1ty Press, 1969). 25. Even here, we should not assume that it was never possible for the GDR to pursue a
subtly differenliated foreign policy, especially under Walter Ulbricht. See Peter Grieder.
 360 Notes and References to pp. 295-303 Notes and References Ia pp. 303-7 361

The_ Eas_t German Leadership 1946-1973: Conflict and Crisis (Manchester: Manchester 41. Christian Lequesne, 'The common fisheries policy', in Helen Wallace and William
UmversJty Press, 1999), especially pp. 170-83. Wallace (eds). Policy-lvfaking in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University
26. Kalcvi J. Holsti (ed.), Why Nations Realign: -Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Press, 2000) analyses the imeraction of communitarian, environmental and economic
Post-War World (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). considerations.
27. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Universitv 42. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne. 'Good international citizenship: a third way for
Press, 1981). Thucydides' commenl is from the Melian Dialogue: 'the strong do wh;t British foreign policy', International Affairs. vol. 74, no. 4, October 1998; also the same
th~y have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept'. Thucydidcs, authors' 'Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?' in Smith and Light, Ethics and
H1story• of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (Harmondswonh: Penguin Forei~n Policy, pp. 169-70. This form of citizenship may be located in the classic liberal
1972) p. 402. . internationalist tradition, whereby interests and ideals arc seen as converging, but it also
28. ~olfram F. Hanriedcr, 'Compatibility and consensus: a proposal for the conceptual has complex philosophical ramifications. See Andrew Linklater, 'What is a good inter-
hnkage _of external and internal dimensions of foreign policy', American Political national citizen?' in Paul Keal (ed.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (St Leonards. NSW: Allen
Science Review, vol. 61, no. 4, December 1967, pp. 971-82. and Unwin in association with the Australian National University. 1992).
29. Even a supposed realist like Wolfers stressed 'the many domestic goals which no oov- 43. The latest instance of this is the demand that European defence budgets rise so as to give
emme~t can ignore and which compete for resources with whatever external purp~se::. real meanin11: to the new Common European Security and Defence Policy. Fram;ois
the natmn may be pursuing'. Arnold Wolfers, 'The goals of foreign policy' in his Discord Heisbourg, European Defence: Making It Work (Paris: WEU Institute for Security
and Collaboration, p. 72. Studies, Paris 2000), Chaillot Paper No. 42.
30. See Max Weber, 'Politics as a vocation' especially pp. 126-8, and 'Science as 44. I have made this argument in relation to European foreign policy, but it has wider
a vocation' in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills trans., intra. and eds. From Max Weber: applicability, for example, to the United States and Russia. See Christopher Hill,
Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948). Also Francis Deno 'The capability-expectations gap, or conceptualising Europe's international role',
eta!., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC~ Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 3, September 1993, and 'Closing the
the Brookings Institution, 1996) pp. 27-33. capability-expectations gap?' in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds), A Porei~n
31. Chris Alden's 'Solving South Africa's Chinese puzzle: foreign policy-making and the Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge, 1998).
"two Chinas" question', in Jim Broderick, Gary Burford and Gordon Freer (eds), Sowh 45. Paul Taylor, 'The institutions of the United Nations and the principle of consonance:
Africa's Foreign Policy (London: Pal grave, 2001), traces the dilemmas of the Mandela an overview', in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (cds), The United Natiom at the
government over the de-recognition of Taiwan. Millennium: the Principal Organs (London: Continuum, 2000) pp. 304--5.
32. Martha Finnemore, Nationallmerests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 46. Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Re~-Jwping the
University Press, 1996) p. 145. World Order (New York: Ballantine, 1996), cited in David Martin Jones and Mike
33. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual Stare, pp. 18-19. Lawrence Smith, Reim•enting Realism, p. 1.
34. Ibid., p. 211. 47. In French it is Label France. See Michel Girard, 'States, diplomacy and image-making:
35. The novelist Julian Barnes gives an interesting example of the way we may evade what is new? Reflections on currem British and French experiences', in Alan Chong and
responsibility by literally not providing a subject. He notes how couples get into the habit Jana Valencic (eds), The Image, the State and lllfernational Relations: Conference
of sayi~g 'love you', thus dropping the '1': 'As if you weren't taking responsibility for Proceedings (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001 ),-EFPU
the feelmg any more. As if it had become somehow more general, Jess focused'. See Working Papers 2001/2, p. 22. As Michel Girard points out, however, for French leaders
Love Etc (London: Picador, 2001) p. 158. 'France is far more complex than a label, or an image'. Moreover, the one developed
36. By 1999 Cuba's forces had been overtaken in size also by those of Mexico, Colombia. country which does not feel the need to dabble in rebranding is the United States.
Argentina and Peru- but were still larger than those of Canada. Since the US threat did A superpower knows that its foreign policy counts. --
not notably diminish before 1999 the conclusion must be that this was the result of fewer 48. The two works entitled 'The Prisoners' (or for some 'The Slaves') are to be found in the
far-flung interventions. See The Milital}' Balance 2000--2001 (London; International Galleria dell' Accademia, Florence.
Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2000).
37. Davi~ Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of
identity, rev. edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998) p. 226.
38. Ibid., pp. 68-72.
39. For detail on the particular British context, see Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones
(eds), New Labour's Foreign Policy: a New Moral Crusade? (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2000) and Christopher Hill, 'Foreign policy', in Anthony Seldon (ed.),
The Blair Effect: the Blair Gowmment 1997-2001 (London: Little, Brown, 2001).
40. See Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridoe:
Cambridge University Press, 2001 ). o
 ' '·:,,,,,-
n~ ... -

Index 363

Index Banks: central 83: private 222

Barnard, Chester 92
CabineL" 54, 57-8, 63-6, 69: British
cabinet 58, 60
Bay of Pigs invasion see United States California 231
BBC: World Service 153: BBC World Callaghan, James 144
TV 203 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
- Begin, Menachem 59, 69 260
Behaviouralism II, 28, 47, 55, 160 Campbell, David 9; distinction between
Belgium 122 !Oreign policy and Foreign Policy
Berlin airlift I 06, 117 302
Accountability, problem of 38, 74, Berlusconi, Silvio 53-4, 278 Canada 140,147, 177, 232; subnational
Anarchy, international 7, 159-86
25!--61, 277, 282; and foreign Andreotti, Giulio 61, 64
0
-·- -"-·-serriH Report, 1977: 81 foreign policies 196; Chanak crisis
policy 300--1 Bettelheim, Bruno 103 274; see also Quebec
Anti-Apartheid movement I 97
Action 127-9, 155,286--92 Betts, Richard 92 Capabilities 17-18, 136-8;
Appeasement 117
Actors, international 27, 47, 162. 164, Arab States 226-7 Bevin, Ernest 61 over-stretched 305
305; ~·ee also business, churches, Arab-Israel conflict 150, 224 Bin Laden, Osama 55 Capabilities-expectations gap 46, 305
pressure groups, regions, trans-national Arafat, Vasser 55, 62, 113 Bitterlich, Joachim 72 Capitalism 247
enterprises Blainey, Geoffrey 228 Carlsnaes, Walter 27
Andropov, Yuri 68
Actomess, international 70, 87, 223, 23 [ Area studies 6, 162 Blair, Tony 14, 61, 63,303,342 note 8 Carr, Edward Hallett 6
Adenauer, Karl I06 Bosnia 46, 198 Carrington, Lord 58
Argentina 142, 145; and nuclear
Adorno, Theodor I 09 Botha, P. K 65 Carruthers, Susan 276
weapons 146
Afghanistan 228; return of UK embassy, Botha, P.W 65 Carter, Jimmy 62. 66, 254, 259
Am1enia 182; Annenian diaspora 195
2001; 77; Taliban regime 62, 122, Arn1s races I 04 Boulding, Kenneth xxiii Case studies II
146, 199, 224, 300 Bounded rationality see rationality Castro. Fidel 245, 301-2
Aron, Raymond 23
Africa, foreign policies of 6 Brandt, Willy 110 Cau.~ation 186; and physical
Arrow, Kenneth 328 note II
African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Brazil 83, 232; and nuclear weapons environment 170, 174
Asian values debate 289
(ACP<) 247 146 Ceau~cscu, Nicolac 183, 210
Association of South East Asian Nations
African National Congress (ANC) 40, 55, Brezhnev, Leonid 68 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 67, 95,
(ASEAN) 176, 290
146, 195 Bright, John 240 153
A ttlee, Clement 60, 61
Agency 2, 3, 16, 19, 23,25-30, 35, 37, Britain see United Kingdom Chamberlain, Neville 58, 62, Ill, 133,
Australia 211, 226, 232, 302, 357 note 4:
41,51,86, 100,127,164,186,190, Brown, Gordon 61 259, 265, 271, 293
Chanak crisis 274; federalism of
191, 192,214-15 Bruck, H.W 223 Change 166, 293
290; white paper on foreign policy
Agenda-setting 107-8, 135 290 Bull, Hedley 159-60 Charisma I 10-ll, 116
Agents 26, 27, 72-96 Bureaucracy 54, 72-96, 128, 225; Chernenko, Konstantin 61
Austria. Haider affair 242-3
Agnelli dynasty 70 politicization of 96-6; privatization Chcrwell, Lord (F.A. Lindemann) 114
Austria-Hungary 132
Aids (Acquired immune deficiency Autocratic states 239 of 95 Cheysson, Claude 61
syndrome) 183 Bureaucratic politics 72,85-92, 127,272: Chile: overthrow of Allende government
Axelrod, Robert 114
Alakeson, Vidhya 279 and see organization process, roles 184: Pinochet affair, 1999; 271
Axwonhy, Lloyd l35
Albania 184 Burke, Edmund 104, 108, 329 note 23; China, People's Republic of 40, 46, 77, 87;
Azereido di Silveira, Antonio 61
Alger, Chadwick 272 address to the electors of Bristol 353 attack on Vietnam; 147; diplomacy
Aziz, Tariq 61
Algeria 198,214--15,301 note 44 of 241_: foreign policy of 18;
Allende, Salvador 184 Burma (Myanmar) 83, 294 and human rights 206; and Korean
Baker, James 60, 61. 119
Alliance politics 9 Burton, John 182 war I 23; and nuclear weafXJnS
Ba1anceofpower 168, 181; nine
Allison, Graham 85--8, 292; criticized by Bush, George (senior) 61, 103, 119 146: National People's Congress
meanings of 333, note 4
Waltz 161 Business, international 39,40--1, 149; 252; political system in 234;
Baldwin, David 149-50, 155, 336 note 47
AI Qaeda network 41, 55, 198,224 'corporate responsibility' 202: practices in 290; public opinion
Baldwin, Stanley 271
American Israel Public Affairs Committee see also mass media multinational 280; and Taiwan 120
Banda, Hastings 185, 227
270--1 companies, transnational Choice 170, 174, 292-7; see also public
BandAid 270
Amnesty International 41, 197, 199,301 Bangladesh 169 enterprises choice, rational choice
Buzan, Barry 27 Chou En-Lai 59

362
 364 Index Index 365

Christopher, Warren 61 Constructivism 28. 98, 162 Denmark 303: Folketing 254; and Economic statecraft 148~52, 155:
Churches, as international actors 41, Cook, Robin 61, 79, 84, 303 Maastricht Treaty 222; public sanctions 149--150, 155, 336-7
197-8; and see religion Cosmopolitanism 164; Cosmopolitan opinion in 266 note 52; wealth 151~2, 155
-~-· Economics. profession of 97. 201;
Churchill, Winston 61, 66, 67, 70, 74, 106, Democracy 161, 30 I , 303, 3 I 6 note I_ :_i Delli, Martin 262
114,259 37. 338 note 9 Dependency, theory Of 245 'economic man' I 04
Ciampi, Carlo Azeglio 53--4 Costa Mendez, Nicanor 61 Determinism 294, 305 Eden, Anthony 61, 62,65
Ciano, Count (Galeazzo) 133 Country studies 5-6, 11 Development 244-8 Efficiency: principle of 17, 23, 43;
Cimabue 163 Council of Foreign Relations, Developing coumries I 72; problem of tension with democracy 42, 46,
Civil-military relations 66. 83 NewYork 272 debt 352 note 31 75, 101
Civil society 32, 187,215,279, 283; Crime, international 202 Diasporas 195, 198, 267. 281 Egypt 146, 161,245: and 1967 war
international 214 Crisis, conditions of 57, 65. 66, 123, 319 -~ ..... ~Dictators 131 182; cultural diplomacy 154; and
Clarke, Michael xxiii note 10; crisis prevention 70; Dinkins, David (Mayor of New York City. fundamentalism 198; and
Class, social: and foreign policy 240-1; public opinion in 262 t __ _ 1990--93); visit to South Africa 196 Israel 147, 295
idea of a ruling class 241; see also Croatia 243; and use of force 145 Diplomacy 45, 77, 135, 138--43, 155, 187; Eisenhower, General Dwight 61,66
elites Crowe, Sir Eyre 76 dangers of 81; diplomats 88, 304; Elections place of foreign policy in
Clausewitz, Karl von 143 Cuba 170, 294; and US blockade 150, diplomatic caste 241; and 258-9
Climate 173, 340 note 32 183 communication 139-40; and Elites 42, 43, 54, 69, 90, 96, 246, 263,
Clinton, William 61, 259, 296; and Cuban Missile Crisis 57, 86, 91, !13. 123, negotiation 140-1; multilateral 265, 277-8, 305; elite theory
Somalia 133; and nuclear missile 129, 144 141~2; economic 142~3·, public 108
defence 276 Cultural diplomacy 44, 135, 154-4, 155, diplomacy 279-81, 306; see also, Ends, of foreign policy see also goals,
CNN 'CNN effect' 200, 273 306; Voice of America et al. 136 coercive diplomacy, cultural means
Cobden, Richard 13 Cybernetic theory of decision making diplomacy, summits English school see International
CoCom (Coordinating Committee for 105-6 Direction G€n€rale de Ia S€curit€ Relations
Multilateral Controls) 79 Cyprus: decision to buy Russian missiles Ext€rieur (DGSE French Security Environment, the problems of 9, 45, 167,
Coercive diplomacy 143-4,335 note 39 128; 1974 crisis 133 Service) 68 169,200,226, 231; UN conference
Cogniti\:e dissonance, theory of 114 Cyprus, Turkish Northern Republic of 40, Discourse analysis 9, 30 on 177
Cognitive maps 114 185 Disjointed incrementalism 103-4, 105, Environments, of foreign policy 293;
Cold War, end of 11-13, 168; 'peace Czechoslovakia: Munich crisis, 1938; 98; 329 note 25 connections between 43, 47, 221,
dividend' 136 Prague Spring Crisis, 1968; 57, 184 Doctrine oflmernational Community 14 228,229-30,249, 261; distinctions
Collective action, problem of 8~9 Czech Republic 185 Domestic environment 223-4; change between 16,37-8,39, 189, 226; see
Collingwood, Robin George (R.G) 111, 228- 30~ domestic events a._<; also domestic environment, external
170 Dahl, Robert 53 complications of foreign policy environment. intennestic environment,
Communication physical 167, 171 Decision making 10, 51, 86, 97; 224--30; political culture 227---8; psychological environment
Comparative foreign policy, school of 10 decision makers 264, 265, 268; see also constitutions, domestic Epistemic communities 199---20 I, 208
Complexity 102, 106 theories of 29; stages of 128 sources, domestic society Ethics 316 note 38; and foreign policy
Conditionality, political 151 Decolonization I 07 Domestic society 15, 37,38 17, 39,219,303--4
Conference in Security and Cooperation Defence policy 70 Domestic sources, of foreign policy 86, Europe, as geopolitical entity 186;
in Europe (CSCE) see Organisation Defence Intelligence Agency (USA) 67 219--49 Eastern 210, 265
for Security and Cooperation in De Gaulle, General Charles 66, 67, 110: Domino theory 112 European foreign JXllicy 6, 148, 290, 295;
Europe (OSCE) in Quebec 140; resignation of 267 Doty, Roxanne 9 and integration 285; in Eastern
Conflict prevention 70 De Michel is, Gianni 61 Doyle, Michael 235 Europe 151; missions, worldwide,
Conservative Party (UK) 260 Democracy 38, 42, 73, 74, 75, 101,236-7. Double standards, problem of 15 of EU Member States 358 note 5;
Constituencies of foreign policy 250 300; democratic scrutiny 104, 282; Droit d'ingffrence (right of inten:ention) towards the Middle East 123; and
Constitutions constitutionalism 34; principle of 17, 23; public views on II; see also law, international the United States 129,254
federal systems 230-2; and 264; see also democratic peace DubCek,Alexander 114,184 European Nuclear Disarmament Movement
foreign policy 230-5; multi party Democratic peace, hypothesis of 47. 143. Dulles, John Foster 61 (END) 197,270
systems; 233-4; one-party states 235-6 Duroselle, Jean Bapiste 136 European Parliament 38, 199, 255; see
234; single party-dominant Democratic states 15, 86, 101, 208, 259: also political parties
systems 234-5; Westminster public opinion in 269, 282; see also East Timor 113, 206,213 European Union 3, 38, 43; Council of
model 256 democratic peace Ecology see environment Ministers 79; and defence 227;
366 Index lnde.r 367

European Union- continued Foreign ministers 53-4; overwork of Gallucci, Robe1t 85 policy 306, 342 note 8: as approach
enlargement policy 58, 122, 126, 60; relations with heads of Gallup, George 267 to International Relations 161, ISS;
132, 154,242-3,276-7: development government 60-2 Galtieri, General Leopolda 61, 120 protests against 22
policy 93, 141, 247; European Foreign ministries 14, 75,76-82,83,305 Games, and foreign policy 37; g<~me Goals, of foreign policy 100, 118-23,
Commission 78; European Foreign policy, as area of public policy x_-;i, theory 52, 97, 161.221,292 126, 175, 291-2; milieu goals 45.
Communities 105, 148. 263; 1-24,25-47,70,80, 155, 161, 186. Gazit, Shlomo 69 121; possess-ion goals 121 : see
see also European foreign (Xliicy 222,248-9,284,286, 290-1,304-7; Geisel, Emesto 61 also ends, ideology, National Interest,
Evangelista, Mathew 200-1 costs of 225-6; and globalisation Geldof, Bob 270 values
Evans, Gareth 304 190---92; municipal foreign policies -Gender 243-4 Goering, Hermann 152
Executive: checks on 231-2; core 63: 182, 196; socialist and foreign policy General Agreements on Tariffs and Tmde Goh Chok Tong 259-60
see also foreign policy executive 240; strategies of resiswnce 183-86; (GATT) 58 Gonzalez, FelijX! 62, II 0
Expectations: of bureaucrats 89: and see environment policy Generalization, problem of 18,46-7 Gorbachev. Mikhail 56, 59, 61, 68. 70,
of foreign policy 17-18. 19, 43-6; Foreign policy, definitions of xxi-xxii. Genocide 180; of the Jews, 1939-45; 108, 110, 153, 210, 264
of heads of government 56; 1-2, 3-5, 188, 283; language of 94; in Great Lakes zone 109. I 17 Gore, AI 276
of international politics 174-5; 134,305 Genscher. Hans Dietrich 61 , 62 Gowing, Nik 276
of the state 192; .~ee also Foreign policy, theories of 6-11 : Geopolitics 168-71 Gradualism in English politics I 04
capabilities, expectations gap Foreign policy analysis (FPA) xxi, ; Geography 166-7, 169; human Great cmsh 1929; 117
Explanation 29, 221 xxii-xxiii, 5, 6-7, 8, 10-11, 15-19, geography 171-74; political Greece 83, 128; anti-Americanism
External (international) environment 15, 23-4,27,30, 52, 86, 98, 99, 100, 160, geography 171 in 227-8; and Macedonia 271
19, 39, 56, 184, 186, 189; distance 188, 236, 287, 292, 308 note 3 George. Alexander 110, 143 Green Movcmem 224, 273
169, 171-2; localism 172-3; Foreign Policy Association (of the USA) George, Juliette 110 Greenham Common Peace Movement 244
material conditions 166-71; 269-70 Geopolitics 21 Greenpeace 4I, 52, 197, 199, 206
population 173; size 169-70; Foreign policy executive 56-ti6 Germany, Federal Republic of 54; Basic Greenstein, Fred I 10
states system 159-66; see also France 12, !55, 226; and Algeria 215. Law 253; bureaucratic politics Gromyko, Andrei 61, 62, 75,91
anarchy causation resources, climate. 229, 271; Anglo-French military 9I-2; cultural diplomacy 153--4; Grotianism ~·ee liberalism
geography, geopolitics, globalisation, conversations, 1905-14, 82, 289; East Germany 295, 327 note 51; Group of 77; 177, 245
interdependence, international system, cultuml diplomacy 135, 153, 172. economic policy 142; elections and Groupof7/8; 81,300
transnational relations 306; elites 78, 80-1; fanning foreign policy 258; foreign policy of Groupthink 115
External relations 5, 16-17, 188, interests 222: French language 6, 139, I51; foreign policy making Guevara, Che II 0
309 note 5 208; French Revolution 73, 109, 232, 233, 261; Green Party 273: Gunder Frank, Andre 173
175--6, 222; Fifth Republic 76, 229; Gulf War 226; history of 73, 148,
Farmi, Ismail 62 Fourth Republic 229, 253, 279; 220, 230-1 ; image of 280; Lander Haider, Jorg 242
Fascism 247-8; domestic origins of foreign policy making in 57, 64, 67, 196, 231, 287, 289, 358 note 9; Nazi Haig, Alexander 62
220 78, 90, 232-3, 255; and Maastricht period 78, I49, 152, 222, 248; Hain, Peter 261
Fassalend, Werner 243 Treaty 222; military 94; public Ostpolitik 140; party foundations Halliday, Fred 23, 90-1, 276
Festinger, Leon 114; fiascoes in opinion in 266, 271; Quai d'Orsay 343-4 note 23; public opinion in Halperin, Morten 85. 87, 90
foreign policy 90, 104, 106, 115, 306; Rainbow Warrior 206; and 261, 263; and recognition of Croatia Hanreider, Wolfram 296
160, 257 Suez Crisis 120; Third Republic and Slovenia 118, 243; and Haushofer, Klaus 168
Fieldhouse, David 247 73, 136; and United States 211 unification 121, I40, 210 Heads of Government 53, 59; relations
Finland 294; foreign policy making Fran~ois-Poncet, Andre 76 Ghana 288 with foreign ministers 60-62
80, 83; neutrality of 184; and Frankel, Joseph xxii-xxiii, 159-60 Giddens, Anthony 26, 303 Heads of state 53-4
Soviet Union, Russia 133 Freud, Sigmund 109 Gilpin, Robert 295 Healey, Dennis 114
Finnemore, Martha 300 Frontiers 169 Global Commons 45; see also Hearst, William Randolph 274
Fischer, Fritz 220 Fulbright, Senator William - 256 environment, planet earth Hegel, Georg I10, I I 7, 210, 238
Fischer, Joschka 120,233 Fulci, Paolo 141 Global Community, ideas of 191-2; Held, David 190, 316 note 37, 338 note 9
Foot, Michael 64, 260 'global civil society' 2I4 Helms, Jessie 80
Foreign economic policy 8, 13-14, 45, Gaddafi, Colonel Mu;immar 63, 110, Global governance, idea of xxii, 2, 13 Henkin, Louis 177
188, 287; foreign trade 122,281 Globalisation 3, 13-14,55, 190,219, High and low politics, distinction between 4
policy 257 Galileo, G:liilei 165 300, 306, 31I note 29; and foreign Hitsman, Roger 96
368 Index Index 369

History: as approach ro foreign policy 5. Intelligence Services 54, 66--8, 77, 84, 95, Inm 146, 154, 184, 199,208. 243; loss textbooks dispute 289; and Lnited
30: historical thinking I 16--18; 106, 322-3 note 53: see also CIA, of airbus. 1988; 93; revolution of States 21 l
impact on states 169; 'lessons' of KGB, Ml6, DGSE 1979; 90-1 Jensen. Lloyd xxiii
117; nature of 186: obligations to Interdependence 175: political 175-6 Iraq 147; invasion of Iran 52, 107; Jervis, Robert 139
298: periods of change 108, 110 Interests. concept of 132, 303; national and nuclear weapons 146; 'safe Jewish Diaspora 195, 198; and see Israel
Hitler, Adolf 66, 103, 110. 120, 125, interests 6, 22, 43, 70,118-19,149 havens' in, for Kurds 275; War of Joffe, Josef 276
130-1. 152, 168,301 Interest Groups 268-73: see also 1991; 93, 119, 144, 145 Johnson, Lyndon 110, 112,255, 260;
Hobson, J.H 246-7 pressure groups Ireland 37, 177; image of 280-1; Tuesday lunch group 115
Hocking, Brian 193 lntennestic environment 214, 230 neutrality of 184; public opinion in Jordan 10, 147, 15L 224
Hoffman, Stanley xxiii, 177,276 International community, conception 266
Hollis, Martin 29, 89 of 15. 250, 298 Irish Republican Anny {IRA) 195-6, 263 Kant, Immanuel 179, 235
Hoi y Alliance 21 I International Court of Justice (ICJ) 178 Irrationality 124-5, 293; see also Karvonen, Lauri 83
Hong Kong 40, 172, 255 International Herald Tribune 278 rationality Kehr, Eckart 220
Houphouet-Boigny, Felix 227 International history, academic subject of 5 Islam 198-99; organization of the Islamic Kennedy,JohnE 84,91, 104,110,144.259
House, Colonel Edward M. 76 Inlernational Monetary Fund (IMF) 263 conference 198; western attitudes to Kennedy, Robert 113
Howe, Sir Geoffrey 62 International non governmental 207; see also Muslim states Komitet Gosudarstvel/ltoi [Link]
Hudson, Valerie 23 organizations (INGOs) 69, 182-3. Isolationism, as foreign policy strategy (KGB) 68
Human rights: discourse of 42, 179; 306 184--5 Keohane, Robert I 03, 188, 189
resonance with public opinion 258 International organizations 45, 141-2, Israel 69; attitudes to Vasser Arafat Khomeini, Ayatollah 110, !53
Humphrey, Hubert 260 163, 174, 176-7, 187,202, 306; see 113; bureaucratic politics 91; Khrushchev, Nikita 59, 61, 65,75
Hungary, Soviet repression, 1956; 118, also law invasion of Lebanon, 1982; 293; Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg 110
182 International Political Economy (IPE) and Jewish diaspora 198: Knesse£ Kitmock. Neil 260
Huntington, Samuel 204, 206 171-74 254; military strength of 147; and Kissinger. Henry 60,61, 94, 110, 133,
Hussein, King of Jordan 140 International Politics 2; and diplomacy nuclear weapons 146, 147; and 134,164,209,229,255
Hussein, Saddam 52, 61, 72, 107, 109, 155; and power 129 Palestinians 300; political system of Klerk, F. W De 65
113, 130, 144 International Relations (JR), academic 233-4, 243; public opinion in Kohl, Helmut 59, 61; and Fran!i?ois
subject of xxi, xxii, 2, 160-3, 188, 266--7; and Suez Crisis 120; and Mitterrand 113
Iceland 173; 'Cold Wars' 237 304; centre-periphery model 173; use of force 145 Korea, North 77, 145, 153, 184
Identity, national 9, 169, 175, 302; empirical findings in 237; English Italy 53, 128, 170, 233; and Algeria Kosovo 145,180,238,279
protection of, abroad 44 school 160, 161, 162,338 note 3; 214; buTeaueratic politics 91, 93-4; Kossuth, Lajos 210
Ideology I 19 level of analysis problem 7, 27, 28, foreign policy 6, 12, 123; frequency Kouchner, Bernard 200
Illness see leadership 313 notes 6----7; Scandinavian school of changes in government 64, 229, Kurdistan, Workers Party of (PKK) l 95
Images I 11-2, 135; state's concern 10,311 note 25; in USA 160-1. 348 note 34; and Parliament 256; Kurds 'Safe havens' policy 275
for 280-1 304; see also geopolitics political system in 233, 234, 243;
Imperialism 186, 21 I, 246----7 International relations, practice of xx, I, public opinion 267; in UN 141 Labour Party (UK) 260
Implementation 127-55 23-4. 133-4 Lamborn, Alan 86
India 164,242, 245; Bharatiya Janata International Society 162-4, 193 Jamaica 245 Lange, David 185
Party I 76, 242; and Kashmir 176; International system 39, 45, 134, 164-66, James, Alan 160 Language 9; common discourses 179;
and nuclear weapons 146, 224; and 174-83,293, 294; bipolarity 160; Jan is, Irving 114, I 15 of foreign policy 134
use of forces 145 hierarchy within 181-2; diverse Japan: cultural diplomacy 154; defence Laos 184
Indonesia l 13, 206, 2 I 3 logics of 165; solidarism within spending 105; Diet 253; Larsen, Henrik 9
Influence [ 35 164; system change 186; and see economic strength 138, 142, 154; Laswell, Harold 130
lnfonnation, role of in foreign policy making society, interdependence, external Foreign Ministry 324 note 19; Latin America 173
77, 79, 102, 105, 109, 114; environment, nonns, world opinion, foreign policy of 151; Ministry of Law, intemalional 163, 177-9;
information technology 94, 171-2,213 balance of power Internatio-nal Trade and Industry 79; of humanitarian intervention 14-15:
Instruments, of foreign policy 128, 135-8, Internet 279-80 political culture 65, 90; political of the sea 93
155; see also conditionality cultural Intervention, in the internal affairs of system in 234-5; role in Asia Leadership 69, 116; illness and 60:
diplomacy, economic statecraft, states 35, 45,213,281 148: Security Council seats 52, 90; and historical Lhinking I 17; and
military force, diplomacy, means Intuition I 16, l 24 siege of Embassy in Lima 81; power 129-30
370 Index Index 371

League of Nations 163 May, Ernest 117 Moran, Fernando 62 Nigeria 83. 198. 228-9, 232,245
Lebanon 224 McLuhan. Marshall 191 Moravcsik. Andrew 222 Nissan 52
Lee Kuan Yew 59, 109 McNamara_. Robert 87 Morgenthau, Hans 6, 129,160, 161; Nixon, Richard 60, 61, 107,259,260.296
Legal personality 20, 35, 312; note 35 Means, of foreign policy 121. 126, 134--8; criticized by Waltz Nkrumah, Kwame 245,288
Legitimacy 299-30 I; effects of loss see also instruments Moro, Aldo 64 Non-alignment 12; non-aligned
of 265; need for democratic Meciar. Vladimir 185 Mubarak, Hosni 110 movement 140. 184
legirimacy 10 I MMecins sansjlmrrii:res 200 Muddling through see disjointed Non-decisions 107-8
LeMay, Curtis 91 Media, mass 77, 79, 199, 200, 273-8; incrementalism Non-central government actors 210, 231
Le Monde 278 spin-doctors· 274; limitations of ~---Mugabe, Robert 185,222 Non-proliferation (of nuclear weapons)
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyitch 131,246-7 277, 278; and see Press, Television, Multinational companies 143 146-7
Lennon, John 183 CNN ._...._.._,_.Multiple advocacy, approach to policy Normative issues 43, 46, 10!, 155, 160,
Leonard, Mark 279 MERCOSUR (common market of the making 124, 333 note 74 161 , 163, 285, 306; see also ethics.
Less (Least) developed countries (LDC's) southern cone) 290 Mummie, Stephen 86 values
141,244-6 Meritocracy. principle of 73, 75 Murdoch, Rupert 38, 40, 70, 199,203,278 Norms 178-9, 180
Levels of analysis see International Mexico 79 Musharraf, Pervaiz 84 North, Colonel Oliver 67. 255
Relations Michelangelo, Buonarotti 306 Muslim States 243 Northedge, Frederick (F.S.) 330 note 36
Liberal approaches to International M16 (Military Intelligence, section 6) 68 Mussolini, Benito 120, 133, 267, 301 Norway; and EU membership 176,
Relations 3, 285 Michels, Roberto 92 228, 266
Liberalism 34, 35, 37, 98, 162-3; liberal Middle class, international 42 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) Nuclear weapons 146; acquisition of
states 238, 304, 306 Middle range theory 10, 30, 290 124; British and French 107
Libya 63, 129, 146, 153, 184, 197, 241 311 note24 Nagy, lmre 118 Nye, Joseph l 88, 189
Likud Party (Israel) 69 Milbraith, Lester 269 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 65 Nyererc, Julius 183, 245
Lindblom, Charles 85, 103, 104, Military, the 82-3, 92, 222, 224; chiefs Napoleon, Bonaparte 122
109, 115 of staff 54; inter-service Nasser, Gamal Abdel 1!0, 130 Oakeshott, Michael I 08
Linkage politics 152, 208-14, 229; rivalries 88; military regimes 239; National interest, concept of see interests Officials 90, 95, 96; see also
emulative linkage 210--11; military-industrial complex 288, I
National Security Council, of the bureaucracy, bureaucratic politics
penetrative linkage 211; reactive 355--6 note 70 United States 63 OPEC (Organization of Petroleum
linkage 209--10 Military power 135, 143-8; defence Nationhood 32 Exporting Countries) 149
Linklater, Andrew 125 deterrence 146-8; of LDCs 245; Nationalism 113.241-3 Opinion polls 267
Litvinov, Maxim 62 and revisionism 145; and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) Organization of African Unity (OAU) 122
Livingstone, Ken 196 subversion 145--6 12; and Cold War 180: debate on Organization of American States (OAS)
Lloyd George, David 274 Mill, John Stuart 99 enlargement of 276; NATO 122
Lukes, Steven 265 Milosevic, Slobodan 14 Assembly 301; public opinion Organizational process, in decision-making
Luther, Martin 110 Ministries: defence 56, 64, 80; in 263; and see Kosovo 92-5. 106
development 64, 89; economics Nehru, Jawaharlal 6!, 140 Organization for Security and Cooperation
MacArthur, General Douglas 83 56, 83---4; finance 56, 64, 80, 83, Nco-functionalism 105 in Europe (OSCE) 141; Conference
Mackinder, Sir Halford 168 89; as rivals to foreign ministries Neo-liberal institutionalism 98 in Security and Cooperation in Europe
Mahan, Alfred 168 82-5, 138; rivalries of 89; trade Nco-realism 3, 7-8, 98, 161, 163, 188, (CSCE) 179
Malawi 185 56,64,83 220; see also realism Ostrogorski, Moisei 92
Malaysia 256, 280 Misperception 1 I 1-14, 162 Netanyahu, Benjamin 267 Owen, David 56
Malta 39, 122 Mitsotakis, Constantinos 62 Netherlands 122; foreign ministry 79; Oxfam 41, 199
Mandela, Nelson 55, I 10 Mitterrand, Francois 59, 61, 67, 133; lobbies in 271
Manheim, Jarol 280 and Helmut Kohl I 13 Neustadt, Richard 85, 117,292 Packard, Vance 135
Manley, Michael 245 Modelski, George 129, 132 Neutralism 12; neutmlity 124, 184-5 Pakistan 84, 124, 164; and Kashmir
Mann, Leon 114 Modernity and rationality 101; New states 15, 168 176; and nuclear weapons 146
Manning, Charles 160, 330, note 36 and the West 102, 124 New Zealand 185; and clash with US Palestine Libemtion Organization (PLO)
Marxian approaches 240--1 Molotov, Vyacheslav 62 255,285 55, 195
Marshall, Colin (Lord) 291 Monnet, Jean 105 Nicolson, Harold 139 Palestinian people 40
Marshall, George 61 Morality, and foreign policy see ethic~ Niebuhr, Reinhold 6, 160 Palmerston, Lord (Henry John Temple) 210
372 Index Index 373

Panama Canal 167. 168 Psychological approaches, psychoanalysis Reagan, Ronald 59, 61, 65, 67. 144; Sadat,Anwar 62,95, 107.110,121,
Papandreou, Georges 59 xxiii. 116 AWACS sale 270-1; Iran-Contra 198, 295
Pariah states 184 Psyc~ological environment, offoreign scandal 255-6; and Margaret Samams, Antonio 62
Paris Peace Conference, 1919; 42 policy 108-16: affective aspect:', Thatcher 112 Sanctions .~ee economic statecraft
Parliaments 80, 252---8; foreign affairs 109, 113, 116; cognitive aspects . Realism 2, 6-7,43,-52, 160,214,283, San Egidio 214---5
committees 54, 256-7; scrutiny of 109,113, 116; mass psychology 285,295,307.310 note 13; liberal Sapin, Burton 223
foreign policy 256 109: personality, impact of 58, realism 37; and power 133; and 'Satisficing' 103
Parmar, Inderjeet 272 I 09-11; versus operational rationality 98; ~·ee also nco-realism Saudi Arabia 151.154,198,243
Parsons, Sir Anthony 141-2 environment 1I 1, 162; tracked , diplomatic 35, 40; IPE Scandinavian School of Foreign Policy
Perceptions Ill, 162 thinking. 113; see also charisma. 172 Analysis/International Relations I 0.
Peres. Shimon 62 cognitive dissonance, illness, images, 266-7 311 no!C 25
Persian Gulf.-states of 69. 171 intuition, misperception, perception. 211 Schattschneider, Elmer I 07
Pipes, Richard 220 stereotypes '-"''h-'"'""''-"' international 13, 45, 103, Schlieffen Plan 93
Pivotal States 246 and note, 350, note 61 Public administration, approach to policy Schmidt, Helmut 270
Planet Earth, conception of 44; see also making 55, 96 Regions, border regions 169; as Schultz, George 61
global commons, environment Public choice approaches 8-9; and sr>e international actors 196, 231 Secrecy, as a factor in foreign policy 95,
Planning 102, 293--4; flcxi-planning rational choice Religion, as influence on foreign policy 139; lack of 233
126, 293 Public diplomacy see diplomacy 243; and see churches Security acceptable levels of 103; and
Pluralism 29-30,265,270,271,282 Public opinion 42-3, 136,210, 262-8, Renouvin, Pierre 136 geography 168; as insurance policy
Poland 173; public opinion in 267 281-2, 298; channels of 264-5; Resources, of foreign policy 136-7, 131: security dilemma 334 note 10
Political culture 65 as 'notional constraint' 268, 282; 225-7; natural 167, 172 Selwyn Lloyd, John 61, 65
Political parties: tnmsnationaJ reach 197, and slavery 262; as target 279-81: Responsibility, concept of 21, 23, 69, 70, Serbia 153, 184, 185; and use of
199 see also diasporas' elections, opinion 251-2,297-304, 350note I~ in force 145
Political Science xxi, 97, 292 polls, world opinion practice 84, 125, 152, 214---15; Shah of Iran (Mohammed Reza Shah
Politics: problems of definition 89; Public opinion, anentive 85, 262-3, 274-5 multiple dimensions of 219,250, Pahlavi) 133----4
relations to economics in practice Public opinion, mass 192,222, 250-1, 297, 304 Sharon, Ariel 62, 69, I I I
151-2 262-3, 275, 305; mass hysteria 109 Reston, James 277 Shevardnadze, Eduard 320, note 26
Public relations 277; 'media events'
1!:·~::;~·~~:~."~
1
Pol Pot 130 Shlaim, Avi 233
and foreign policy 228-9
Pompidou, Georges 60 267,274,277 :~ Charles 111 Sierra Leone 139
Population 136, 173 Puchala, Donald 138 Rhodes, R.A.W 63 Simon. Herbert xxiii. 85. 92. 99, 102.
Positivism I 7, 28 Pugwash conferences 200 Risse-Kappen, Thomas 188, 20 I, 269 103, 104, 109; criticized by
Post Positivism, approach of 9-10 Putin, Vladimir 68, 259, 265 Rogue states see pariah states Waltz 161
Power, concept of, 129-34; as a context Putnam, Robert 37, 221 Roles, bureaucratic 88, 89; and see Singapore 259-60, 294, 309 note 10
133-4; as an end in itself 129-30; bureaucratic politics Sinn Fein 196, 299
externally projectable 138; hard Quebec 231, 289 Romania 183,210,294 Skybolt dispute 91
power 135; as a means 130-2; Roosevelt, Franklin 101 Slovakia 185
soft power 135, 155, 279; structural Radio 337 note 64 Roosevelt, Theodore 168 Slovenia 280, 295; see also Gennany
155; see also, balance of power Rasputin, Grigoriy 76 Rosati, Jerel 88 Small states 169, 182,294
influence Rationalism 160 Rosecrance, Richard 288, 300 Smith, Adam 99
Prebendal states 224, 315 note 23 Rationality 86, 97-126; bounded Rosenau, James 119,152,166, 188,209 Smith, Michael H. 193
Prebisch, RaUl 173 rationality 102-7, 116, 123; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 131 Smith, Steve 29, 89
President>; 53-4, 59 individual versus col!ective I 00: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Snyder, Richard 223
Press 273-4, 275,276-7 nonnative versus positive 101-2; London (Chatham House) 272 Social Science xxiv, 19
Pressure groups 41, 43, 197,269, 280; procedural versus substantive 99, Rummel, Rudolph 228 Solana, Javier 56
see also interest groups, international I 0 I; mtional actor model 98, 221 , Rumor, Mario 64 Sorensen, Theodore 275
non-governmental organizations, 292; rationality of irrationality I 02: Rushdic, Salman 243 Sorokin, Pitirim 228
transnational actions see also democracy, efficiency, Russia 99, 240; contrast with Soros, George 52
Prime ministers see heads of government irrationality Soviet Union 234; Kursk disaster South Africa 95-6, 108,
Prodi, Romano 128 Rational choice, approaches 8-9, 97, 9~ 244, 265; physical attributes 169; 309 note 10; apartheid regime's
Propaganda 152-3 Rawls, John 285, 306 pre-revolution 211 foreign policy 146, 147,227:

I.
l,i
 374 Index fndex 375

South Africa- cominued autocratic states, expectations_. less Transnational actors 189,193-215, 291; United Nations 39, 145, 179, 305;
churches in 197-8; as pariah developed countries, pariah states. economic 201-3; admission of new members 315 note
state 184 prebendal states, small states, ideological/cultural 196--201: 27; charter 15, 163, 286; and
Sovereignty 30-7; 'at bay' 188: superpower, weak states tcnitorial 195--6: terrorist 195 gender 244; Secretary General
popular 31. 42 State Department 80, 93 Transnational enterprise.'> 41.54-5, 201-3; 138; and United States 176-7:
Soviet Union 123, 129, 178; and Stcinbruner, John 105--6, 109. 114 and see business, international, UNCTAD 177
Afghanistan 223; Brezhnev Steiner, Miriam 116, 124 multinational companies United States: ABM decision. 1967; 87:
doctrine 178; bureaucratic politics Stereotypes 112 Transnational relations 187-215 academic approaches in 18; Bay of
91, 93, 94: and China 147; Stopford, John 41, 207-8 ::-uo,tsKy. Leon 139 Pigs invasion 84, 104, 117; and
collapse of 70, 134, 154; and Cuba Strange, Susan 38, 41, 134, 165,208 335 note 29 Bretton Woods system 148;
1962 123, 129; and Structuralism 161, 236 Truman, Harry 59. 61, 78, 83, 123 bureaucmcy in 80; civil-military
Czechoslovakia 1968; 57,114. 178; Structures. and foreign policy 3, 25-30, 83, 120. 30 I; geographical relations in 83; Congressional-
diplomacy 241; domestic politics in 108, 134, 155, 174-5; position 170; and use of force 145 executive relations 42, 54,221,232,
220, 223; foreign policy making in 'structurationism' 295 Tutu, Archbishop Desmond 197 253, 254, 255, 257; cullural
77, 234, 292; and Helsinki Accords Subnational foreign policies 287, 289-90; diplomacy 153; diplomats of 81,
179; ideology 106; imperialism of Massachusetts and Burma 210 . Understanding, approach to 82; doctrines in foreign policy 114.
247; intervention of western powers Subversion 145--6, 167 social science 29 118; elections and foreign policy
1918-20 229; invasion of Hungary, Suez Canal 167 Union of Democratic Control 42 258, 259, 60; and the environment
1956 118, 178; leaden; of 60. Suez Crisis see United Kingdom United Kingdom 12, 155; and Algeria 226: ethnic and national lobbies
229; and Marshall Aid 142; Summits see Group of7/8 215; Anglo-French military within 220-1, 270; federali~m in
military 83; and NATO enlargement Sundelius, Bengt 83 conversations, 1905-14; 82, 289; 290; foreign lobbies in 280;
229; negotiations with Britain, 1939; Superpowers 134 attitudes towards Europe 112, 118, foreign policy of 18, 39, 144; and
58; and nuclear weapons 146: Sweden, foreign policy making 80, 83; 120, 121, 140; and Bulgarian Gulf War 119; and hostages in the
overstretch of 151; and Poland neutmlity of 184; public opinion atrocities 243; Cabinet revolts, Lebanon 21 0; and ICJ 178; and
210; Politbum 63; Politburo 63; in 263 August 1914 and September 1939 Iran 146; Iran-Contra affair 67;
Russian Revolution 175--6, 222-3; Switzerland 124, 131, 141, 184,228,232, 65; civil service 73; and Cod isolationist cycles in 220, 228; and
Supreme Soviet 252, 253; 294; and UN membership 176; Wars 180, 237; cultural diplomacy Israel 221, 270-1; and Japan 211;
technological mobilization 138; and referenda in 266 138, 153, 172; devolution in 290-9; and Latin America 146,151, 247;
uprisings of 1989 21 0; and use of Syria 147, 224; HindawiAffair 84 economic diplomacy 142; elections and Marshall Plan 148, 155; and
force 145: and see KGB, Russia Systems theory 10; world systems in 259, 260; empire 247; and Middle East 129; and nuclear
Spain 128, 289; Civil War 299 theory 161 Falkland Islands 113, 141-2, 144; weapons 146; political culture of
Spate, O.K 170 foreign pol icy making 90, 94; Hong 69: public opinion in 263, 268,
Spencer, Diana, Princess of Wales 224 Taiwan 40, 185, 294, 299 Kong negotiations 141, 255; House 270-1, 276; relations with China
Spice Girls 183 Tambo, Oliver 55 of Commons 253, 255, 256. 257-8; 60, 108, 140, 239; strengths of 169;
Society international (of states) 162-4, Tanzania 183 image of 280; Iraqi supergun affair and subnational foreign policy 196,
193; world (of people) 164, 182-3, Tatu, Michael 262 67; Labour governments 76; 210, 231; and terrorist attack of
189 Technology 171; see also infonnation membership of international II September 2001 207; and
Sport as instrument of foreign policy 154 Televi.~ion 267. 275; BBC's 'Ne\vsnight' organizations 340 note 39; United Kingdom 129, 148, 229;
Springer, Axel 278 278 negotiations with Soviet Union, 1939 USAF 106; and use of force 145;
Sprout, Harold and Margaret 170 Terrorism 46, 146; 11 September 58; New Labour foreign policy 222, Vietnam War l05, 117,180,225,
Stalin, Joseph 62, 65, 68, 83, 109, Ill, 2001; 29, 38, 67, 133, 164; 272-3: and nuclear weapons 146; 260; Watergate crisis 60, 229; and
130-1, 133 'war on' 29: see also AI Qaeda. Privy Council 64; public opinion in Western Europe 129; see also
Standard Operating Procedures 93, 113; transnational actors 263,265-6, 271; RAF 106; Sierra American-[sracl Public Affairs
see also organization process Thatcher, Margaret 58; 62, 67, 80, 88. 94. Leone 67, 84; Sterling crises 104, Committee, Cuban Missile Crisis,
State, the 16, 29,30-7,87, 187,215,220, 109, 110, 114, 255, 260; and EC 62, 142: Suez crisis, 1956 65, 117, Defence Intelligence Agency, National
287; diversity of 46-7, 134, 287; 105, 123; and Ronald Reagan l U 120, 129; two-power standard 131; Security Council, CIA, State
the Security State 251-3; society of Third World see developing countries and United States 129, 229; in UN Depanment
states 160; theory of 23, 288, 289; Tito, Marshall (Josip Broz) 140 141-2; and Zimbabwe 261 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 15
transitional states 249; see also Toshiba 79, 206 see also MI6, BBC Universal suffrage 236-7
376 Index

Urban, Jerzy 267 Wendt, Alexander 163, 220

Westphalian states system xxi, 15, 31
Values 101, 119, 121~2, 132, 135, White. Brian xxiii
298; domestic 296 Wight, Martin 6, 160
Vance, Cyrus 62 Wilson, Woodrow 42, 75, 76, 103. 110,
Vansittart, Sir Robert 116 122, 180
Vatican 41, 69, 197; Papal visits 194 Wo1fers, Arnold xxiii, 6, 121, 122, 131,
Versailles peace, 1919; 117 160,303
Vertzberger, Yaacov ill, I 25 Women's rights, Beijing conference
Vietnam 121; North Vietnam 294 on 177
Vigezzi, Bnmello 338 note 3 World Bank 176
Vincent, Johri (R.J) 160, 338-9 note 13 World Economic Forum (Davos) 153, 194.
Voluntarism 294 343 note 14
World opinion 179
Walker, R.B.J 37 World Society 164, 182-3, 189
Waltz, Kenneth 7, 131, 161,236, World Trade Organisation (\VTO)
338 note 6 58, 289
Walzer, Michael 306 World Wildlife Fund 197
War: civil wars 228-9; relationship to
internal tunnoil 228; and see Yamani, Sheikh 62
democratic peace hypothesis Yaniv, Avner 233
Waraims 107 Yeltsin, Boris 59, 60, 112, 143,
Watson, Adam 160 229, 253 +-
Weak states !39, 204, 224 Yugoslavia 170, 294; disintegration
Weber, Cynthia 37 164, 295; neutralily and 184
Webe~. Max 73, 74, 92, 99, 110
[Link], Richard Von 54 Zimbabwe 185,222,241,261