220. I.

Each one of the solidary creditors may do whatever may be useful or beneficial to the others but
not anything which may be prejudicial to the latter.

II. As a general rule, a solidary creditor can assign his rights based on the principle of transmissibility of
rights.

a. Only I is true

b. Only II is true

c. Both are true

d. Both are false

A. The law provides that each one of the solidary creditors may do whatever may be useful or beneficial
to the others but not anything which may be prejudicial to the latter.

For example, B and C, solidary debtors, are indebted to X and Y, solidary creditors, in the amount of
P1,000,000 which will mature on December 31, 2018. On said date, either X or Y must make a demand.
This demand is beneficial to the other co-solidary creditor; otherwise, the debt might be extinguished
because of prescription (a mode of extinguishing an obligation through the lapse of time). Additionally, if
the debtors paid the obligation because of the demand then the said act of making a demand is
beneficial again to the other co-solidary creditor. Contrariwise, if X or Y will not make a demand, said
negative act is prejudicial to the other co-solidary creditor.

A solidary creditor cannot assign his rights without the consent of the others.

221. Is a mode of extinguishing an obligation by changing the object or principal conditions, or by

substituting the person of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor?

a. Novation

b. Compensation

c. Merger of rights
d. Remission

A. The law declares that novation, compensation, confusion or remission of the debt, made by any of
the solidary creditors with any of the solidary debtors, shall extinguish the obligation.

The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall be
liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them.

For example, B and C solidarily owes X and Y the amount of P100,000. Band C agreed with X only that
instead of paying the amount of P100,000, B and C will just deliver a specific car. Upon delivery by B and
C of the specific car to X, their obligation is extinguished. Nonetheless, X is liable for the share of Y

in the amount of P50,000.

222. It is a mode of extinguishing an obligation that take place when two persons, in their own right, are
creditors and debtors of each other.

a. Merger of rights

b. Novation

C. Remission

d. Compensation

D. The law declares that novation, compensation, confusion or remission of the debt, made by any of
the solidary creditors with any of the solidary debtors, shall extinguish the obligation.

The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall be
liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them.

For example, B and C solidarily owes X and Y the amount of P100,000. Prior to this agreement X was
already indebted to B for P100,000 because of a separate contract. If X and B agreed to a compensation
or set-off, then the obligation is extinguished; however, X is liable to Y in the amount of P50,000 as this
is his share in the obligation. Also, C must pay B’s share in the amount of P50,000.

223. The obligation is extinguished from the time the characters of creditor and debtor are merged in
the same person.
a. Confusion

b. Novation

c. Remission

d. Compensation

A. The law declares that novation, compensation, confusion or of the debt, made by any of the solidary
creditors with any of the debtors, shall extinguish the obligation.

The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall be
liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them.

For example, B and C solidary debtors owe solidary creditors X and Y the amount of P100,000 as
evidenced by a negotiable promissory note. X and Y negotiated this promissory note to H then the latter
negotiated it to I then to J then to K then to L then back to B only. In this case, obligation is extinguished.

Nevertheless, C is liable to B for his share in the amount of P50,000. This is because when B and C issued
the promissory note to X and Y, they are both debtors in the amount of P100,000 (B’s share of P50,000
plus C’s share of P50,000) and thereafter when L negotiated the same promissory note to B only (L is the
debtor for P100,000 and B only is the creditor for P100,000), the latter is the only creditor in the amount
of P100,000 which was extinguished due to merger of rights. Therefore, it is just but right that C should
pay B his share P50,000.

224. It is an act of liberality by virtue of which the obligee, without receiving any price or equivalent,
renounces the enforcement of the obligation.

a. confusion

b. Novation

c. Condonation

d. Compensation

C. The law declares that novation, compensation, confusion, or remission of the debt, made by any of
the solidary creditors with any of the solidary debtors, shall extinguish the obligation.
 The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall be
liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them.

For example, B and C solidary debtors owe X and Y the amount of P100,000. Before the date matures, X
condoned or remitted the obligation in favor of B. In this case, the obligation of B and C are extinguished
because of the condonation or remission. If the remission is without the knowledge or consent of Y, X is
liable to Y in the amount of P50,000. Moreover, C is not liable to B for his share because of the principle
“all for one, one for all” thus; “the remission of one, is the remission of all.”

The law provides that the remission of the whole obligation, obtained by one of the solidary debtors,
does not entitle him to reimburse from his co-debtors.

For example, X and Y solidarily obliged themselves to pay B the amount of P300,000 on December 31,
2018. Because of their present financial condition, X pleaded with B for the latter to extinguish the
obligation. Consequently, B condoned the obligation. Now, X is demanding from Y the amount of
P150,000 because he alleged that it was through his efforts that B condoned the obligation. Is X correct?
No, because the remission of the obligation obtained by him does not entitle him to reimbursement.
Take note that the principle of solidary obligation is “all for one and one for all”; hence, the “remission
or condonation of one is the remission or condonation of all.”

The remission made by the creditor of the share which affects one of the solidary debtors does not
release the latter from his responsibility towards the co-debtors, in case the debt has been totally paid
by anyone of them before the remission was effected.

For example, X and Y solidarily obliged themselves to pay B and C the amount of P150,000. Later, B
remitted or condoned only the share of X (P75,000). Unknown to X, the whole obligation was already
paid by Y to C before the remission took place. In this case, X is still liable to Y because the obligation
was extinguished first by payment before the condonation set in. Take note that both payment and
condonation are modes of extinguishing an obligation, its only that payment in this case precedes the
condonation.

25. I. Solidarity makes a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor.

II. When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, each obligor may be compelled to
pay the entire obligation.

A. Only I is true

B. Only II is true

C. Both are true

D. Both are false

B. Indeed, Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that a creditor may sue any of the solidary debtors.

Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled in Operators Incorporated vs. American Biscuit Co. Inc. stated thus:

“x x x solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor.
Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors
or some or all of them simultaneously (Constante Amor de Castro and Corazon vs. CA and Francisco
Artigo, G.R. No. 115838, July 18, 2002).”

When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a
contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. The agent may recover
the whole compensation from any one of the co-principals (Constante Amor de Castro and Corazon
Amor de Castro vs. CA and Francisco Artigo, G.R. No. 115838, July 18, 2002).

226. I. Suretyship is merely an accessory or a collateral to a principal obligation.

II. A surety is considered in law to be on the same footing as the principal debtor in relation to
whatever is adjudged against the latter.

A. Only I is true

B. Only II is true

C. Both are true

D. Both are false

C. Suretyship is merely an accessory or a collateral to a principal obligation. Although a surety contract is

secondary to the principal obligation, the liability of the surety is direct, primary, and absolute; or
equivalent to that of a regular party to the undertaking. A surety becomes liable to the debt and duty of
the principal obligor even without possessing a direct or personal interest in the obligations constituted
by the latter (International Finance Corporation vs. Imperial Textile Mills, Inc., G.R. No. 160324,
November 15, 2005).
A surety is considered in law to be on the same footing as the principal debtor in relation to whatever is
adjusted against the latter (International Finance Corporation vs. Imperial Textile Mills, Inc., G.R. No.
160324, November 15, 2005).

227. I. A solidary debtor will not be able to recover from the co-debtors the full amount already paid to
the creditor, because the right to recovery extends only to the proportional share of the other co-
debtors, and not as to the particular proportional share of the solidary debtor who already paid.

II. A surety who pays the creditor has the right to recover the full amount paid, and not just any
proportional share, from the principal debtor or debtors.

A. Only I is true

B. Only II is true

C. Both are true

D. Both are false

C. In the case of joint and several debtors, Article 1217 makes plain that the solidary debtor who
effected the payment to the creditor may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to
each, with the interest for the payment already made. Such solidary debtor will not be able to recover
from the co-debtors the full amount already paid to the creditor, because the right to recovery extends
only to the proportional share of the other co-debtors, and not as to the particular proportional share of
the solidary debtor who already paid. In contrast, even as the surety is solidarily bound with the
principal debtor to the creditor, the surety who does pay the creditor has the right to recover the full
amount paid, and not just any proportional share, from the principal debtor or debtors. Such right to full
reimbursement falls within the other rights, actions, and benefits which pertain to the surety by reason
of the subsidiary obligation assumed by the surety.

228. The following actions must be commenced within six years:

A. Upon the quasi-contract

B. Upon a quasi-delict

C. Upon an obligation created by law

D. Upon a written contract

A. By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner
and under the conditions laid down by law. In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by
prescription (Art. 1106, NCC). Also, actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law (Art. 1139,
NCC).

The following articles are the pertinent rules on prescription of actions, to wit:

1. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is lost,
unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to Articles
1132, and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 559, 1505, and 1133 (Art. 1140, NCC).

2. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real
rights by prescription (Art. 1141, NCC).

3. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years (Art. 1142, NCC).

4. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in the Civil Code, are not extinguished by
prescription:

A. To demand a right of way (Art. 649, NCC); and

B. To bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance (Art. 1143, NCC).

[Link] following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

A. Upon a written contract;

B. Upon an obligation created by law; and

C. Upon a judgment (Art. 1144, NCC).

6. The following actions must be commenced within six years:

A. Upon an oral contract; and

B. Upon a quasi-contract (Art. 1145, NCC).

7. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

A. Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff; and

B. Upon a quasi-delict (Art. 1146, NCC);

 8. The following actions must be filed within one year:

A. For forcible entry and detainer; and

B. For defamation (Art. 1147, NCC);

9. The limitations of action mentioned in Articles 1140 to 1142, and 1144 to 1147 are without prejudice
to those specified in other parts of the Civil Code, in the Code of Commerce, and in special laws (Art.
1148, NCC).

10. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or other laws must be brought within five
years from the time the right of action accrues (Art. 1149, NCC).

X and Y solidarily obliged themselves to pay B the amount of P150,000. Subsequently, the obligation was
extinguished through prescription as B did not make a demand. However, X still paid the obligation and
thereafter he is demanding from Y his share of P75,000. In this case, Y is not obliged to reimburse X
because the obligation was already extinguished through the lapse of time. Take note of the principle
that a solidary party may do anything which is beneficial but not prejudicial. In here, X made a
prejudicial act because he still paid despite the fact that the obligation was extinguished.

229. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

A. Upon a quasi-contract

B. Upon a quasi-delict

C. Upon an obligation created by law

D. Upon an oral contract

230. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

A. Upon a quasi-contract

B. Upon a quasi-delict
C. Upon an obligation created by law

D. Upon an oral contract