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NVIDIA's Motion to Dismiss Rambus Case

This document is NVIDIA Corporation's reply to Rambus's opposition to NVIDIA's motion to dismiss and strike, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. NVIDIA argues that Rambus's claims of willful and indirect infringement should be dismissed because Rambus fails to provide any factual allegations to support these claims. Specifically, NVIDIA asserts that Rambus does not identify any facts indicating that NVIDIA had knowledge of the patents-in-suit or engaged in reckless disregard of Rambus's patent rights before the lawsuit. NVIDIA also argues that its existing antitrust lawsuit against Rambus does not demonstrate prior knowledge of the asserted patents. Therefore, NVIDIA contends

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Topics covered

  • legal standards,
  • legal defenses,
  • patent infringement,
  • patent rights,
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  • patent claims,
  • exceptional case,
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
102 views9 pages

NVIDIA's Motion to Dismiss Rambus Case

This document is NVIDIA Corporation's reply to Rambus's opposition to NVIDIA's motion to dismiss and strike, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. NVIDIA argues that Rambus's claims of willful and indirect infringement should be dismissed because Rambus fails to provide any factual allegations to support these claims. Specifically, NVIDIA asserts that Rambus does not identify any facts indicating that NVIDIA had knowledge of the patents-in-suit or engaged in reckless disregard of Rambus's patent rights before the lawsuit. NVIDIA also argues that its existing antitrust lawsuit against Rambus does not demonstrate prior knowledge of the asserted patents. Therefore, NVIDIA contends

Uploaded by

sabatino123
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Topics covered

  • legal standards,
  • legal defenses,
  • patent infringement,
  • patent rights,
  • legal documentation,
  • judicial review,
  • patent claims,
  • exceptional case,
  • discovery disputes,
  • Northern District of Californi…

Case 3:08-cv-03343-SI Document 44 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 1 of 9

1 I. NEEL CHATTERJEE (STATE BAR NO. 173985)


nchatterjee@[Link]
2 DEBORAH E. FISHMAN (STATE BAR NO. 197584)
dfishman@[Link]
3 ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
1000 Marsh Road
4 Menlo Park, CA 94025
Telephone: +1-650-614-7400
5 Facsimile: +1-650-614-7401
6 J. PETER COLL (NY STATE BAR NO. 1479492) (Pro Hac
Vice Pending)
7 pcoll@[Link]
KAREN D. THOMPSON (NY STATE BAR NO. 4242814)
8 (Pro Hac Vice Pending)
kthompson@[Link]
9 ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
666 Fifth Avenue
10 New York, NY 10103-0001
Telephone: +1-212-506-5000
11 Facsimile: +1-212-506-5151
12 Attorneys for Defendant
NVIDIA Corporation
13

14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

15 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

16 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

17

18 RAMBUS, INC., Case No. C-08-03343 SI

19 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT NVIDIA


CORPORATION’S REPLY TO
20 v. RAMBUS'S OPPOSITION TO ITS
MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO
21 NVIDIA CORPORATION, STRIKE, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR MORE
22 Defendant. DEFINITE STATEMENT

23 Date: November 14, 2008


Time: 9:00 a.m.
24 Judge: Hon. Susan Illston

25

26

27

28
NVIDIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE OR
OHS West:260542714.1 FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
C-08-03343 SI
Case 3:08-cv-03343-SI Document 44 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 2 of 9

1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Because Rambus offers no reason why it cannot plead basic facts to support its claim of

3 willful and indirect infringement of 15 patents, Nvidia’s motion to dismiss should be granted.

4 Rambus’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts every conceivable theory of patent

5 infringement for 15 patents1 totaling more that 500 claims against NVIDIA's entire product line

6 encompassing as many as 140 products with no underlying facts pled. Such a pleading is

7 precisely the type of speculative pleading that the United States Supreme Court dismissed in Bell

8 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).

9 To support its claim of willful infringement, Rambus does not identify any facts pled in its

10 complaint, but instead reaches outside the allegations of its complaint and contends that

11 NVIDIA’s own antitrust case demonstrates that it had knowledge of Rambus’s patents. Nvidia’s

12 antitrust complaint does not cure the defects of Rambus’s pleading nor does it support Rambus’s

13 contention of prior knowledge of the asserted patents in suit. Rambus noticeably omits reference

14 to any passage in either the North Carolina antitrust complaint or in underlying licensing

15 negotiations reflecting that Nvidia had knowledge of the asserted patents before the filing of

16 Rambus’s instant lawsuit. Rambus’s claims for indirect infringement likewise fail to satisfy the

17 minimal pleading requirements by failing to provide Nvidia with fair notice of the allegations

18 against it.

19 II. ARGUMENT
20 A. Rambus Must Provide Factual Allegations

21 Rambus argues it need not plead specific facts to give fair notice of its claim or the

22 grounds upon which the claim rests.2 Instead, it contends that it only needs to plead facts

23 sufficient to put NVIDIA on notice of what to defend, and only with enough detail to allow

24 NVIDIA to answer.3 But Bell Atlantic held that factual allegations are necessary to give notice of

25 the grounds underlying the claim before launching into costly and unfocused discovery. Claims

26 1
Rambus originally asserted infringement of seventeen patents but later entered a covenant not to
sue on two of the seventeen patents.
27 2
See Rambus Opposition at 4, citing to Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.3 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
28 3
See Rambus Opposition at 4.
NVIDIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE OR
OHS West:260542714.1 -1- FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
C-08-03343 SI
Case 3:08-cv-03343-SI Document 44 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 3 of 9

1 without a factual basis fail to cross the line from conceivable to plausible and should be
2 dismissed.4 Because Rambus fails to provide such a factual basis for its claims of willful and
3 indirect infringement, those claims should be dismissed.
4 B. Rambus's Willful Infringement Claim Is Insufficient
5 Rambus incorrectly claims that it sufficiently pled willful infringement.5 Rambus asserts
6 that its complaint is acceptable under the Magistrate's ruling in FotoMedia Techs., LLC v. AOL,
7 LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73033 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2008), and because, it says, NVIDIA's
8 knowledge of the patents in suit should be implied.
9 Rambus does not identify, however, any facts to support a claim of willful infringement.
10 Indeed, Rambus has not alleged that NVIDIA had knowledge, or engaged in "reckless disregard"
11 of Rambus' patents, and has not asserted any facts to support such an inference. Moreover, three
12 of the asserted patents did not even issue until 2008, and Rambus alleges no facts identifying how
13 NVIDIA would have learn of those patents before the filing of this lawsuit. (Rambus Complaint
14 at ¶¶ 19, 20, 21)
15 First, FotoMedia is a nonbinding decision that was incorrectly decided and is not
16 applicable to this case in any event. FotoMedia was decided by Magistrate Judge Charles
17 Everingham in the Eastern District of Texas and adopts unpublished recommendations. In
18 addition, FotoMedia is inapplicable here since Rambus, unlike the plaintiff in Fotomedia, has not
19 alleged that defendant acted in "reckless disregard" of their patent rights.6
20 Second, Rambus claims that NVIDIA's knowledge of the patents in-suit should be implied
21 from the existence of its Nvidia’s antitrust lawsuit against Rambus in the Middle District of North
22
4
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1974.
23 5
Rambus Opposition at 5.
6
See Rambus Opposition, Ex. B at ¶¶ 22, 26, 30. Unlike Rambus, the FotoMedia plaintiffs had a
24 good faith basis for alleging defendants acted in "reckless disregard" of their patent rights. They
did not claim that every defendant that directly infringed also willfully infringed. Plaintiff names
25 AOL, Yahoo, PhotoBucket, Shutterfly, and CNET Networks as direct infringers on all three of its
patents, but only alleges that AOL and Yahoo willfully infringed the three patents, and Shutterfly
26 one of the patents. If a good faith basis for alleging willful infringement was not required,
FotoMedia plaintiff could have asserted willful infringement against all the defendants on each
27 patent. See In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir 2007) (requiring
"good faith basis for alleging willful infringement" "when a complaint (hereafter “NVIDIA
28 antitrust complaint”), is filed.").
NVIDIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE OR
OHS West:260542714.1 -2- FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
C-08-03343 SI
Case 3:08-cv-03343-SI Document 44 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 4 of 9

1 Carolina.7 But these facts are not pled and are an impermissible inference. In any event, even if
2 the court considered Nvidia’s pending antitrust case, the existence of the case does not support a
3 willfulness claim. Nowhere in Nvidia’s antitrust complaint does it identify or allege that it had
4 knowledge of the particular Rambus patents asserted in this patent litigation and, noticeably,
5 Rambus fails to identify any passage of Nvidia’s antitrust complaint or any underlying facts to
6 suggest otherwise.8
7 Despite Rambus' allegations, it has not pled a single fact demonstrating that NVIDIA
8 knew of the specific patents asserted. Asserting willful infringement is not the same as actually
9 alleging knowledge of the patent, the former is a "legal tautology" while the latter is a "factual
10 allegation."9 Rambus's complaint only asserts willful infringement, it does not allege knowledge.
11 If Rambus cannot in good faith allege facts that NVIDIA had knowledge of the patents in-suit,
12 then the claim of willful infringement should be dismissed.
13 C. Rambus's Induced Infringement Pleading is Insufficient
14 Because Rambus has failed to allege that Nvidia had knowledge of its alleged
15 infringement, its pleading for induced infringement likewise fails. Rambus does not contest that
16 in order to prove its claim of induced infringement, it must show that Nvidia “knowingly induced
17 infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.”10 Yet, Rambus
18 contends that it has discharged its pleading obligation by simply alleging that Nvidia “actively
19 induced and continues to actively induce others to infringe.” (Rambus FAC at ¶ 34) Not once
20 does Rambus use the word “knowingly,” nor does it provide any factual basis for an allegation
21 that Nvidia knew of its alleged infringement. In fact, Rambus’s own citation to CBT Flint
22 Partners – the sole post-Bell case that Rambus cites for its argument – demonstrates that a
23 claimant must allege knowledge of the alleged infringement in order to satisfy its pleading
24
7
Rambus Opposition at 5, fn 3.
25 8
See NVIDIA’s First Amended Complaint in the Middle District of North Carolina, attached
hereto as Exhibit A.
26 9
F5 Networks, Inc v. A10 Networks, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31319 at *4 (W.D. Wash.
March 10, 2008)(dismissing claim that asserted willful infringement but did not allege
27 knowledge); see also Sentry Prot. Prods., Inc. v. Hero Prods., Inc., 400 F.3d 910, 918 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
28 10
DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS, Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
NVIDIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE OR
OHS West:260542714.1 -3- FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
C-08-03343 SI
Case 3:08-cv-03343-SI Document 44 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 5 of 9

1 obligations.11
2 Rambus fails to identify anything in its pleading that would cure this deficiency and
3 instead suggests in a footnote that that NVIDIA’s knowledge of the asserted patents (not even
4 knowledge of its alleged infringement) should be inferred from extrajudicial documents, namely
5 from Nvidia’s antitrust suit against Rambus.12 As discussed above, that lawsuit does not
6 demonstrate prior knowledge of the asserted patents and without such knowledge, an accused
7 infringer cannot have knowledge of its own alleged infringement sufficient to induce
8 infringement.13 Without some factual basis for asserting induced infringement on all 15 patents,
9 Rambus does not provide NVIDIA "fair notice" of the "grounds on which the claim rests."14
10 Next, Rambus claims to allege the existence of third-party direct infringers but the
11 complaint only speaks of “others” with no further detail. (See Rambus FAC at ¶¶ 34, 36, 38, 40,
12 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64 and 66.) Rambus argues that third-party direct
13 infringers are implied because it seeks to enjoin “…,customers,…,OEMs, dealers, and
14 distributors.”15 Even if this were true, Rambus does not allege which patents – if any – third-
15 parties directly infringe. Bare statements of direct and indirect infringement without further facts
16 do not demonstrate a plausible entitlement to relief.16 Because Rambus does not allege which of
17 its patents its patents are directly infringed by third-parties it does not demonstrate a plausible
18 entitlement to relief.
19 Rambus incorrectly urges that its inducement claim is similar in detail to other complaints
20 that were found sufficient. Unlike the present case, none of Rambus's cited cases involve claims
21 with more than two patents.17 Rambus says NVIDIA is capable of responding to its complaint
22
11
CBT Flint Partners v. Goodmail Systems, Inc., 529 [Link].2d 1376, 1379 ([Link]. 2007).
23 12
Rambus Opposition at 9 n. 4 referring to NVIDIA Antitrust Complaint.
13
See DSU Med Corp v. JMS., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
24 14
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n. 3; see also Erickson v. Prdus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007).
15
Rambus Opposition at 10.
25 16
See Anticancer Inc., v. Xenogen Corporation, et al., 248 F.R.D. 278, 282 (S.D. Cal 2007).
17
See Jackson v. Illinois Bell Tell. Co., No. 01-C-8001, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13186 (N.D. Ill.
26 July 8, 2002)(asserting one patent); Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Micromuse, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis
2073 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)(asserting two patents); Windy City Innovations, LLC v. Am. Online, 227
27 F.R.D. 278 (N.D. Ill. 2005)(asserting one patent); CBT Flint Partners v. Goodmail Systems, Inc.,
529 [Link].2d 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2007)(asserting two patents); Scanner Technologies, Corp. v.
28 NVIDIA Corporation, No. 9:06-cv-00205-RC-KFG (E.D. Tex.)(asserting two patents).
NVIDIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE OR
OHS West:260542714.1 -4- FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
C-08-03343 SI
Case 3:08-cv-03343-SI Document 44 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 6 of 9

1 because NVIDIA answered the complaint in Scanner Technologies. That was entirely different,
2 as it involved two patents and was related to an extremely complex set of proceedings with an
3 established history.18
4 The present case is closer to In re Papst Licensing,19 which required a more definite
5 statement because the plaintiff claimed infringement for 20 patents totaling 503 patent claims, by
6 as many as a hundred of defendant's products. Here, Rambus's complaint alleges infringement of
7 15 patents totaling 512 patent claims, by as many as 140 NVIDIA products. Moreover, Rambus
8 asserts every theory of infringement on all 512 patent claims.20 In fact, this court has held that
9 similar factual scenarios do not provide defendants with "fair notice" of plaintiff's claims.21 Here,
10 as in Papst Licensing and Intergraph, some specificity is needed to allow NVIDIA to answer the
11 complaint.
12 D. Rambus's Contributory Infringement Claim is Insufficient
13 Rambus's complaint alleges that NVIDIA "has contributed and continues to contribute to"
14 infringement because NVIDIA has sold or offered for sale the accused products. But Rambus has
15 failed to plead that the accused devices have no substantial non-infringing uses and that use of
16 these devices constituted an act of direct infringement. Indeed, these elements are essential to
17 proving contributory infringement.22 Rambus disputes that DSU Med Corp. establishes pleading
18 requirements and urges these requirements are only burdens of proof, but offers no case law
19 interpreting DSU Med. Corp. this narrowly.
20 Moreover, Rambus’s reliance on McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
21
18
See Scanner Technologies v. ICOS. Visions Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
22 19
In re Papst Licensing, 2001 U.S. Dist Lexis 2255 (E.D. La. February 22, 2001)(holding
"complaint must be amended to specifically identify [defendant]'s products which [plaintiff]
23 alleges infringe upon one or more claims of each of the twenty patents.")
20
Rambus's claim for products including SDR, DDR, DDR2, DDR3, GDDR3 is not a limitation.
24 on the number of alleged infringing products. The list is not exclusive and identifies the universe
of standard memory controllers. It is equivalent to the claim in Papst Licensing that alleged all
25 IBM products containing hard disk drives infringe.
21
See Hewlett-Packard Company v. Intergraph Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26092 (N.D. Cal.
26 September 6, 2003)(dismissing complaint for contributory and induced infringement because
Form 16 style did not adequately provide defendants with "fair notice.").
27 22
See, e.g., MGM Well Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., LLC, No. H-05-1634, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30536, at *6 (S.D. Tex. April 25, 2007)(citing DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471
28 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
NVIDIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE OR
OHS West:260542714.1 -5- FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
C-08-03343 SI
Case 3:08-cv-03343-SI Document 44 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 7 of 9

1 2007) in support of the sufficiency of its claim is misplaced. McZeal cannot sustain Rambus’s
2 complaint, however, because it applies to pro se litigants. Id. The Federal Circuit specifically
3 held in that case that plaintiff met the "low bar" pleading requirements for pro se litigants. Id. at
4 1358. Further, McZeall did not address the sufficiency of pleading indirect infringement or
5 willfulness, only direct infringement.
6 III. RAMBUS’S PRAYER FOR ATTORNEY FEES BASED ON AN ASSERTION
THAT THIS CASE IS“EXCEPTIONAL” SHOULD BE STRICKEN IN THE
7 ABSENCE OF A FACTUAL BASIS
8 Rambus relies on its claim of willful infringement to warrant recovery of attorney fees.
9 Because Rambus cannot point to any factual allegations of NVIDIA's knowledge of its patents,
10 Rambus has not adequately pled willfulness. To the extent Rambus’s prayer for attorney fees is
11 intended to be based on any other wholly-unpleaded facts, the prayer should be stricken.23
12 Should this Court dismiss Rambus's willful infringement claim, the Court should also strike
13 Rambus's prayer for attorney fees.
14 IV. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD REQUIRE RAMBUS TO
AMEND ITS CLAIMS TO PROVIDE A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
15

16 Rule 12(e) clearly states relief is appropriate when a pleading is "so vague or ambiguous
17 that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading…" Fed. R. Civ. P.
18 12(e). Rambus neither provides facts to support a willfulness claim, nor notice of the grounds on
19 which its willfulness claim rests. Its claims of indirect infringement lack sufficient factual
20 support and are overbroad and unduly burdensome. Rambus’s FAC therefore fails to provide
21 NVIDIA with fair notice allowing response and should either be dismissed or amended to provide
22 a more definite statement of the claim being asserted.
23

24

25

26
23
Nichia Corp. Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor, Ltd., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29959 (N.D. Cal.
27 May 9, 2006) (striking prayer for treble damages where no facts were alleged to support
willfulness and complaint did not “include any other allegation that, if proven, might support an
28 award of treble damages.”).
NVIDIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE OR
OHS West:260542714.1 -6- FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
C-08-03343 SI
Case 3:08-cv-03343-SI Document 44 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 8 of 9

1 V. CONCLUSION
2 Rambus has not sufficiently pled its claims for willful infringement, induced infringement,

3 or contributory infringement. As a result, the Court should dismiss those claims and strike the

4 related prayers for relief. In the alternative, Nvidia respectfully requests that the Court require

5 Rambus to amend it complaint to provide proper notice of the claims asserted.

6
Dated: October 31, 2008 ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
7

8
/s/ Deborah E. Fishman /s/
9 Deborah E. Fishman
Attorneys for Defendant
10 NVIDIA CORPORATION
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NVIDIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE OR
OHS West:260542714.1 -7- FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
C-08-03343 SI
Case 3:08-cv-03343-SI Document 44 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 9 of 9

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I hereby certify that this document(s) filed through the ECF system will be sent
electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)
3
and paper copies will be sent to those indicated as non registered participants on August 29, 2008.
4

5 Dated: October 31, 2008 Respectfully submitted,

6 /s/ Deborah E. Fishman /s/


Deborah E. Fishman
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NVIDIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE OR
OHS West:260542714.1 FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
C-08-03343 SI

Common questions

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Rambus's willful infringement claim against NVIDIA is deficient mainly because it fails to provide any factual allegations to support the claim. Rambus has not alleged that NVIDIA had knowledge of the patents before the filing of the lawsuit or engaged in reckless disregard of Rambus' patent rights. Rambus relies on the implication of NVIDIA's knowledge due to an antitrust lawsuit in North Carolina, but this is not explicitly backed by any specific factual claims linking NVIDIA to the patents. Furthermore, the sources critique Rambus for not detailing NVIDIA's knowledge or any inferred knowledge of the specific patents, leading to the conclusion that asserting willful infringement without knowledge is essentially a legal tautology without factual support .

The legal precedent emphasized in the arguments against Rambus's claims is the Bell Atlantic case, which underlines the necessity of factual allegations to support the plausibility of claims before proceeding to costly discovery. It is applied to argue that Rambus's claims should be dismissed due to the lack of a factual basis. Similarly, In re Seagate Technology serves as a precedent requiring a good faith basis for alleging willfulness, which Rambus fails to demonstrate .

Rambus fails to address the requisite element of knowledge in its claim of induced infringement, which is necessary to prove that Nvidia knowingly induced another to infringe. Rambus merely alleges that Nvidia actively induced others without showing that Nvidia had knowledge of the alleged infringement or specific intent to encourage it. Furthermore, there is no factual basis provided to assert the existence of third-party direct infringers or identify which patents are allegedly being infringed .

If Rambus’s claims are deemed insufficient, they face dismissal unless amended. The sources suggest that Rambus should provide a more definite statement to rectify the insufficiencies, detailing the factual basis for its claims. Specifically, the claims and their grounds must be specified to provide NVIDIA with fair notice and allow for a proper response. The failure to sufficiently detail willful, induced, and contributory infringement claims could also lead to the striking of associated prayers for relief, such as attorney fees .

The court views the implication of knowledge from external lawsuits, such as the Nvidia antitrust case, as insufficient to demonstrate patent infringement knowledge. Rambus's attempt to imply NVIDIA's knowledge due to the existence of an antitrust lawsuit is dismissed because the lawsuit itself does not contain any specific allegations related to the patents in question. Thus, implying knowledge without direct allegations or factual support is considered an impermissible inference .

The court distinguishes between alleging willful infringement and asserting knowledge of a patent by emphasizing that willful infringement requires a factual basis demonstrating the defendant’s knowledge of the patent. Without such factual allegations indicating that the defendant was aware of the patent, claiming willful infringement is insufficient. The complaint must move beyond mere assertions to provide specific facts that would suggest the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the patent rights .

Rambus's contributory infringement claim lacks necessary elements because it fails to plead that the accused devices have no substantial non-infringing uses or to show that these devices directly infringe the patents. These are critical elements to substantiate a claim of contributory infringement, and their absence weakens the case against NVIDIA. The argument against Rambus is further supported by references to DSU Med Corp., which outlines such pleading requirements, even though Rambus attempts to downplay their applicability as mere burdens of proof .

The comparison between Rambus's claims and other cases deemed sufficient reveals significant differences. Rambus's cited cases generally involve a smaller number of patents and are better detailed in the allegations of infringement. Rambus's claims lack the specificity found in sufficient complaints, often involving more streamlined or less complex matters. The conclusion is that Rambus's claims, with 15 patents and over 500 patent claims, resemble the more complex cases like In re Papst Licensing, which require more definite statements due to their overbroad nature .

Factual allegations play a crucial role in pleading patent infringement cases as they provide the necessary detail to give defendants fair notice of the claims against them, allowing for a meaningful response. The ruling in Bell Atlantic establishes that complaints need to provide enough factual grounding to move beyond conceivable claims to plausible claims. In the case of Rambus against NVIDIA, the lack of specific factual allegations regarding NVIDIA's knowledge of the patents undermines the plausibility of the willful infringement claims .

The Rambus complaint shares similarities with In re Papst Licensing in terms of complexity, as both involve a large number of patents and claims against numerous products. This complexity requires detailed pleadings to give fair notice of the specific claims at issue. The main difference lies in the court's response; In re Papst Licensing required the plaintiff to amend its complaint to identify specific infringing products, emphasizing the need for specificity in complex cases. Similarly, Rambus's broad and vague allegations are seen as insufficient without specific factual support, echoing the need for a more definite statement as required in the Papst Licensing case .

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