Article 1 ECHR: Jurisdiction & Imputability Guide
Article 1 ECHR: Jurisdiction & Imputability Guide
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Table of contents
Note to readers.............................................................................................. 5
Introduction................................................................................................... 6
II. Delegation of State powers or joint exercise of the latter with other
States ...................................................................................................... 45
A. Imputability to the European Union of an alleged violation: the Bosphorus presumption
or the principle of equivalent protection ................................................................................. 46
B. Imputability to the UN of alleged violations ............................................................................. 46
1. International military operations........................................................................................ 47
2. International sanctions ordered by the UN Security Council ............................................. 48
C. Imputability of the alleged violation to other international organisations .............................. 49
Note to readers
This Guide is part of the series of Case-Law Guides published by the European Court of Human Rights
(hereafter “the Court”, “the European Court” or “the Strasbourg Court”) to inform legal practitioners
about the fundamental judgments and decisions delivered by the Strasbourg Court. This particular
Guide analyses and sums up the case-law under Article 1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (hereafter “the Convention” or “the European Convention”). Readers will find herein the key
principles in this area and the relevant precedents.
The case-law cited has been selected among the leading, major, and/or recent judgments and
decisions.*
The Court’s judgments and decisions serve not only to decide those cases brought before it but,
more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby
contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting
Parties (Ireland v. the United Kingdom, § 154, 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, and, more recently,
Jeronovičs v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898/10, § 109, ECHR 2016).
The mission of the system set up by the Convention is thus to determine issues of public policy in the
general interest, thereby raising the standards of protection of human rights and extending human
rights jurisprudence throughout the community of the Convention States (Konstantin Markin
v. Russia [GC], § 89, no. 30078/06, ECHR 2012). Indeed, the Court has emphasised the Convention’s
role as a “constitutional instrument of European public order” in the field of human rights
(Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, § 156, ECHR
2005-VI, and more recently N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, § 110,
13 February 2020).
Protocol No. 15 to the Convention recently inserted the principle of subsidiarity into the Preamble to
the Convention. This principle “imposes a shared responsibility between the States Parties and the
Court” as regards human rights protection, and the national authorities and courts must interpret
and apply domestic law in a manner that gives full effect to the rights and freedoms defined in the
Convention and the Protocols thereto (Grzęda v. Poland [GC], § 324).
This Guide contains references to keywords for each cited Article of the Convention and its
Additional Protocols. The legal issues dealt with in each case are summarised in a List of keywords,
chosen from a thesaurus of terms taken (in most cases) directly from the text of the Convention and
its Protocols.
The HUDOC database of the Court’s case-law enables searches to be made by keyword. Searching
with these keywords enables a group of documents with similar legal content to be found (the
Court’s reasoning and conclusions in each case are summarised through the keywords). Keywords
for individual cases can be found by clicking on the Case Details tag in HUDOC. For further
information about the HUDOC database and the keywords, please see the HUDOC user manual.
* The case-law cited may be in either or both of the official languages (English and French) of the Court and
the European Commission of Human Rights. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to a judgment on
the merits delivered by a Chamber of the Court. The abbreviation “(dec.)” indicates that the citation is of a
decision of the Court and “[GC]” that the case was heard by the Grand Chamber. Chamber judgments that
were not final when this update was published are marked with an asterisk (*).
Introduction
Article 1 of the Convention – Obligation to respect human rights
“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.”
HUDOC keywords
High Contracting Party (1) – Responsibility of States (1) – Jurisdiction of States (1)
4. The adoption of Article 1 of the Convention was also preceded by a comment made by the
Belgian representative, who, on 25 August 1950 during the plenary sitting of the Consultative
Assembly, said that:
“... henceforth the right of protection by our States, by virtue of a formal clause of the Convention, may
be exercised with full force, and without any differentiation or distinction, in favour of individuals of
whatever nationality, who on the territory of any one of our States, may have had reason to complain
that [their] rights have been violated.”
5. The travaux préparatoires go on to note that the wording of Article 1, including “within their
jurisdiction”, did not give rise to any further discussion and the text as it was (and is now) was
adopted by the Consultative Assembly on 25 August 1950 without further amendment (Collected
Edition, vol. VI, p. 132) (Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 2001, §§ 19-20).
6. The concept of “jurisdiction” for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention must be considered
to reflect the term’s meaning in public international law (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC],
2020, § 344).
7. Establishing the existence of “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention is
not necessarily determined by the merits of the case, and it is not therefore necessary to be left to
be determined at the merits stage of the proceedings (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC],
2020, § 265). Accordingly, there is nothing to prevent the Court from establishing already at the
preliminary (admissibility) stage whether the matters complained of by the applicant fall within the
jurisdiction of the respondent Government (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec), 2022,
§ 507). In any event, the question whether the case falls within the jurisdiction of the respondent
State is a preliminary issue to be determined before any assessment of the merits of the substantive
allegations can take place (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020, § 264; Ukraine and the
Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 506).
8. In addition, the Court may examine of its own motion the question of jurisdiction or that of the
imputability of the alleged violations to the respondent State even if the Government have not
raised an objection on such grounds (Stephens v. Malta (no. 1),2009, § 45; Vasiliciuc v. Republic of
Moldova, 2017, § 22; Veronica Ciobanu v. Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 25).
9. Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant’s complaints fall within the jurisdiction of
the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the
Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court
at the merits stage (Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte
Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). A distinction must also be
drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that
of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the
latter issue being examined from the angle of the application’s compatibility ratione personae with
the provisions of the Convention (Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility
and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the
assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the
particular facts of the case (Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi
v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability
and responsibility as going together, such that the State’s responsibility under the Convention is only
engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court
is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately (Assanidze
v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).
10. Unlike jurisdiction, issues of attribution and the responsibility of the respondent State under the
Convention for the acts complained of fall to be examined at the merits stage of the proceedings. It
is, however, important to clarify that this concerns only the evidential question whether the act or
omission complained of was in fact attributable to a State agent as alleged. It does not preclude an
15. The acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of private
individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its jurisdiction may engage
the State’s responsibility under the Convention (Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004,
§ 318; Solomou and Others v. Turkey, 2008, § 46).
16. Article 1 makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned, and does not exclude
any part of the member States’ “jurisdiction” from scrutiny under the Convention (N.D. and N.T.
v. Spain [GC], 2020, § 102).
17. It should also be borne in mind that, for the purposes of the Convention, the sole issue of
relevance is the State’s international responsibility, irrespective of the national authority to which
the breach of the Convention in the domestic system is imputable. Even though it is not
inconceivable that States will encounter difficulties in securing compliance with the rights
guaranteed by the Convention in all parts of their territory, each State Party to the Convention
nonetheless remains responsible for events occurring anywhere within its national territory. Further,
the Convention does not merely oblige the higher authorities of the Contracting States themselves
to respect the rights and freedoms it embodies; it also has the consequence that, in order to secure
the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms, those authorities must prevent or remedy any breach
at subordinate levels. The higher authorities of the State are under a duty to require their
subordinates to comply with the Convention and cannot shelter behind their inability to ensure that
it is respected. The general duty imposed on the State by Article 1 of the Convention entails and
requires the implementation of a national system capable of securing compliance with the
Convention throughout the territory of the State for everyone. That is confirmed by the fact that,
firstly, Article 1 does not exclude any part of the member States’ “jurisdiction” from the scope of the
Convention and, secondly, it is with respect to their “jurisdiction” as a whole that member States are
called on to show compliance with the Convention. (Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, §§ 146-147). In
short, it is only the responsibility of the Contracting State itself – not that of a domestic authority or
organ, whether central or local – that is in issue before the Court. It is not the Court’s role to deal
with a multiplicity of national authorities or courts or to examine disputes between institutions or
over internal politics (ibid., § 149).
18. Generally speaking, a State may be held responsible even where its agents are acting ultra vires
or contrary to instructions. Under the Convention, a State’s authorities are strictly liable for the
conduct of their subordinates; they are under a duty to impose their will and cannot shelter behind
their inability to ensure that it is respected (Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004,
§ 319).
Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 104, and the references therein); for very clear examples of
application of the territorial criterion see Gurbanov v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 22-26, and as regards ports
and territorial waters, Friedrich and Others v. Poland, 2024, § 113).
20. The fact that an applicant currently lives in a Contracting State does not suffice to confer
territorial jurisdiction on that State, and therefore responsibility under Article 1 of the Convention. It
is the subject-matter of the applicant’s complaints alone that is relevant in this regard (Chagos
Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2012, § 63).
21. In the case of Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 2001, the applicants
complained about the deaths of members of their families (and the injuries sustained by one of the
applicants who had survived) resulting from the bombing of the Serb radio and television premises
in Belgrade by NATO armed forces, even though the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not a
Contracting State. The Court rejected the applicants’ argument that any person suffering the
negative effects of an act attributable to a Contracting State came ipso facto, wherever the act was
committed or wherever its consequences were felt, “under the jurisdiction” of that State for the
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. It reiterated that the Convention was a multilateral treaty
operating, subject to Article 56 of the Convention, in an essentially regional context and notably in
the legal area (espace juridique) of the Contracting States, to which the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia did not belong. The Convention was not therefore designed to be applied throughout the
world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States. The Court was not persuaded, in that
case, that there was any jurisdictional link between the respondent States and the applicants, who
had not demonstrated that they and their deceased relatives were capable of coming within the
jurisdiction of the respondent States on account of the extraterritorial act in question (see also
Marković and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2003). The Court subsequently abandoned that approach, finding
that the Convention rights could be “divided and tailored” for the application of Article 1 (Ukraine
and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 571, with further references).
22. A State’s jurisdiction is considered to be exercised normally throughout its territory (Assanidze
v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 139; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 345). The Convention
precludes territorial exclusions other than in the instance referred to in Article 56 § 1 of the
Convention (dependent territories) (ibid., § 140; N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, § 106; and A.A.
and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, § 61). In other words, the territorial scope of the Convention
cannot be reduced, selectively and artificially, to only certain parts of the territory of a Contracting
State (ibid., 2022, § 63).
23. It is immaterial whether the respondent State is unitary or federal. Unlike the American
Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969 (Article 28), the European Convention does not
contain a “federal clause” limiting the obligations of the federal State for events occurring on the
territory of the States forming part of the federation. Besides, even if an implied federal clause
similar in content to that of Article 28 of the American Convention were found to exist in the
European Convention (which is impossible in practice), it could not be construed as releasing the
federal State from all responsibility, since it requires the latter to “immediately take suitable
measures, in accordance with its constitution ..., to the end that the [states forming part of the
federation] may adopt appropriate provisions for the fulfilment of [the] Convention”. Indeed, for
reasons of legal policy – the need to maintain equality between the States Parties and to ensure the
effectiveness of the Convention – it could not be otherwise. But for the presumption, the
applicability of the Convention could be selectively restricted to only parts of the territory of certain
States Parties, thus rendering the notion of effective human rights protection underpinning the
entire Convention meaningless while, at the same time, allowing discrimination between the States
Parties, that is to say between those which accepted the application of the Convention over the
whole of their territory and those which did not (Assanidze v. Georgia, 2004, §§ 141-142). Moreover,
the authorities of a territorial entity of the State are public-law institutions which perform the
functions assigned to them by the Constitution and the law (ibid., § 148).
24. Moreover, the practical difficulties in the migration context cannot justify leaving an area
outside the law where individuals are covered by no legal system capable of affording them
enjoyment of the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention which the States have
undertaken to secure (A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, § 63).
25. The European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) affirmed the principle of
territoriality in the framework of two applications from a single person directed against the United
Kingdom and Ireland, respectively. The applicant in those cases, a British national living in Northern
Ireland, alleged a violation by both those States of the positive obligations stemming from Article 2
of the Convention on account of her husband’s murder committed in the territory of the Republic of
Ireland, and her brother’s murder committed in Northern Ireland (and therefore in the United
Kingdom). In the first application, against the United Kingdom, the applicant submitted that that
State had also been responsible under the Convention for her husband’s murder in the Republic of
Ireland because the British authorities had not done all in their power to combat the overall
phenomenon of IRA terrorism. The Commission recorded its disagreement. It noted that when he
had died, the direct victim – the applicant’s husband – had not been within the “jurisdiction” of the
United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. The Commission also considered
whether any action of the United Kingdom authorities could have played a part in the applicant’s
husband’s murder in the Republic of Ireland, but found that the applicant herself had at no point
alleged any such action on the part of the British authorities. Consequently, inasmuch as her
complaint concerned the United Kingdom and related to her husband’s murder, it was incompatible
ratione loci with the Convention. On the other hand, her brother’s murder in the United Kingdom
had bestowed “jurisdiction” on that State, such that the corresponding complaint was indeed
compatible ratione loci (W. v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 28 February 1983). In the
second case, against Ireland, the Commission reached diametrically opposed conclusions, to the
effect that the applicant’s husband had been within the jurisdiction of the respondent State, but not
her brother. In particular, as regards the brother, the Commission added that the constitutional
claim to the territories of Northern Ireland set out in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution were
not recognised by the international community as constituting the basis of jurisdiction over Northern
Ireland (W. v. Ireland, Commission decision of 28 February 1983).
26. The existence of a fence located some distance from the border does not authorise a State to
unilaterally exclude, alter or limit its territorial jurisdiction, which begins at the line forming the
border (N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, § 109). The case cited concerned the return to Morocco of
two persons, one a Malian and the other an Ivoirian national, who had attempted to enter Spanish
territory unlawfully by scaling three parallel fences surrounding the Spanish enclave of Melilla, which
is located on the North African coast. The applicants had managed to reach only the top of the inner
fence, from which they had finally climbed down with the help of the Spanish security forces, which
had subsequently handed them over to the Moroccan authorities. The Court could not discern any
“constraining de facto situation” or “objective facts” capable of limiting the effective exercise of the
Spanish State’s authority over its territory at the Melilla border and, consequently, of rebutting the
“presumption of competence” in respect of the applicants. They therefore fell within Spain’s
“jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. The Court pointed out that the
practical difficulties of managing illegal immigration (in this case, the storming of the border fences
by groups generally comprising several hundred non-nationals) did not alter its reasoning; on the
contrary, the special nature of the context as regards migration cannot justify an area outside the
law where individuals are covered by no legal system capable of affording them enjoyment of the
rights and guarantees protected by the Convention (ibid., §§ 104-111).
27. Furthermore, the Court has recently specified that three refusals by Lithuanian border officials
to accept asylum applications from a Chechen family at the border with Belarus constituted actions
imputable to Lithuania, thereby falling within that country’s jurisdiction under Article 1 of the
Convention (M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, § 70).
28. As regards the territory of a State’s diplomatic missions abroad, the administrative control
exercised by the State over the premises of its embassies is not sufficient to bring every person who
enters those premises within its jurisdiction (M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 119).
Thus the Court refused to recognise the territorial jurisdiction of Belgium in respect of four Syrian
nationals who had submitted visa applications at the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon. Indeed, as they
had not been in the territory of the State in question or at its border, they had not been in a
situation of removal from its territory (ibid., § 120).
29. Where the circumstances leading to the alleged violation occurred in a cross-border or
transnational context, pursuant to the principle that the jurisdictional competence of a State is
primarily territorial, an application directed against several Contracting States is compatible
ratione loci with the provisions of the Convention as regards the events which occurred on their
respective territories (Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, § 160).
30. In the specific context of the State’s positive obligations in matters of climate change, the Court
found that individuals living on the territory of a Contracting Party were within its jurisdiction for
such purposes. The issue of responsibility, however, is a separate matter to be examined, if
necessary, in relation to the merits of the complaint (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others
v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, § 287, 9 April 2024; Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and
32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178).
first of all, that Ukraine and Russia had ratified the Convention in respect of their respective
territories as delimited by their then internationally recognised borders; secondly, that neither of the
States in question had notified any changes to their sovereign territories; and thirdly, that a number
of States and international bodies had refused to recognise any kind of change involving Crimea,
affecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine under international law. Under those circumstances, the
Court stated that the applicant Government had failed to put forward any arguments capable of
convincing it that there had been any change to the sovereign territory of either party to the
proceedings. For the purposes of the decision on the admissibility of the application, therefore, the
Court proceeded on the basis of the assumption that the jurisdiction of the respondent State over
Crimea was in the form or nature of “effective control over an area”, as mentioned above (Ukraine
v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 338-351). In short, the alleged victims of the
administrative practice complained of by the applicant Government fell within the “jurisdiction” of
the respondent State (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 352); Ukraine v Russia
(Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 864).
35. In the case of Quark Fishing Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2006, a fishing company,
complained about the refusal by the authorities of the South Georgia and the South Sandwich
Islands (“SGSSI”) to grant it a licence to catch a particular species of fish. The applicant company
applied to the British High Court and secured the quashing of the instruction in question;
nevertheless, his claim for damages was dismissed by the court on the grounds that the application
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (right to the peaceful enjoyment of property) had not been
extended to the SGSSI. The Court found that according to the decisions of the British courts, the
SGSSI were under the responsibility of the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 56 of the
Convention, but that the United Kingdom had not made a declaration extending the scope of
Protocol No. 1 to that territory. The Court then rejected the applicant’s plea relying on the
“effective control” principle for the purposes of Article 1; that principle did not replace the system of
declarations provided for in Article 56. The fact that the United Kingdom had extended the
Convention itself to the territory gave no grounds for finding that Protocol No. 1 had also to apply to
that territory and the Court could not require the United Kingdom somehow to justify its failure to
extend that Protocol.
36. In the case of Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2012, the applicants were 1,786
former inhabitants or descendants of former inhabitants of the Chagos Islands, now known as the
British Indian Ocean Territory (or BIOT). The Chagos Islanders had been expelled de facto from their
homeland, or had been prohibited from returning there, by the British Government between 1967
and 1973, in order to allow for the construction of US defence facilities on one of the islands. No
force was used, but the inhabitants of the islands found themselves destitute after having been
uprooted and having lost their homes and means of subsistence. The proceedings in the British
courts ended in 1982 in a settlement involving renunciation by the islanders of their right to return
to their homeland. Adjudicating on the applicability ratione loci of the Convention, the Court noted
that the United Kingdom had never made a notification under Article 56 extending the right of
individual petition to the population of the BIOT. A possible basis of jurisdiction within the meaning
of Article 1, as defined by the Court’s case-law (see in particular Al-Skeini and Others v. the United
Kingdom [GC], 2011), could not take precedence over Article 56. The fact that the final decision went
to politicians or civil servants in the United Kingdom did not constitute sufficient grounds to bring
within the jurisdiction of that State a region located outside the Convention’s legal area. Lastly,
inasmuch as the applicants had complained under Article 6 about the decisions of the British courts,
the Court’s assessment had to be confined to the procedural rights secured under that provision.
and the final outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the jurisdiction
ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil proceedings are brought in the
domestic courts, the State is required by Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings
respect for the rights protected by Article 6 (Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 53-54). In
the cited case, the Court had examined the objection as to incompatibility ratione loci raised by the
respondent Government, to the effect that the civil action brought by the applicants before the
Italian courts had concerned events of an extraterritorial nature (an air strike by NATO forces in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
39. Similarly, if the investigative or judicial authorities of a Contracting State institute their own
criminal investigation or proceedings concerning a death which has occurred outside the jurisdiction
of that State, by virtue of their domestic law (e.g. under provisions on universal jurisdiction or on the
basis of the active or passive personality principle), the institution of that investigation or those
proceedings is sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1 between that
State and the victim’s relatives who later bring proceedings before the Court (Güzelyurtlu and Others
v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], 2019, § 188; see also Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.),
2022, § 559). This approach is also in line with the nature of the procedural obligation to carry out an
effective investigation under Article 2, which has evolved into a separate and autonomous
obligation, albeit triggered by acts in relation to the substantive aspects of that provision. In this
sense it can be considered to be a detachable obligation arising out of Article 2 and capable of
binding the State even when the death occurred outside its jurisdiction (ibid., § 189, and the
references therein). Furthermore, it does not follow from the mere establishment of a jurisdictional
link in relation to the procedural obligation under Article 2 that the substantive act falls within the
jurisdiction of the Contracting State or that the said act is attributable to that State (Hanan
v. Germany [GC], 2021, § 143).
40. On the other hand, where no investigation or proceedings have been instituted in a Contracting
State, according to its domestic law, in respect of a death which has occurred outside its jurisdiction,
the Court will have to determine whether a jurisdictional link can, in any event, be established for
the procedural obligation imposed by Article 2 to come into effect in respect of that State. Although
the procedural obligation under Article 2 will in principle only be triggered for the Contracting State
under whose jurisdiction the deceased was to be found at the time of death, “special features” in a
given case will justify departure from this approach, according to the principles developed in Rantsev
v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010, §§ 243-44. However, the Court does not consider that it has to define in
abstracto which “special features” trigger the existence of a jurisdictional link in relation to the
procedural obligation to investigate under Article 2, since these features will necessarily depend on
the particular circumstances of each case and may vary considerably from one case to the other
(Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], 2019, § 190; Carter v. Russia, 2021, § 132).
Nevertheless, the Court recently asserted that the principles governing the establishment of a
jurisdictional link between the victim(s) and the respondent State, which had already been
formulated in relation to Article 2 of the Convention, are also applicable to Articles 3 and 5 of the
Convention (Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, § 157).
41. The above-mentioned principles apply only to the bringing of domestic criminal proceedings
which relate to the violations alleged before the Court. By contrast, proceedings brought by the
victim of the alleged violation without being directly related to the complaints before the Court do
not suffice to trigger a “jurisdictional link” between the victim and the respondent State (H.F. and
Others v. France [GC], 2022, §§ 194-195). The Court clarified this point in a case where the applicants
had complained about a refusal by the French authorities to repatriate their daughters (French
nationals) and their grandchildren, who were being held in Syria in Kurdish-controlled camps after
the fall of the so-called “Islamic State”. The applicants had alleged a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention (prohibition of degrading treatment) and Article 3 § 2 of Protocol No. 4 (right to enter
the State of one’s nationality). The French authorities had brought proceedings against the
daughters for participating in a terrorist association; however, the Court took the view that those
proceedings had no bearing on whether the facts complained of under Article 3 of the Convention
and Article 3 § 2 of Protocol No. 4 fell within France’s jurisdiction. In that connection the Court noted
the concerns expressed by the respondent Government that an interpretation to the contrary would
dissuade States from opening investigations, on the basis of their domestic law or international
obligations in respect of individuals involved in acts of terrorism, if they would then be required, on
that basis alone, to secure Convention rights to those individuals even though they were not under
their effective “control” (ibid.).
42. Thus in the case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010, § 243-244) concerning the conduct of the
Cypriot and Russian investigative authorities following the apparently violent death of a Russian
national in Cyprus, the Court rejected the objection raised by Russia that the facts mentioned in the
application fell outside its jurisdiction and therefore did not incur its responsibility. Since the alleged
trafficking in human beings had begun in Russia, the Court was competent to examine the extent to
which Russia could have taken steps within the limits of its own territorial sovereignty to protect the
victim from trafficking, to investigate allegations of trafficking and to investigate the circumstances
leading to her death, in particular by questioning witnesses living in Russia (§§ 206-208).
Furthermore, assessing the merits of the complaint under the procedural head of Article 2 of the
Convention, the Court concluded that Article 2 did not require member States’ criminal laws to
provide for universal jurisdiction in cases involving the death of one of their nationals outside their
territory. Therefore, there was no free-standing obligation incumbent on the Russian authorities to
investigate the victim’s death in Cyprus, even if she was a Russian national – although Russia was
indeed under an obligation to provide legal assistance as the State in whose territory the relevant
evidence was to be found (§§ 243-245).
43. In the case of Aliyeva and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2014, the Court had before it an application from
the parents of an Azerbaijani national who had been killed in Ukraine under circumstances
implicating two other Azerbaijani nationals. Pursuant to a mutual legal assistance agreement
between Ukraine and Azerbaijan, the case had been transmitted to Azerbaijan, but in the absence of
evidence the Azerbaijani authorities had discontinued the proceedings against the suspects. The
Court raised of its own motion the issue of its jurisdiction ratione loci, considering that in so far as
Azerbaijan had accepted the obligation to conduct an investigation under the 1993 Minsk
Convention to continue the criminal investigation commenced by the Ukrainian authorities, it was
bound to conduct such an investigation in compliance with the procedural obligation under Article 2
and had undertaken to continue the criminal investigation commenced by the Ukrainian authorities,
regardless of where the death had occurred. Therefore, the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan within the
meaning of Article 1 came into play only to the extent that the Azerbaijani authorities had decided to
take over the proceedings previously opened by Ukraine, under the applicable international treaty
and domestic law (§§ 55-57).
44. In the case of Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], 2019, concerning the murders
of several former residents of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) in the territory of
the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC authorities had initiated their own investigation into those
murders, thus creating a “jurisdictional link” between the applicants and Turkey, which incurred the
latter’s responsibility vis-à-vis the acts and omissions of the “TRNC” authorities. Moreover, there
were “special features” related to the situation in Cyprus. First of all, the international community
regards Turkey as being in occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, and does not recognise the
“TRNC” as a State under international law. Northern Cyprus is under the effective control of Turkey
for the purposes of the Convention. Secondly, the murder suspects had fled to the “TRNC” and as a
consequence, the Republic of Cyprus had been prevented from pursuing its own criminal
investigation in respect of those suspects and thus from fulfilling its Convention obligations. Having
regard to those “special features” and to the initiation of the investigation by the “TRNC”
authorities, the Court considered that Turkey’s jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention was
established (ibid., §§ 191-197).
45. In the case of Romeo Castaño v. Belgium, 2019, the applicants complained of the Belgian
authorities’ refusal to execute a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Spanish authorities against a
person suspected of having been a member of the ETA terrorist organisation, who had allegedly
been involved in the murder of the applicants’ father in Spain and who lived in Belgium, thus
preventing the commencement of criminal proceedings against her in Spain. Unlike the
aforementioned cases of Güzelyurtlu and Others and Rantsev, the complaint lodged under the
procedural limb of Article 2 had not been based on any alleged failure on the part of Belgium to
honour a procedural obligation to investigate that murder itself. Nevertheless, the Court considered
that the principles set out in the above-mentioned judgments as regards the determination of the
existence of a “jurisdictional link” with the respondent should apply in that case mutatis mutandis.
Given that the person suspected of the murder had fled to Belgium and that the Spanish authorities
had asked their opposite numbers in Belgium to arrest and surrender her in the framework of the
European Arrest Warrant system, which was binding on both States, the Court concluded that those
“special features” were sufficient to hold that there was a “jurisdictional link” between the
applicants and Belgium (ibid., §§ 38-42).
46. In the case of Hanan v. Germany [GC], 2021, the Court considered the existence of a
“jurisdictional link” in the light of the principles set out in the Güzelyurtlu and Others judgment. In
Hanan, which solely concerned the procedural limb of Article 2, a German colonel operating within
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under a mandate issued by the Security Council of
the United Nations pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, had ordered an airstrike on two fuel
tankers that had been hijacked by Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan, killing and injuring the
insurgents and also a number of civilians. A German public prosecutor had initiated an investigation,
which he had finally discontinued in the absence of criminal liability on the colonel’s part. The Court
held that the principle that the opening of an investigation into deaths which had occurred outside
that State’s jurisdiction ratione loci, and not in the exercise of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, had in
itself been sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link between that State and the victim, did not apply
to the circumstances of the case. The deaths investigated by the German prosecution had occurred
during an extraterritorial military operation in the framework of a UN Security Council mandate,
outside Convention territory. Establishing a jurisdictional link based solely on the opening of an
investigation could have had a deterrent effect on the opening of national-level investigations into
deaths occurring during extraterritorial military operations and were liable to lead to inconsistent
application of the Convention to Contracting States participating in the same operation. Moreover,
this would excessively broaden the scope of application of the Convention. However, the Court
considered that the instant case comprised special features which could establish a jurisdictional link
bringing the procedural obligation imposed by Article 2 into effect, even in the absence of an
investigation or proceedings having been instituted in a Contracting State in respect of a death
which had occurred outside its jurisdiction. First of all, Germany was obliged under customary
international humanitarian law to investigate the airstrike at issue, as it concerned the individual
criminal liability of members of the German armed forces for a potential war crime. Secondly, the
Afghan authorities were, for legal reasons, prevented from instituting a criminal investigation
themselves. By virtue of section I, subsection 3, of the ISAF Status of Forces Agreement, the troop-
contributing States had indeed retained exclusive jurisdiction over the personnel they contributed to
ISAF in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offences which their troops might commit on the
territory of Afghanistan. Thirdly, the German prosecution authorities were also obliged, under
domestic law concerning the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to
institute a criminal investigation relating to the responsibility of German nationals for war crimes or
wrongful deaths inflicted abroad by members of their armed forces. All those factors constituted
“special features” which in combination had triggered the existence of a jurisdictional link for the
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention in relation to the procedural obligation to investigate under
Article 2 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 134-145).
47. The Court declared admissible a complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the
Convention concerning the murder by poisoning of a Russian defector, a former agent of the Russian
security services and a political dissident. The crime had been committed in the United Kingdom by
individuals acting as agents of the Russian State. The Court noted that the Russian authorities had
initiated their own criminal investigation into the victim’s death under domestic legal provisions
giving them jurisdiction to investigate offences against Russian nationals wherever they had been
committed. The pursuance of those proceedings had established a “jurisdictional link” between the
victim and the Russian State. Furthermore, the persons suspected of the murder had been two
Russian nationals who, since returning to Russia, had enjoyed constitutional protection from
extradition, which protection had been relied upon by the Russian authorities to refuse the
extradition of one of them to the United Kingdom. Consequently, the United Kingdom authorities
had been prevented from pursuing the criminal prosecution of the suspects. The fact that the
Government had retained exclusive jurisdiction over an individual who was accused of a serious
human rights violation constituted a “special feature” of the case establishing the respondent State’s
jurisdiction under Article 1 . Any other finding would have undermined the fight against impunity for
serious human-rights violations within the “legal space of the Convention” (Carter v. Russia, 2021,
§§ 133-135).
48. In the case of Israilov v. Russia, 2023, the son of the applicant, a Russian national from Chechnya
who had fled to Austria to avoid having to continue working for the secret services of Ramzan
Kadyrov, President of the Chechen Republic, had been murdered in Vienna by a commando. The
Austrian authorities had convicted three Russian nationals of Chechen origin for the crime. There
was evidence that, a few months before the crime, the applicant’s son had been contacted in Austria
by an individual from Chechnya who had reportedly informed the Austrian police that he had been
instructed to bring the victim back to Chechnya or to “resolve the problem”. During the trial, the
Austrian authorities, seeking to determine to what extent the Chechen leaders (in particular Mr
Kadyrov) had been involved in the crime, had sent a letter of request for legal assistance to the
Russian authorities, whose response had been belated and incomplete, according to the applicant.
Before the Court, the applicant reproached the Russian authorities for failing to fulfil their positive
obligation under Article 2 of the Convention, and in particular for not assisting the Austrian
authorities. Without having sufficient information the Court was unable to establish whether the
preliminary investigation in Russia corresponded to the first basis of jurisdiction defined in
Güzelyurtlu and Others, 2019. However, it concluded that there had been “special features”, in
particular the fact that the Austrian letter of request, far from being manifestly unreasonable, was
based on precise facts, cited precise names, and was aimed at clarifying the circumstances
surrounding Umar Israilov’s murder and the identity of those responsible for it. The Court thus had
jurisdiction to examine whether Russia, acting on its own territory, had complied with its positive
obligation to investigate precise facts within the limits of its own jurisdiction (Israilov v. Russia,
§§ 105-110).
49. Procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention may go beyond the conviction and
sentencing of the guilty party. The Court thus established that “special features” obtained in the
following factual context. While taking part in a training course in Hungary, an Azerbaijani officer
decapitated an Armenian officer and threatened to kill another Armenian soldier. He was sentenced
to life imprisonment in Hungary. The ethnic bias in respect of his crimes was fully investigated and
highlighted by the Hungarian courts. Having served eight years of his sentence in Hungary, he was
transferred to Azerbaijan under the Council of Europe Convention on Transfer of Sentenced
Persons (“the Transfer Convention”) with a view to serving the remainder of his sentence in his
home country. However, upon his return he was welcomed as a hero, immediately released,
pardoned, promoted at a public ceremony and awarded arrears in salary for the period spent in
prison as well as the use of a flat. Many comments approving his conduct and pardon were made by
various high-ranking Azerbaijani officials. The Court reiterated that the enforcement of a sentence
imposed in the context of the right to life had to be regarded as an integral part of the State’s
procedural obligation under Article 2. Regardless of where the crimes were committed, in so far as
Azerbaijan had agreed to and assumed the obligation under the Transfer Convention to continue the
enforcement of the prison sentence commenced by the Hungarian authorities, it was bound to do
so, in compliance with its procedural obligations under Article 2. In sum, there were sufficient
“special features” in the case to trigger the existence of Azerbaijan’s jurisdictional link in relation to
those procedural obligations (Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020, §§ 50-51).
50. All the above-mentioned cases concerned criminal proceedings which were (or should have
been) commenced at the initiative of the authorities of a Contracting State in the framework of its
procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention. On the other hand, that reasoning does
not apply to the very different case of administrative proceedings – for example proceedings aimed
at obtaining a visa – brought by an individual without any pre-existing connection with the State in
question, where the choice of that particular State was not imposed under any treaty obligation. In
particulier, as regards immigration, the Court has held that to find otherwise would amount to
enshrining a near-universal application of the Convention on the basis of the unilateral choices of
any individual, irrespective of where in the world they find themselves, and therefore to create an
unlimited obligation on the Contracting States to allow entry to an individual who might be at risk of
ill-treatment contrary to the Convention outside their jurisdiction. If the fact that a State Party rules
on an immigration application is sufficient to bring the individual making the application under its
jurisdiction, precisely such an obligation would be created. The individual in question could create a
jurisdictional link by submitting an application and thus give rise, in certain scenarios, to an
obligation under Article 3 which would not otherwise exist (M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC],
2020, § 123; Abdul Wahab Khan v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2014, § 27). Such an extension of the
Convention’s scope of application would also have the effect of negating the well-established
principle of public international law, recognised by the Court, according to which the States Parties,
subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, have the right to control the entry,
residence and expulsion of aliens (M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 124, and the case-
law cited therein). The Court reached the same conclusion on the subject of proceedings brought
before the French urgent applications judge, on behalf of French applicants detained abroad,
seeking their repatriation (H.F. and Others v. France [GC], 2022, §§ 195-196).
circumstances relating to the situation of individuals who wished to enter the State of which they
were nationals, relying on the rights they derived from Article 3 § 2 of Protocol No. 4, might give rise
to a jurisdictional link with that State for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. However, the
Court did not consider that it had to define these circumstances in abstracto since they would
necessarily depend on the specific features of each case and might vary considerably from one case
to another. In the circumstances of that case, the Court considered that it was necessary to take into
account, in addition to the legal link between the State and its nationals, the following special
features which might trigger France’s jurisdiction under Article 3 § 2 of Protocol No. 4. The
applicants had addressed a number of official requests to the French authorities for repatriation and
assistance, on the basis of the fundamental values of democratic societies, while their family
members were facing a real and immediate threat to their lives and physical well-being; in view of
their health situation and extreme vulnerability, the individuals concerned were unable to leave the
camps in order to return to France without the assistance of the French authorities; lastly, the
Kurdish authorities had indicated their willingness to hand over the female detainees of French
nationality and their children to the national authorities. In view of those special features, the Court
found France to have jurisdiction in respect of the family members under Article 3 § 2 of Protocol
No. 4 (ibid., §§ 205-214).
themselves were located. In its case-law on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 the Court had always considered that an interference occurred where the possession
was interfered with, rather than where the owner was located. In the circumstances, the
interference with the applicants’ rights therefore fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the
respondent State (Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 88-95).
State did not control, the principal question will be whether the respondent State exercised ratione
personae jurisdiction. Even in cases where it is established that the alleged violations occurred in an
area under the respondent State’s effective control (and thus within its ratione loci jurisdiction), the
State will only be responsible for breaches of the Convention if it also has ratione personae
jurisdiction. This means that the impugned acts or omissions must have been committed by State
authorities or be otherwise attributable to the respondent State (Ukraine and the Netherlands
v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, §§ 548-549).
60. The Court is empowered, in so far as and only to the extent necessary for the exercise of its
competence – which Article 19 of the Convention defines as to “ensure the observance of the
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols
thereto” – to determine the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a respondent State over a given
territory (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 341).
61. However, before successively examining the aforementioned two concepts of jurisdiction, we
shall assess separately the specific issue of the jurisdiction of a State conducting a military operation
in a foreign territory during the active phase of hostilities.
[GC], 2021, cited above. As regards the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” it noted that Azerbaijan no
longer controlled it since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-1994. It had involved heavy
shelling of towns and villages on either side of the line of contact for four days, resulting in many
dead, wounded and temporarily homeless people as well as considerable damage to property and
infrastructure on both sides. In these circumstances, and without any indication to the contrary, it
was not a situation of “effective control” over an area. The active phase of hostilities under
examination in the present case concerned bombing and artillery shelling by the armed forces on
both sides of the conflict, seeking to put the enemy force hors de combat and capture territory. The
factual elements of the case did not reveal any instance of control over or proximity to the alleged
victims of a violation. In these circumstances, there could not be said to have been “State agent
authority and control” over those individuals. The Court thus found that neither Armenia nor
Azerbaijan had “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention (Allahverdiyev
v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-33; Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 24-29; Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan
(dec.), 2023, §§ 30-37; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-35).
a. General comments
69. While nationality is a factor that is ordinarily taken into account as a basis for the extraterritorial
exercise of jurisdiction by a State, it cannot constitute an autonomous basis of jurisdiction. The mere
fact of having the nationality of a State does not constitute a sufficient connection with that State in
order to establish a jurisdictional link (H.F. and Others v. France [GC], 2022, §§ 198 and 206).
70. Similarly, the mere fact that decisions taken at national level had an impact on the situation of
persons resident abroad is not such as to establish the jurisdiction of the State concerned over those
persons outside its territory (M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 112). In order to
determine whether the Convention applies to an individual case, the Court must examine whether
any exceptional circumstances actually exist relating to the nature of the connection between the
applicant and the respondent State, such as to show whether the latter effectively exercised
authority or control over him or her (M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 112-113).
71. Unlike jurisdiction based on effective control over an area, the Court has on numerous occasions
found personal jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention to exist outside the Convention legal
space (see, among other examples, Öcalan, Medvedyev and Others, Al-Skeini and Others and Jaloud,
together with Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 572).
72. In response to reliance by applicants on a test of “control over the applicant’s Convention
interests”, the Court found that extraterritorial jurisdiction required control over the person himself
or herself rather than the person’s interests as such. It did not consider that the scope of
extraterritorial jurisdiction could be expanded in such a manner, which would entail a radical
departure from established principles under Article 1 (Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and
32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, §§ 205-206).
which occur abroad but directly concern the said applicant place him under its jurisdiction (X. v. the
United Kingdom, Commission decision of 15 December 1977).
74. The Commission therefore found that the applicants were within the jurisdiction of the
respondent State in the following cases:
▪ a series of acts allegedly committed by German consular agents in Morocco against the
applicant (a German national who did not consider himself as such because he was a
member of the Sudetendeutsch community) and his wife, damaging their reputation and
finally, according to the applicant, triggering his expulsion from Moroccan territory (X.
v. Germany, Commission decision of 25 September 1965);
▪ the alleged inaction of the British consul in Amman (Jordan) to whom the applicant, a
British national, had asked for assistance in restoring custody of her child, who had been
taken to Jordan by the father (X. v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 15
December 1977);
▪ the fact that the Danish Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had called
the police of that State to remove a group of Germans who had taken refuge in the Danish
Embassy (M. v. Denmark, Commission decision of 14 October 1992).
75. Conversely, the Court left open the question whether a binational (or a national of several
different States) detained in one of the States whose nationality he or she held fell under the
jurisdiction of the other State where the latter refused to afford him or her diplomatic protection or
consular assistance (indeed, pursuant to a provision of customary international law relied on by the
national authorities, a State cannot afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals in respect of
a State which he or she is also a national). Thus the Court rejected as manifestly ill-founded a
complaint submitted by a Belgian-Moroccan binational concerning a refusal by the Belgian
authorities to grant him consular assistance during his detention in Morocco. Even supposing that a
positive obligation to act could have been deduced from the provisions of the Convention, the Court
noted that the Belgian authorities had by no means remained passive or indifferent. The failure of
their approaches to the Moroccan authorities had been the result not of their own inertia but of the
categorical rejection of their requests by the Moroccan authorities, who at the time had had
exclusive control over the applicant (Aarrass v. Belgium (dec.), 2021, §§ 37-41).
76. The Court found that Belgium had no jurisdiction over four Syrian nationals who had
unsuccessfully applied for visas at the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon, relying on the risk of ill-
treatment in their country of origin. First of all, the applicants were not Belgian nationals seeking to
benefit from the protection of their embassy. Secondly, at no time did the diplomatic agents
exercise de facto control over the applicants. The latter freely chose to present themselves at the
Belgian embassy in Beirut, and to submit their visa applications there – as indeed they could have
chosen to approach any other embassy; they were then free to leave the premises of the Belgian
embassy without any hindrance (M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 118). In this
connection, it is irrelevant that the diplomatic agents had, as in the present case, merely a “letter
box” role, or to ascertain who was responsible for taking the decisions, whether the Belgian
authorities in the national territory or the diplomatic agents posted abroad (ibid., § 114). The Court
subsequently explained that its reference to “exceptional circumstances” had not been intended to
establish a distinct jurisdictional test. Within the specific context of that case, in which the applicants
had sought to rely on a combination of supposed substantive and procedural links to Belgium, it was
noted that an assessment of any “exceptional circumstances” required the Court “to explore the
nature of the link between the applicants and the respondent State and to ascertain whether the
latter effectively exercised authority or control over them”. In other words, the assessment was
ultimately one of effective authority or control over the applicants, in line with established case-law
(Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 188).
77. In the case of H.F. and Others v. France [GC], 2022, the applicants had complained about a
refusal by the French authorities to repatriate their daughters (French nationals) and their
grandchildren, who were being held in Syria in Kurdish-controlled camps after the fall of the so-
called “Islamic State”. In so far as the applicants had alleged a violation of Article 3 of the Convention
(allegation of ill-treatment in the camps), the Court found that France did not have jurisdiction,
which could not be triggered by the nationality of those concerned or France’s refusal to repatriate
them. Such an extension of the Convention’s scope found no support in the case-law. First, the mere
fact that decisions taken at national level had had an impact on the situation of individuals residing
abroad was not such as to establish the jurisdiction of the State concerned over them outside its
territory. Secondly, neither domestic law nor international law required the State to act on behalf of
its nationals and to repatriate them. Moreover, the Convention did not guarantee a right to
diplomatic or consular protection. Thirdly, in spite of the stated desire of local non-State authorities
that the States concerned should repatriate their nationals, France would have had to negotiate with
them as to the principle and conditions of any such operation and to organise its implementation,
which would inevitably have taken place in Syria (ibid., §§ 198-203).
agreement between Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the latter was debarred from excluding the
effects of an entry ban imposed by the Swiss authorities, whereby only the latter authorities were
entitled to exclude Liechtenstein from the territorial scope of such a measure. In those conditions,
Switzerland should be deemed responsible not only for the legal procedure and consequences of the
prohibition on entry into its own territory, but also for the effects produced by that prohibition in
Liechtenstein. Indeed, in conformity with the specific relationship between those two countries, in
acting on behalf of Liechtenstein the Swiss authorities were actually acting in accordance with their
national jurisdiction. According to the agreement in question, they were acting exclusively in
pursuance of Swiss law, and it was merely the effect of their actions which extended to Liechtenstein
territory. In other words, the prohibition had been imposed under Swiss jurisdiction, which had been
extended to Liechtenstein. The Commission found that the measures implemented by the Swiss
authorities which took effect in Liechtenstein placed all persons to whom they were applicable –
including the applicants – under Swiss jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.
82. The Court addressed a fairly similar issue in Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 1992,
concerning the unique relationship between the Principality of Andorra and France and Spain,
especially before the 1993 reform of the Constitution (at the material time Andorra had not yet
signed or ratified the Convention). The applicants had been convicted of armed robbery by the
competent Andorran court (Tribunal des Corts), which is made up of three members: a judge (French
or Spanish, appointed in turn by each of the Co-Princes of Andorra, that is to say the President of the
French Republic and the Bishop of Urgell), an episcopal veguer (appointed by the Bishop of Urgell),
and a French judge delegated by the French veguer (in turn appointed by the French Co-Prince).
After the conviction, pursuant to Andorran law, the applicants had the option of serving their
sentence in France or in Spain; they opted for France. Before the Court they complained, in
particular, that they had not benefited from a fair trial; they alleged that France and Spain were
responsible, at the international level, for the conduct of the Andorran authorities. The Court
disagreed. It noted that while judges from France or Spain sat in the Andorran courts, they did not
do so in their capacity as French or Spanish judges. Those courts discharged their duties
autonomously, and their judgments and decisions were not subject to supervision by the French or
Spanish authorities. Moreover, there was nothing to suggest that the respondent States had
attempted to interfere with the applicants’ trial in Andorra. Consequently, insofar as they
complained about the proceedings before the Andorran court, the applicants were under neither
French nor Spanish jurisdiction (§ 96).
83. By the same logic, the Court found that there had been no jurisdictional link in the case of
Brandão Freitas Lobato v. Portugal (dec.), 2021, in which the applicant, a former Minister of Justice
in East Timor, had been convicted in the East Timor courts by Portuguese judges seconded under a
judicial cooperation programme. The Court noted that the Portuguese judges had been serving on
behalf of East Timor rather than Portugal, and that the Portuguese authorities had not been
empowered to uphold or invalidate the impugned decisions; they had therefore had no discretionary
powers vis-à-vis the criminal charges against the applicant. Neither the fact that those judges had
retained certain professional rights in Portugal and had still been subject to the disciplinary power of
the Portuguese Supreme Council of the Judiciary (including in respect of offences committed
abroad), nor even the fact that the Council had actually launched an inquiry and commenced two
sets of disciplinary proceedings concerning the judges’ conduct in East Timor, had been sufficient to
establish any jurisdictional link in the framework of the impugned criminal proceedings. Conversely,
the applicant had herself come under Portuguese jurisdiction inasmuch as she considered that her
procedural rights had been breached in the framework of the proceedings commenced by the
Supreme Council following her complaint.
84. Another example of a Court finding that the respondent State lacks “jurisdiction” was in the case
of Gentilhomme, Schaff-Benhadji and Zerouki v. France, 2002. The applicants were three French
women who were married to Algerian men and lived in Algeria. Pursuant to an agreement concluded
by France and Algeria in 1962, French children – including those with dual Franco-Algerian
nationality under French law – could attend French public schools in Algeria managed by the French
Academic and Cultural Office for Algeria (“OUCFA”). In 1988, however, the Algerian Government
sent the French Embassy in Algiers a note verbale informing it that Algerian children could no longer
be enrolled or (re-enrolled in French schools; that included the applicants’ children, since dual
nationality was not recognised under Algerian law. The applicants lodged applications with the Court
against France, alleging, inter alia, a breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 8 and 14 of the
Convention. The Court noted that the impugned situation had stemmed directly from a unilateral
decision by Algeria. Whether or not that decision had been in conformity with public international
law, it basically amounted to a refusal on the part of Algeria to comply with the 1962 agreement.
The French authorities, whose exercise of “jurisdiction” in Algerian territory in the present case had
been based solely on that agreement, could only note the consequences of the Algerian decision for
the education of children in the same situation as those of the applicants. In short, the facts
complained of had been caused by a decision imputable to Algeria, which had thus taken a
discretionary decision within its own territory, outside the scope of any French scrutiny. In other
words, in the specific circumstances of the case, those facts could not be imputed to France (§ 20).
authorities would expose them to a real risk of execution by hanging. The Court held that
inasmuch as the control exercised by the United Kingdom over its military detention
facilities in Iraq and the individuals held there had been absolute and exclusive de facto
and de jure, the applicants should be deemed to have been within the respondent State’s
jurisdiction (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, §§ 86-89).
▪ The applicants, crew members of a cargo ship registered in Cambodia and intercepted off
the Cape Verde islands by the French navy under suspicion of transporting large quantities
of drugs, were confined to their quarters under military guard until the ship’s arrival in
Brest. The Court found that as France had exercised full and exclusive control over the ship
and its crew, at least de facto, from the time of its interception, in a continuous and
uninterrupted manner until they were tried in France, the applicants had been effectively
within France’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention (Medvedyev and
Others v. France [GC], 2010, § 67). The Court reached the same conclusion in a case
concerning a group of Greenpeace activists confined to their ship, which had been
intercepted by the Russian coastguard and escorted to the Russian port of Mourmansk
(Bryan and Others v. Russia*, 2023, § 37).
▪ The applicants, a group of Somali and Eritrean nationals, who had been attempting to
reach the Italian coast on board three vessels, were intercepted at sea by Italian Revenue
Police and Coastguard ships, transferred on to Italian military ships and taken back to
Libya, from whence they had departed. Reiterating the principle of international law
stating that a vessel sailing on the high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
State of the flag it is flying, the Court rejected the designation “rescue on the high seas”
used by the Government to describe the events, and attached no importance to the
allegedly low level of control exercised over the applicants by the agents of the Italian
State. Indeed, the whole series of events had occurred on board Italian military ships, with
crews made up exclusively of national servicemen. From the time of their arrival on board
those ships until their handover to the Libyan authorities the applicants had been under
the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities (Hirsi
Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 76-82).
87. The Court also determined Turkey’s responsibility for the actions of the “Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) in three cases concerning a single series of events linked to a Greek
Cypriot demonstration against the Turkish occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. One of the
demonstrators had been beaten to death in the UN buffer zone. Three days later, after his funeral,
another man entered the buffer zone near the place where the first man had died, climbed up a
flagpole as a sign of protest and was shot down. Turkish, or Turkish-Cypriot, soldiers opened fire on
the crowd gathered in the buffer zone, injuring, in particular, a woman who had remained outside
the zone, in undisputed Cypriot territory. The Court therefore had to establish whether all three
victims had come under the authority and/or effective control – and therefore the jurisdiction – of
Turkey in relation to the actions of the Turkish and “TRNC” soldiers and agents. To that end, the
Court relied on the statements of the police officers operating under the UN Forces in Cyprus, the
reports drawn up by the latter and by the UN Secretary General, as well as the video recordings and
photographs submitted by the applicants. The Court noted that the victim in the first case had died
as a result of the aggressive attitude of the Turkish Cypriot police officers and soldiers towards the
civilian demonstrators, and that despite the presence of the Turkish armed forces and the Turkish
Cypriot police in the buffer zone, no action had been taken to prevent or put an end to the attacks or
to help the victim (Isaak v. Turkey (dec.), 2006). As regards that man who had been the direct victim
in the second case, the Court noted that he had entered the buffer zone tampon, that the flagpole
which he had scaled had been in TRNC territory and that the bullets which had killed him had been
shot by the TRNC forces (Solomou and Others v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 48-50). Lastly, although the
applicant in the third case had sustained her injuries in a territory covered by the Convention, albeit
one over which Turkey had not exercised any control, the injuries had been caused by gunfire from
the TRNC forces (Andreou v. Turkey (dec.), 2008). Accordingly, the impugned facts had occurred
under the “jurisdiction” of Turkey within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and had
engaged that State’s responsibility under the Convention.
88. The Court also found that Russia had jurisdiction in the case of a man who had been shot dead
on Georgian territory near the de facto border with Abkhazia (entity not recognised as a State by the
international community) by an Abkhazian “border guard” who had crossed the border and was
outside Abkhazian territory. Having previously found that the acts of agents of the de facto
Abkhazian authorities fell within the jurisdiction of Russia and were attributable to the latter without
it being necessary to provide proof of “detailed control” of each of their actions, the Court found
that the direct victim fell within the respondent State’s jurisdiction even though he had been killed
on territory over which it had no control (Matkava and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 100-105).
89. In a decision where the issue of the jurisdiction of the respondent State had not been
questioned, the Court held that there was no need to determine the exact location of the impugned
events, given that the Government had already admitted that the fire discharged from the
helicopters had caused the killing of the applicants’ relatives, who had been suspected of being
terrorists (Pad and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2007, § 54).
90. The Court declared admissible an application concerning the targeted killing of a defector, a
Russian former security service agent and dissident, carried out in the United Kingdom by individuals
acting as agents of the Russian State. The public investigation established beyond any reasonable
doubt that the victim had been poisoned with polonium 210, a rare radioactive isotope, and that
that he had been administered that poison by two Russian nationals who had arrived in the United
Kingdom on the instructions of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Fédération (those persons
had subsequently been charged with murder by the United Kingdom police). The Court attempted to
determine whether the murder had amounted to the exercise of physical power and control over his
life in a situation of proximate targeting. The evidence of premeditation strongly indicated that the
victim’s death had been the result of a planned and complex operation; he had not been an
accidental victim of the operation and he could not have ingested polonium 210 by accident.
Accordingly, the Court found that the victim had been under the physical control of the two Russian
agents, who had had power over his life, thus establishing a sufficient jurisdictional link for the
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention (Carter v. Russia, 2021, §§ 158-161 and § 170).
91. Whenever the State, through its agents, exercises control and authority, and thus jurisdiction,
over an individual, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the
rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that
individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided and tailored” (Al-Skeini and
Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011, § 137); Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 74);
Carter v. Russia, 2021, § 126).
f. Other situations
92. There can be other situations where the nature of the link between the applicant and the
respondent State are such as to permit a finding that that State had indeed exercised its authority or
control over the applicant. Thus the Court found that the drowning of an underage Moldovan
national during his stay in a summer camp in Romania had fallen under the jurisdiction of Moldova,
since his stay on the Romanian coast had been organised by the Moldovan Ministry of Youth and
Sport and that Ministry had appointed and mandated three of its officials as group leaders
responsible for the young people. Furthermore, it did not transpire from the case file that any
Romanian officials had been involved in looking after the young Moldovans, including the victim
(Veronica Ciobanu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 26).
a. Jurisdiction of the “active” State on the grounds of its military action outside
its territory
97. As regards the “active” State, the Court must first of all establish whether the alleged facts
actually fall within its “jurisdiction” for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.
98. One exception to the principle that jurisdiction under Article 1 is limited to a State’s own
territory occurs when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State
exercises effective control of an area outside that national territory. The obligation to secure, in such
an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control,
whether it be exercised directly, through the Contracting State’s own armed forces, or through a
subordinate local administration (Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC],
2012, § 106, and the references therein).
99. Where the fact of such domination over the territory is established, it is not necessary to
determine whether the Contracting State exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of
the subordinate local administration. The fact that the local administration survives as a result of the
Contracting State’s military and other support entails that State’s responsibility for its policies and
actions. For the purposes of Article 1 the area in question is therefore regarded as indistinguishable
from areas within the controlling State’s sovereign borders. The controlling State has the
responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within the area under its control, the entire range of
substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified. It
will be liable for any violations of those rights exactly in the same way as if those violations had
occurred strictly speaking on its own territory (Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, §§ 76-77; Al-Skeini and
Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011, § 138; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and
Russia [GC], 2012, § 106; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 561).
Furthermore, where a Contracting State exercises overall control over an area outside its national
territory, its responsibility is not confined to the acts of its soldiers or officials in that area but also
extends to acts of the local administration which survives there by virtue of its military and other
support (Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 77; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004,
§ 316). In such a case, where there is effective control over an area, the State will have jurisdiction
ratione loci (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 561).
100. A finding of spatial jurisdiction brings within the jurisdiction of the respondent State all
complaints which concern events occurring wholly within the relevant area. Such a finding does not,
however, bring within the respondent State’s jurisdiction events which took place outside that area.
Moreover, even if the events occurred wholly within the relevant area, the impact, if any, of the
exclusion from jurisdiction of “military operations carried out during the active phase of hostilities”,
in the sense of “armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to
establish control over an area in a context of chaos” (see paragraphs 58-61 above) must also be
considered (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 698).
101. The Court has never said that there can only be effective control over an area outside a State’s
sovereign borders if the area in question falls within the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties. However, this would appear to be the rationale behind its conclusion that the controlling
State should in principle be held to account for all breaches of negative and positive obligations
under the Convention within the controlled territory. After all, as the Court has explained, to hold
otherwise would be to deprive the population of that territory of the rights and freedoms previously
enjoyed and to which they are entitled, and would result in a vacuum of protection within the legal
space of the Convention. It has moreover emphasised that the Convention is a constitutional
instrument of European public order: it does not govern the actions of States which are not Parties
to it, nor does it purport to be a means of requiring the Contracting States to impose Convention
standards on other States. The Court has accordingly concluded that extraterritorial ratione loci
jurisdiction existed in a number of such cases concerning territory inside the Convention legal space.
However, to date, the Court has never found there to be extraterritorial jurisdiction on account of
ratione loci jurisdiction over an area outside the sovereign territory of the Council of Europe member
States (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, §§ 562-563).
102. The question whether a Contracting State is genuinely exercising effective control over a
territory outside its borders is one of fact. In seeking to answer that question the Court primarily has
regard to the following two criteria:
▪ the number of soldiers deployed by the State in the territory in question; this is the
criterion to which the Court had hitherto attached the greatest importance (Loizidou
v. Turkey (merits), 1996, §§ 16 and 56; Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004,
§ 387);
▪ the extent to which the State’s military, economic and political support for the local
subordinate administration provides it with influence and control over the region (ibid.,
§§ 388-394; Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011, § 139).
103. Where the Court establishes that the facts of the case are within the respondent State’s
“jurisdiction”, the latter has two main obligations:
▪ a negative obligation to refrain from actions incompatible with the Convention (Ilaşcu and
Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 320-321);
▪ a positive obligation to guarantee respect for the rights and freedoms secured under the
Convention – at least as set out in the Court’s general case-law (ibid., § 322).
104. The cases considered by the Court in the light of the above-mentioned principles may be
broken down into two sub-categories:
a. cases concerning military “occupation” in the traditional sense as defined in Article 42 of
the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which reads as
follows: “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of
the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has
been established and can be exercised”;
b. cases concerning the creation, within the territory of a Contracting State, of an entity
which is not recognised by the international community as a sovereign State, with the
military, economic and political support of another Contracting State.
status there. Three of them had been killed or fatally wounded by gunfire from British soldiers;
another victim had been fatally injured during an exchange of fire between a British patrol and
unidentified gunmen; another had been shot by British soldiers and then forced to jump into a river,
where he had drowned; and 93 wounds had been found on the body of the last victim, who had died
in a British military base. The Court noted that following the removal from power of the Ba’ath
regime and until the accession of the interim Iraqi government, the United Kingdom (together with
the United States of America) had assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers
normally to be exercised by a sovereign government. In particular, the United Kingdom had assumed
power and responsibility for maintaining security in the south-west of the country. In these
exceptional circumstances, there was a jurisdictional link, for the purposes of Article 1 of the
Convention, between the United Kingdom and the persons killed during security operations
conducted by British troops between May 2003 and June 2004. In the light of that conclusion, the
Court considered it unnecessary to assess whether the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction was also
established because that State had exercised effective military control over South-East Iraq during
that period (§§ 143-150). That having been said, as the Court subsequently pointed out, the
statement of facts in Al-Skeini and Others had included material which tended to demonstrate that
the United Kingdom was far from being in effective control of the south-eastern area which it
occupied, and this had also been the finding of the Court of Appeal, which had heard evidence on
this question in the domestic proceedings (Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2014, § 75, referring
to Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011, §§ 20-23 and 80).
107. The Court delivered its judgment in the case of Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011, on
the same day as the Al-Skeini and Others judgment. That case concerned the internment of an Iraqi
civilian for over three years (2004-2007) in a detention centre run by the British forces in Basra.
Unlike in Al-Skeini and Others, the facts of this case had taken place after the end of the occupation
regime, when power had already been transferred to the interim government; however, the
multinational force, including British forces, were still stationed in Iraq at the Government’s request
and with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council. The respondent Government had
denied that the detention at issue fell within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction, because the
applicant had been interned at a time when the British forces had been operating as part of a
Multinational Force authorised by the Security Council and subject to the ultimate authority of the
United Nations; they had submitted that in detaining the applicant, the British troops had not been
exercising the sovereign authority of the United Kingdom but the international authority of the
Multinational Force, acting pursuant to the binding decision of the United Nations Security Council.
The Court rejected that argument. It noted that at the time of the invasion of Iraq, no Security
Council resolution had specified how the roles should be distributed in Iraq should the regime be
overthrown. In May 2003 the United Kingdom and the United States, having removed the former
regime, had taken control of security in Iraq; the UN had been assigned a role in the fields of
humanitarian aid, supporting the reconstruction of Iraq and assistance in setting up an Iraqi
provisional authority, but not in the security sphere. The Court took the view that the subsequent
resolutions had not altered that situation. Since the Security Council had had neither effective
control nor ultimate authority and control over the acts and omissions of troops within the
Multinational Force, the applicant’s detention was not attributable to the United Nations. The
internment decision against the applicant had been taken by the British officer in command of the
detention facility, and he had been interned in a detention facility in Basra City, controlled
exclusively by British forces. Although the decision to keep the applicant in internment had, at
various points, been reviewed by committees including Iraqi officials and non-The United Kingdom
representatives from the Multinational Force, the existence of these reviews had not operated to
prevent the detention from being attributable to the United Kingdom. Mr Al-Jedda had therefore
been under the authority and control of the United Kingdom for the duration of his detention. In
conclusion, the Court found that the internment of the applicant had been attributable to the United
Kingdom and that during his internment the applicant had fallen within the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention (§§ 76-86). The Court had thus
concentrated on whether the applicant had been effectively subject to the power of the respondent
State rather than assessing the extent and nature of the controlee exercised by the United Kingdom
over the territory in question.
108. The same approach had been adopted in the case of Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2014,
concerning the capture of the applicant’s brother by the British armed forces and his detention in
Camp Bucca in south-eastern Iraq during the hostilities in 2003. The applicant submitted that his
brother had been under the control of the British forces and that his corpse, when subsequently
found, had borne traces suggesting that he had been tortured and executed. As in the Al-Skeini and
Others judgment, the Court did not deem it necessary to determine whether the United Kingdom
had indeed been in control of the area in question during the relevant period because the direct
victim had fallen under that country’s jurisdiction for another reason. In that connection the Court
rejected the Government’s argument to the effect that no jurisdiction had applied because as
regards the period subsequent to his admission to Camp Bucca, the applicant’s brother had been
transferred from the authority of the United Kingdom to that of the United States. Having regard to
the arrangements operating at Camp Bucca, the Court held that the United Kingdom had retained
authority and control over the direct victim. That authority and that control had extended from the
admission of the applicant’s brother to the Camp through the period following his admission, when
he had been taken to the Joint Forward Interrogation Team compound, which was under the
exclusive control of the British forces. Following the interrogation the British authorities had placed
him on one of the categories set out in international humanitarian law, deciding that he was a
“civilian” who did not pose a threat to security, and ordered that he should be released as soon as
practicable. Finally, it was clear that when he had been taken to the civilian holding area with a view
to his release, the applicant’s brother had remained in the custody of armed military personnel and
under the authority and control of the United Kingdom until the moment he was let off the bus that
took him from the Camp. He had therefore been within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom
throughout the period in question (§§ 75-80).
109. In the case of Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, the Court broadened the concept of
extraterritorial jurisdiction as compared with Al-Skeini and Others and Al-Jedda, explicitly stating that
the “occupying power” status mentioned in Article 42 of the Hague Convention respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land was not in itself decisive vis-à-vis the question of jurisdiction for the
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention (§ 142). Following the Iraq invasion, the Netherlands
Government had provided troops which had been based in south-east Iraq between July 2003 and
March 2005, as part of a multinational division under the command of an officer of the British armed
forces. In the instant case the applicant’s son had been fatally wounded by gunfire in April 2004,
when he had been attempting to pass a checkpoint which was controlled by the Iraqi Civil Defence
Corps (ICDC) but which also involved members of the Netherlands Royal Army operating under the
command and direct supervision of a Royal Army officer; the shots had been fired by a Dutch
lieutenant. The Court noted that the Netherlands had not forfeited jurisdiction by the mere fact of
accepting the operational control of a British officer. As the evidence on file demonstrated, not only
had the Netherlands retained full command of their military personnel in Iraq, but also the
establishment of separate rules on the use of force in Iraq remained the reserved domain of
individual sending States. The Court therefore concluded, in the circumstances of the case, that the
Netherlands forces had not been placed at the disposal of any other State, be it Iraq or the United
Kingdom, and that the death of the applicant’s brother had occurred under the jurisdiction of the
Netherlands (§ 142).
110. However, the Court reached the opposite conclusion in the case of Issa and Others v. Turkey,
2004, which concerned Iraqi Kurdish shepherds who had allegedly been arrested by Turkish soldiers
during a Turkish military operation in northern Iraq in 1995, and then been taken to a cave and
killed. In the Court’s view, notwithstanding the large number of soldiers involved in that operation, it
did not appear that Turkey had exercised effective overall control of the entire area in question.
Moreover, it had not been sufficiently established by the evidence on file that the Turkish armed
forces had been conducting operations in the geographical area in question when the victims had
been present there. Consequently, the direct victims could not be considered to have been within the
jurisdiction of the Turkish State (§§ 71-82).
111. In an inter-State case against Russia, the Ukrainian Government had raised a series of
complaints concerning events which had occurred between 27 February 2014 and 26 August 2015,
in the course of which the Crimean region (including the city of Sebastopol) had been incorporated
into the Russian Federation. The Court examined the question of the respondent State’s
“jurisdiction”, dealing separately with two different periods: the period preceding 18 March 2014,
when the Russian Federation, the “Crimean Republic” and the City of Sebastopol had signed a
“unification treaty” incorporating Crimea into Russia, and the period since that date. As regards the
former period, the Court followed its usual approach as defined in Al-Skeini and Others v. the United
Kingdom [GC], 2011 (§§ 133-140), exceptionally recognising the extraterritorial exercise of
jurisdiction based on the “effective control” by Russia of the area in question. The Court based it
finding on a detailed appraisal of the evidence relating to the circumstances of the case, assessing
both the power and the actual conduct of the Russian military forces in Crimea. Regarding the
former aspect Sur le premier point (military power), the Court considered that the question whether
the reinforcement of the Russian military presence in Crimea at the time had been in compliance
with the bilateral agreements in force between the two States could not be decisive: it attached
greater importance to the relative size and strength of the respondent State’s armed forces in the
area in question than to their combat potential, also focusing on the reasons given for increasing the
military presence. In connection with the second aspect (the army’s actual behaviour), the Court had
regard to the level of the Russian soldiers’ active involvement in the impugned events in Crimea, as
well as the public statements made by various high officials in the respondent State. Having regard
to all the available evidence, the Court concluded that Russia had exercised effective control over
Crimea during the period in question. That being the case, it was unnecessary to determine whether
the respondent State had exercised specific control over the policies and actions of the local
authorities. The fact that Ukraine had not availed itself of the right of derogation from its Convention
obligations in respect of Crimea regarding the period in question is irrelevant for the above findings
concerning the respondent State’s jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. In short, the
alleged victims of the administrative practice complained of by the Ukrainian Government had fallen
under the “jurisdiction” of the Russian State during the period in question, without any need to
ascertain whether such jurisdiction had also been based on the principle of “State agent authority”
(Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 308-352). No information to the contrary having
been provided by the Russian Government, this conclusion was also valid for the period following 26
August 2015, especially as Russia had expressly claimed territorial jurisdiction over Crimea after that
date (Ukraine v. Russia (Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 873).
112. A different inter-State application against Russia concerned complaints related to the conflict,
involving pro-Russian separatists, which had broken out in eastern Ukraine in the same period as in
the previously mentioned case. One of the applicant Governments, that of Ukraine, had complained
mainly about the ongoing patterns (“administrative practices”) of violations of a number of
Convention Articles which had allegedly been committed by separatists of the “Donetsk People’s
Republic” (DPR) and “Lugansk People’s Republic” (LPR) and by Russian army personnel. The other
applicant Government, that of the Netherlands, had complained about the downing of the Malaysia
Airlines aircraft operating flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014, killing 298 including 196
Dutch nationals. The applicant Governments had argued that their complaints fell within the
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The Court concluded, in particular, that at least from 11 May
2014 to 26 January 2022, the areas in eastern Ukraine that were under separatist control fell within
the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. It noted the presence of Russian military personnel in
eastern Ukraine, from April 2014 onwards, and the mass deployment of Russian troops from August
2014 at the latest. It also noted the decisive degree of influence and control Russia enjoyed over the
separatist military strategy; that from the earliest days of the DPR and LPR administrations and over
the ensuing months and years the Russian Federation had provided weapons and other military
equipment to the separatists in eastern Ukraine on a significant scale; and that the separatists had
relied on the Russian military for artillery cover and that political and economic support had been
provided to them by Russia. In those circumstances the Court arrived at the conclusion that there
was sufficient evidence to satisfy the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard required at the
admissibility stage in respect of administrative practices alleged to breach certain Convention
Articles. It declared admissible the majority of the complaints submitted by the Ukrainian
Government as the territory in question did fall within the respondent State’s Article 1 “jurisdiction”.
It also decided that the same evidence test was met in respect of the complaints of the Netherlands
Government about flight MH17 (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, §§ 576-
706).
that State, insofar as that military personnel exercised their authority over such persons
and property.
▪ In the case of Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, where the applicant, a
Greek Cypriot, complained that she had been deprived of access to her property in
northern Cyprus, the Court noted, at the preliminary objections stage, that the applicant’s
loss of control of her property stemmed from the occupation of the northern part of
Cyprus by Turkish troops and the establishment there of the "TRNC", and that the applicant
had been prevented by Turkish troops from gaining access to her property. The impugned
acts were therefore capable of falling within Turkish "jurisdiction" within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 63-64). In the judgment on the merits of the same
case, the Court, considering the “imputability” of the alleged violations to Turkey, held that
it was unnecessary to determine whether that country actually exercised detailed control
over the policies and actions of the authorities of the "TRNC", because it was obvious from
the large number of troops engaged in active duties in the disputed area that the Turkish
army exercised effective overall control over that part of the island; such control incurred
Turkish responsibility for the policies and actions of the "TRNC". Persons affected by those
policies and actions therefore fell within the “jurisdiction” of Turkey, and the alleged
violations were consequently “imputable” to that State (Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996,
§§ 52-57).
▪ In the inter-State case of Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, the Court reiterated its general
finding in Loizidou that Turkey in practice exercised overall control in northern Cyprus via
its military presence on the ground; consequently, its responsibility under the Convention
was incurred for the policies and actions of the “TRNC” authorities. The Court emphasised
that Turkey’s responsibility under the Convention could not be confined to the acts of its
own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but had also to be engaged by virtue of the acts
of the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support.
Turkey’s “jurisdiction” should be considered to extend to securing the entire range of
substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which Turkey
has ratified, and violations of those rights were imputable to it (§§ 76-77).
▪ In the case of Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], 2019, concerning the
murders of several former residents of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”)
in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and the investigations conducted into those facts
by the “TRNC” authorities, the Court pointed out that the international community
regarded Turkey as being in occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, and did not
recognise the “TRNC” as a State under international law. Northern Cyprus was under the
effective control of Turkey for the purposes of the Convention. Secondly, the murder
suspects had fled to the “TRNC” and as a consequence, the Republic of Cyprus had been
prevented from pursuing its own criminal investigation in respect of those suspects and
thus from fulfilling its Convention obligations (§ 193).
118. The second series of cases concerns the responsibility of Russia for acts committed in the
“Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria”, an entity set up in Moldavan territory. In the case of Ilaşcu
and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, the applicants, who had been sentenced variously to
death and heavy prison sentences by the “supreme court” of that entity, complained of a series of
violations of their fundamental rights which they alleged were imputable to Russia. The Court noted
that in 1991-1992, forces of the former 14th Army (which had belonged successively to the USSR and
Russia), stationed in Transdniestria, had fought with and for the Transdniestrian separatist forces.
Large quantities of weapons from the 14th Army’s arsenal had been transferred voluntarily to the
separatists, who had, moreover, been able to secure further arms, unopposed by the Russian
military. Furthermore, throughout the confrontations between the Moldovan authorities and the
Transdniestrian separatists, the Russian leaders had issue political statements in support of the
separatist authorities. Even after the ceasefire agreement, Russia had continued to provide military,
political and economic support to the separatist regime, thus enabling it to survive by strengthening
itself and by acquiring a certain amount of autonomy vis-à-vis Moldova. In the Court’s view, all the
acts committed against the applicants by the Russian military authorities, including their handover to
the separatist regime, in the context of collaboration between the Russian authorities and that
unlawful regime, which was not recognised by the international community, had been such as to
create responsibility for the consequences of the acts of that regime. The whole case-file proved that
the Transdniestrian region remained under Russia’s effective authority, or at least under its decisive
influence, and at any event that it survived thanks to the military, economic, financial and political
support provided by Russia both before and after its ratification of the Convention. In those
circumstances, the applicants were within the “jurisdiction” of Russia, whose responsibility was
incurred in relation to the impugned acts (§§ 377-394).
119. This conclusion as regards Russia’s responsibility vis-à-vis Transdniestria was reiterated in the
following cases:
▪ In the case of Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, concerning the continued
detention of two of the four applicants in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC],
2004, after and despite the delivery of the Grand Chamber judgment in this case. The Court
sought to establish whether Russia’s policy of supporting the Transdniestrian separatist
regime had changed between 2004 and 2007, the date of the applicants’ release. It noted
that Russia continued to enjoy a close relationship with the “Moldovan Republic of
Transdniestria”, amounting to providing political, financial and economic support to the
separatist regime. Moreover, the Court found that the Russian army (troops, equipment
and ammunition) had, at the date of the applicants’ release, still been stationed on
Moldovan territory in breach of the Russian Federation’s undertakings to withdraw
completely and in breach of Moldovan legislation. The applicants had therefore fallen
within Russia’s “jurisdiction” for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention (Ivanţoc and
Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, §§ 116-120).
▪ In the case of Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012,
concerning a complaint lodged by children and parents belonging to the Moldovan
community in Transdniestria regarding the effects of a language policy adopted in 1992
and 1994 by the separatist regime prohibiting the use of the Latin alphabet in schools, as
well as the subsequent measures to implement that policy. Having reiterated its finding
already set out in the Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC] (2004) and Ivanţoc and
Others v. Moldova and Russia (2011) judgments, the Court noted that Russia was
continuing to provide military, economic and political support to the Transdniestrian
separatists (gas supplies, payment des pensions, etc.). The impugned facts therefore fell
within the jurisdiction of Russia, even if no Russian agents had been directly involved in the
measures adopted against the applicants’ schools (Catan and Others v. the Republic of
Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 116-123).
▪ In the case of Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, concerning the
detention of a man suspected of fraud, as ordered by the courts of the “Moldovan Republic
of Transdniestria” (“MRT”). Given the absence of any relevant new information to the
contrary, the Court considered that its conclusion concerning Russia’s jurisdiction
expressed in all the above-mentioned judgments continued to be valid for the period
under consideration in that case (§§ 109-111); see the same reasoning in respect of a
subsequent period in Apcov v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2017, § 24; Eriomenco
v. Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2017, § 47; Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. Republic
of Moldova and Russia, 2024, § 87).
120. The third case examined by the Court was that of the two separatist entities established in
Georgia, that is to say South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially during and after the armed conflict
between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, the climax of a long series of tensions, provocations
and incidents between the two countries. In its observations, the Russian Government had
acknowledged a substantial Russian military presence after the cessation of hostilities and provided
numerous indications showing the extent of the economic and financial support that the Russian
Federation had provided and continued to provide to South Ossetia and to Abkhazia. the EU’s Fact-
Finding Mission also emphasised the relationship of dependency not only in economic and financial,
but also in military and political terms; the information provided was also revealing as to the pre-
existing relationship of subordination between the separatist entities and the Russian Federation,
which had lasted throughout the active phase of the hostilities and after the cessation of hostilities.
In its report, the EU’s Fact-Finding Mission had spoken of “creeping annexation” of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia by Russia. The Court considered that the Russian Federation had exercised effective
control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (as well as a “buffer zone” located in undisputed Georgian
territory) during the period from the date of cessation of active hostilities and the date of the official
withdrawal of Russian troops. Even after that period, the strong Russian presence and the South
Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities’ dependency on the Russian Federation, on whom their survival
depended, as was shown particularly by the cooperation and assistance agreements signed with the
latter, indicated that there had been continued “effective control” over the two territories. The
events which had occurred after the ceasefire had therefore fallen within the jurisdiction of the
Russian Federation for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention (Georgia v. Russia (II), 2021,
§§ 161-175; Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023, §§ 43-45; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023,
§ 61).
121. With specific regard to the alleged ill-treatment of prisoners of war, even if the direct
participation of the Russian forces had not been clearly demonstrated in all cases, the Russian
Federation had also been responsible for the actions of the South Ossetian forces, without it being
necessary to provide proof of “detailed control” of each of those actions (Georgia v. Russia (II), 2021,
§ 276). As regards the large number of Georgian nationals who had fled the conflict and been unable
to return to South Ossetia, they had also come under Russia’s jurisdiction. Indeed, the fact that their
respective homes, to which they were prevented from returning, were situated in areas under the
“effective control” of the Russian Federation, and the fact that the Russian Federation exercised
“effective control” over the administrative borders, are sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link for
the purposes of Article 1 (ibid., §§ 293-295).
122. Concerning Abkhazia, the Court has also recognised the existence of “effective control” by
Russia over its territory for a period preceding the armed conflict of 2008. It found in the relevant
case that since the armed conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians in 1992, Russia had not
ceased to extend and strengthen its influence over this region militarily, politically, economically and
culturally. In its assessment the Court relied on a long series of factual circumstances; for example,
the fact that the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia were made up of Russian military personnel; that
the majority of the population of Abkhazia had been given Russian nationality after 2002; that
Abkhazia used Russian currency as its means of payment and was economically heavily dependent
on Russia; lastly, according to the repeated statements of its (de facto Abkhazian) leaders, Abkhazia
had in some ways become part of Russia. In sum, Abkhazia was only able to survive because of
Russia’s sustained and substantial political and economic support, and of Russia’s military influence,
which was sufficient for it to be considered “dissuasive” and as such decisive in practice. It followed
that the conduct of the de facto authorities of that region fell within Russia’s jurisdiction under
Article 1 of the Convention (Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 323-340). The
same was true for actions of members of the Abkhazian armed forces, which were imputable to
Russia without it being necessary to provide proof of “detailed control” of each of those actions
(Matkava and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 96).
123. Finally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for
acts committed in the former “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” established in an area of Azerbaijan.
At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Oblast (the “NKAO”) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan
Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Azerbaijan SSR”). There had been no common border between the
NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Armenian SSR”), which had been separated
by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 –
shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union – the NKAO soviet
announced the foundation of the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” (“the NKR”), comprising the NKAO
and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and
boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the
secession of the “NKR”, the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992.
After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian
troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent
Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement. The self-proclaimed
independence of the “NKR” had not been recognised by any State or international organisation
(Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28).
Later on, in the night of 1 to 2 April 2016, violent armed clashes broke out near the contact line
between the “NKR” and Azerbaijan (sometimes referred to as the “Four-Day War”). They lasted until
5 April 2016, but other clashes occurred later in the month (Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023,
§ 5; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, § 5).
124. On 27 September 2020 a new war broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh. It lasted 44 days until 10
November 2020 when a ceasefire agreement, signed the previous day, entered into force.
Subsequent events led to the official dissolution of the “NKR” on 28 September 2023 with effect
from 1 January 2024. The Court has taken note of those changes; however, the cases it has
examined to date concern events that predate this fresh conflict (Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022,
§§ 91; Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, § 26; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70).
125. In the case of Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, the applicants, Azerbaijani Kurds
from the Lachin district (which is part of Azerbaijan, separating Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia),
complained of their inability to accede to their homes and property since having been forced to
leave the district by the armed conflict between the two countries. Under Article 1 of the
Convention, the Court had regard to a whole series of reports and public statements – particularly
from present and former members of the Armenian Government – and concluded that Armenia,
through its military presence and its provision of military material and advice, had been involved in
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the very early stages. In the Court’s view, that military support
was decisive for the control over the territories in issue, and moreover, it was obvious from the facts
of the case that Armenia provided substantial political and financial support to the “NKR” (“Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic”). Furthermore, the residents of the “NKR” were required to obtain Armenian
passports to travel abroad. The Court found that Armenia and the “NKR” had been highly integrated
in virtually all important matters, and that the NKR and its administration survived thanks to the
military, political, financial and other supported provided by Armenia, which, accordingly, exercised
effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent territories. The alleged facts had
therefore occurred within the jurisdiction of Armenia (§§ 169-186).
126. The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following
cases:
▪ a community of Jehovah’s Witnesses to whom the “NKR” had denied registration as a
religious organisation (Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the NKR
v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49) and a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses on whom the “NKR”
had imposed an administrative fine for discussing the Bible with another person at the
latter’s home (Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 26-27);
▪ an Armenian national convicted by the “NKR” courts for refusing to perform compulsory
military service in that entity (Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37);
▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the
“NKR” (Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016,
§§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92;
Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 59-63; Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023,
§§ 42-44; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 67-70). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court
applied both jurisdictional criteria – territorial and personal –, as the direct victim had been
killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer (ibid., § 56), whereas in
those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison
between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92, and in Varyan
v. Armenia, 2024, § 70). In Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, the Court refused to
draw a distinction between the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the
Convention, finding that the facts of the case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent
State, with regard both to the substantive limb (the killing of the applicants’ sons by an
Armenian soldier in the service of the “NKR”) and to the procedural limb (investigation by
Armenian authorities; ibid., §§ 57-63).
prevented from exercising effective control over the relevant part of its territory (Ilaşcu and Others
v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 322-331; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011,
§§ 105-106; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 109-110; Mozer
v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, § 99-100). The fact that under public international
law the region is recognised as part of the territory of Moldova bestows on the latter a positive
obligation, based on Article 1 of the Convention, to use all the legal and diplomatic means at its
disposal to continue to ensure that the persons living in the region can benefit from the rights and
freedoms set forth in the (see, for a reminder of the principles, Pocasovschi and Mihaila v. the
Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2018, §§ 43-44). It is noted that this case concerned a specific
situation. Prisoners being held in unacceptable conditions in a Moldavan prison complained that
water and electricity supplies had been cut off by the separatist entity. Even if the municipal
authority which had ordered the cutting off of the water, heating and electricity supplies had
operated under the control of that entity, unlike in the other cases, the Moldavan authorities had
exercised effective control over the prison in which the alleged violations had occurred, as well as
over its inmates. The latter authorities could therefore have intervened directly (§ 46).
130. In the case of Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, an Armenian refugee who had had to flee his
home in the Shahumyan region of Azerbaijan in 1992, during the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (see above), complained that he had been unable to return to his
village in order to access and use his property there. This was the first case in which the Court was
called upon to determine a complaint against a State which had lost control of part of its territory as
a result of a war and occupation, but which was alleged to have been responsible for refusing to
allow a displaced person to accede to his property situated in a region which was still under its
control. The Court first of all noted that the village in question was located in the internationally
recognised territory of Azerbaijan and that, accordingly, the presumption of Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction
applied. It was therefore incumbent on the Azerbaijani Government to demonstrate the existence of
exceptional circumstances liable to limit its responsibility under Article 1 of the Convention. Having
regard to the facts before it, the Court noted that it was impossible to determine with any certainty
whether the Azerbaijani military forces had been present in the village during its period of
temporary jurisdiction (that is to say since the ratification of the Convention by Azerbaijan).
Moreover, it observed that no party had alleged that the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” had had
any troops in the village. The Court was not convinced by the Government’s argument to the effect
that because the village had been located in a disputed are and was surrounded by mines and
military positions, Azerbaijan’s responsibility under the Convention had been limited. Indeed, unlike
in other similar cases concerning Transdniestria or Northern Cyprus, the territory in question had not
been occupied by the armed forces of a third State. The facts of the case had therefore fallen within
the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan (§§ 132-151).
131. The case of Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, concerned an unusual situation. The applicant
complained that he had been retained in the custody of the authorities of the Ajarian Autonomous
Republic, an autonomous territorial unit of Georgia, despite having received a presidential pardon
for a first offence and been acquitted of a second by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court noted
that Georgia had ratified the Convention for the whole of its territory, and that no other State
exercised effective overall control in Ajaria. On ratifying the Convention, Georgia did not make any
specific reservation under Article 57 of the Convention with regard to Ajaria or to difficulties in
exercising its jurisdiction over that territory. Such a reservation would in any event have been
ineffective, as the case-law precludes territorial exclusions other than in the instance referred to in
Article 56 § 1 of the Convention (dependent territories). Therefore, the impugned facts had fallen
within the “jurisdiction” of Georgia for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention (§§ 139-143). The
Court then considered the “imputability” to the Georgian State of the alleged violations. It noted
that the central authorities had taken all the procedural steps possible under domestic law to secure
compliance with the judgment acquitting the applicant, sought to resolve the dispute by various
political means, and repeatedly urged the Ajarian authorities to release him, all in vain.
Consequently, the facts complained of by the applicant had been directly imputable to the local
Ajarian authorities. However, even though it is not inconceivable that States will encounter
difficulties in securing compliance with the rights guaranteed by the Convention in all parts of their
territory, each State Party to the Convention nonetheless remains responsible for events occurring
anywhere within its national territory. The Court therefore found that the responsibility of the
Georgian State had been incurred under the Convention (§§ 144-150).
132. When a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to
an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1
of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control (Sargsyan
v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317; O.J.
and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of
reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State
under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State’s positive obligations in
respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal
and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to
continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention.
Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to
comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were
appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the
Court’s task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether
it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an
alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention (Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334).
133. Generally speaking, the following six positive obligations incumbent on the “passive” State can
be identified in the Court’s existing case-law:
a. Three general obligations
i. to affirm and reaffirm its sovereignty over the territory in issue (Ilaşcu and
Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 339-341 and 343; Ivanţoc and
Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108);
ii. to refrain from providing any kind of support to the regime unrecognised by the
international community (Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004,
§ 345);
iii. to actively attempt to (re-establish control over the disputed territory (ibid.,
§ 341-344; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108; Mamasakhlisi
and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 400-401; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and
Russia, 2023, § 79).
b. Three special obligations relating to individual applicants
i. to attempt to resolve the applicants’ situation by political and diplomatic means
(Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and
Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 109; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia
and Russia, 2023, §§ 401-403; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 80);
ii. to attempt to resolve the applicants’ situation by appropriate practical and
technical means (Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC],
2012, § 147; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 405-406);
iii. to take the appropriate judicial action to protect the applicants’ rights (Ilaşcu and
Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and Others
v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 110).
134. Furthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the “passive” State in question
to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant (Ilaşcu and Others
v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011,
§ 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the
question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court’s
case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of
the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-
410; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60).
135. Moreover, failings of a legal system and decisions of de facto “courts” of entities not
recognised by the international community cannot be imputed to the “passive” State (O.J. and J.O.
v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 88).
138. The mere fact that a State exercises the right to vote in an inter-State entity is not sufficient for
the persons affected by the decisions of that entity to be deemed to fall within the jurisdiction of
that State for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. The first case in which the Commission
had to consider this kind of situation was that of Hess v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of
28 May 1975. Rudolf Hess, the former head of the chancellery of the German National-Socialist
Party, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal, was incarcerated in the Allied Military Prison in Berlin-Spandau. That prison was jointly
administered by the four occupying powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, France and the
Soviet Union), and all decisions concerning the administration of the prison could only be taken in
agreement with the representatives of all four States. The United Kingdom had therefore been
acting as a partner, sharing authority and responsibility with the other three powers. The
Commission ruled that that shared authority could not be divided up into four separate jurisdictions
and that, therefore, the United Kingdom’s participation in the administration of the prison had not
fallen under that State’s jurisdiction. The application was therefore declared incompatible ratione
personae with the Convention.
interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids
any conflict of obligations.
148. Moreover, the Court has recently confirmed the Al-Jedda principles in its Hassan v. the United
Kingdom [GC] (2014) judgment concerning the capture of an Iraqi national by the British armed
forces and his detention in a camp during the hostilities in 2003. This was the first case in which a
respondent State had relied on international law to request the Court to find inapplicable its
obligations under Article 5 of the Convention or, failing that, to interpret them in the light of the
powers of detention conferred on it by international humanitarian law. The Court unanimously
found that the victim had been within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction rather than that of the
United States, as contended by the British Government. The Court rejected the latter’s submissions
denying the application of any jurisdiction during the active hostilities phase of an international
armed conflict, when the agents of the Contracting State are acting within a territory of which the
latter is not the occupying power and the conduct of the Contracting State is instead governed by
the provisions of international humanitarian law. The Court considered that such a conclusion would
be contrary to its previous case-law. It also held that even after the area in question had been
transferred from British to US authority, the United Kingdom had retained authority and control over
all the aspects of the complaints raised by the applicant.
the (rebuttable) presumption that the UNSC does not intentionally impose on States an obligation
contravening the fundamental principles of human rights. Therefore, when a resolution contains no
clear and explicit exclusion or limitation of respect for human rights in the framework of the
implementation of sanctions, it must always be understood as authorising the courts of the
respondent State to exercise sufficient scrutiny to avoid any arbitrariness. Consequently, to that
extent, Switzerland had been responsible for a possible violation of the right to a fair trial.
may therefore also be taken into account and inferences may be drawn from such conduct (Ukraine
v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020, §§ 256 and 380, Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, § 341;
Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), § 437). In the past the Court has drawn inferences
from a failure by the respondent Government to supply the documents requested of them (Timurtaş
v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 66-72; Akkum and Others v. Turkey, 2005, §§ 185-190 and 225; Çelikbilek
v. Turkey, 2005, §§ 56-63; El-Masri v. former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 152-
167). In the case of El-Masri, the Court found that the burden of proof should shift to the
Government once it had established prima facie evidence in favour of the applicant’s version of
events. The Government had failed to provide documents or a satisfactory explanation of how the
events in question had occurred. In such circumstances, the Court could draw inferences from the
available material and the authorities’ conduct and found the applicant’s allegations sufficiently
convincing and established beyond reasonable doubt (ibid., §§ 165-167). In the case of Matkava and
Others v. Russia, 2023, the Court drew conclusions from the refusal by the Russian authorities to
open an investigation and provide documents relating to the investigation by the de facto
authorities of the “Republic of Abkhazia”, an entity not recognised as a State under international law
and controlled by Russia (ibid., §§ 102-103).
156. Reference is made in this connection to Rule 44A of the Rules of Court, which provides that the
parties have a duty to cooperate fully in the conduct of the proceedings and to take such action
within their power as the Court considers necessary for the proper administration of justice.
Moreover, pursuant to Rule 44C § 1, where a party fails to adduce evidence or provide information
requested by the Court or to divulge relevant information of its own motion or otherwise fails to
participate effectively in the proceedings, the Court may draw such inferences as it deems
appropriate. Rule 44C § 2 plainly states that the failure or refusal by a respondent Contracting Party
to participate effectively in the proceedings shall not, in itself, be a reason to discontinue the
examination of the application. It is clear from the well-established case-law of the Court and from
Rules 44A and 44C that if a respondent Government fail to comply with a request by the Court for
material which could corroborate or refute the allegations made before it and do not duly account
for their failure or refusal, the Court can draw inferences and combine such inferences with
contextual factors (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 438).
157. The level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and the distribution of
the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the
allegations made and the Convention right at stake (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020,
§§ 257; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 439).
Court’s role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States’ responsibility
under the Convention (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 453).
159bis. For a negative example of the application of the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard of
proof, see Ukraine v. Russia (Crimea) [GC], 2024, §§ 880-887. In that inter-State case, the Ukrainian
Government had complained of violations of the fundamental rights of a Ukrainian national who had
been supposedly abducted in Belarus by Russian agents then transferred to Russia. Having regard to
all the evidence, the Court took the view that neither “effective control” by Russia over part of
Belarus nor “State agent authority and control” over the person in question – the two main criteria
characterising the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction– was proven to the requisite standard.
2. Assessment of evidence
160. There are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae
for its assessment: the Court has complete freedom in assessing not only the admissibility and
relevance but also the probative value of each item of evidence before it. The Court adopts those
conclusions of fact which are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all material before it
irrespective of its origin, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties’
submissions and conduct (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020, §§ 379-380; Ukraine and
the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, §§ 440).
161. Proof may follow from the “coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences
or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact” (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020,
§ 257; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 441).
162. The Court takes into account reports and statements by international observers, NGOs and the
media as well as decisions of other international and national courts to shed light on the facts or to
corroborate findings made by the Court (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020, § 257). Its
assessment of the evidence, and in particular the weight to be given to it, varies in view of the
different nature of the material, the source of the material and the degree of rigour applied to its
collection and verification (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 442).
163. The Court has thus often attached importance to material from reliable and objective sources,
such as the UN, reputable NGOs and governmental sources. However, in assessing its probative
value a degree of caution is needed since widespread reports of a fact may prove, on closer
examination, to derive from a single source. In relation to such material, consideration should be
given to the source of the material and in particular its independence, reliability and objectivity. The
Court also considers the presence and reporting capacities of the author in the country in question:
it will not always be possible for investigations to be carried out in the immediate vicinity of a
conflict and in such cases information provided by sources with first-hand knowledge of the situation
may have to be relied upon. Consideration is given to the authority and reputation of the author, the
seriousness of the investigations forming the basis for the report, and the consistency of the
conclusions and their corroboration by other sources (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020,
§§ 386-388; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 443).
164. Media reports, on the other hand, are to be treated with caution. They are not themselves
evidence for judicial purposes, but public knowledge of a fact may be established by means of these
sources of information and the Court may attach a certain amount of weight to such public
knowledge (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020, § 383; Ukraine and the Netherlands
v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 444).
165. The direct evidence of witnesses is also taken into account by the Court (Georgia v. Russia (II)
[GC], and Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, § 26). Even where the domestic
authorities have not been given the opportunity to test the evidence and the Court itself has not had
the opportunity to probe the details of the statement in the course of the proceedings before it, this
does not necessarily diminish its probative value. It is for the Court to determine whether it
considers a statement to be credible and reliable, and what weight to attach to it (Ukraine and the
Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 445).
166. The Court may also rely on witness statements from Government officials. Statements by
Government ministers or other high officials should, however, be treated with caution since they
would tend to be in favour of the Government that they represent. That said, statements from high-
ranking officials, even former ministers and officials, who have played a central role in the dispute in
question are of particular evidentiary value when they acknowledge facts or conduct that place the
authorities in an unfavourable light. They may then be construed as a form of admission (Ukraine
v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020, §§ 334 and 381). Similar considerations apply to official
documents and intelligence material provided by State ministries and agencies (Ukraine and the
Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 446).
167. There is no need for direct evidence from alleged victims in order for a complaint about an
administrative practice to be regarded as admissible (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020,
§ 384; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 447).
168. A delay in collecting evidence, or its collection specifically for the purposes of proceedings
before the Court, does not render such evidence per se inadmissible (Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)
[GC] (dec.), 2020, § 381; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 448).
—A—
A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, nos. 55798/16 and 4 others, 5 April 2022
Aarrass v. Belgium (dec.), no. 16371/18, 7 September 2021
Abdul Wahab Khan v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 11987/11, 28 January 2014
Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, no. 46454/11, 31 May 2018
Akkum and Others v. Turkey, no. 21894/93, ECHR 2005-II (extracts)
Andreou v. Turkey (dec.), no. 45653/99, 3 June 2008
Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland [GC], no. 5809/08, ECHR 2016
Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, no. 6383/17, 16 January 2024
Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, ECHR 2011
Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 61498/08, 30 June 2009
Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, ECHR 2011
Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), no. 25589/16, 12 September 2023
Aliyeva and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 35587/08, 31 July 2014
Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), no. 25576/16, 12 September 2023
Apcov v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, no. 13463/07, 30 May 2017
Arlewin v. Sweden, no. 22302/10, 1 March 2016
Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, ECHR 2004-II
Avanesyan v. Armenia, no. 12999/15, 20 July 2021
—B—
Bakanova v. Lithuania, no. 11167/12, 31 May 2016
Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII
Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (dec.) [GC],
nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, 2 May 2007
Bekoyeva and Others v. Georgia (dec.), no. 48347/08 and 3 others, 5 October 2021
Beygo v. 46 member States of the Council of Europe (dec.), no. 36099/06, 16 June 2009
Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 58170/13 and 2 others, 25 May 2021
Boivin v. 34 member States of the Council of Europe (dec.), no. 73250/01, ECHR 2008
Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, ECHR 2005-VI
Brandão Freitas Lobato v. Portugal (dec.), no. 14296/14, 11 March 2021
Bryan and Others v. Russia*, no. 22515/14, 27 June 2023
—C—
Carter v. Russia, no. 20914/07, 21 September 2021
Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, ECHR
2012
Çelikbilek v. Turkey, no. 27693/95, 31 May 2005
Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 35622/04, 11 December 2012
Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], no. 13216/05, ECHR 2015
Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, no. 41817/10,
22 March 2022
Cyprus v. Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission decision of 26 May 1975, Decisions and
Reports 2
Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV
Connolly v. 15 member States of the European Union (dec.), no. 73274/01, 9 December 2008
Couso Permuy v. Spain, no. 2327/20, 25 July 2024
Cummins v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 27306/05, 13 December 2005
—D—
Dimaksyan v. Armenia, no. 29906/14, 17 October 2023
Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 26 June 1992, Series A no. 240
Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, 9 April 2024
—E—
El-Masri v. former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, ECHR 2012
Eriomenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia, no. 42224/11, 9 May 2017
—F—
Friedrich and Others v. Poland, nos. 25344/20 and 17 others, 20 June 2024
—G—
Gasparini v. Italy and Belgium (dec.), no. 10750/03, 12 May 2009
Gentilhomme, Schaff-Benhadji and Zerouki v. France, nos. 48205/99 and 2 others, 14 May 2002
Georgia v. Russia (II), no. 38263/08, 21 January 2021
Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), no. 39611/18, 28 March 2023
—H—
H.F. and Others v. France [GC], nos. 24384/19 and 44234/20, 14 September 2022
Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), nos. 74566/16 and 74573/16, 12 September 2023
Hamzayan v. Armenia, no. 43082/14, 6 February 2024
Hanan v. Germany [GC], no. 4871/16, 16 February 2021
Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, ECHR 2014
Hess v. the United Kingdom, no. 6231/73, Commission decision of 28 May 1975, Decisions and
Reports 2
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, ECHR 2012
Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, no. 67351/13, 17 October 2023
—I—
Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004-VII
Isaak v. Turkey (dec.), no. 44587/98, 28 September 2006
Israilov v. Russia, nos. 21882/09 and 6189/10, 24 October 2023
Issa and Others v. Turkey, no. 31821/96, 16 November 2004
Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, no. 23687/05, 15 November 2011
—J—
Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 47708/08, ECHR 2014
—K—
Klausecker v. Germany (dec.), no. 415/07, 6 January 2015
[Link] AS v. Norway (dec.), no. 47341/15, 5 November 2019
—L—
Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310
Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI
López Cifuentes v. Spain (dec.), no. 18754/06, 7 July 2009
Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia, nos. 40926/16 and 73942/17,
20 February 2024
—M—
M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], no. 3599/18, 5 May 2020
M. v. Denmark, no. 17392/90, Commission decision of 14 October 1992, Decisions and Reports 73
M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, no. 59793/17, 11 December 2018
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, ECHR 2011
Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, no. 17247/13, 26 May 2020
Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, 7 March 2023
Marković and Others v. Italy (dec.), no. 1398/03, 12 June 2003
Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 1398/03, 14 December 2006
Matkava and Others v. Russia, no. 3963/18, 19 December 2023
Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, ECHR 2010
Mirzoyan v. Armenia, no. 57129/10, 23 May 2019
Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138/10, ECHR 2016
Muradyan v. Armenia, no. 11275/07, 24 November 2016
—N—
N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, 13 February 2020
Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08, ECHR 2012
Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, no. 69517/11, 5 April 2022
—O—
O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 42126/15 and 42127/15, 19 December 2023
O’Loughlin and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23274/04, 25 August 2005
Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 74508/16, 12 September 2023
Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, ECHR 2005-IV
—P—
Pad and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 60167/00, 28 June 2007
Pocasovschi and Mihaila v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, no. 1089/09, 29 May 2018
—Q—
Quark Fishing Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 15305/06, ECHR 2006‑XIV
—R—
Rambus Inc. v. Germany (dec.), no. 40382/04, 16 June 2009
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, ECHR 2010
Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, nos. 75734/12 and 2 others,
19 November 2019
Romeo Castaño v. Belgium, no. 8351/17, 9 July 2019
—S—
Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, ECHR 2015
Shavlokhova and Others v. Georgia (dec.), no. 45431/08 and 4 others, 5 October 2021
Slovenia v. Croatia (dec.) [GC], no. 54155/16, 18 November 2020
Solomou and Others v. Turkey, no. 36832/97, 24 June 2008
—T—
The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, no. 35271/19, 2 May 2024
Timurtaş v. Turkey, no. 23531/94, ECHR 2000-VI
—U—
Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 16 December 2020
Ukraine v. Russia (Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024
Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20,
30 November 2022
—V—
Varyan v. Armenia, no. 48998/14, 4 June 2024
Vasiliciuc v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 15944/11, 2 May 2017
Veronica Ciobanu v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 69829/11, 9 February 2021
—W—
W. v. Ireland, no. 9360/81, Commission decision of 28 February 1983, Decisions and Reports 32
W. v. the United Kingdom, no. 9348/81, Commission decision of 28 February 1983, Decisions and
Reports 32
Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, nos. 64371/16 and 64407/16, 12 September 2023
—X—
X. v. Germany, no. 1611/62, Commission decision of 25 September 1965, Yearbook 8
X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 7547/76, Commission decision of 15 December 1977, Decisions and
Reports 12
X. and Y. v. Switzerland, no. 7289/75, Commission decision of 14 July 1977, Decisions and Reports 9
—Z—
Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, nos. 36894/04 and 3521/07, 17 March 2016