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Understanding Specific Performance in Law

Specific performance is an equitable remedy granted by courts when a defendant fails to fulfill their contractual obligations, particularly in cases involving unique contracts like land sales. The remedy is discretionary and typically applied when monetary damages are inadequate, with notable cases illustrating its application and limitations. Specific performance is generally not granted for illegal, immoral contracts, or when mutuality is lacking, and delays in seeking the remedy can also affect a claimant's ability to obtain it.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
114 views4 pages

Understanding Specific Performance in Law

Specific performance is an equitable remedy granted by courts when a defendant fails to fulfill their contractual obligations, particularly in cases involving unique contracts like land sales. The remedy is discretionary and typically applied when monetary damages are inadequate, with notable cases illustrating its application and limitations. Specific performance is generally not granted for illegal, immoral contracts, or when mutuality is lacking, and delays in seeking the remedy can also affect a claimant's ability to obtain it.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Specific performance is an equitable relief which is granted by the court where the defendant has
failed to fulfill in specie his end of the bargain. This means that the defendant should provide exactly
that which he promised.

One of the standout cases under this concept is Beswick v Beswick (1968). In this case, the court
granted the relief of specific performance to P who was disadvantaged by her late husband’s
nephew, on the pretext that P was not a party to the agreement between P’s late husband and the
nephew.

It was noted, in the case of Scott v Alvarez (1895) that the remedy of specific performance, like other
equitable remedies, is entirely within the discretion of the court.

More often than not, specific performance is frequently deemed in cases concerning contracts for the
sale of land, as each piece of land is unique and may have a peculiar value to the purchaser.

Further, it was remarked in the case of Maddison v Alderson (1883) that anyone who goes to equity
for specific performance must show a contract that is binding in law. Similar reasoning exists in the
case of Gibson v Manchester City Council (1979).

Also, in Stickney v Keeble (1915), the court stated that equity will only grant specific performance if
under all the circumstances, it is just and equitable so to do.

The equitable jurisdiction to grant specific performance is based on the inadequacy of the remedy
(damages) at law (Hutton v Watling [1948]), and so it follows as a general principle that equity will
not interfere where damages at law will give a party the full compensation to which he is entitled
and will put him in a position as beneficial to him as if the agreement had been specifically
performed (Harnett v Yielding (1805).

Although in most cases no action for specific performance will be commenced until a breach of the
contract has occurred, a breach is not an essential part of the cause of action in equity, thus a claimant
may commence proceedings before the due date for performance of the obligation. Plainly the court
cannot order the defendant to perform earlier than the due date, but exceptionally it may order that
steps be taken in advance of that date, with a view to proper performance of the obligation in due
course.

Researched & Compiled by Leslie F. Cole- Showers LLB Hons I (FBC, 2022)
Contracts where Specific Performance may be Decreed or Not

Land

The commonest case in which the court almost invariably specifically enforces a contract is where the
contract is for the sale of land or for the granting of a lease.

Where the necessary conditions are satisfied, the court will therefore almost invariably decree
specific performance of a contract regarding land, even if the interest to be granted is no more than a
licence of short duration; and according to the case of Penn v Baltimore where the contracting parties
are within the jurisdiction this willingness to decree specific performance extends even to land out of
the jurisdiction.

Chattels

Equity would not grant specific performance in contracts for the sale of goods, unless they were
“unique” goods such as antiques and works of art of unusual beauty or rarity may be specifically
enforced (Falcke v Gray (1859). In practice, the courts are reluctant to exercise this discretion unless
the goods are effectively unique. There is also jurisdiction, analogous to the Sale of Goods Act
regime, to order the specific delivery of chattels wrongfully detained by the defendant. At common
law, the defendant had the option of keeping the chattel and paying damages. But in equity an order
for delivery of the chattel could be obtained if the thing was of peculiar value to the owner, e.g. if it
was an heirloom, as was so held in Pusey v Pusey (1684); and if the defendant stood in a fiduciary
position to the claimant, whether as agent, trustee or broker, equity would order specific delivery of
the chattel, even if the claimant would have been fully compensated by the payment of damages
(Wood v Rowcliffe (1847).

Employment Contracts

In De Francesco v Barnum (1890), it was stated inter alia that the principle that an employee will not
be compelled to perform a contract of employment is based on the courts’ refusal to endorse
anything that smacks of slavery. A further rationale has been suggested as an explanation of Lumley
v Wagner, where an opera singer agreed with a theatrical manager to sing exclusively at his theatre
for a definite period, but then in breach agreed to sing for a rival impresario. The court would not
compel her to sing and this has been justified on the basis that, although the threat of committal
might induce some sort of performance, the court could not control imperfections of performance or
judge whether they were natural or self-induced.
Researched & Compiled by Leslie F. Cole- Showers LLB Hons I (FBC, 2022)
Building Contracts

In many building cases, specific performance will not be granted because damages will be adequate
compensation for the breach of such a contract; for if the defendant will not build the claimant can
find some other builder ready to do so, and can recover any loss from the defendant as damages.
This was so held in Flint v Brandon (1803). However, it was settled in Wolverhampton v Emmons
(1901) that specific performance will be decreed here if:

i. The building work is clearly defined by the contract


ii. The plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the contract of a nature, which
would not be adequately compensated by damages
iii. The defendant is in possession of the land so that the plaintiff cannot employ another
person to build without committing a trespass

Defences
Illegal or Immoral Contracts

Equity will not compel specific performance of a contract which is immoral or which is contrary to
public policy in accordance with the case of Sutton v Sutton [1984]. This is part of the wider principle
of ex turpi causa that the courts will not enforce illegal or immoral contracts or those otherwise
contrary to public policy. If a statutory corporation enters into a contract which is ultra vires, there
can accordingly be neither specific performance nor an award of damages, for the contract is illegal
and void (Corbett v South Eastern and Chatham Railway [1906]).

See also: Re Mahmood and Ispahani (1921)

Mutuality

As a rule, the court would not grant specific performance against the defendant if it could not have
done so against the claimant. Thus, if a vendor had no title to the estate which he contracted to sell
and no right to compel the real owner to convey it, he could not force the purchaser to take a
conveyance from the true owner, even if he was willing to convey the property, for the purchaser
had no right to compel a conveyance by the true owner (Forrer v Nash (1865). Again, a minor could
not compel specific performance, for the court could not compel specific performance against him
(Flight v Bolland (1828).

Misdescription

One not uncommon ground of defence is that, by a misdescription of the property, the defendant has
purchased what he never intended to purchase. Under this defence, two classes of cases arise: (i)
Researched & Compiled by Leslie F. Cole- Showers LLB Hons I (FBC, 2022)
cases where a misdescription is of a substantial character which will not in justice admit of
compensation; and (ii) cases where the misdescription is such as fairly to admit of compensation. The
case of Flight v Booth (1834) is instructive on misdescription where the court stated that if the effect
of the misdescription is to prevent the purchaser from really getting the property which he bought,
the vendor will not be granted specific performance.

Defective Title

A vendor who has purported to sell “registered freehold property” cannot enforce the contract if he
is unable to make title. This was so held in Castle v Wilkinson [1870].

Also, in Baker v White, it was that opined that specific performance will not be decreed against a
vendor who cannot show a good title to the property he has contracted to sell, or where his title is
doubtful.

Delay

Delay, they say, defeats equity. In Milward v Earl of Thanet (1801), the court opined that a claimant
who delays in bringing an action may be denied specific performance. It was also stated that the
traditional test for laches was relatively strict: for a claimant to obtain specific performance, he must
have shown himself “ready, desirous, prompt, and eager”. In practice, however, the courts show
some flexibility in assessing the extent, impact of and reasons for the delay, when whether to permit
specific performance.

Researched & Compiled by Leslie F. Cole- Showers LLB Hons I (FBC, 2022)

Common questions

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The adequacy of legal damages is pivotal because specific performance is reserved for instances where monetary compensation is insufficient. A court will grant this relief when goods or property are unique, or a plaintiff retains substantial interest in what was contracted that cannot be substituted by damages. The uniqueness of land or irreplaceable chattels often leads to such a remedy, as monetary damages cannot adequately capture their true value to the injured party, as outlined in cases like Beswick v Beswick and Harnett v Yielding .

Contracts involving illegal or immoral acts are excluded from specific performance to uphold the principle of ex turpi causa, which dictates no legal remedy should reinforce illegal partnerships. Such contracts, being void, do not allow for legal remedy either in terms of damages or specific performance. Courts avoid reinforcing any transaction that undermines legal and public policy standards, as embodied in Sutton v Sutton .

Specific performance is typically not applied to contracts involving ordinary goods because monetary damages are usually deemed adequate to compensate for the loss. Equity considers specific performance only when goods are unique, such as antiques or items with peculiar personal value, where damages fail to capture the item's worth to the claimant, as noted in Pusey v Pusey and Falcke v Gray .

Timeliness, encapsulated by the principle 'delay defeats equity', significantly impacts the viability of specific performance. A claimant must demonstrate they are prompt, desirous, and eager in enforcing their contractual rights. Courts may deny relief if there is insubstantial reason for delay, as laches may imply a waiver of rights or cause prejudice to the defendant. However, courts show flexibility by considering the reasons and impact of delays in the specific context .

Specific performance in building contracts is decreed when the building work is clearly defined, the plaintiff has a substantial interest in its performance that damages cannot adequately remedy, and if the defendant controls the land, making it impossible for the plaintiff to hire another builder without committing trespass. However, this is rare because usually, damages are considered adequate since the plaintiff can hire another contractor to complete the work, as in Flint v Brandon .

The concept of 'mutuality' means that specific performance will not be granted to one party unless it could also be granted to the other party. Hence, if a vendor lacks title, he cannot compel the purchaser to accept a conveyance, nor can a minor enforce specific performance if the court cannot compel it against them. This principle ensures fairness and that both parties are equally bound by the contract terms before a court enforces performance .

Specific performance may be denied in employment contracts because enforcing such contracts could resemble coercion akin to slavery, which courts are unwilling to endorse. This principle is highlighted in De Francesco v Barnum, where it was emphasized that courts will not compel personal services, as the threat of committal for non-compliance cannot ensure genuine performance and may infringe on personal liberty .

Specific performance can be sought before a breach if the claimant anticipates non-performance and equitable relief is vital to safeguard their interests, even though courts cannot order performance before the due date. It shows that equity looks beyond strict time frames to ensure a fair outcome, ensuring that steps for performance are put in place timely, reflecting the remedial flexibility of equity .

A misdescription in a property contract can prevent specific performance if it is substantial enough to prevent the purchaser from getting what was intended. The court differentiates between misdescriptions that are substantial, as in Flight v Booth, where compensation does not remedy the buyer's loss, and those minor enough to allow for compensation, affecting the decision on enforcing specific performance .

Courts are more likely to grant specific performance for contracts regarding land because each piece of land is considered unique and may hold peculiar value to the purchaser. The traditional view holds that no two parcels of land are alike, making damages a less adequate remedy. Also, in Penn v Baltimore, even if the land is outside the jurisdiction but the parties are within it, courts would likely decree specific performance. Therefore, if a contract involves the sale of land and the necessary legal conditions are met, specific performance is typically favored .

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