“Early Chinese Thought” Course Readings

(R. Eno)

LEGALISM AND HUANG-LAO THOUGHT

PART 1: LEGALISM

Legalism is a network of ideas concerning the art of statecraft. It looks at the problems of the
Warring States period entirely from the perspective of rulers (although the authors of Legalist
texts were not themselves rulers, but rather men who wished to be employed by rulers as their
counselors and ministers). Legalism provides answers to the question, how can a ruler
effectively organize and control his government so as to yield the greatest possible increase in
state wealth and territory. Legalist arguments assume that these goods are only meaningful
when they are under the absolute control of an autocrat, that is, a ruler whose personal power
within his realm is absolute and unconstrained.
If among all the ideologies of personal and political governance that flourished in
contention during the Warring States period there was a winner, it was Legalism. Legalism was
principally the development of certain ideas that lay behind a set of political reforms
introduced in the state of Qin 秦 during the period 360-338 by its prime minister Shang Yang.
These reforms were what led most materially to Qin’s ultimate conquest over the other states
of Eastern Zhou China in 221.
Moreover, the political administrator who oversaw the triumphant march of Qin power
was a self-avowed Legalist. Li Si, the last prime minister of pre-Imperial Qin, and in many
ways the first architect of Imperial China, had initially studied at the Jixia Academy in Qi,
where he was known as a student under the Confucian master Xunzi. Xunzi, unlike previous
Confucians, allowed that laws and punishments could play a legitimate role in the state, but
only as adjunct tools for rulers who had demonstrated moral self-perfection, and only as a
means of motivating the people towards ethical self-improvement. His pupil Li Si, perhaps
observing that Confucians who stressed to rulers the priority of moral excellence were never
granted positions of governmental significance, discarded the ethical dimensions of Xunzi’s
teachings and retained only the Legalistically inclined pragmatic elements. Although a native
of Chu, he recognized that political opportunities were greatest in Qin and migrated there, in
time becoming the most successful political figure of the century.
The Legalism of Li Si’s age was a growing complex of ideas. It is unclear just when
Legalism came to be regarded as an intellectual faction, comparable to well defined schools
such as Confucianism and Mohism, but it is most likely that only in the mid-third century did
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individuals bring together the various strands that came to be recognized as Legalist thought.
It may be the case that it was not until the greatest of all Legalist texts was written in the years
surrounding 240 that this group of ideas came to be thought of as a coherent ideology. That
work was written by a prince of the state of Han, a man known as Han Feizi.
Unlike many highborn patricians, Han Feizi was an intellectually ambitious man. Born
to a cadet branch of the ruling lineage of Han, he saw as a young man that his influence at the
Han court might be limited by the fact that he was handicapped in the arts of persuasion – he
spoke with an enormous stammer. In order to better himself, therefore, he traveled to Jixia,
where, like Li Si, he gravitated to the company of Xunzi. What he learned from Xunzi is little
evident in the spirit of his later works and career, and after a few years at Jixia, Han Feizi
returned to Han and began to compose the text that bears his name.
This very large book weaves together ideas from four principal sources, each making a
distinct contribution to the complex system of Legalism. The four strands may be associated
with the ideas and policies of four men, who may be considered the “fathers of Legalism.”

The “Four Founders” of Legalism

If one were to trace the origins of Legalism as far back as possible, it might be appropriate to
date its beginnings to the prime ministership of Guan Zhong, chief aide to the first of the
hegemonic lords of the Spring-Autumn period, Duke Huan of Qi (r. 685-643). Among the
other services that Guan Zhong performed for his lord, he instituted certain reforms in
domestic administration, including the registration of households, the demarcation of
administrative sub-units within the state, and the promulgation of a law code that was made
copied out and posted for the information of all the duke’s subjects.
Two key features may be discerned in Guan Zhong’s activities. The first was the basic
notion that to raise the quality of government to a new scale in order to accommodate the
hegemonic aspirations of the duke, a certain degree of technocratic expertise would be
required. Guan Zhong may be seen as the source of the notion that good government involved
skilled systems design. This idea became widely accepted by many schools of thought, but
Legalism adopted it most strongly.
The second aspect was a more radical departure from traditional norms. It was the
acknowledgment that efficient rule could not depend solely on the morally transformative
powers of a virtuous ruler, but must involve some degree of positive law – rules for public
conduct backed by coercive sanctions. This ran counter to basic beliefs of the Zhou feudal
structure, which aspired to produce orderly rule solely through the charismatic excellence of
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the aristocratic leaders of the state, in the manner of Yao and Shun. Prior to Guan Zhong, we
may assume that the common notion was that the promulgation of a law code amounted to a
confession of deficient virtue on the part of the ruler. Such a confession implicitly undermined
the legitimacy of the ruler and of his class. Guan Zhong code, and, more important, the
outstanding success of the state of Qi subsequent to its adoption, went far towards legitimizing
a role for law in society, and this was an essential pillar of Legalism.
Guan Zhong, however, was not consciously a theoretician or philosopher, and he can
be termed no more than a proto-Legalist. In tracing the origins of Legalism as a systematic
school of thought, four later thinkers are usually cited as its most important founders.

Shang Yang 商鞅
The first of these four was Shang Yang, whose policies in Qin transformed the shape
of Warring States society, and who may be regarded as the true “father” of the Legalist school.
If we rely on the historical texts that have been left to us to determine the greatest turning
point of Classical Chinese history, it would be the ministry of Shang Yang in the state of Qin.
While it is undoubtedly true that the histories exaggerate his achievements, it is still likely that
the reality was extraordinary. Shang Yang was a political thinker who reflected his times, and
it may be that without his efforts, the same general outcome of Warring States chaos would
have, in time, been brought about – another Shang Yang would have eventually arisen. But
Shang Yang’s career is no less remarkable for that.
Because of Shang Yang’s historical importance, it is appropriate to discuss his career
and his ideas in some detail here. Although there is an extant text that bears Shang Yang’s
name (translated into English as The Book of Lord Shang), it is actually a post-Zhou forgery and
cannot be used to elucidate Shang Yang’s original ideas. Our best sources from these actually
come from historical texts, such as the Han period Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian). The
following account is based on such sources.
Shang Yang’s exploits in Qin crystallized earlier tendencies that had arisen to create
centralized states whose governments were managed both by the officers of a central court
and by district officers whose appointments were made without reference to birth. Shang Yang
also recognized that the benefits of such a system to the central government would only accrue
if there were fashioned sophisticated systems of social control that would have the same effects
as micro-management by the ducal court without requiring great additional manpower and
expense. In Qin, the law code and its enforcement became just such a tool of social control.
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Although to later Confucians Shang Yang represented the epitome of political

immorality, Shang Yang was actually a legitimist in the same sense as Confucius: he relied on
the legitimacy of the Zhou-appointed ducal house, but otherwise sanctioned only criteria of
merit rather than birth. His reforms had the predictable effect of drastically reducing the power
of the patrician class, before this ultimate outcome was determined, the enmity of the
patricians brought Shang Yang down.

How Shang Yang came to Qin. Shang Yang was born in the state of Wey about 390 to a patrician
family descended from the Wey ruling house (he is also known as Wei Yang, or Prince Yang).
Wey, which had been a significant political force among the Central States centuries earlier,
had lost nearly all of its interstate influence by the fourth century. Nevertheless, as a young
man, Shang Yang seemed on the way to a brilliant career in Wey. He became a clan retainer
of the prime minister of Wey, who was greatly impressed with his abilities.
It is said that when the prime minister fell ill, the duke of Wey visited him to consult
on a successor, should one be needed. The prime minister startled the duke by naming Shang
Yang, who, in the duke’s eyes was still an obscure youth. The duke not only ignored the
recommendation, he ridiculed it. Consequently, Shang Yang came to the conclusion that his
fortune would best be sought outside his home state.
In 362 the prime minister of Wey, having recovered his health, was captured in battle
by the armies of Qin, and the following year a new ruler took the throne in Qin, Duke Xiao.
Duke Xiao was intent on recapturing territories and influence that had slipped from Qin in
recent centuries, and like other ambitious rulers of the time, he issued a proclamation inviting
men of talent throughout China to travel to his court. With his future in Wey seeming bleak,
Shang Yang responded to Duke Xiao’s call.
It seems to have taken Shang Yang some time to persuade the duke of his usefulness
to Qin. Many of the reforms that he ultimately engineered were apparently proposals that he
announced soon after his arrival in order to attract the duke’s attention and stand out from
the crowd of learned men flocking to Qin in hopes of wealth and prestige. When the duke at
length began to probe Shang Yang’s ideas in greater depth, traditionalists at his court voiced
strenuous objections to the radical nature of his proposals. But Shang Yang kept his self-
possession and continued to speak eloquently for his ideas. He was, after all, not only a brilliant
man, but a cultivated patrician who had seen service as a key aide to a prime minister in Wey.
In the end, the duke decided to adopt Shang Yang’s ideas and put him in charge of their
implementation as prime minister of Qin. As the established power holders in Qin were
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adamantly opposed to this outsider’s programs, we may assume that the administrative staff
that Shang Yang used to manage his reforms probably included many men not previously of
high standing. Their loyalty towards Shang Yang would have been unusually strong, as their
own careers were most likely tied tightly to his success.
Thus because Shang Yang was denied a chance to join the political establishment of
his small native state, he became instead the unusually independent head of government in
one of the greatest states in China.

The Qin reform program. Shang Yang was in power in Qin for about twenty years and during that
time he made Qin into a completely new type of state. That state was characterized by
centralized administration, new systems of taxation, government management of the economy,
standardization of weights and measures (a major undertaking in those times), armament of a
greatly enlarged army, and, what later writers most stressed, the implementation of a brutally
draconian set of laws.
To achieve centralized control of the state, Shang Yang divided the lands of Qin into
counties, administrative units determined by the duke’s court rather than by tradition. The
management of these counties was entrusted not to local power holders, but to magistrates
whose talents were valued by the court and who were answerable to the duke and the prime
minister for their actions. These were men who could be fired without repercussions – they
did not represent powerful clans, only themselves, and there was no hereditary right associated
with their offices. Their sole political loyalty was thus to the men who appointed them, and in
this way, Shang Yang created the first true state-wide bureaucracy in China.
The patrician clans still retained rights to incomes from the lands that earlier dukes had
bestowed upon them, and the aristocracy was by no means eliminated. In fact, Shang Yang
himself received a patrimonial estate from Duke Xiao (it was the city region of Shang, which
is why he is usually called Shang Yang, or sometimes Lord Shang). But the power of the
patrician clans to influence the operations of both state and local government was sharply
reduced.
The changes that Shang Yang effected in Qin were more than administrative, they were
social as well. All families were registered, and groups of five or ten families living in a single
village, neighborhood, or lane were designated as a “mutual responsibility” unit. Each member
of the unit was a guarantor to the government for the behavior of the entire group. Thus if
one member of the group broke the law, all members received punishment.
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And the punishments were severe. Heavy punishments were decreed for crimes that
might be considered relatively minor, and any who sheltered law breakers were sentenced to
be cut in two. Rewards were similarly great, and good conduct could actually earn promotion
to patrician status in a newly crafted system of sixteen social grades (another thorn in the side
of the established patricians in Qin, who were equally dismayed to learn that law breaking
could strip them of their ancient status under the new system). In practice, the punishments
made a far greater impact on cultural memory than the rewards.
A second wave of reforms attacked the family structure of Qin still further. In order to
discourage the formation of large family compounds that might become points of independent
social influence, government policies encouraged the independence of the nuclear family unit.
Fathers, married sons, and brothers were forbidden to occupy a single household once of a
certain age. Families with two unmarried adult sons faced a double tax assessment. As families,
the basic economic units of the state, were reconfigured in this way, the boundaries of fields
were completely redrawn so as to reflect new realities.
Despite these pressures on social arrangements, which worked to the disadvantage of
the less influential strata of society, Shang Yang’s reforms initially benefitted the peasant class
at the expense of the patricians. The sharp limitations in the prerogatives of the patricians was
complemented by the explicit designation of all farming families as independent units owing
taxes directly to the Qin state. Over the portions of Qin where patrician claims were not clearly
established, this act essentially gave farmers ownership responsibilities over their lands, and
spelled the end of any expansion of patrician control of the peasant class, apart from control
exercised directly from court.
However, this system seems not to have benefitted the peasant class in the long run.
Shang Yang’s laws also established the legality of the private purchase of land. Land was thus
transformed into a marketable commodity of great value, substantially increasing the volatility
of commerce in Qin. Under these circumstances, a process of land speculation appears to have
occurred in which those with liquid assets, principally members of the merchant class, bought
out poor peasants and accumulated substantial holdings of land. Although Qin had strong
bars against members of the merchant class being awarded patrician rank, it does appear that
the merchant class was the chief beneficiary of Shang Yang’s reforms.
In time, it was widely acknowledged that Shang Yang had created a state that worked.
The population was orderly, the harvests were huge, the markets were flourishing, and soldiers
fought bravely. When Shang Yang exhibited the fairness of the laws by punishing high ranking
courtiers as severely as commoners, he won grudging admiration. But when people began to
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praise his laws, he took further action. Desirous of suppressing the notion that independent
evaluation of the duke’s legitimate government was permissible, regardless of the nature of the
judgment, he had those who praised his reforms banished along with his opponents and
passed a law forbidding any discussion of the laws whatever.
Shang Yang claimed that the sole values relevant to a state were its wealth and its
military success. Since his political outlook was framed entirely from the perspective of the
personal interests of the legitimate ruler, no other values were of importance. It was irrelevant
whether the people of the state were content or not: whichever was more conducive to
enlarging the duke’s treasuries and strengthening his armies was the one more desirable. Shang
Yang’s state was an absolute tyranny, but like many well managed tyrannies, it purchased the
toleration of the population by delivering to them the fruits of order: wealth and security.
The aspects of Shang Yang’s thought that became central to Legalism, apart from his
foundational stress on the wealth and size of the state as its sole concerns, included his
rejection of the criterion of heredity in office in favor of a government of bureaucratic term
appointments, his goal of creating a fully centralized state, and most of all, his insistence on
the absolute rule of law and the uniform application of rewards and punishments.

Shen Buhai 申不害 and Shen Dao 慎倒

The second founder of Legalism was a man named Shen Buhai, who was a minister
to the state of Han and a contemporary of Shang Yang (he died in 337). Shen Buhai was chiefly
concerned with the art of manipulating people for political ends. He knew first hand of the
wealth of interests, affinities, and enmities at a patrician court, and how difficult these were to
control. His writings, most now lost, explored the ways in which a ruler could employ the
greed and fear of ministers as tools to gain his own ends. Shen Buhai’s contribution to
Legalism may be thought of as his code for successful personnel management.
The third man was Shen Dao (c. 350-275), about whom we know little. Shen Dao was
impressed by the way in which the consequences of actions were often governed less by the
intentions of the actors than by the contours of situational contexts, or “strategic advantage”
(shi), a term we have encountered in Sun Tzu’s writings. Shen Dao wrote a handbook to help
rulers envision these contexts as arrays of power relationships. He noted that identical actions
under different circumstances of power will produce radically different results; for example,
the ruler of a powerful state might become hegemon by launching an attack against a state
with a record of recklessly coercing its neighbors, but if the ruler of a modest state did the
same, he risked becoming a laughingstock or losing his state. An example of Shen Dao’s
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thinking is cited at length in the Han Feizi, which, in this particular case, criticizes Shen Dao
for the incompleteness of his ideas:
Shen Dao says, “The flying dragon rides on the clouds, the leaping viper flies on the
mist. If the clouds disperse and the mist clears, the dragon and viper are no different
than the earthworm and ant; they have lost the vehicles on which they rode. When a
worthy man is subordinate to an unworthy man it is because his weight of authority is
light and his position is low. When an unworthy man is able to subdue a it is because
his weight of authority is heavy and his position is high. If Emperor Yao had been a
common peasant he could not have commanded three men, yet the Emperor Jie was
the Son of Heaven, * and so brought chaos to the entire world. It is on this basis that I
know that the strategic advantage (shi) of position is enough to rely on, and that wisdom
and worthiness are not worth admiring. Though one’s bow is weak, if one shoots from
a great height, one’s arrow will fly swifter than the wind. Though you are yourself
unworthy, that your orders are carried out is due to the people’s duty to assist you.
Were Yao to occupy the social rank of a slave, none would listen to him, yet when he
faced south and ruled the world, what he ordered was done, what he prohibited was
stopped. Looking at things this way, we can see that wisdom and worthiness are
inadequate to subdue the people, while the strategic advantage of position is able to
subdue worthy men.”
There is a reply to Shen Dao’s arguments. The flying dragon rides on the clouds
and the leaping viper flies on the mist, it is true, and I do not deny that they rely upon
the strategic advantage of the clouds and mist. Nevertheless, if one were to give up on
worthiness and simply rely on strategic advantage, could one create order? I have yet
to see it! That they can employ the strategic vehicles of cloud and mist to fly is a product
of the fine talents of the dragon and viper. Although the clouds may be dense, the
earthworm cannot ride on them; although the mists are brewing thick, the ant can’t fly
on them. That there may be the strategic array of dense clouds and thick mist but the
earthworm and ant cannot take them as their vehicles is a product of the meager talents
of the earthworm and ant.
Now, Jie and Zhòu faced south and ruled the world,** and they relied on the
awesomeness of the office of Son of Heaven as their cloud and mist, yet the world was
nevertheless plunged into chaos. This reflects the meager talents of Jie and Zhòu.
Moreover, in the case of Yao, he employed his strategic advantage in order to bring
order to the world; how his this strategic advantage different from that of Jie, who
brought chaos to the world?
Strategic advantage is not something that a worthy will inevitably make use of,
but the unworthy man will not be able to make use of it. If a worthy relies upon it, the
world will be ordered; if an unworthy man relies upon it, the world will be in chaos.
(from Han Feizi, “Disputing Strategic Advantage”)

*
Jie was the evil last emperor of the Xia Dynasty.
**
Zhòu was the evil last emperor of the Shang Dynasty.
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Han Feizi’s Innovations 韓非子

The final major contributor to Legalist theory was Han Feizi himself, who died in 233.
Han Feizi gave Legalism a metaphysical worldview by introducing into it Daoist ideas, many
borrowed directly from the Dao de jing (several chapters in his book – probably posthumous
additions – are titled “Explications of Laozi”). Han Feizi incorporated the idea of non-action,
wu-wei, into Legalism. For him, the perfect ruler of the ideal state was a man who sat at the
center of a vast web of laws, offices, and procedures, and did nothing whatever – nothing but
allow the system to regulate itself. Such a ruler would exemplify the spontaneity of nature by
neither adjusting nor interfering with the balanced system over which he presided.

Legalism and Confucianism

As mentioned earlier, both Han Feizi and Li Si studied under the Confucian Xunzi,
and there are some important ways in which Confucianism does actually resonate with
Legalism. The Legalist vision of positive law as a self-regulating state system governing social
conduct is in many ways parallel to the Confucian concept of li as a holistic code of ceremony
and daily etiquette. Confucians stressed, however, that li could not be coercively imposed: the
efficacy of ritual forms depended upon their internalization by all members of society, and this
is why the key to government was education and processes of self-cultivation, rather than the
design of a positive law code. Moreover, the Confucians denied that effective constraints on
people’s behavior could be legislatively engineered as the Legalists envisioned. Rather, the li
were seen as slowly evolving codes that reflected a historical process of sages mediating
between the enduring structures of human nature and the ever-changing configurations of
society. No single generation could undertake so complex a task. For Confucians, the
precedents of history were the guidelines of the present.
But the Legalists saw the historical changes of history not as evolution but as
disjunction – the past and the present were radically different in kind. They ridiculed the
Confucians with an anecdote that told of a farmer who, while ploughing one day, saw a rabbit
run into a tree stump and knock itself dead. Delighted, the farmer put aside his plough and
determined to live at ease by the stump waiting for rabbits to pile up beside the stump, ready
for sale at the market. Rituals may have worked well in the eras for which they were designed,
Legalists said, but to wait for the same rituals to work again when the old times were forever
vanished was to be as deluded as this farmer.
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A second area of apparent similarity between Confucians and Legalists was expressed
in a doctrine called “the rectification of names,” which was actually a Confucian term. The
concept, which was very much discussed in early debates on government, actually involved
three rather different aspects. Originally, Confucius had claimed that a key barometer of
success in government lay in ensuring that officials were both fully devoted to the tasks that
fell under their responsibility and also careful not to interfere with the duties of other officers.
This notion actually belonged to the ritual portrait of government, in which the entire
“ceremony” of administration could only be executed in harmony if every political actor
perfectly performed his own part and no other. As you will see below in the story of Marquis
Zhao of Han and his keeper of the hat, Legalism borrowed this idea, and transformed it into
a draconian and coercive code best called “matching deeds to words.” While this element of
the rectification of names doctrine is often cited as significant common ground between
Confucianism and Legalism, it is important to bear in mind the different approaches to the
concept that each school took, and also to note that this was the only aspect of this complex
notion shared by the schools.
Two other elements of the Confucian rectification of names doctrine were not adopted
by Legalists. Mencius stretched the doctrine into the area of political legitimacy. In answer to
a question concerning whether King Wu of the Zhou had not been guilty of the high crime of
regicide by killing his lord, the Shang king Zhòu, Mencius pointed out that by his unkingly
behavior, Zhòu had totally alienated the people and his ministers – he was, in effect, no longer
the king when he was slain. “I have heard of the solitary man Zhòu,” Mencius pontificated,
“but never of a Zhòu who was king.” This attack on political legitimacy, which would have
allowed individuals to judge whether rulers deserved their titles and treat them accordingly,
was anathema to the absolutism of Legalism.
Xunzi had carried the rectification of names doctrine even further, in response to a
range of sophisticated debates which had emerged among early philosophers of language. He
held that language was inherently regulative of behavior – that a well designed language
clarified reality and natural values, but that twisted usage of language could make it nearly
impossible for people to see the truth or understand morality. For Xunzi the term
“rectification of names” denoted a process of carefully examining word definitions and the
ways in which debaters employed words in persuasive argument, to ensure that the naturally
moral Dao was not distorted by the misapplication of descriptive terms. Here again, the
Legalists, who showed no interest in abstract linguistic speculations, did not share Confucian
concerns.
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In one other respect, Legalism and Confucianism share common ground. This was in
the anti-aristocratic thrust of the policies of Shang Yang and Han Feizi’s theoretical
formulation of them. The Legalism of Shang Yang was the greatest of all intellectual forces
contributing to the one revolutionary change that all philosophical schools agreed was
desirable: the destruction of the aristocratic system that had assigned power and prestige to
people on the basis of birth throughout the Shang and Zhou eras. Shang Yang, though himself
of noble birth, was the aristocratic class’s greatest and most effective enemy. His reforms in
Qin crippled the nobility there and strengthened the growing belief that with the sole
exception of the need for a powerful hereditary ruler, the role people should play in society
should be determined solely by merit and not by birth. (This is a belief that is now so well
established throughout much of the modern world that we sometimes lose track of how hard
and long was the process of overturning the belief in the hereditary nature of personal worth.)
What the other schools hated about Shang Yang was not his “meritocratic” principles, but
rather the Legalist definition of what constituted “merit.” For Shang Yang, merit meant simply
a combination of absolute obedience to the dictates of the state and the competence to
perform those task assigned by the state for its benefit. This notion of merit was sharply
different from those envisioned by the other three schools. The crudeness of the concept and
its view of individuals as organically linked only to the state rather than to family and
community as well, has made Legalism a system of thought repellent to most later thinkers.

The Role of Li Si 李斯
In addition to the four major founders of Legalism, it is only just to add a fifth name,
Li Si, prime minister of Qin. Traditional histories have portrayed Li Si as one of the great
villains of the Chinese past. Rather than marvel at the way that he was able to systematically
apply Legalist principles to engineer the Qin conquest and the establishment of a revolutionary
new form of government in the Qin Imperial state, they have quibbled over his slight misdeeds.
For example, historians have deplored his treachery to his friend Han Feizi, whom he jealously
slandered so that he would be sentenced to execution, later thoughtfully bringing him poison
in jail so that he could die with honor before having a chance to learn who had slandered him.
Or they have fussed over his having persuaded the First Emperor of the Qin to order all non-
Legalist texts, with a few exceptions, to be burnt, so that people would no longer have the
understanding to challenge the government. They have even gone so far as to take him to task
for the massive slaughter of scholars, who were, so it is said, buried alive in huge pits.
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We should recognize, however, that without Li Si, the First Emperor would surely
never have been able to channel his megalomaniac talents into so productive an outlet as the
establishment of perhaps the largest successful tyranny ever seen, and the revolution of the
Chinese state that the Qin Dynasty represented might never have occurred, or would at least
have been seriously delayed. And in this regard, Li Si must surely be regarded as in a class by
himself among the Legalists.

* * *
What follows below are two chapters of the Han Feizi. The first is “The Two Handles,” which
is the best expression of the Legalist notion that explicit codes of laws and administrative
regulations and strictly applied standards for rewards and punishment are the most essential
tools for effective statecraft. The second, “Wielding Power,” illustrates the Daoist element in
Han Feizi’s thought.
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The Two Handles

On rewards and punishments

The enlightened ruler guides and controls his ministers by means of two handles alone.
The two handles are punishment and reward. What do I mean by punishment and reward? To
inflict mutilation and death on men is called punishment; to bestow honor and wealth is called
reward. Those who act as ministers fear penalties and hope to profit from rewards. Thus if
the ruler himself wields his punishments and rewards, the ministers will fear his awesomeness
and flock to receive his benefits. But the perfidious ministers of this age are different. They
persuade the ruler to let them inflict punishment themselves on men they hate and bestow
favors on men they like. Now if the ruler does not insist upon reserving to himself the
authority to dispense profit in the form of rewards and show his awesome power in
punishments, but instead allows his ministers to hand these out, then the people of the state
will all fear the ministers and treat the ruler with disrespect; they will flock to the ministers and
desert the ruler. This is the danger that arises when the ruler loses control of punishments and
rewards.
The theme of this chapter concerns the use of reward and punishment to control ministers,
and the text examines in detail this adversarial relationship that the Shen Buhai strain of
Legalism specified as the central challenge of ruling.
The term “reward,” which denotes bestowals of wealth and status in this chapter, is
actually the word de, which elsewhere means virtue, power, or more generally, earned social
leverage. Here, de is conceived as the storehouse of favors that a state’s resources allow a ruler
to dispense (or a minister to usurp).

The tiger is able to overpower the dog because of his claws and teeth, but if he discards
his claws and teeth and lets the dog use them, then he will be overpowered by the dog. The
ruler of men uses punishments and rewards to control his ministers, but if he discards his
punishments and rewards and lets his ministers dispense them, then he will fall under the
control of his ministers.
Tian Chang petitioned the ruler for various offices and stipends which he then
dispensed to the lesser ministers, and he used oversize measures when he doled out grain to
the common people. In this way the ruler, Duke Jian of Qi, lost the exclusive right to dispense
favors, and it passed into Tian Chang’s hands. Thus it was that Duke Jian came to be
assassinated.
 14

Zihan said to the lord of Song, “Since the people all delight in rewards and gifts, you
should bestow them yourself; but since they hate punishments and death sentences, allow me
to dispense these for you.” Thereupon the lord of Song gave up control over penalties and it
passed into the hands of Zihan. Thus it was that the ruler of Song came under the power of
others.
Tian Chang got hold of the power to reward and Duke Jian was assassinated; Zihan
got hold of the power to punish and the ruler of Song fell under his power. Ministers today
are permitted to gain control over both punishment and reward; their rulers put themselves in
greater peril than Duke Jian and the lord of Song. When rulers are coerced, assassinated,
obstructed, or subject to deception, it has invariably because they lost control over punishment
and reward to their ministers, and thus brought about their own peril and downfall.

On speech and action

If a ruler wishes to put an end to depravity, then he must be careful to align name and
form, that is to say, word and deed. When ministers come forward to present proposals, the
ruler assigns them tasks on the basis of their words and measures their merit solely on the
basis of the accomplishment of the tasks. If the accomplishment fits the task, and the task fits
the words, then he rewards them; but if the accomplishment fails to fit the task or the task the
words he punishes them. Hence, if ministers offer big words but only produce small
accomplishments the ruler punishes them. This is not because the accomplishments are small,
but because they do not match the name that was given to the undertaking. Likewise, if
ministers come forward with small words but produce great accomplishments they too are
punished. This is not because the ruler is displeased with great accomplishments, but because
he considers the harm of giving too small a name to the undertaking to be more serious than
the benefit of great accomplishments.
Once Marquis Zhao of Han got drunk and fell asleep. The Keeper of the Hat, seeing
that the duke was cold, laid a robe over him. When the marquis awoke, he was pleased and
asked his attendants, “Who covered me with a robe?” His attendants replied, “The Keeper of
the Hat.” The marquis thereupon punished both the Keeper of the Hat and the Keeper of the
Robe. He punished the Keeper of the Robe for failing to do his duty, and the Keeper of the
Hat for overstepping his office. It was not that he did not dislike the cold, but he considered
the harm of one official encroaching upon the duties of another to be a greater danger than
cold.
 15

Hence an enlightened ruler, in handling his ministers, does not permit them to gain
merit by overstepping their offices, or to speak words that do not tally with their actions. To
overstep one’s office is to die; speech that does not tally with action is punished. When
ministers execute their proper duties and must ensure that deeds are true to words, then they
cannot form factions and work for each other’s benefit.

On concealing preferences

The ruler of men has two worries: If he employs only worthies as ministers, then they
will use their worthy reputations to control the ruler. However, if he promotes men
unreasonably state affairs will become blocked and nothing will get done. Hence, if the ruler
values worthies, his ministers will all ornament their actions in order to exploit his desires. In
this way, they will never show their true characters, so the ruler will have no way to distinguish
the qualities of his ministers.
Because the king of Yue admired valor, many of his subjects looked on death lightly.
Because King Ling of Chu liked slim waists, his state was full of people starving themselves.
Because Duke Huan of Qi was jealous and loved his ladies in waiting, Shudiao castrated
himself in order to be put in charge of the harem; because Duke Huan was fond of unusual
food, Yiya steamed his son’s head and served it to him. Because Zikuai of Yan admired worthy
men, his minister Zizhi made it clear that he would not accept the throne were it offered to
him. *
Thus if the ruler reveals what he dislikes, his ministers will be careful to disguise their
motives; if he shows what he likes, his ministers will feign abilities they do not have. In short,
if he lets his desires be known, his ministers will know how what attitude to assume in order
to hide their true characters.
Hence Zizhi, by playing the part of a worthy, was able to seize the throne from his
sovereign. Shudiao and Yiya, by catering to the ruler’s desires, were able to encroach upon his
authority. In the end, Zikuai died in the chaos that ensued, and Duke Huan was left unburied
for so long that maggots came crawling out beneath the door of his coffin chamber. What

*We
have seen in prior readings all of the events referred to here. The first two were touched on in the Mohist
readings. The disastrous ministers trusted by Duke Huan of Qi are those Guan Zhong warned against on his
deathbed. Zikuai was the name of the king of Yan who ceded his throne to Zizhi in the incident of 316 which
led to the invasion of Yan by Qi and the disillusionment of Mencius.
 16

were the causes? These are examples of calamity that comes when a ruler reveals his true
feelings to his ministers.
Ministers do not necessarily feel true love for their ruler; they serve him only in the
hope of substantial gain. Now if the ruler of men does not hide his feelings and conceal his
motives, but instead gives his ministers a means encroach upon his authority, then they will
have no difficulty in doing what Zizhi and Tian Chang did. Hence it is said: Do away with
likes, do away with hates, and the ministers will reveal their unadorned characters. And when
the ministers reveal their unadorned characters, the great ruler’s vision will be unobstructed.
 17

Wielding Power

The following chapter exhibits many of the Daoist characteristics that are sometimes identified
as Han Feizi’s particular contribution to Legalism (though the Han Feizi is a large and varied
text, and which parts may have been by Han Feizi himself is a question not yet well answered).
The entire chapter is written in a condensed language that frequently lapses into rhymed
passages, reminiscent of the Dao de jing.

The wuwei ruler

There is a fixed order that governs the action of Tian; there is a fixed order that governs
man as well. Fragrant aromas and delicate flavors, strong wine and fat meat delight the mouth
but sicken the body. Sleek skin and pearly teeth satisfy desire but dissipate the essence.
Therefore discard all excess; only then can your keep your body unharmed.
Power should not be displayed; be plain, like undyed cloth, and actionless (wuwei).
Government affairs reach to the four quarters, but the pivot lies at the center. The sage grasps
the pivot and the four quarters come to serve him. Await them in emptiness and they will
spontaneously take up their tasks. Once all within the four seas are within your store, follows
the Dao of yin to manifest yang. When subordinates to your left and right are in their places,
open the gate of court and all will be settled. Change nothing, alter nothing, but unceasingly
act by the “two handles”; this is called walking the path of principle.
Things have their proper places, talents their proper uses. When all are properly settled,
then high office or low, all will be free from action. Let the cock cry out the dawn, let the cat
catch rats – when each exercises his ability there is nothing the ruler needs to do. If the ruler
excels in any way, affairs lose their proper fit. If he prides himself on love of talent, he invites
his ministers’ deceit. If he shows mercy and care of others’ lives, his ministers will impose
upon his kind nature. Once superior and inferior exchange their roles, the state will surely
never be ordered.
Use the Dao of One and let names be its beginning. When names are rectified things
stay in place; when names are twisted, things shift about. * Hence the sage holds to the One in
stillness; he lets words spontaneously fit with their proper sense and affairs become settled on
their own. He does not display his colors and so his ministers are plain like undyed cloth. He
assigns them tasks according to their ability and lets affairs complete themselves; he bestows

*Note
how the text reinvents the quietist Dao of the Daoists by placing words at its core and linking it to the
Confucian concept of the rectification of names.
 18

rewards according to the results and lets promotions follow spontaneously. He establishes the
standard, abides by it, and lets all things settle themselves.
A ruler makes his appointments on the basis of names, and where the name is not clear,
he investigates achievement. When achievement and name tally, he dispenses the reward or
punishment deserved. When these are utterly predictable, subordinates will dedicate
themselves entire.
Attend diligently to affairs and await the decree of Tian; do not lose held of the pivot
and thus become a sage. The Dao of the sage discards wisdom and wit, for if you do not, you
will find it hard to remain constant. When the people use wisdom and wit, they fall into great
danger; when the ruler uses them, his state faces the peril of destruction. Follow Tian’s Dao,
return to the principle behind forms; match word to deed, and every end will become a renewal.
Be empty, following behind in tranquility; never follow personal inclinations. All of the worries
of the ruler stem from acting like others. Employ others and never be like them, and then the
people will follow you as one.
The Dao is vast and without form; its power (de) creates order and extends everywhere.
It extends to all living beings, and they partake of it in their measure. Though all things flourish
through it, it does not come to rest in any of them. The Dao pervades all affairs here below,
destinies being set by a constant standard, life and death governed by proper season. Compare
names, differentiate events, and you will comprehend their underlying unity.
Thus it is said: The Dao does not identify itself with any of the things of the world; its
power does not identify with either yin or yang – no more than a scale identifies itself with
heaviness or lightness, a measuring string with bumps and hollows, tuning pipes with
dampness or dryness, or a ruler with his ministers. All these six are products of the Dao, but
the Dao itself never takes a double; therefore it is called the One. For this reason the
enlightened ruler prizes solitariness, which is the figure of the Dao. Ruler and ministers do not
follow the same Dao. Ministers’ requests are like words of prayer: the ruler holds fast to the
words, and the ministers present him with results. When words and results match, superior
and inferior achieve harmony.
The Dao of holding court: take the statements that come forth and compare them with
reports that come back. Examine names carefully in order to set ranks, clarify duties in order
to distinguish worth.
This is the Dao of listening to the words of others: be silent as though in a drunken
stupor. Lips! teeth! Do not be the first to move! Lips! teeth! Be ever more numb! Let others
explain and detail – I will gain knowledge thereby.
 19

Though assertions and denials swirl about him, the ruler does not argue. Empty and
still, inactive (wuwei), such is the true character of the Dao. Study, compare, line things up to
match, examine thus the forms of deeds done. Compare with matching affairs, aligning them
to join with emptiness. Where the root and base are firmly anchored, there will be no error of
movement or stillness. Whether moving or still, all is corrected though wuwei.
If you show pleasure in some, your troubles will grow; if you show hatred of others,
resentment will rise. Therefore discard both pleasure and hatred and with an empty mind
become an abode of the Dao.
When the ruler does not work side by side with his people, the people treasure him.
He does not discuss affairs with them, but leaves them to act by themselves. He bars shut his
inner door and from his room looks out into the court; rules and measures all provided, all go
straight to their places. Those who merit reward are rewarded; those who deserve punishment
are punished. Reward and punishment follow the deed; each man brings them upon himself.
When pleasant or hateful consequences follow with inevitability, who dares fail to match word
and deed? When compass and rule have marked out one corner, the other three are evident
of themselves.
If the ruler does not appear spirit-like (shen), his subordinates will find leverage points.
If his management of affairs is not impartial, they will track his preferences. Be like heaven,
be like earth, all coils will untangle. Be like heaven, be like earth, who will be intimate, who
estranged? He who can be an image of heaven and earth may be called a sage.

Controlling ministers

If you wish to govern your inner palace, have no intimates among your officers. If you
wish to govern your realm, appoint one man to each office. Let none do as he pleases, and
none will exceed his office or control another. Take warning when there are many men
gathered at the gates of high ministers. The utmost of governance is to allow no subordinates
means to seek favor. Make certain that word and deed match, and the people will guard their
offices. To discard this and seek elsewhere is profound delusion. Wily men will ever increase,
and treachery will crowd by your side. Hence it is said: Never enrich a man so he can become
your creditor; never ennoble a man so he can become your oppressor; never put all your trust
in a single man and thereby lose your state.
When the shin grows stouter than the thigh, it is hard to run; when the ruler loses his
spirit-like mien, tigers prowl behind him. If the ruler remains unaware, the tigers will run in
 20

packs like dogs. If the ruler does not soon halt, like dogs they will grow in number. When
tigers form a band they will assassinate their own mothers. Now, a ruler who has no ministers
– how could he keep possession of a state? The ruler must apply the laws, then the greatest
tigers turn timid. If the ruler applies punishments, the greatest tigers will grow docile. If laws
and punishments are unfailingly applied, then tigers will be transformed into men again and
revert to their true form.
If you wish to govern the state, you must make certain to destroy factions; if you do
not destroy factions, they will grow ever more numerous. If you wish to govern the land, you
must make certain that your rewards pass into the right hands; if you do not do so, then unruly
men will seek gain. If you grant what they seek, you will be lending a battle-ax to your enemies;
you must not lend it, for it will only be used to attack you.
The Yellow Emperor had a saying, “Superior and inferior fight a hundred battles a day.”
The subordinates hide their private desires and see what they can get from the ruler; the ruler
grasps his standards and measures to constrain his subordinates. Thus to set standards and
measures is the ruler’s treasure; to form factions is the ministers’ treasure. The only reason the
ministers do not assassinate their ruler is that their cliques are not strong enough. Hence, if
the ruler loses an inch, his subordinates gain a yard.
The ruler who knows how to govern his state does not let his cities grow too large; the
ruler who understands the Dao does not enrich powerful families or ennoble his ministers.
Were he to enrich and ennoble them, they would oppose and displace him. Guard against
danger, fear peril, make haste to designate an heir, and misfortune will have no means to arise.
In searching the palace to expel traitors within, hold fast to your standards and measurements.
Pare away those who have too much, enrich those who have too little, and let both be
according to measure, so they will not form cliques to deceive their ruler. Pare the great as
moon wanes, enrich the meager as the frost thaws. Simplify the laws and be cautious in
executions, but carry out punishments to the full. Never loosen your bow or you will find two
cocks in a single roost; when two cocks share a single roost, they fight in a frenzy of cries.
While the wildcat and wolf roam within the fold the sheep will never increase. When one
house has two senior elders, its affairs will never prosper. When husband and wife both order
the family, the children cannot know whom to obey.
A ruler of men must often prune his trees and not let the branches grow too long, for
if they do they will block the gate of court. If the gates of private men are crowded with visitors
the ruler’s courts will stand empty, and he will be shut in and encircled. He must often prune
his trees and not let them become obstacles, for if they do, they will encroach upon his place.
 21

He must often prune his trees and not let the branches grow larger than the trunk for, if they
do, they will not be able to stand before a spring wind; when they cannot, the braches have
injured the heart of the tree. When cadet branches of the ruler’s lineage become too numerous
the royal family will face anxiety and grief. The Dao to preventing this is often to prune your
trees and not let the branches grow luxurious. If the trees are often pruned, cliques and factions
will be dispersed. If you dig up the roots, the tree is no longer vital (shen). Fill up the pools,
and do not let water collect in them. Search out the hearts of others, seize their power. The
ruler who does so is like lightning, like thunder.
 22

PART 2: HUANG-LAO THOUGHT

The most influential school of thought in the early second century BCE, just after the close
of the Warring States period and the brief era of the Legalist empire of the Qin, was an known
as “Huang-Lao.” Although the term is used repeatedly in Han Dynasty texts, never is the
meaning of the term systematically explained, and for many centuries scholars puzzled over
its meaning. The mystery of Huang-Lao was only enhanced by the fact that it was for several
generations the guiding ideology of the Han state, prior to the adoption of Confucian ideology
by the state during the time of Dong Zhongshu.
From early times it has been known that the word “Huang” in Huang-Lao referred to
Huangdi, that is, the Yellow Emperor, a legendary culture hero whose mythical status had
risen in eastern China during the late Warring States era, after the rulers of the state of Qi
(patrons of the Jixia Academy) announced that they were in fact direct descendants of Huangdi,
making him part of the state religious cult. Since the “Lao” of Huang-Lao designates Laozi,
interpreters reasoned that Huang-Lao was probably a type of Daoism, perhaps one associated
with Qi – but no one was sure.
In 1973, archaeologists working near the city of Changsha in southern China uncovered
a tomb that held the bones and the goods of the ruler of one of the early Han kingdoms that
had been located in that area. The date of the tomb has been determined to be in the 180s
BCE. Among the grave goods were found a set of silk scrolls and bamboo slips with texts
written on them. The texts included two different copies of the Dao de jing; the other texts were
previously unknown. All the texts were in legible condition, but the characters were not always
of standard form, and over the years, the materials had rotted in places, leaving gaps large and
small.
One of the previously unknown texts, which was actually a collection of four smaller
texts appended to a Dao de jing manuscript, immediately attracted a great deal of attention
because it appeared to be a collection of Huang-Lao texts. Ideas resonant of Laozi Daoism
were pervasive, and one of the four texts was an account of Huangdi. Because a first century
CE bibliography lists a long lost Huang-Lao book called The Four Classics of the Yellow Emperor,
this new four-section text was given that title on the supposition that the lost text had now
been recovered. Scholars disagree about whether this new text is, in fact, the same one listed
in the ancient bibliography, but there is consensus that it is unquestionably a true Huang-Lao
text, and interpreters have attempted to reconstruct the ideology of Huang-Lao on this basis.
 23

As any quick survey of the four texts will indicate, these documents are deeply syncretic,
that is to say they draw together selected ideas from many different schools and attempt to
present them in a harmonious arrangement. Among these schools, Laozi-style Daoism and
Legalism are clearly foremost. The influence of Confucianism and of certain militarist schools
of thought can also be detected – even some traces of Mohism – but their contributions are
generally scattered and do not shape the overall structure of ideas to the extent of Daoism and
Legalism.
Because the manuscripts are conspicuously lacking in the five-element theories that
were so characteristic of early Han thought, and occasionally seem to refer to the present time
as one of political fragmentation, the date of their original composition has been generally
accepted as pre-Han. Most likely, they are mid-third century texts. This indicates that the
Huang-Lao School was actually a Classical period phenomenon. This is not surprising. The
earliest surviving commentary on the Dao de jing actually appears as a pair of chapters in the
Legalist text Han Feizi, and as we have seen earlier, Laozi-style Daoism pervades other chapters,
such as “Wielding Power.”
In this section, we will translate a short selection of passages from each of the four
Huang-Lao texts that comprise the so-called Four Classics of the Yellow Emperor. As mentioned
above, the manuscripts are difficult to read. Chinese editors have transcribed the written
characters into printed forms and done much work to explain the possible meanings of
unusual or unexpected characters, but their readings are often difficult to accept. Moreover
there remain many gaps in the texts – they always seem to obliterate the key word in a passage!
In the translations which follow, each missing character is represented by the sign / .
Where characters are missing, the translation may be rough or grammatically incomplete, and
you may find awkward or puzzling passages, indicating that the text’s meaning is unclear (at
least to me – unlike all our classical texts, this one comes without traditional commentary
explanations). The way that the phrases are arranged typographically in verse style is governed
solely by considerations about how this difficult text may be rendered more understandable;
the texts are not generally in poetic form. In addition to a few footnotes explaining certain
terms used in the text, I have also added marginal notes to draw your attention to some of the
“syncretic” features of the text – passages that suggest that its ideas represent a melding of the
ideas of many different schools.
 24

“The Four Classics of the Yellow Emperor”

(selections)

Text I: The Regular Law*

This first text is the longest of the four “classics.” It is divided into nine
named sections. Only the initial parts of section one are translated here.

The Dao gives birth to laws. The Daoist/Legalist linkage is

Laws are the measuring-line of gain and loss especially clear at the outset.
and what illuminates straight and crooked.
Who holds to the Dao gives birth to laws
and dares not contravene them;
once laws are set up, he dares not discard them.
After one can stretch plumb spontaneously,
one can know the world and not be of two minds.

Void without form,

its axis all dark;
it is what the world of things is born from.
In their birth-nature there is that which harms,
called desire,
called not knowing what is enough.
By birth-nature they must move:
In movement there is that which harms, “Timeliness,” or the appropriate-
called untimeliness, ness of action in context was an
called timely but / . interest bridging many schools.
In movement are affairs:
In affairs there is that which harms,
called opposition,
called not balancing,
not knowing the practicable.
Affairs must have words: Note the transition to the art of
In words there is that which harms, rulership here.
called unfaithfulness,

*
The words “regular” or “regularities” translates a word that in other contexts means “classic.” Thus this title
could also be “The Laws of the Classics.”
 25

called not knowing to be in awe of others,

called revealing one’s baseness,
called vain boasting,
taking insufficiency for surplus.
Thus alike coming forth from the dark,
some dying thereby,
some living thereby,
some defeated thereby,
some completed thereby.

Fortune and calamity share one Dao,

none knows whence it is born.
The Dao of knowing is merely voidness with nothing.
Voidness with nothing, the smallest thing complete within it
must have form and name. *
When form and name are set up The issues of the Dao &
then the distinction of black and white is complete. the “rectification of
Hence he who holds to the Dao, as he observes the world, names” are linked here.
has nothing to which he holds,
has no place at which he dwells,
has no action,
has no partiality.
Hence, when there are affairs in the world
none do not spontaneously exhibit form, name, sound, and title.
Form and name being already set up, sound and title being already established,
then one cannot cover up one’s tracks, or obscure the standard.

*
Form and name are the two components that the Legalist version of the “rectification of names” theory
requires to be matched.
 26

Text II: The Sixteen Regularities

The Sixteen Regularities is a text with fifteen sections (too late to add one
now!) that includes a great deal of material concerning the Yellow
Emperor (Huangdi). Of all of the texts, this is the hardest to understand.
One of the sections is translated below.

Huangdi asked of Yan Ran saying:

“I wish to implement the Five Governances:
wherein should I stop, wherein start?”
Yan Ran responded:
“The beginning lies in the person: This doctrine linking “sageliness
when within there proper standards of measure, within” to “kingliness without”
it will afterwards reach others without. was shared by Confucianism and
Inner and outer intertwining, Daoism, but not Legalism.
one will be correct in the completion of affairs.”

Huangdi said: “I am both correct and tranquil,

yet my state is becoming more unsettled:
what shall I do?”
Yan Ran responded: “When you, the ruler, are substantial within
the outer will be according to norm;
/ / unsettled.
In your left hand hold the compass;
in your right hand hold the square:
what worries of the world will you have?
Male and female finally together –
how would this disturb the state?
When the Five Governances are already employed
use them to supervise the Five Lights.
Hold the compass to left and right to await opposing armies.”

Huangdi said: “I do not myself yet know myself: what shall I do?”
Yan Ran responded: “If you do not yet know yourself, We see traces of the
then deeply conceal yourself in the abyss to seek out eremitic values that
internal punishment; lay behind pre-Qin
once internal punishment has been gained, Daoist texts.
you will / know to bend your person.”
Huangdi said: “I desire to bend my person; how do I bend my person?”
Yan Ran responded: “Those whose Daos are the same have the same affairs;
 27

those with different Daos have different affairs.

Now the time of the world being in great strife is arrived:
can you take care not to engage in strife?”
Huangdi said: “How does one not engage in strife?”
Yan Ran responded: “Anger is a matter of the blood qi; Here we see influence
strife is the outer skin and fat; of pre-Qin “qi
if anger is not emitted, it collects and forms a tumor; philosophies” and
later, if one must remove all four, hygiene cults.
how can one’s brittle bones engage in strife?”

Thereupon, Huangdi bade goodbye to his state grandees and climbed

to the mountain of Broad Gazing
and reclined for three years to seek himself.
Shan Cai and Yan Ran then climbed up to alert Huangdi, saying:
“Good enough! Those who engage in strife are inauspicious, but those
who do not engage in strife also complete no accomplishments –
how could this not be good enough?”
Thereupon, Huangdi brought out his great axe,
bestirred his armed soldiers,
raised himself the drum and baton,
went to meet Chi You, and captured him.
The Emperor authored a covenant, which said:
“He who reverses righteousness and acts contrary to the times,
shall be punished as Chi You;
reversing right and turning one’s back on the exalted, These words are fully
the law for him shall be to perish and die exhausted.” Confucian.
 28

Text III: Quotations

This text consists of a string of aphoristic passages of widely

varying lengths, fifty-six in all. Two are translated here

The Dao has no beginning, but has a responding:

what has not yet come, be without it;
what has already come, be like it.
When a thing is about to come, its form precedes it:
establish it with its form;
name it with its name.
What words describe it?

All ordering must take yin and yang / great righteousness:

Heaven is yang, earth is yin; spring is yang, autumn is yin;
summer is yang, winter is yin; day is yang, night is yin;
great states are yang, small states are yin; heavy states are
yang, light states are yin;
to have affairs is yang, to have no affairs is yin; those
who expand are yang, those who bend are yin;
the ruler is yang, the minister is yin; superiors are yang,
inferiors are yin;
male is yang, female is yin; the father is yang, the son is yin;
the elder brother is yang, the younger brother is yin;
elder is yang, younger is yin;
high status is yang, low status is yin; attaining [position] is
yang, having no means [to position] is yin;
taking a wife and giving birth to a child is yang, having a
family death is yin;
those who regulate others are yang, those who are regulated by
others are yin;
the guest is yang, the host is yin; military service is yang,
corvée labor is yin;
speech is yang, silence is yin; bestowing is yang, receiving is yin.
All yang things emulate Heaven;
Heaven values the norm; straying from the norm is called / /
/ / / sacrifice thereupon reverses.
All yin things emulate the earth:
the gift-power of earth is to be easy and slow, normed and tranquil;
the code of pliancy is first settled,
it approves of bestowing and does not contend:
these are the measures of earth and the code of the female.
 29

Text IV: The Source of the Dao

This final text is a short, coherent essay. Its opening lines are translated here.

At the start of what is eternally prior,

is the penetrating identity and the great void;
when void and identity are one,
eternally they remain one and cease.
Moist and indistinct, as yet without light or darkness;
spirit-like in subtlety, filling up in circuit,
essence and tranquility not bright.
Originally not yet having use,
none in the world of things used it;
originally without form,
joining with the nameless.
Heaven could not cover it,
earth could not carry it;
small to create the small,
large to create the large;
filling all within the Four Seas,
and embracing all without as well;
as yin not decaying,
as yang not burning;
altogether unchanging,
it was able to reach things that wriggle and crawl.
Birds gained it and flew,
fish gained it and swam;
beasts gained it and ran;
the world of things gained it and were born;
the hundred affairs gained it and were complete.
Men all gained it,
none knew its name;
men all used it,
none saw its form.
Its title is the One;
its dwelling is the void;
non-action is its plainness;
harmony is its operation.