China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State

Qi Chen

Law, Social Justice & Global Development

China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies:

The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

ARTICLE INFO
Issue: 2016(1): Special Issue 'Cultural Economies and Cultural Activism', ed. Vickery, J. P.
This article was published on: 1st May, 2016.
Keywords: soft power; China; national development; Chinese Culture Going Abroad; public diplomacy;
Chinese Dream

ABSTRACT
‘Soft power’ has become a popular concept in Chinese political discourse, frequently
appearing in government documents, academic discussions and the mainstream media. This
article defines soft power as a form of state activism through culture – and examines the
ongoing discourses at home and abroad on China’s soft power in transition, exploring the
strengths, weaknesses, and potential of China exerting soft power in the West. The paper
starts with an exploration of China’s embrace of the concept soft power as a strategic
compass for its efforts to enhance comprehensive national capabilities. It then investigates
the obstacles that China hitherto has encountered when building and implementing soft
power. Through reviewing China’s soft power assets and liabilities, the paper suggests that
Chinese soft power strategies should be performed on the basis of humanitarian values,
pacifistic policies, multilateral cooperation, and multiculturalism. In addition, the
implementation of China’s soft power strategies in the West will be more effective if non-
governmental bodies can be allowed more institutional space.

AUTHOR
Dr Qi Chen is Associate Professor in the Department of English and the Centre for British
Studies, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai: chqi@[Link]
Copyright: Journal of Law, Social Justice & Global Development, University of Warwick,
UK: [Link]

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

The term "Chinese Dream" [中国梦] was put concept, generating an architecture of terms for
forward by President Xi Jinping in November 2012. It strategic deployment within established international
has been heavily popularised in political circles and relations or foreign policy frameworks. Through both
the mass media since that time, particularly on and qualitative and quantitative analyses, this paper
since Xi's accession to Prime Minister in March 2013. articulates the term's adaptation in a Chinese
The official interpretation of the Chinese Dream (as political context, ascertaining the effectiveness of
routinely articulated by government propaganda) is China’s soft power strategies in the West – on both
oriented towards a large-scale planning initiative for the sender’s and the receiver’s side. This paper then
national capacity building and aiming for prosperity assesses the factors contributing to China’s soft
and "rejuvenation".1 Xi subsequently delivered a power resources, and looks at potential ways of
significant speech in the headquarters of UNESCO in improving China’s soft power against the background
Paris on 27 March 2014, asserting that "the of its current, dominant, national policy framework
realisation of Chinese dream is the development of – the Chinese Dream.
material civilisation and spiritual civilisation", and
"with the peoples of the world together", China China’s embrace of ‘soft power’
wants to "create a colourful civilisation for mankind
The concept ‘soft power’ has found a receptive
and provide the correct spiritual guidance and strong
audience in China, entering Chinese academic and
motivation".2 Chinese Vice-Premier Liu Yandong, (in
political debate as much as the speeches and
charge of culture and education), elaborated on the
documents of China’s highest leaders. The
Chinese Dream in her speech at the third annual
enthusiasm for the ‘soft power’ concept is now firmly
conference of the Tai-Hu World Forum (a Chinese
embedded in Chinese political, social and cultural
NGO, aiming to promote cross-cultural
spheres. The term appeared for the first time on an
communication). She addressed three points: first,
official occasion in the government report at the 17th
China is set to build the strategic means to
CPC Congress (The National Congress of the
strengthen its culture, and for culture to play a major
Communist Party) in October 2007. The then-
role in pursuit of the Chinese Dream; second, China
president Hu Jintao announced clearly that "China
will give attention to cultural development to boost
must enhance its cultural soft power". Some five
its soft power; third, China will expand people-to-
years later, in his report to the 18th CPC Congress,
people exchanges with other countries, so as to open
(one of the most authoritative documents of China’s
up larger room for "win-win" cooperation in the
current government), Hu elaborated on soft power
world.3
and reclaimed its significance:
Liu used the term ‘soft power’, the now globally-
To achieve the great renewal of the Chinese
famous term first forged by Harvard professor Joseph
nation, we must create a new surge in promoting
Nye, who coined the term in relation to a country's
socialist culture and bring about its great
power of attraction and persuasion (as distinct from
development and enrichment, increase China’s
the "hard" power of force or coercion).4 Since its
cultural soft power, and enable culture to guide social
introduction, the term has proven to be a flexible
trends, educate the people, serve society, and boost
development. 5
1 Xi said, "We must make persistent efforts, press ahead with indomitable
will, continue to push forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese
Hu’s successor, President Xi Jinping embraced the
characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great concept soft power as part of his ambitious Chinese
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." China Daily (accessed 17 March, Dream. On 30 Dec 2013, Xi presided over a
2013) [Link]
03/17/content_16314303.htm conference on the topic of how to enhance China’s
2 The full Paris speech is available from: national cultural soft power within current policy
[Link] frameworks. Xi stressed that improving China’s
(accessed 2 April, 2014)
3 Liu Yandong's speech available from the Xinhua News Agency: cultural soft power matters to the very realisation of
[Link]
(accessed 18 June, 2014)
4 See Joseph Nye's original development of the concept in his work Bound 5 Full text of Hu Jintao's report at the 18th Party Congress available from:

to Lead (1990), which disputed the view that the United States was in [Link]
decline, then further elaborated in The Paradox of American Power 11/17/c_131981259.htm
(2002), then properly defined in Soft Power: the Means to Success in (accessed 18 November, 2012).
World Politics (2004).

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

the Chinese Dream,6 claiming that "we should strive power in improve China’s global standing; how to
to spread the values of contemporary China, namely develop a peaceful national image and dispel
the values of socialism with Chinese characteristics, perceptions of a ‘China Threat’ – otherwise
and strive to increase China’s international discourse tempering foreign suspicions of China’s growing
power."7 strength; how to enhance China’s percentage in the
Notwithstanding the confluence of the terms global market of cultural and creative industries; how
'communism', 'socialism' and Chinese society', the to maintain the balance between the exploitation
term ‘soft power’ has proliferated in Chinese official and protection of cultural resources; how to harness
discourse on both domestic and international issues the role and the power of the media in nation
in very specific ways. Especially after the humiliation branding; how to influence the opinions of an
of the torch relay for 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, audience through the transmission of ideas and
where because of protests China was forced to cut values; and how to design 'public diplomacy' to serve
short the relay (and so reflect on its international the interest of politics.
image and political reputation). In the light of such Having explored and expanded the concept,
global media exposure, the Chinese leadership has evaluated its importance and implications, Chinese
recognised soft power as an important indicator of a theorists have not reached a visible consensus on
state’s international status, contending that China’s how to formulate soft power theoretically in a
soft power must be strengthened so to match the Chinese context. Notwithstanding specific
nation’s economic power and political status on the deployments of the term by China's leaders, for
world stage. The government decided to make its scholars there seems to be no definitive distinction
own voice heard, investing in the cultivation of between soft power strategies and 'public diplomacy'
China’s own global media brand. or 'cultural diplomacy', for instance. The opaqueness
Chinese scholarly discussions about soft power in Chinese theoretical interpretations of soft power is
have mushroomed since 2008. Chinese scholars have due, in part, to the complex and non-quantifiable
gone to great lengths to explore the uses of soft nature of cultural, affective, aesthetic, visual and
power and its implications, and numerous papers image-based forms of communication, as well as
have been published in China on the topic. Table 1. events, the coordination of international relations
records the number of published Chinese academic through events, the particular and relational qualities
papers on soft power from 2004 to 2013 (Source: of relations between nation states, and the nebulous
[Link]). It demonstrates that after 2008, the nature of one's global 'image', perceptions, cultural
number of Chinese papers on soft power virtually identity, reputation, 'standing', influence, credibility,
doubled. confidence, and the reception of expressions of one's
national virtues – the armory of soft power strategy,
Year 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 combined with the vagueness in Nye’s original
Papers 2020 2365 2433 2569 2079 conceptualisation of soft power, make for a difficult
Year 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 subject of theorisation. Nye (2004) did not specify
Papers 2068 1041 500 165 75 how to translate soft power into actual political
influence or to produce specific desired specific
Table 1: Research papers published on the subject of political outcomes within international relations; nor
Soft Power in China. did he clarify whether the concept tailored for US
foreign policy and orientated within US experience,
Chinese scholars have been actively exploring the would be effectively applied to the cases of other
concept’s possibilities as much as its political or countries (even in the West, let alone the East).
practical uses. The main academic issues that have Although Nye updated a refined version of his
emerged in China include: the appropriation of soft concept through prescribing the use of ‘smart power’
in his The Future of Power (2011); the operability,
6 While Xi has not offered a single definition of the Chinese Dream, it is measurability and sphere of application of soft power
generally accepted that it refers to a cultural renaissance of the Chinese remained unspecified. In fact, Western academia has
nation as a means of rapid and maximum social, economic and military
growth – all within the framework of Chinese socialism.
not reached a definitive clarification of the term
7[Link] either. For example, Hayden (2012) suggests that
(accessed 31 December, 2013).

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

"soft power encompasses three broad categories: foreign and a domestic policy tool, forming a
influence, the force of an actor’s argument, the fundamental difference with Nye's classical iterations
'attractiveness' of an actor’s culture and institutions" of the term and other subsequent scholars’ definition
(p.5). Meanwhile, when Kurlantzick (2007) analysed of soft power as a singular strand foreign policy
how China uses soft power as its "charm offensive" to instrument.
project a benign national image in the world, he Another feature worth mentioning is that some
controversially includes trade and overseas scholars – including Western sinologists – believe
investment in the definition of soft power.8 that the concept of soft power resonates with
Nevertheless, conceptual ambiguity per se does Chinese intellectual traditions. For example, Sheng
not prevent China appropriating the idea as a Ding (2008) argues that "such ideas [soft power] have
convenient tool of political science to understand been embedded in ancient Chinese philosophies and
China’s position in the world. Instead, the complexity culture throughout its history" (p.25). According to
inherent in the term semantically actually allows Ding, Chinese strategists, Taoist thought, and
Chinese political discourse the opportunity for an Confucian thinkers, all recognized that power can be
easier assimilation – for it can serve as an umbrella derived through morality and benevolence, good
term accommodating various interpretations and governance, and the winning of hearts and minds
uses. The proliferation of writings on soft power (Ding, 2008; Ding, 2010). The idea of soft power is
suggest that the mainstream Chinese politicians and therefore not something in itself new to the Chinese,
scholars simply accept soft power as a general and but internal to the historic synthesis of Confucianism
infinitely variably political instrument, which has the and Taoism and the social means by which they
potential to serve China’s national and international formed a unique Chinese cultural character. For more
interests, considering China’s political and economic than two millennia, the ideal image of Chinese
successes on the international stage often spark traditional culture the world over can be attributed
applause as well as fears. rather to soft-power than hard-power. Abundant
The most significant feature of discussions on soft evidence of comparable understandings to the idea
power in Chinese academia is that its usage is not of soft power within ancient Chinese thought can be
limited to international image-building or found in Alastair Johnson’s (1995) important
international cultural communication for political discussion on how culture in China was always
effect: It is also applied used within domestic cultural 'strategic'.
affairs to strengthen national and collective
consciousness. In other words, soft power is an The reception of China’s soft power in the West
instrument for deepening debates about culture at
The idea of soft power has evidently (and
home. The definition of soft power has been
curiously) stimulated the imagination of Chinese
broadened in Chinese discourse and thus is often
politicians as much as scholars, perhaps that during
interchangeable with the term ‘national cultural soft
the current era of its history China has reason to be
power’, implying of certain domestic mobilisation
acutely sensitive to foreign perceptions of its national
capability.9 China’s interpretation of soft power
image and policies abroad. It can be observed that
sounds more like Morgenthau's 2005 identification of
the Chinese government has made great efforts to
the nine elements of national power, among which
promote its soft power in the West, embarking on
national character, national morale, diplomacy, and
numerous soft power initiatives. These efforts
the quality of government, form the intangible source
include holding large-scale events of cultural
of the 'power' itself. The Chinese have similarly
exchanges (art, literature, music, film, historical relic,
conceptualised soft power generically, as both a
performances, and so on), investing a large amount
of financial resources in various schemes to cultivate
8 Kurlantzick’s book on soft power recognises only one player (state elites) a better national image, enhancing media outreach
in the Chinese soft power universe, consequently ignoring the soft power aimed at the Western public, and establishing
activities of non-state actors, thus failing to recognize and acknowledge
the cultural complexities and diversity of China.
Confucius Institutes throughout Europe and North
9 ‘National cultural soft power’ has a similar but wider spectrum: it America. The Chinese government has signed formal
ascertains resources of culture, morality, political values, institutions, agreements with Western countries that help
foreign policies, patriotism, and even then qualities of citizens.
integrate Chinese language teaching into their public

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

schools’ curricula. The China Scholarship Council to China will become a critical threat to vital US
oversees a wide range of educational activities interests in the next ten years; two-thirds believe
worldwide, awarding generous scholarships to China practices unfair trade; a majority is opposed to
Western students for study in China, also sponsoring having a free trade agreement with China; and a
educational exchange programmes. Furthermore, majority prefers to hedge against a possible future
"the diplomats from China are more amiable and threat from China by building up strong relations with
skilled at engaging local communities […] more skilled Asian-Pacific allies, even if this might diminish
than earlier in navigating foreign media outlets" relations with China.10 The results demonstrated the
(Lampton, 2008: 128). China has placed special Americans’ widespread negative impressions of, and
emphasis on the soft-power aspects of its attitudes towards, the People's Republic (in the
engagement with the West, seeking to be accepted framework of geopolitics, though it is difficult not to
as a nonthreatening, constructive, and reliable consider this as reflective of attitudes more broadly).
power, and a responsible stakeholder in the Similarly, according to a YouGov poll (28-29 April,
international system. As Hayden (2012) argues, 2013) with a sample size of 1632 British adults, the
"China’s efforts to cultivate soft power reflects a participants were asked to choose a number (from 1
strategic awareness that soft power resources and to 7 on the scale, where ‘1’ means "the political
mechanisms are crucial to the larger effort of system in China is not at all free" and ‘7’ means that
managing China’s rise, addressing challenges, and "the political system in China is completely free").
leveraging a highly mediated and increasingly 72% of those polled awarded China a low freedom
transparent environment for international politics" score (1-3), while only 6% thought "China has a free
(p.169). political system" (those who give a high score 5-7).
Investing billions of Chinese RMB (Yuan) into soft While this may seem factually obvious to some,
power promotion in the West, China's central questions on freedom are value-laden and in China
government, however, has hitherto obtained a are understood to reflect a general positive regard. In
limited return on its investment. The public opinion this case the response was not positive. YouGov also
studies conducted by YouGov, the BBC World Service, conducted research for the YouGov-Cambridge
the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and the Pew Programme (11-12 June, 2013) with a sample of 1000
Global Attitudes Project, all suggest that China’s soft- US citizens. The samples are classified into Gender,
power achievements have not been as effective as Age, Party ID, Race and Education. Participants were
expected. Compared with its rapid economic asked to consider words and phrases tabled in boxes,
development, China’s soft power facility lags and decide which one they most associate with China
significantly behind the rate of performance of its (selecting up to four or five). Five of the top six words
newly-acquired hard power. Of course, opinion poll associated with China were negative: ‘can’t be
outcomes are influenced by sample selection, trusted’, ‘undemocratic’, ‘corrupt’, ‘lacks important
question formulation and interview timing, and the morals’, ‘bullying’. Only 2% of American participates
perceptions of China and of China’s soft power differ believe China is ‘a force for good’, 2% think China
significantly per Western country and per target respects human rights, and only 1% links China with
group. Overall, however, these polls indicate that ‘democratic’.
China’s massive investment has not been translated The BBC World Service annual global polls offer a
into more supportive views of China's current broad picture, and in this case (June, 2014) reflects a
political quest for status and legitimacy both within predictable state of affairs:11
the global economu and in the realm of international
relations. China, which is ever perceived as a
'significant other', has encountered specific
difficulties in implementing soft power strategies in
Western societies.
For example, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
released a public opinion survey ‘US Attitudes 10 Available from: [Link]
attitudes-toward-china-results-2010-chicago-council-public-opinion-
towards China’ in 2010. It shows half of American survey (accessed 28 March, 2014).
adults consulted consider that financial indebtedness 11 Available from: [Link]

[Link] (accessed 30 August, 2014).

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

Country Mainly Mainly Negative government of China cannot easily borrow Western
Positive values so as to find political legitimacy or justify itself;
Canada 28% 64% it seems that China has unconsciously sought to
USA 25% 66% challenge the West’s monopoly on such 'legitimacy'
UK 49% 46% by contesting how we interpret this. As long as the
France 26% 68% general perception in the West persists – that China
Spain 24% 59% is an autocracy respecting no human rights and
Germany 10% 76%
lacking in democracy – no Western society would
Table 4: China's Influence. wish to imitate China’s model of governance, or
indeed accept China as a trustworthy partner. It
That the majority of Western publics regarded seems that China has to contend with many negative
China’s influence as ‘mainly negative’12 is not perceptions on this front, which are all very difficult
surprising, and it is not surprising either to find that to change. These negative perceptions spring in part,
China’s soft power strategies have resonated in of course, from conflicting political ideologies,
liberal-democratic Western countries on a much different political systems, different interpretations of
lower level than the third world. Shambaugh (2013) human rights, economic competition, cultural and
depicts China’s embarrassment at promoting soft racial alienation, historical mistrust, a misreading of
power: "we witness a large and growing number of Chinese policy and political orientation in the world,
China’s cultural activities abroad – but very little a disagreement with China’s strategies, and fears of
influence on global cultural trends, minimal soft yet another unpredictable rising power on the world
power, and a mixed-to-poor international image in stage, and so on. As Michael Barr (2011) agues, the
public opinion polls" (p. 207). It is recognised that a rise of China as an alternative model to Western
country’s international reputation is shaped by its liberalism could question the very basis of traditional
government, multinational corporations, products political legitimacy (p.5). Shambaugh (2013)
and brands, and people. The effects of soft power describes the macro-context of China’s awkwardness
strategies depend heavily on the 'receivers’' so: "China is in the community of nations but is in
acceptance, which is often difficult for the 'senders' many ways not really part of the community; it is
to control. When a country is perceived as formally involved, but it is not normatively
representing moral integrity, social progress, and integrated" (p.7). Because of China being different in
economic success, it will exert appeal to other all of the above respects, it would find it hard to
nations, but if a country is associated with the avoid being seen as a potential challenge to the
impressions of ‘untrustworthy, immoral, corrupt, West’s hegemony – in making the 'rules of the
bullying, undemocratic’, the country will hardly be game' of global political legitimacy. Such resulting
able to exert soft power over others. This is alienation and such indissoluble differences, form a
particularly true if any soft power strategy is framed fundamental barrier for China’s soft power efforts in
by media and information sources over which a the West; China's strength and difference combined
government may have little influence, even on the contain the seeds of a potentially fierce strategic
level of factual accuracy. Soft power strategy can also competition between two great global forces.
be compromised by foreign dissidents, or critics, or
even celebrities whose publicised opinions (however
ill-informed) can have a major impact on a given China’s soft power assets and liabilities
public.
Western societies have by and large firmly In the context of China's current strategi concerns,
embraced the values of individualism, human rights, soft power is associated with intangible assets: with
the rule of law, justice, freedom of speech, and other foreign policies, political values, diplomatic artistry,
fundamental principles common to what is routinely international reputation, traditional culture, and the
referred to as 'liberal democracy'. However, the new creative industries. As mentioned above, it also
includes domestic factors such as citizenship
education, scientific development, social cohesion,
12 Available from:[Link] and harmonious ethnic relationship. I wish now to
of-the-united-states-and-china (accessed 28 September, 2014).
focus on reviewing China’s soft power in terms of its

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

assets and liabilities and do so in the context of protagonist of ideological arguments with other
President Xi’s Chinese Dream, and so I will attempt to countries; second, China is actively seeking an
articulate the more effective approaches to soft understanding of its political system and policies,
power that China does or could engage in by which to rather than an 'export' of such as a 'model'. China's
extend its influence in the West. political leadership does not (at least in policy terms)
In terms of its political values, the Chinese Dream expect the West to emulate the Chinese model – in
is, in its own phraseology, engaged in constructing a fact, China itself knows that Western publics are
"socialism with Chinese characteristics" reluctant to promote any part of the Chinese political
[中国特色社会主义], which demands a systematic system. Yet the slogan ‘Chinese Dream’ itself can be
application of "core socialist values" rightly perceived as a soft-power instrument, albeit
[社会主义核心价值观 ]. But, is the Chinese Dream both coined and used for defensive purpose. The
an asset to China’s soft power? There are, on the face slogan suggests an alternative, a bold proclamation of
of it, two aspects to a country’s political value system: a coherent worldview, a testimony of faith in the
one domestic – by what principles a government trajectory of the current political system, and a
rules its own people – and the other international – conviction of belief in a viable future for this system.
how this government deals with other nations and It is a banner to strengthen its standing in the world,
conducts international affairs. Domestic political defending the Chinese government against criticism
values and its corresponding political system are from the West, and at the same time it emphasises
important considerations for a state’s soft power China’s uniqueness.
capabilities – to a certain degree soft power if a Actually, some of the ‘core socialist values’ of the
representation of such. The Chinese constitution Chinese Dream (such as ‘democracy, freedom,
does provide for guarantees of economic, social, and equality, justice, the rule of law’), of course resonate
cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. But with the fundamental principles of Western liberal-
all such rights must only be exerted in accordance democratic thought. To some extent, the
with "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and predominance of Western thought (both ideological
concommitant ‘core socialist values’. According to and political terms) in China’s new political rhetoric of
Report to the 18th CPC Congress, the core socialist ‘socialist core values’ implies that China, at least
values embrace "patriotism, collectivism, and presently, has no intention of challenging the
socialism; prosperity, democracy, civility, and ideological dominance of Western liberal democracy.
harmony; freedom, equality, justice, and the rule of The Chinese Dream is subtle and sophisticated in the
law; dedication, integrity, and friendship" (Chapter way it presents difference within a fundamental
VI). These values have indeed the potential to unity. The difference is lodged in both history, culture
develop into a consistent and persuasive and of course interpretation – the Chinese
universalism. Meanwhile, the term "socialism with government's interpretation of these values does not
Chinese characteristics" emphasises China’s lead, for example, to Western-style suffrage or
uniqueness and implies a sense of exceptionalism. individualism. Yet it proposes that both China and the
It seems that there is here a paradox: for the West can together embrace the enlightenment and
core socialist values (to be promoted in the West) are the humanitarian values required for an equal
universal (for socialism itself was always political dialogue.
internationalist and exceeded the traditions or The Chinese Dream appeals to the philosophical
political systems of any one nation state), but the register of politcal values – where both sides can
'Chinese characteristics' form an emphatic focus on affirm a vision of a common humanity rather than a
Chinese particularity. How therefore can China's fixed set of interests divided by national boundaries.
socialism function as an attractive model for Western On the level of political pragmatics, both the Chinese
societies? Will China export its ‘core socialist values’ Dream’s socialist values and classical Western
as a crtical alternative to Western liberal and liberalism maintains an opposition to religious
democratic values? To answer those questions, two extremism, advocating tolerance and equality,
facts must be recognised: first, since Deng Xiaoping’s respecting and protecting women’s and children’s
‘Reform and Open-Door’ policies [ 改革开放 ] of the rights for example. China and the West equally share
late 1970s, China largely abandoned its role as a pragmatic agreements on a range of global

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

challenges, such as their responses to natural power itself. Foreign policies as soft power will stop
disasters, epidemics and terrorism. Like Western to be a dominant consideration in situations where
social contract theories, China also has its own there are real differences of diplomatic interests and
version of ‘social contract’ – the principle that geopolitics: economic competition regularly leads to
central government obtains legitimacy only through uneasiness between China and Western Europe,
fulfilling its responsibilities to its citizenry.13 It is geopolitical competition in Asia-Pacific often
therefore conceivable that on both philosophical and contributes to the clash between China and the
pragmatic registers, the Chinese Dream might find a United States. Nevertheless, Chinese foreign policies
measure of acceptance with Western publics, can still offer China soft-power resources if the
providing that China does not maintain a stance of Chinese government can enhance its proficiency in
ideological opposition to the West’s pre-eminence in global governance on the basis of pacifist multilateral
connecting the philosophical and the pragmatic when cooperation. China needs to accept international
determining the shape of the global order (such as standards, behave according to international rules,
the operation of global markets, global security, and participate in establishing international rules and
international cooperation, and so on). Through the norms. The Chinese diplomacy must convince the
permanent seats on the UN Security Council, China is world that China is a trustworthy, cooperative, and
in any case an established partner and plays a role in responsible member of the international community,
such 'shaping' in any case. capable of and willing to contribute to world peace
In foreign policy terms, the Chinese Dream and prosperity. China has expanded its contribution
inherits Chairman Mao’s "five principles of peaceful to offering global public goods. For instance, Xi’s
coexistence" [ 和平共处五项原则 ]. As a permanent ‘Chinese dream’ in foreign policies has been
member of the UN Security Council with veto power, converted into the ambitious proposals of ‘the Silk
China is conscious of international security, and Road Economic Zone’ and ‘the 21st Century Maritime
President Xi’s foreign policies can therefore be Silk Road’ [一带一路] The Asian Infrastructure
understood in terms of the application of the ‘five Investment Bank is another successful example of
principles of peaceful coexistence’ to the current using diplomatic skills and economic temptation to
world order. Originating in the 1950s, these principles shape soft power.
are: respect of national sovereignty and territorial China possesses one of the most ancient, vibrant
integrity; non-aggression; peaceful coexistence; non- and sophisticated cultural traditions. Mainstream
intervention in another country’s internal affairs; Chinese intellectuals view culture, both traditional
equality and mutual benefit. As a political principle, and modern, in a very serious sense as internal to the
China holds a long-standing opposition to the use of country's stability and development (and so, where a
force, insists non-interference in other countries’ core resource in the country’s soft power,
internal affairs, and refuses to participate in authentically representing Chinese society as
economic sanctions against certain regimes simply on grounded on an historically deep and diverse cultural
account of international consensus. China’s foreign life). Chinese culture – which can be listed simply as
policies are applauded in some developing countries, its language, traditional Chinese painting, calligraphy,
but in the West are met with suspicion, particularly in literature, philosophy, music, Peking opera, film,
relation to human rights, or humanitarian crises in online game, medicine, acupuncture, martial arts,
other countries. China is widely regarded as a cuisine, historic relics, architecture, sightseeing –
forthcoming superpower, yet within the context of a can indeed be appropriated so as to create a
sustained Western hegemony, it increases the favourable image of China abroad. As Sheng Ding
likelihood of contention and conflict. And so in its (2008) contends, "China’s cultural attractiveness has
foreign policy effort, China’s soft power liabilities will become its reliable soft power resource" (p.73). One
alert us to the limitations of the concept of soft dimension of the Chinese Dream policy framework is
to revive a sense of China's historicity. And China has
13Confucianism argues that the ruler ("the son of Heaven") must be a a long history of being an object of fascination for
capable, responsible, moral and benevolent protector of the people as Western scholars.
well as of Chinese civilisation. If the ruler fails to fulfil his duty in this,
Heaven will abandon him and replace him with other rulers who can
Western studies of Chinese classics began with the
better fulfil these responsibilities. Jesuits as early as in the sixteenth century. The

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

celebrations of the Chinese New Year around the warming.

world, spreading outside the diaspora of people of China can thus increasingly resort to the deep
Chinese origin, is a reminder of the growing virtues of its own traditions for inspiration. The
popularity and expanding international recognition of articles collected in Callahan and Barabantseva
the vibrancy of Chinese culture and traditions.14 The (2011) describe and explain how traditional Chinese
richness and diversity of Chinese culture is also concepts, particularly those stemming from
something of a surprise to Westerners educated on a Confucian thought, are rediscovered in modern
stock imagery of the 'Orient'. Since the end of the Chinese political rhetoric and foreign policies. China’s
First World War, there emerged arguments in China traditional values provide a much needed ontological
contending how traditional culture could apprehend and epistemological underpinning for the country’s
the negative consequences of modernisation, future development. As a nation retreating from
providing alternative values in addressing global Leninist communism, the Chinese government has
challenges. President Xi himself also holds great moved closer to an official embrace of Confucianism
enthusiasm for Confucianism and other Chinese and the forms of collectivism, corporate
classics.15 Furthermore, traditional values are responsibility and respect for authority contained
apolitical or ideologically neutral, thus much less within Confucian tradition. While interpretations on
threatening. 16 the difference between Confucius' teaching and
However, it is arguable that traditional Chinese historical Confucian traditions, which are plural and
culture only provides soft power potential, not soft pan-Asian, the CPC nonetheless uses Confucius as a
power itself given its complexity. It remains to be symbol to signify its ideological approach to leading
seen how traditional culture can be translated or and unifying the nation (Bell, 2008).
represented in its full character as a contemporary Such political exploitation of traditional culture
reality, and so applied through the sustained may of course generate negative impacts and
institutional practice of soft power. Joseph Y. S. Cheng misunderstanding if handled inappropriately. For
(2012) observes "the exploitation of traditional example, some Chinese cultural nationalists tend to
culture strategically to provide re-assurance to the idealise Confucianism and China’s imperial past,
international community has now been raised to the claiming that Chinese culture can restructure the
official level" (p.183). For example, such traditional world order and address its chronic failures. Such
virtues are, namely "winning respect by virtue" [ statements will diminish rather than enhance soft
以德服人 ], which actually objects to militarism and power. Traditional Chinese culture is much more
national chauvinism, advocating a resolving of complex than a few slogans or models of global order,
international conflict through equal negotiation; and there are surely always differring interpretations
"harmony without suppressing differences" [ of history. For example, M. J. Li (2009) observes that
和而不同 ] can be interpreted as a multiculturalism, "the traditional Chinese cultural emphasis on social
respecting cultural, political, religious, and ideological hierarchy generates suspicion among some
diversity while encouraging tolerance; "do not do to international observers that China seeks a Sino-
others what you do not want to be done to you" [ centric international order in East Asia" (p.8).
己所不欲勿施于人 ] articlates a biblical-like call for Furthermore, Chinese culture is still a form of "local
understanding and a respect of each other's different knowledge" and a huge effort is needed before it
interest and welfare; "harmony between nature and becomes a true ‘global knowledge’, and in this
humankind" [天人合一] can be appropriated to linguistic inhibitors are great (even within China).
confront environmental problems such as global As soft power measures nonetheless, China has
established a considerable number of Confucius
14 For example, London’s Trafalgar Square hosts one of the biggest Institutes in Western countries, providing Chinese-
Chinese Lunar New Year celebrations in Europe, involving nearly half a language classes. Naming the institutes after
million visitors each year. Confucius is significant, not least a testimony to this
15 President Xi has attended academic conferences on Confucianism,

visited the Confucian Shrine, and often makes quotations from Confucius internationally recognised ancient aspect of pre-
in his speeches. communist China. The Confucius Institute
16 For example, Confucian works and Taoist works were widely translated

into Western languages after the First World War, and Confucian scholars
programme is initiated by the Office of Chinese
(such as Gu Hong Ming) was welcomed in the West during the 1920s. Language Council International (Han ban), influenced

9
China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

by the mission and programs of Germany’s Goethe and artistic pursuit, create a vast cultural arena for
Institute, France’s Alliance Française, Spain’s the people and encourage the free flow of cultural
Cervantes Institutes, and the British Council. With a inspiration from all sources."
mission to promote the Chinese language education The report indicates that the Chinese government
and increase mutual understanding, the state- has developed coordinated, consistent, coherent and
sponsored Confucius Institutes are regarded as an comprehensive soft-power strategies of promoting
important vehicle to transport China’s soft power. modern Chinese culture. The government has
The Ministry of Education provides massive financial recognised the importance of cultural markets, the
support to cover CI expenditures worldwide, talents of its people, and modern communication
including US$150,000 in start-up funds for each CI network. To enhance competitiveness in the
and 50 percent of their operation and development international trade of cultural products, the cultural
costs. The number of European and American industries must be developed in accordance with the
students of the Chinese language has been on the logic of cultural market; to foster mutual
rise for many years and is now a widespread option. understanding and free cross-national information
However, even in its most optimistic anticipation, it flows should be guaranteed and protected; to extend
will take many decades to approach the demand for its mass communications and media outreach,
English. In addition, because the Confucius Institutes person-to-person communications should be
are state-sponsored, "political concerns have been encouraged, non-governmental actors should be
raised over the presence of a Chinese government- allowed to participate in the global circulation of
backed institution on Western university campuses" ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture.
(Starr 2009: 79). It is also noticed that individual However, in practice, the state-centred
admiration for Chinese culture and interest in hierarchical model is still shaping China’s cultural
learning the Chinese language will not causally management. State actors possess huge advantages
generate support for, or acceptance of, the Chinese and resources, but often suffer disadvantages. For
communist government’s foreign or domestic example, state actors sometimes lack flexibility, and
policies. are easily to be viewed with suspicion concerning
It is important to be equally cautious about their motives for hegemony in this area, or even their
appropriating modern culture as a soft-power engaging in espionage. The consequence is that
resource. The Chinese government has elaborated whatever China does will be associated with China’s
strategies to promote China’s cultural sector as the internal central government politics, which remains
Report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the controversial in the West. When soft power is seen as
Communist Party of China (Chapter VI): issuing from the ideological campaign of the State
"We should promote rapid development and apparatus, it will more often than not undermine
all-around flourishing of the cultural industry and rather than increase China's reputational capital.
cultural services, and ensure both social impacts and Centralised soft power operations and the direct
economic benefits, with a priority on the former. state intervention into cultural activities, can expect
"We should invigorate state-owned non-profit resistance from audiences in the West, particularly in
cultural institutions, improve corporate governance Europe, where 'culture' exceeds the sphere of the
of profit-oriented cultural entities, and create a state; for despite the generous public funding of
thriving cultural market. culture in the West, cultural actors themselves widely
"We should foster a fine environment that enables associate with 'civil society' and are resolutely
a large number of talented cultural figures, independent of the apparatus of the state. Soft
particularly eminent cultural figures and power is in danger of generating suspicion
representatives of Chinese culture, to distinguish internationally, that what the Chinese government is
themselves in artistic pursuits. export is an inauthentic official version of ‘Chinese
"We should develop a modern communication culture’ – in reality, a government-sanctioned image
network to improve our capacity for communications. of itself.
"We should deepen reform of the cultural sector, Many of the Chinese cultural events that
release and develop cultural productive forces, foster successfully reach large audiences in the West, such
a democratic atmosphere in both academic research as Chinese New Year celebration, are not in fact

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

promoted by the Government (or, of which, the civil society organisations, though in China this
government is not the most important suporter). category is not a stable one) that can shapes cross-
Many eminent translators and promoters of Chinese national relationship in a more pervasive, authentic
art, philosophy and literature, are not Chinese and more decisive context over the long term (in a
Government officials but Western sinologists. In sustainable way). Specification of the audience is
global cultural dialogue, non-state actors – such as essential to evaluating effectiveness. It has been
artists, writers, tourists, visiting scholars and criticised that China has focused on ‘high’ and
students, immigrates, business communities, relatively ignores the ‘low’. China should direct its
universities, research institutions, creative initiatives at multiple audiences, distinguishing
enterprises – routinely contribute more to the between target countries and target groups, and
promotion of Chinese culture in the West than official relocating the resources to make for a more balanced
Government channels. and diverse range of organisations involved.
The digital media or information revolution over It is therefore necessary for China to deliberate on
the last two decades has also diminished the its public diplomacy including long-term national
traditional borders of nation-states, facilitating a policy, specific strategies, and multi-level
global circulation of discourses, ideas, values and programmes. China’s public diplomacy should show
cultural practices, creating virtual communities and the world its tolerance and multi-cultures, its
global networks that exceed any one 'tradition'. On responsibilities for and contributions to the
one hand, a country’s cultural impact does not always international community, its determination to insist
match the size of its economy (see the modern on peaceful development and common prosperity.
influence of English culture), and the growth in its Public diplomacy must never seem to be nationalistic
soft power is not necessarily in direct proportion to propaganda, must not be narrowed down to
the increase in its hard power (see Denmark or government PR. And indeed, China does possess
Switzerland's international reach). On the other hand, public-diplomacy instruments: The State Council
there is a new phenomenon of power diffusion from Information Office, Foreign Publicity Office, and
nation-states to non-state actors, like NGOs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs are three major
Chinese government issues white papers explaining governmental players in the field of public diplomacy.
China’s positions and policies on such critical issues Policies are explained in white papers, on
as human rights, national defence, and educational governmental websites and during press conferences.
and cultural exchanges, to create a more favourable Celebrations such as the Beijing Olympic Games and
image, or more understanding of China in world the Shanghai World Expo 2010 were held with public
opinion. Yet so far the Chinese government’s soft- funds, and publications introducing China are
power strategies seem to have a vital flaw: there has exported with governmental subsidiaries. The
been limited emphasis on how to fulfill its policy aims Chinese government has promised to increase the
through mobilising Chinese non-state organisations government budget to finance more international
and, for example, maximise the power of students to visit China, and support foreign
international cultural and social communications, of educational institutions in launching cooperative
which the Internet is central. China needs to consider programs with Chinese universities. To target at
the intimate relation of public diplomacy to soft Western audiences, CCTV (China Central Television:
power capability. the state broadcaster) has launched international
Kurlantzick (2006) classifies soft power into ‘high’ channels in English, and broadcasts programmes in
(targeted at political elites) and ‘low’ (targeted at the almost all the major European languages. Xinhua, the
broader public) (p.1). China's soft power should, state news agency, has also launched its twenty-four-
given the range of its aims, target at both elites and hour English language channel to launch an
the broader public. It is often believed that ‘high soft international presence. Other state-owned media –
power’ is more direct than ‘low soft power’ because China Radio International and the China Daily
political elites can exert more impact on policy newspaper – participate in the promotion of China’s
making than general public can. But even if the international image also. Meanwhile, China’s public
benefits of ‘high soft power’ are more immediate, it diplomacy has acknowledged the role of Western
is the broader public and its organisations (call them media. Chinese leaders have begun to invite Western

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

correspondents to press conferences, and a new the political interests of parties and states. Culture
generation of Chinese diplomats have started to must be allowed and enabled to flourish freely
address the Western media. For example, the China’s according to its own laws. The government should
Ambassador to the UK, Mr Liu Xiaoming, received accept the position that cultural communication
interview in BBC programme Newsnight, explaining doesn’t exist solely to serve the nation’s international
China’s position on maritime disputes. The State political interests or image-building. It exists
Council Information Office commissioned Lowe and historically, independently, and socially, and not
Partners, international advertising agency, to help equivalent to mechanisms that serve solely for
produce a series of "China image films". But the making economic profits or even enhancing personal
outside world obtains information about China not friendship. More fundamentally, culture exists for the
just via Chinese official media or China’s friends in the sake of improving humankind’s understanding and
West. There are newspapers and magazines not enriching the diversity of culture – and the
state-owned or controlled bringing their own cosmopolitan cooperation and cultivation of diversity.
messages; there are independent reports, writers and Cultural exchanges for the purpose of diversification
bloggers who enrich the image of China without require diverse participants. It is artists, intellectuals,
being influenced by the Chinese government. In performance companies, artistic organisations,
order to reach to a wider audience more than the creative enterprises, ordinary citizens, and civil
diplomatic community, China needs to makes more society organisations, who decide what is Chinese
effective use of the possibilities of the internet and culture and how to market it abroad. The
mobilise its netizens. Unfortunately, China is deficient government needs therefore to find its own approach
in this area. to the British principle of 'arm’s length' when
There are political and structural obstacles which supporting and promoting culture, letting the
make it more difficult for China (more than Western creative minds and innovative non-governmental
governments) to push its soft power agenda over the bodies in and outside China use their expertise and
Internet. The Chinese government is convinced that it manage their own production. China’s soft-power
is in the national interest to control the flow of strategies would be more effective in the West if the
information between China and the outside world. Chinese government could understand how so much
And there are consequent criticisms that accuse the of culture is not simply a form of power; encouraging
State's cultural management bureaucracies of the talents of its citizens and cultural industries
inadvertently constraining China’s soft power through through a non-competitice and gradual movement
their conservative attitudes towards artistic towards greater openness and more tolerance, would
innovation and creation (Zheng, 2008). The provide a vital condition for Chinese culture to extend
governmental censorship and the controversial Great into the world around it. In other words, the Chinese
Firewall mechanism, if abused, are supposed to Dream could embrace cultural variety and cultural
supress the talents and creativeness of its citizens, diversity and benefit from the power of culture's
potentially depriving China of a significant soft-power autonomous capacity for development.
asset in the global networked cyberspace, which can
directly engage with Western publics and civil Conclusion
societies in a much wider spectrum.
Henry Kissinger, in his now well-known account on
The 18th CCP Congress report (2012) claims that
the rise of China observes that "China does not see
"the strength and international competitiveness of
itself as a rising, but a returning power.17 It does not
Chinese culture are an important indicator of China’s
view the prospect of a strong China exercising
power and prosperity and the renewal of the Chinese
influence in economic, cultural, political, and military
nation" (Chapter VI). It is understandable that China
affairs as an unnatural challenge to world order –
considers the cultivation of soft power as part of the
but rather as a return to a normal state of affairs." (p.
international political competition. But the term
546) As China has emerged as a global power, its
"cultural competitiveness" is somehow ambiguous
range of national interests is expanding, and soft
and unclear; cultural competition is not zero-sum
game, culture is not something that can be
controlled, regulated or quantified to directly serve 17 Kissinger, H (2011) On China, New York and London: Penguin.

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China’s Soft Power Policies and Strategies: The Cultural Activist State
Qi Chen

power has become an important component of the

Chinese Dream, promising a fully integrated national
revival. Both political leaders and academic elites are
nonetheless concerned about China’s image
worldwide, and devote much attention to shaping
China’s influence. Yet polling shows that China’s soft-
power efforts have so far encountered obstacles. In
this paper I have suggested that China needs to
deepen and broaden its knowledge of (and therefore
research of) the conceptualization and
operationalization of soft power both at home and in
the West. While reviewing the assets and liabilities of
China’s soft power, I have observed that China
possesses huge soft power resources – its political
weight, its pacifist foreign policies, its economic
success, and its richly diverse traditions. Yet, the most
crucial components of Chinese soft power are its
versatile people.18 All soft power efforts are,
however, diminished if China fails to extend the
capabilities of its people, and, for example, grasp
opportunities in the global information age, when
soft-power strategies are more and more overlapping
with public diplomacy, where cultural communication
has moved from straight lines and clear hierarchies to
networked forms of organisation, and where it is not
central government but civil society, institutions and
markets that decide what shape a country's output
takes. Soft power, in its most clear and direct form, is
derived from synergies between state and civil
society. Collaboration with non-governmental bodies
in public diplomacy is passivity in the face of
globalisation, but an effective way of implementing
soft power strategy. It is hoped that President Xi’s
Chinese Dream will deliberate on how to grant non-
governmental bodies and a range of cultural actors
more space so that soft power is not simply a form of
promotion or political PR, but a form of development
and expression of a growing, creative, expansive
cultural life.

Acknowledgements
This paper was supported by the Innovation Research Team of
Shanghai International Studies University.
（本文获上海外国语大学青年教师科研创新团队资助）

18 D’Hooghe (2010) observes that Westerners hold a more favourable

view of Chinese people than the nation state of China (p.14).

13