Religion, Secularism, and Democratic Culture

Mark Cladis

The Good Society, Volume 19, Number 2, 2010, pp. 22-29 (Article)

Published by Penn State University Press

DOI: 10.1353/gso.2010.0012

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Democratic Professionalism:
Religion, Sharing
Secularism, and Authority
Democratic in Civic Life
Culture
Albert
Mark W.
Cladis
Dzur

Religion in Politics: It is Not Going Away I address this question by offering a normative approach that
provides a generous role and place for traditional religions in
The question of religion and politics—that is, the question
democratic public and political realms. In this approach, what I
of the appropriate relation between the two—is an old one.
call the religion-as-unexceptional model, religion is not initially
Ancient Israel, for example, wrestled with the king’s relation to
treated as a special case, but rather is treated like any other more
the priesthood; early Roman pagans and Christians debated the
or less comprehensive view that informs intellectual and moral
emperor’s divine status; medieval Christianity in the West was
contributions to democratic life and deliberation. With this
marked by power struggles between the “secular” (temporal)
approach, I challenge: 1) those who wish to relegate religious
and religious spheres; early Protestant Christianity debated the
belief and practice to the private sphere (thereby disadvantaging
application of Martin Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms, the
religious citizens); and 2) those who claim that a robust democ-
civil and the spiritual; and ever since James Madison interpreted
racy requires a religious citizenry (disadvantaging non-religious
Luther’s doctrine as an account of the separation of church
citizens). My argument necessarily entails an assessment of
and state, North Americans have passionately argued over the
secularism. I identify three senses of this central yet vague
meaning and utility of the Wall of Separation. The question of
term—secularism in its good, bad, and ugly sense. In its good
religion and politics becomes more complex if we include in
sense, secularism supports the religion-as-unexceptional model,
our consideration civil or political religion. Unlike confessional
entitling individuals and communities to bring comprehensive
or traditional religion (Hinduism and Christianity, for example),
views, including religious perspectives, to political stances and
which typically makes reference to God, gods, or some other
democratic deliberation.
sacred beings, civil religion has the
Additionally, and independent
sociological and psychological form of
of my arguments for this normative
traditional religion (enduring beliefs We had assumed that modernity
approach that covers traditional reli-
and practices, powerful ideals and sym- would necessarily usher in an age
gions in democracies, I endorse what I
bols, tutored passions and emotions) in which religion had no significant
call spiritual democracy: a progressive
but it does not have the traditionally public standing. We were wrong.
democratic culture and its concomitant
religious content. Debates over the role
civil religion that is inclusive of various
of civil religion and traditional religion
citizens, believers and nonbelievers alike. Spiritual democracy,
in relation to the political are not new. Around the time of the
as I employ the term, is a dynamic, culturally specific and cul-
American Revolution, for example, Benjamin Franklin endorsed
turally contested embodied democracy. My proposal for spiritual
a civil “Publick Religion” to inculcate civic virtue while at the
democracy will raise basic questions about civil religion—what
same time he opposed any state-sponsored traditional religion.
exactly is civil religion and should we be fearful of it? Ultimately,
And not long before the French Revolution, Rousseau con-
I will argue that civil religion per se is not dangerous. In fact,
demned “blood thirsty,” nationalistic traditional religions even
democratic civil religions offer protection from totalitarian and
as he advocated an enforceable civil religion with tolerance as
theocratic religion, among other varieties of antidemocratic
its centerpiece.
movements.
The question of religion and politics, then, is an old one, a
In sum, then, I will argue that there are at least two forms of
complicated one, and one that is still very much with us today.
religion in politics that we tend to fear unnecessarily: 1) diverse
Many of us thought or hoped that the question would fade away.
traditional religions, when suitably embedded in a demo-
We had assumed that modernity would necessarily usher in an
cratic culture; and 2) democratic civil religions, when suitably
age in which religion had no significant public standing. We
defined. I address both forms of religion because our fears
were wrong. Religion as an intellectual, cultural, and political
about dangerous traditional and civil religion have coalesced.
force is not, for the most part, waning on the globe. And hence
I acknowledge our justified fears, but I also show why attempts
many inside and outside the academy find themselves thinking
to bar or otherwise exclude religion from democratic public and
about religion—specifically, about religion in public and politics
political spheres is not a promising way forward.
and whether it ought to be there.

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The Standard Liberal Approach to Religion: of religion. It is not prudent because religious perspectives
A Temptation to be Resisted potentially have much to contribute to shared moral and politi-
cal projects of nations and global communities. Some religious
Political liberalism, broadly understood, has taken to heart perspectives and practices, of course, could prove to be destruc-
the profound lesson that traditional or confessional religions tive. But unless one holds an essentialistic view of religion, one
can contribute to extremely dangerous political and social should maintain that religious perspectives and practices per se
outcomes. We also know about the terror that can flow from a cannot be usefully generalized with respect to whether they are
different kind of religion. In the twentieth century, catastrophic politically and morally beneficial or harmful.
murder and suffering is associated with what some call political Unfortunately, liberal approaches to religion often do essen-
or civil religion, that is, with political and civil institutions that tialize religion. There is often the assumption that insofar as
became charged with the sacred and functioned in many ways there is such a thing as authentic religion, it is a private, inward
as a religion. Mussolini’s fascism, Hitler’s Nazism, and Russian affair of conscience. Should it move outward and intermingle
Bolshevism have all been plausibly described as religious, with politics, it ceases to be authentic and it becomes potentially
when suitably defined by something like a broad, Durkheimian dangerous. This parochial (principally Romantic, nineteenth
account of religion. Of the danger of these political regimes, we century) spiritualized view of religion will necessarily gener-
are all well aware. ate suspicion and fear about Islam or other religions that are
When we see today (what appears to be) the resurgence of often manifestly involved in public and political spheres. It will
religion in politics, we cannot help but think about lessons also cause worry about civil religion, a form of religion that
from the past and become alarmed. Many fear, for example, the is necessarily public and political. Public religion, then, is by
religious right in the U.S. and Islamism in the Middle East and definition inauthentic religion, and the most dangerous forms
Indonesia. This subset of Christians and Muslims often appears of inauthentic religion are manifested in religious fundamental-
to be linking their traditional, confessional religion to a civil ism, antidemocratic civil religion, or in some combination of the
religion, thereby making the situation all the more potentially two. Just such a combination is conjured by Emilio Gentile—a
dangerous. Our twin fears—one about dangerous confessional leading theorist of political religion—who in his book, Politics
religion, the other about dangerous civil religion—have con- as Religion, has a section titled “Bolshevism Like Islam.”2 The
verged. With the apparent increase of religious fundamentalism heading likens Bolshevism, clearly a dangerous political move-
in conjunction with civil religion, the promise and sanity of ment, to what has become for many the paradigm of dangerous
political liberalism has become all the more alluring. And sure traditional religion—Islam.
enough, liberal political theorists are once again starting to write
about religion, and, for the most part, they seek to protect the
Secularism: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
secular state from encroaching religion by consigning religion
to the private sphere—the sphere of the apolitical voluntary In light of the fears and suspicions that flow from the very
association, the family, or the individual. idea of religion in politics, the simplest and most effective strat-
In most cases, a premise of this standard liberal approach is egy seems to be to pursue aggressive laïcité or secularism and
that religion is based on beliefs not subject to public reasoning keep all religion out of political life. Yet this approach, I noted,
and hence religion is potentially divisive. It is more difficult to is a temptation that should be resisted. If we are, then, to move
generalize about a standard liberal approach to the other reli- beyond aggressive secularism and develop a judicious response
gious threat—civil religion—because most liberal theorists have to the question of religion and politics, we need to identify which
ignored the very idea of civil religion. But it is easy to imagine aspects of secularism to let go of and which to keep—for surely
that if a liberal theorist were to accept, say, that Mussolini’s fas- some aspects should be kept. This central task—adjudicating
cism was a form of religion, then civil religions of all kinds (per- what to keep and what to forgo—entails naming the good, the
haps even more benign ones) would be condemned on the basis bad, and the ugly senses of the key term, secularism.
of their threat to individual freedom and liberty of conscience.
Secularism: Good Sense
While I appreciate why many are wary of religion in public
and political life, the standard liberal approach—namely, the Secularism in the good sense is characterized by three ideal
hope and effort to keep religion private—is not an adequate features: 1) when participating in the public and political
response to our justified fears.1 The standard approach is a realms, citizens do not normally assume that others necessarily
temptation that should be resisted. It is neither morally viable share their religious perspectives or perspectives on religion;
nor prudent. It is not viable because illiberal means would need 2) citizens do not treat religious perspectives in public debate as
to be employed to achieve the liberal goal of the privatization a special case subject to special exclusion or special privilege;

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and 3) government neither officially sponsors nor hinders judgments on religion in general or on a particular religion
religion, upholding the First Amendment. The first two features associated with the offered religious reason.6 This principle of
of secularism (in the good sense) pertain to constraints on citi- focused attention safeguards against dismissing or deriding an
zens, and the third on government. interlocutor simply on the basis of his or her religious identity.
The first constraint on citizens amounts to an acknowledgment This principle represents one way to welcome and critically
that we live in a pluralistic society and that we therefore should appropriate insights from citizens’ varied voices while at the
not assume that everyone shares our perspectives, whether same time minimizing unnecessary conflict and social discord.
those perspectives be religious or anti-religious.3 The second Both principles are supported by and belong to a larger set of
constraint acknowledges that fellow citizens are free to bring to skills and virtues associated with excellence in the practice of
democratic deliberation whatever perspectives they deem appro- democratic public engagement. Such virtues include but are not
priate, provided that they do so in such a way so as to honor limited to attentiveness, discretion, humility, and sensitivity to
the first constraint. A premise here is that all voices are to be audience, as well as courage, honesty, and judgment.7 Religious
heard and none are initially to be treated as special, subject to perspectives in public debate do not uniquely or especially call for
4
exclusion or privilege. Religious perspectives, then, are treated the need of public engagement virtues. These skills and virtues
just like any other more or less comprehensive views—such as would dissuade dogmatically throwing one’s beliefs into the faces
those of Marxism, American pragmatism, secular humanism, or of others. But here the vice and the corresponding virtue do not
hedonism. necessarily run along religious versus non-religious lines. A non-
When a perspective (religious or otherwise) is offered in pub- religious Marxist, feminist, or environmentalist may be as likely
lic debate, citizens speak and listen—or write and read—in a to fail to exhibit the appropriate virtues as, say, a Christian or a
distinct manner that acknowledges the constraints of secularism. Buddhist. Secularism in the good sense puts a high premium on
This distinctive manner entails, among other things, the principle public engagement skills and virtues, for these sustain and protect
of non-privileging and the principle of inclusive, agonistic public debate. Insofar
focused attention. The first principle per- as such debate lacks formal procedures
Secularism in the good sense puts
tains primarily to the speaker, the second and rules, the public engagement virtues
a high premium on public engage-
to the listener. The speaker, understand- become all the more important.
ment skills and virtues, for these
ing that no assumptions can be made Secularism seeks to uphold both
sustain and protect inclusive,
about the comprehensive views of her the Establishment Clause and the Free
agonistic, public debate. Insofar
fellow citizens, will not privilege her Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
as such debate lacks formal pro-
speech, that is to say, will not expect all ment: to prohibit government from offi-
cedures and rules, the public
to deem it self-evidently true and with- cially funding or otherwise sponsoring
engagement virtues become all the
out need of justification. Rather, she will religion and to guarantee the free exer-
attempt to offer arguments and reasons in
more important. cise of religion. This commitment to the
such a way that will garner some support First Amendment is the third ideal fea-
from or will appeal to a diverse audience. Due to no fault of her ture of secularism in the good sense. Secularism seeks to protect
own or her audience, she may not be successful. Persuasion, even citizens from all manner of theocracy (the imposition of religion)
when advancing good ideas, is not guaranteed because “public as well as to safeguard citizens’ liberty of conscience (including
reason” or an overlapping consensus does not always favor every the free exercise of religion or atheism). While interpretations
good perspective or idea. Her success will depend on a variety of and applications of the First Amendment are often fraught with
circumstances, especially on the “conceptual distance” between legal and cultural complexities, splitting supreme court judges
5
her perspectives and those of her fellow citizens. Nonetheless, as well as cities, counties, and states, this much is clear: the First
there is an imperative that she attempt to engage meaningfully Amendment is a legal expression of a central cultural aspiration
while in public debate with potentially diverse citizens. of secularism, namely, that citizens be treated with dignity and
Secularism in the good sense, then, admits into democratic respect regardless of their religious perspectives and perspec-
deliberation, but does not privilege, religious perspectives or rea- tives on religion. To treat a fellow citizen with dignity and
sons. In practice, this principle of non-privileging often amounts respect does not require agreement with a citizen’s views, but it
to a constraint on the interlocutor offering the religious reason does require that one assume (at least initially) that the citizen,
or perspective. The principle of focused attention, in contrast, whether religious or non-religious, is reasonable and deserves a
applies primarily to the listeners. When religious reasons are “hearing.” The First Amendment, then, grants rights with respect
offered in democratic debate, listeners ought to focus on the to religion (the prohibition of religious coercion and protection
particular issue at hand and avoid introducing negative global of religious expression); and secularism, in turn, envisions and

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aspires to cultural practices that are informed by and that support But secularism in the bad sense becomes all the worse when
the First Amendment. This broad, cultural affirmation of free and governments attempt to enforce the narrow, parochial view of
diverse speech and practice, including religious and atheistic religion. It can be plausibly argued that U.S. foreign policy spon-
expressions, is central to secularism in the good sense and is sors good religion abroad, namely, religion that has been suitably
legally expressed by the First Amendment. reformed—that is, privatized.8 Secularism in the bad sense, then,
has fashioned a notion of religion that has little relation to how
Secularism: Bad Sense
most religion is lived, and now governments such as the U.S.
Secularism in the bad sense is characterized by three posi- are attempting to impose and normalize this fanciful view of
tions: it holds that 1) religion is a discrete, sui generis phe- religion.
nomenon; 2) religion is not self-critical or open to critique and
Secularism: Ugly Sense
exchange (because, it is held, religion is radically subjective or
based on dogmatic authority or on both); and therefore 3) reli- It is one thing to attempt to privatize religion for the sake of
gious citizens can and should accept the privatization of religion, a pact of nonaggression; some among the religious themselves
that is, they should keep their religion out of politics. These three have contributed to the pact. It is another thing to promote
positions presuppose a narrow, parochial view of religion that aggressively the view that religion is a destructive, superstitious
is unconvincing in the face of actual, lived religion. Generally relic of the past that has no place in modernity. In this view, secu-
speaking, religion is a culturally complex, historical institution larism is the modern age of humans enlightened and freed from
that cannot be separated easily or radically from other institu- the shackles of religion. Secularism is the essence of modernity
tions, whether they be moral, aesthetic, economic, or political. and religion is the antithesis of all that is modern. This is the ugly
Generally, religions are dynamic and change in response to and sense of secularism.
in dialogue with individuals, communities, events, and devel- Its origins may be innocent enough, but its continuing effects
opments both within and outside a given religious tradition. are menacing. Theories of secularization supported the view
Generally, religion is a pervasive aspect of a person’s identity, that religion was increasingly an anomaly in modernity and was
an aspect that both informs and is informed by other aspects of hence retrograde; proponents of secularization wished to protect
one’s identity, including one’s various beliefs, ideals, authori- progress and save the world from backsliding into an inferior,
ties, attitudes, and practices—all of which are embedded in and religious state. The declension theories, however, turned out to
respond to local, national, and global sociohistorical and physi- be largely wrong, and yet the hope for secularization persisted
cal circumstances. among many. Secularists of this sort continue to maintain that
The good and useful ways that religion can be generalized, religion is the antithesis of modernity and enlightened human-
then, undermine the narrow, parochial way that religion is ity. They would like to keep religion not only out of politics but
understood by secularism in the bad sense. The social history off the planet. And if you object to their view, you yourself risk
of the narrow, parochial view is complex. One explanatory being branded as a sympathizer with the unenlightened barbar-
narrative points to various eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ians. In the meantime, the world’s abundant and diverse religious
German, French, and British Enlightenment and Romantic populations are doing the things that everyone else in modernity
thinkers who promoted the view that religion is ultimately is doing—building skyscrapers, farming, investing in the market,
inward, subjective, and private. Another explanatory narrative designing computers, raising children, writing books, cooking,
argues that the narrow, parochial way of conceiving religion was and teaching in universities. Their very presence in the world
strategically forged at a time when it was tactical for European poses a mystery to these secularists. For, given the unmitigated
nations to conceive of religion as a discrete, private arena evil that (in their view) accompanies religion, how can religion
separate from the state and from science. Jointly, these explana- persist in modernity? Even if Marx, Freud, Tylor, and Durkheim
tory narratives suggest that in modernity it was convenient for provided suitable explanations for the origin of religion, there
many European constituencies to establish a pact of nonaggres- appears to be no accounting for its persistence. Perhaps cognitive
sion between “religion” and “the secular”—the new emerging science will do better. Meanwhile, the religious populations are
privatized view of religion would not interfere with politics stigmatized—implicitly or explicitly—by these secularists, and
and science, and the new emerging laicized view of the secular religious resentment is growing all around us.
would not interfere with religion. Having identified secularism in the good, bad, and ugly
Insofar as these accounts are correct, secularism in the bad senses, we can now approach more judiciously the earlier ques-
sense fails to be self-reflective and investigate the ways in which tion about religion in politics and whether it ought to be there.
it operates with (and helped to create) a concept of religion that Secularism in the good sense is aligned with what I earlier called
has little traction with actual lived religion. This is bad enough. the religion-as-unexceptional model, an approach in which

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individuals and communities are entitled to bring comprehensive its concomitant democratic civil religions. Spiritual democracy
views, including religious perspectives, to political stances and is an example of just such an ideal cultural safeguard.
to democratic deliberation. This model does not solve all the Before recommending spiritual democracy, I need to discuss
problems pertaining to religion and politics. It does, however, civil religion more generally, since the very idea of civil religion
provide a helpful approach for how to cope variously with makes many nervous. I will frame my discussion of civil religion
the on-going challenge of religion and politics. In our day, we around two broad issues: 1) the relation between a democratic
must wrestle with such specific challenges as: public funding culture and a civil religion; and 2) the distinction and relation
for religious charter schools; prayer or a moment of silence in between descriptive and normative features of civil religion.
public schools; government supported faith-based initiatives; the A democracy is not only a set of formal political institu-
permissibility of religious courts; and the exclusion of explicitly tions, but a cultural achievement sustained by the distinctive
religious language and rationales from state judicial rulings and beliefs, ideals, practices, and habits of its citizens. This is not
legislation. to belittle the importance of procedural justice, legal codes, or
As we debate these issues, among others, it is under- of such democratic principles as “one person, one vote.” But
stood that citizens will bring different perspectives, resources, a democracy is more than elections and formal procedures;
and authorities to bear on shared, public concerns. The it also entails the manners and character of a nation and its
religion-as-unexceptional model (which entails the virtues of diverse citizens. A salient dimension of cultural democracy is
public engagement) promotes the capacity to hear and critically what could be called its civil religions. By civil religion, I mean
appropriate the various contributions of fellow citizens. At the those aspects of a group’s civic life that take on the sociological
heart of this model and its concomitant view of secularism is a and psychological form of religion (deep beliefs and practices,
commitment to honor diversity in our public and political life ideals, and symbols, for example) without necessarily hav-
and a reasonable hope that from such diversity comes promis- ing any traditionally religious content. The language of shared
ing outcomes. This commitment and belief, practice, and ideals is commonly
hope evinces J. S. Mill’s conviction employed, implicitly or explicitly, in
A democratic society, then, will
that “only through diversity of opinion order to name and cultivate the civic
have civil religion—for bet-
is there, in the existing state of human life or moral solidarity among individu-
ter, for worse. This is a matter of
intellect, a chance of fair play to all als who belong to the same political
sociological necessity.
sides of the truth.”9 Upholding diversity entity or cultural group (a city-state, a
turns out to be not only an expression cultural subgroup, a nation-state, or a
of democracy but also the best avenue for discovering “all sides transnational association, for example). And the language and
of the truth.” manner of moral solidarity often assumes what can be called the
language and manner of religion. Emile Durkheim, for instance,
claimed that “religion is the way of thinking characteristic of
Civil Religion, Democratic Culture
collective existence.”10
Thus far, I have mainly addressed the role and place of From the perspective of this Durkheimian account of religion,
confessional or traditional religions in a democracy. I now all societies and cultures will have one or more civil religions.
want to turn to and endorse what I call spiritual democracy: This is a descriptive, sociological claim. If it is true—and I think
a progressive democratic culture marked by a distinctive civil it is—then Weberian claims about disenchantment look less and
religion. I have argued that democracies need to be able to less convincing in light of Durkheimian claims about how the
accommodate religious diversity—as well as other forms of elementary forms of religious life pervade all societies, includ-
diversity—in public and political spheres. I recognize, however, ing modern ones (and our theories of secularization will need to
that a powerful antidemocratic faction, religious or otherwise, be significantly revised). A democratic society, then, will have
could emerge and threaten the very democratic institutions that civil religion—for better, for worse. This is a matter of socio-
enabled it to gain prominence and power. A society can protect logical necessity. Yet not all civil religions are alike: each carries
itself to a large degree from such antidemocratic movements if it its own distinctive normative meanings and substance. A civil
is equipped with sufficient constitutional measures that are sup- religion can promote, for example, inclusivity and tolerance or
ported by a robust democratic culture. But there are no guaran- xenophobia and bigotry. Unfortunately, much of the debate over
tees that the legal measures and the requisite culture supporting civil religion fails to make a distinction between descriptive and
them will hold or will not at least experience moral “lapses.” One normative accounts. Some celebrate and others lament that civil
of the best safeguards against antidemocratic movements is to religion has departed or that it is flourishing; some argue that
work continuously on sustaining a vital democratic culture and civil religion is good and beneficial, while others maintain that it

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is harmful and destructive. My view is civil religions will always insofar as American civil religion morally undergirds the nation,
be with us. This is just part of what it is to be social animals. the actions and character of the nation are identified with the
And in diverse societies like the U.S. there will be more than one civil religion.
civil religion. Civil religion in the U.S. is not a homogeneous set This common critique, however, essentializes both the nation
of ideals, symbols, beliefs, and practices. It is a heterogeneous and its civil religions. Surely, the nation’s actions and character
assortment of conflicting elements subject to multiple interpreta- are normatively heterogeneous, as are its civil religions. Many
tions and serving multiple purposes. For this reason, it is helpful of the actions, manners, and civil religions of the U.S. have
to think of a plurality of civil religions. Civil religions, then, have indeed been criminal and shameful, bellicose and arrogant,
always been with us, even if we have not always had the eyes or exceptionalist and imperialist. But noting as much does not
occasion to see them. In light of this, the central normative ques- constitute a critique of civil religion per se any more than of gov-
tion is: What kind of civil religions should we want? What kind ernment per se. The standard critique runs together normative
of normative content do we want them to carry? and descriptive aspects of civil religion, setting up one negative
Rousseau’s civil religion is the paradigmatic example of a normative type of civil religion—bellicose and chauvinistic—as
civil religion devised for its normative content—an explicit definitive of all civil religion. The normative task, however,
profession of faith that declares sacred the (legitimate) laws of entails critiquing the morally problematic and shameful civil
the land. I do not know anyone advocating this model in its most religions in America as well as identifying the morally promis-
pristine form, and I have my doubts whether even Rousseau ing and beneficial ones. By identifying and endorsing spiritual
ever meant for us to take Rousseauean civil religion literally. democracy—beneficially progressive democratic culture and
Proposing a civil religion may have been his way of reminding civil religions—I am engaged in this normative task. Far from
his generation—and now ours—of the indispensability of some sanctioning national idolatry and shameful state violence, spiri-
shared beliefs and practices for a vibrant, democratic republic, tual democracy holds the nation hostage to its highest democratic
especially if that republic counts tolerance as one of its chief vir- ideals and aspirations.
tues. A republic that places a premium on tolerance, and hence
on diversity, must be attentive to building and sustaining a cul-
Spiritual Democracy
ture that supports democratic inclusion and self-governance—a
“government of the people, by the people, for the people” (to cite By spiritual democracy, I mean a progressive democratic
President Lincoln’s phrase). culture: its practices, laws and Constitution, ideals, institutions,
The allusion to Rousseau and Lincoln raises the interrelated critical reflection, and its progressive civil religions (especially
issues of democratic inclusion and exclusion. Rousseau’s civil if we think of civil religion not only as a set of beliefs and ideals
religion famously banned from the republic all those who refused but also as practices and habits). Spiritual democracy is neither
to honor tolerance and respect diversity. Liberal democracies a mystical, nationalistic political body nor a democracy based
exclude too. There seems to be no way around this. As soon as on supposed transcendent or immutable ideals. I employ the
you aspire to have a government of, by, and for the people, you term spiritual to capture the wide range of sociocultural and
cannot help but asking, Who are the people? However diverse psychological aspects of a flourishing, progressive democratic
“we the people” are, there remains a “we”—even if imaginary— culture. Spiritual, here, connotes a reflective integration of the
by which we (dynamically, provisionally) name our country, critical thought, skills, practices, dispositions, and emotions
judge our country, attempt to move our country forward. Yet of diverse citizens as they pursue the distinctively democratic
any “we” will necessarily exclude. A critical legal and cultural relation between their distinct identities and the dynamic, plural
question, then—central to the character of a democracy—is who character of their country. The progressive civil religions that
and what are excluded? Who is allowed to enter, reside, and accompany spiritual democracy highlight the explicitly shared,
participate in—to shape—the republic? And which behaviors, non-utilitarian facets of diverse citizens working together “to
practices, and ideals are honored and which are condemned? achieve our country” (to use James Baldwin’s phrase).12 Shared
The most common criticism of civil religion claims that it practices and projects, powerful ideals and symbols, joint aspi-
contributes to national idolatry and chauvinistic patriotism, sanc- rations and work—these collective facets of the democratic
tioning, by sanctifying, nationalistic ideologies and aspirations. experiment accompany and sustain the everyday, mundane life
In this view, civil religion is inseparable from state violence.11 and work in communities big and small. Durkheim called these
The lamentable and deplorable actions of the U.S.—the near collective facets of progressive democracy “sacred.” This should
extermination of Native Americans, the slavery of Africans, the not imply that they are immutable or untouchable, beyond cri-
military conquests and cultural subjugations—are all sanctioned tique and scrutiny. These collective facets are “sacred” insofar as
by American civil religion. The argument is straightforward: they “transcend” or are “above” disparate individuals; and they

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are above disparate individuals insofar as: 1) they are the joint lacking power and social standing—those stigmatized by
creation of communities and their histories; and 2) they inspire reason of race, ethnicity, gender, and dissident thought, those
and motivate individuals to think and work above exclusively who fought to make a contribution to progressive democracy
narrow self-interests. and to the cause of human dignity. And not only are success
Spiritual democracy, I need to make clear, is not identical to stories recounted, but also the tragedies and the crimes that
the democratic nation. It is one among many possible normative saturate the history of the U.S.—these, too, are our stories,
stances within a democracy. Descriptively, spiritual democracy reminding us of our limits and transgressions. These painful
refers to a dynamically constructed legacy of progressive move- stories, however, do not morally paralyze but inspire critical
ments, figures, practices, and ideals which extends into the pres- reflection and resolve to do better. Which victories, which
ent; normatively, it refers to a dynamically constructed cultural losses, are recounted? Whose history is to be told? These ques-
space with which to identify and from which to critique the ways tions, for those committed to progressive spiritual democracy,
and manners of the nation (even as spiritual democracy is subject are not to be asked and answered once, but are part of an on-
to its own self-critique). Spiritual democracy, then, is a progres- going struggle and commitment to narrate our past and to work
sive vision of the promise of democracy and of the character, toward a more humane future.
practices, and work that that promise entails.
Spiritual democracy is akin to what Whitman called “Religious
Transforming Fear into Hope
Democracy,” namely, the many and diverse cultural threads that
form a progressive, democratic social fabric. This intricate I have argued that there are two forms of religion in a
weave is composed of poetry and pottery, literature and car- democracy that we need not fear: 1) diverse traditional or
pentry, opera and folk songs, philosophy and masonry, women confessional religions when suitably embedded in a robust
and men, old and young. Each member of society is called democratic culture; and 2) democratic civil religions, when
on to contribute uniquely to the com- suitably defined. While acknowledging
plex weave of the emerging spiritual our justified worries about religion in
The temptation to ban traditional
democracy. This public engagement in public, I have maintained that attempt-
religion from democratic politics
building spiritual democracy does not ing to exclude religion from demo-
will not ultimately serve democratic
bring the diminishment of individual- cratic public and political spheres is
purposes. Nor will fearing a demo-
ity but rather its flourishing. And like not a promising path. Moreover, I have
cratic common faith or
Durkheim, Whitman maintained that attempted to show how traditional reli-
civil religion.
“a greater product”—the sacred forms gions and civil religions can contribute
of a shared democratic life—results to the flourishing of a democracy.
when individuals participate in (and not simply compete in) an Religion and politics, then, is not necessarily a dangerous or
inclusive and lively public life.13 “unnatural” combination in modernity. Nonetheless, there are
Spiritual democracy acknowledges that the U.S. is a pluralistic ways in which I do worry about religion and politics in modernity.
society with multiple sociolinguistic, cultural, and ethnic groups I worry about reactionary traditional religions around the globe
that contribute importantly to the complex identity of individu- that are fostering dangerous forms of the sacralization of politics.
als and to the complex identity of the nation. Pursuing spiritual And I worry about forms of civil religion in the U.S. and elsewhere
democracy is not a venture in discovering a single, fixed national that appear to be nationalistic and militaristic. One reason I dis-
moral identity. Rather, it is an adventure in discovering how tinguished between normative types of civil religions (democratic
rich identities, fed by diverse streams, can also be fed by shared and antidemocratic, for example) was to acknowledge danger-
visions of who we can become as a people, a people capable of ous forms of civil religion. If I spent much time describing and
bringing diverse backgrounds and perspectives to the work of championing spiritual democracy (along with its anti-nationalistic
achieving a progressive democracy. To that end, we can draw on forms of civil religion), it was to provide a counterexample to
and contribute to a diverse repertoire of public democratic ritu- perilous, antidemocratic religion, both traditional and civil.
als, practices, and stories, and on such powerful symbols as the My worries about religion in politics are matched by my hope in
Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights; the image what both traditional and civil religions have to offer progressive
of Sojourner Truth and Martin Luther King, Jr.; the Lincoln democracies. Secularism in the bad and ugly sense fails to grasp
Memorial and the Women’s Rights National Historic Park. the powerful, normative resources in traditional religions that can
Far from sanctioning nationalism and marginalizing those check ugly nationalism, militarism, and injustice. And democratic
not deemed “true Americans,” the civil religions of progres- civil religions, in their own way, can promote that which is most
sive spiritual democracy put a premium on the stories of those admirable in a flourishing democratic society, sustaining the

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 D E M O C R A C Y, S E C U L A R I S M , A N D P L U R A L I S M
on-going work of “achieving our country.” I do not mean to be 5. “Conceptual distance” is not the result of a (supposed)
Pollyannaish here. Modern democracies have much to learn from fundamental epistemological abyss, the kind that would challenge
the possibility of Donald Davison’s radical interpretation. Rather,
history about how various forms of religion, traditional and civil,
conceptual distance is the result of disagreements emerging in the
can be treacherous. But the temptation to ban traditional religion context of substantial intersubjective agreement. In the absence
from democratic politics will not ultimately serve democratic pur- of intersubjective agreement, it would be impossible to identify
poses. Nor will fearing a democratic common faith or civil reli- disagreements.
gion. We tend to be suspicious of all forms of Gemeinschaft—that 6. This recommendation to avoid negative global judgments
is, of robust tradition, belonging, and community—in modernity. is not a form of religious apologetics. Such global judgments are
rarely productive or satisfying. To disparage or to dismiss out
This has spurred secularism in the bad and ugly sense. Yet if we of hand an entire tradition such as Hinduism or Christianity (or
stop consigning Gemeinschaft to the past, stop viewing it as an Marxism or pragmatism, for that matter) entails caricatures or at
anomaly in modernity, we may worry less about traditional and the very least essentializing. The principle of focused attention does
civil religions per se and the very idea of shared commitments, not, of course, require that one accept as compelling any offered
practices, and ideals. We may learn to transform some of our religious reasons or the religious traditions to which the reasons may
be connected. It simply requires that, whenever possible, the focus
deepest fears into sources and communities of hope.
of the conversation or debate remain on the specific issues at hand.
7. For an excellent discussion on democratic virtues—“practical
Mark Cladis is Professor of Religious Studies at Brown University wisdom and tact”— in public engagement, see Stout, Democracy
and focuses on the modern history of Western political, social, and Tradition, 85–86.
and religious thought. His publications include Public Vision, 8. For a convincing version of this argument, see Saba
Mahmood, “Religious Reasons and Secular Affect: An
Private Lives, and A Communitarian Defense of Liberalism.
Incommensurable Divide?,” in Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy,
Injury, and Free Speech, eds. Tala Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith
Endnotes Butler, and Saba Mahmood (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 2009), 64–100.
1. I am generalizing, of course, when I refer to “the liberal 9. J. S. Mill, ‘On Liberty’ and Other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini
approach to religion.” Although it is a recognizable position held by (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 49.
many, it is important to recognize the limits of these broad terms, 10. Emile Durkheim, Suicide, trans. F. A. Spaulding and
“liberal approach,” “liberal theorists,” and especially, “liberalism.” G. Simpson (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951), 312.
For example, that liberal theorist Rawls increasingly moved beyond 11. There is an additional common criticism that pertains to
the standard liberal approach, as has Habermas (assuming it is apt democratic civil religion. Patrick Deneen interprets democratic
to call Habermas a liberal). Even Richard Rorty, who for most of civil religion as humans attempting to exceed their capacities and
his life argued that religion should be consigned to the private life, assume divine-like powers and authority, failing to acknowledge
offered in his later positions a somewhat less restrictive view. And in human depravity and limitation, and, in the process, glorifying the
any case, liberalism need not be necessarily identified with promot- democratic state. See Patrick Deneen, Democratic Faith (Princeton:
ing privatized views of religion, or—for that matter—individualistic Princeton University Press, 2005), 96. Yet it is not at all clear that
conceptions of political or social orders. It is not an oxymoron to Deneen’s long list of “secular thinkers” who promote a democratic
speak of liberal characters, traditions, or communities. civil religion—Rousseau, Emerson, Whitman, Dewey, and Rorty,
2. See Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion (Princeton, NJ: for example—do so in a promethean manner that exaggerates
Princeton University Press, 2006), 38 and 40. human powers and ignores human limits. In contrast to Deneen’s
3. On this feature of secularism, see Jeffrey Stout, Democracy account of Rousseau, for example, my investigation of his civil reli-
and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), gion discloses Rousseau’s Augustinian sensibilities and the limits
93 and 98. of political achievements. See Mark Cladis, Public Vision, Private
4. I add the qualifier, initially, to indicate that over time a Lives (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 209–13.
particularly insightful voice can gain authority and hence in some 12. James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (New York: Vintage,
sense be deemed “special,” that is, especially knowledgeable and 1992), 105.
helpful. Conversely, a consistently unreasonable or foolish voice can 13. Walt Whitman, “Democratic Vistas,” in Whitman: Poetry and
eventually be deemed poorly informed or worse. Prose (New York: Library of America, 1982), 941.

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