Environmental and Sustainability Indicators 26 (2025) 100648

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Bankruptcy rules and sustainable water management: A MODSIM-NSGAII

simulation multi-objective optimization framework for equitable
transboundary water allocation
Bentolhoda Asl-Rousta a,* , S. Jamshid Mousavi b
a
Faculty of Environment, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
b
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran, Iran

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: A primary challenge in shared or international water resources management is ensuring their "equitable and
Bankruptcy reasonable utilization". This issue is further complicated by scarcity and can be addressed using Bankruptcy
Simulation-optimization Games (BG). Classical bankruptcy game methods assume homogenous resource accessibility, but water resource
Equitable and reasonable utilization of shared
systems vary widely in both spatial and temporal dimensions. This study addresses these challenges by intro­
water resources
Sustainability
ducing a new optimal bankruptcy rule (OpPro rule) through a simulation-optimization model (MODSIM-
NSGAII), where MODSIM simulates the spatial and temporal variability of water resources, and the NSGA-II
optimization algorithm includes two objective functions of maximizing basin-wide ecological sustainability
and maximizing economic efficiency reflecting "equitable and reasonable utilization" of water. A mechanism
based on the rationality principle of cooperative games and the equity concept is designed to identify the most
stable solution. Results indicate that the optimal bankruptcy coefficients for Iran and Iraq are 100 and 88,
respectively, suggesting a 12% reduction in Iraq’s agricultural water demands. Additionally, efficient water
management practices and the cultivation of high-value agricultural products in Iraq are proposed to enhance the
reasonable utilization of water in this country.

1. Introduction efficiency. Liu et al. (2024) introduced the concept of equity cooperation
into the "water-economy-environment" nexus by developing an eco­
A major challenge in water resource management involves estab­ nomic analysis model.
lishing a mechanism for "equitable and reasonable" or "rational" allo­ Many water resources are transboundary, with around 276 interna­
cation of water to safeguard the rights of all stakeholders while tional river basins shared among 148 riparian countries worldwide (De
addressing the incompatibility between water utilization and environ­ Stefano et al., 2012). The decreasing availability of freshwater resources
mental protection (Liu et al., 2024). Numerous researchers have due to urbanization, industrial and agricultural development, and pop­
attempted to tackle this challenge by developing water allocation ulation growth (Behboudian et al., 2024; Dinar et al., 2013; Momeni
frameworks that consider the economic, social, and environmental as­ et al., 2021; Sadri-Shojaei et al., 2025), can lead to competition or
pects of water use. For instance, Hu et al. (2016) developed a conflict among riparian countries in these river basins
multi-objective model for water allocation involving equality and eco­ (Mirzaei-Nodoushan et al., 2022). Therefore, under conditions of water
nomic efficiency risk control by integrating the Gini coefficient and the scarcity, the absence of basin-wide "equitable and reasonable" water
CVaR concept. Xu et al. (2019) developed a water allocation optimiza­ allocation mechanisms agreed upon by all riparian countries can result
tion model that ensures efficiency, equality, and both intra- and inter­ in unilateral actions by self-optimizing decision-makers, who may
generational equity by integrating the Gini coefficient and a modified ignore the basin’s sustainability. This condition leads to the overuse of
Bentham-Rawls criterion. Zheng et al. (2022) investigated problems water, referred to as “the tragedy of the commons” (Degefu and He,
associated with basin water allocation and redistribution by applying 2016; Degefu et al., 2018; Madani, 2010). To prevent this, nations
different equity allocation rules, which enhanced water allocation sharing freshwater resources have established numerous conventions

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: hodaroosta@[Link] (B. Asl-Rousta), jmosavi@[Link] (S.J. Mousavi).

[Link]
Received 16 October 2024; Received in revised form 19 February 2025; Accepted 21 February 2025
Available online 21 February 2025
2665-9727/© 2025 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license ([Link]
nc/4.0/).
B. Asl-Rousta and S.J. Mousavi Environmental and Sustainability Indicators 26 (2025) 100648

and rules regarding the utilization of these resources (Dinar et al., 2013), priorities/objectives of stakeholders, as well as "equitable and
with the main guiding principle being "equitable and reasonable utili­ reasonable utilization" of shared water resources into the BG
zation" (Rahaman, 2012; Salman, 2007). The most notable examples of methods.
such rules are the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of Interna­
tional Rivers (International Law Association, 1966) and the United Na­ Accordingly, this research proposes a simulation multi-objective
tions Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of optimization model to establish a new bankruptcy rule called Optimal
International Watercourses (McCaffrey, 1998; UN, 1997). Several re­ Proportional (OpPro). Simulation models are efficient tools for evalu­
searchers have developed analytical methods to define "equitable and ating the performance of water resource systems over time and space,
reasonable utilization" of international watercourses (Degefu et al., particularly for complex and large-scale shared river basins (Mousavi
2018; Van der Zaag et al., 2002), while others have focused on quanti­ et al., 2017). Metaheuristic optimization approaches have proven
fying the factors outlined in Article 6 of the UN Watercourses Conven­ effective in solving various complex optimization problems (Gendreau
tion (Avarideh et al., 2017; Comair et al., 2013; Eleftheriadou and and Potvin, 2010; Maier et al., 2014). These approaches can be easily
Mylopoulos, 2008; Gari et al., 2023; Mianabadi et al., 2015; Mimi and linked to generic river basin simulation models without requiring access
Sawalhi, 2003; Zeng et al., 2017). Despite the consideration of numerous to specific functions, variables, or related computer codes
factors in these studies, "equitable and reasonable utilization" appears to (Mirfenderesgi and Mousavi, 2016; Mousavi and Shourian, 2010). This
be a matter of degree and cannot be completely quantified (Imani et al., linkage allows for the use of more detailed simulation models that can
2025; Zeng et al., 2017). represent hydrologic, environmental, legal, administrative, and
In analyzing situations involving conflicts, cooperation, or compe­ socio-economic processes. Taking advantage of these capabilities, this
tition over shared water resources, Game Theory (GT) has proven to be research aims to develop an efficient approach to incorporate the spatial
an effective tool (Madani et al., 2014). Cooperative game theory (CG) and temporal variabilities of water resources and the characteristics of
aims to create allocation mechanisms that are efficient, equitable, and water-consuming sectors into bankruptcy methods by linking the
fair. Solution methods of cooperative games (CG) are employed when MODSIM river basin simulation model to the global heuristic NSGAII
there are incremental benefits of cooperation among parties optimization algorithm. Two objective functions in NSGAII have been
(Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann, 2004; Teasley and McKinney, 2011; selected to capture the ecological sustainability and economic efficiency
Wu and Whittington, 2006). In cases of water scarcity or the absence of of water utilization across the basin.
incremental benefits, bankruptcy games (BG), classified as cooperative The results from MODSIM-NSGAII model yield a set of Pareto
game methods (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), are considered optimal bankruptcy coefficients, making it challenging to determine the
practical for distributing an asset (E) among a group of claimants (C) best coefficient set. To address this, a new stability index is introduced to
where the total claims exceed the available asset (Ashrafi et al., 2022; select stable solutions based on stakeholders’ approval and the concepts
Degefu et al., 2018; Madani et al., 2014; Mianabadi et al., 2014; of "rationality" and "equity". This framework is then applied to the
Rightnar and Dinar, 2020; Yuan et al., 2023; Zheng et al., 2022). Allo­ Sirwan-Diyala transboundary river basin shared between Iran and Iraq
cations made by BG and standard CG differ significantly, as BG methods countries.
aim to distribute the total deficit among parties, while CG methods focus This research indeed incorporates the concept of "equitable and
on distributing the incremental benefits of cooperation among them reasonable utilization" of international watercourses into bankruptcy
(Madani et al., 2014). Three classical and popular bankruptcy rules games from two perspectives: Firstly, it considers that "reasonable or
include the proportional rule (PRO), which allocates equal proportions rational water utilization" entails balancing supply and demand while
of the claims; constrained equal losses (CEL) which is based on equal maintaining ecological sustainability and economic efficiency through
losses (the differences between claims and awards); and constrained MODSIM-NSGAII model. Secondly, it looks at how equitable access to
equal awards (CEA) which is based on equal awards (Mianabadi et al., water resources relies on stakeholder approval and the stability of the
2014). In recent years, there has been growing interest in applying BG allocation mechanism by introducing a stability index.
methods to various resource allocation problems (Ashrafi et al., 2022; The proposed pioneering framework for water resources allocation
Grundel et al., 2011; Sheikhmohammady et al., 2010; Yarahmadi et al., in shared basins under conditions of scarcity based on the bankruptcy
2023). In water resource management, when demands exceed available games, the principle of the "equitable and reasonable utilization", and
resources, researchers have addressed surface or groundwater allocation stakeholders’ approval is a notable contribution that addresses gaps in
problems (Yazdian et al., 2021) using different bankruptcy methods. previous studies. This innovative framework is a robust tool that
These methods have been applied in their classical form (Ansink and dynamically adjusts bankruptcy coefficients, ensuring equitable,
Weikard (2012); Madani et al. (2014)), in a weighted form incorporating reasonable, and stable allocation of shared water resources during
different conventions/rules/norms/standards (Mianabadi et al., 2015; scarcity. It represents a significant step forward in applying cooperative
Mianabadi et al., 2014; Sechi and Zucca, 2015; Zeng et al., 2017), or game theory to real-world water scarcity challenges, providing a scal­
combined with other game-based theories (Degefu et al., 2018; Yazdian able solution that can be adopted in other transboundary contexts,
et al., 2021). Meanwhile, few scholars have considered the spatial thereby setting a new precedent in managing shared water resources.
variability of river basin users or the characteristics and constraints of
different water-consuming sectors in bankruptcy methods (Yazdian 2. Methodology
et al., 2021; Zheng et al., 2022). Despite recent advancements in BG
methods/rules, there is still a need for a comprehensive, integrated 2.1. Study area
framework that simultaneously accounts for the spatial and temporal
variability of water resources, the characteristics of different The study area encompasses the Sirwan-Diyala Transboundary River
water-consuming sectors, the priorities/objectives of stakeholders, as Basin (SDTRB). The Sirwan-Diyala Transboundary River, a tributary of
well as existing conventions and norms, in BG methods. the Tigris River, is shared between Iran and Iraq. The Sirwan River
In this research we address two issues raised from previous studies. originates in the Zagros Mountains in western Iran, flows westward to
the Iran-Iraq border (Asl-Rousta and Mousavi, 2019), forms the border
1 Developing a framework for allocating water in international river between Iran and Iraq for approximately 30 km (UN-ESCWA BGR,
basins considering "equitable and reasonable utilization" of shared 2013), and then enters Iraq, where it is known as the Diyala River.
water resources in conditions of scarcity, based on BG methods. Another river in the basin, the Alvand River, originates in Iran and flows
2 Incorporating the spatial and temporal variability of water resources, into Iraq, where it joins the Diyala River.
the characteristics of different water-consuming sectors, the A number of dams have been constructed in the river basin in Iran

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B. Asl-Rousta and S.J. Mousavi Environmental and Sustainability Indicators 26 (2025) 100648

and Iraq, serving purposes such as water supply, hydropower genera­ et al., 2014). Another issue regarding river systems, especially when
tion, and flood control (Avarideh et al., 2017). Although water resource shared, is the value of water and the asymmetry among the parties
development plans have existed in the Iranian part since 1940, their (Motlaghzadeh et al., 2023), which indeed raises the challenge of
implementation was delayed due to the eight-year war between the two "equitable and reasonable utilization" of water. As noted by Degefu et al.
countries, and construction challenges in the mountainous regions (2018), water resources should be allocated to maximize the total net
(Avarideh et al., 2017). The war forced many Iranians to migrate from benefits of their utilization.
the border provinces, resulting in reduced water utilization in the Ira­ Considering these points, this research proposes a modeling frame­
nian part of the basin for several years (Avarideh et al., 2017). After the work that accounts for the heterogeneity of water resources systems and
war, as displaced people returned to their homelands, the necessity for the economic value of water by introducing a new bankruptcy rule for
poverty alleviation and welfare improvement in the region became solving transboundary water allocation problems. The framework de­
apparent. Consequently, The Iranian government has recently resumed termines the optimum values of coefficients ρ defined in the PRO rule,
water resources development plans in the Iranian part of the basin which will not necessarily be equal for all the parties; hence the new rule
(Avarideh et al., 2017). On the other hand, Iraq has constructed large is called optimal PRO (OpPro). The proposed framework includes the
dams and water resources schemes earlier and began utilizing water MODSIM simulation model and the NSGAII multi-objective optimization
from shared rivers through low-efficiency supply networks (Avarideh model. In the MODSIM river basin simulation model, the temporal and
et al., 2017). This has led to increased water resource utilization on both spatial heterogeneity of river flows is considered. Additionally, the
sides of the rivers, resulting in overuse and bankruptcy of the basin. optimization model includes two objective functions quantifying
Fig. 1 shows the location and provides a schematic illustration of the "equitable and reasonable utilization" of shared watercourses. In the
SDTRB. This illustration helps to understand how upstream affects optimization model, which is linked online to the simulation model, the
downstream. According to the Figure, the Sirwan River drains into the coefficients of objective functions are determined to maximize system-
Darbandikhan Reservoir, and the Alvand River joins the Diyala down­ wide agricultural benefits and ecological sustainability, with the basic
stream of the Darbandikhan Dam or the upstream of the Hamrin Dam. assumption of cooperation among all riparian countries at the basin
Zone 1 which includes demand sites in the Sirwan River Basin, and Zone level. A mechanism is then designed to identify the most stable solution
2 encompassing demand sites in the Alvand River Basin, are located in by considering the rationality principle of cooperative games and the
Iran. Meanwhile, Zone 3, 4, and 5 are situated in Iraq. Zone 1 does not concept of equity. This framework is implemented in three scenarios.
impact Zone 3, while Zone 2 in Iran affects Zone 5 in Iraq. Fig. 2 illustrate the flow diagram of the research.

2.3. Simulation-optimization modeling framework

2.2. Cooperative game theory and bankruptcy rules
2.3.1. Simulation model
Cooperative game theory (CG) seeks to provide efficient, equitable, MODSIM, a generalized priority-based river basin network model
and fair allocation mechanisms. The allocation can be based on either (Labadie, 2006), is used in this study to simulate river basin system
“benefit game” or “cost game” solutions on respectively “positive” or processes and elements, including unregulated flows, storage reservoirs,
“negative” goods (Sechi and Zucca, 2015; Yuan et al., 2024). In the consumptive and in-stream flow demands, evaporation and channel
former, parties cooperate to achieve the greatest fair benefit, whereas in losses. MODSIM employs a network flow optimization algorithm in each
the latter case, they cooperate to share the smallest cost (Young, 1994). period to allocate water among different nodes according to predefined
CG employs two fundamental principles of “efficiency” and “rational­ physical, hydrological, and institutional considerations (Fereidoon and
ity”. “Efficiency” ensures that total benefits and costs are allocated Koch, 2018; Shourian et al., 2008). Details on how different components
among all the parties, while “rationality” ensures that each party gains are modeled in MODSIM can be found in Fredericks et al. (1998).
more benefits from cooperation than from acting alone (Dinar et al., One of MODSIM’s features is its ability to prepare customized codes
2013). written in Visual [Link] or C#.NET, compiled with MODSIM through
A classical bankruptcy problem, a branch of Cooperative Game the [Link] Framework. This feature provides users with access
Theory (CGT) (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), involves to all key variables and object classes, allowing customization for any
distributing an asset (E) among a group of claimants (C) when the asset complex river basin without the need to reprogram and recompile the
is insufficient to meet all the claims. In this case, the asset must be source code. With MODSIM’s custom coding feature, one can modify the
distributed so that each claimant receives a non-negative amount that values of the specified variables in any iteration of the model execution
does not exceed their claim. Comprehensive surveys on bankruptcy and compare the simulation results (Shourian et al., 2008).
problems and rules can be found in O’Neill (1982), Thomson (2003), The MODSIM river basin simulation model developed for the SDTRB
and Thomson (2015). A common issue in water resources systems is a large-scale model encompassing 560 nodes and 575 links, in which
planning and management is water allocation during scarcity, when the ordinal priority of demands is considered as environmental,
available water resources is not sufficient to fully satisfy demands. This municipal, industrial, and agricultural, respectively. The priority of
problem can be addressed using Bankruptcy Game (BG) methods. demand sites increases from upstream to downstream with water utili­
The proportional (PRO) rule is recognized as one of the classical zation in Iraq is given a relative high priority.
bankruptcy rules (Mianabadi et al., 2015). According to this rule, all
claimants receive the same proportion ρ of their claims as follows: 2.3.2. Optimization model
E The optimization model consists of objective functions, constraints,
xPRO = ρ.cs where ρ = (1) decision variables, and an appropriate algorithm to solve the model. The
s
C
general formulation of the proposed bi-objective optimization problem
where s denotes each claimant, cs is the claim of claimant s, E and C are which requires the evaluation of the fitness function through the
the total amount of assets and claims, respectively, and xPRO s is the MODSIM simulation model, can be represented as follows (Mousavi and
allocation to each claimant using the PRO rule. Shourian, 2010):
The basic assumption behind classical bankruptcy rules is homoge­ ( ) ( )
nous resource accessibility, whereas water resources systems are Max f1 y Max f2 y (2)
temporally and spatially heterogeneous (Madani et al., 2014). There­
Subject to:
fore, applying these rules in their original formulations may produce
infeasible water allocation solutions for river basin systems (Madani

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Fig. 1. The location and the schematic illustration of the SDTRB.

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Fig. 2. The flow diagram of the study.

hi (x) = 0i = 1, …, m (3) ( 1) /
∑M 3
( )
SEcIp = αm × αʹm × γm M (8)
gj (x) ≥ 0j = 1, …, n (4)
m=1

y = sim(x) (5) where z and m are numerators representing modeled ecological demand
( ) ( ) sites in Iran and Iraq, respectively; Z and M are the total number of
where x is the vector of decision variables; f1 y and f2 y are objective modeled ecological demand sites in Iran and Iraq, respectively; α is the
functions; hi (x) and gj (x) are respectively the equality and inequality temporal reliability of meeting ecological demands; αʹ is the volumetric
constraints; and y is the vector of the MODSIM simulation model out­ reliability of meeting ecological demands and γ is the resiliency of
meeting ecological demands. α, αʹ and γ are calculated using outputs
puts.
from the MODSIM simulation model.
Water Scarcity (WS) indices for Iran and Iraq have been calculated
[Link]. Objective functions. Two objectives have been considered to
using blue water footprint, natural runoff, and environmental flow re­
address both ecological and agricultural needs and requirements. The
quirements as represented by Equation (9), following these steps.
first objective is the maximization of a basin-wide ecological sustain­
ability index. By incorporating different coefficients (water scarcity
1 The raster map of the WS index, available globally, has been ob­
indices) for the ecological sustainability of Iran and Iraq into the first
tained from the water footprint network (Mekonnen and Hoekstra,
objective function, the optimization search algorithm directs the simu­
2016).
lation model to retain water in rivers with poorer ecological conditions,
2 The map for the Sirwan and Diyala basins has been extracted
thereby paving the way towards "equitable and reasonable" utilization of
separately.
water resources. The first objective function is formulated as follows:
3 The mean values of WS indices for Iran (Sirwan) and Iraq (Diyala)
f1 (y) = WSIr × SEcIr + WSIq × SEcIq (6) have been calculated using GIS.

where SEcIr and SEcIq are ecological sustainability indices for Iran and The results of these steps are presented in Table 1.
Iraq, respectively; WSIr and WSIq are the water scarcity indices for Iran
Blue Water Footprint
and Iraq (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016), respectively. WS = (9)
Natural runoff − Environmental flow requirements
Ecological sustainability indices provide information about the sus­
tainability of meeting ecological requirements. According to Loucks The second objective is the maximization of basin-wide agricultural
(1997), and Loucks and Gladwell (1999), who defined the sustainability benefits, formulated as follows:
Index of water resources in terms of reliability, vulnerability, and
resiliency, and Sandoval-Solis et al. (2011) who used the geometric
Table 1
average of performance criteria defined by Loucks (1997), the ecological WS index values of Iran and Iraq for the
sustainability indices for Iran and Iraq are defined as follows: period 1996–2005 (Mekonnen and
( 1) / Hoekstra, 2016).
∑Z 3
( )
SEcIr = αz × αʹz × γz Z (7) WSIr WSIq
z=1
0.787 2.378

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f2 (y) = AgBenIr + AgBenIq (10) addressed by the MODSIM simulation model and its single-period NFPs,
such as balance flow equations over time and across every node in the
where AgBenIr and AgBenIq are the benefits from agriculture in Iran and system. Details on the NFP algorithm and its linkage to a multiperiod
Iraq, respectively, and are estimated following these steps metaheuristic optimization algorithm can be found in Shourian and
Mousavi (2017).
1 The dominant crop pattern of Sirwan, and Diyala was selected In this study, two inequality constraints (equations (15) and (16))
separately, and it appeared to be "wheat" in all regions (Lucani and bind decision variables to their upper and lower bounds.
Saade, 2012). The percentage of supplied agricultural demands (volumetric reli­
2 The amount of water consumed to produce one ton of wheat in Sir­ ability) when there is not cooperation between the parties has been
wan and Diyala was obtained from the water footprint network for considered as the lower bound of bankruptcy coefficients. This ensures
1996–2005 (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2010) as presented in Table 2. greater benefits from cooperation, adhering to the "rationality" principle
According to the Table, the amount of water required to produce one of cooperative game methods.
ton of wheat in Sirwan and Diyala was estimated to be 4417, and
5709 cubic meters, respectively. Ir ≤ ρIr ≤ 100
ρmin (15)
3 The price of wheat was considered to be 460 dollars per ton (Tridge;
USDA, 2019). Therefore, the benefits gained from agriculture in Iran Iq ≤ ρIq ≤ 100
ρmin (16)
and Iraq were estimated as follows:
where ρmin min
Ir and ρIq are the percentages of supplied agricultural demands
WAgIr (volumetric reliability) in the non-cooperation state for Iran and Iraq,
AgBenIr = 460 × (11)
0.004417 respectively, and are obtained from simulating the non-cooperation
WAgIq state into the MODSIM model (the non-cooperation state is explained
AgBenIq = 460 × (12) in section 2.3.4)
0.005709

where WAgIr and WAgIq (in MCM) are, the annual volumes of water 2.3.3. Simulation and optimization models interaction
allocated to agriculture in Iran (Sirwan) and Iraq (Diyala), respectively, Non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II (NSGA-II), which has
as calculated below: been widely used in various water resources modelling and management
( )/ problems (Ai et al., 2022; Bekele and Nicklow, 2007; Chang and Chang,
R
WAgIr =
∑
YSupplyr NYear (13) 2009; Tsai et al., 2015; Zheng et al., 2016), has been linked to MODSIM
r=1 using MODSIM custom coding feature to solve the proposed bi-objective
optimization model. Written in MATLAB, NSGA-II includes three main
( )/
Q
∑ features: elitism, fast non-dominated sorting, and an explicit
WAgIq = YSupplyq NYear (14) diversity-preserving mechanism (Deb et al., 2002; Tsai et al., 2019). The
q=1
following steps explain how NSGA-II has been implemented in
MODSIM-NSGAII.
where r and q are numerators for agricultural demand sites in Iran and
Iraq, respectively; R and Q are the total number of agricultural demand
1. The initial population P0 of size N is randomly initialized. With two
sites in Iran and Iraq, respectively; YSupply is the annual volume of water
decision variables, namely ρIr and ρIq , N chromosomes are randomly
allocated to each agricultural demand site, as determined by the
MODSIM simulation model; and NYear is the total number of years in the initialized, each containing two genes (decision variables). The
simulation horizon. generated values are fed into MODSIM, which is then executed to
The coefficients appearing in the second objective function, i.e. allocate water to each node for all time periods and estimate the
460 460 objective function values. Subsequently, fast non-dominated sorting
0.004417 and 0.005709 encourage the simulation model to deliver water to
is implemented and crowding distances are calculated.
those agricultural demand sites with higher economic value, thereby
2. Binary tournament selection, crossover, and mutation operators are
fulfilling the overall goal of "equitable and reasonable utilization" of
implemented to generate an offspring population Q0 of size N.
water resources.
3. In each iteration t, the objective functions for Qt are evaluated, then
Qt and Qt− 1 are combined into an intermediate population Pt of size
[Link]. Decision variables. The decision variables of the optimization
2N. Then, non-dominated sorting is implemented, and crowding
model are the OpPro bankruptcy coefficients of Iran and Iraq, i.e. ρIr and
distances are calculated.
ρIq , which are intended to be obtained through the proposed simulation-
4. By using binary tournament selection, a new parent population Pt+1
optimization model framework. On the other hand, ρIr and ρIq are the of size N is selected from Pt . The offspring population Qt+1 is then
elements of the x vector in equation (5), whose values are generated by generated using crossover and mutation operators, and the corre­
the NSGAII optimization model and fed as input into the MODSIM sponding objective function values are calculated.
simulation model. 5. Steps 3 and 4 are repeated until the stopping criteria are met.

[Link]. Constraints. According to Equations (3)–(5), the optimization In the above steps, whenever a new population is generated, objec­
model has two types of constraints. The first type encompasses equalities tive function evaluations require MODSIM to be executed. In the pro­
and inequalities that are directly handled by the metaheuristic optimi­ posed MODSIM-NSGAII, the single-period NFP optimization algorithm
zation search algorithm (NSGA-II). The second type includes those of MODSIM is used within the NSGA-II algorithm, creating a nested
optimization approach. The flow diagram for the developed model has
been illustrated in Fig. 3.
Table 2
Water required to produce one ton of wheat, for 1996–2005 (Mekonnen and
Hoekstra, 2010).
2.3.4. Solution acceptability
In this research, two extreme states of "cooperation" and "non-
water required to produce one ton of water required to produce one ton of
cooperation" have been assumed for the interaction between Iran and
wheat in Sirwan (m3) wheat in Diyala (m3)
Iraq.
4417 5709

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Fig. 3. The flow diagram of the proposed MODSIM-NSGAII model.

1. The "non-cooperation" state: regarding water allocation, the best-case

WAgIr − WAgIR IRBest
scenario for Iran as the upstream country is assumed to be the non- StIIR = (19)
cooperation state, where Iran does not consider water utilization in WAgIRIRBest

Iraq and allows only the portion of available water flowing to Iraq IQBest
that exceeds water demands in Iran. WAgIq − WAgIQ
StIIQ = IQBest
(20)
2. The "cooperation" state: regarding water allocation, the best-case WAgIQ
scenario for Iraq is assumed to be the cooperation situation, where
Iran considers water utilization in Iraq even when there are shortages where StIIR and StIIQ denote stability indices for Iran and Iraq, respec­
IRBest
in meeting demand nodes located in Iran. tively, WAgIR is the annual water allocated to agriculture in Iran for
IQBest
the non-cooperation state (the best case scenario for Iran), WAgIQ is the
The solution of the bi-objective optimization model is a Pareto front, annual water allocated to agriculture in Iraq for the cooperation state
where each point can be considered a potential solution based on de­ (the best case scenario for Iraq).
cision makers’ preferences. However, in the case of bankrupt basins, Solutions that have similar or close distances (stability indices) from
where parties must decrease their demands to a certain value, there the best-case states for Iran and Iraq can be considered stable (equi­
should be norms or indices acceptable to all parties. table). Fig. 4 shows the position of a stable solution in a schematic
To determine solutions that are acceptable to both Iran and Iraq, we manner.
evaluated the first objective function using the principle of "rationality"
of cooperative game methods. For a water bankruptcy solution to be 3. Results and discussion
considered rational from the perspective of the first objective function
(maximization of a basin-wide ecological sustainability), its ecological The MODSIM simulation model has been developed for the entire
sustainability for Iran/Iraq (SEcIr / SEcIq ) must surpass the levels corre­ basin. Water demand data for the Iranian side is sourced from the Ira­
sponding to the best-case scenarios as described in Equations (17) and nian Ministry of Energy, while this data for the Iraqi side is taken from
(18) Hussein (2010) and Al-Faraj and Scholz (2015). This is a large-scale
SEcIr ≥ SEcIRBest
IR (17)

SEcIq ≥ SEcIQBest
IQ (18)

where SEcIr and SEcIq denote the ecological sustainability of Iran and
Iraq, respectively; SEcIRBest
IR is the ecological sustainability of Iran for the
"non-cooperation" state (the best case scenario for Iran), SEcIQBest
IQ is the
ecological sustainability of Iraq for the "cooperation" state (the best case
scenario for Iraq).
We examined the second objective function from the perspective of
"equity" by introducing new stability indices (equations (19) and (20)),
which calculate the distance of each Pareto solution from the points
corresponding to best-case scenarios for Iran and Iraq. Fig. 4. Schematic illustration of the stable/unstable solution.

7
B. Asl-Rousta and S.J. Mousavi Environmental and Sustainability Indicators 26 (2025) 100648

model featuring a significant number of nodes and links.

3.1. OpPro bankruptcy result

In the developed MODSIM-NSGAII model, NSGA-II generates

random values for the OpPro bankruptcy coefficients of ρIr and ρIq (de­
cision variable) which are then fed into MODSIM. As explained in sec­
tion 2.2, under the proportional rule, claimants receive a reduced
proportion (ρ) of their claims/demands (equation (1)). Therefore, the
demand values for agricultural sites in Iran (Iran’s claim) are multiplied
by the bankruptcy coefficient generated for Iran (ρIr ) and these values in
Iraq (Iraq’s claim) are multiplied by the coefficient generated for Iraq
(ρIr ). MODSIM is then executed with these reduced demand values, and
the objective function values are evaluated by the NSGAII optimization
model. This process is repeated for a defined number of iterations in the
MODSIM-NSGAII model. This is the Baseline Scenario and its results are Fig. 5. Pareto front solutions obtained by the MODSIM-NSGAII model for the
summarized in Table 3. Fig. 5 also shows the Pareto front result. Ac­ Basline Scenario.
cording to Table 3, the values of ρIq vary between 38 and 88 which
corresponds to a 12–62 % reduction in Iraq’s demands. Meanwhile, the
Table 4
values of ρIr for Iran range between 96 and 100 resulting in a 0–4%
the "cooperation" and "non-cooperation" states results for the ecological
reduction in Iran’s demands. This indicates that water utilization in Iran sustainability.
is more sustainable, equitable, and reasonable compared to Iraq.
SEcIr SEcIq
for the best case scenario for Iran for the best case scenario for Iraq
3.2. Solution acceptability 0.6 0.43

The MODSIM model was first executed for the two extreme states of
“non-cooperation” and “cooperation,” and values for the SEcIr for the best values of − 0.02 is identified as the most stable solution. According to
case scenario for Iran, and SEcIq for the best case scenario for Iraq are Table 3, the optimal bankruptcy coefficients assigned to Iran and Iraq for
provided in Table 4. solution 13 are 100 and 88, respectively. This implies that no reduction
To choose an acceptable solution from the Pareto optimal front, the in agricultural water demands in Iran is necessary, while at least a 12
first objective function is evaluated based on the "rationality" principle percent reduction in agricultural water demands in Iraq can be
of cooperative games (Equations (17) and (18)). The second objective proposed.
function is assessed using the "equity" concept and stability indices as The greater the distance of a solution from those corresponding to
defined by Equations (19) and (20). the best cases, the less likely it is to be considered acceptable by the
The SEcIr (Ecological Sustainability Index) value for the best case parties. Therefore, as absolute StIIQ values increase, a greater reduction
scenario for Iran is 0.6. For a solution to be individually rational for Iran, in water demands for Iraq is proposed. This results in a state that is less
SEcIr must exceed 0.6. Similarly, the SEcIq value for the best case scenario likely to be accepted by the Iraqi side. Conversely, solutions with (ab­
for Iraq is 0.43. Thus, solutions with SEcIq less than 0.43 violate the in­ solute) lower stability index values have a higher chance of being
dividual rationality criterion for Iraq. Therefore, solutions 3, 5, 6, and accepted by the parties. However, these solutions are more self-
11, marked with a cross sign, do not meet the individual rationality optimized and less considerate of ecological sustainability, resulting in
criterion with respect to the first objective. lower sustainability of the basin. Figs. 5 and 6 illustrate this point. Fig. 5
The values of stability indices for Iran and Iraq, namely StIIR and StIIQ shows that the most stable solution is the one with the lowest ecological
are also reported in Table 3. Among the remaining solutions, those with sustainability. Additionally, Fig. 6 demonstrates that as ρIq values in­
close or equal values of StIIR and StIIQ are considered stable for both crease calling for a lower reduction in Iraq’s demands (clockwise di­
parties. Therefore, solution 13, highlighted in bold, with StIIR and StIIQ rection in the Figure), Iraq’s ecological sustainability (SEcIq ) values

Table 3
Pareto Front result of the MODSIM-NSGAII model for the Baseline Scenario.
Solution SEcIr SEcIq f1 (y) f2 (y) ρIr ρIq StIIR StIIQ
Million $

1 0.60 0.55 1.78 235 96 38 − 0.02 − 0.24

2 0.60 0.49 1.63 252 100 63 − 0.01 − 0.10
3˟ 0.59 0.55 1.78 238 99 38 0.01 − 0.24
4 0.60 0.54 1.75 242 100 41 0.01 − 0.21
5˟ 0.59 0.54 1.76 239 100 38 0.02 − 0.24
6˟ 0.59 0.53 1.72 244 100 45 0.00 − 0.18
7 0.60 0.46 1.57 256 100 77 − 0.02 − 0.05
8 0.60 0.45 1.55 258 100 81 − 0.02 − 0.04
9 0.60 0.48 1.61 254 100 69 − 0.02 − 0.07
10 0.60 0.53 1.73 243 100 42 0.01 − 0.20
11 ˟ 0.59 0.52 1.71 246 100 50 0.00 − 0.15
12 0.60 0.52 1.70 247 100 51 0.00 − 0.15
13 0.60 0.44 1.51 259 100 88 ¡0.02 ¡0.02
14 0.60 0.50 1.65 251 100 61 − 0.01 − 0.11
15 0.60 0.50 1.66 250 100 59 − 0.01 − 0.12
16 0.60 0.47 1.58 255 100 74 − 0.02 − 0.06
17 0.60 0.51 1.68 248 100 55 − 0.01 − 0.13

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B. Asl-Rousta and S.J. Mousavi Environmental and Sustainability Indicators 26 (2025) 100648

The results are presented in Table 5 and Fig. 7. From the table, it is
evident that the stable solution has StIIR and StIIQ values of 0 and -0.02,
respectively, and ρIr and ρIq values of 100. Therefore, if Iraq can enhance
its agricultural productivity to decrease the water demands of crops per
hectare by adopting efficient water management practices, the stable
solution will not result in Iraq’s bankruptcy. This demonstrates the
MODSIM-NSGAII model’s sensitivity to the objective function co­
efficients. If each party utilizes water more reasonably, the model will
dynamically favor them. Fig. 7 further reveals that the solution with the
highest agricultural benefit is also the most stable solution.

3.3.2. Scenario 2: cultivating high price agricultural products by Iraq

Referring to equations (11) and (12), another important factor in the
second objective function is the price of agricultural products, which is
$460 per ton of wheat in the Baseline Scenario. In Scenario 2, it is
assumed that Iraq will cultivate more expensive crops in Diyala, with the
price of agricultural products set at $1400 per ton instead of $460. This
assumption is incorporated into the MODSIM-NSGAII model, and the
results are presented in Table 7 and Fig. 8.
When comparing the bankruptcy coefficient for Iran (ρIr ) in this
scenario with the Baseline Scenario and Scenario 1, it is evident that,
unlike the previous scenarios, the MODSIM-NSGAII model allocates less
water to Iran’s agriculture in response to higher agricultural product
Fig. 6. SEcIr and SEcIq values for different OpPro Bankruptcy coefficient sets prices in Iraq. Among the solutions with close StIIR and StIIQ values,
((38, 96) means ρIq = 38 and ρIr = 96).
namely solutions 6, 7, and 11, solution 6, with ρIr and ρIq values of 97
and 92 respectively, emerges as the most stable and practical solution.
decrease.

3.3. Sensitivity analysis of objective function coefficients

3.3.1. Scenario 1: agricultural demand management in Iraq

In Section 3.1, it was noted that the Pareto front results call for a
12–62% reduction in Iraq’s demands. This section explores agricultural
demand management in Iraq by adjusting the coefficient of the second
objective function in the MODSIM-NSGAII model. Agricultural demands
management in Iraq can be achieved through structural measures, such
as renovating water conveyance and supply networks, as well as non-
structural measures, including planting low water-consuming crops,
adopting modern irrigation techniques, practicing greenhouse farming,
and discontinuing the cultivation of secondary crops in the same season.
Implementing these measures will reduce the water required to cultivate
agricultural products in Diyala. Consequently, it is assumed that one ton
of agricultural products in Diyala will require 3425 cubic meters of
water (a 40% reduction compared to the Baseline Scenario) instead of
Fig. 7. Pareto front solutions obtained by the MODSIM-NSGAII model for the
5709 cubic meters. This assumption is incorporated into the MODSIM-
Scenario 1 (Agricultural Demand Management in Iraq).
NSGAII model.

Table 5
Pareto Front result of the MODSIM-NSGAII model for the Scenario 1.
Solution SEcIr SEcIq f1 (y) f2 (y) ρIr ρIq StIIR StIIQ
Million $

1 0.60 0.43 1.49 343 100 100 ¡0.02 0.00

2 0.60 0.55 1.78 294 94 38 − 0.03 − 0.23
3 0.60 0.51 1.69 319 100 56 − 0.01 − 0.13
4 0.60 0.50 1.65 323 100 61 − 0.01 − 0.11
5 0.60 0.54 1.75 305 98 42 0.00 − 0.20
6 0.60 0.54 1.76 301 94 42 − 0.04 − 0.20
7 0.59 ˟ 0.55 1.78 299 98 38 0.00 − 0.24
8 0.60 0.52 1.70 316 100 51 0.00 − 0.15
9 0.59 ˟ 0.52 1.71 313 99 49 − 0.01 − 0.16
10 0.60 0.49 1.63 325 99 64 − 0.02 − 0.09
11 0.60 0.53 1.73 309 97 46 − 0.02 − 0.17
12 0.60 0.46 1.57 333 100 77 − 0.02 − 0.05
13 0.59 ˟ 0.53 1.72 310 97 48 − 0.02 − 0.16
14 0.60 0.48 1.61 327 99 67 − 0.02 − 0.08
15 0.59 ˟ 0.47 1.59 330 100 72 − 0.02 − 0.07
16 0.60 0.47 1.60 328 96 73 − 0.05 − 0.06
17 0.60 0.47 1.58 332 100 75 − 0.02 − 0.06

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B. Asl-Rousta and S.J. Mousavi Environmental and Sustainability Indicators 26 (2025) 100648

Table 6 4 Incorporating different water scarcity indices for Iran (WSIr ) and Iraq
Comparison of agricultural benefits for Iran and Iraq in different scenarios. (WSIq ) into the first objective function to reflect the asymmetric
Scenario Iran’s agricultural Iraq’s agricultural ecological states of the rivers in Iran and Iraq, calling for more water
benefits (Million $) benefits (Million $) to be allocated to maintain the ecological sustainability of Iraqi river,
Baseline 141 119 as shown in Table 1.
Scenario 1 (Agricultural 140 202 5 Including different coefficients in the second objective function,
Demand Management in which helps the model allocate water more reasonably by reflecting
Iraq)
both the efficiency of water utilization and the benefits gained from
Scenario 2 (Cultivating higher 137 370
price crops)
it, in each country. While Hu et al. (2016) and Xu et al. (2019) used
the Gini coefficient to represent economic asymmetry which does not
account for the asymmetry in water utilization between the parties.
A comparison of the agricultural benefits for Iran and Iraq for stable This advantage of the proposed framework makes it robust and
solutions across different scenarios, as shown in Table 6, indicates that beneficial for parties that utilize water more reasonably.
implementing reasonable water utilization practices in Iraq, as simu­ 6 Setting minimum threshold values for OpPro bankruptcy coefficients
lated in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, leads to increased agricultural ben­ to incorporate "rationality" principle of cooperative games, ensuring
efits for Iraq and decreased benefits for Iran. In fact, as discussed in cooperation among the riparian countries. In the "non-cooperation"
Section 2, the MODSIM-NSGAII model aims to allocate water to the state, Iraq, as the downstream country would receive ρmin Iq = 38% of
parties that use it more reasonably, thereby producing greater benefits. its agricultural demands. However, referring to Table 3, within the
proposed allocation mechanism, it receives significantly more water
3.4. Discussion than the non-cooperation state.
7 Designing a mechanism to select acceptable solutions by considering
A major challenge in shared or international water resource alloca­ individual "rationality" of parties and defining the stability index to
tion is how to distribute water among different stakeholders equitably maintain water allocation along with the desired states of riparian
and reasonably. This issue becomes critical under conditions of scarcity countries.
and can be addressed through Bankruptcy Games (BG), classified as
Cooperative Game methods. Classical bankruptcy rules assume ho­ Although previous studies have attempted to account for the "equi­
mogenous resource accessibility, but water resource systems are het­ table and reasonable utilization" of international watercourses by
erogeneous in both spatial and temporal aspects (Madani et al., 2014). assigning weights based on the factors outlined in Article 6 of the UN
This issue is addressed in this research by introducing a novel optimal Watercourses Convention (Avarideh et al., 2017; Gari et al., 2023;
bankruptcy rule called the OpPro rule. This rule is derived using a Mianabadi et al., 2015), they have not taken into account the dynamic
simulation-optimization MODSIM-NSGAII model where MODSIM sim­
ulates spatial and temporal variability of water resources and NSGAII
identifies optimal bankruptcy coefficients. Several measures have been
incorporated into the modeling framework to uphold the concept of
"equitable and reasonable utilization" of water resources.

1 Using the bankruptcy game (BG) method in the model.

2 Considering the spatial and temporal variations of water resources
and demands in the BG method by employing the MODSIM river
basin simulation model. The novel proposed OpPro bankruptcy co­
efficients are obtained through a simulation-optimization framework
that dynamically sets these coefficients, evaluates the allocation re­
sults, and resets the coefficients to achieve more desirable allocation
results. Zheng et al. (2022) also addressed water resource hetero­
geneity; however, they used static bankruptcy rules in their water
allocation model to simulate water scarcity conditions within their
framework.
3 Considering "the ecological sustainability" and "economic efficiency"
as the objective functions of the NSGAII model. Fig. 8. Pareto front solutions obtained by the MODSIM-NSGAII model for the
Scenario 2 (Cultivating High Price Agricultural Products by Iraq).

Table 7
Pareto Front result of the MODSIM-NSGAII model for the Scenario 2.
Solution SEcIr SEcIq f1 (y) f2 (y) ρIr ρIq StIIR StIIQ
Million $

1 0.61 0.55 1.78 327 80 38 − 0.15 − 0.24

2 0.61 0.55 1.78 327 80 38 − 0.15 − 0.24
3 0.61 0.55 1.70 347 83 39 − 0.13 − 0.22
4 0.61 0.49 1.69 352 87 64 − 0.11 − 0.08
5 0.60 0.54 1.58 371 94 42 − 0.04 − 0.20
6 0.60 0.44 1.66 357 97 92 ¡0.05 ¡0.01
7 0.61 0.52 1.59 368 83 52 ¡0.14 ¡0.13
8 0.61 0.52 1.68 354 91 54 − 0.07 − 0.13
9 0.61 0.54 1.53 377 82 43 − 0.14 − 0.18
10 0.61 0.55 1.57 371 85 38 − 0.11 − 0.24
11 0.61 0.47 1.55 373 91 77 ¡0.09 ¡0.04
12 0.61 0.53 1.76 335 84 47 − 0.13 − 0.15

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B. Asl-Rousta and S.J. Mousavi Environmental and Sustainability Indicators 26 (2025) 100648

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