948

1. NO. The New Civil Code holds that property as to private ownership are of 2 kinds: first kind is
property owned by the State in its private capacity and such property is also called patrimonial
property, and second kind is property owned by private persons individually or collectively.
Further, jurisprudence holds that collective private ownership may be exercised by partnerships,
corporations, and the like. Here, ABC Corporation is a corporation granted with the
administration and management of the Petrochemical Industrial Zone. Thus, ABC Corporation’s
contention is wrong and subject land can be a subject of expropriation upon just compensation.

2. Immovable and movable properties are the two main kinds or classification of property. The
New Civil Code, per Art. 415, 416, and 417 and jurisprudence provide that the test here is Test
by Description and Test by exclusion. Immovable properties include those not carried from one
place to another and those included in Art. 415 which are Real by Nature like land, construction,
Real by Incorporation, Real by Destination, and Real by Analogy, whereas the latter include
those carried from one place to another and those not included in Art. 415 like forces of nature.

3. NO. The contention of One Lanao is incorrect. Art. 415, para. 5 states that machinery,
equipment, and tools placed by the owner in a building or land that tend to directly meet the
needs of the industry or work are considered immovable properties. Also, jurisprudence holds
that property is considered a machinery through test of essentiality or whether or not such
property is essential and principal element in the business or industry. Here, the road
equipment and haulers are essential and principal element in the oil plantation business. Hence,
it is a realty, and it is subject to taxation.

4. Real right and personal right are classifications of right over which ownership can be
acquired. As to the existence of a definite, passive subject, the former is a right in which an
active subject or a creditor has no definite, passive subject or debtor upon whom he imposes
his right. Conversely, the latter is a right in which an active subject or a creditor has a definite,
passive subject or debtor upon whom he imposes his right.

5. YES. It is the proper remedy. Jurisprudence holds that an action of forcible entry is the proper
remedy in real property cases involving force, intimidation, strategy, threat, and stealth which
has a prescriptive period of 1 year from the time of discovery. Moreover, it holds that telephone
lines and cables are immovable property if it satisfies the test of essentiality. Here, the
telephone lines and cables satisfies the test of essentiality as it is essential and principal in the
communication industry or business of PLDT. Stealth is also present in this case and the suit was
properly commenced within the prescriptive period of 1 year. Hence, subject property is an
immovable and the ejectment suit is proper.

6. NO. Rick is not a builder in good faith. The New Civil Code defines good faith as a possessor in
a capacity of an owner, having an honest belief that he is the legal owner in the title and he is
unaware of the flaws and defects in said title. Here, Rick is aware that Tim is the true legal
owner and he is merely tolerated by Tim in terms of building improvements which are the
building and the fishponds. Ownership is not divested by mere tolerance.
The code also provides that bad faith neutralizes the bad faith of another. Here, both Tim and
Ricky are in bad faith as the former allowed the latter build in his land knowing that he is the
true owner. Hence, the law grants Tim the obligation to either retain the improvements by
reimbursing the builder, Rick or offer the latter to buy the land except if the value of the land is
greater than that of the structure.
7. Jurisprudence holds that a finder is entitled in one-half of the share if he found the hidden
treasure by chance, or in another lot owned by the State, or in another land which he is not the
owner, or he is not a trespasser, he is not a co-owner, or he is a stranger Moreover, it holds that
a stranger includes a tenant and usufructuary, but one is not a stranger if he is a paid laborer
specifically to find a treasure. Here, the occupation of River can be considered a usufructuary as
he is made to live in the house for benefit alone and not to transfer ownership. River cannot be
considered a paid laborer merely to find the treasure as the administration of Bahay ni Kuya or
ABS-CBN didn’t employ him for such purpose, but merely to live inside the house. Hence, River
is a finder by chance.

8. The contention of Alvin is not tenable. Jurisprudence holds that a registered title is not a
guarantee in case of ownership disputes involving alluvium. Alluvium should still be registered
anew in the registry of deeds. Further, it holds that a possessor of realty in open, continuous,
and undisturbed possession is favored and more importantly, protected by the law, even against
the true owner himself, who is Alvin in this case. Hence, Alvin’s contention is not tenable.

9. If I were the counsel of Nahulog Ann, I would argue here that the New Civil Code imposes an
obligation upon an owner of a tree at risk of falling, to manage the same or cut it to a
reasonable extent for purposes of public safety. The code also imposes the liability to the owner
in the form of damages in cases proven to be not caused by force majeure, such as in the case
of trees at risk of falling. Further, a force majeure is defined by the code as an unforeseen event,
or if foreseen, is one that is inevitable. Here, the case is not of force majeure because the
owner, Reech, lack due diligence in performing the obligation of managing or cutting the tree.
Hence, Reech is liable of Nahulog Ann for damages.

10. NO. A co-ownership is distinct from a joint ownership and one of its distinction is the feature
that a co-owner is compelled by the New Civil code to notify his co-owners in case of
improvements and repairs, whereas a joint-owner can act as an agent or representative in
behalf of all joint-owners. Here, Saxon’s sole decision may not be binding upon all co-owners
unless they agree subsequently with the improvement of iron gate.

11. NO, it would not be binding. The ownership present in co-ownership are joint ownership in
ideal share and absolute ownership in individual proportionate share. Moreover, jurisprudence
holds that before partition, the co-owners may not be entitle to a separate, proportionate
share. Here, no partition is still held. Hence, Piper and Lochaln’s decision would not be binding
against Saxon.

12. Chase’s claim is not tenable because the New Civil Code provides that in case of change of
course of rivers, the disadvantaged landowner who lost his land to a new river bed is entitled to
ownership of the abandoned river bed. The Government’s claim is also not tenable because
conversion of private property to public domain requires not only abandonment, but also the
affirmative act of the Legislative or Executive branch. Also, a case of change of course of rivers is
one that is not an express abandonment but a force majeure. Hence, only Cameron has a legal
right.

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16. NO. Even though Mika is a possessor in good faith, ownership by sale of a stolen property
would entitle the Office of the President to pursue and get the Pajero from Mika.

17. Four years is the prescriptive period in acquisitive prescription per Art. 1180 of the Civil
Code. Hence, another 4 years to possess is necessary for B.

18. No, they are not correct. The New Civil Code permits agreement in co-ownership to be
ratified especially in case of repudiation by a co-owner.

19. Nene is the possessor of the corn land because animus revertendi or the intent to stay is
present in her case, unlike Nono the owner and Nona.

20. The determining factor of good faith is an honest belief of possession in the concept of an
owner and that his title is free of defect or flaw.