f

CHAPTER 2

TH E SEM IO TIC
APPROACH

I Like Traffic Lights

In chapter i, I offered a condensed overview o f the development o f

popular culture studies, highlighting two curious facts: first, there has
been a lot of debate over just what popular culture actually is and, second,
until recently there was, in contrast, very little debate over the fact that,
whatever popular culture was and is, it is inferior when compared to elite
culture, folk culture, the avant-garde, and so on. Buried in the middle
of chapter i, I took the apparently daring step o f offering a list o f char­
acteristics we can use to pinpoint what it is we are talking about when
we discuss popular culture. To recap: as conventionally understood in
the twenty-first-century popular press, popular culture is:

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• accessible;
• affectively engaging;
• youth oriented;
• trendy;
• indifferent to or antagonistic toward sources of authority, taste, age
appropriateness, and decorum;
• individualistic, yet also a source of community among like-minded
individuals; and
• purportedly frivolous and depthless.

This list reflects the ways that popular culture is routinely discussed
and, as we move forward, weTl have reason to question some of these
characteristics— notably, the charges of frivolousness and depthlessness.
For now though, having proposed a set of criteria we can use to identify
pop culture, we are going to put aside assumptions about quality and
instead focus on the ways pop culture conveys meaning. We will first
start with how something is made meaningful, and then will consider
various lenses we can use to bring into focus particular aspects of pop
culture phenomena.

Semiotics

Our privileged approach to popular culture in this textbook will be

through the lens o f something called semiotics. Semiotics is the study
of signifying systems— rule-governed systems of meaning production.
Spoken and written languages are obvious examples of signifying systems,
but then so are things like semaphore (a system of communicating using
flags), fashion, and tattoos. The building blocks of any semiotic system
are signs, which are little units of meaning. Signs themselves consists
of two parts: the signifier and the signified. The signifier is the way in
which a particular concept is expressed. The signified is the concept
being expressed.

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T CHAPTER 2 | THE SEM IO TIC A PPR O A CH

SIGN

SIGNIFIED

SIGNIFIER

Fig. 2.1 The Sign

To see how this works, let’s take the most famous example: the sign tree
(see Figs. 2.1 and 2.2).The letters T -R -E -E and how we pronounce them
is our signifier, and our mental impression corresponding to the word
tree (what we think o f when we see or hear the word) is the signified.

SIGN

"TREE"
SIGNIFIER

SIGNIFIED

Fig. 2.2 Signifier/Signified

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 SECTION 1 | THE PO P CULTURE T O O L B O X

Signs, therefore, are dyads— they consist o f two parts: signifier +

signified. A signifier without a signified attached to it would make no
sense to us— it would be a word without an associated concept, sner-
kle? And a signified without a signifier would be something we can’t ...
what’s the word for it again? The sign, by the way, is not the thing itself.
The concrete thing out there in the world that the sign identifies is the
referent. This relationship is sometimes represented as a kind of pyramid:

THOUGHT OR REFERENCE

SYMBOL ..........................................................+ REFERENT

stands for

Fig. 2 .j The Semiotic Triangle

Important here is that, in most cases, the relation between the signifier
and the signified is arbitrary. There’s no inherent reason that that tall
thing over there with branches and leaves has to be called a tree—we
know this because the same concept is expressed in other languages with
a different signifier. A tree in Spanish, for example, is arbol. In German,
it’s baum. In Swedish, it’s trad. And, if we wanted to, we could agree to
substitute a different word for tree— say “trashpanda villa.” As long as
you and I both understand that trashpanda villa refers to a leafy thing
with branches out in the world (and, for that matter, that trashpanda
is how we’re going to refer to raccoons), the sign will work fine for us.
Don’t the trashpanda villas look gorgeous this fall? Signs therefore rely
on convention', learned and shared understandings of how signifiers and
signifieds go together.

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T CHAPTER 2 | THE SEMIOTIC A P P R O A C H

Now, let’s take things the next step. The arbitrary nature o f the sign
on its own is interesting to contemplate. Even more fascinating though
is the way in which most signs become meaningful to us: through their
relationship with other signs. Here, we can talk about two different types
of relationships among signs— and these will be important to us moving
forward: paradigmatic relationships and syntagmatic relationships. The
way to think of the paradigm is as a category of related signs. I f we go
with the paradigm “tree,” then that includes oak, maple, larch, willow,
banzai, yew, and so on. The paradigm “racket sports” includes tennis,
ping pong, racquetball, badminton, etc. Each sign within a paradigm
acquires meaning by virtue o f not being others of the same type. An
oak is not a maple, willow, or larch. Thinking about color can help make
this clear: looking at your box of 64 Crayola crayons, how would you
describe the color “blue”? Well, its darker than cornflower blue, but
lighter than midnight blue. The meaning o f “blue” therefore depends
on its difference from other members of the same paradigm.

50 Shades o f (Bluish) Grey

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 SECTION 1 | THE POP CULTURE T O O L B O X

Syntagmatic relationships, in contrast, are relationships of position—

where one sign is in relation to others. I f we are talking about spoken
or written language, then the meaning a sign acquires has to do with
what precedes and follows it in a sentence. I f I say, “Oh, no! The dog...!”
our understanding of “dog” here wont be fixed until the sentence is
finished: “Oh, no! The dog ordered take-out again!” Here, the syntagm
is a sequential arrangement— a kind of chain o f meaning. It is only
when we get to the end o f the sentence that we can retroactively impose
meaning on words in the chain— the dog is now busted for stealing
your credit card. Where visual elements are concerned, syntagmatic
relationships can also be spatial— the visual relationship between one
sign and others. A picture o f one person alone in the bleachers of a
stadium means something very different to us than a picture o f that
same person surrounded by many other people (see Figs. 2.4 and 2.5).
Meaning is constructed by the relationship of one sign to others that
surround it.

Figs. 2.4 and 2.5 Go Team!

In thinking about the meaning conveyed by signs, it is also import­

ant to distinguish between denotation and connotation. The denotative
meaning of a sign is what we might consider its dictionary definition:

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 CHAPTER 2 | THE SEMIOTIC A PPR O A C H

its most basic or literal meaning.

The denotative meaning of a rose
is “a prickly bush or shrub that
typically bears red, pink, yellow,
or white fragrant flowers” and so
on. However, we know that roses
come saturated with connota­
tions— associations attached to the
sign that come from our culture
and our personal experience. Roses,
we have been taught, mean love,
passion, Valentine s Day, and so on.
A useful example to help
clarify these semiotic concepts is
the category of tattoos. Tattoos are
a type of language— a signifying
system (see Figs. 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8).
Individual tattoos are signs— the
signifier is the design, the signi­
fied is what it conveys. But what Figs. 2.6, 2.y, 2.8 Tattoos
does a tattoo tell us? First, we may
consider the design itself: a “tribal” pattern, a detailed Japanese koi fish,
rudimentary blue ink letters, or a rose will each signify— mean— dif­
ferently to us based upon our understandings of and associations with
these images. And then we consider the syntagmatic relationships: on
whose body does the tattoo appear? Where is it placed? And what is its
connection to other tattoos or forms o f body adornment? A rose tattoo
signifies differently depending if it is on a conventionally feminine woman
or conventionally masculine man, if it is on the small of the back or on
the face, and if it appears alone or is part of an elaborate cluster of tattoos.

Y O U R T U R N : Consider each of these images—in each case,

what meaning is conveyed to you by the tattoo and why does it
signify that way to you?

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Another useful example of thinking about signs and signifying sys­

tems is fashion, which is also a rule-governed system of communication
(see, for example, Figs. 2.9, 2.10, and 2.n). We can think o f pieces of
clothing as signs. Shoes and hats and everything in between are mean­
ingful objects. Just what they mean, however, depends not only on the
signs themselves, but their combination and their context. A slinky
black dress may be appropriate for a formal evening event, but not for
bowling. And that slinky black dress signifies quite differently if it is on
a conventionally feminine woman or on a big burly dude. A blue blazer
with a blue-and-red-striped tie on a man is regarded as conservative.
However, what if the man wearing the blazer and tie is also wearing
shorts and sandals?

Y O U R T U R N : What rules do you know that govern fashion—

about how, when, and where articles of clothing are conventionally
worn?

Figs. 2.9 ,2.10 ,2.11 Outfits

Y O U R T U R N : Consider each of these images above—in each

case, what meaning is conveyed to you by the articles of clothing
and why do they signify this way for you?

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The kinds of signs we have been discussing in which the relationship

between signifier and signified is arbitrary and must be learned are
sometimes called symbolic signs. Before moving on from semiotics, it
is important to note, however, that there are two types of exceptions to
this rule. Iconic signs are words or images that resemble the thing they
represent. A picture of pancakes on a Waffle House menu, for example,
is an icon: it is a delicious visual approximation of the concept associated
with it. The connection between a picture of a stack of pancakes and the
concept of pancakes is not arbitrary; it is instead one o f resemblance.
The signifiers of indexical signs, in contrast, may not look or sound like
their signifieds, but nevertheless are directly connected in some way.
Smoke, for example, points (as with your index finger) to fire. A sign
at the beach with a shark fin is a warning that there may be ... wait for
i t ... sharks in the water! These associations still need to be learned, but
there is a kind of causal connection tethering them together.

DANGER

Types o f Signs

Y O U R T U R N : Would you categorize each of these signs above

as symbolic, iconic, or indexical?

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Myfhs and Ideology

Much o f what we’ll be doing in our considerations of popular culture is

thinking about both what popular culture means and how it creates and
conveys those meanings. Using the language introduced above, we’ll be
thinking about categories of popular culture as rule-governed systems
of communication composed of signs that acquire meaning in light of
their denotative and connotative meanings, as well as their paradigmatic
and syntagmatic relationships with other signs. One sitcom or hip-hop
artist or social media app becomes meaningful to us in particular ways
through its relationships to others in the same paradigm, the context
in which it is consumed or used, and all the associations we bring to
bear upon it. As a starting point though, before we attempt to assign
meaning or to interpret the significance o f a pop culture object or
practice, we need to ask a series o f questions about just what the thing
is in the first place. Signs as part of signifying systems are where we
start our investigation. Only after we consider what something is and
how and why it is performed or used can we then start to consider its
larger significance within its historical context. Questions to ask at the
start therefore include:

• What makes this thing or practice what it is?

• What qualities does it possess?
• How is it used or performed?
• How does it compare or contrast with other, similar things?
• Who uses it?
• In what contexts is it used?
• Why is it used?

The sign is our beginning point. Where we end up is with myths,

ideology, and codes. The idea of myth within semiotics differs a good
bit from the commonplace understandings of myths as either traditional
stories, often set long ago and involving gods and monsters (such as
those including Greek gods and goddesses), or widely held but false

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 CHAPTER 2 | THE SEMIOTIC A PPRO A CH

beliefs (such as that George Washington chopped down a cherry tree

and then confessed when busted for it). Within semiotics, the idea of
myth was developed by the twentieth-century French literary theorist
and philosopher Roland Barthes in a seminal work called Mythologies
in which he defines myth as the disguising o f history as nature. As
discussed above, signs are little units of meaning consisting of signifiers
and signifieds that are initially connected arbitrarily but then cemented
together by convention. English-language speakers have agreed (without
ever really having been consulted or thinking about it) that “rose” is a
sign that consists of the letters R -O -S-E attached to a mental image
of a flower— likely red, having a stem with thorns, and so on. What
myth does, according to Barthes, is to take that sign and overlay an
additional meaning on it: passion. Because roses have been associated
so consistently and for so long with romance-—in poetry, literature, film,
and television; in Valentine’s Day marketing; in wedding ceremonies,
and so on— the concept “passion” seems to be intrinsically associated
with roses, as if the rose itself somehow naturally expresses the ideas of
passion, love, and [Link] connection between roses and passion is
convention. There is no reason at all that roses have to be the go-to gift

Passionate Roses

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 SECTION 1 | THE PO P CULTURE T O O L B O X

for Valentine’s Day—it’s just the way things have developed over time.
However, we’ve heard and seen roses connected with love and romance
so often that the connection now seems “the way it is.”
This, for Barthes, is how myth functions: it takes an association that
is the product o f historical forces— repetition over time in the case of
the rose— and presents it to us as natural, just the way things are. To
put it into technical terms, Barthes refers to myth as a “second-order
semiological system”: “That which is a sign in the first system, becomes a
mere signifier in the second.” Here’s how this looks schematically using
the example of horseshoes in Fig. 2.12:

(1) Signifier (2) Signified

HORSESHOE

0
(3) Sign
Good Luck
HORSESHOE
(II) Signified
(1) Signfiier

(III) Sign
MYTH OF HORSESHOE BEING LUCKY

Fig. 2.12 Myth

A t this point, you may be saying, “OK. What’s the big deal?” What is
important about myth for Barthes is that it illustrates how ideology func­
tions. While there may be a tendency to think o f ideology as something
other people have, we are all subject to ideology because ideology refers
to the ideas, beliefs, and principles that structure our world view. From
the moment we are born, we are immersed in ideology—bombarded by

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messages from family and friends and institutions and texts that tell us
what we should believe to be right, normal, and natural. In some cases,
our ideological beliefs may be the result o f conscious deliberation—we
may march in the cause of Black Lives Matter (BLM ), for example, or
petition the government to be more active in addressing climate change
because our beliefs and experiences lead us to conclude that engaging in
these ways is an important expression of our values. Although it is difficult,
we may also choose to depart from the views we were raised with or that
we subscribed to at some point in our lives. In other cases, ideological
beliefs may be unrecognized or unconscious. Many people for a long
time simply assumed that men were better suited for professional careers
and women for domestic and childcare duties. Some people questioned
this, but many did not because, they assumed, “this is just the way things
are.”Today, some may simply assume, for example, that the “natural” tra­
jectory for personal growth is school, work, marriage, perhaps children,
home-ownership, and so on, because that is a narrative we have heard
[Link] is how ideology functions. A particular social configuration
that has emerged over time and, importantly, benefits some members of
society, is presented as the “right” and “natural” way things are done. In
many cases, as we’ll discuss in the next section of this chapter, people are
even coerced into participating in their own disenfranchisement.
The thing about ideology is that our ideological beliefs, to us, seem
obvious, right, and natural. O f course democracy is the best political
system! O f course people should be free to say whatever they want! O f
course capitalism is the best economic system! Other people are the
crazy ones for not sharing our beliefs— and if they would only think on
the matter carefully, no doubt they would realize they are wrong, we are
correct, and then shift their views, right? It can be difficult to consider
that, from someone else’s perspective, our ideological views are equally
suspect or pernicious, because we generally act in ways congruent with
our “values”—what matters to us, what we have been told and/or come
to believe is important. Indeed, we can become quite defensive when our
ideological beliefs are questioned—wars have been fought over which
religion or economic system is the best or truest.

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Y O U R T U R N : A powerful example of ideology in action is the

idea of the American Dream. The American Dream is the belief that,
through hard work and honest dealings, all Americans, no matter
how humble their origins, can achieve material success and rise to a
place of prominence within American society. Where have you seen
this idea before? Do you believe it is true? Whose interests does it
serve and what would happen if lower-class Americans stopped
believing in it?

For the purposes of our investigation of popular culture, were going

to save our conclusions about whether we agree with something or not
until the end. We will, however, be very, very suspicious of anything
presented to us as “natural,” “the right way,” “just the way things are,”
and so on. Rather than accepting these claims, we will consider instead:

• How did this particular way of doing things or thinking come about?
That is, we may seek to recover its history.
• Whose interests does it serve?
• What other ways of thinking or doing things are there?

Congealed Ideology

Here is where things get even more interesting (I know—you’re saying,

“not possible!” Well, hang on to your hat). It is relatively easy to appreciate
things like political movements, advocacy groups, religious sects, and
so on as motived by ideology. But what about a desk?
Maybe you’ve had the misfortune of sitting at a desk such as the
ones pictured in Fig. 2.13 below (maybe you are even “sitting” in one
right now).The molded plastic seats are uncomfortable and the desktop
is awkward and slippery. What does the desk— and the classroom in
which it exists— tell us about the philosophy of education that governs
the school or university in which it is placed? Lots, actually. It tells us for
one thing that education is not supposed to be fun, relaxed, or comfort­
able, but serious business— this is emphasized as well by the absence of

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 CHAPTER 2 | THE SEMIOTIC A PPR O A CH

- 4 1*

* ■ *
/T'g. 2./J Desks as Congealed Ideology

carpet, the bare walls, and the florescent lighting. Students are supposed
to sit upright and utilize the space afforded them for taking notes. The
placement of desks in rows facing forward discourages collaboration
and directs student attention across the great divide toward the teacher
at the front of the room— the teacher, who is standing and free to move
while students are awkwardly stuffed into seats in rows, is the authority.
It is the teachers job to unscrew the tops o f their students’ heads and
pour in knowledge, which the students will then regurgitate to show
they have been paying attention on exams and in papers. In short, the
desk is what we can consider “congealed ideology”— the distillation of a
conventional philosophy of education in the form of aluminum, plastic,
and wood. The desk— a sign— in conjunction with the other signs that
surround it tells us a lot about the understandings of what teaching and
learning are that will prevail in that classroom.
I f classrooms organized as in the image above— rows o f singular
desks facing the front of the room— are all you’ve ever seen, no doubt
because of its familiarity, this would seem the natural and correct way
to do it. But we can pause for a moment and ask our questions: what

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SECTION 1 | THE PO P CULTURE T O O L B O X

other kinds o f desks— or seating arrangements— could be substituted?

How else could the space of learning be organized? What other models
of pedagogy could be substituted?

Y O U R T U R N : What ideas about teaching and learning are

conveyed by the two images in Figs. 2.14 and 2.15 and how do
they compare to the traditional classroom pictured above? Which
educational space do you think would be most effective in facilitating
student learning and why?

Figs. 2.14 and 2.15

Whats true of desks in classrooms is

true of all the things we encounter:
they are— or become— congealed
forms o f ideology that reflect and
naturalize particular ways o f think­
ing about the world. Here’s another
example. Consider the object in Fig.
2.16:

Fig. 2.1 6 Baseball M itt

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 CHAPTER 2 | THE SEMIOTIC A PPR O A C H

We can start by asking our questions:

• What makes this thing or practice what it is?

• What qualities does it possess?
• How is it used or performed?
• How does it compare or contrast with other, similar things?
• Who uses it?
• In what contexts is it used?
• Why is it used?
• What associations are connected with it?

Many people will recognize the object as a baseball mitt— a tool used
in a game o f sport to protect the hand and facilitate catching a ball. In
what ways could there be anything ideological about that? I f we start by
asking what this thing is and what qualities define it, we might notice
that it is made of leather— an animal product. Right there, we can see
one way in which the baseball glove is congealed ideology: it is one
object among many (shoes, belts, jackets, sofas and chairs, and so on)
that helps to naturalize the idea that animals are objects available for
human use (and, I would add, at this point, we are bracketing off our
feelings about the use of animals in this way. Our goal now is first to
explore the ways that this material object reflects larger social patterns,
beliefs, and understandings before then evaluating those positions).
Noticing that the glove is made of leather and, therefore, participates
in the naturalization of animals as raw materials for human objects is a>
good starting point. But we can go further, because consideration of the
mitt prompts us to think about what baseball is, who plays it, and the
contexts in which it is played. Baseball is a rule-governed competitive
sport in which teams square off with players having specialized positions
(pitcher, catcher, outfielder, etc.) and, usually, a coach who directs the
players— it is a game that combines collaboration with competition,
and naturalizes the ideas that individuals or groups must compete with
others to win and be “the best,” and that individuals have particular
roles to play within the collective of the team. Baseball reinforces the

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ideas that one must follow the rules of the game (there are penalties for
breaking the rules) and that there will always be winners and losers— and
that winning “within the rules” is the ultimate goal. Further, players are
supposed to be “team players” and to collaborate by playing their parts—
independent action is discouraged and creative thinking is minimized.
In organized play (leagues and professional), the rules are policed by
umpires and line judges, who have the final say.
Baseball, when described in this way, is weirdly like a corporation:
workers play their prescribed roles within the “team” overseen by a boss
with the goal of “winning”—beating their competitors and making the
most profit possible for the company and its investors. Perhaps this is
why baseball has often been described as “America’s pastime”? However,
one could reasonably push back here and say that other team sports
are organized in the same way: football, hockey, soccer, and so on all
are rule-governed sports in which players have positions, coaches make
decisions, and winning is the objective. You would be exactly right to
point this out (go you!)— and it leads to a significant realization: the
forces telling us that “winning” means beating our opponents, that there
will always be winners and losers, that we need to play our roles, play
by the rules, and respect those in position o f authority are everywhere
and, as we’ll talk about a bit in the next chapter, reflect how capitalism
functions. The baseball mitt then— when used as intended at least— is
emblematic of a complete worldview. This is how ideology functions:
it presents one possible configuration— in this case, o f sport— as just
the way things are done. This now raises the question: how else could
sports be played? Are there ways that sports can be wholly collabora­
tive rather than competitive? Can sports have goals other than “win­
ning”? Can sports allow participants to play various roles and exercise
independent thinking?
We could go on here and talk about how sports in general and
baseball in particular naturalize a division between work and leisure—-
similar to our discussion of the Frankfurt School’s opinion of popular
music, going to a ball game on a summer afternoon allows us to return
to “the grind” refreshed— a kind of escape valve to blow off steam and

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 CHAPTER 2 | THE SEMIOTIC A PPRO A CH

keep the system stable (serving the interests o f those in positions of

power and authority who benefit from the present status quo). We
could also consider the history o f baseball and the kinds o f bodies it
has conventionally privileged (what does it mean that the professional
participants in “America’s pastime” have been all male, all able-bodied,
and primarily white?). We could talk about player salaries in the major
leagues, how they compare to what teachers and civil servants make,
and what that tells us about American culture and its priorities. But I
think you get the point: we started with a baseball mitt and ended up
with a consideration of the ideological beliefs that structure the game
and baseball’s role in naturalizing a particular worldview.
The idea here is that all the objects we encounter find a place in our
ideological worldview. Certainly, human-made objects from baseball
gloves to classroom desks to paper plates to giant inflatable holiday
decorations are the products of human assumptions and intentions.
But even elements of the natural world are made meaningful in light
of our ideological beliefs and understandings. Going back to our initial
sign “tree,” the denotative mean­
ing o f tree is “a woody perennial
plant, typically having a single
stem or trunk growing to a con­
siderable height and bearing lat­
eral branches at some distance
from the ground.” However, the
meaning o f a particular tree— or
group o f trees— for us in the real
world will have everything to do
with not just our personal experi­
ences and connotations with trees,
but with also the larger systems
o f thinking that have shaped our
understandings. Fig. 2.17 is a pic­
ture o f a larch.
Fig. 2 .1J The Larch

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 SECTIO N 1 | THE PO P CULTURE T O O L B O X

What do you think this tree would mean to you if you were (a) a
logger whose livelihood depended upon harvesting trees; (b) a developer
seeking to build a housing development where it stands; (c) an environ­
mental activist interested in preserving the habitat of the endangered
Northern Spotted Owl who nests in these trees; (d) a climate change
activist who recognizes deforestation as an important component in
global warming; (e) an artist who paints landscapes. Human beings
don’t make trees in the same ways that we intentionally manipulate
materials to create objects for use or enjoyment (although we can gen­
etically manipulate trees and plant them); however, what they mean for
us depends upon their place in our ideological worldview.

Y O U R T U R N : In what way can the objects pictured below (Figs.

2.18 and 2.19) be considered congealed ideology? What beliefs or
assumptions about the world do they naturalize?

Figs. 2.18 and 2.19 A Hummer and a Cell Phone

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 CHAPTER 2 | THE SEMIOTIC A PPR O A C H

Codes

In our discussion of baseball and trees above, we have already shifted

from a consideration of the denotative and connotative meanings of
signs to their participation in what we can refer to as codes. In this
case, unlike with myth, the semiotic understanding of codes is relatively
close to the common understanding. Codes in general are systems of
communication. To decode a message—that is, to render it intelligible,
to make sense of it— one needs a “key,” a set of instructions that help
translate elements of the code. Morse code, for example, famously uses
dots and dashes in place of letters to form words. Three dots equal the
letter “S” and three dashes equal the letter O. Originally established
for maritime use, “SO S” is a distress call, sometimes translated as “save
our ship.” (Incidentally, SOS is a great example o f the arbitrary nature
of the sign. There is no reason at all that three dots should equal an
“S” or three dashes an “O.” It’s just convention.) In order to translate
dots and dashes into letters, one needs a key. After a while, once one
has memorized the key, dots and dashes can be immediately translated
into letters forming words.
In semiotics, codes function more or less in the same way: as
interpretive frameworks for making sense of signs. Codes guide us
in making sense of something— a statement, an action, an object, etc.
For example, the idea o f a “dog whistle” can be understood as a pol­
itical message intended for a very specific group and which one cant
“hear” unless one understands the code o f which it is a part. The use
of former US President Barack Obama’s middle name, Hussein, was
often construed as a “racist dog-whistle”— part of a xenophobic and
Islamophobic code intended by the president’s detractors to highlight
his skin color and to stoke intolerance. The political message o f the
“dog whistle” can’t be interpreted unless one is conversant with the
code o f which it is a part.
Codes in general, however, aren’t always or even usually as per­
nicious as racist codes that permit one to make sense o f political
dog-whistles. Codes are, at bottom, shared understandings among

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users o f signs— learned sets o f conventions that allow us to make

sense of signs. According to Carl W. Jones, codes function as “general
maps o f meaning, belief systems about oneself and others, which
[imply] views and attitudes about how the world is and/or ought to
be” (Jones 500). Codes, in short, are the point at which semiotics and
ideology meet. L et’s take our example o f the Hummer in Fig. 2.18
above. To the person who buys one, it not only signifies wealth but
is part o f the code o f “rugged masculinity”— derived from military
H U M V E E s, the Hummer signals “toughness”; it takes up space
and fuel efficiency is a minimal concern. (This is what we might call
a displaced code as the Hummer stands in for the owner’s rugged
masculinity.) Interpreted using a different code, however, the same
features o f the Hummer can be understood as representative o f “toxic
masculinity”— traditional cultural norms o f masculinity that are harm­
ful to men, women, and society. The same object, therefore, can be
interpreted in light of multiple codes.

Y O U R T U R N : Consider the following images in Figs. 2.20 and

2.21. What "key"—that is, what cultural understanding—is needed
to decode their meaning?

Figs. 2.20 and 2.21

 CHAPTER 2 | THE SEMIOTIC A P P R O A C H

Encoding / Decoding

This brings us then to what is often referred to as the “encoding / decod­

ing” model o f communication developed by cultural studies scholar
Stuart Hall in the early 1970s. While we’ll be discussing this in greater
depth in chapter 5 on film and television, this model of communication
addresses how messages result in meaning. The first step is encoding in
which the sender of a message uses signs to “package” a meaning they
wish someone else to receive. These signs may be verbal or non-ver­
bal. The decoding of the message is how the recipient of the message
interprets it— and there are three possibilities here for a message that
is understood in some way:

• The dominant / hegemonic position is one in which the message is

interpreted in the way it was intended.
• The negotiated position is a mixture of acceptance and rejection.
The message is understood, but not fully taken up.
• The oppositional position is one in which the recipient understands
the message but rejects it.

Our Hummer can again serve as a good example here. I f someone buys
a Hummer intending to signal their rugged masculinity and someone
else is impressed by their purchase for that reason, then the recipient of
the message occupies the dominant / hegemonic position. I f someone
responds to the Hummer by envying the rugged masculinity aspect
but being bothered by the fuel inefficiency and ostentatious display of
wealth, the recipient of the message occupies the negotiated position.
And if someone responds to the Hummer by viewing it as emblematic
o f toxic masculinity—disdain for the environment, taking up excessive
space, fetishizing military violence, and so on, this would clearly be
an oppositional position. All three positions understand the code of
“rugged masculinity” being deployed through the Hummer; the way in
which the they interpret the message, however, reflects the recipients’
own ideological beliefs.

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Y O T J R T U R N : What message is conveyed by the following

image in Fig. 2.22 and what form would a dominant / hegemonic
response, a negotiated response, and an opposition response take?

Fig. 2.22

Code Switching

Much o f what I ’ve said about codes above as shared understandings

by users o f signs can be illustrated by attending briefly to the phe­
nomenon of “code switching.” Code switching refers to the practice
of alternating between two or more languages or language variants in
conversation. This can refer to something obvious, such as a bilingual
speaker switching from English to Spanish. It can also, however, refer
to consciously adopting or disguising an accent to facilitate a particular
agenda. For example, a National Public Radio story from 2013 noted
that US restaurant servers who adopt a convincing Southern accent “get
better tips and more sympathetic customers” (“Five Reasons”). In the
hilarious 2018 cinematic send up of American racism and stereotypes,

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Sorry to BotherYou (Boots Riley), telemarketer Cassius Green (Lakeith

Stanfield) is instructed by his co-worker (played by Danny Glover) to
use his “white voice” when trying to sell encyclopedias. Disguising his
usual intonation with a pinched, nasal parody o f whiteness results in
increased sales and preferential treatment.

Lakeith Stanfield as Cassius Green in Sorry to Bother You

In the cases o f restaurant servers adopting Southern accents and

Cassius Green in Sorry to Bother You, code switching is a conscious
strategy— a way to encode messages such that they will be decoded
by recipients in a dominant / hegemonic way. However, we all do this
to varying extents in our daily lives—you probably don’t speak the
same when hanging out with friends as you do when addressing your
boss at work. That’s code switching, too, and it reveals a sophisticated
understanding of the relation of code to context.

Y O U R T U R N : What other examples of code switching can you

think of?

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Much of what has been introduced in this chapter will be returned

to and developed more fully in the chapters to come. The main idea to
take away here, however, is that everything in some sense is ideological
as we are all constantly engaged in a process o f making our world
meaningful in light of our current understandings, values, beliefs, and
the codes we speak. What we will continue to investigate is how signs
are produced, interpreted, and circulated.

Suggested Assignments

1. Focusing on a particular sign (such as a tattoo or outfit, as discussed

above), explore the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships that
govern how it signifies.
2. Looking deeper into Roland Barthes's idea of mythologies, analyze
a myth you see as important and explain how history is disguised
as nature.
3. Explore how a common object can be considered congealed
ideology.

Works Cited in This Chapter

Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. Translated by Annette Lavers, Farrar, Straus

and Giroux, 1972.
Hall, Stuart. "Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse."
Discussion Paper. CCCS Stencilled Occasional Papers, University of
Birmingham, 1973, [Link]
Jones, Carl W. "Personal Branding: 'Encoding a Personal Brand Through
Semiotics: A Case Study.'" Semiotics and Visual Communication
III: Cultures of Branding, edited by Evripides Zantides, Cambridge
Scholars Press, 2019, pp. 492-511.
Thompson, Matt. "Five Reasons Why People Code Switch." National Public
Radio, 13 Apr. 2013, [Link]
codeswitch/2013 /0 4/1 3/1 77126294/five-reasons-why-people-
code-switch.

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Additional Reading Suggestions

Berger, Arthur Asa. Signs in Contemporary Life: An Introduction to

Semiotics. 2nd ed., Sheffield Publishing Company, 1999.
Blonsky, Marshall. American Mythologies. Oxford UP, 1992.
Chandler, Daniel. Semiotics: The Basics. 3rd ed., Routledge, 2017.
Danesi, Marcel. O f Cigarettes, High Heels, and Other Interesting Things: An
Introduction to Semiotics. St. Martin's Press, 1999.
Eco, Umberto. A Theory o f Semiotics. Indiana UP, 1976.
Sebeok, Thomas Albert. Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics. University of
Toronto Press, 2001.

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