TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies

2023-2025
European Commission Grant No 101095237

SOCIAL MEDIA PARTICIPATION AND

POLITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS
DEMOCRACY

Deliverable number: D6.1

Due date: 29 Feb 2024
Type: REPORT
Dissemination Level: PU (PUBLIC)
Work Package: WP6. Social media and political trust: democracy backing or
democracy destabilization
Lead Beneficiary: UKBA-SK
Contributing
All partners provided feedback
Beneficiaries:
Authors: Baboš Pavol, Dolný Branislav, Világi Aneta

Purpose and scope of the deliverable:

The purpose of this report is to expand upon existing theories and the current state of the art, laying the
groundwork for research within the TRUEDEM project's work package 6, which focuses on social
media and political trust. Some authors emphasize the significance of the "input" side of liberal
democracy in fostering public confidence, particularly in connection to decision-making processes.
Social media has recently emerged as a critical component of online news dissemination and
consumption, serving as a vital tool for sharing political information and facilitating political dialogue
among various stakeholders. Viewed from this perspective, social media offer opportunities for
investigating new channels for translating citizens' demands into policymaking and for analysing
modern tools for political engagement. Consequently, this framework paper explores the interaction
between social media participation and political attitudes towards democracy.

Citation: Baboš, P., Dolný, B., Világi, A. (2024). Social media participation and political attitudes
towards democracy. Working paper no. 6.1. TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies Project
([Link]).
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Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3
Project summary ................................................................................................................... 3
Summary of the report (D 6.1) ............................................................................................. 3
1 Exploring the links between social media and political behaviour .................................... 4
1.1 Social media and political trust .................................................................................... 4
1.2 Social media, polarization and populism ..................................................................... 4
1.3 Social media, political knowledge and news exposure ................................................ 5
1.4 Social media and political participation ....................................................................... 7
2 Exploring the links between social media and attitudes towards democracy ................. 10
2.1 Conceptualisation and operationalization of democratic attitudes............................. 10
2.2 Social media and democratic attitudes ....................................................................... 15
2.3 Measuring the effects ................................................................................................. 16
3 Political trustworthiness and social media ......................................................................... 21
4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 22
References ..................................................................................................................................... 24

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Introduction
Project summary
TRUEDEM is a 3-year multinational research project funded by the Horizon program of the
European Commission with several core objectives. TRUEDEM aims to design and implement a
complex research effort to collect comprehensive evidence on the perceptions of trust and
judgments of trustworthiness in a range of European states. The project will create a robust and
comprehensive knowledge base on long-term dynamics and predictors of trust in political
institutions of representative democracy (parties, executives, parliaments, judiciary etc.) in the EU.
TRUEDEM will examine the role of new patterns of electoral behaviour, impact of socioeconomic
transformations, the erosion of old and emergence of new political cleavages for the inclusiveness,
representativity and legitimacy in European democracies, and political trust. TRUEDEM will
identify strategies to address the demands and needs of citizens expressed via both electoral and
non-electoral forms of political participation as means to enhance active engagement and inclusion
and thus booster inclusive and responsive decision-making and governance in Europe. TRUEDEM
will distinguish clusters of values that can hinder or foster pro-democratic values and attitudes and
thus contribute to the barriers and opportunities to re-invigorating and enhancing representative
democratic systems. Finally, TRUEDEM will develop a comprehensive and transparent toolbox of
policy interventions including recommendations, toolkits and methodologies for enhancing trust in
political institutions, boosting transparency inclusiveness of representative systems. TRUEDEM is
coordinated in Austria with partners in Czechia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine. The three-year program runs from January 2023 to
December 2025.
Summary of the report (D 6.1)
This report is a part of work package 6 “Social media and political trust: democracy backing or
democracy destabilization”, led by Aneta Világi, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia.
This research framework paper focuses on political trust, trustworthiness, democracy and the role
played by social media. The aim of the paper is to elaborate on existing theories and state of art
and prepare groundwork for the subsequent research in this work package.
Performance theories suggest that attitudes formation reflect rational calculations in decision-
making processes about trustworthy relationships. The evaluation may result from either one or
both dimensions: 1) reflection of the past competency of agents and agencies; 2) reflection of the
performance of government decision-making processes (e.g. transparency, good governance etc.).
The “filters” individuals use for reflection of objective agency performance are various, however,
academic literature stresses the role played by information provided by media. The communication
channels might trigger the processes of informed decision-making and therefore influence the
judgements on trustworthiness (Norris 2002). Social media recently have become an important part
of online news distribution and consumption (Newman et al., 2021), crucial tool for sharing
political information (Bhagat and Kim, 2023) and serve as easily accessible platforms for political
dialogue (interactions with agents, agencies and other users). From this perspective, social media
offer amply opportunities for studying new channels for transfer of citizen’s demands into the
policymaking and for analysing modern tools for political communication and participation.
Therefore, the research focus within the TRUEDEM project (WP6) incorporates also an
investigation of the links between political trust, democracy and social media usage.

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1 Exploring the links between social media and political behaviour

Social media can be broadly defined as “a group of internet-based application that build on the
ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of
user-generated content” (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010: 60). Prominent examples of social media
platforms encompass Facebook, Instagram, X (previously Twitter), YouTube, TikTok, and others.
Despite the distinct features inherent in various platforms and applications, scholars commonly
employ the overarching terms 'social media' or 'digital media' to undertake their examination.
The academic literature is not unified nor straightforward on the effects social media have on
democracy. While exploring such links, the studies focus on the influence social media usage has
on political behaviour and political attitudes. There are several political activities of citizens that
draw the attention of political scientist like electoral behaviour, political participation or interest in
politics. While such activities might be of importance in any political regime, they are essential for
democratic governance. Therefore, the literature focusing on the effects of social media on political
behaviour examines the consequences that such an effect has on democracy.
1.1 Social media and political trust
The empirical studies do not find clear uniform effects of social media on democracy. However,
there is significant evidence for scholars to argue that the use of social media is associated with a
reduction in the level of political trust. Trust is generally considered a crucial element that not only
fosters societal cohesion but, concerning the political system, a certain level of trust in political
institutions is vital for the legitimacy and stability of the political system. From the perspective of
democratic regimes, trust and trustworthiness are also important in terms of the quality of
democracy.
The findings of several empirical studies are relatively unequivocal; the use of social networks and
media diminishes trust in politicians, political institutions (Kiratli 2023), public institutions
(Sabatini and Sarracino, 2019), and the media (Park et al. 2020). However, what is less clear is the
effect it has from the perspective of democracy. Evaluating the impact depends on the type of
regime in each country, making it context related. Decreasing trust in political institutions and
politicians may, in the long term, lead to the destabilization of the political regime and even its
alteration. In authoritarian regimes, the influence of social media on diminishing trust in the (non-
democratic) regime may be considered a beneficial effect. An example could be the role that social
media played during the Arab Spring (for more details, see Lutz and Toit, 2014). However, in case
of consolidated democracies (e.g., Western European countries, the USA, Australia), such an
influence of social media is considered detrimental to democracy.
1.2 Social media, polarization and populism
Yet, another detrimental effect the social media has on democracy is documented with regard to
polarization as political polarization contributes to the strengthening of extremist currents in society
and politics. Various forms of polarization, such as affective polarization, have the tendency to
divide societies into opposing camps and hinder or at least jeopardize democratic decision-making
(McCoy, Somer 2019). A specific type of polarization is the populist division of society into a
corrupt 'elite' opposed by 'the people.' As one of the essential democratic values in liberal
democracy is tolerance and derived from it, political and social pluralism, polarization that divides
society and politicians into antagonistic, cooperation-incapable camps goes against these
democratic values.

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Empirical studies on the impact of social media highlight the expansion of populist, often connected
with far-right, political communication on social media platforms, contributing to the spread of
populism in societal discourse and the increased popularity of populist parties (Schumann et al.
2021; Heiss and Matthes 2020; Bouljanne, Koc-Michalska and Bimber 2020). However, research
on the behaviour of social media users also provides mixed evidence about their impact on
strengthening polarization, depending on the research design. Studies that examine the use of social
media in general often show a positive correlation between social media usage and processes such
as partisan sorting, affective polarization, or issue alignment (e.g., Bryson 2019; Yarchi et al. 2020).
However, studies focusing on specific platforms present a more nuanced picture. For example,
studies on the use of X (formerly Twitter) in the United States unequivocally point to an increase
in polarization (Bail et al. 2018), while the use of Facebook contributed to the reduction of affective
polarization (Levy 2021). Yet, in other cases, Facebook also served to support polarization based
on right-wing populism (Heiss and Matthes 2020).
Polarization, whether broadly or in its populist form, goes against the ideals of a pluralistic
democracy. A more detailed examination of the effect in various political contexts and on different
platforms, as well as testing hypotheses about the depolarizing effect of social media, would
contribute to a better understanding of the mixed effect reported so far.
In the next sections we will delve into more detailed examination of social media effects on political
behaviour via news consumption and mobilization as these are of interest to the TRUEDEM
research agenda in WP6.
1.3 Social media, political knowledge and news exposure
Media assume a crucial role in democratic systems, playing integral roles in citizen information
dissemination, informed decision-making, and the facilitation of mechanisms for democratic
accountability by monitoring government performance. Furthermore, news media contribute
significantly to democratic socialization, aiding in the cultivation or reinforcement of democratic
values and attitudes (Lorenz-Spreen et al., 2023; Selvanathan and Lickel, 2021; Salzman, 2019).
Media research predominantly concentrates on two avenues through which media shape political
attitudes: media news effects/exposure (framing, priming, agenda setting, etc.) and contributions
to political interest. The impact of media on attitudes is encapsulated in two prominent theories:
1) the Theory of Media Malaise (Robinson, 1976); 2) the Theory of Virtuous Circle (Norris, 2000)
or Media Mobilization (Strömbäck and Shehata, 2016).
The Media Malaise thesis links media consumption to perceptions of political distrust and
inefficacy. This thesis posits that the interpretive, negative, and anti-institutional nature of media
news contributes to fostering such attitudes (Robinson, 1976). Experimental testing by Cappella
and Jamieson (1997) confirmed that the effect of media news consumption on political cynicism
(distrust) is attributed to the framing of politics as a strategic game, portraying political actors as
self-interested rather than working towards the common good. Television often bears responsibility
for inducing civic malaise, with the Internet expected to exacerbate the issue (e.g., Putnam, 2000).
Contrastingly, Norris' argument on the Media Virtuous Circle asserts that "attention to campaign
communication and feelings of political trust are mutually reinforcing, producing a virtuous circle"
(2000: 251). New communication channels potentially allow greater interactivity between voters
and politicians (Norris, 2023). Newton (1999) similarly emphasizes positive effects, associating
media news consumption with increased political trust, knowledge, and interest.

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Media environment and media consumption patterns have changed significantly during the last
decades (Williams and Delli Carpini, 2011). As Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre and Shehata (2016)
pointed out, low-choice media environment transform into high-choice environments and
individual motivations and abilities become more important for understanding the effect of media
on one´s attitudes.
The impact of the evolving media landscape on the quality of democracy remains a subject of
contention. While there is mixed evidence suggesting a potential benefit for democracy, a
concurrent accumulation of studies highlights a growing body of evidence indicating a detrimental
effect on democracy.
The current discussions about the role of social media on democracy and democratic attitudes are
characterized by a higher level of complexity compared to the debates of the 1990s (Lindner and
Aichholzer, 2020). Social media, as innovative online platforms allowing users to construct public
or semi-public profiles, establish connections, and explore connections made by others (Boyd and
Ellison, 2007), present a new realm of internet-based communication. These platforms offer diverse
opportunities for user interaction (Boulianne, 2015), significantly entangling with traditional mass
media and becoming deeply embedded in daily practices (Graham and Schwanholz, 2020). The
unprecedented popularity and use of platforms like Facebook, Twitter (X), and Instagram have
gradually integrated into formal politics. However, the complexity of understanding their impact
arises due to the evolving nature of these platforms within a hybrid media system (Boersma and
Graham, 2016). Current debates on social media and democratic attitudes are part of a broader
discussion on the crisis of liberal democracy, marked by declining civic and political engagement,
reduced trust in political institutions and representatives, and the rise of anti-liberal tendencies
(Lindtner and Aichholzer, 2020).
Arguments for social media democratizing potential pointed on their capacity to promote horizontal
communication, collaboration, and diverse opinions, allowing easy connections and independent
opinion formation outside established institutions (Dahlgren, 2013). Social media bring forth
additional information sources, contributing to a better-informed public (Price, 2013). They
increase exposure to politically relevant information, diversify sources and viewpoints, and enable
dialogue and democratic participation as alternatives to traditional forms (Boulianne, 2015). This
was exemplified by the early events of the Arab Spring, demonstrating their impact on interest
articulation outside conventional democratic channels (Lutz and Toit, 2014).
On the other hand, scholars have argued that the potential for digital democracy is greatly
overstated or that the digital media pro-democratic potential is conditional and content restrictions
by government influence such potential (Stoycheff, 2020). Empirical evidence often showcases the
detrimental impact of social media on democratic processes, failing to fulfill optimistic ideas about
democracy's positive transformation. Concerns arise from pathologies associated with social
network communication, including fake news, filter bubbles, echo chambers, hate speech, rapid
spread of false information, and promotion of authoritarianism (Shin et al., 2018; Pariser, 2011;
Sustein, 2017; Chetty and Alathur, 2018; Soroush et al., 2018; Fuchs, 2018). These phenomena
contribute to declining trust, increased polarization, and the rise of populist and authoritarian
figures (Vaidhyanathan, 2018; Morelock and Narita, 2021; Schirch, 2021).
Social media algorithms may create “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011) or “echo chambers” (Burns,
2021; Sunstein, 2001) that reinforce existing biases and online tribalism, make it difficult for
individuals to engage with competing perspectives (see del Vicario et al., 2016). Echo chamber
concept is based on theory of selective exposure which explains that users intentionally choose

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information which are in congruence with their views while avoiding the information that distorts
it. Social media additionally reinforce these patterns as algorithms contribute to this selective
consumption of information with an optimized offer. While original theory of selective exposure
built on traditional media environment was mainly focused on the demand side, social networks
might reinforce the selective bias on both demand and offer side of information consumption. Thus,
when social media became a primary source of political news to citizens, their echo chamber effect
might contribute to polarization locking a social media user into information trap minimalizing
different perspectives (potential for critical thinking) on the issue. From such angle, digital media
are seen as “self-learning vehicle to indoctrination, to radicalisation, to shaming, and
discrimination” (Kaunert, de Deus Pereira & Edwards, 2022, p. 53).
Blind or uncritical trust towards digital information sources due to its echo chamber effect but also
due to its potential for amplification of misleading information (e.g. disinformation or conspiracy
theories) is seen as problematic for democracy. However, as Nguyen and Vu (2019) argue, declared
negative power of social media is rather problematic when relaying on empirical evidence. Their
study on echo chamber effect of social networks users (compared to users of other media) provides
little evidence for such impact. Rather, it was general predisposition of users towards the issue, not
their primary source of political news, that influenced their attitudes and beliefs. Similarly, Bruns
(2021) argues that “echo chambers and filter bubbles principally constitute an unfounded moral
panic that presents a convenient technological scapegoat (search and social platforms and their
affordances and algorithms) for a much more critical problem: growing social and political
polarization” (p. 33). While some studies mitigate these negative perceptions, social media have
yet to fulfill expectations as spaces for deliberative exchange of diverse arguments (Boersma and
Graham, 2016; Lindtner and Aichholzer, 2020).
1.4 Social media and political participation
The empirical studies suggest that social media encourage democratic participation and
engagement by creating opportunities for online participation. Along these lines, digital media are
often associated with greater support for democracy (Breuer and Groshek, 2012; Stoycheff, Nisbet
and Epstein, 2020).
In a broad sense, political participation refers to the activities undertaken by citizens, either directly
or indirectly, with the aim of influencing political processes (van Deth, 2014; Nissen, 2021). The
conventional understanding of political participation, as articulated by Verba et al. (1995), imposes
four essential conditions: a) it involves active actions rather than passive behaviours; b) it
encompasses unpaid actions by private citizens, excluding professional politicians or lobbyists;
c) the actions are voluntary and not coerced by external forces or legal mandates; and d) the actions
are directed toward the political system and decision-making processes.
This traditional conceptualization of political participation not only encompasses activities related
to the electoral process (such as voting and participating in election campaigns) or engaging with
government officials but also involves activities within groups seeking to influence political
decision-making and participating in protest activities (Blais, 2010). However, the identification of
novel avenues for influencing political decision-making, such as political consumerism, has posed
challenges in demarcating a clear conceptual boundary between political participation and civic
engagement. Consequently, efforts have been made to broaden the definition of political
participation to include activities challenging conventional understandings of the role and scope of
politics. This expanded definition encompasses activities addressing collective community

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problems and indirectly political activities that express the political goals and values of participants
(van Deth, 2014).
Within the literature, various arguments underscore the importance of political participation for
democracy and its proper functioning. Carole Pateman's participatory theory of democracy posits
that citizen political participation serves an educational function, influencing individuals'
opportunities to impact the political system and decisions, thereby enhancing the democratic
legitimacy of outcomes. Furthermore, participation contributes to personal growth, psychological
aspects of personality, and the acquisition of skills related to democratic procedures. Pateman
argues that participation also serves an integrating function, fostering acceptance, cooperation, and
group harmony among individuals engaged in collective decision-making (Pateman, 1970:63).
This perspective emphasizes the broader effects of participation on values, socialization, and
democratic attitudes.
Aligned with this argument, Quintelier and van Deth (2014) found that participatory behaviour
plays a crucial role in shaping the values of young people, making them more adept democrats,
particularly in terms of political attitudes and normative considerations.
Social media is thought to have the potential to enhance democratic attitudes, not necessarily
through the information it offers (media exposure), but rather through the environment it creates.
Salzman (2019) calls this environment the public sphere referring to deliberative theorists like
Habermas (2022). He points on the uniqueness of social media as a form of communication which
provide space for individuals to interconnect with one another regardless of their personal
backgrounds and immerse themselves in the deliberative processes. This means that social media
users can gather information to share and then respond when others present information or
arguments that contradict/confirm their position. Such direct experience with social media as
discursive platforms, inviting engagement and deliberation might influence pro-democratic values.
Based on empirical evidence from Latin America, Salzman points on a strong, positive relationship
between social media and democratic attitudes, more precisely he finds social media users to be
more tolerant to competing ideas and the individuals and institutions advocating those contra
positions (2019). Evidence from Norway suggests similar role of social media on democratic
attitudes via deliberative practices (Holst and Moe, 2021).
The academic discussions on political participation in a digital environment revolve around the
question of what kind of activity should be considered as ‘participation’ (Gibson and Cantijoch,
2013; Ruess et al., 2023). Some forms of online participation require minimal activity, leading
authors to dismiss them as mere clicktivism (Morozov, 2011) or 'feel-good forms of political
participation' (Vitak et al., 2010). Consequently, they are considered insufficiently legitimate to
serve as participation due to a perceived lack of ability to effect change. Others advocate for broader
definitions encompassing various contemporary forms of engagement (Norris, 2001; Theocharis,
2015; Pickard, 2020).
Ruess et al. (2023) suggest that the evolving definition of political participation in the digital age
stems from the fact that online technologies have enabled new forms of engagement previously
impossible. For instance, social media platforms like Facebook and X have facilitated sharing
political content and engaging in online discussions, while online petitions and crowdfunding
campaigns have introduced novel ways for people to participate in political causes. Overall, the
authors argue that the shifting definition of political participation in the digital age mirrors the
evolving nature of democracy and civic engagement in the 21st century. They propose that scholars

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and policymakers must acknowledge these changes and adapt their approaches accordingly to
ensure that democracy remains vibrant and inclusive in the digital age.
Some scholars argue for distinguishing between online and offline forms of participation, while
others consider them largely interchangeable. In our view, with the advancement of digital
technologies and their integration into contemporary political life, online and offline participation
complement each other. Some activities have both online and offline forms, while others exist
exclusively online or offline. Based on various recent studies, online political behaviors can be
categorized into two types: active and passive (see Table 1).
Table 1 Modes of political participation
Active Passive
voting news consumption
party/campaign activities discussions
protest activities expressive mode
communal actions
contacting politicians/institutions
Source: Gibson and Cantijoch 2013

Focusing on the online environment, the active category of political behaviors includes forms of
political participation such as petitions, protests, and so-called “digitally native activism” (Li,
Bernard and Luczak-Roesch, 2021). For instance, online movements could aim to counter online
disinformation and hate speech by campaigning to withdraw advertising from certain websites.
Passive online political behaviors encompass activities like reading political news or visiting
political websites (similar to media exposure), while expressive behaviors involve sharing political
content on social media or engaging in online discussions. In some studies, including the
aforementioned categorization, expressive engagement is considered a form of passive political
participation. However, in line with other scholars, we find the term ‘passive’ for online discussion
and expression somewhat misleading, as these activities require heightened levels of attention and
engagement (Reuss et al., 2023). In the TRUEDEM project, we aim to distinguish between “un-
constructive” expressive participation (closer to clicktivism, such as contributing with emojis to a
discussion) and “constructive” expressive participation, which seeks to achieve change (of opinion,
attitude, or policy) through argumentation. The question worth to explore is how social media is
used for political communication and participation by both sides – users as well as political actors.
Our assumption is that constructive expressive activities on social media could be considered active
political participation. Our research aims to test if political empowerment facilitated by social
media expressive participation influences democratic attitudes and to explore the effect more
thoroughly.

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2 Exploring the links between social media and attitudes towards

democracy
Similarly to impact social media has on political bahviour, the academic discourse on social media
impact on democratic attitudes yields inconclusive results. Initial optimistic views have shifted to
focus more on the problems they bring. This stream of literature is simultaneously characterized
by its emphasis on the theoretical assumptions regarding the opportunities and pitfalls that social
media bring for shaping democratic attitudes. One possible explanation is the issue related to the
conceptualization and operationalization of "pro-democratic" attitudes, which we address in the
following section.
2.1 Conceptualisation and operationalization of democratic attitudes
What can be considered pro-democratic attitudes is debatable and largely depends on the concrete
conceptualization of democracy. Mattes (2018) succinctly delineates four distinct conceptions of
democratic support. The first three emphasize varying values and personality traits, constituting
what Rose (1997) terms an "idealist" value-based approach, while the fourth centres on regime
preferences.
The first conception, micro-level theory, is founded on a set of fundamental psychological
predispositions conducive to democracy, including moderation, accommodation, tolerance,
pragmatism, interpersonal trust, efficacy, cooperation, and willingness to compromise. Individuals
possessing pro-democratic attitudes, according to this approach, must strongly endorse individual
liberty, tolerate diverse political ideas, exhibit interpersonal trust, while simultaneously
maintaining a reasonable level of distrust towards political authorities (Diamond, 2008). Research
employing this approach typically employs a series of questions prompting respondents to express
agreement or disagreement with statements related to democracy, democratic processes, and
politics more broadly.
The second conception, macro-level theory, aligns with Putnam's democracy theory, emphasizing
the role of social capital. A democratic society, according to this perspective, is characterized by
numerous civic organizations wherein citizens share overlapping memberships and a pervasive
sense of interpersonal trust. Norms of cooperation and trust extend to civic participation,
manifesting in activities such as collaborative efforts, contacting representatives, and government
monitoring. In addition to the micro-level approach, this conception incorporates the measurement
of interpersonal trust and the number of organizations to which the average citizen belongs.
The third conception is rooted in modernization theory, which posits that economic growth,
increased education levels, and enhanced communication networks propel political systems
towards liberalization and democracy (Inglehart, 1997). Individuals supportive of democracy,
according to this perspective, are those satisfied with life, trusting of others, valuing equality over
patriarchy, prioritizing participation over security, and endorsing tolerance over conformity.
The fourth conception, introduced by Mattes (2018), shifts the focus from values conducive to
democracy to popular regime preferences. In this approach, support for democracy is measured as
a choice between competing regime types, aligning with Rose's (1997) "realist" theory of
democracy and public opinion. Accordingly, a proponent of democracy is not characterized by an
inherent love for democracy or specific democratic personality traits but rather by a lack of
preference for alternative regime types.

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Transitioning from conceptualization to operationalization, constructing a valid measurement of

attitudes supporting democracy presents a considerable challenge. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007)
contend that survey questions explicitly employing the term '‘democracy’’ may elicit socially
desirable responses, as respondents might idealize democracy without necessarily internalizing
democratic values. People might answer that they support democracy, and, at the same time, they
support a strong leader unrestricted by parliament or elections, as well. To address this issue,
multiple indicator scales have been advocated.
Ariely and Davidov (2010) present two distinct scales for measurement of attitudes towards
democracy. First, the ‘‘democracy-autocracy preference’’ (DAP) scale ask respondent´s opinion
on a way of governing the country while describing various types of political systems. Second, the
‘‘democratic performance evolution’’ (DPE) scale reflects respondent’s evaluation of democratic
performance in different spheres like economy, maintenance of order, efficiency in decision-
making etc. The first scale is more in line with Easton´s (1975) “diffuse support” concept which
capture popular belief that the existing system of adopting, implementing and enforcing societal
rules are legitimate. As such it is a support for the political system that transcends individual office
holders. The second scale, performance evaluation is closer to Easton´s (1975) “specific support”
which is based on people satisfaction with what they get from the system (as “outputs”). This
specific support is more volatile as it may reflect support for the current administration or regime.
In practical terms it can reflex in a way that when preferred candidates or parties are in power,
satisfaction with democracy increases; and when preferred candidates or parties are out of power,
satisfaction with democracy decreases.
Contemporary scholarly research provides extensive data on citizen endorsement of the abstract
notion of democracy, yet there exists a notable gap in our understanding of what democracy
signifies to ordinary citizens. This problem has persisted within studies of political culture and
support (Canache, 2012; Hernández, 2016). Previous investigations predominantly focused on the
tension between favourable attitudes towards the ideal of democracy as a system of governance
and the considerably less favourable satisfaction levels with democratic governance among
citizens. By integrating these two dimensions of attitudes, aligning with the classical differentiation
between diffuse and specific support (Easton, 1975), scholars derive four potential combinations
of support and satisfaction. In addition to categorizing citizens as either democrats or non-
democrats based on their support for democracy as a governance regime, a subset of citizens
emerges who favour and endorse democracy as a suitable form of government but express
dissatisfaction with its practical functioning. This subgroup is often denoted as "critical citizens"
(Norris, 1999; 2011) or "disaffected democrats" (Dalton, 2004; Klingemann, 2014). While the
prevalence of citizens exhibiting this perception and support profile varies across individual
countries, a significant concentration is observed, particularly in Central and Eastern European
nations in contrast to their Western European counterparts.
Empirical evidence affirms that citizens differentiate between their endorsement of democracy as
a regime and their satisfaction with the state of democracy in their respective countries. Utilizing
the latest European Social Survey data, we investigated the perceived importance of living in a
democracy and citizens' satisfaction with democracy in their countries. Democracy support is
gauged through the query: "How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed
democratically?" with respondents selecting a numerical value between zero (not at all important)
and ten (extremely important). Satisfaction with democracy is measured through the question:
"And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?" on a scale
ranging from zero (extremely dissatisfied) to ten (extremely satisfied). Figure 1 illustrates the

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average support scores for EU member states based on the European Social Survey. The support
for democracy ranges from 9.4 in Finland to 8.0 in Czechia, while satisfaction with democracy
varies from 7.3 in Finland to 3.3 in Bulgaria.
Figure 1: Support for, and satisfaction with democracy (mean values)

Finland 9.4
7.3
Greece 9.1
5.0
Netherlands 8.8
6.1
Portugal 8.8
5.6
Ireland 8.7
6.2
Estonia 8.6
5.7
Italy 8.6 SUPPORT FOR
5.1
8.5 DEMOCRACY
France 5.2
Hungary 8.5
5.0
Belgium 8.4
5.5
Bulgaria 8.4
3.3
8.3 SATISFACTION
Croatia 4.2 WITH
Slovakia 8.3 DEMOCRACY
4.3
Slovenia 8.2
4.3
Lithuania 8.1
5.1
Czechia 8.0
5.7

Source: ESS 2022, Authors’ calculation

These findings suggest that while support for democracy displays minimal variation and remains
relatively high across all countries, satisfaction with democracy exhibits greater variability among
EU member states, with only a handful of nations reporting unequivocal citizen satisfaction with
the state of democracy. In addition to country-level results, we delved into individual-level
correlations between support for and satisfaction with democracy. The individual correlations
range from 0.38 (Finland) to -0.09 (Hungary). This reaffirms our conjecture that citizens formulate
their support for democracy more or less independently of their assessment of satisfaction with the
current state of democracy in their country.
As empirical data suggest, measuring pro-democratic attitudes through satisfaction and support for
democracy yield different results. TRUEDEM's research interest is diffuse support for a democratic
regime, and since the use of the word democracy in a measuring instrument can be misleading, we
are looking for a measuring instrument that does not explicitly mention it.

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To address the respondents' individual interpretations of the term "democracy" and whether such
subjective notions significantly vary among citizens, we provide a partial insight based on data
from the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted in 2022. The survey module on democracy
featured a question prompting respondents to select the characteristic feature of democracy they
deemed most important. Respondents could choose one characteristic from a predefined set of five,
each representing a distinct theoretical model of democracy. The options were as follows: a) that
national elections are free and fair (highlighting the procedural model of democracy); b) that the
courts treat everyone the same (emphasizing liberal democracy); c) that the government protects
all citizens against poverty (reflecting the egalitarian principle); d) that citizens have the final say
on the most important political issues through voting in referendums (indicative of direct
democracy); e) that the views of ordinary people prevail over those of the political elite (illustrating
the populist principle).
The analysis revealed that in nine out of 16 countries, the principle typical of the procedural
democratic model prevailed, albeit marginally so in Belgium and Ireland. Conversely, in the
remaining seven countries, citizens predominantly selected the egalitarian principle. Notably, the
populist principle appeared to be of lesser significance for citizens in the surveyed EU countries.
However, in four countries—Hungary, Greece, Ireland, and Czechia—the populist principle
assumed greater importance than either the liberal-democratic or egalitarian principles.
Figure 2: Popular choice of democratic model principles

Finland 60% 8% 13% 14% 6%

Netherlands 46% 17% 17% 12% 8%
Estonia 45% 13% 12% 22% 8%
Slovakia 32% 16% 17% 20% 15%
Slovenia 31% 18% 19% 18% 14%
Lithuania 30% 22% 18% 20% 10%
Belgium 29% 27% 20% 15% 9%
Ireland 29% 24% 13% 20% 14%
Czechia 29% 15% 23% 18% 16%
Hungary 26% 27% 12% 17% 19%
France 25% 26% 21% 19% 9%
Portugal 22% 33% 25% 12% 8%
Italy 22% 29% 20% 16% 12%
Bulgaria 19% 33% 15% 19% 14%
Croatia 16% 29% 29% 13% 13%
Greece 14% 41% 13% 19% 13%

procedural egalitarian liberal direct populist

Source: ESS 2022, Authors’ calculation

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An alternative approach to capturing popular attitudes towards democracy based on diffuse support
is rooted in the conceptualization of democracy as liberal democracy. Van der Brug et al. (2021)
argue that a valid operationalization of support for liberal democratic principles should encompass
the different dimensions of democracy, encompassing majority rule, constitutional protection of
basic rights, and the limitation of executive power. This measurement aligns with diffuse support
for a democratic regime and reflects the two pillars of liberal democracy: the electoral pillar based
on citizen representation and majority rule, and the constitutional pillar encompassing institutional
checks and balances to limit executive power and protect minorities.
Ferrin and Kriesi (2016) who measured support for democracy by liberal democratic values, used
a battery of questions. It included items asking about the importance of ‘equality before the law’,
‘checks of government by the courts’, ‘minority protection’, ‘freedom of the media’ and ‘freedom
of expression’. As opposite, illiberal democratic attitudes, that might be widespread also in
countries that fulfil the criteria of liberal democracies, manifest themselves by a rejection of the
legitimacy of institutions (e.g. constitutional courts) that impose constraints on the power of the
executive, and possibly limit the tyranny of majority (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018) and
rejection of minorities protection.
Figure 3: Support for democracy and support for principles of liberal democracy

SE 9.0
9.4
AT 8.8
9.4
FI 8.9
9.4
DE 8.8
9.2
GR 8.7
9.1
CY 8.7
9.1
ES 9.0
9.0
PL 8.8
8.9
NL 8.8
8.8
PT 9.2
8.8
IE 8.5
8.7
IT 8.3
8.6
EE 8.8
8.6
FR 8.5
8.5
HU 8.4
8.5
BG 8.8
8.4
BE 8.5
8.4
LV 8.2
8.3
SK 8.1
8.3
HR 8.7
8.3
SI 8.9
8.2
LT 8.2
8.1
CZ 8.4
8.0
Support for liberal democracy (4 items) Support for democracy (single-item scale)

Source: ESS 2022, Authors’ calculation

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Nevertheless, employing such an approach for measurement is not devoid of complexities and
challenges. A critical question arises, particularly in relation to the analysis of data derived from
the scale gauging support for liberal principles of democracy. Table 3 presents the outcomes of the
comparison between support for democracy measured through a single item ("How important is it
for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?") and a composite index comprising
four principles of liberal democracy (rights of media to criticize government, courts treating
everyone equally, elections being free and fair; minority rights protection). The results indicate no
significant differences when employing these two distinct approaches. However, disparities emerge
when scrutinizing inferences, specifically the relationships between variables that elucidate the
reasons underlying attitudes towards democracy.
While the liberal model represents just one interpretation of democracy among several, it holds a
prominent position in contemporary democracies. Theoretical distinctions between democracy and
liberalism are possible, leading to influential concepts such as "delegative democracy" (O'Donnell,
1992) or "illiberal democracy" (Zakaria, 1997). However, classical democratic theorists argue that
liberal democracy is the sole type that adequately corresponds to and facilitates the realization of
the true essence of democracy (Dahl, 1989; Sartori, 1993; Merkel, 2004). Empirical investigations
corroborate the strong interdependence between the liberal and democratic components of
contemporary democracies (Møller, 2007). Therefore, when assessing and measuring democracy,
it is imperative to consider it precisely in the context of its liberal model.
2.2 Social media and democratic attitudes
Arguments for democratizing potential of social media are bolstered by new features specific to
such platforms, especially compare to regular media. Notably, their capacity to promote horizontal
communication, collaboration, and diverse opinions, allowing easy connections and independent
opinion formation outside established institutions, stands out (Dahlgren, 2013). Social media bring
forth additional information sources, contributing to a better-informed public (Price, 2013). They
increase exposure to politically relevant information, diversify sources and viewpoints, and enable
dialogue and democratic participation as alternatives to traditional forms (Boulianne, 2015). This
was exemplified by the early events of the Arab Spring, demonstrating their impact on interest
articulation outside conventional democratic channels (Lutz & Toit, 2014).
Scholars also anticipated social networks fostering relationships between citizens and their
representatives, potentially boosting political trust. Deseriis (2021) notes that by lowering
participation costs and facilitating cooperation, these platforms modernize representation along
different dimensions: monitoring constituents' opinions (responsiveness), enhancing transparency
(accountability), and encouraging collaboration on political initiatives (collaboration). Some even
propose that social media can establish direct relationships between politicians and citizens,
characterized by interactive communication and mutual learning (Graham et al., 2013; Coleman,
2017).
Empirical investigations into the nexus between social media and satisfaction with democracy yield
equivocal findings. Ceron and Memoli (2016) emphasize that the utilization of the Internet itself
exerts no discernible impact on satisfaction with democracy. However, a negative effect manifests
when users engage with news disseminated through social media channels. This correlation is
mediated by the prevalence of online discord and conflicts. Similar effect on satisfaction with
democracy is present also in Fan and Zhang's (2022) study, wherein occasional social media use
and a skeptical disposition towards these platforms are inversely associated with the probability of
satisfaction with democracy.

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In a distinctive contribution, Placek (2024) incorporates considerations of democratic regime

characteristics, introducing a nuanced perspective for prospective research endeavours. Placek's
examination of Central East European democracies reveals that the relationship between social
media use and satisfaction with democracy is contingent upon the robustness of a country's
democratic framework. Notably, higher social media use is correlated with increased satisfaction
when the democratic regime is more resilient. Conversely, as democratic backsliding occurs, social
media use is associated with diminished satisfaction with democracy.
This collective body of research underscores a recurrent theme: the intrinsic relationship between
social media use and satisfaction with democracy lacks clear indicative value, with mediating
factors assuming an important role in shaping outcomes. The role of social media in altering
political attitudes thus remains unclear. Could social media as technological infrastructure
influence individuals’ attitudes?
In theoretical discourse, democratic attitudes, particularly those pertaining to diffuse support, are
posited to have deep-seated roots in childhood socialization (Easton, 1965; Jennings and Niemi,
1968) or even genetic predispositions (Smith et al., 2012; Hatemi et al., 2011). Parents, functioning
as agents of socialization, transmit specific values to their children, including those conducive to
supporting democracy.
Scholars have also highlighted the potential for altering or shaping political attitudes through the
acquisition of experiences, whether firsthand (Banducci and Karp, 2003; Mattes and Bratton, 2007)
or mediated experiences (Lelkes, 2016; Newton, 2016). Direct or firsthand experiences may stem
from active participation in political processes, such as engaging in elections, participating in
deliberative activities, or directly observing government performance. This approach is grounded
in the principle of learning by doing, positing that political participation or civic engagement can
empower citizens, contributing to the perception of regime efficacy, and fostering an appreciation
for democratic principles, such as political accountability and consensus building.
Indirect or mediated experiences occur through intermediaries, such as following political
developments in the media. In this context, individuals learn not only about specific cases or
politicians but also gain insights into democratic practices and procedures.
We start from the assumption that our independent variable—social media—represents an
infrastructure that facilitates the shaping of political attitudes through both channels. Firstly,
individuals utilize social media to consume political news, and secondly, social media platforms
provide a space for online political participation. Consequently, we posit that the influence of social
media on the formation of political attitudes should be evident. However, given the diverse content
in social media and varied consumer practices, the question of how social media precisely shape
political attitudes remains a pertinent and open inquiry which we aim to explore in the project.
2.3 Measuring the effects
The European Social Survey serves as a valuable resource for conducting cross-national analyses
to explore the impact of various factors on democratic attitudes. This comparative dataset
incorporates inquiries on support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, as well as news
exposure for offline media, and both online and offline political participation. Therefore, we
examined the relations between these selected variables for the TRUEDEM project countries.
News exposure was gauged through the following query: "On a typical day, about how much time
do you spend watching, reading, or listening to news about politics and current affairs?"

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Respondents were prompted to input their responses in minutes. The dataset was refined by
excluding data with durations exceeding eight hours per day, and the variable was subsequently
recoded to measure time in hours for enhanced interpretability.
Offline political participation was assessed using the subsequent question: "During the last 12
months, have you done any of the following? 1) ... contacted a politician, government, or local
government official? 2) ... donated to or participated in a political party or pressure group? 3) ...
worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker? 4) ... signed a petition? 5) ... taken part in a public
demonstration?"
Online participation was measured by a single item that inquired: "... thinking about different ways
of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong, during the last
12 months, have you ... posted or shared anything about politics online, for example on blogs, via
email, or on social media such as Facebook or Twitter?"
Initially, we examine variations across countries in the levels of political participation and news
exposure. Figure 4 illustrates the proportions of individuals engaged in specific political activities.
Overall, Austrian citizens exhibit the highest level of offline political participation, particularly in
activities involving direct interaction with politicians or political parties. Signing a petition emerges
as the most prevalent form of offline participation across all countries. Notably, Poland
demonstrates the highest percentage of citizens who have worn or displayed a badge or sticker, as
well as the highest participation rate in public demonstrations.
Figure 4: Offline political participation rates

Source: ESS 2022, Authors’ calculation

When it comes to online participation, Austrian citizens appear to be the most active, just as they
are in the realm of offline activities. Almost a quarter of them have shared or posted something
about politics online. Similarly, in line with offline participation activities, Polish citizens seem to
be more active than their counterparts from other post-communist countries, although the
differences are not very large.

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Figure 5: Offline political participation rates (average across different types in %)

14 20 19 19 16 17 14 14
24

86 80 81 81 84 83 86 86
76

AT CZ DE FR GR IT PL SI SK
no yes

Source: ESS 2022, Authors’ calculation

News exposure (in relation to politics and current affairs) is rather similar in the countries under
study. In seven out of nine countries the median time people spend watching, listening or reading
news is one hour, and it is less only in Slovenia (median 0.5 hours) and Czechia (0.75). Mean time
of news exposure runs from 0.89 (Slovenia) to 2.71 (Italy). Since the median time is almost the
same in all countries, the mean time is most likely affected by few extreme cases.
Table 2: News exposure in hours, mean and median.
News exposure in hours Mean Median
AT 1.14 1
DE 1.26 1
FR 1.36 1
SI 0.89 0.5
SK 1.32 1
CZ 1.10 0.75
IT 2.71 1
PL 1.63 1
GR 1.72 1
Source: ESS 2022, Authors’ calculation
To assess the impact of news exposure and political participation on democratic attitudes, we
developed several regression models. Initially, three models were compared, each based on
different measurements of democratic attitudes as dependent variables: 1) support for democracy
as a single-item question; 2) satisfaction with democracy measured as a single-item question; and
3) a composite index reflecting support for liberal democratic principles (rights of media to criticize
government, courts treating everyone equally, elections being free and fair; minority rights
protection). In addition to news exposure and political participation (both online and offline), key

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control variables such as political interest and self-placement on the left-right political scale were
included. Standard demographic variables including age, education, gender, size of establishment,
household income, and country of origin were also incorporated into the regression analysis (details
not presented).
The results of the regression analyses indicate that both news exposure and political participation
exert an impact on democratic attitudes. However, news exposure demonstrates a statistically
significant effect solely on support for democracy (diffuse regime support), without influencing
satisfaction with democracy.
Both online and offline participation exhibit significant influence on democratic attitudes, albeit in
opposing directions. Offline political participation adversely affects democratic support among
citizens, while concurrently positively influencing satisfaction with democracy. Consequently,
offline political participation appears to narrow the gap between traditionally higher support for
democracy and lower satisfaction with democracy. Opposite to it, online political participation
positively correlates with democratic support but simultaneously diminishes satisfaction with
democracy. In essence, the effect of online political participation manifests as higher support for
the democratic regime among participants, coupled with lower satisfaction with the way democracy
operates, compared to individuals not engaged in online participation.
Table 3: Regression coefficients
Support for Satisfaction with Support for liberal
democracy democracy democratic principles
Online participation 0.096** -0.601*** 0.149***
Offline participation -0.078*** 0.129*** -0.101***
News exposure -0.019** 0.012 -0.025***
Political interest -0.296*** -0.344*** -0.240***
Left-right self-placement -0.012* 0.058*** -0.052***

N 17275.000 17249.000 17018.000

r2 0.123 0.108 0.136
Note: *** - p-value < 0.001
** - p-value < 0.01
* - p-value < 0.05
Source: ESS 2022, Authors’ calculation

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the effects of both types of participation, as well as news exposure,
are stronger (whether positively or negatively) when considering support for liberal democracy, as
opposed to using a more general, single-item scale to measure support for democracy. Despite
relatively minor differences in effect sizes, one may conclude that the choice of measure for support
for democracy does not significantly alter the observed outcomes.

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However, if we regress the same predictors on the individual four principles (‘equality before the
law’, ‘minority protection’, ‘freedom of the media’, ‘free and fair elections’), we discover distinct
effects that participation and news exposure have. As presented in Table 4, online participation
exhibits the most pronounced impact on the perception of the importance of media rights, with no
significant effect on the perception of the importance of minority rights. Conversely, offline
participation exerts its strongest effect on the perception of the importance of minority rights
protection but in a negative direction. This implies that increased offline participation is associated
with a diminished consideration of the importance of protecting minority rights.
News exposure is negatively linked to the perception of the importance of three principles: media
rights, free and fair elections, and courts treating everybody the same. However, in the assessment
of the importance of minority rights protection, it appears that news exposure has a negligible, or
at least insignificant, impact.
Table 4: Regression coefficients
Principle: media Principle:
Principle: national Principle: rights of
are free to courts treat
elections are free minority groups
criticise the everyone
and fair are protected
government the same
Online
0.276*** 0.116*** 0.048 0.128***
participation
Offline
-0.111*** -0.098*** -0.121*** -0.076***
participation
News exposure -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.009 -0.023***
Political interest -0.287*** -0.281*** -0.241*** -0.163***
Left-right self-
-0.055*** -0.017** -0.121*** -0.017***
placement

N 17 236 17 235 17 198 17 262

r2 0.100 0.100 0.095 0.089
Note: *** - p-value < 0.001
** - p-value < 0.01
* - p-value < 0.05
Source: ESS 2022, Authors’ calculation

In general, the effects of participation and news exposure exhibit significant variations based on
the specific liberal democratic principles under consideration. Consequently, we contend that a
nuanced understanding of real-world relationships necessitates not only measuring but also
analysing support for democracy in a detailed manner, distinguishing the specific principles that
citizens endorse or reject.

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3 Political trustworthiness and social media

In the introduction to this report, we have already addressed the relationship between political trust
and social media. Existing literature indicates a decrease in trust in political institutions among
individuals who use social media. However, in this section we aim to explore how social media
can contribute to building trustworthiness. Given that various platforms may have different effects
on democracy, and political context (e.g., regime type) also plays a role, we assume that it is
necessary to examine the effects of specific platform. Additionally, it is crucial to focus on studying
the behaviour of individuals in social networks, going beyond the frequency of usage. We posit
that the positive effects of social networks, such as their impact on political knowledge and
participation, may create conditions for improving trust in political institutions. The acquired
information can contribute to making informed decisions about whom and when to trust.
Empowerment from political participation can influence the perception of the efficiency of the
political regime. The direct form of political communication facilitated by social networks, which
we want to investigate, provides actors with the space to form judgments about the competence,
integrity, and impartiality of political actors and institutions. Therefore, investigation of online
political participation seems like promising avenue to learn more about mechanisms influencing
political trust and trustworthiness.
There are two main theoretical approaches to the potential impact of online participation on
building the relations based on trust. One approach considers news consumption as a form of
passive political participation, while the other stems from studies of deliberation and deliberative
practices in policy-making.
Considering news consumption as a form of passive political participation, a few studies have
explored this area. Alongside news consumption, the choice of media also holds importance. A
comparative study across European countries revealed a link between media choice and political
trust. Specifically, individuals who read or watch news from social media platforms tend to have
lower political trust compared to those who rely on traditional news media (Ceron, 2015).
Similarly, Strömbäck and colleagues (2016) found that consuming traditional news media is
associated with higher levels of political trust. This relationship was observed even before social
media became a dominant information source for a significant portion of society.
However, in contrast to traditional offline media, using social networking sites as information
sources increases the likelihood of encountering 'antipolitical and antisystem information,' which
can have a negative impact on political trustworthiness. In more recent research, Klein and
Robinson (2020) established a strong relationship between social media use and political trust (as
a dependent variable). However, they also examined the content of the news along with
respondents’ ideologies and party preferences. Their findings revealed that the impact of news
media on political trust is influenced by an individual's political attitudes.
Shifting focus to online participation in deliberation, several arguments suggest why such
experiences could lead to higher levels of political trust (Halvorsen, 2003; Wright, 2019). Firstly,
through deliberation, citizens encounter the necessity for compromises and trade-offs to achieve a
democratic consensus. This suggests that participating in deliberation grants citizens a better
understanding of the complexity of policy-making processes and the need for compromise in
reaching consensus, possibly leading to increased trust in political institutions and leaders who
engage in this process. Participants might also learn more about public officials and identify with
them based on shared personal characteristics, potentially raising trustworthiness levels.

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Additionally, exposure to diverse viewpoints during deliberation might lead to a greater

appreciation of the complexity of policy issues, thereby increasing trust in political decisions.
Finally, the exchange of ideas and opinions might foster a sense of shared understanding and
mutual respect among participants. However, this assumption relies on the notion that participants
engage respectfully with others' opinions, promoting shared understanding and mutual respect
among them. This aspect might not always be present in online discussions on social networks.
Scholars have already proposed more nuanced or improved models for studying associations
between political trust and participation. Trustworthiness might interact with a person's sense of
political efficacy, a person's belief in their ability to influence political outcomes when investing
time and energy into online political participation. Although this interaction effect lacks
comprehensive empirical support, it represents an intriguing research question worth exploring, as
we aim to do within the future research in the TRUEDEM project.
4 Conclusion
This research framework paper delves into the role played by social media in shaping democratic
behaviour and attitudes, with a specific focus on laying the groundwork for the TRUEDEM work
package on social media and trustworthiness.
The scholarly discourse, thus far, lacks a definitive and universally agreed-upon answer regarding
the precise impact of social media on democracy. Various scholars have reported both beneficial
and detrimental effects of social media on democracy. The assessment of these effects is, to a
certain extent, context-dependent, contingent upon the specific social media platform and the
nature of the prevailing political regime. For instance, the assessment of the negative effect of
social media on political trust may vary when considered within the contexts of illiberal
democracies or authoritarian regimes as opposed to consolidated democracies. Such distinctions
lead to divergent conclusions, with social media potentially contributing to pro-democratic change
in the former and having a detrimental effect in the latter.
Also, it is important to acknowledge the complexity of evaluating these effects, given that both
democratic behaviour and attitudes are multidimensional variables sensitive to the validity of
measurement methodologies. The paper underlines the need to distinguish the support for
democracy and satisfaction with democracy as two conceptually, but also empirically distinct
phenomena. As argued above, the various levels of support and satisfaction indicate that they are
most likely shaped by different factors, or, in other words, that the same factors shape them in a
different way. We argue that when evaluating and measuring support for democracy, particularly
in the context of diffusive support, it is crucial to consider it within the framework of its liberal
model. The operationalization of this concept should reflect the dual pillars of liberal democracy:
the electoral pillar, grounded in citizen representation and majority rule, and the constitutional
pillar, encompassing institutional checks and balances to limit executive power and protect
minorities.
Yet, another question is what shapes such attitudes. The “filters” individuals use for reflection of
political reality and agency performance are various, however academic literature stress the role
played by information provided by media. The communication channels might trigger the processes
of informed decision-making and therefore influence the judgements on trustworthiness (Norris
2002). Social media recently have become an important part of online news distribution and
consumption (Newman et al., 2021), crucial tool for sharing political information (Bhagat and Kim,
2023) and serves as easily accessible platforms for political dialogue (interactions with agents,

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agencies and other users). From this perspective, social media offer amply opportunities for
studying new channels for transfer of citizen’s demands into the policymaking and also for
analysing modern tools for political communication and participation.
On one hand, online political participation is inherently low-cost. On the other hand, the
participation rate remains substantially lower than internet penetration or social network usage.
This prompts the question of whether there is a self-selection bias in online political participation—
whether factors such as interest in politics or a sense of political efficacy motivate individuals to
participate online. In alignment with existing literature highlighting the role of social networks as
platforms for expressing hate speech or spreading fake news (Shin et al., 2018; Sunstein, 2017;
Chetty and Alathur, 2018; Soroush et al., 2018; Fuchs, 2018), it is plausible that social networks
such as Facebook or X (formerly Twitter) attract individuals already dissatisfied with the state of
democracy in their country, providing an outlet to vent their discontent. Based on existing findings,
the plausible is also that political activities on social networks could increase the overall support
for democracy. In the TRUEDEM project, we aim to study political activities on social media,
distinguishing between “un-constructive” expressive participation (closer to clicktivism, such as
contributing with emojis to a discussion) and “constructive” expressive participation, which seeks
to achieve change (of opinion, attitude, or policy) through argumentation. Our assumption is that
constructive expressive activities on social media could be considered active political participation.
Our research aims to test if political empowerment facilitated by social media expressive
participation influences democratic attitudes.
The paper additionally delineated avenues for future research as the mixed evidence of social media
effect on democracy and especially political trust call for further investigation. Also, an
examination of social media dynamics through a focused analysis of specific types or platforms,
recognizing their differential impact is worth to explore. And last but not least, the literature
revision pointed on need to explore political participation on social media (extending beyond mere
usage frequency) as potential influence of individual´s judgements on political trust.
Drawing upon the contemporary academic discourse, we articulate the following research inquiries
for further empirical scrutiny:
• What are the patterns and modalities of social media utilization for political interactions,
involving both users and political actors?
• How do users perceive political activities conducted on social media platforms?
• In what ways can social media function as platforms for fostering or increase of
trustworthiness and pro-democratic attitudes?

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